Red Eagles
21st November 2010, 13:22
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=333927
A coming war with Israel? - Sufian Abu Zaydeh
Published Wednesday 17/11/2010 (updated) 20/11/2010 16:28
http://www.revleft.com/vb/images/ViewDetails/Eng-1.jpg http://www.revleft.com/vb/images/ViewDetails/Eng+1.jpg
Listening to the statements of Israeli military and government officials, the conclusion that war is imminent is difficult to escape.
With Israel's military commander and chief Gabi Ashkenazi turning out statements about "the enemy," and hints about a surprise attack, the specter of a war without a preceding provocation - even of the rhetorical sense - looms.
Assessing the threat and the ultimate target of the war mongering remains difficult, with Israel pointing at enemies in the north and the south. Cells in Egypt, possible militants infiltrating into Gaza, danger in the Sinai; southern Israel remains on alert.
In the north, Ashkenazi says an inevitable war awaits with Iran, Israel's arch-enemy, and closer to the border is Hezbollah, and Syria.
And as military maneuvers with the troops prepare soldiers to face the mistakes made during the assaults on Gaza and southern Lebanon, preparations also continue on the home front. Local Israeli authorities get training on what to do when the rockets fly, with bomb shelters and body bags for every locale.
Through all the preparations, Israeli officials maintain the grip of fear over the population; the threat of constant danger and the idea that things could be worse is always at play.
The worst case today would be Gaza, since a war on Gaza would leave the north unprotected, opening Israel to the rockets of Hezbollah and even Iran. A war on any front would mean rockets flying at Israel from all directions, and Israeli preparations have been all encompassing, not giving much of a hint as to where forces may strike.
Listening to the statements of Israeli military and government officials, it is unclear whether the war will be in the coming days, or weeks, or months. Some of the leaders have unknown objectives, and while the possibility of an external strike could light the war match, internal machinations could just as likely come into play.
Each factor, it seems, has three elements which could come into play.
An external attack on Israel.
A resistance operation or an attack orchestrated by factions in Gaza, or in the northern Egyptian Sinai seems the most evident source of threat, and could precipitate and Israeli attack.
Despite Israeli estimates over the quiet in the region, others do not sleep for fear of another soldier capture, as factions try to increase the pressure on Israel to exchange Gilad Shalit for hundreds of Palestinians in Israeli prisons. Such a move would be seen as a moral victory for the resistance, and would lead to a rapid execution of plans Israel says are already in place.
Even a single rocket from Gaza, one that causes injuries or civilian casualties, could be the trigger for an Israeli war.
On the Lebanese and Syrian borders the stakes appear higher, but current tensions in Beirut around investigations into the assassination of former President Rafiq Al-Hariri in 2005 could see the country's order crumble, granting a wish for Israel.
If the situation destabilized, if Hezbollah reasserted a large measure of control over Lebanon, it would give cover to Israel for an attack.
But by all accounts, Gaza would not remain quiet during an attack on Hezbollah. The Israeli estimation seems to be that Hamas would lose control of the situation in Gaza, perhaps opening a second front after anger erupts into rockets.
Failure of the political process
If the political process is resumes, any military operations on Gaza or against Hezbollah would be temporarily shelved, since Israel cannot risk accusations of sabotaging US efforts.
If talks fail, if Netanyahu finds a way out of the process, chances of a military operation increase, leaving Israel open to assessing its threats and responding with force.
Even less clear factors in the assessment of imminent war must be taken into account, however, as personalities within the Israeli leadership continue to bump shoulders as Netanyahu sees through the political angle.
Gaza legacy
It is known, that before and during the war on Gaza, and even after, controversy flew over the actual aims of the operation.
Ashkanazi and Defense Minister Ehud Barak both called it a deterrant, the dealing of a painful blow to stop the flow of rockets into Israel. Yoav Galan, the former chief of the Southern Command Unit who headed the Operation Cast Lead, maintained that the operation was meant to topple Hamas.
While Galan was not able to convince either, he gained the support of then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Both wanted to take advantage of the Palestinian division and rout Hamas to preserve Israeli interests.
Starting in 2011, Galan will take charge of the Israeli military. His opinion on Gaza and what to do about Hamas has not changed.
Barak himself, after his party failed to win in the last Israeli elections, and unable to force issues in the current coalition government, faces severe political backlash and a loss of confidence as a party leader. There is even doubt about the survival of the Labor Party, and thus the survival of Barak as defense minister.
All the polls indicate that Barak’s political and factional strengths have been smashed. The justification remaining for him to stay on in the post is his military training and expertise.
Barak's own political crisis may lead him to accept a military operation in the hopes that it would rescue his career.
As for Netanyahu, he cannot continue his political maneuvers forever.
His choices are limited; the first option is progress on the political process, either through changes to the current coalition government or through bold unilateral steps.
There, former Israeli Prime Minister Arel Sharon broke some major ground. Few expected his unilateral pullout from Gaza in 2005.
It is not a strong option for Netanyahu though, and there are few indications that he would make such a move in the near future. His strongest option remains the political process, which, if it fails, will leave him to face the "security files" of Gaza, Lebanon and perhaps Iran, left to be solved.
