Marxism and Existentialism

[Lee Van Cleef]

Do you feel the two naturally go together? Are they at odds? Neither? I would really like to know what other Revleft members think of the relationship between Marxism and existentialism.

I personally am greatly influenced by Sartre and his particular brand of existential humanism. Like Sartre himself, I see it as completely compatible and even complimentary to Marxism.

However, in looking around the MIA, I see not everyone agrees. What do you think?

[ChrisK]

Existentialism is the same as anyother philosophy; it is based on a distortion of ordinary language and, therefore, has no meaning. Existentialists typically (from what I've seen) misused terms such as "meaning," and I'm pretty sure it was Sarte who misused terms like "Being" and "Nothingness". Could be wrong on that one, I'm not expert on existentialism.

It has no place in Marxism, it would just be extra baggage.

[4 Leaf Clover]

I simply don't get Existentialism

[blake 3:17]

I really like some of Sartre's interviews and comments in Between Marxism and Existentialism. He was a very creative Left thinker.

I've found his strictly philosophical writing really hard to get anything out of. Of the phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty seems more pointed.

[Amphictyonis]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critique_of_Dialectical_Reason

[Milk Sheikh]

Existentialism is the same as anyother philosophy; it is based on a distortion of ordinary language and, therefore, has no meaning.

Could you explain this 'distortion of language' thing. I hear it often. What exactly does it mean?

[Lee Van Cleef]

Could you explain this 'distortion of language' thing. I hear it often. What exactly does it mean?
From my understanding, it means philosophers remove words from their every day, commonly accepted definition, and re-define them in abstract terms to help them formulate their abstract, philosophical ideas. Of course, since "distortion of language" is itself used as a philosophical term in this context, I could be wrong. :rolleyes:


Existentialism is the same as anyother philosophy; it is based on a distortion of ordinary language and, therefore, has no meaning. Existentialists typically (from what I've seen) misused terms such as "meaning," and I'm pretty sure it was Sarte who misused terms like "Being" and "Nothingness". Could be wrong on that one, I'm not expert on existentialism.

It has no place in Marxism, it would just be extra baggage.
So this is really a long-winded, round-about way of saying all philosophy is full of crap. Thank you, but I already knew that. My question was regarding your opinion of the ideas of existentialism and their compatibility with Marxist ideas; it had nothing to do with how some words were manipulated in order to best express such complex ideas when trying to put them on paper.

EDIT: In short, your post was completely off topic.


I simply don't get Existentialism
The best way to grasp an understanding of existentialism is, in my opinion, not through the philosophic essays, but through Sartre's fictional works.

[Milk Sheikh]

Doesn't existentialism lay great stress on subjective experiences - that life is essentially without meaning and an individual is free to 'create' meaning and purpose in his own unique way? How is it different from phenomenology?

[ZeroNowhere]

So this is really a long-winded, round-about way of saying all philosophy is full of crap. Thank you, but I already knew that. My question was regarding your opinion of the ideas of existentialism and their compatibility with Marxist ideas; it had nothing to do with how some words were manipulated in order to best express such complex ideas when trying to put them on paper.It strikes me that far from knowing that philosophy is full of crap, you appear to be in the same camp as the 'ideal language' philosophers.

[Lee Van Cleef]

Doesn't existentialism lay great stress on subjective experiences - that life is essentially without meaning and an individual is free to 'create' meaning and purpose in his own unique way? How is it different from phenomenology?
Sartre espoused that "existence comes before essence," meaning that although he did believe that people create their own meaning and purpose, the material conditions of your experiences shape your consciousness and thus limit the possible ways in which you can perceive your existence. This limitation of worldview, in turn, limits the meanings and purposes one can attach to themselves.


It strikes me that far from knowing that philosophy is full of crap, you appear to be in the same camp as the 'ideal language' philosophers.
Okay, I honestly don't care about which camp of linguistic philosophy I fall into. This thread is about opinions on the relationship between Marxism and existentialism. Could everyone please refrain from further derailment of the thread, or is that just too much to ask in the Philosophy forum?

[Meridian]

Okay, I honestly don't care about which camp of linguistic philosophy I fall into. This thread is about opinions on the relationship between Marxism and existentialism. Could everyone please refrain from further derailment of the thread, or is that just too much to ask in the Philosophy forum?
So, you don't want to discuss existentialism itself, or whether existentialism even can make sense, you merely want to discuss the relationship between Marxism and existentialism?

Okay, then. I think Marxism and existentialism are incompatible, because Marx recognized that philosophy is based on distortion of ordinary language.

[Lee Van Cleef]

So, you don't want to discuss existentialism itself, or whether existentialism even can make sense, you merely want to discuss the relationship between Marxism and existentialism?

Okay, then. I think Marxism and existentialism are incompatible, because Marx recognized that philosophy is based on distortion of ordinary language.
I started this thread for a discussion on existentialism. On the contrary, it seems some people here are less inclined to talk about existentialism and would prefer to launch into some rant about linguistics. Maybe I am just too much of a Philistine to understand your "ordinary language." :rolleyes:

[Jimmie Higgins]

Sartre espoused that "existence comes before essence," meaning that although he did believe that people create their own meaning and purpose, the material conditions of your experiences shape your consciousness and thus limit the possible ways in which you can perceive your existence. This limitation of worldview, in turn, limits the meanings and purposes one can attach to themselves.But Sartre was an existentialist on the left side of that movement who tried to meld his Marxism with his existentialism but he ended up rejecting Marx's ideas about class - so I think, it seems that the two ideas of viewing the world are in conflict. Most of the Marxist existentialists also ended up rejecting class, but I don't know enough about this subject to say if it was because of existentialist thought that they ended up rejecting class or because of the post-war situation and a general trend in radical politics away from working class struggle.

[Amphictyonis]

But Sartre was an existentialist on the left side of that movement who tried to meld his Marxism with his existentialism but he ended up rejecting Marx's ideas about class - so I think, it seems that the two ideas of viewing the world are in conflict. Most of the Marxist existentialists also ended up rejecting class, but I don't know enough about this subject to say if it was because of existentialist thought that they ended up rejecting class or because of the post-war situation and a general trend in radical politics away from working class struggle.

qF9t3NtUPhM
Sartre the anarchist? I agree his attempt to negate class was kinda strange. I think his entire point in writing 'Critique' was not to attack class but to morph the individualism of existentialism with the (possible) broader socialist mind frame. A sort of communist egoism is what he was striving for- somewhat like Emma Goldman. I know for a fact Camus was a big fan of Stirner which drew Camus towards anarchism early on. I think the late Sartre was taking the same path Camus took earlier, towards a sort of anarchism but wasn't willing to openly admit it.

[ZeroNowhere]

I started this thread for a discussion on existentialism. On the contrary, it seems some people here are less inclined to talk about existentialism and would prefer to launch into some rant about linguistics.
What they are saying, though, is that you may as well ask people about the relationship between Marxism and plackyplack. That's hardly derailment.

[Amphictyonis]

He also chipped away at economic determinism and his attack on the classical Marxist conception of class was rooted in this attack on determinism. His basic premise was we make our own choices so we are giving our 'stamp of approval' to "class society". In reality, he thought, the proletariat are not under the control of the bourgeoisie and therefore class was only an illusion because we are free at anytime to sweep aside that paradigm.

Class was what he saw as.... chains of our own making.

[Meridian]

I started this thread for a discussion on existentialism. On the contrary, it seems some people here are less inclined to talk about existentialism and would prefer to launch into some rant about linguistics. Maybe I am just too much of a Philistine to understand your "ordinary language." :rolleyes:

It is not a "rant about linguistics". Tell that to Marx, when he said:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.
A return to ordinary language dissolves philosophical confusion caused by distorting ordinary language in the first place. Also, putting quotation marks on the term "ordinary language", as if it means something elusive, is ridiculous.

You may call showing how existentialism is nonsensical "irrelevant", and simply a "rant about linguistics", but then you are sticking your head in the sand. 'Existentialism' is the result of the use of words of philosophers; if it is a completely nonsensical use of words, then existentialism is bullshit. :rolleyes:

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

Okay, first of all: I didn't know Sartre well, but I had opportunities to interact with him, as did most lefties in France in the 'sixties. The guy was fantastic. Politically he put his butt on the line the way most of us would only dream of. Anyone hear of the "Affaire des valises?" When he was getting old, in the 'seventies, he went around selling copies of banned radical newspapers on the street, knowing the Govt. wouldn't dare touch him.

As to his theories: read his Search for a Method, which is the Introduction to the Critique of Dialectical Reason, in which he sets out the argument that the "Marxist Horizon" is, so far, all-encompassing, and that even Existentialism only exists within Marxism. Some have accused him of being a "Kantian," because he suggests that Marxism itself is historically (and therefore, I suppose they infer, subjectively) subjective. Whatever: I think Marx might have agreed. Great thinker, and a true comrade.

[Milk Sheikh]

Okay, first of all: I didn't know Sartre well, but I had opportunities to interact with him, as did most lefties in France in the 'sixties. The guy was fantastic. Politically he put his butt on the line the way most of us would only dream of. Anyone hear of the "Affaire des valises?" When he was getting old, in the 'seventies, he went around selling copies of banned radical newspapers on the street, knowing the Govt. wouldn't dare touch him.

As to his theories: read his Search for a Method, which is the Introduction to the Critique of Dialectical Reason, in which he sets out the argument that the "Marxist Horizon" is, so far, all-encompassing, and that even Existentialism only exists within Marxism. Some have accused him of being a "Kantian," because he suggests that Marxism itself is historically (and therefore, I suppose they infer, subjectively) subjective. Whatever: I think Marx might have agreed. Great thinker, and a true comrade.

That's amazing. Could you tell us more about him - what was he like and all that? I mean, your personal experience so we can get a better idea of the man as he really was (rather than what books say).

[Lee Van Cleef]

But Sartre was an existentialist on the left side of that movement who tried to meld his Marxism with his existentialism but he ended up rejecting Marx's ideas about class - so I think, it seems that the two ideas of viewing the world are in conflict.

Class was what he saw as.... chains of our own making.
An interesting point of view. While I would agree that class is (obviously) a social construct created by humans, and that the working class does have the power to overcome class, that certainly does not mean they are "chains of our own making," or that class struggle is not real.

Thank you for the informative video clip. I will have to watch the other parts of that later.


You may call showing how existentialism is nonsensical "irrelevant", and simply a "rant about linguistics", but then you are sticking your head in the sand. 'Existentialism' is the result of the use of words of philosophers; if it is a completely nonsensical use of words, then existentialism is bullshit. :rolleyes:
I do now see the point you were trying to make about the words being nonsensical, but as someone who is no lover of philosophy and sees the majority of the text in this subforum as nonsensical, I indeed sought to bury my head in the sand, and avoid a long, nonsensical debate on the nonsensical nature of nonsense. Alas, I was naive.


As to his theories: read his Search for a Method, which is the Introduction to the Critique of Dialectical Reason, in which he sets out the argument that the "Marxist Horizon" is, so far, all-encompassing, and that even Existentialism only exists within Marxism.
Yes, this is what I always got from him as well. It is also very interesting to know that you knew him personally. Even if there might arguably be some contradictions or holes in his ideas, I think it's safe to say that he was a dedicated radical.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

The best word to describe him was from one of the rank-and-file at my workplace, when Sartre turned up: "un grand bonhomme," meaning a combination of Great Man and Great Guy. Sartre cultivated this very thoroughly, you got the sense he was 100% approachable, he'd been a high-school teacher for a long time.

That's why I don't give much credence to arguments that he "denied" the class struggle. It's more that he fully acknowledged that he was a bourgeois, his life project was the internal contradictions of the bourgeois, felt by the bourgeois as a metaphysic, but in fact issuing from historical contingencies best described by Marxism. By the same token, Sartre was willing to grant the same freedom, unflinchingly, to all those he encountered.

Someone once said the real mark of a smart person is, they don't make you feel stupid, they make you feel smart. Sartre approached everyone, from worker to President, as though they, too, were capable of thinking and acting on their own. To me that was the most important lesson in organizing, ever.

[blake 3:17]

Class was what he saw as.... chains of our own making.

Maybe when he was younger... In his later thinking he was much clearer about class exploitation and national oppressions.

His political formation was through the anti-fascist Resistance in France, with the degree of Leftism is a little uncertain. He was certainly very brave in his support for the Algerian FLN at a time when it was pretty taboo. I think he used his intellectual credentials for the best part -- supporting the Algerian revolution and later the far Left in 68 and the period following. De Gaulle considered him to be hands off -- there's the famous crack by De Gaulle that you don't arrest Voltaire, with Sartre being the contemporary.

I read Ian Birchall's Sartre Against Stalinism a couple of years ago, and it was OK. Birchall's out of the English SWP and that origin helped give the book some strengths and weaknesses. Probably the best thing in English on Sartre's relationship to the radical and revolutionary Left.

[Amphictyonis]

Maybe when he was younger... In his later thinking he was much clearer about class exploitation and national oppressions.

His political formation was through the anti-fascist Resistance in France, with the degree of Leftism is a little uncertain. He was certainly very brave in his support for the Algerian FLN at a time when it was pretty taboo. I think he used his intellectual credentials for the best part -- supporting the Algerian revolution and later the far Left in 68 and the period following. De Gaulle considered him to be hands off -- there's the famous crack by De Gaulle that you don't arrest Voltaire, with Sartre being the contemporary.

I read Ian Birchall's Sartre Against Stalinism a couple of years ago, and it was OK. Birchall's out of the English SWP and that origin helped give the book some strengths and weaknesses. Probably the best thing in English on Sartre's relationship to the radical and revolutionary Left.

His last work was 'Critique Of Dialectical Reason'- the book where he criticized Marx's view of class. I wasn't saying he didnt think class existed- you can see him call capitalists the bourgeoisie many times in his writing and interviews. If that's not a direct acknowledgment of class then I don't know what is :)

He was a tad confused when he was older in his last years. He even said he regretted writing Being and Nothingness, Nausea and other early works and wanted to be remembered for Critique Of Dialectical Reason and his political life. I think he felt (according to interviews) his existentialist views were being used to form a sort of selfish apathetic attitude, especially in America. This is why he wrote Critique- to tie existentialism in with socialism. I think people like Sartre are great for socialism- socialism does need to retain individuality and autonomy within a socialist society. If Sartre had lived another 10 years he wouldn't pronounced himself to be a libertarian socialist. He basically did before he died (but didnt use the anarchist label)

[Apoi_Viitor]

His last work was 'Critique Of Dialectical Reason'- the book where he criticized Marx's view of class. I wasn't saying he didnt think class existed- you can see him call capitalists the bourgeoisie many times in his writing and interviews. If that's not a direct acknowledgment of class then I don't know what is :)

From what I've read, it seemed as though he felt class was something determined by oneself, rather than being pre-determined by social/economic position. His critique seemed to be aimed towards the idea that, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness..."

[bretty]

I always liked the idea that labels meant little to him one must continually recreate oneself.. which is to say, it's not enough to call yourself a communist, you have to act to be one. I found a lot of affirmation in his ideas, regardless of the metaphysical jargon one has to wade through.

-B

[ChrisK]

So this is really a long-winded, round-about way of saying all philosophy is full of crap. Thank you, but I already knew that. My question was regarding your opinion of the ideas of existentialism and their compatibility with Marxist ideas; it had nothing to do with how some words were manipulated in order to best express such complex ideas when trying to put them on paper.

EDIT: In short, your post was completely off topic.

On the contrary, since their ideas are based on a misuse of language, then their ideas are nonsense. Thus, their nonsense ideas have no place in Marxism.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

For the comrades who are interested in clarifying for themselves Sartre's position toward individualism, action, and Communism I would suggest reading Paul Nizan's "Les Chiens de garde," translated as "The Watchdogs." Nizan and Sartre were best buddies at the Ecole Normale Superieure, the ultra-prestigious academy that formed most twentieth-century intellectuals in France, except that Nizan dropped out, went off to Aden, figured out capitalism and joined the French Communist Party. Les Chiens de Garde is one of the great critiques of the Kantian/positivist philosophical system and its practical applications to bourgeois subjectivism.

For all that, after the Stalin-Hitler pact Nizan could take that much of sacrificing his "bourgeois subjectivism" to the Party, and resigned. He was killed in action in 1940, was slandered by the Party, and his books went out of print. Only twenty years later was The Watchdogs reissued, with an important preface by Sartre. It's still a classic, and widely read in France. I just recently handed a copy to a very young friend who was having trouble handling her first year at the Uni.

Which is to say that if you approach Sartre from the Anglo-Saxon Marxist tradition of obsessive anti-subjectivism you're not going to get it, especially since this anti-subjectivism has far more in common with the Idealistic Positivism Nizan denounced in his teachers, but which turned up again in the Communist Party - in all Communist Parties, and it's of course rampant throughout this site. What Sartre is arguing, is that you must take responsibility for your own subjectivity, it's the only way to transcend it.

Of course, you have the alternative of getting on some chat-list and screaming everybody down as to how "objective" you are.That's what I mean when I say I learned so much from Sartre...

Solidarity.

[black magick hustla]

too much faith in the agency of human beings. people who are born in hell will be fiends. free will is a christian creation

[Palingenisis]

too much faith in the agency of human beings. people who are born in hell will be fiends. free will is a christian creation

Im not known for over flowing faith in humanity...But seriously if that is the case than there is fuck all hope at all, surely?

[bretty]

Maldodor is either just uneducated on the subject, or trolling. The amount of people who come out of disparate and absolute poverty to become significant actors in society, and certainly not fiends, proves otherwise.

-B

[black magick hustla]

Maldodor is either just uneducated on the subject, or trolling. The amount of people who come out of disparate and absolute poverty to become significant actors in society, and certainly not fiends, proves otherwise.

-B

what i meant was hyperbolic. i think for every "great man" individual you pick out of history there is a whole world of people who get dragged down by their enviroment. in the prisons, in the ghettoes, in the fields. i find it almost offensive that some dude that came out of the ecole normaile superioure has the nerve to say "its all in the mind mang".

"By proclaiming such theses as these, a certain existentialist conception has demonstrated not only the collusion of left intellectuals with power, but also the crude trick by which an inhuman social organization attributes the responsibility for its cruelties to its victims themselves. A nineteenth century critic remarked: "Throughout contemporary literature we find the tendency to regard individual suffering as a social evil and to make the organization of society responsible for the misery and degradation of its members. This is a profoundly new idea: suffering is no longer treated as a matter of fatality." Certain thinkers steeped in fatalism have not been troubled overmuch by such novelties: consider Sartre's hell-is-other-people ..."

-vaneigem

[bretty]

what i meant was hyperbolic. i think for every "great man" individual you pick out of history there is a whole world of people who get dragged down by their enviroment. in the prisons, in the ghettoes, in the fields. i find it almost offensive that some dude that came out of the ecole normaile superioure has the nerve to say "its all in the mind mang".

"By proclaiming such theses as these, a certain existentialist conception has demonstrated not only the collusion of left intellectuals with power, but also the crude trick by which an inhuman social organization attributes the responsibility for its cruelties to its victims themselves. A nineteenth century critic remarked: "Throughout contemporary literature we find the tendency to regard individual suffering as a social evil and to make the organization of society responsible for the misery and degradation of its members. This is a profoundly new idea: suffering is no longer treated as a matter of fatality." Certain thinkers steeped in fatalism have not been troubled overmuch by such novelties: consider Sartre's hell-is-other-people ..."



-vaneigem

I don't think he is ignoring environment, he was after all a communist. While I agree people get dragged down in the system, it's different to argue that horrible places create horrible people. To me, socio-economic determinism has a much softer logic than you seem to argue.

Also I've always considered the merits of his philosophy as life-affirming rather than a reprimand of people for their social conditions.

"You can always make something out of what you've been made into"
-Sartre

-B

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

Funny that so many critics of Sartre from the right or left make the same mistake: they assume Sartre means that if you're unhappy it's your own fault. (You know, folks like the original Maldoror, wallowing in their own espresso, or like the heroes of No Exit, his most popular work). In fact, Sartre (like Camus) tells you you have a say in your own happiness, which from a political point of view means something very different.

1) "Happiness, a new idea in Europe." Saint-Just, close friend of Robespierre. The point of the French Revolution being, that it had proposed the idea that everybody was entitled to happiness. A bourgeois idea, no doubt, but after all, the bourgeoisie contains the seeds of its own destruction when it proclaims that all are entitled to be happy, and then denies them this happiness on earth.

2) From the point of view of class, Sartre is saying that "The liberation of the working class must come from the workers themselves." Sartre, like many other French leftists, had followed Kojève's lectures on Hegel in the thirties, and he frequently applies Hegel's categories of existence to problems of race and class - notably the so-called Master-Slave relationship. Sartre's position is not far from that of Lukács in History and Class Consciousness.

