Dialectics and Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts

[Zanthorus]

Continuing from here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/nature-lover-science-t144922/index.html?p=1927438#post1927438).



I'm afraid that Marx's notebooks on the calculus are not worth the paper they were written upon -- having been fatally compromised by his use of Hegelian concepts.

Hadn't he abandoned these by 1873?


I think so -- but others imagine they're the last word on the subject!

ZeroNowhere's point I think, which I think deserves to be discussed, and which I don't think the other thread should be derailed with, was that according to your interpretation of Marx, he had completely waved goodbye to the 'mystical bumbler' Hegel in the afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital (Which was written in 1873. Scarily enough it was the first thing that popped into my head when I saw that year). Yet now according to you, Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts are 'fatally compromised' by his use of Hegelian concepts. The year given by the MIA at least for the writing of the Manuscripts is 1881, which means you have some explaining to do.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I made the point that in published works he had done so, and that unpublished sources cannot take precedence.

If he continued to toy around with Hegel's useless ideas in private notebooks, and only in relation to mathematics, then so be it. But that does not affect the conclusion that 'the dialectic method' he used in Das Kapital contained no Hegel at all.

[Broletariat]

I made the point that in published works he had done so, and that unpublished sources cannot take precedence.

If he continued to toy around with Hegel's useless ideas in private notebooks, and only in relation to mathematics, then so be it. But that does not affect the conclusion that 'the dialectic method' he used in Das Kapital contained no Hegel at all.
Complete hypothetical:

Suppose it could be proved that Marx did use Hegel's dialectic.

This wouldn't really change anything as far as we're concerned right?

[S.Artesian]

Yes, he certainly hadn't abandoned his ideas on calculus by 1873, since the notebooks nominally carry an 1881 date.

But Rosa's answer is, of course, that Marx never published his mathematical manuscripts.

This is a bit like proclaiming one's a virgin because she or he hasn't published the record of his or her sexual intercourse.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have already made the point (in earlier threads on this topic) that if it could be shown that he did use 'the dialectic method' in Das Kapital -- in the way that the mystics here understand it --, then that would detract from Marx's stature -- but only in the sense that Newton's mystical works also detract (slightly) from his reputation.

[Zanthorus]

Suppose it could be proved that Marx did use Hegel's dialectic.

I think that would be practically impossible, since Marx himself continually confirms that his method is not only not the Hegelian method, but is in fact it's direct opposite. Of course, no-one here is arguing that Marx used Hegel's dialectic.

[Broletariat]

I have already made the point (in earlier threads on this topic) that if it could be shown that he did use 'the dialectic method' in Das Kapital -- in the way that the mystics here understand it --, then that would detract from Marx's stature -- but only in the sense that Newton's mystical works also detract (slightly) from his reputation.
Alright thanks that's kind of what I figured. I don't really keep up with all the threads so I was just curious.


I think that would be practically impossible, since Marx himself continually confirms that his method is not only not the Hegelian method, but is in fact it's direct opposite. Of course, no-one here is arguing that Marx used Hegel's dialectic.
Well I think Rosa got what I meant, she corrected me in her post as well.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA:


But Rosa's answer is, of course, that Marx never published his mathematical manuscripts.

I thought I was on your 'ignore list'?


This is a bit like proclaiming one's a virgin because she or he hasn't published the record of his or her sexual intercourse.

This is a lame analogy. One cannot recover one's virginity, but one can recover from a viral attack.:)

Fortunately, Marx managed to shake off the Hermetic Virus that still holds you in its grip.

[S.Artesian]

Rosa's on my ignore list. She should be on everyone's ignore since she has absolutely nothing to contribute of Marx's analysis and method of analysis of capital.

As for Broletariat's question:

It's a question of historical accuracy. If Marx "extirpated" Hegel, rather than as he himself said, extracted the rational kernel, so be it. If he didn't let's not try and get a university chair by claiming Marx did something he didn't.

Does it change anything about capitalism? No. Does it change anything about Marx's analysis of capitalism? No, because Marx's analysis through all 3 volumes clearly resonates with his materialist dialectic, with his extraction, demystification of Hegel's dialectic.