Sufian Abu Zaydeh is a former Fatah cabinet minister who lives and works in the northern Gaza Strip
A coming war with Israel? - Sufian Abu Zaydeh
Published Wednesday 17/11/2010 (updated) 20/11/2010 16:28
http://www.revleft.com/vb/images/ViewDetails/Eng-1.jpg http://www.revleft.com/vb/images/ViewDetails/Eng+1.jpg
Listening to the statements of Israeli military and government officials, the conclusion that war is imminent is difficult to escape.
With Israel's military commander and chief Gabi Ashkenazi turning out statements about "the enemy," and hints about a surprise attack, the specter of a war without a preceding provocation - even of the rhetorical sense - looms.
Assessing the threat and the ultimate target of the war mongering remains difficult, with Israel pointing at enemies in the north and the south. Cells in Egypt, possible militants infiltrating into Gaza, danger in the Sinai; southern Israel remains on alert.
In the north, Ashkenazi says an inevitable war awaits with Iran, Israel's arch-enemy, and closer to the border is Hezbollah, and Syria.
And as military maneuvers with the troops prepare soldiers to face the mistakes made during the assaults on Gaza and southern Lebanon, preparations also continue on the home front. Local Israeli authorities get training on what to do when the rockets fly, with bomb shelters and body bags for every locale.
Through all the preparations, Israeli officials maintain the grip of fear over the population; the threat of constant danger and the idea that things could be worse is always at play.
The worst case today would be Gaza, since a war on Gaza would leave the north unprotected, opening Israel to the rockets of Hezbollah and even Iran. A war on any front would mean rockets flying at Israel from all directions, and Israeli preparations have been all encompassing, not giving much of a hint as to where forces may strike.
Listening to the statements of Israeli military and government officials, it is unclear whether the war will be in the coming days, or weeks, or months. Some of the leaders have unknown objectives, and while the possibility of an external strike could light the war match, internal machinations could just as likely come into play.
Each factor, it seems, has three elements which could come into play.
An external attack on Israel.
A resistance operation or an attack orchestrated by factions in Gaza, or in the northern Egyptian Sinai seems the most evident source of threat, and could precipitate and Israeli attack.
Despite Israeli estimates over the quiet in the region, others do not sleep for fear of another soldier capture, as factions try to increase the pressure on Israel to exchange Gilad Shalit for hundreds of Palestinians in Israeli prisons. Such a move would be seen as a moral victory for the resistance, and would lead to a rapid execution of plans Israel says are already in place.
Even a single rocket from Gaza, one that causes injuries or civilian casualties, could be the trigger for an Israeli war.
On the Lebanese and Syrian borders the stakes appear higher, but current tensions in Beirut around investigations into the assassination of former President Rafiq Al-Hariri in 2005 could see the country's order crumble, granting a wish for Israel.
If the situation destabilized, if Hezbollah reasserted a large measure of control over Lebanon, it would give cover to Israel for an attack.
But by all accounts, Gaza would not remain quiet during an attack on Hezbollah. The Israeli estimation seems to be that Hamas would lose control of the situation in Gaza, perhaps opening a second front after anger erupts into rockets.
Failure of the political process
If the political process is resumes, any military operations on Gaza or against Hezbollah would be temporarily shelved, since Israel cannot risk accusations of sabotaging US efforts.
If talks fail, if Netanyahu finds a way out of the process, chances of a military operation increase, leaving Israel open to assessing its threats and responding with force.
Even less clear factors in the assessment of imminent war must be taken into account, however, as personalities within the Israeli leadership continue to bump shoulders as Netanyahu sees through the political angle.
Gaza legacy
It is known, that before and during the war on Gaza, and even after, controversy flew over the actual aims of the operation.
Ashkanazi and Defense Minister Ehud Barak both called it a deterrant, the dealing of a painful blow to stop the flow of rockets into Israel. Yoav Galan, the former chief of the Southern Command Unit who headed the Operation Cast Lead, maintained that the operation was meant to topple Hamas.
While Galan was not able to convince either, he gained the support of then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Both wanted to take advantage of the Palestinian division and rout Hamas to preserve Israeli interests.
Starting in 2011, Galan will take charge of the Israeli military. His opinion on Gaza and what to do about Hamas has not changed.
Barak himself, after his party failed to win in the last Israeli elections, and unable to force issues in the current coalition government, faces severe political backlash and a loss of confidence as a party leader. There is even doubt about the survival of the Labor Party, and thus the survival of Barak as defense minister.
All the polls indicate that Barak’s political and factional strengths have been smashed. The justification remaining for him to stay on in the post is his military training and expertise.
Barak's own political crisis may lead him to accept a military operation in the hopes that it would rescue his career.
As for Netanyahu, he cannot continue his political maneuvers forever.
His choices are limited; the first option is progress on the political process, either through changes to the current coalition government or through bold unilateral steps.
There, former Israeli Prime Minister Arel Sharon broke some major ground. Few expected his unilateral pullout from Gaza in 2005.
It is not a strong option for Netanyahu though, and there are few indications that he would make such a move in the near future. His strongest option remains the political process, which, if it fails, will leave him to face the "security files" of Gaza, Lebanon and perhaps Iran, left to be solved.
Sufian Abu Zaydeh is a former Fatah cabinet minister who lives and works in the northern Gaza Strip