3) Incidentally, it was Sartre who brought anti-colonial discourses into the European mainstream, with his support and encouragement of Frantz Fanon and others: to say that colonial people are responsible for their own liberation does not mean, obviously, that Europeans should sit back: it means that the decisions, the thought, must come from them. No wonder centralizing authoritarian leftists hate Sartre.

So, Comrades, I ask you, from the purely pragmatic point of view of the political organizer, which is most helpful: to tell your working-class (or non-European) comrades that you recognize the possibilities for happiness and self-affirmation within their own existence (tough as it may be), their very own being-in-the world, or to sit on your butt like Vaneigem and the Situs, whining that nobody lives up to your exquisite, very upper-class and European sense of truth?

[Palingenisis]

Your problem malador is that you are too cynical on one hand and too romantic on the other...you are going to do your own head in if you are not careful.

[Hit The North]

On the contrary, since their ideas are based on a misuse of language, then their ideas are nonsense. Thus, their nonsense ideas have no place in Marxism.

Walking the dogma?



So, Comrades, I ask you, from the purely pragmatic point of view of the political organizer, which is most helpful: to tell your working-class (or non-European) comrades that you recognize the possibilities for happiness and self-affirmation within their own existence (tough as it may be), their very own being-in-the world, or to sit on your butt like Vaneigem and the Situs, whining that nobody lives up to your exquisite, very upper-class and European sense of truth?


On the the proverbial spot. More to the point, that action, agency, can make a difference to the world. That the intertia can be resisted. That a new world is possible.

[black magick hustla]

So, Comrades, I ask you, from the purely pragmatic point of view of the political organizer, which is most helpful: to tell your working-class (or non-European) comrades that you recognize the possibilities for happiness and self-affirmation within their own existence (tough as it may be), their very own being-in-the world, or to sit on your butt like Vaneigem and the Situs, whining that nobody lives up to your exquisite, very upper-class and European sense of truth?



first i dont have to tell the "working class" anything. the "working class" can think for itself and every time it self organizes and makes the question of communism not a dream but a possible reality the left and its bosses always stay behind. i will tell you this though, i think this world is miserable and it has to be destroyed and eclipsed from the memory of men. the talk of "self affirmation" is the talk of therapists and people who write self help books. it is true vaneigem and the situationist dream is bankrupt, but existentialism is an attempt at answering a question that was posed by us by our masters, namely the utility of our existence, and the question of free will. the former as an attempt to justify work and civil duties under the framework of class society, the latter as an attempt to punish and smite those who sin. i do not address the question because i reject the logic of masters and slaves

[black magick hustla]

Your problem malador is that you are too cynical on one hand and too romantic on the other...you are going to do your own head in if you are not careful.
:D

[Palingenisis]

:D

Im serious...And I dont mean it in a *****y way.

[black magick hustla]

Im serious...And I dont mean it in a *****y way.

my romanticism is the only reason why i dont fall to the deadly temptation of nihilism and despair

[theAnarch]

Not to advertise but im pretty shure pathfinder press has a book out on this subject with the same title as the thread.

http://www.pathfinderpress.com/

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

The "working class" can think for itself
So long as they think the "vanguard" thinks they should be thinking. Working class wants car? Bad, bad working class. Working class wants Revolution? Good, good working class.


i find it almost offensive that some dude that came out of the ecole normaile superioure has the nerve...

Especially so long as "the" working class can safely be assumed to have contempt for "bourgeois" thinking, one of the favorite conceits of the bourgeoisie.

Assumption no. 1:
You assume that the dudes from Norm' Sup. were not of working-class backgrounds. Many of them were one generation removed from hand laborers, and their conflict was, precisely, to make their education serve the working class without being co-opted.

Assumption no. 2:
You assume that the "true" working class is not interested/has no use for intellectuals. ("Dumb, dumb, working class!") Not necessarily true, and certainly not true in France (or in Germany, or in quite a number of European countries) in the first half of the twentieth century. Sartre's problem, and Nizan's, and that of a majority of intellectuals from Jaures down to Bourdieu was, precisely, to be available to the working class and below, without prejudice and without assumptions. On the whole, they were remarkably successful.

[Ostrinski]

I feel like existentialism has a lot of individualist implications. Since existentialism rejects morality, it seems to me that it can set the premise for capitalist ideas, seeing how amoral capitalism really is (the right to exploit others by using their labor for your gain). All in all, I really don't see how the two could possibly go hand in hand when existentialists generally hold that the focus of philosophical thought should be to deal with the conditions of existence of the individual person and his or her emotions, actions, responsibilities, and thoughts. Individualism is the anti-thesis to left thought, therefore existentialism is the anti-thesis to egalitarianism.

[Lucretia]

Do you feel the two naturally go together? Are they at odds? Neither? I would really like to know what other Revleft members think of the relationship between Marxism and existentialism.

I personally am greatly influenced by Sartre and his particular brand of existential humanism. Like Sartre himself, I see it as completely compatible and even complimentary to Marxism.

However, in looking around the MIA, I see not everyone agrees. What do you think?

There is nothing fundamentally incompatible between Marxism and existentialism. In fact the best known existentialist philosophers were basically Marxists, or at least heavily influenced by Marx without disavowing his core ideas. Phenomenology asks a different set of questions and looks at a different realm of social existence than Marxism does. While some existentialist might be anti-Marxist, there is nothing anti-Marxist in the basic tenets of existentialism.

[ColonelCossack]

i used to be an existentialist of sorts, but now im less sure... is existemtialism merely just a form of idealism, and thus opposes the good of the proletariat?

[The Grey Blur]

So long as they think the "vanguard" thinks they should be thinking. Working class wants car? Bad, bad working class. Working class wants Revolution? Good, good working class.



Especially so long as "the" working class can safely be assumed to have contempt for "bourgeois" thinking, one of the favorite conceits of the bourgeoisie.

Assumption no. 1:
You assume that the dudes from Norm' Sup. were not of working-class backgrounds. Many of them were one generation removed from hand laborers, and their conflict was, precisely, to make their education serve the working class without being co-opted.

Assumption no. 2:
You assume that the "true" working class is not interested/has no use for intellectuals. ("Dumb, dumb, working class!") Not necessarily true, and certainly not true in France (or in Germany, or in quite a number of European countries) in the first half of the twentieth century. Sartre's problem, and Nizan's, and that of a majority of intellectuals from Jaures down to Bourdieu was, precisely, to be available to the working class and below, without prejudice and without assumptions. On the whole, they were remarkably successful.
you should enable rep because i would be thanking your posts something shocking. maldoror's argument is cool too though.

[Thirsty Crow]

I feel like existentialism has a lot of individualist implications. Since existentialism rejects morality,You should substantiate this claim.
But from my perspective, it would be totally meaningless to "reject morality" since all human interaction, given the fact that humans are social beings, are prone to a more or less codified system of appraising what is desirable and what is not - and that is morality. There cannot be a society without some kind of morality.
And if existentialists reject a certain kind of morality, grounded in a specific tradition and enforced by specific social institutions (e.g. Catholic sexual morality), that is something entirely different.


it seems to me that it can set the premise for capitalist ideas, seeing how amoral capitalism really is (the right to exploit others by using their labor for your gain).Capitalism amoral? I beg to differ.
Or in other words: there are other bases on which to ground one's attack on the capitalist mode of production. Your argument here depends on the evidence for existentialists rejection of morality (supposing that they embrace the domineering facets of a kind of a social darwinism; and I find that assumption unlikely).

[QUOTE=Red Guerilla;1973874All in all, I really don't see how the two could possibly go hand in hand when existentialists generally hold that the focus of philosophical thought should be to deal with the conditions of existence of the individual person and his or her emotions, actions, responsibilities, and thoughts. Individualism is the anti-thesis to left thought, therefore existentialism is the anti-thesis to egalitarianism.[/QUOTE]I think that your positing the problem in a purely dichotomous manner. I don't see why Marxism shouldn't focus (of course, not exclusively) on the process of subjectivity formation from the point of view of the individual.

[ar734]

Since existentialism rejects morality

Sarte's well known essay is Existentialism is a Humanism. Existentialism not only does not reject morality, it demands humans accept the responsibility of making moral decisions, not only for themselves but for society.

[bezdomni]

No Study, No Right to Speak!

The fact that people are going around here saying that existentialism and Marxism have nothing to do with one another is absurd.

If you do not know the answer to a question, then do research until you come up with something. In this case, googling for "marxism and existentialism" would take you directly to Sartre's major works on this topic.

Marxism and Existentialism

I am a Marxist and an existentialist. The two ideas fit together beautifully.

[Meridian]

If you do not know the answer to a question, then do research until you come up with something. In this case, googling for "marxism and existentialism" would take you directly to Sartre's major works on this topic.
That there historically have been proponents of both marxism and the philosophy of existentialism is not what's being denied.

An observation like that would belong in the History or Politics forum, if the Philosophy forum did not implicitly cover the history of philosophical thinkers. It is besides the point when it comes to a discussion of whether the observations of marxism and the philosophy of existentialism can both be used as valid pictures, or theories, at the same time; it would only show that historically there have been people who have been either confused or consistent in their beliefs.

[Luís Henrique]

Existentialism is the same as anyother philosophy; it is based on a distortion of ordinary language and, therefore, has no meaning. Existentialists typically (from what I've seen) misused terms such as "meaning," and I'm pretty sure it was Sarte who misused terms like "Being" and "Nothingness".

What would be an "undistorted" use of language?

What is "ordinary language"?

Do ordinary people, when speaking, use "ordinary language"?

If so, how is it in anyway ridden of metaphysical pressupositions? Or aren't the ideas of the ruling class the ruling ideas of each epoch?

If not, how is it "ordinary" first place?


Could be wrong on that one, I'm not expert on existentialism.In other words, you have no idea about what you are talking about, and cannot actually give any analysis of the subject. Which means you are speaking out of sheer dogmatism.


It has no place in Marxism, it would just be extra baggage.It is basically apolitical, so it can be appended to any political beliefs without much contradiction. And so we had existentialists in the left (Sartre) as well as the right (Jaspers).

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

What would be an "undistorted" use of language?

What is "ordinary language"?
Language, as spoken by nearly 7 billion people every day.


Do ordiinary people, when speaking, use "ordinary language"?
I don't know what you mean by "ordiinary people". Almost everyone use one ordinary language or other to communicate. You would have thought most people knew this.


If so, how is it in anyway ridden of metaphysical pressupositions? Or aren't the ideas of the ruling class the ruling ideas of each epoch?
I am unsure if you, by "ridden of", mean "without any" or "having a lot of". It seems like a confusion between "(gotten) rid of" and "ridden with".

In any case, language itself can not have presuppositions, but there can be presuppositions in the use of it. Otherwise the word "presupposition", as used ordinarily in cases where they are implicit or explicit in the use of language, would not make logical sense.

Similarly, an idea is expressed in language. Language itself is not an idea, or multiple ideas, for the same reason as above.


If not, how is it "ordinary" first place?
Language is ordinary to the extent that it is the language which is actually used by people when communicating.


In other words, you have no idea about what you are talking about, and cannot actually give any analysis of the subject. Which means you are speaking out of sheer dogmatism.
Please, fall off your high horse.

[Luís Henrique]

Language, as spoken by nearly 7 billion people every day.

Ah, but this would include physicians, computer geniuses, and even... metaphysical mystics.


I don't know what you mean by "ordiinary people". Almost everyone use one ordinary language or other to communicate. You would have thought most people knew this.

Well, we are even. You don't know what 'ordinary people' is, and I don't know what 'ordinary language' is.


I am unsure if you, by "ridden of", mean "without any" or "having a lot of". It seems like a confusion between "(gotten) rid of" and "ridden with".

Yes, sorry. I meant, how is "ordinary language" free of metaphisical pressupositions?


In any case, language itself can not have presuppositions, but there can be presuppositions in the use of it.

Oh? Of course it has presuppositions. At the very least, it presupposes it is meaningful, ie, that it says something about the "real world", which means it at very least presupposes the existence of a "real world".


Otherwise the word "presupposition", as used ordinarily in cases where they are implicit or explicit in the use of language, would not make logical sense.

And why not?


Similarly, an idea is expressed in language. Language itself is not an idea, or multiple ideas, for the same reason as above.

And what is an "idea"?


Language is ordinary to the extent that it is the language which is actually used by people when communicating.

Then all language is "ordinary language". Including its misuses by metaphysical mystics, lawyers, and insurance policies sellers.


Please, fall off your high horse.

I don't have a horse, much less a high one.

What, are you using the word "horse" in some different sence? Distorting "ordinary language", are we?

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

Ah, but this would include physicians, computer geniuses, and even... metaphysical mystics.
Indeed! They will use (ordinary) language every day almost invariably, in order to communicate, despite whatever theory or field they may concern themselves with.


Well, we are even. You don't know what 'ordinary people' is, and I don't know what 'ordinary language' is.
Well, I think what is meant by "ordinary people" differs somewhat depending on the use. Perhaps on these forums we would most normally use it about people who are not of the capitalist class, but in general it's use would vary between meaning anyone who's not a celebrity, a genius, a mentally disabled person, following the widespread trends, and so on.


Yes, sorry. I meant, how is "ordinary language" free of metaphisical pressupositions?
I often prefer to use the term "language" instead of "ordinary language". The latter term may imply that what is being discussed is a technical language in-and-of-itself, or that ordinary language and philosophical language are equal.


Oh? Of course it has presuppositions. At the very least, it presupposes it is meaningful, ie, that it says something about the "real world", which means it at very least presupposes the existence of a "real world".
This is a common mischaracterization of language. Language itself does not represent anything. Some words are objects, and some sentences are used to describe or represent for another person how things are. But these sentences may be true or false. Language having presuppositions can not be the case. Presuppositions are made by those who speak or write (such as yours now; that language which is meaningful necessarily says something about the "real world").

You can compare grammar to rules in games. It does not make sense to say that the rules of football are presuppositions.


And what is an "idea"?
Why would anyone have any better idea about this than anyone else? Perhaps if they have studied language? Since "an idea" does not refer to an object, your question is grammatical. So, in which cases do we talk about ideas?


Then all language is "ordinary language". Including its misuses by metaphysical mystics, lawyers, and insurance policies sellers.Philosophical/logical distortion of language and lies are different in kind. The first kind can not be true or false since it does not follow grammar, lies or conclusions which do not follow are just not the case.


I don't have a horse, much less a high one.
Well, that's great, now you got me imagining a high horse.


What, are you using the word "horse" in some different sence? Distorting "ordinary language", are we?
Manners of speaking, etc., are not misuses of language.

[Luís Henrique]

Indeed! They will use (ordinary) language every day almost invariably, in order to communicate, despite whatever theory or field they may concern themselves with.

Oh yes, but the issue is, when physicians are talking to other physicians in medical technical "language", are they using "ordinary language"?

If so, what is the exact difference between medical technical "language" and "metaphysical technical language"?

And if not, again, what is "ordinary language"?


Well, I think what is meant by "ordinary people" differs somewhat depending on the use. Perhaps on these forums we would most normally use it about people who are not of the capitalist class, but in general it's use would vary between meaning anyone who's not a celebrity, a genius, a mentally disabled person, following the widespread trends, and so on.


That would be a working definition.


I often prefer to use the term "language" instead of "ordinary language". The latter term may imply that what is being discussed is a technical language in-and-of-itself, or that ordinary language and philosophical language are equal.

Indeed here is a problem. If "ordinary language" is the same a language sans phrase, why the need to use the adjectivated form? And if so, how is metaphysical or philosophical "language" a distortion of language? Whatever I may think of say, Bradley's work, I would say that it is written in English, not in "distorted English".

There is a confusion here, between two different acceptions of the word "language". "Language" as in "English language" (or "Japanese", or "Swahili" "languages") has no pressupositions (and thence it cannot be "distorted"); "language" as in "lawyiers language" or "Berkeley's language" certainly relies on pressupositions.


This is a common mischaracterization of language. Language itself does not represent anything. Some words are objects, and some sentences are used to describe or represent for another person how things are. But these sentences may be true or false. Language having presuppositions can not be the case. Presuppositions are made by those who speak or write (such as yours now; that language which is meaningful necessarily says something about the "real world").

So here you are speaking of "language" in the sence it is used in the phrase "English language". But then it includes everything that is included in the English language: technical jargons, regional speeches, different registers, social slangs, sectarian sociolects (and, of course, mystical, philosophical or metaphysical jargons), etc, etc, etc. Is this the same as "ordinary language", or does it merely include something that we call "ordinary language" which is distinct from medical jargon, lawyierese, cockney, hooligan slang, etc?


You can compare grammar to rules in games. It does not make sense to say that the rules of football are presuppositions.

Well, maybe. (Why not though? If a soccer player other than the goalkeeper picks the ball with his/her hands while it is at play, it is a foul. This is a "pressuposition" of soccer, if we so define it). But the issue is not grammar. The issue is, if "ordinary language" is a subset of language (in the sence that "scientific language", "philosophical language", "technical language" stand opposed to "ordinary language") then the assertion that it has no metaphysical pressupositions is still to be demonstrated.

On the other hand, a field of about 10,000 square meters is a "pressuposition" of soccer football; if you don't have something close to that, you cannot actually play soccer football. And a belief in an "objective" world outside of speakers and hearers is a pressuposition of (any) language. Is it the case that such pressuposition is not metaphysical?


Why would anyone have any better idea about this than anyone else? Perhaps if they have studied language? Since "an idea" does not refer to an object, your question is grammatical. So, in which cases do we talk about ideas?

Well, the point that "ideas are expressed in language" is yours, not mine. What do you mean, when you say "an idea is expressed in language"? Is "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" an idea? Is "Ouch, that hurts" an idea? Is "The nothingness of Nothing anihilates the very possibility of Being" an idea? Is "whereof we cannot speak, we must pass in silence" an idea?


Philosophical/logical distortion of language and lies are different in kind. The first kind can not be true or false since it does not follow grammar, lies or conclusions which do not follow are just not the case.

Important distinction. But it cannot rely where you put it. A sentence like "The nothingness of Nothing anihilates the very possibility of Being" is not agrammatical (whereas "Nothing book car the will" is).


Well, that's great, now you got me imagining a high horse.

Well, don't have a nightmare (or a night mare) about it.


Manners of speaking, etc., are not misuses of language.

And where is the line dividing them? Why is "whereof we cannot speak we must pass in silence" a a manner of speaking while "motion without matter is unthinkable" is a misuse of language?

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

Oh yes, but the issue is, when physicians are talking to other physicians in medical technical "language", are they using "ordinary language"?
I wouldn't say they were, would you? They would be using technical medical terms. However, they would indeed be using language, with technical terms in supplement to ordinary language.


If so, what is the exact difference between medical technical "language" and "metaphysical technical language"?
Unlike any other fields with technical terms, metaphysics is based on using ordinary terms and misusing their grammar. Any technical terms are supplements to this activity.


Indeed here is a problem. If "ordinary language" is the same a language sans phrase, why the need to use the adjectivated form?
I said that there are times when "language" is a more appropriate term than "ordinary language", but for the sake of understanding, the latter can be more useful.


And if so, how is metaphysical or philosophical "language" a distortion of language? Whatever I may think of say, Bradley's work, I would say that it is written in English, not in "distorted English".
It is a distortion of language because it is characterized by misusing, or distorting, grammar, the way language is ordinarily used. As a result, declarative sentences of this type can not make logical sense and can not be true or false. A sentence like this: "The age of the man turned into a blue-ish red color" has words in English, but it is grammatically incorrect. Metaphysical propositions are the same, yet their faulty composition is not brought to surface due to our own confusion.


There is a confusion here, between two different acceptions of the word "language". "Language" as in "English language" (or "Japanese", or "Swahili" "languages") has no pressupositions (and thence it cannot be "distorted"); "language" as in "lawyiers language" or "Berkeley's language" certainly relies on pressupositions.
I agree with this, except that general language can be used to form distorted sentences. Similarly to how language itself can not have presuppositions but it can be used in ways which imply presuppositions, it can also be misused in ways to create deformed sentences.


So here you are speaking of "language" in the sence it is used in the phrase "English language". But then it includes everything that is included in the English language: technical jargons, regional speeches, different registers, social slangs, sectarian sociolects (and, of course, mystical, philosophical or metaphysical jargons), etc, etc, etc. Is this the same as "ordinary language", or does it merely include something that we call "ordinary language" which is distinct from medical jargon, lawyierese, cockney, hooligan slang, etc?
As you (I believe, correctly) pointed out, a development of technical language can be based on a presupposition. Consider a field of theoretical physics, for example. However, the term "presupposition" would not apply to features of language itself, only to rules and terms in a certain language-game (to use a term of Wittgenstein). And that is because of the rules of that language-game's independence to our other rules of grammar.