Does it change our interpretation of Marx's analysis? Yeah. Certainly. Makes us go back and actually look into the historical origin of capital, of its organization of social labor, which is precisely where Marx finds the "rational kernel" of Hegel's dialectic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


I think that would be practically impossible, since Marx himself continually confirms that his method is not only not the Hegelian method, but is in fact it's direct opposite. Of course, no-one here is arguing that Marx used Hegel's dialectic.

Again, as I have pointed out many times, one can't get more opposite to Hegel's 'method' than to extirpate it completley from one's (published) work.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA:


Rosa's on my ignore list. She should be on everyone's ignore since she has absolutely nothing to contribute of Marx's analysis and method of analysis of capital.

You mystics and boss-class lackey's just can't cope, can you?:lol:


It's a question of historical accuracy. If Marx "extirpated" Hegel, rather than as he himself said, extracted the rational kernel, so be it. If he didn't let's not try and get a university chair by claiming Marx did something he didn't.

Does it change anything about capitalism? No. Does it change anything about Marx's analysis of capitalism? No, because Marx's analysis through all 3 volumes clearly resonates with his materialist dialectic, with his extraction, demystification of Hegel's dialectic.

Does it change our interpretation of Marx's analysis? Yeah. Certainly. Makes us go back and actually look into the historical origin of capital, of its organization of social labor, which is precisely where Marx finds the "rational kernel" of Hegel's dialectic.

1) As I have shown, there is no 'rational kernel' to Hegel's 'method'.

2) Marx's only published summary of 'the dialectic method' has no Hegel whatsoever in it -- which indicates that he too thought there was no rational kernel to Hegel's 'method'.

This confirms my estimation that he was returning to the method found in Aristotle, the Scottish Historical School and Kant.

[Zanthorus]

Again, as I have pointed out many times, one can't get more opposite to Hegel's 'method' than to extirpate it completley from one's (published) work.

Of course, he didn't extirpate it from his work, as Hegelian language is used throughout the three volumes of Capital. Of course, the first volume is just 'coquetting', and the other two volumes weren't published. This latter point is only because he didn't have the time to finish them, indeed, he didn't have the time to finish anything because of his carbuncles. But of course, the important point is that he didn't publish anything which contradicts Rosa's analysis of his work, except he did, since Rosa's analysis of the passage is demonstrably wrong, but none the less...


Marx's only published summary of 'the dialectic method' has no Hegel whatsoever in it -- which indicates that he too thought there was no rational kernel to Hegel's 'method'.

The passage mentions the laws of economic life being more akin to those of biology than those of chemistry or physics, and talks about the 'social organism', which is at least partly reflective of Hegel's organicism. The passage also clearly implies the idea of studying each mode of production according to it's own immanent laws and tendencies, in the same way Hegel studied varing modes of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit according to their own standards, and showed the necessary development and collapse of each mode according to it's own internal standards (As opposed to Kant's supra-historical method of criticism). Finally, Marx says on the same bloody page that there is a rational kernel to Hegel's method which he is utilising.


This confirms my estimation that he was returning to the method found in Aristotle, the Scottish Historical School and Kant.

If Marx was returning to the ahistorical analysis of Kant or the figures of the Scottish enlightenment then we have more problems on our hands than just mystical Hegelian jargon.

[S.Artesian]

The English translation of vol1 that most of have, that Rosa probably relies upon, is not based on the the first edition of Capital, but on the 4th German edition.

If we look at a translation from that first German edition [the Marxist Internet Archive has one of Chapter 1, The Commodity, by Albert Dragstedt], Marx's language, analysis, and demonstration of the relative, equivalent, and value forms of the economy are clear examples of Marx's extraction of the rational kernel from Hegel's dialectic.

Marx in this first chapter is explaining the most critical facet of his investigation into capital [which is why it is the first chapter] and his materialist dialectic- the interpenetration of form and substance, of identity and opposition are clear.

He writes:


The expression of the value of linen in the coat impresses a new form upon the coat itself. After all, what is the meaning of the value-form of linen? Evidently that the coat is exchangeable for it. Whatever else may happen to it, in its mundane reality it possesses in its natural form [coat] now the form of immediate exchangeability with another commodity, the form of an exchangeable use-value. or Equivalent. The specification of the Equivalent contains not only the fact that a commodity is value at all, but the fact that it in its corporeal shape [I]counts as value for another commodity and consequently is immediately at hand as exchange-value for the other commodity..

Marx continues:

But commodities are objects. They have to be what they are in an object-like way or else reveal it in their own object-like relationships. In the production of linen, a particular quantum of human labour exists in having been expended. The linen's value is the merely objective reflection of the labour so expended, but it is not reflected in the body of the linen. It reveals itself by its [I]value relationship it to the coat. By the linen's equating the coat to itself as value-- while at the same time distinguishing itself from the coast as object of use-- what happens is that the coat becomes the form of appearance of line-value as opposed to linen-body: its value-form as distinguished from its natural form.

Now you can hem and haw all you want, twist and turn, and talk about coquetting all you want with forms of expression-- but there is no coquetting here with the relationship of value and use-value, their inter-determination, their transformation of one, and all, commodities into the other through equivalences.

"..what happens is that the coat becomes the form of appearance of linen-value as opposed to linen-body"

The emphasis is in the original, as supplied by Marx. You don't emphasize things you are flirting with.

Where does this get Marx? Where it always gets us-- back to the specific social organization of labor:


The use value coat only becomes the form of appearance of linen-value because linen relates itself to the material of the coat as to an immediate materialization of abstract human labour, and thus to labour which is of the same kind as that which is objectified within the linen itself. The object, coat, counts for it as a sensually palpable objectification of human labour of the same kind, and consequently as value in its natural form. Since it is, as value, of the same essence as the coat,the natural form coat thereby becomes the form of appearance of its own value. But the labour represented in the use-value, coat, is not simply human labour, but is rather a particular useful labour: tailoring.Simple human labour [expenditure of human labour-power] is capable of receiving each and every determination, it is true, but is undetermined just in and for itself. It can only realize and objectify itself as soon as human labor-power is expended in a determined form, as determined and specified labour; because it is only determined and specified labour which can be confronted by some natural entity-- an external material in which labour objectifies itself. It is only the 'concept' in Hegel's sense that manages to objectify itself without external material.

Here we have Marx's material extraction of the rational kernel from Hegel's dialectic. Human labor is capable of receiving every determination, and remaining human labor. But the labor can only realize itself as labour power embedded in the specific commodity. the labor can only realize itself as labour power, as an abstract quality-less expression when expressed in specific, determined material.

So the determination is two-fold-- as the concrete specific object of production, in all articles of production as value. It is the social determination, transforming labor into raw undifferentiated labor power, that contains the antagonism, the conflict, in Marx's word, the "contradiction" where labor power becomes opposite to and the negation of the power of labor.

[ZeroNowhere]

If he continued to toy around with Hegel's useless ideas in private notebooks,
They weren't private. He certainly shared them with Engels, for example.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Of course, he didn't extirpate it from his work, as Hegelian language is used throughout the three volumes of Capital. Of course, the first volume is just 'coquetting', and the other two volumes weren't published.

You have just answered your own objection: he was merely 'coquetting' with the useless jargon Hegel inflicted on humanity.


This latter point is only because he didn't have the time to finish them, indeed, he didn't have the time to finish anything because of his carbuncles. But of course, the important point is that he didn't publish anything which contradicts Rosa's analysis of his work, except he did, since Rosa's analysis of the passage is demonstrably wrong, but none the less...

In which case, perhaps you can tell us which works Marx published, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, support this latest flight of fancy of yours?


The passage mentions the laws of economic life being more akin to those of biology than those of chemistry or physics, and talks about the 'social organism', which is at least partly reflective of Hegel's organicism.

But, because that summary has had Hegel excised, it in fact reflects Aristotle's organicism, as I alleged.


The passage also clearly implies the idea of studying each mode of production according to it's own immanent laws and tendencies, in the same way Hegel studied varying modes of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit according to their own standards, and showed the necessary development and collapse of each mode according to it's own internal standards (As opposed to Kant's supra-historical method of criticism). Finally, Marx says on the same bloody page that there is a rational kernel to Hegel's method which he is utilising.