Well, maybe. (Why not though? If a soccer player other than the goalkeeper picks the ball with his/her hands while it is at play, it is a foul. This is a "pressuposition" of soccer, if we so define it).No, that is a rule. It is a part of the game of soccer, it can not be (or imply) a presupposition because it does not declare anything to be the case. A presupposition would perhaps be that the soccer player will be spotted by the referee, or that the referee knows the rules.


But the issue is not grammar. The issue is, if "ordinary language" is a subset of language (in the sence that "scientific language", "philosophical language", "technical language" stand opposed to "ordinary language") then the assertion that it has no metaphysical pressupositions is still to be demonstrated.
Ordinary language, by my reasoning, includes the foundations of technical terms in its grammar, but it excludes metaphysical language which is characterized by misapplications and misunderstandings of grammatical rules.


On the other hand, a field of about 10,000 square meters is a "pressuposition" of soccer football;
Again, this is an established norm, or rule in a looser sense, this can not be a presupposition because it does not predicate about anything.


if you don't have something close to that, you cannot actually play soccer football.
This is a grammatical statement, you are giving a qualification for what we call "playing soccer", what falls in under the 'definition', so to speak.


And a belief in an "objective" world outside of speakers and hearers is a pressuposition of (any) language. Is it the case that such pressuposition is not metaphysical?
No, languages can not have presuppositions, only humans can, which I thought you had realized. Only some words are names we use of objects, other words are names but not of any existing object, and other words are not names at all. Only declarative sentences are used to describe how things are, and then again, a function of language is that they may be true or false.


Well, the point that "ideas are expressed in language" is yours, not mine. What do you mean, when you say "an idea is expressed in language"? Is "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" an idea? Is "Ouch, that hurts" an idea? Is "The nothingness of Nothing anihilates the very possibility of Being" an idea? Is "whereof we cannot speak, we must pass in silence" an idea?
Well, the only source you, I, or anyone could draw from when it comes to establishing this, is grammar. That is a function of ideas being expressed in language.

We would not normally say of "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" that it is an idea. "Idea" is more commonly used like the word "plan" or the word "opinion", none of which apply to this sentence. But "idea" can also be used like "notion", a more general statement which a person thinks to be true.

"Ouch, that hurts" does not fit any of the uses of the word. "The nothingness of Nothing anihilates the very possibility of Being" and "whereof we cannot speak, we must pass in silence" fits the 'notion' version of "idea".


Important distinction. But it cannot rely where you put it. A sentence like "The nothingness of Nothing anihilates the very possibility of Being" is not agrammatical (whereas "Nothing book car the will" is).
Yes, it is completely nonsensical. First off, it treats words ("Nothing" and "Being") as if they were names of existing spirits instead of communicational tools. It disregards the grammar for those words completely, and instead uses the grammar of names. Secondly, it uses supposed characteristics of these terms (under the guise of the words being names, like they were characteristics of a thing) to formulate a sentence which looks like it declares something to be the case about the objects 'underlying' our ordinary use of language.

Because it has the appearance of a declarative sentence, it is harder to see that it breaks grammatical rules.


And where is the line dividing them? Why is "whereof we cannot speak we must pass in silence" a a manner of speaking while "motion without matter is unthinkable" is a misuse of language?
No, "whereof one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence" is not a manner of speaking.

[JazzRemington]

Oh yes, but the issue is, when physicians are talking to other physicians in medical technical "language", are they using "ordinary language"?

If so, what is the exact difference between medical technical "language" and "metaphysical technical language"?

And if not, again, what is "ordinary language"?

"Technical terms" (there is no "technical language") can be explained in ordinary language so as to make it understandable to others who aren't experts in whatever field the physicians are working in (that's how people learn about different subjects in school). "Metaphysical language" (even if is technical) cannot be explained in ordinary language, hence it being incoherent. Most attempts to do so either produce phrases that amount to synonyms, a repetition of the same phrase, and/or something else that has little to nothing to do with what was originally said. For instance, explanations of the nature of "truth" revolve around the conditions under which something is considered true and not "truth" itself.


Indeed here is a problem. If "ordinary language" is the same a language sans phrase, why the need to use the adjectivated form? And if so, how is metaphysical or philosophical "language" a distortion of language? Whatever I may think of say, Bradley's work, I would say that it is written in English, not in "distorted English".

Even if you knew the latter as being the case, you'd still be perfectly justified in saying it's written in English - because it is. A Lewis Carrol poem is still written in English, even though it's deliberate nonsense.


And where is the line dividing them? Why is "whereof we cannot speak we must pass in silence" a a manner of speaking while "motion without matter is unthinkable" is a misuse of language?

Luís Henrique

"To get off one's high horse" is an idiom of the English language, while the above two phrases are not (unless the former is a German idiom). Philosophical/metaphysical phrases are not idioms.

[Luís Henrique]

"Technical terms" (there is no "technical language") can be explained in ordinary language so as to make it understandable to others who aren't experts in whatever field the physicians are working in (that's how people learn about different subjects in school). "Metaphysical language" (even if is technical) cannot be explained in ordinary language, hence it being incoherent. Most attempts to do so either produce phrases that amount to synonyms, a repetition of the same phrase, and/or something else that has little to nothing to do with what was originally said. For instance, explanations of the nature of "truth" revolve around the conditions under which something is considered true and not "truth" itself.

Ah, but this is just because "truth" is only that: the quality of a proposition that happens to be true. There is nothing like "truth" (or, more typically, "Truth") itself. This however isn't a grammatical issue as Meridian seems to think. It is an hypostasy, where the referent of a term is unduly attributed qualities it doesn't have.


"To get off one's high horse" is an idiom of the English language, while the above two phrases are not (unless the former is a German idiom). Philosophical/metaphysical phrases are not idioms.

Those are clear cut cases.

Take for instance,

"According to Newton, this stone must fall to the ground."
"According to Newton, this stone will fall to the ground."

The latter is widely recognised as an idiom (though it historically involves a personification, or hypostasy: stones never had a "will" of their own). The former has been argued to be metaphysical, since it makes no sence at all to attribute a moral obligation to the stone.

I would say that both are idiomatic expressions, and mean exactly the same thing. Others might say that both are metaphisical sentences (and then I would ask, how does one express the idea in English?). Others still, like Rosa, will maintain that the former is metaphysical and the latter is an idiom. I don't see any actual way to establish a difference between both, and firmly believe the inability to see the "metaphysical" appearance of the latter is due to mere ignorance of the history of the word "will", coupled with the usual difficulty of native speakers to spot illogicalities in their own languages.

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

Ah, but this is just because "truth" is only that: the quality of a proposition that happens to be true. There is nothing like "truth" (or, more typically, "Truth") itself. This however isn't a grammatical issue as Meridian seems to think. It is an hypostasy, where the referent of a term is unduly attributed qualities it doesn't have.
There is nothing like 'truth' in and of itself. In other words, the word "truth" does not have a referent.

[Luís Henrique]

I wouldn't say they were, would you? They would be using technical medical terms. However, they would indeed be using language, with technical terms in supplement to ordinary language.

Fine, but the confusion continues: what is the difference between "language" and "ordinary language"?


Unlike any other fields with technical terms, metaphysics is based on using ordinary terms and misusing their grammar. Any technical terms are supplements to this activity.

And so the famous "distortion" of language is grammatical misuse?

But this isn't the case. Languages are flexible considering the grammatical functions of their words. They have to be, or they would be unusable as languages.

Here is an example of grammatical "misuse" that cannot be misconstrued into "metaphysics":



Your ifs and buts make it clear that your position is insincere.

There you can see two words that are not substantives being used as substantives - including gaining a plural form, that words of their class don't have. And yet there is nothing metaphysical about that sentence, it is just plain "ordinary" English.

On the other hand, your example of grammatical misuse - the word "being" as a substanctive - is certainly not a grammatical misuse: "being", albeit having the form of (and indisputably being derived from) a verbal tense, is a substanctive on its own, with legitimate, non-metaphysical, uses:



There were many human beings suffering there.

And so the fact that the word "being" has a metaphysical use in "The nothingness of Nothing anihillates the very possibility of Being" cannot be due to a grammatical issue; it resides elsewhere.


It is a distortion of language because it is characterized by misusing, or distorting, grammar, the way language is ordinarily used. As a result, declarative sentences of this type can not make logical sense and can not be true or false. A sentence like this: "The age of the man turned into a blue-ish red color" has words in English, but it is grammatically incorrect. Metaphysical propositions are the same, yet their faulty composition is not brought to surface due to our own confusion.

Your example is grammatically incorrect (and yet it is not a metaphysical sentence). Its incorrection is due to a selection mistake: "age of man" is lexically equivalent to an abstract noun, and expressions like "blue-ish red colour" do not accept abstract nouns as subjects. The same isn't true of "motion without matter is unthinkable", or of most metaphysic sentences that I can think of.


I agree with this, except that general language can be used to form distorted sentences. Similarly to how language itself can not have presuppositions but it can be used in ways which imply presuppositions, it can also be misused in ways to create deformed sentences.

Here we are back to the fluid meaning of the word language. As most words in any language, "language", too, has several different acceptions:



The Japanese language is not Germanic.
In Russel's language, "instance" does not mean the same as in Wittgenstein's.
John Doe uses foul language constantly.

I think there is absolute consensus that the Japanese language does not have presuppositions. It seems to be also clear that "Russel's language" does have presuppositions, as well as John Doe's "foul language". It also seems clear that "Russel's language" and "foul language" refer to particular "uses of language", to use your terms. So there is no point in insisting on this. When I say, "ordinary language necessarily have presuppositions", it is because I understand "ordinary language" as meaning something similar to "Russel's language" or "foul language", ie, as a particular use of language. As I see it, to you "ordinary language" is merely a synonim to "language". This particular misuse of language (using a more complicated expression that may have a double entendre instead of a more simple and less equivocal term) is exactly of the kind that conduces to sophistry.


As you (I believe, correctly) pointed out, a development of technical language can be based on a presupposition. Consider a field of theoretical physics, for example. However, the term "presupposition" would not apply to features of language itself, only to rules and terms in a certain language-game (to use a term of Wittgenstein). And that is because of the rules of that language-game's independence to our other rules of grammar.


Perhaps. Now, is it possible to actually speak outside any "language-game"? Is "ordinary language" a particular "language game", or is it a collection of some "language games", or does it encompass all "language games", or is it a different way to classify things?


Ordinary language, by my reasoning, includes the foundations of technical terms in its grammar, but it excludes metaphysical language which is characterized by misapplications and misunderstandings of grammatical rules.

As we saw, that is not what characterises "metaphysical language" ("metaphysical use of language" to be precise as you Wittgensteinians would like other people to be - even though you don't apply the same standards to yourselves).


No, languages can not have presuppositions, only humans can, which I thought you had realized.

I think by now it is clearly established that the confusion here lies in your sloppy use of the word "language", which sometimes means the same as "language" in technical linguistic discourse, and sometimes means what you call "uses of language".

In any way, most "uses of language" do start with the presupposition that there is an "objective world" apart from speakers. It would make no sence to speak at all without such presupposition. Isn't that presupposition metaphysical?


Only some words are names we use of objects, other words are names but not of any existing object, and other words are not names at all.

Well, yes. But language is strictly conventional. The only reason that "bus" is the name of an object is because it is established in common use that it is such. Nothing bars users from establishing different uses for it, if they so see fit (indeed, I think that it is nowadays commonly used as a verb, with the usual verbal forms - buses, bused, busing). This isn't, except perhaps to strict linguistic conservatives, a "misuse" of words. It is like languages are; they constantly change and evolve, in an unstoppable process.


Only declarative sentences are used to describe how things are, and then again, a function of language is that they may be true or false.


Erm, is this a function of language?


We would not normally say of "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" that it is an idea.

On the contrary, it seems to be quite commonplace to think of "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" as an idea:



The idea that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.



"Ouch, that hurts" does not fit any of the uses of the word.

Agreed.


"The nothingness of Nothing anihilates the very possibility of Being" and "whereof we cannot speak, we must pass in silence" fits the 'notion' version of "idea".

I don't think the former is an idea, or even a notion. It seems to me pretty meaningless; whatever the speaker has in mind when uttering it has nothing to do with whatever the target of the communication will think when receiving it.

The latter, on the other hand is clearly an idea.


"Idea" is more commonly used like the word "plan" or the word "opinion", none of which apply to this sentence. But "idea" can also be used like "notion", a more general statement which a person thinks to be true.


Then the question would be changed from "what is an idea" to "what is a notion", without excessive gain, in my view.

Since you are having trouble with defining the term "idea" (first you said that language expresses ideas, now you say that "idea" is more commonly used as synonim for "plan" or "opinion"), let me give a temptative definition of "idea":



"Idea" is something that is transmitted via language, in such a way that it is what is the same for the emissor and the receptor, as a result of the act of communication.


Yes, it is completely nonsensical. First off, it treats words ("Nothing" and "Being") as if they were names of existing spirits instead of communicational tools. It disregards the grammar for those words completely, and instead uses the grammar of names. Secondly, it uses supposed characteristics of these terms (under the guise of the words being names, like they were characteristics of a thing) to formulate a sentence which looks like it declares something to be the case about the objects 'underlying' our ordinary use of language.

As we saw above, you are wrong here.

Grammar is a collection of formal rules. What you are describing is a semantic shift, that, while is simultaneous to what a "grammar Nazi" would describe as a "grammatical mistake", in fact consists in a much broader (and not grammatical at all) operation.

To make it more clear:



Please give you me the in the upper shelf candy.

is a grammatically wrong sentence. It violates a few rules considering the word order in English language. Yet it is perfectly understandable, and not nonsencical at all.



The nothingness of Nothing anihillates the very possibility of Being.

is grammatically sound. Yet it is meaningless and ununderstandable. It has a nominal expression (the "nothingness of Nothing") as a subject; this expression is well constructed ("nothingness" is a plausible word, correctly derived from "nothing" by sufixation; "nothing" is usually an adverb, but as many adverbs, it can be used as a substanctive, and, as such, as the nucleus of a nominal syntagm); etc.


Because it has the appearance of a declarative sentence, it is harder to see that it breaks grammatical rules.

But the bottom line of this is, if all grammatically sound sentences are actually non-metaphysical, and all metaphysical sentences revolve around some kind of grammatical mistake, it would seem that the structure of the grammar of human languages mirrors, in some mysterious sence, the structure of the objective world.

Now that is a metaphysical assumption if I ever saw one.


No, "whereof one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence" is not a manner of speaking.

And so it is metaphysical non-sence?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Ah, but this is just because "truth" is only that: the quality of a proposition that happens to be true. There is nothing like "truth" (or, more typically, "Truth") itself. This however isn't a grammatical issue as Meridian seems to think. It is an hypostasy, where the referent of a term is unduly attributed qualities it doesn't have.

It is a grammatical issue because normally "is true" is a predicate "attached" to a sentence whereas in metaphysical/philosophical language it is treated as an object that has properties (as you've said). This shows a misunderstanding of the grammar of the term. Hypostasis involves cultural personification of something. Simply applying attributes to something is not hypostasis. Even then, the root of this supposed hypostasis is in a failure to understand the grammar of how the word "truth" is used.



Those are clear cut cases.

Take for instance,

"According to Newton, this stone must fall to the ground."
"According to Newton, this stone will fall to the ground."

The latter is widely recognised as an idiom (though it historically involves a personification, or hypostasy: stones never had a "will" of their own). The former has been argued to be metaphysical, since it makes no sence at all to attribute a moral obligation to the stone.

I would say that both are idiomatic expressions, and mean exactly the same thing. Others might say that both are metaphisical sentences (and then I would ask, how does one express the idea in English?). Others still, like Rosa, will maintain that the former is metaphysical and the latter is an idiom. I don't see any actual way to establish a difference between both, and firmly believe the inability to see the "metaphysical" appearance of the latter is due to mere ignorance of the history of the word "will", coupled with the usual difficulty of native speakers to spot illogicalities in their own languages.

Luís Henrique

The latter is not an idiom because "will" is being used as an auxiliary verb to denote the tense of the main verb "to fall." What do you think an idiom is?

[ar734]

And so it is metaphysical non-sence?

Luís Henrique

If a sentence cannot be reduced to, or translated into, plain or ordinary language then it qualifies as metaphysical nonsense.

Medical jargon, for instance, can be translated so that an "ordinary" person can understand it.

A metaphysical statement, on the other hand, cannot be translated into ordinary language, or when translated is either self-contradictory or tautological. As "The nothingness of Nothing anihillates the very possibility of Being."

The phrase translates as "Nothing annihilates Being." This is merely the partial restatement of "matter can neither be created nor destroyed."

On the other hand, if it is meant that "Nothing annihilates social consciousness," what does that translate to or mean? Nothing can destroy humanity? Nothing can destroy human consciousness? Nothing can destroy
universal consciousness?

Wittgenstein was probably the last great philosopher of the 20th century, although, unfortunately, a lot of what he said was nonsense.

[Luís Henrique]

It is a grammatical issue because normally "is true" is a predicate "attached" to a sentence whereas in metaphysical/philosophical language it is treated as an object that has properties (as you've said). This shows a misunderstanding of the grammar of the term. Hypostasis involves cultural personification of something. Simply applying attributes to something is not hypostasis. Even then, the root of this supposed hypostasis is in a failure to understand the grammar of how the word "truth" is used.

Well, so you believe it is a grammatical issue.

But grammar is not this; it is just a set of formal rules for a language. The issues at stake aren't formal; they are issues of content.

Unless you believe the grammar of human languages is somehow a reflexion of the physical rules of the material universe. But this is an idealist view.


The latter is not an idiom because "will" is being used as an auxiliary verb to denote the tense of the main verb "to fall." What do you think an idiom is?

Oh, but "must" is also an auxiliary verb to the main verb.

The difference here is merely historical. The expression "will fall", which originaly meant "wants to fall" lost its metaphysical venom much longer ago than the expression "must fall". But both can be, and are, used as an "ordinary language" expression to signify a future about which there is a good degree of certainty.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Well, so you believe it is a grammatical issue.

But grammar is not this; it is just a set of formal rules for a language. The issues at stake aren't formal; they are issues of content.

Unless you believe the grammar of human languages is somehow a reflexion of the physical rules of the material universe. But this is an idealist view.

A predicate is one of two parts of speech, which is a portion of the grammar of a language. So, since "truth" is a predicate applied to a subject the problem comes in the form of trying to define a predicate as if it were a subject...which is a problem of grammar. Analyzing how the word is normally used and whatever grammar involved clears up the question of what, if anything, the nature of "truth" is.


Oh, but "must" is also an auxiliary verb to the main verb.

The difference here is merely historical. The expression "will fall", which originaly meant "wants to fall" lost its metaphysical venom much longer ago than the expression "must fall". But both can be, and are, used as an "ordinary language" expression to signify a future about which there is a good degree of certainty.

Luís Henrique[/QUOTE]

"Must" does not denote or modify a tense of a verb. It is used to denote that the verb is "done" in the context of some type of compulsion, urgency, requirement, imperativeness, etc.

[Meridian]

Fine, but the confusion continues: what is the difference between "language" and "ordinary language"?
I am sorry to see that you are so confused.


And so the famous "distortion" of language is grammatical misuse?
Yes, misuses of the rules and conventions of language.


But this isn't the case. Languages are flexible considering the grammatical functions of their words. They have to be, or they would be unusable as languages.
You paint the picture as if there are rules which can be bent. But in reality, the grammar of language is expansive and evolving, not flexible. The grammar itself is not bent in an expression of language. You claim this would make it unusable as language, but the opposite is true, it makes it usable. Of course, grammar evolves over time and is in that sense flexible, in addition to the flexibility a person has with the conventions of language already existent, but the conventions themselves offer the meaning and use of the words.


Here is an example of grammatical "misuse" that cannot be misconstrued into "metaphysics":

Your ifs and buts make it clear that your position is insincere.
That isn't grammar misuse. You can (or should) write it as "Your 'if's and 'but's make it clear that your position is insincere", because you are referring to the words "if" and "but".


There you can see two words that are not substantives being used as substantives - including gaining a plural form, that words of their class don't have. And yet there is nothing metaphysical about that sentence, it is just plain "ordinary" English.
Yes, when referring to a word it is a noun. Look up the use-mention distinction.


On the other hand, your example of grammatical misuse - the word "being" as a substanctive - is certainly not a grammatical misuse: "being", albeit having the form of (and indisputably being derived from) a verbal tense, is a substanctive on its own, with legitimate, non-metaphysical, uses:

There were many human beings suffering there.