As I also noted, this is in fact a method Hegel derived from the Scottish Historical School, which he then proceeded to mystify.

And Hegel's method is also 'supra-historical'. What else is the development of 'Mind'?


Finally, Marx says on the same bloody page that there is a rational kernel to Hegel's method which he is utilising.

Which, as the summary underlines, is either empty, or is based on the method laid down by Aristotle, the Scottish School and Kant.

But, since their is no 'rational kernel' to Hegel's 'method', you do the math...


If Marx was returning to the ahistorical analysis of Kant or the figures of the Scottish enlightenment then we have more problems on our hands than just mystical Hegelian jargon.

So you say, but until you fill in the details, the 'rational kernel' of your response is also empty.:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA:


If we look at a translation from that first German edition [the Marxist Internet Archive has one of Chapter 1, The Commodity, by Albert Dragstedt], Marx's language, analysis, and demonstration of the relative, equivalent, and value forms of the economy are clear examples of Marx's extraction of the rational kernel from Hegel's dialectic.

1) What 'rational kernel'? According to the summary of 'the dialectic method' Marx published, there isn't one. And you certainly haven't been able to tell us what this alleged 'kernel' is.

2) Marx himself, not me, told us he was merely 'coquetting' with the few examples of Hegel's obscure jargon to be found in Das Kapital.

Still scratching around for a few supporting passages, SA produces this lame example:


form of appearance of linen-value

This sort of jargon can be found in ancient Greek theorists, and in practically all traditional philosophers since. It's not uniquely Hegelian.


Here we have Marx's material extraction of the rational kernel from Hegel's dialectic. Human labor is capable of receiving every determination, and remaining human labor. But the labor can only realize itself as labour power embedded in the specific commodity. the labor can only realize itself as labour power, as an abstract quality-less expression when expressed in specific, determined material.

So the determination is two-fold-- as the concrete specific object of production, in all articles of production as value. It is the social determination, transforming labor into raw undifferentiated labor power, that contains the antagonism, the conflict, in Marx's word, the "contradiction" where labor power becomes opposite to and the negation of the power of labor.

Again, all Aristotelian notions, mediated by the aforementioned 18th century theorists, whose work Hegel appropriated and then mystified.

And we already know that he was merely 'coquetting' with "contradiction".

So, your search goes on for a single passage, published by Marx contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your vain attempt to re-mystify his work.

Oh wait -- there aren't any...:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


They weren't private. He certainly shared them with Engels, for example.

1) How does that show they weren't private notebooks?

2) He certainly did not publish them.

[S.Artesian]

Marx did not "extirpate" his "Hegelianism" in vol 1 since he was not an Hegelian before vol 1 was published.

According to our prefacists, somewhere between the Grundrisse and Vol 1, Marx made a "complete break" with Hegel.

In the preface/afterward itself Marx tells us differently. He says he had criticized the mystifying side of Hegel's dialectic 30 years previously. That would be the time of his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. He doesn't say, "Oh somewhere in my recent economic studies I realized I had to extirpate my residual Hegelianism." He doesn't say he re-examined his critique of Hegel and extended, deepened, it.

And the prefacists completely miss the point of Marx's phrase about coquetting. As Graymouser has shown, the "forms of expression" that Marx coquetted with were the expression he used in the first German edition of volume 1 in the discussion of value.

If you actually read that first German edition, or a translation of that first German edition you see exactly what Marx is referring to- particularly in part III on the third, reversed or reciprocal second form of relative value, and near the end of part II when he actually uses "reflection-determination," a term taken directly from Hegel.

To do any of that means to read Marx, to look, as Marx did, at the history of the development of the subject-- rather than distort it according to your personal desires.

Marx's dialectic is embedded in his analysis of value. That's where the substance of any discussion should focus, not on the deliberate distortion of an afterward.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA:


Marx did not "extirpate" his "Hegelianism" in vol 1 since he was not an Hegelian before vol 1 was published.