And so the fact that the word "being" has a metaphysical use in "The nothingness of Nothing anihillates the very possibility of Being" cannot be due to a grammatical issue; it resides elsewhere.
That was not my example, I quoted it from you.

Anyway, you will note that the noun (substantive) "being" is a limited word with a relatively limited grammar. And more specifically; a being is different, not only to a degree but in kind, to the Being expressed in the 'metaphysical sentence' we are dealing with. So, you fail to show that the problem 'resides elsewhere'. Where else the problem could be in a dysfunctional sentence than in the way the sentence is formed, one might wonder.




It is a distortion of language because it is characterized by misusing, or distorting, grammar, the way language is ordinarily used. As a result, declarative sentences of this type can not make logical sense and can not be true or false. A sentence like this: "The age of the man turned into a blue-ish red color" has words in English, but it is grammatically incorrect. Metaphysical propositions are the same, yet their faulty composition is not brought to surface due to our own confusion.
Your example is grammatically incorrect (and yet it is not a metaphysical sentence). Its incorrection is due to a selection mistake: "age of man" is lexically equivalent to an abstract noun, and expressions like "blue-ish red colour" do not accept abstract nouns as subjects. The same isn't true of "motion without matter is unthinkable", or of most metaphysic sentences that I can think of.
Yes, pronouncing anything as unthinkable (and not as a manner of speech, like "Hilda coming over to dinner tomorrow is unthinkable!") is contradictory, because what can be said can also be thought. Thinking is not the same as imagining; I can think that you are confident, for example, and nothing is imagined by that. Imagining and thinking are two different things, ignorance of which I think disorients you when it comes to Rosa's argument over Lenin's statement. Let us make it clear:

I can think "motion" "without" "matter" in my head, only thinking about the words.

I can think "motion without matter" in my head, as when I am thinking normally.

And finally, I can try to imagine something like motion without matter, and here I find I have problems. The result seems similar to when one tries to imagine a square triangle, and I think we went over the cause of this.

So, the point is that "Motion without matter is unimaginable" would be true (in fact, tautologous).



Here we are back to the fluid meaning of the word language. As most words in any language, "language", too, has several different acceptions:

The Japanese language is not Germanic.
In Russel's language, "instance" does not mean the same as in Wittgenstein's.
John Doe uses foul language constantly.
I think there is absolute consensus that the Japanese language does not have presuppositions. It seems to be also clear that "Russel's language" does have presuppositions, as well as John Doe's "foul language". It also seems clear that "Russel's language" and "foul language" refer to particular "uses of language", to use your terms. So there is no point in insisting on this. When I say, "ordinary language necessarily have presuppositions", it is because I understand "ordinary language" as meaning something similar to "Russel's language" or "foul language", ie, as a particular use of language. As I see it, to you "ordinary language" is merely a synonim to "language". This particular misuse of language (using a more complicated expression that may have a double entendre instead of a more simple and less equivocal term) is exactly of the kind that conduces to sophistry.
It is not a more complicated expression, and it is ironic that it troubles you. While both metaphysical theories and (f.ex.) discussion of work conditions are expressed in language, only the latter is expressed in ordinary language. This is the poverty of the word "language" in this case.



As you (I believe, correctly) pointed out, a development of technical language can be based on a presupposition. Consider a field of theoretical physics, for example. However, the term "presupposition" would not apply to features of language itself, only to rules and terms in a certain language-game (to use a term of Wittgenstein). And that is because of the rules of that language-game's independence to our other rules of grammar.
Perhaps. Now, is it possible to actually speak outside any "language-game"? Is "ordinary language" a particular "language game", or is it a collection of some "language games", or does it encompass all "language games", or is it a different way to classify things?
"Language game" is used as an analogous picture to understand the role of language by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. If you haven't read it (which it seems from these questions) I recommend it!




Ordinary language, by my reasoning, includes the foundations of technical terms in its grammar, but it excludes metaphysical language which is characterized by misapplications and misunderstandings of grammatical rules.
As we saw, that is not what characterises "metaphysical language" ("metaphysical use of language" to be precise as you Wittgensteinians would like other people to be - even though you don't apply the same standards to yourselves).
As we saw a few paragraphs above, your attempt to show such a thing failed, miserably.



No, languages can not have presuppositions, only humans can, which I thought you had realized.
I think by now it is clearly established that the confusion here lies in your sloppy use of the word "language", which sometimes means the same as "language" in technical linguistic discourse, and sometimes means what you call "uses of language".
The only thing that has been established is that you are confused over the meaning of the word "language".


In any way, most "uses of language" do start with the presupposition that there is an "objective world" apart from speakers. It would make no sence to speak at all without such presupposition. Isn't that presupposition metaphysical?
I already showed that this is not the case. Your objection here contains the presupposition that language is representational as opposed to a communicative tool, and ignore the fact that declarative sentences may very well be false. As I have attempted to show to you, presuppositions can only stem from sentences that predicate about things. We do not start every sentence with "There is an objective world, blah blah blah". And if we did, the presupposition would not be endemic to language since, after all, the proposition could be false. So there is no presuppositions with declaring something to be the case, unless the utterer is actually making a presupposition.



Only some words are names we use of objects, other words are names but not of any existing object, and other words are not names at all.
Well, yes. But language is strictly conventional. The only reason that "bus" is the name of an object is because it is established in common use that it is such. Nothing bars users from establishing different uses for it, if they so see fit (indeed, I think that it is nowadays commonly used as a verb, with the usual verbal forms - buses, bused, busing). This isn't, except perhaps to strict linguistic conservatives, a "misuse" of words. It is like languages are; they constantly change and evolve, in an unstoppable process.
They do indeed. The grammar of some words is more deeply rooted than others. This tends to fool philosophers into believing language does not change and evolve, but rather gives access to 'fundamental properties of nature' or 'reality'.



Only declarative sentences are used to describe how things are, and then again, a function of language is that they may be true or false.
Erm, is this a function of language?
Yes, their truth is variable, so presupposition can not be an endemic feature of declarative sentences.



We would not normally say of "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" that it is an idea.
On the contrary, it seems to be quite commonplace to think of "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" as an idea:

The idea that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.
Yes, this was why I said "not normally". In that particular form of expression, the word could be used. But saying "I have an idea: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" would be foolish.



"The nothingness of Nothing anihilates the very possibility of Being" and "whereof we cannot speak, we must pass in silence" fits the 'notion' version of "idea".
I don't think the former is an idea, or even a notion. It seems to me pretty meaningless; whatever the speaker has in mind when uttering it has nothing to do with whatever the target of the communication will think when receiving it.

The latter, on the other hand is clearly an idea..
I disagree, I would have called the former an idea as well, even if it was 'a very weird idea'. Philosophers throughout history have had such very weird ideas.



"Idea" is more commonly used like the word "plan" or the word "opinion", none of which apply to this sentence. But "idea" can also be used like "notion", a more general statement which a person thinks to be true.
Then the question would be changed from "what is an idea" to "what is a notion", without excessive gain, in my view.
I already helped you out here; this particular use of the word means something like a general statement. For example, that society is divided into economical and social classes would be called an idea. There's no reason to be confused.


Since you are having trouble with defining the term "idea" (first you said that language expresses ideas, now you say that "idea" is more commonly used as synonim for "plan" or "opinion")
You miss the point yet again. Ideas are still expressed in language: "My idea is that we go biking", "your idea of what should be done about immigration is sickening", and so on. I have absolutely no trouble with the term, nor have I tried to define it.



Yes, it is completely nonsensical. First off, it treats words ("Nothing" and "Being") as if they were names of existing spirits instead of communicational tools. It disregards the grammar for those words completely, and instead uses the grammar of names. Secondly, it uses supposed characteristics of these terms (under the guise of the words being names, like they were characteristics of a thing) to formulate a sentence which looks like it declares something to be the case about the objects 'underlying' our ordinary use of language.
As we saw above, you are wrong here.
As I showed you again, no. (To be precise, you have not even made attempts which, had they been successful, would disprove what you quoted of me here).


Grammar is a collection of formal rules. What you are describing is a semantic shift, that, while is simultaneous to what a "grammar Nazi" would describe as a "grammatical mistake", in fact consists in a much broader (and not grammatical at all) operation.
No, grammar is the study of the structure of sentences, and following Wittgenstein's use of the term, the application of words in forming meaningful sentences.


Please give you me the in the upper shelf candy.
is a grammatically wrong sentence. It violates a few rules considering the word order in English language. Yet it is perfectly understandable, and not nonsencical at all.
It is only understandable (through guessing) because, and to the degree that, it resembles an ordinary sentence. However, ask any person on the street whether that sentence is nonsense and they would say yes.


The nothingness of Nothing anihillates the very possibility of Being.
is grammatically sound.
I have already presented to you why that is not the case.


But the bottom line of this is, if all grammatically sound sentences are actually non-metaphysical, and all metaphysical sentences revolve around some kind of grammatical mistake, it would seem that the structure of the grammar of human languages mirrors, in some mysterious sence, the structure of the objective world.
No, you ignore everything I have said. I have covered that idea of yours, several times.


Now that is a metaphysical assumption if I ever saw one.
The only one making assumptions here is you.



No, "whereof one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence" is not a manner of speaking.
And so it is metaphysical non-sence?
Yes, the Tractatus does contain non-sensical statements. Wittgenstein himself of course realized this, and rectified it in his later work which I have recommended to you now as many times as to make it cliché.

[Dean]

If a sentence cannot be reduced to, or translated into, plain or ordinary language then it qualifies as metaphysical nonsense.

Medical jargon, for instance, can be translated so that an "ordinary" person can understand it.

This isn't fair. A lot of economic, mathematical and scientific processes are very complex, detailed, and hard for the "layman" to understand.

I am constantly reading things I don't understand. It's a struggle to determine what I do and don't need to investigate further to inform myself on what I want to. To claim that all things can be reduced to single statements with common terminology is absurd at best. It betrays an ideology of reductionism which diminishes any honest scientific inquiry.

[JazzRemington]

This isn't fair. A lot of economic, mathematical and scientific processes are very complex, detailed, and hard for the "layman" to understand.

I am constantly reading things I don't understand. It's a struggle to determine what I do and don't need to investigate further to inform myself on what I want to.

This has more to do with a particular learning or education style than what we're talking about. At any rate, how do you think, e.g., scientists learn their field? There's a difference between explaining things in ordinary language and being good at it.


To claim that all things can be reduced to single statements with common terminology is absurd at best. It betrays an ideology of reductionism which diminishes any honest scientific inquiry.

Using common terminology, I see.

[ar734]

This isn't fair. A lot of economic, mathematical and scientific processes are very complex, detailed, and hard for the "layman" to understand.

I am constantly reading things I don't understand. It's a struggle to determine what I do and don't need to investigate further to inform myself on what I want to. To claim that all things can be reduced to single statements with common terminology is absurd at best. It betrays an ideology of reductionism which diminishes any honest scientific inquiry.

I think it was Einstein who said that if a scientific theory could not be explained to a six year old then it wasn't valid. That was probably one of his exaggerations, like "God doesn't play dice with the universe."

I agree with you that many concepts must be expressed with scientific, complicated language. For instance, here is a quote from Wikipedia:

"The best way to formulate Einstein–Cartan theory is to distinguish between tangents to the spacetime M and tangents to an associated flat affine fiber space, X. X is a (pseudo-) Euclidean space (a Minkowski space) with metric g and no origin, so you cannot add two points in X or multiply a point in X by a scalar."

I don't have a clue what that means, but I think it can be expressed in plain language. The translation may be extremely difficult, and possibly not worth doing, but my point is that it should be possible.


Another example is the definition of "marginal utility," which, I think, until recently was the mainstream economic explanation of "value," also from Wiki:

"The marginal utility of a good or service is the utility of its marginal use. Under the assumption of economic rationality, it is the utility of its least urgent possible use from the best feasible combination of actions in which its use is included."

Now this is complete non-sense. First it says, "Marginal utility is marginal utility is marginal use." Then it says, assuming economic rationality, "Marginal utility is the marginal use from possible uses."

It seems to me that all mainstream economics (non-Marxist) has been based on this patent non-sense. Mainly because economists did not want to admit that value comes from labor.

[Luís Henrique]

A predicate is one of two parts of speech, which is a portion of the grammar of a language. So, since "truth" is a predicate applied to a subject the problem comes in the form of trying to define a predicate as if it were a subject...which is a problem of grammar. Analyzing how the word is normally used and whatever grammar involved clears up the question of what, if anything, the nature of "truth" is.

Well, this is obviously false.

"True" is an adjective, so it cannot be the nucleus of a nominal syntagm. And since only nominal syntagms can be subjects, "true" can only figure in a sentence's subject as a modificator of its nucleus, like in "true Scottsmen don't drink Vodka".

But "truth" is a substantive, and, as any substantive, it can be the nucleus of a nominal syntagm, and so it can be the the nucleus of the subject of a sentence, which implies it can figure even alone as such subject. And so, sentences like,



Truth is the opposite of falsehood.
Truth is the result of the work of the scientist.
Truth was Plato's passion.

are all perfectly grammatical - whether they do or do not make sence. The grammar has not a mind of its own that can decide what is meaningful or meaningless, nor does it reflect the structure of the "objective world" in order to make what does not belong to the "objective world" agrammatical in principle.

Otherwise you would be telling us that the nominalisation of adjectives or verbs is agrammatical - but it is a commonplace grammatical resource of all languages (or of all languages that I have ever heard of, at least). Or are you going to maintain that words like "uglyness", "selfishness", "madness", etc., are inherently meaningless, non-sencical, or agrammatical?

That certainly isn't what Wittgenstein believed anyway, so you are going astray from Holy Scripture.


"Must" does not denote or modify a tense of a verb.

Nor did "will", until it started to be used like that more and more commonly, ending by rendering whatever older form was used to mark the future (in Old English, or Germanic, or Indo-European, I'm not sure) obsolete and archaic.

Languages are historical, which is something that Wittgenstein never realised.


It is used to denote that the verb is "done" in the context of some type of compulsion, urgency, requirement, imperativeness, etc.

You must be kidding...

(and I don't mean that you are under some compulsion, urgency, requirement, or imperativeness to make a joke - nor do I think I am making a non-sence sentence in any way...)

Words are conventional. They mean what people use them to mean; they do not have a fixed meaning, much less one inscribed in grammar. And as a result, they seldom have a unequivocal meaning; they have many potential meanings, about which listeners or readers decide in context.

This whole confusion, by the way, was adequately dispelled by yours truly, here: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=932992&postcount=84 and here: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=933715&postcount=89. It hasn't lost any of its a-historical flavour, or of its absurd essentialism, since then.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Well, this is obviously false.

"True" is an adjective, so it cannot be the nucleus of a nominal syntagm. And since only nominal syntagms can be subjects, "true" can only figure in a sentence's subject as a modificator of its nucleus, like in "true Scottsmen don't drink Vodka".

But "truth" is a substantive, and, as any substantive, it can be the nucleus of a nominal syntagm, and so it can be the the nucleus of the subject of a sentence, which implies it can figure even alone as such subject. And so, sentences like,

Truth is the opposite of falsehood.
Truth is the result of the work of the scientist.
Truth was Plato's passion.
are all perfectly grammatical - whether they do or do not make sence. The grammar has not a mind of its own that can decide what is meaningful or meaningless, nor does it reflect the structure of the "objective world" in order to make what does not belong to the "objective world" agrammatical in principle.

Otherwise you would be telling us that the nominalisation of adjectives or verbs is agrammatical - but it is a commonplace grammatical resource of all languages (or of all languages that I have ever heard of, at least). Or are you going to maintain that words like "uglyness", "selfishness", "madness", etc., are inherently meaningless, non-sencical, or agrammatical?

That certainly isn't what Wittgenstein believed anyway, so you are going astray from Holy Scripture.

You've needlessly expounded upon a topic that was brought up as an example.


Nor did "will", until it started to be used like that more and more commonly, ending by rendering whatever older form was used to mark the future (in Old English, or Germanic, or Indo-European, I'm not sure) obsolete and archaic.

Languages are historical, which is something that Wittgenstein never realised.


The discussion is about modern English and the way it's normally spoken today, not as it was spoken a thousand years ago.


You must be kidding...

(and I don't mean that you are under some compulsion, urgency, requirement, or imperativeness to make a joke - nor do I think I am making a non-sence sentence in any way...)

Actually, in normal conversation that's what "must be kidding" would mean.


Words are conventional. They mean what people use them to mean; they do not have a fixed meaning, much less one inscribed in grammar. And as a result, they seldom have a unequivocal meaning; they have many potential meanings, about which listeners or readers decide in context.

If that were the case, people would always be asking what is meant by everything, even the explanations given as to what was meant. This is obviously not the case.

[Luís Henrique]

I am sorry to see that you are so confused.

And I am sorry to see you recur to such a Rosaite tactic. The confusion is yours. It is you who cannot for the sake of Pete explain what is the difference between "ordinary language" and "language" - and it is to your position that "ordinary language" is a key concept.


You paint the picture as if there are rules which can be bent. But in reality, the grammar of language is expansive and evolving, not flexible.Of course rules can be bent. Otherwise linguistic creativity would be impossible - and we live in a world that is full of linguistic creativity. The very fact that there are different languages is a proof of that.

Here are some examples:



That is so Mozart that I find it actually very hard to believe it was composed by Schubert!
Can someone please take this guy out of his misery?
Your religion is completely fucked up.
Mr. Obama is walking on a tight rope when it comes to the Libyan uprising.

Obviously nobody believes that a piece of music "is" a (long dead, btw) human being, or that a speaker is politely asking for a favour when implying that a third person should be killed, or that a listener's religion has just had a sexual relation, or that Mr. Obama becomes a circus artist when the subject of Libya comes into discussion.


The grammar itself is not bent in an expression of language. You claim this would make it unusable as language, but the opposite is true, it makes it usable.So let's look at that. You tell me, "please fall off your high horse", and neither you, nor I, nor anyone else, thinks that you mean that I should fall from an actual horse. That's because "high horse" has come to mean something quite different from an actual horse, high or low. Which means that the grammatical conventions for the word "horse" are completely altered here, not to mention its meaning. Now, evidently, this means that a different convention applies to "horse" in this context. But this singular expression, which is now trite and unremarkable, was used once for its first time - when no one had either uttered or heard it before: and that could only be done by bending rules of language.


Of course, grammar evolves over time and is in that sense flexible, in addition to the flexibility a person has with the conventions of language already existent, but the conventions themselves offer the meaning and use of the words.And so, if they are flexible in that sence, in what sence are they inflexible?


That isn't grammar misuse. You can (or should) write it as "Your 'if's and 'but's make it clear that your position is insincere", because you are referring to the words "if" and "but".Oh yes, but how then I can say someone's position is "iffy"? This kind of sufixation is privative of nouns, it shouldn't apply to conjunctions.


Yes, when referring to a word it is a noun. Look up the use-mention distinction.Ah, but this is certainly not the case of many other uses:



New York is a monster city.
Here comes the living proof that John's story is false.
Gambling is a vice.
Yellow is my favourit colour.

See, there you have, a substanctive being used as an adjective, a verb being used as an adjective, a verb being used as a substanctive, and an adjective being used as a substantive - and not in one of these sentences you can say that the situation can be saved by the use of quote marks.


Anyway, you will note that the noun (substantive) "being" is a limited word with a relatively limited grammar. And more specifically; a being is different, not only to a degree but in kind, to the Being expressed in the 'metaphysical sentence' we are dealing with. So, you fail to show that the problem 'resides elsewhere'. Where else the problem could be in a dysfunctional sentence than in the way the sentence is formed, one might wonder.Well, "being" is either a concrete substanctive more or less interchangeable with "creature" or "thing", depending on context, or it is an abstract substanctive meaning something like "existence" or "life". And as such, its grammatical constraints are those of animated or unanimated substanctives in the first case, or those of abstract substanctives in the second case. It takes plural and singular numbers as any substanctive, can be used as the nucleus of a nominal syntagm, and accepts some adjectives and verbs but rejects others (and often it is the kind of adjective or verb attached to it - in other words, its context! - that allows us to understand what it means):



Those green beings in Mars are ugly, eat too much, and cannot fly.
Stars are strange beings that convert hydrogen into helium.
Being is difficult, who told you otherwise?


Yes, pronouncing anything as unthinkable (and not as a manner of speech, like "Hilda coming over to dinner tomorrow is unthinkable!") is contradictory, because what can be said can also be thought.Well, I disagree with that, and have argued why in my opinion you are wrong. Sometimes the meaning of words just isn't consensual among speakers of a language - and this goes further to show how wrong you are in presuming a fixed grammar and a fixed semantic.


Thinking is not the same as imagining; I can think that you are confident, for example, and nothing is imagined by that.Yes, sure, but I can say the words "I think you are confident" while actually thinking you are not (and indeed similar expressions can be used to denote the exact opposite, such as in "I thought you knew how to drive" or "I think you are a grown up"). Thinking that you are confident involves an ideation of your person as holding a quality, which is completely independent from the words (indeed, I can think you are confident, even if I don't know the word "confident"; I can think that you are confident without even knowing English).

On the other hand, the confusion can be easily dispelled if we, as English speakers, can agree that the word "unthinkable" can mean, depending on context, the same as "impossible", or "contradictory", or "nonsencical". In which case we would just read Lenin's "motion without matter is unthinkable" as a quite Wittgensteinian notion - that the verb "to move" requires a subject, that such subject should, at least in the most commonplace contexts, be a material substanctive, and that therefore saying "motion without matter" is uttering a contradiction, or a non-sence, or otherwise refers to something that cannot exist.


Imagining and thinking are two different things, ignorance of which I think disorients you when it comes to Rosa's argument over Lenin's statement. Let us make it clear:

I can think "motion" "without" "matter" in my head, only thinking about the words.Well, if this is the case, we can think of anything, even of Christofer's famous "Chack plsit hol", which he says is unspeakable, while actually saying - yes, writing, but there is no difference here - it.

Indeed, according to Christopher, "saying" is the same as "making sence":


Tell me what "Chack plsit hol" means and then tell me its speakable (really makes sense)This would be easily paraphrased as:


Tell me what "Chack plsit hol" means and then tell me its thinkable (really makes sense)or


Tell me what "motion without matter" means and then tell me its thinkable (really makes sense)Or, in other words, you guys seem to be saying more things than actually making sence of them...


And finally, I can try to imagine something like motion without matter, and here I find I have problems. The result seems similar to when one tries to imagine a square triangle, and I think we went over the cause of this.

So, the point is that "Motion without matter is unimaginable" would be true (in fact, tautologous).Oh, so that is the whole problem. Lenin used the word "unthikable" when he should have used the word "unimaginable". But, besides the obvious fact that the words "imagine" and "think" are used interchangeably in ordinary language ("I imagined/thought you went to the supermarket", "do you imagine/think I would use such a ridiculous shirt?"), it seems to be a bit of an overstatement to conclude that Lenin was a "mystical" because of such misuse.

Sometimes people are just being rhetorical, and sometimes they just mispeak. It doesn't imply a whole philosophy any more than smoking a cigar implies you know what...


It is not a more complicated expression, and it is ironic that it troubles you. While both metaphysical theories and (f.ex.) discussion of work conditions are expressed in language, only the latter is expressed in ordinary language. This is the poverty of the word "language" in this case.
But that is simply untrue. While discussing work conditions we just do misuse language as everywhere else:



An eight hour journey is unbearable! (albeit we have been bearing it for a century now...)
Not having a lunch stop is unthinkable. (quite less than "motion without matter, I would say...)
Our salaries are unfair... (and what would a "fair salary" be?)

I deny any of the above sentences are "metaphysical" or "non-sence".


"Language game" is used as an analogous picture to understand the role of language by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. If you haven't read it (which it seems from these questions) I recommend it!Thank you, I might.


The only thing that has been established is that you are confused over the meaning of the word "language".No, I am not.

I know that the word has different meanings in different contexts (you should actually read Rosa with more attention, she actually points out that - though, unhappily, she errs in the simmetrical way, in believing that words have no meaning of themselves, and only sentences bear meaning). This is one of the reasons faulty logic is possible: we shift the meaning of a word when moving from the premises to the conclusion, or from one premise to another, and - presto! - we have an invalid argument with a compelling appearance:



Languages cannot be sexist, because they can express every thought, sexist and not-sexist alike.
Ergo, John's language cannot be sexist, even though he commonly calls women *****es and always imply women are unintelligent.

(OK, this doesn't have even a compelling appearance at all, but that's because I am making it as exaggerated as possible.)


I already showed that this is not the case. Your objection here contains the presupposition that language is representational as opposed to a communicative tool, and ignore the fact that declarative sentences may very well be false.Not so. If there wasn't an objective world about which to communicate, language would be useless as a communicative tool too.


As I have attempted to show to you, presuppositions can only stem from sentences that predicate about things. We do not start every sentence with "There is an objective world, blah blah blah".Well, obviously. If we did so, it would not be a presupposition. But when I say "the sky is blue", I do presuppose me and you are talking about something that is not part of either me or you; that the blueness of the sky isn't an état d'âme of me, nor something that it would be utterly unnacessible to you if I didn't say it. And evidently the assertion can be true or false, I could be mistaken or lying, or the context of the declaration could be equivocal ("well, of course it is blue, that is the colour of the sky, isn't it?" versus "Blue? It is rainy and foggy today, how do you think it is blue?")


They do indeed. The grammar of some words is more deeply rooted than others.I am sorry, but I fear this sentence is utter nonsense. What would be "the grammar of a word"? What does it means for "a grammar" to be "more deeply rooted" than "another grammar"? As far as I understand, words don't have private grammars, nor grammars have roots.


This tends to fool philosophers into believing language does not change and evolve, but rather gives access to 'fundamental properties of nature' or 'reality'.Which is a mistake you keep repeating, when you believe that you can understand something about the world by understanding what (what you call) the "grammars of words". You can't know anything about the "truth-value" of a sentence from the fact that it is "grammatically correct", unless the sentence is about grammatics itself (such as "four-sided triangles do not exist", which merely reflects the fact that "triangle" is the name we give to "three sided geometric shapes").


Yes, their truth is variable, so presupposition can not be an endemic feature of declarative sentences.And how does this make it a "function of language"?

I don't think you understand what I am trying to express with the word "presupposition". If I tell you "This umbrella is red", I presuppose that you can understand the difference between red and other colours, that you know what an umbrella is, that we are talking about the same things, etc. If each time I felt the necessity of communicating I had to make such presuppositions explicit, communication would be much harder than it actually is.

Now, of course, some of those presuppositions are not metaphysical at all. Others are, and there is nothing wrong with that. The only philosophy that is completely free of metaphysics is solipsism, and it is quite useless.


Yes, this was why I said "not normally". In that particular form of expression, the word could be used. But saying "I have an idea: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" would be foolish.I certainly don't see why one of the acceptions of the word would be more "normal" than the other". To me "The idea that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous" is an acceptable use of the word as "I have an idea: let's give Tony Blair a copy of Das Kapital, and see if his politics change".


I disagree, I would have called the former an idea as well, even if it was 'a very weird idea'. Philosophers throughout history have had such very weird ideas.Well, since I invented the sentence myself, I can assure you that it corresponds to nothing that I can actually think of. It is merely a parody of a sentence of Heiddeger, specifically designed as an example of a string of words completely devoid of any communicable notion.


I already helped you out here; this particular use of the word means something like a general statement. For example, that society is divided into economical and social classes would be called an idea. There's no reason to be confused.I see that you cannot actually explain what an "idea" is, using "ordinary language". And of course: whatever terms you may use, I can always ask you "and this, what does this mean" (for instance, I could now question you on what is a "general statement"), until you get into some circularity or contradict yourself. The number of words is limited, so you will necessarily reach this limit at some point.

We know what an idea is because we know (most) the conventions of the English language (not its grammar!).


You miss the point yet again. Ideas are still expressed in language: "My idea is that we go biking", "your idea of what should be done about immigration is sickening", and so on. I have absolutely no trouble with the term, nor have I tried to define it.Well, those sentences refer to different acceptions of the word "idea". The first is the one you think is "normal", or more "normal" than the others: a plan. You can see what it "means" here by experimenting what can substitute for it:



My idea is that we go biking.
My plan is that we go biking.
My proposal is that we go biking.
My take is that we go biking.

But


*My opinion is that we go biking.
*My general statement is that we go biking.
*My notion is that we go biking.

On the other hand,



your idea of what should be done about immigration is sickening
your plan of what should be done about immigration is sickening
your proposal of what should be done about immigration is sickening
your take of what should be done about immigration is sickening
your opinion of what should be done about immigration is sickening
your general statement of what should be done about immigration is sickening
your notion of what should be done about immigration is sickening


As they accept (or reject) different substitutes, they have different meanings. As does this one:



The idea that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.
*The plan that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.
*The proposal that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.
The take that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.
The opinion that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.
*The general statement that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.
The notion that Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital is ridiculous.

In "ordinary language", this is never a problem. Context shows us what we are talking about. But trying to make logical assertions, this will result in falacies:



You have the idea that we should give Tony Blair a copy of Das Kapital;
An idea is a plan;
ergo, you have a plan for giving Tony Blair a copy of Das Kapital.

Which seems reasonable, but:


You have the idea that we should build a church here.
An idea is a plan;
ergo, you have a plan for building a church here. (when, in fact, you have a mere opinion, and haven't actually planned anything).

Or, more philosophycally,



An idea is a general statement about something;
A general statement about something exists independently of the thing existing or not;
ergo, the idea of something exists independently of the thing existing or not.



No, grammar is the study of the structure of sentences, and following Wittgenstein's use of the term, the application of words in forming meaningful sentences.Erm, no. If so, there would be no difference in the grammaticality of sentences; to say that one sentence is grammatical would make no sence, since every sentence has a structure. Studying grammar is precisely understanding why some sentences are grammatical and others are not. This is evidently impossible if there isn't a set of formal rules that some sentences follow and others don't.

The proper field of the study of meaning is not grammar, but semantics.

Here are some sentences that are perfectly grammatical:



The ghost came in through the window.
God loves us.
The unicorn is a horse with a single horn in its forehead.

And albeit being grammatically sound, the first three are absurd. Now compare:


A butterfly is not a fly.
Shooting stars are not stars.

Which seem to violate grammatical rules, but are nevertheless not only perfectly sound, but even true.

And



The fourth side of the triangle has to be taken into consideration.

Which is a violation of grammar - not the grammar of the English language, but the grammar of mathemathics. (Because mathemathics is a formal language, the form of its words follow its definitions, and so a tri-angle has to have three sides, and not four; because English is not a formal language, a butterfly can be neither a fly, nor made of butter. But to talk about the world, a language cannot be formal.)

There is no direct relation between grammaticallity and "meaningfullness" in an informal language: the words of an informal language are arbitrary, merely conventional, and their form does not reflect their content.


It is only understandable (through guessing) because, and to the degree that, it resembles an ordinary sentence. However, ask any person on the street whether that sentence is nonsense and they would say yes.
In which case a stutterer would be less grammatical than a "normal" person, because s/he would be more difficult to understand.


Yes, the Tractatus does contain non-sensical statements. Wittgenstein himself of course realized this, and rectified it in his later work which I have recommended to you now as many times as to make it cliché.It contains "non-sencical" statements because it is impossible to speak about metaphysics without being metaphysical - even if the intention is to negate metaphysics.

Or, it is "non-sencical" because it tries to make sence of things that are "pre-sencical", and intrinsically so. What we cannot speak thereof, we must pass into silence - and when we try to speak about it, we are not passing it into silence. So...

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Oh, and could a mod split the relevant posts into another thread, or possibly merge them into the thread on "logical positivism"?

Wittgenstein has nothing to do with neither Marxism nor existentialism.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

This isn't fair. A lot of economic, mathematical and scientific processes are very complex, detailed, and hard for the "layman" to understand.

And this is why the expression "ordinary language" is so imprecise. If we nail it down to something understandable, then it follows that there are many different brands of "extraordinary language", not all of which can be said to arouse metaphysical confusion.


I am constantly reading things I don't understand. It's a struggle to determine what I do and don't need to investigate further to inform myself on what I want to. To claim that all things can be reduced to single statements with common terminology is absurd at best. It betrays an ideology of reductionism which diminishes any honest scientific inquiry.

Or, as Perry Anderson puts it, a mystic of common sence and of the ordinary language that reflected it.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

If that were the case, people would always be asking what is meant by everything, even the explanations given as to what was meant. This is obviously not the case.

What part of "decide on context" are you finding difficult to understand?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Another example is the definition of "marginal utility," which, I think, until recently was the mainstream economic explanation of "value," also from Wiki:

"The marginal utility of a good or service is the utility of its marginal use. Under the assumption of economic rationality, it is the utility of its least urgent possible use from the best feasible combination of actions in which its use is included."

Now this is complete non-sense. First it says, "Marginal utility is marginal utility is marginal use." Then it says, assuming economic rationality, "Marginal utility is the marginal use from possible uses."

It seems to me that all mainstream economics (non-Marxist) has been based on this patent non-sense. Mainly because economists did not want to admit that value comes from labor.

The problem with "marginal utility" is that it is either circular (what is value? value is what people value) or implies an inverted notion of value as labour (what is utility? utility is not having to work). Of course, this leads marginalist economists into nonsencical, even mystical, heights. After all, their work is to negate the reality of exploitation; what else could they arrive to other than a completely unreal theory?

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

Or, as Perry Anderson puts it, a mystic of common sence and of the ordinary language that reflected it.
Ordinary language and 'common sense' are not functionally related.


I am constantly reading things I don't understand. It's a struggle to determine what I do and don't need to investigate further to inform myself on what I want to. To claim that all things can be reduced to single statements with common terminology is absurd at best.Obviously, not all 'things' can be reduced to a single statement, but all healthy indicative expressions can be restated using the common terminology of a given language, from which the languages grammar derives.

What you want to inform yourself of is besides the issue.

[Luís Henrique]

Ordinary language and 'common sense' are not functionally related.

They are historically and ideologically related, though. The mystic of "ordinary language" is the mystic of an acritical language, that refuses to look into its foundations (thence the idea that it has "no presuppositions). That's why it is "ordinary": it is the mere use of words as conventionally accepted; and that's why it is common sencical: its conventions are taken for granted.

To deny it requires a systematic fluidification of the meaning of "ordinary language", so to not make it clear that it is the "ordinary language" of class oppression and submission. The practical wisdom of the ruling class, as Gramsci puts it.

Here it is, in action:


I believe that bad housekeeping within the state fosters bad housekeeping in families. A workman who is constantly ready to go on strike will not bring up his children to respect order either.

Yes, that's what we need. An "ordinary language" to tell workers that they are necessarily bad parents if they go on strike, and that being a bad parent actually means not instilling a conventional respect for order and and a sheepish fear of authority...

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

What part of "decide on context" are you finding difficult to understand?

Luís Henrique

If two people have a meaningful conversation with each other, that suggests the words they're using have a fixed meaning. Otherwise they'd have to determine the meaning of the words used before actually going about having a conversation.

[Luís Henrique]

If people have to decide what a word means based on the context of its use, then the word has a fixed meaning in said context.

But the number of possible contexts is not finite.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

In all honestly, I don't understand the point Luis Henrique's criticisms.

[JazzRemington]

But the number of possible contexts is not finite.

Luís Henrique

And words would still have a fixed meaning in those contexts as well. Words do change in meaning from time to time ("consumption" once meant a physical illness and not anything related to the use of goods or services), but whether the meaning is fixed or not depends on the level granulation you want to use when analyzing meaning.

[Luís Henrique]

And words would still have a fixed meaning in those contexts as well. Words do change in meaning from time to time ("consumption" once meant a physical illness and not anything related to the use of goods or services), but whether the meaning is fixed or not depends on the level granulation you want to use when analyzing meaning.

Take a look at your own signature. There is this silly sentence by a reactionary troll, that you quote for fun:


driving down the highway screaming 'Ploterait of the world, unite!'.

Both you and me perfectly know that the idiot who wrote that meant "proletariat", but couldn't type it properly. But if the word was in another context, something like, "the ploterait today is a sorry memory of what it was in the past", we might simply miss the meaning. We know what it is because of Marx's famous sentence, that is being supposedly quoted here.

Now how many times has "ploterait" been uttered before this genius used it for our fruition? How could it have a "fixed" sence if it didn't exist before? Suppose now that your joking with it results in a number of people starting to use it for fun. Can you predict what meaning will this neologism take?

Or even with well established words. I suppose you know what I mean by calling the troll who involuntarily coined this gem a "genius". But the word "genius" has many meanings, of which the sarcastic acception I used is certainly not the most frequent. But I don't think you considered the possibility that I was considering that unintelligent guy a superb mind on a comparable standing to Newton, Mozart, or Clausewitz. And so the meaning of the word is not fixed, but we don't usually have trouble in realising which of its many possible acceptions is at stake (we do have much more trouble when directly asked what a word "means", as exemplified by Meridian's inability to realise that a quite commonplace acception of the word "idea" is actually very normal, or by your inability to see any other meaning in the word "must" than the one that best serves your argument in the discussion).

Now suppose that someone who hasn't followed the discussion, who doesn't know me, or you, nor where or how the "word" "ploterait" was first used, stumbles with the following sentence, devoid of all context:


Now how many times has "ploterait" been uttered before this genius used it for our fruition?

How can this hypothetical reader decide whether I consider the creator of "ploterait" an actual genius, or am being sarcastic?

Consider here how many different acceptions the word "meaning" actually has: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1926793&postcount=9. Rosa lists seventeen (!), and remarks that it is possible that they not cover all possibilities.

And while we are at it, let me quote Rosa again:


Frege was concerned to oppose the traditional view that words gained their meaning individually by acting as the names of ideas, concepts, things, objects, etc.

Based on Plato's idea that the smallest unit we can say anything is a sentence containing a noun and verb, he argued that it is only in the context of a sentence/proposition that a word has a meaning:

"[N]ever ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition." [Frege (1953) The Foundations of Arithmetic, p.x.]

"[W]e ought always to keep before our eyes a complete proposition. Only in the context of a proposition have the words really a meaning." [Ibid., p.71. Cf., also pp.73, 116.]

This is even more explicit here: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1515848&postcount=23:


The point is that howsoever we give sense to the meaning of our words, we cannot do so except in the context of a sentence. Frege is not saying that just any old sentence will do, since he himself pointed out that many sentences make no sense.

So I don't get how now you have come to the weird conclusion that words have "fixed" meanings.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Or even with well established words. I suppose you know what I mean by calling the troll who involuntarily coined this gem a "genius". But the word "genius" has many meanings, of which the sarcastic acception I used is certainly not the most frequent. But I don't think you considered the possibility that I was considering that unintelligent guy a superb mind on a comparable standing to Newton, Mozart, or Clausewitz. And so the meaning of the word is not fixed, but we don't usually have trouble in realising which of its many possible acceptions is at stake (we do have much more trouble when directly asked what a word "means", as exemplified by Meridian's inability to realise that a quite commonplace acception of the word "idea" is actually very normal, or by your inability to see any other meaning in the word "must" than the one that best serves your argument in the discussion).

You'll have to explain what you mean by "fixed" and "non-fixed" then, because it's evident you aren't using them in their normal sense. If the meaning of a word is shared between two people using it, we'd normally say it's fixed in this regard because it can't mean anything else within the context. Again, the level of granulation matters.


Now suppose that someone who hasn't followed the discussion, who doesn't know me, or you, nor where or how the "word" "ploterait" was first used, stumbles with the following sentence, devoid of all context:

How can this hypothetical reader decide whether I consider the creator of "ploterait" an actual genius, or am being sarcastic?

We'd normally say he/she just doesn't know what is meant by the use of the word "genius." If he/she thought you were serious, we'd say that he/she was wrong.



Now how many times has "ploterait" been uttered before this genius used it for our fruition? How could it have a "fixed" sence if it didn't exist before? Suppose now that your joking with it results in a number of people starting to use it for fun. Can you predict what meaning will this neologism take?

[...]

So I don't get how now you have come to the weird conclusion that words have "fixed" meanings.

Luís Henrique

I never said they had fixed meanings. I said it depended upon the level of granulation you take when analyzing the meanings of words, which you seem to also believe by the arguments you're raising.

[ar734]

To deny it requires a systematic fluidification of the meaning of "ordinary language", so to not make it clear that it is the "ordinary language" of class oppression and submission.

Luís Henrique

This is an example of language that needs to be translated. Trans: "Ordinary language" is a tool of capitalists used to suppress workers. To deny this and to conceal the true meaning of "ordinary language," its proponents constantly change its definition.

[ar734]

But the number of possible contexts is not finite.

Luís Henrique

Thus, the number of possible meanings is infinite; and meaning can change
whenever the speaker or listener choose. Thus, there is a "systematic fluidification" of meaning. The use of which by "ordinary language" proponents Luis Henrique has already condemned in a previous post.

[Luís Henrique]

You'll have to explain what you mean by "fixed" and "non-fixed" then, because it's evident you aren't using them in their normal sense.