Still ignoring me I see.:lol:

We can't believe a singe thing you boss-class lackeys, say, can we?

And where did I allege Marx was an Hegelian?

However, and alas for you mystics, Marx added a summary to the Postface to the second edition of volume one that contained not one atom of Hegel.

So, 'the dialectical method' Marx used has had Hegel excised.


According to our prefacists, somewhere between the Grundrisse and Vol 1, Marx made a "complete break" with Hegel.

Not according to what we say; according to what Marx himself published.


In the preface/afterward itself Marx tells us differently. He says he had criticized the mystifying side of Hegel's dialectic 30 years previously. That would be the time of his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. He doesn't say, "Oh somewhere in my recent economic studies I realized I had to extirpate my residual Hegelianism." He doesn't say he re-examined his critique of Hegel and extended, deepened, it.

And yet, the only summary we have of 'the dialectical method' that was published and endorsed by Marx in his entire lifetime contains no trace of Hegel at all -- upside down, or 'the right way up'.


And the prefacists completely miss the point of Marx's phrase about coquetting. As Graymouser has shown, the "forms of expression" that Marx coquetted with were the expression he used in the first German edition of volume 1 in the discussion of value.

If you actually read that first German edition, or a translation of that first German edition you see exactly what Marx is referring to- particularly in part III on the third, reversed or reciprocal second form of relative value, and near the end of part II when he actually uses "reflection-determination," a term taken directly from Hegel.


GM certainly alleged this, but he did not succeed in showing it. If you think otherwise, then you need to show where my reply to GM goes wrong.

But you don't and neither did GM.


To do any of that means to read Marx, to look, as Marx did, at the history of the development of the subject-- rather than distort it according to your personal desires.

Marx's dialectic is embedded in his analysis of value. That's where the substance of any discussion should focus, not on the deliberate distortion of an afterward.

Sure Marx's dialectic is embedded in Das Kapital, but as that summary shows, his 'dialectic method' has had Hegel completely extirpated from it.

However, if you can find a single passage, published by Marx contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your vain attempt to re-mystify his work, I will recant and apologise profusely.

Oh wait -- you can't... :lol:

[Zanthorus]

You have just answered your own objection: he was merely 'coquetting' with the useless jargon Hegel inflicted on humanity.

He does claim that he was 'coquetting' with the 'mode of expression' which is peculiar to Hegel, however he qualifies this claim by stating that he coquetted with Hegel's mode of expression in the chapter on the theory of value, which would be chapter one. Unfortunately, concepts lifted from Hegelian philosophy appear elsewhere throughout the first volume of Capital, and although the first chapter was revised for subsequent editions and much of the more obscure jargon edited out, but the chapter still retains the Hegelian concepts. Which would tend to indicate that what Marx was referring to when he talked about coquetting was different from what you interpret him as meaning.


In which case, perhaps you can tell us which works Marx published, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, support this latest flight of fancy of yours?

Can you tell me any works which he published contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital? Apart from a few speeches and works on the internal politics of the IWMA, as well as the Critique of the Gotha Program (Which was originally a private letter until Engels had it published in the course of his disputes with the SDP leadership), there isn't much. He became seriously ill after 1872. So of course there are no works contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital that don't support your interpretation, there aren't any works to begin with.


But, because that summary has had Hegel excised, it in fact reflects Aristotle's organicism, as I alleged.

Except Marx himself refers to it as the dialectical method and talks about extracting the rational kernel from the mystical shell. If he was talking about Aristotle, he would've talked about Aristotle. He had certainly studied Aristotle, there are references to the latters work within volume one itself. If Marx wanted to abandoned Hegel to become and Aristotlean, he would've been capable of realising it and expressing himself as an Aristotlean. That he does not do this suggests that there was something in Hegel which Marx didn't find in Aristotle.


As I also noted, this is in fact a method Hegel derived from the Scottish Historical School, which he then proceeded to mystify.

Marx was also amply familiar with the figures of the Scottish enlightenment. As above, why did he not recognise that the 'rational kernel' of Hegel's method was the method of the scottish enlightenment. Why go to all the trouble of defending Hegel against the epigones of Feuerbach if what he got from Hegel was already present in the ideas of Adam Smith or Adam Ferguson?