Dictionary.com gives us eleven different acceptions for the word "fixed":




[fikst]
–adjective

fastened, attached, or placed so as to be firm and not readily movable; firmly implanted; stationary; rigid.
rendered stable or permanent, as color.
set or intent upon something; steadily directed: a fixed stare.
definitely and permanently placed: a fixed buoy; a fixed line of defense.
not fluctuating or varying; definite: a fixed purpose.
supplied with or having enough of something necessary or wanted, as money (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/money).
coming each year on the (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the) same calendar (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/calendar) date: Christmas is a fixed holiday, but Easter is not.
put in order.
Informal . arranged in advance privately or dishonestly: a fixed horse (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/horse) race.
Chemistry .



a. (of an element) taken into a compound from its free (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/free) state.
b. nonvolatile, or not easily volatilized: a fixed oil.



Mathematics . (of a point) mapped to itself by a given function.

I would say that I am using acception #5: not fluctuating or varying; definite. I would say that this is also a quite perfectly "normal" use of the word "fixed".
But the point is again that "ordinary language" is like that, and, yes, people do have to often ask what is being meant by a particular word - especially when we start to discuss subjects where precision is needed. For "ordinary language" is exactly imprecise, fuzzy.


If the meaning of a word is shared between two people using it, we'd normally say it's fixed in this regard because it can't mean anything else within the context. Again, the level of granulation matters.But it varies with the context, so it is not fixed at all. You could perhaps say that there is a "fixed" set of possible meanings, within which speakers are able to choose when using a word, but even this would only be true in the very short term, as whenever context makes it possible, new acceptions will arise.


I never said they had fixed meanings. I said it depended upon the level of granulation you take when analyzing the meanings of words, which you seem to also believe by the arguments you're raising.Yes, indeed - which puts the lie to the idea that there is one univocal and unequivocal use of "ordinary language", which would be "grammatically" immune to misunderstandings, nonsence (or non-sence), double sence, word plays, lies, sophisms, etc.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Dictionary.com gives us eleven different acceptions for the word "fixed":

[...]

I would say that I am using acception #5: not fluctuating or varying; definite. I would say that this is also a quite perfectly "normal" use of the word "fixed".
But the point is again that "ordinary language" is like that, and, yes, people do have to often ask what is being meant by a particular word - especially when we start to discuss subjects where precision is needed.

When a word is repeatedly used within a context and it elicits, e.g., the same responses every time, then it has a fixed meaning by the definition you've chosen. Otherwise, you'll have to explain what you mean better by "fixed."


For "ordinary language" is exactly imprecise, fuzzy.

You're contradicting yourself here, in more ways than one.


But it varies with the context, so it is not fixed at all. You could perhaps say that there is a "fixed" set of possible meanings, within which speakers are able to choose when using a word, but even this would only be true in the very short term, as whenever context makes it possible, new acceptions will arise.

What about within a context? If I'm helping someone fix a car and he/she asks me for a screwdriver and I produce a drink with vodka mixed with orange juice, I would be told I'm wrong. Whether or not "screwdriver" can mean something else doesn't matter in this situation. It doesn't matter what it means in other contexts. Period. We'd normally say that I'm conflating the two contexts in which "screwdriver" is used.


Yes, indeed - which puts the lie to the idea that there is one univocal and unequivocal use of "ordinary language", which would be "grammatically" immune to misunderstandings, nonsence (or non-sence), double sence, word plays, lies, sophisms, etc.

Luís Henrique

Who said otherwise?

[Meridian]

They are historically and ideologically related, though. The mystic of "ordinary language" is the mystic of an acritical language, that refuses to look into its foundations (thence the idea that it has "no presuppositions). That's why it is "ordinary": it is the mere use of words as conventionally accepted; and that's why it is common sencical: its conventions are taken for granted.
No, ordinary language can't be based on presuppositions, unless you happen to be speaking in metaphor, because the meaning of the word derives from ordinary language. Only people making certain claims base them on presuppositions. A theory can contain presuppositions. Language is like a set of tools, it is not a reflection of the world, it by itself does not reflect the world beyond our own practices. We say of statements that they are true, false, dubious, and so on, but doing so is still a linguistic act.

And claiming ordinary language has historically been reactionary is like claiming sowing has historically been reactionary.

[Luís Henrique]

No, ordinary language can't be based on presuppositions, unless you happen to be speaking in metaphor, because the meaning of the word derives from ordinary language. Only people making certain claims base them on presuppositions. A theory can contain presuppositions. Language is like a set of tools, it is not a reflection of the world, it by itself does not reflect the world beyond our own practices. We say of statements that they are true, false, dubious, and so on, but doing so is still a linguistic act.

And claiming ordinary language has historically been reactionary is like claiming sowing has historically been reactionary.

To me, the expression "ordinary language" only bears any sence as meaning "ordinary, daily, acritical use of language". Otherwise it is synonimous with "language", and so is an unnecessarily complicated term.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

What about within a context? If I'm helping someone fix a car and he/she asks me for a screwdriver and I produce a drink with vodka mixed with orange juice, I would be told I'm wrong.

Certainly.

This, however, is a very limited "language game", to use Wittgenstein's terminology. Indeed, asking for different tools in the context of fixing something doesn't even need a syntax: you don't need to say anything like,


Please pass me the screwdriver.You could simply say,


Screwdriver!and it would perfectly do the trick. Now a "language" without a syntax is certainly a few orders of complexity below any human language, "ordinary" or not.


Whether or not "screwdriver" can mean something else doesn't matter in this situation. It doesn't matter what it means in other contexts.Well, do you really believe that most situations are that clearcut, or that the use of language in such clearcut situations is representative of general use of language? Or, more properly, do you believe that such limited use of language can serve as a general model for the use of language?

I would say that in any situation that goes beyond a very "ordinary" use of language, we have to verbally (ie, linguistically) establish what the context is.


Period.Colon: when matters get complicated, you want to stop discussion. You should perhaps limit yourself to handing screwdrivers or asking for them.


We'd normally say that I'm conflating the two contexts in which "screwdriver" is used.Or that you are making a practical joke, etc.


Who said otherwise?Who knows? "Ordinary language" keeps changing its meaning, so that it best fits the immediate needs of the argument, so it is difficult to assert what is being stated about it. The general idea seems to be,



Metaphysics is non-sence because it is a (result of a) misuse of "ordinary language";
These misuses are "grammatical" misuses, ie, violations of grammatical rules of "ordinary language";
ergo, metaphysics is a grammatical issue.

From the above, I would conclude that "ordinary language" is grammatically immune to metaphysics, or non-sence (and, consequently, to "misunderstandings", "double sence, word plays, lies, sophisms, etc." But, of course, after having stated that, you will state that nobody ever stated it, so it is difficult to follow the reasoning.

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

To me, the expression "ordinary language" only bears any sence as meaning "ordinary, daily, acritical use of language".
Well, a lot of people are critical and express it using ordinary language, leftists not least of which.


Otherwise it is synonimous with "language", and so is an unnecessarily complicated term.Only in an 'ideal world'.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

Funny, I was just reading about you guys. The following is from Mikhail Bakhtin, who wrote this under Stalin, so maybe he was trying to say something without getting in trouble.


The dual tone of the people's speech is never torn away from [the] whole nor from the becoming...[but] in the official philosophy of the ruling classes such a dual tone of speech is, generally speaking, impossible: hard, well-established lines are drawn between all the phenomena (and these phenomena are torn away from the contradictory world of becoming, of the whole). A monotone character of thought and style almost always prevails in the official spheres of art and ideology.

[JazzRemington]

Certainly.

Then why are you wasting everyone's time arguing that it's never fixed, which was your original assertion?


Well, do you really believe that most situations are that clearcut, or that the use of language in such clearcut situations is representative of general use of language? Or, more properly, do you believe that such limited use of language can serve as a general model for the use of language?

The counter-examples you've given me were merely situations in which one doesn't know the meaning of the word in the context given or is using it in a different way than intended. Even if it were a model, what do you think models are used for?


Colon: when matters get complicated, you want to stop discussion. You should perhaps limit yourself to handing screwdrivers or asking for them.

You'd be told the same thing if you said "well, that word can mean anything outside this context." It only matters what it means within the context at hand, not in others. For it to be a practical joke, it would have to be known that this isn't what is intended.


Who knows? "Ordinary language" keeps changing its meaning, so that it best fits the immediate needs of the argument, so it is difficult to assert what is being stated about it. The general idea seems to be,


Metaphysics is non-sence because it is a (result of a) misuse of "ordinary language";
These misuses are "grammatical" misuses, ie, violations of grammatical rules of "ordinary language";
ergo, metaphysics is a grammatical issue.

From the above, I would conclude that "ordinary language" is grammatically immune to metaphysics, or non-sence (and, consequently, to "misunderstandings", "double sence, word plays, lies, sophisms, etc." But, of course, after having stated that, you will state that nobody ever stated it, so it is difficult to follow the reasoning.

You've done a poor job demonstrating otherwise.

[ar734]

Could you give me an example of "ordinary language" and an example of non-sense language as meant by Wittgenstein? In 15 words or less; the latter, if possible, from a metaphysical philosopher, say, Hegel.

[Meridian]

Could you give me an example of "ordinary language" and an example of non-sense language as meant by Wittgenstein? In 15 words or less; the latter, if possible, from a metaphysical philosopher, say, Hegel.
Ordinary language:

Could you give me an example of "ordinary language" and an example of non-sense language as meant by Wittgenstein?
Metaphysics:

The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom

[Luís Henrique]

You've done a poor job demonstrating otherwise.

Maybe, but the point stands: you cannot explain what "ordinary language" is, except by identificating it to "language" in general, case in which it is a useless expression.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Metaphysics:

The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.

And so, where is the "non-ordinaryness" of Hegel's sentence?

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

Maybe, but the point stands: you cannot explain what "ordinary language" is, except by identificating it to "language" in general, case in which it is a useless expression.
It is not, because it highlights a difference between language (and particular forms of language) as a functional element of human interaction and a crystallized, idealized view of language as separable from human communication, where the extension of words without extensions (but with a grammar of use) are sought due to the presupposed descriptive function of language. An example of this is how certain people believe the nature of fear can be found through a study of the brain.

[JazzRemington]

Could you give me an example of "ordinary language" and an example of non-sense language as meant by Wittgenstein? In 15 words or less; the latter, if possible, from a metaphysical philosopher, say, Hegel.

This entire thread is pretty much one giant example of ordinary language. If it wasn't, we'd constantly be asking each other what is meant by every single word written. The key is that even if you didn't know what "ordinary language" meant in any exactness, you'd still probably know when something doesn't make sense. It's like not know what "right" means in a moral/ethical sense, but still knowing what it means for something to be described as "the right thing to do."

As far as an example of nonsense, consider something like "I know I am typing this sentence." This doesn't make sense because normally "to know" is used in contexts in which doubt is a possibility or an actuality. One cannot describe a situation in which one can and cannot doubt "I know I am typing this sentence." It's the same thing with sentences like "Pi is equal to the ratio between a circle circumference and diameter," which is an example of a rule used in mathematics. The difference between a metaphysical statement and the statement of a rule is that a metaphysics tries to tell us what is true or false about the world whereas rules do not.

[JazzRemington]

And so, where is the "non-ordinaryness" of Hegel's sentence?

Luís Henrique

I don't think anyone can even begin to untie the confused knots of the quoted sentence. But if you think it's perfectly ordinary, maybe you can explain what it means and explain how you know that's what it means?

[Luís Henrique]

I don't think anyone can even begin to untie the confused knots of the quoted sentence. But if you think it's perfectly ordinary, maybe you can explain what it means and explain how you know that's what it means?

But I am not claiming that it is, or that it is not, ordinary. You are the one making claims, you should be the one backing them.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

It is not, because it highlights a difference between language (and particular forms of language) as a functional element of human interaction and a crystallized, idealized view of language as separable from human communication, where the extension of words without extensions (but with a grammar of use) are sought due to the presupposed descriptive function of language. An example of this is how certain people believe the nature of fear can be found through a study of the brain.

Is that "ordinary language"?

"the extension of words without extensions"

"are sought due to the presupposed descriptive function of language"

Sound to me like what Wittgenstein would call "non-sence".

[JazzRemington]

But I am not claiming that it is, or that it is not, ordinary. You are the one making claims, you should be the one backing them.

The form "the progress of X" is normally used to talk about how far along a process is (i.e. from beginning to end) with a definite method of measuring such, while "consciousness" usually means the same thing as being aware of something or self-aware (e.g., "he was conscious of others around him," "he was self-conscious while on stage"). "Consciousness" itself is never used to denote a process with a beginning and end, let alone one with a definite measure. "Freedom" and its cognates don't normally refer to processes, either. So, "consciousness of freedom" is neither a process.

[Luís Henrique]

The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.


The form "the progress of X" is normally used to talk about how far along a process is (i.e. from beginning to end) with a definite method of measuring such,

Is it?

If so, all sentences about "scientific progress" are metaphysical.

But in reality, in "ordinary language", "progress" is used in a quite different way (much of it, or course, hypostasised).


while "consciousness" usually means the same thing as being aware of something or self-aware (e.g., "he was conscious of others around him," "he was self-conscious while on stage").Yes. If so, "progress of the consciousness of Freedom" would have to mean, either the advancement of [some unstated subject's] awareness of Freedom (as in [mankind/the Spirit/God] becoming more and more aware of Freedom), or the advancement of Freedom's awareness (of some unstated object - quite probably of itself, as in self-awareness). The latter is an obvious hypostasy, as "Freedom" is not a lady in a Phrygian cap, but an abstract concept incapable of awareness. The former would depend on what the hidden subject is.

Up to now, sounds as "ordinary language" - one might disagree with Hegel, or even point to hypostasies in his reasoning, but this is different from denying it the quality of "ordinary language".


"Consciousness" itself is never used to denote a process with a beginning and end, let alone one with a definite measure.This isn't required by Hegel's sentence. He is talking about a "process of becoming aware", which can be easily expressed by the "ordinary" word "progress" (even, in fact, in your limited acception of "progress"). Nowhere the sentence implies that "conciousness" is a process with beggining and end - rather that it is the "end" of a process that beggins elsewhere (in "unconsciousness", one might guess).


"Freedom" and its cognates don't normally refer to processes, either. So, "consciousness of freedom" is neither a process.Again, this is a strange misreading of the sentence.

It is obvious that "freedom" can figure in a meaningful sentence as part of a process - as its end, as its beggining, as its moving force:

"The quick development from freedom into tyranny in Italian mediaeval communes was due to the inadequacy of their political structures." (freedom as the starting point of a process that ends in oppression)

"The conquest of freedom by the French people was thwarted by Bonapartist counter-revolution." (freedom as the aimed end of a process that is interrupted by an external factor)

"The explosion of artistic creativity in 1920's Russia was powered by the newfound freedom of expression warranted by the Revolution." (freedom as the moving force of a process)

But what Hegel seems to mean is either:

a. What we call "history of the world" is the progress of somebody's (mankind? God?) awareness of freedom;

or

b. What we call "history of the world" is the progress of Freedom's (self-)awareness.

Neither requires the odd identification of "consciousness" or "freedom" as "processes" you seem to imagine.

Luís Henrique

[ar734]

"The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom"

Is it the word "consciousness" or "freedom" that is non-sense or both or their context?

What if you said, "The History of the world is none other than the progress of mankind or the progress of the human social condition?" ...or the "progress of the freedom of consciousness?" (Hegel being uprighted.)

If ordinary language is what appears on this website (including my own) then surely there is some evidence of its uselessness.

I just came across this, I think, from The Holy Family: "To speak in an exact and
and prosaic sense." One problem I have with ordinary language is that it seems to be only prosaic, only pedestrian, only simplistic.

[Cody_2ZZ]

I've arrived late to this conversation but I'll do my best to add something of value. I didn't see anyone mention Sartre's book Search For a Method, which reconciles Marxism and Sartre's Existentialism. It's been a long time since I've read the actual text and I don't have a copy to quote directly, but Sartre basically argues that the two systems of thought are not at odds with each other at all.

Sartre says that Marxism and Existentialism function differently in society. Existentialism, he argues, is not an all-encompassing philosophy, but more like an ideology that can act as a means of knowledge-gaining. Marxism, on the other hand, is a full-blown philosophical view of history (as we all know). He sees existentialism, and early existentialism a la Kierkegaard, as a reaction to Hegelian philosophy. Marxism also has it's problems. He viewed it as being corrupted and idealized by the Soviet Union when it should have focused entirely on materialism.

Sartre's ties with communism kinda faded in and out throughout the course of his life, but from later in his life until the bitter end, he was a radical Maoist through and through. I'd recommend burning through the actual text. It's not a long read.

[JazzRemington]

Is it?

If so, all sentences about "scientific progress" are metaphysical.

But in reality, in "ordinary language", "progress" is used in a quite different way (much of it, or course, hypostasised).


What are some ways that don't involve processes?


Yes. If so, "progress of the consciousness of Freedom" would have to mean, either the advancement of [some unstated subject's] consciousness of Freedom (as in [mankind/the Spirit/God] becoming more and more aware of Freedom), or the advancement of Freedom's consciousness [...]

The former is based on an assumption that "the progress of the consciousness of Freedom" is elliptical, while the latter is suggested by grammar of the sentence as written by Hegel.


It is obvious that "freedom" can figure in a meaningful sentence as part of a process - as its end, as its beggining, as its moving force:

None of your examples show how "freedom" is a process, as opposed to a starting or ending point, or something that provides conditions under which something can occur. Your examples are of "freedom" occurring during a process, and not as a process itself.


Up to now, sounds as "ordinary language" - one might disagree with Hegel, or even point to hypostasies in his reasoning, but this is different from denying it the quality of "ordinary language".

[...]

This isn't required by Hegel's sentence. He is talking about a "process of becoming aware", which can be easily expressed by the "ordinary" word "progress" (even, in fact, in your limited acception of "progress"). Nowhere the sentence implies that "conciousness" is a process with beggining and end - rather that it is the "end" of a process that beggins elsewhere (in "unconsciousness", one might guess.

[...]

But what Hegel seems to mean is either:

a. What we call "history of the world" is the progress of somebody's (mankind? God?) awareness of freedom;

or

b. What we call "history of the world" is the progress of Freedom's (self-)awareness.

And how do you know any of this is what Hegel means, as opposed to what you mean or what you think Hegel means?

[JazzRemington]

"The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom"

Is it the word "consciousness" or "freedom" that is non-sense or both or their context?

Really, it's the entire sentence that doesn't make sense. The main problem is with the use of "consciousness," "freedom," and "progress."


What if you said, "The History of the world is none other than the progress of mankind or the progress of the human social condition?" ...or the "progress of the freedom of consciousness?" (Hegel being uprighted.)

It wouldn't be any different. And just because I can't explain what, exactly, is nonsensical about them, doesn't mean no one else can.


If ordinary language is what appears on this website (including my own) then surely there is some evidence of its uselessness.

Are you referring to the term or the language itself? The former is only useful when differentiating between how a layperson speaks and how a specialist does (e.g. "to follow a law" means one thing in ordinary language and something else in scientific language), while the latter is always useful.


I just came across this, I think, from The Holy Family: "To speak in an exact and
and prosaic sense." One problem I have with ordinary language is that it seems to be only prosaic, only pedestrian, only simplistic.

You're talking about the use of ordinary language.

[Luís Henrique]

What are some ways that don't involve processes?

Well, all of them involve processes. What it doesn't involve necessarily (even usually, I would say), is this:


normally used to talk about how far along a process is (i.e. from beginning to end) with a definite method of measuring such"Progress" is more often a word used to refer to a (kind of) process as a whole:


The progress of agricultural mechanisation in India has been immense in the latest two decades.

than a word used to situate the point to which a process has advanced. I would also definitely say that it doesn't necessarily imply any definite method of measuring, and may well rest in imprecise assumptions.


The former is based on an assumption that "the progress of the consciousness of Freedom" is elliptical, while the latter is suggested by grammar of the sentence as written by Hegel.The assumption is well grounded when we talk of Hegel, to whom there is an universal subject (the Geist) of history. The latter is suggested by the usual hypostasy of "Freedom" as a historic subject by enlightenment writers in general. So the former reading is more "Hegelian", and the latter more "French", if you grasp what I mean. Both seem to have been missed by your first reading.


None of your examples show how "freedom" is a process,Nor were they intended to show "freedom" is a process. This is exactly what I deny. To be clear, let me shout a little: FREEDOM IS NOT A PROCESS!!!11ONEONE What I am trying to explain to you is that a minimal attentive reading of Hegel's sentence shows that he was not saying or implying that "Freedom" is a process.


And how do you know any of this is what Hegel means, as opposed to what you mean or what you think Hegel means?Getting metaphysical, are we?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Really, it's the entire sentence that doesn't make sense. The main problem is with the use of "consciousness," "freedom," and "progress."

To me, the problem is much different. It makes sence, I just happen to disagree with it.


It wouldn't be any different. And just because I can't explain what, exactly, is nonsensical about them, doesn't mean no one else can.No, of course. But it means that explaining why it is non-sence is not that easy - and if you cannot explain it, how are you going to expect that we take it at face value?

A little less arrogance would be warranted when we actually don't know how to defend our own position.


You're talking about the use of ordinary language.And what "ordinary language" is there outside of the use of "ordinary language"? What answer can you give to this question that is, in any sence, even slightly Wittgensteinian?

[JazzRemington]

"Progress" is more often a word used to refer to a (kind of) process as a whole:


The progress of agricultural mechanisation in India has been immense in the latest two decades.

than a word used to situate the point to which a process has advanced. I would also definitely say that it doesn't necessarily imply any definite method of measuring, and may well rest in imprecise assumptions.

And here "progress" refers to a process or activity that is specifically mentioned ("agricultural mechanization in Indian"). "Consciousness of freedom" is not a process, so this example doesn't work here.


The assumption is well grounded when we talk of Hegel, to whom there is an universal subject (the Geist) of history. The latter is suggested by the usual hypostasy of "Freedom" as a historic subject by enlightenment writers in general. So the former reading is more "Hegelian", and the latter more "French", if you grasp what I mean. Both seem to have been missed by your first reading.

That doesn't make it any less confused.


Nor were they intended to show "freedom" is a process. This is exactly what I deny. To be clear, let me shout a little: FREEDOM IS NOT A PROCESS!!!11ONEONE What I am trying to explain to you is that a minimal attentive reading of Hegel's sentence shows that he was not saying or implying that "Freedom" is a process.

Once again, how do you know this?


Getting metaphysical, are we?

Luís Henrique

And how is it metaphysical?

[JazzRemington]

To me, the problem is much different. It makes sence, I just happen to disagree with it.

You've done a thoroughly poor job at explaining what it means. You've only managed to bleat out what you think it means. And you admitted this, even.


No, of course. But it means that explaining why it is non-sence is not that easy - and if you cannot explain it, how are you going to expect that we take it at face value?

A little less arrogance would be warranted when we actually don't know how to defend our own position.

Remember when I said I didn't know where to begin with explaining why the Hegel quote was nonsense?


And what "ordinary language" is there outside of the use of "ordinary language"? What answer can you give to this question that is, in any sence, even slightly Wittgensteinian?

I'm sorry you can't tell the difference between referring to a language itself and to how people make use of it.

[Luís Henrique]

And here "progress" refers to a process or activity that is specifically mentioned ("agricultural mechanization in Indian"). "Consciousness of freedom" is not a process, so this example doesn't work here.



The progress of the Wehrmacht within the Soviet Union was halted on december of 1941.

Does this mean that I think that the Wehrmacht was "a process"?

What Hegel means here is ambiguous, as discussed above, but by no means incomprehensible or mysterious: he means either the process of the Geist becoming more and more aware of freedom, or the process of Freedom becoming more and more self-aware.


That doesn't make it any less confused.

Maybe, but then the reasons for it are far from "grammatical": we should reject Hegel's sentence because either, a. the Geist doesn't exist, or, b. "Freedom" is not able to develop a self-awareness.


Once again, how do you know this?

Because I read the sentence, and understood it.


And how is it metaphysical?

Because now you want me to guess what was on Hegel's mind when he wrote the sentence?

But the only way to do such is to read the sentence as a normal, well-formed English sentence. And whence read, it makes sence in two different possible ways (and no other that I can see). So I assume that he meant it either way, more probably the former than the latter because it would fit the little knowledge that I have of Hegel. You on the other hand want to impose onto it clearly impossible meanings (that "consciousness is a process", or that "freedom is a process") that are clearly misconstructions of Hegel's reasoning.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

You've done a thoroughly poor job at explaining what it means. You've only managed to bleat out what you think it means. And you admitted this, even.

He was doing something more complicated than asking for a screwdriver. So, yes, it is open to interpretation. But this is commonplace. You, for instance, have been reading into that sentence what you want to read into it, regardless of the fact that your interpretation is obviously absurd. Now, since we quite well know that Hegel was a trained philosopher, and not a babbling idiot, which seems more likely, that he made a sentence that made sence, whether we agree with it or not, or that he made a sentence that amounts into complete gibberish?


I've said something similar before with the Hegel quote. Remember?

You have said many things in this thread - usually implying that you have a superb knowledge of our subjects, and the rest of us are babbling idiots or ill-intentioned "mystics". Now we see that you don't actually have a working knowledge of the revealed truth, and must tell us that somebody else would be able to explain why the sentence makes no sence.


He ascribed particular qualities to a language itself that are normally ascribed to people's particular use of a language. It's called clarification.

So, is "ordinary language" a language, a particular use of language, a particular way to use language, a "language game", or what else? Because, ya know, there is


a difference between language (and particular forms of language) as a functional element of human interaction and a crystallized, idealized view of language as separable from human communication

Which is it, then?

Up to now, what I have read about it amounts to, "we haven't the leastest idea of what 'ordinary language' is or means, but will keep repeating it because we were taught that it is cool. And, oh, because Wittgenstein used the term".

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

The progress of the Wehrmacht within the Soviet Union was halted on december of 1941.

Does this mean that I think that the Wehrmacht was "a process"?

No, because a process is usually denoted by a verb or a verb with an object. "Progress" is being used as a verb to denote the advancement of the Wehrmacht toward some goal in Russia.


What Hegel means here is ambiguous, as discussed above, but by no means incomprehensible or mysterious: he means either the process of the Geist becoming more and more aware of freedom, or the process of Freedom becoming more and more self-aware.

And how do you know that?


Maybe, but then the reasons for it are far from "grammatical": we should reject Hegel's sentence because either, a. the Geist doesn't exist, or, b. "Freedom" is not able to develop a self-awareness.

If (a) was the case, you wouldn't have been able to say it didn't exist. (b) only works because of what you think Hegel means.


Because I read the sentence, and understood it.

OK, and how did you arrive at this particular understanding?


Because now you want me to guess what was on Hegel's mind when he wrote the sentence?

And how is this metaphysical?


But the only way to do such is to read the sentence as a normal, well-formed English sentence. And whence read, it makes sence in two different possible ways (and no other that I can see). So I assume that he meant it either way, more probably the former than the latter because it would fit the little knowledge that I have of Hegel. You on the other hand want to impose onto it clearly impossible meanings (that "consciousness is a process", or that "freedom is a process") that are clearly misconstructions of Hegel's reasoning.

Luís Henrique

Once again, how do you know what he meant?

[JazzRemington]

He was doing something more complicated than asking for a screwdriver. So, yes, it is open to interpretation. But this is commonplace. You, for instance, have been reading into that sentence what you want to read into it, regardless of the fact that your interpretation is obviously absurd. Now, since we quite well know that Hegel was a trained philosopher, and not a babbling idiot, which seems more likely, that he made a sentence that made sence, whether we agree with it or not, or that he made a sentence that amounts into complete gibberish?

I never mentioned once what Hegel may or may not have meant, so I don't see where you're getting this idea that I'm reading into what he wrote.


You have said many things in this thread - usually implying that you have a superb knowledge of our subjects, and the rest of us are babbling idiots or ill-intentioned "mystics". Now we see that you don't actually have a working knowledge of the revealed truth, and must tell us that somebody else would be able to explain why the sentence makes no sence.

"Revealed truth"?


So, is "ordinary language" a language, a particular use of language, a particular way to use language, a "language game", or what else? Because, ya know, there is

Which is it, then?

Up to now, what I have read about it amounts to, "we haven't the leastest idea of what 'ordinary language' is or means, but will keep repeating it because we were taught that it is cool. And, oh, because Wittgenstein used the term".

Luís Henrique

Even if you can't define it to any degree of certainty, one can still use it effectively in everyday conversation. I'm sorry you can't understand there's a difference between the normal usage of a word and the way the word is used in more specialized fields.

[Luís Henrique]

No, because a process is usually denoted by a verb or a verb with an object. "Progress" is being used as a verb to denote the advancement of the Wehrmacht toward some goal in Russia.

Well, actually no. It is being used as a substantive. But this is immaterial, first because the issue is not grammatical, second, because it is the same use Hegel makes in his famous sentence:


The progress of the Geist towards consciousness of Freedom is the same as the history of the world.
The progress of Freedom towards self-awareness is the same as the history of the world.

You have long lost the Wittgensteinian distinction between 'non-sence" and nonsence, and are trying to read nonsence into Hegel in order to prove that it is non-sence.


And how do you know that?

How do you know that the mechanic wants a screwdrive (tool) and not a screwdriver (drink)?


If (a) was the case, you wouldn't have been able to say it didn't exist. (b) only works because of what you think Hegel means.

a. Well, why wouldn't I be able to say that the Geist doesn't exist?
b. I actually think the means a., not b.


OK, and how did you arrive at this particular understanding?

How do you know that the mechanic wants a screwdrive (tool) and not a screwdriver (drink)?


And how is this metaphysical?

Because you want me to read Hegel's mind.

I don't want to read Hegel's mind (and wouldn't be able, if I wanted). I want to read this particular sentence by Hegel. Reading it, I find only two possible meanings. Ergo, I believe it means one of them, and reject your hypothesis that it is meaningless as arbitrary.


Once again, how do you know what he meant?

How do you know whatever whomever means?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

I never mentioned once what Hegel may or may not have meant, so I don't see where you're getting this idea that I'm reading into what he wrote.

Oh, come on. You have interpreted Hegel's sentence, in order to substantiate your claim that it is meaningless. And that interpretation involves a clear misreading of the sentence. You reject any possible reading that makes sence (and there are at least two, as I already showed you), and insist in a reading that is completely absurd. So yes, you have a personal theory on what that sentence means, and it is that it means absolutely nothing.


Even if you can't define it to any degree of certainty, one can still use it effectively in everyday conversation. I'm sorry you can't understand there's a difference between the normal usage of a word and the way the word is used in more specialized fields.

If I correctly understand what you are saying in the above paragraph, you are now telling me that indeed "ordinary language" is a particular way of using language. If so, what I have many times stated holds: "ordinary language" - or the ordinary use of language, to be precise - is careless, unthoughtful, acritical use of language, and yes, the language of class domination. At least, whenever it goes beyond the activities "proper of proletarians" like asking for screwdrivers.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Well, actually no. It is being used as a substantive. But this is immaterial, first because the issue is not grammatical, second, because it is the same use Hegel makes in his famous sentence:


The progress of the Geist towards consciousness of Freedom is the same as the history of the world.
The progress of Freedom towards self-awareness is the same as the history of the world.

And how do you know this?



You have long lost the Wittgensteinian distinction between 'non-sence" and nonsence, and are trying to read nonsence into Hegel in order to prove that it is non-sence.

What's there to read into? All you've done is give possibilities and nothing definite.


How do you know that the mechanic wants a screwdrive (tool) and not a screwdriver (drink)?

Various ways: he'd tell me, correct me after handing him the wrong item, watch other people hand him the correct item after being asked, etc.


a. Well, why wouldn't I be able to say that the Geist doesn't exist?
b. I actually think the means a., not b.

If something didn't exist, in any sense of the word, you wouldn't be able to even deny it's existence.


Because you want me to read Hegel's mind.

Reading one's mind is not involved. I just asked how you know he meant what you claim he means.


I don't want to read Hegel's mind (and wouldn't be able, if I wanted). I want to read this particular sentence by Hegel. Reading it, I find only two possible meanings. Ergo, I believe it means one of them, and reject your hypothesis that it is meaningless as arbitrary.

Again, this is what you want it to mean.


How do you know whatever whomever means?

Depends on the situation.

[JazzRemington]

Oh, come on. You have interpreted Hegel's sentence, in order to substantiate your claim that it is meaningless. And that interpretation involves a clear misreading of the sentence. You reject any possible reading that makes sence (and there are at least two, as I already showed you), and insist in a reading that is completely absurd. So yes, you have a personal theory on what that sentence means, and it is that it means absolutely nothing.

All I asked was how you know Hegel meant what you claim he means. If I were interpreting his work, I'd be doing that.


If I correctly understand what you are saying in the above paragraph, you are now telling me that indeed "ordinary language" is a particular way of using language. If so, what I have many times stated holds: "ordinary language" - or the ordinary use of language, to be precise - is careless, unthoughtful, acritical use of language, and yes, the language of class domination. At least, whenever it goes beyond the activities "proper of proletarians" like asking for screwdrivers.

Luís Henrique

People are uncritical, careless, and unthoughtful, not language.

[Luís Henrique]

Various ways: he'd tell me, correct me after handing him the wrong item, watch other people hand him the correct item after being asked, etc.

Of course, that's not the way you would know it.

Supposing that [tool] and [drink] are the only two possibilities, you would know that he means a tool and not a drink because he is fixing a car, and it would make more sence to ask for a tool than for a drink in that context. Ie, you look for what sence that sentence can have, and choose the one that better matches the context. You don't wonder, "now he is saying 'screwdriver' - maybe he is asking for a screwdriver, or maybe he just likes the sound of the word and is repeating it for the kicks". You assume intentional communication, not random utterance.

Same for Hegel. His sentence has two possible meanings. Assuming intentional communication, he perhaps he meant one, perhaps he meant the other - there is no safe way to decide, unless we have more context. What we shouldn't assume is random utterance.


If something didn't exist, in any sense of the word, you wouldn't be able to even deny it's existence.Bullocks.

It obviously exists, or existed, as an idea within Hegel's mind. And he obviously believed it had an objective existence outside his own mind. So when I say, "it doesn't exist", I mean it doesn't exist as objective thing/phenomenon/whatever outside Hegel's mind (and that, of course, is the "ordinary language" use of the word "exist"). To be the subject of a process of becoming progressively aware of Freedom, and for that process to be the same as the "history of the world", it would have to have an existence outside Hegel's mind.

So, in short, the Geist doesn't exist, and, because it does not exist, the history of the world cannot be the same as the Geist's increasing consciousness of Freedom.


Reading one's mind is not involved. I just asked how you know he meant what you claim he means.In the same way I know what any other English sentence means.


Again, this is what you want it to mean.No. You are completely off base now, making absurd claims about the issue. Your attempt to demonstrate that the sentence is meaningless has been debunked; find another line of reasoning, or concede the point.


Depends on the situation.So, let's take a sentence like,


We may say: it only makes sense for someone to ask what something is called if he already knows how to make use of the name.Do you know what it means?

How do you know what it means?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

All I asked was how you know Hegel meant what you claim he means. If I were interpreting his work, I'd be doing that.

Well, you certainly claimed it makes no sence:


Really, it's the entire sentence that doesn't make sense. The main problem is with the use of "consciousness," "freedom," and "progress."

And why you believe it doesn't make sence?


The form "the progress of X" is normally used to talk about how far along a process is (i.e. from beginning to end) with a definite method of measuring such, while "consciousness" usually means the same thing as being aware of something or self-aware (e.g., "he was conscious of others around him," "he was self-conscious while on stage"). "Consciousness" itself is never used to denote a process with a beginning and end, let alone one with a definite measure. "Freedom" and its cognates don't normally refer to processes, either. So, "consciousness of freedom" is neither a process.

I have shown you that, once you quit trying to impose these peculiar meanings into those particular words, the sentence makes sence.


People are uncritical, careless, and unthoughtful, not language.Oh, yes, of course. Just like "guns don't kill people, people kill people". But, positing it a little bit differently, people kill people by using guns - by making what could well be called "an ordinary use of guns".

When people use language in an "ordinary" way, they use language in an uncritical, careless, unthoughtful way.

Or are we now going back to the position that "ordinary language" is not a particular way to use language?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Here is the context of Hegel's sentence:


The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite - Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom. All will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, among other properties, is also endowed with Freedom; but philosophy teaches that all the qualities of Spirit exist only through Freedom; that all are but means for attaining Freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone. It is a result of speculative Philosophy, that Freedom is the sole truth of Spirit. Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency towards a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging towards its opposite [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realisation of its Idea; for in Unity it exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its centre in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence (Bei-sich-selbst-seyn). Now this is Freedom, exactly. For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. I am free on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness - consciousness of one's own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self consciousness these are merged in one; for Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realise itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially. According to this abstract definition it may be said of Universal History, that it is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, so do the first traces of Spirit virtually contain the whole of that History. The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit - Man as such - is free; and because they do not know this they are not free. They only know that one is free. But on this very account, the freedom of that one is only caprice; ferocity - brutal recklessness or passion, or a mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature - mere caprice like the former. - That one is therefore only a Despot; not a free man. The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free; but they, and the Romans likewise, knew only that some are free, - not man as such. Even Plato and Aristotle did not know this. The Greeks, therefore, had slaves; and their whole life and the maintenance of their splendid liberty, was implicated with the institution of slavery: a fact moreover, which made that liberty on the one hand only an accidental, transient and limited growth; on the other hand, constituted it a rigorous thraldom of our common nature - of the Human. The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness, that man, as man, is free: that it is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its essence. This consciousness arose first in religion, the inmost region of Spirit; but to introduce the principle into the various relations of the actual world, involves a more extensive problem than its simple implantation; a problem whose solution and application require a severe and lengthened process of culture. In proof of this, we may note that slavery did not cease immediately on the reception of Christianity. Still less did liberty predominate in States; or Governments and Constitutions adopt a rational organization, or recognise freedom as their basis. That application of the principle to political relations; the thorough moulding and interpenetration of the constitution of society by it, is a process identical with history itself. I have already directed attention to the distinction here involved, between a principle as such, and its-application; i.e. its introduction and carrying out in the actual phenomena of Spirit and Life. This is a point of fundamental importance in our science, and one which must be constantly respected as essential. And in the same way as this distinction has attracted attention in view of the Christian principle of self-consciousness - Freedom; it also shews itself as an essential one, in view of the principle of Freedom generally. The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development according to the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.

Which quite makes clear that the first interpretation I proposed is the correct one: that Hegel thought that the "History of the world" is the same as the progress of the Geist towards "consciousness of Freedom" - though, as we should perhaps have suspected in dealing with Hegel, this is also a form of self-awareness, because "Freedom" is the "essence of Spirit".

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Of course, that's not the way you would know it.

Supposing that [tool] and [drink] are the only two possibilities, you would know that he means a tool and not a drink because he is fixing a car, and it would make more sence to ask for a tool than for a drink in that context. Ie, you look for what sence that sentence can have, and choose the one that better matches the context. [...]

This is garbage. It isn't clear what sort of activity constitutes the searching and choosing, when it happens, how it happens, and how it's any different from guessing. For this to work in general, one has to know before hand that tools can be used to fix cars. And it doesn't even explain that. Once again, your explanation contains too many assumptions to be of use. You seem to have a very idiosyncratic definition of "knowing" if you think this is how I know he means a tool and not a drink.


Bullocks.

It obviously exists, or existed, as an idea within Hegel's mind. [...]

Which is why I said "in any sense of the word."


In the same way I know what any other English sentence means.

[...]

No. You are completely off base now, making absurd claims about the issue. Your attempt to demonstrate that the sentence is meaningless has been debunked; find another line of reasoning, or concede the point.

I never sought to claim that the sentence is meaningless, only nonsensical.


So, let's take a sentence like,

Do you know what it means?

How do you know what it means?

Luís Henrique

It doesn't make any sense because no account of the world can be given in which the sentence is true or false. It's more of a statement of a rule that describes how language is normally used. It's either followed or not followed, and doesn't tell us anything about the world, unlike Hegel's sentence. It doesn't make sense, and is not a rule.



Well, you certainly claimed it makes no sence

Saying something doesn't make sense is not an interpretation.


I have shown you that, once you quit trying to impose these peculiar meanings into those particular words, the sentence makes sence.

You've done a poor job of this, actually. It still doesn't make sense in the Wittgensteinian sense of the term, because no account of the world can be given in which the sentence is true or false. Your explanations suffer the same.


Oh, yes, of course. Just like "guns don't kill people, people kill people". But, positing it a little bit differently, people kill people by using guns - by making what could well be called "an ordinary use of guns".

When people use language in an "ordinary" way, they use language in an uncritical, careless, unthoughtful way.

Or are we now going back to the position that "ordinary language" is not a particular way to use language?

You'll have to explain how using words as they normally mean is uncritical, careless, and unthoughtful, because you have yet to do this.

[JazzRemington]

Here is the context of Hegel's sentence:



Which quite makes clear that the first interpretation I proposed is the correct one: that Hegel thought that the "History of the world" is the same as the progress of the Geist towards "consciousness of Freedom" - though, as we should perhaps have suspected in dealing with Hegel, this is also a form of self-awareness, because "Freedom" is the "essence of Spirit".