And Hegel's method is also 'supra-historical'. What else is the development of 'Mind'?

In the way in which Hegel concieves it, it is a historical process.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


He does claim that he was 'coquetting' with the 'mode of expression' which is peculiar to Hegel, however he qualifies this claim by stating that he coquetted with Hegel's mode of expression in the chapter on the theory of value, which would be chapter one. Unfortunately, concepts lifted from Hegelian philosophy appear elsewhere throughout the first volume of Capital, and although the first chapter was revised for subsequent editions and much of the more obscure jargon edited out, but the chapter still retains the Hegelian concepts. Which would tend to indicate that what Marx was referring to when he talked about coquetting was different from what you interpret him as meaning.

We have been over this so many times!

In fact, he said this:


...and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm

The commas indicate that he mentioned the chapter on value as an example of his use of Hegelian jargon, but it's not the only one.

Or are you suggesting the he does not use Hegelian jargon elsewhere -- that he does not use "contradiction", "negation", "quantity and quality", etc, in other chapters?

If he did -- and who can doubt it? -- then he was 'coquetting' throughout the book -- "here and there" as he tells us.


Can you tell me any works which he published contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital? Apart from a few speeches and works on the internal politics of the IWMA, as well as the Critique of the Gotha Program (Which was originally a private letter until Engels had it published in the course of his disputes with the SDP leadership), there isn't much. He became seriously ill after 1872. So of course there are no works contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital that don't support your interpretation, there aren't any works to begin with.

I agree, there are none, that is why I keep adding this comment:


Oh wait, there isn't one.

In other words, you have no published evidence to support your attempt to re-mystify his work.


Except Marx himself refers to it as the dialectical method and talks about extracting the rational kernel from the mystical shell. If he was talking about Aristotle, he would've talked about Aristotle. He had certainly studied Aristotle, there are references to the latter's work within volume one itself. If Marx wanted to abandoned Hegel to become and Aristotelian, he would've been capable of realising it and expressing himself as an Aristotelian. That he does not do this suggests that there was something in Hegel which Marx didn't find in Aristotle.

Where did I say he said he was talking about Aristotle? That is my conjecture, and it is based on the fact that:

1) There is no 'rational kernel' to Hegel's 'method', and Marx's own summary of 'the dialectic method' contains no Hegel at all.

2) Hegel derived his organicism (and much else besides) from Aristotle.


Marx was also amply familiar with the figures of the Scottish enlightenment. As above, why did he not recognise that the 'rational kernel' of Hegel's method was the method of the scottish enlightenment? Why go to all the trouble of defending Hegel against the epigones of Feuerbach if what he got from Hegel was already present in the ideas of Adam Smith or Adam Ferguson?

I have already pointed out to you that Marx's 'defence' (if such it may be called) was put in the past tense:


I criticised the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago, at a time when is was still the fashion. But just when I was working on the first volume of Capital, the ill-humoured, arrogant and mediocre epigones who now talk large in educated German circles began to take pleasure in treating Hegel in the same way as the good Moses Mendelssohn treated Spinoza in Lessing's time, namely as a 'dead dog'. I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him.

Bold added.

Moreover, Hegel derived his ideas not only from Aristotle, but from Kant and the Scottish School. So, if there is a 'rational kernel' anywhere, it lies in their work.

And how do we know that Marx preferred the latter to Hegel's obscure 'method'? Simple: he added a summary of 'the dialectical method' that contained not one atom of Hegel.

That is the only summary of 'the dialectical method' Marx published in his lifetime.

Of course, if you know of another, published by Marx contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, then don't be shy. Let's see it.

Oh wait...etc., etc.


In the way in which Hegel conceives it, it is a historical process.

Only because he was in the grip of some rather peculiar, mystical ideas about 'history' -- to such an extent that it is clear he did not mean by "history" what you or I might mean by it.

[ZeroNowhere]

It seems like all threads in this forum return to a common point, even if it involves completely ignoring the original one.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

And what 'point' might that be?