Luís Henrique

OK. And how do you know this is what Hegel meant?

[Luís Henrique]

This is garbage. It isn't clear what sort of activity constitutes the searching and choosing, when it happens, how it happens, and how it's any different from guessing. For this to work in general, one has to know before hand that tools can be used to fix cars. And it doesn't even explain that. Once again, your explanation contains too many assumptions to be of use. You seem to have a very idiosyncratic definition of "knowing" if you think this is how I know he means a tool and not a drink.

Yes?

It seems better than your explanation, that you would have to try and see if you are told wrong or not.

On the other hand, it seems to fit what we already know about words and their making sence in context.

Of course the explanation contains many assumptions, but those are assumptions that usually helpers to a mechanic will fulfill. They just happen to know what a screwdriver is in the context of fixing a car, what fixing a car is, what a car is, etc.

Evidently if you were a two year old you would probably not know any of those, but you quite probably wouldn't be helping a mechanic. And if you are helping a mechanic, it is quite safe to assume all of those.


Which is why I said "in any sense of the word."Which is sophistry.

The only relevant sence of the word in this case is that which I pointed. The Geist doesn't exist in the way Hegel imagined. And yes, it is pretty correct to use it like that:


God doesn't exist.
Perpetuum mobiles don't exist.
Four-sided triangles don't exist.
The perfect language doesn't exist.
Santa Claus doesn't exist.
Hegel's Geist doesn't exist.

Any problem with any of them? Or any difference that you can explain between the last one and the other five?


I never sought to claim that the sentence is meaningless, only nonsensical.But your line of reasoning was evidently suited to demonstrate the former, not the latter.

You evidently confused the "ordinary language" term "nonsence" with the Wittgensteinian, philosophical, epistemological, specialised, and non-ordinary, term "non-sence".


We may say: it only makes sense for someone to ask what something is called if he already knows how to make use of the name.


It doesn't make any sense because no account of the world can be given in which the sentence is true or false.OK, back to non-ordinary language.

What does it mean "to give and account of the world"?

Or, to use your terminology, what "account of the world" can be given in which a sentence like,


Wittgenstein's sentence doesn't make any sense because no account of the world can be given in which it is true or false.is true? Or in which it is false?


Saying something doesn't make sense is not an interpretation.No, but it certainly requires an interpretation, otherwise it would carry no more weight than "I don't understand it, so it makes no sence".


You'll have to explain how using words as they normally mean is uncritical, careless, and unthoughtful, because you have yet to do this.Well, of course, if I have yet to explain it, it is because I have yet to do it. Congratulations for the tautology.

Using words "as they normally mean" is uncritical, careless, and unthoughtful, because the world "as it normally is" is a world of exploitation, oppression, and alienation.


OK. And how do you know this is what Hegel meant?Because I am intelligent, and am not pretending to be dumb. The point is not what Hegel meant, the point is what the sentence means. As previously demonstrated, it has two possible meanings. Without further context, it was impossible to choose between them. With some more context - the whole paragraph into which the sentence is embedded - it is possible to see that one of them - that "the history of the world is nothing more than the history of the Geist becoming more and more conscious of Freedom" - is the one that should be understood as meant here.

It seems to me that you have a pre-conceived conclusion - that, since it is Hegel's, it cannot make sence - and are struggling to put up arguments in support of such preconception.

This is a dogmatic behaviour.

You should do the opposite: read the sentence and try to understand it, criticise it, and then come to a conclusion about its sence or lack thereof.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Yes?

It seems better than your explanation, that you would have to try and see if you are told wrong or not.

On the other hand, it seems to fit what we already know about words and their making sence in context.

Of course the explanation contains many assumptions, but those are assumptions that usually helpers to a mechanic will fulfill. They just happen to know what a screwdriver is in the context of fixing a car, what fixing a car is, what a car is, etc.

Evidently if you were a two year old you would probably not know any of those, but you quite probably wouldn't be helping a mechanic. And if you are helping a mechanic, it is quite safe to assume all of those.

And how is it better? Depending on the circumstances in which it happens, we might say you're just guessing. It doesn't even how you've come to learn that tools are used for fixing cars. You haven't explained anything about this process beyond saying that it just happens.


Which is sophistry.

The only relevant sence of the word in this case is that which I pointed. The Geist doesn't exist in the way Hegel imagined. And yes, it is pretty correct to use it like that:


God doesn't exist.
Perpetuum mobiles don't exist.
Four-sided triangles don't exist.
The perfect language doesn't exist.
Santa Claus doesn't exist.
Hegel's Geist doesn't exist.

Any problem with any of them? Or any difference that you can explain between the last one and the other five?

None of them make any sense. Now, if you said "God doesn't exist as a character in Blade Runner," that's something else.


But your line of reasoning was evidently suited to demonstrate the latter, not the former.

You evidently confused the "ordinary language" term "nonsence" with the Wittgensteinian, philosophical, epistemological, specialised, and non-ordinary, term "non-sence".


Yes, it is suited to demonstrate how it doesn't make sense. Nonsense isn't the same thing as meaninglessness. Hegel's philosophy can be very meaningful for many people, just as a Lewis Carol poem can as well. That doesn't mean they make sense, though.


OK, back to non-ordinary language.

What does it mean "to give and account of the world"?

Or, to use your terminology, what "account of the world" can be given in which a sentence like,

is true? Or in which it is false?

If an instance of asking what something means without knowing how to use a word can be found and an instance where asking what something means with knowing what a word means can be found, then what I said would be false - that what Wittgenstein said is nonsense by the Wittgensteinian use of the term. Notice we're talking about what I said, not Wittgenstein.


No, but it certainly requires an interpretation, otherwise it would carry no more weight than "I don't understand it, so it makes no sence".

And what would this interpretation consist of?


Well, of course, if I have yet to explain it, it is because I have yet to do it. Congratulations for the tautology.

Using words "as they normally mean" is uncritical, careless, and unthoughtful, because the world "as it normally is" is a world of exploitation, oppression, and alienation.

And how does this affect what words normally mean?


Because I am intelligent, and am not pretending to be dumb. The point is not what Hegel meant, the point is what the sentence means. [...]

You said people give meaning to their words and that people mean things, so evidently it is a question of what Hegel meant.


It seems to me that you have a pre-conceived conclusion - that, since it is Hegel's, it cannot make sence - and are struggling to put up arguments in support of such preconception.

This is a dogmatic behaviour.

You should do the opposite: read the sentence and try to understand it, criticise it, and then come to a conclusion about its sence or lack thereof.

Luís Henrique

I never said that it was because it was Hegel.

[ar734]

because[/I] it was Hegel.

Freedom and consciousness, I think you can make a case for being non-sense. But progress? There has been no progress from slavery to feudalism to capitalism; evolution is not progress; the expansion of the universe is not progress?

Wasn't Marx's criticism of Hegel that he proved the reality of progress (of history, consciousness, mind, spirit, etc.) but that Hegel concluded by trying to establish an absolute idea in which progress ended?

[JazzRemington]

Freedom and consciousness, I think you can make a case for being non-sense. But progress? There has been no progress from slavery to feudalism to capitalism; evolution is not progress; the expansion of the universe is not progress?

Wasn't Marx's criticism of Hegel that he proved the reality of progress (of history, consciousness, mind, spirit, etc.) but that Hegel concluded by trying to establish an absolute idea in which progress ended?

Well, the question is what Hegel means by "progress," not just what "progress" means.

[Luís Henrique]

And how is it better? Depending on the circumstances in which it happens, we might say you're just guessing. It doesn't even how you've come to learn that tools are used for fixing cars. You haven't explained anything about this process beyond saying that it just happens.

I don't think I have to remember how I learned the word "screwdriver" each time someone asks me for one.

The "ordinary" knowledge of world and words normal people have implies they know what acceptions the word "screwdriver" has, and which is more likely to be used in each context. If they are two mechanics fixing a car, they assume this fact, plus the knowledge they have of cars, motors, screws, and screwdrivers, so that one will understand which screwdriver the other needs when dealing with the precise pieces s/he is fixing - and the other will know if the one needs further precision in the demand ("give me the screwdriver #6" or "give me the screwdriver, I mean, not the Philipps one"). If they are two archaeologists discussing whether an object that looks like a screwdriver is or is not one, another kind of knowledge is necessary - whether screws were found in the same archaelogical context, whether date is compatible with the finding of a screwdriver, what other instruments (chisels, holepunchers, etc) would look like a screwdriver that could be a better explanation of the finding, etc.


None of them make any sense. Now, if you said "God doesn't exist as a character in Blade Runner," that's something else.Oh? And why is it different?


Yes, it is suited to demonstrate how it doesn't make sense. Nonsense isn't the same thing as meaninglessness. Hegel's philosophy can be very meaningful for many people, just as a Lewis Carol poem can as well. That doesn't mean they make sense, though.Well, here you are just changing the acception of the word "meaning". Of course we are not discussing an emotional attachment to Hegel's philosophy; we are discussing whatever meaning a particular sentence by Hegel may or may not have.


If an instance of asking what something means without knowing how to use a word can be found and an instance where asking what something means with knowing what a word means can be found, then what I said would be false - that what Wittgenstein said is nonsense by the Wittgensteinian use of the term. Notice we're talking about what I said, not Wittgenstein.What does "trickstel" mean? (I have no idea of whether this is an English word or not)

What does "screwdriver" mean? (I have an ordinary knowledge of what this word means)

So it seems to be possible to ask what something (some word) means without knowing how to use that word. And it seems to be possible to ask what something (what a word) means while knowing what such word means. So?

You still seem unable to explain in "ordinary language" what "giving an account of the world" means.


And what would this interpretation consist of?A confusion between the idea of a progress of the Geist's consciousness of Freedom with the ideas that consciousness is a process, or that Freedom is a process.


And how does this affect what words normally mean?When you talk of "price" and "value" as synonims, when you talk about things like "fair price" or "fair wage", etc. "Ordinary language" words are usually full of ideology; their meanings are meanings within a particular system of beliefs - one that is a system of justification of exploitation and oppression.


You said people give meaning to their words and that people mean things, so evidently it is a question of what Hegel meant.The question is what Hegel meant with that phrase. Otherwise the question doesn't make sence.


I never said that it was because it was Hegel.It very much looks like it is. You seem to be struggling to not understand the sentence. But this is probably because you forgot the distinction between the ordinary language word "nonsence" and the technical expression "non-sence". You were trying to make Hegel's sentence unreadable, absurd, or patently false (all of which may qualify as nonsence), instead of making your point that it is non-sence. Understandably, as you have yet to explain what "non-sence" is without recurring to some more "extraordinary" language such as "account of the world".

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

I don't think I have to remember how I learned the word "screwdriver" each time someone asks me for one.

I never said that. But you are saying that people conduct some kind of process somehow whenever they exhibit some kind of behavior or action that can be considered knowing what is meant. The examples you gave of archaeologists and mechanics doesn't explain this process.


Oh? And why is it different?

Because it's a specific usage of "to exist:" there's what kind of thing "God" is (a character) and where he/she/it may or may not exist in (Blade Runner). It's more clear than "God doesn't exist." This falls under the criteria of making sense because it's possible to describe what has to be the case for this to be true and what does not have to be the case for it to be false.


What does "trickstel" mean? (I have no idea of whether this is an English word or not)

What does "screwdriver" mean? (I have an ordinary knowledge of what this word means)

So it seems to be possible to ask what something (some word) means without knowing how to use that word. And it seems to be possible to ask what something (what a word) means while knowing what such word means. So?

You'd have to know where to place "trickstel" in a question about what it means. Seeing as you've done this successfully according to the rules of English grammar, we'd say you know how to use it by Wittgenstein's argument.


A confusion between the idea of a progress of the Geist's consciousness of Freedom with the ideas that consciousness is a process, or that Freedom is a process.

And where am I uttering this confusion? Be specific.


When you talk of "price" and "value" as synonims, when you talk about things like "fair price" or "fair wage", etc. "Ordinary language" words are usually full of ideology; their meanings are meanings within a particular system of beliefs - one that is a system of justification of exploitation and oppression.

What does it mean for ordinary language to be full of ideology?


The question is what Hegel meant with that phrase. Otherwise the question doesn't make sence.

Then why are you expounding on what the word normally means, with the assumption this is what Hegel means?


It very much looks like it is. You seem to be struggling to not understand the sentence. But this is probably because you forgot the distinction between the ordinary language word "nonsence" and the technical expression "non-sence". You were trying to make Hegel's sentence unreadable, absurd, or patently false (all of which may qualify as nonsence), instead of making your point that it is non-sence. Understandably, as you have yet to explain what "non-sence" is without recurring to some more "extraordinary" language such as "account of the world".

Luís Henrique

Well, if you say so. But you keep failing to explain it. You've given me what you think it means (which I've never denied that's what you think it means) but you systematically fail to explain what your explanation means.

[RHIZOMES]

It is not a "rant about linguistics". Tell that to Marx, when he said:

A return to ordinary language dissolves philosophical confusion caused by distorting ordinary language in the first place. Also, putting quotation marks on the term "ordinary language", as if it means something elusive, is ridiculous.

You may call showing how existentialism is nonsensical "irrelevant", and simply a "rant about linguistics", but then you are sticking your head in the sand. 'Existentialism' is the result of the use of words of philosophers; if it is a completely nonsensical use of words, then existentialism is bullshit. :rolleyes:

Why do philistines such as the above even bother to post in the Philosophy forum...

This fucking forum, I swear...

Also pro-tip guys: Marxism is a philosophy, rooted in Hegelianism, Enlightenment thinking and even a dabble of Ancient philosophy. Anti-intellectualism helps noone, especially the working class. Just admit you don't understand philosophical writing rather than letting your egos do the talking.

Also re: topic question. Marxism has been one of many attempts to unite the object vs. subject dilemma. Existentialism overemphasises subjectivity and contigency far more than they are actually present in oppressive class-based societies.

[Luís Henrique]

I never said that. But you are saying that people conduct some kind of process somehow whenever they exhibit some kind of behavior or action that can be considered knowing what is meant. The examples you gave of archaeologists and mechanics doesn't explain this process.

Well, people use their knowledge of world and words to understand each others. The way they acquire such knowledge varies. If they are native speakers of a language, probably through school, in job, by reading books, by checking words in a dictionary, from their elders at home when they are young, in the streets with their gangs - socially interacting with other people, to sum it up. They don't usually think that the way they acquired such knowledge matters when they are making sence of someone else's words.


Because it's a specific usage of "to exist:" there's what kind of thing "God" is (a character) and where he/she/it may or may not exist in (Blade Runner). It's more clear than "God doesn't exist." This falls under the criteria of making sense because it's possible to describe what has to be the case for this to be true and what does not have to be the case for it to be false.Back to verificationism, I see.


You'd have to know where to place "trickstel" in a question about what it means. Seeing as you've done this successfully according to the rules of English grammar, we'd say you know how to use it by Wittgenstein's argument.Then Wittgenstein's "argument" is clearly stupid. Any person that grasps the basics of a language can make questions about any word. In English, it involves saying something like "What does", followed by the unknown word, and then "mean", in an interrogative intonation. How the word is used (or even whether it exists) in English is immaterial. To do that, you do not have to know "how the word is used"; you don't need to know, for instance, whether it is a noun or a verb (and if you don't know that, you certainly don't know how to use it). Indeed, because asking what a word means does not involve using the word, but merely mentioning it. You don't (usually; forensic experts or archaelogists may eventually do that) ask what a screwdriver means, you ask what "screwdriver" means.

So, considering that he was not that stupid, probably Wittgenstein meant something else.


And where am I uttering this confusion? Be specific.Here: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=2096012&postcount=102


The form "the progress of X" is normally used to talk about how far along a process is (i.e. from beginning to end) with a definite method of measuring such, while "consciousness" usually means the same thing as being aware of something or self-aware (e.g., "he was conscious of others around him," "he was self-conscious while on stage"). "Consciousness" itself is never used to denote a process with a beginning and end, let alone one with a definite measure. "Freedom" and its cognates don't normally refer to processes, either. So, "consciousness of freedom" is neither a process.


What does it mean for ordinary language to be full of ideology?
What part of it is difficult to understand? "Ordinary language", "full", or "ideology"?


Then why are you expounding on what the word normally means, with the assumption this is what Hegel means?Do you have an alternative proposal?


Well, if you say so. But you keep failing to explain it. You've given me what you think it means (which I've never denied that's what you think it means) but you systematically fail to explain what your explanation means.It means what I have many times repeated: that Hegel believed that the history of the world is the history of the Geist getting progressively aware of its own freedom.

To understand it further, it would probably necessary to understand what Hegel means by Geist and by "freedom", which probably implies actually reading Hegel with an attention and depth that I am certainly not interested to give him. Sorry, but if I don't know what a screwdriver is, I am still able to answer to someone asking "what dit the mechanic say?" by telling, "he asked for something, a screwdriver, that I don't know what is"; I don't usually retort by saying "he was being metaphysical, talking of unkown mystical entities", or "he was confusing a screwdriver with a gift, because gifts are what people are normally given".

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Well, people use their knowledge of world and words to understand each others. The way they acquire such knowledge varies. If they are native speakers of a language, probably through school, in job, by reading books, by checking words in a dictionary, from their elders at home when they are young, in the streets with their gangs - socially interacting with other people, to sum it up. They don't usually think that the way they acquired such knowledge matters when they are making sence of someone else's words.

Still not an explanation of this searching and choosing activity.


Back to verificationism, I see.

You'll have to explain what you mean by "verificationism," then.


Then Wittgenstein's "argument" is clearly stupid. Any person that grasps the basics of a language can make questions about any word. In English, it involves saying something like "What does", followed by the unknown word, and then "mean", in an interrogative intonation. How the word is used (or even whether it exists) in English is immaterial. To do that, you do not have to know "how the word is used"; you don't need to know, for instance, whether it is a noun or a verb (and if you don't know that, you certainly don't know how to use it). Indeed, because asking what a word means does not involve using the word, but merely mentioning
it. You don't (usually; forensic experts or archaelogists may eventually do that) ask what a screwdriver means, you ask what "screwdriver" means.

So, considering that he was not that stupid, probably Wittgenstein meant something else.

If you knew how the word is used, you wouldn't be asking what it means. The point is, asking what a word means presupposes that you know how to use it in a question in the least. You know what place it has in the grammar of a question, you know how to construct the question, you know to even ask what it means if you don't know. Thus, you know how to use it. "Knowing how to use a word" isn't the same thing as "knowing what a word means" here.


Here: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=2096012&postcount=102

What part of it is difficult to understand? "Ordinary language", "full", or "ideology"?

How is that an example of ordinary language being full of ideology?


Do you have an alternative proposal?

Yes, what Hegel wrote was nonsense.


It means what I have many times repeated: that Hegel believed that the history of the world is the history of the Geist getting progressively aware of its own freedom.

To understand it further, it would probably necessary to understand what Hegel means by Geist and by "freedom", which probably implies actually reading Hegel with an attention and depth that I am certainly not interested to give him. Sorry, but if I don't know what a screwdriver is, I am still able to answer to someone asking "what dit the mechanic say?" by telling, "he asked for something, a screwdriver, that I don't know what is"; I don't usually retort by saying "he was being metaphysical, talking of unkown mystical entities", or "he was confusing a screwdriver with a gift, because gifts are what people are normally given".

Luís Henrique

Still not an explanation of the two meanings you proposed.

[JazzRemington]

Also pro-tip guys: Marxism is a philosophy, rooted in Hegelianism, Enlightenment thinking and even a dabble of Ancient philosophy. Anti-intellectualism helps noone, especially the working class. Just admit you don't understand philosophical writing rather than letting your egos do the talking.

You're absolutely right. We don't understand philosophical writings, and since no one can explain what is meant by them we're left to believe that no one else does either.

[Luís Henrique]

Still not an explanation of this searching and choosing activity.

What is unclear to you?


You'll have to explain what you mean by "verificationism," then.

Because it's a specific usage of "to exist:" there's what kind of thing "God" is (a character) and where he/she/it may or may not exist in (Blade Runner). It's more clear than "God doesn't exist." This falls under the criteria of making sense because it's possible to describe what has to be the case for this to be true and what does not have to be the case for it to be false. In other words, you search the book and see whether there is a character called "God" there. This is called a "verification" in my book.

Why do you think it is impossible to describe what has to be the case for "God exists" to be true?


If you knew how the word is used, you wouldn't be asking what it means. The point is, asking what a word means presupposes that you know how to use it in a question in the least.Of course not. It only presupposes that I know how to mention it.


You know what place it has in the grammar of a question, you know how to construct the question, you know to even ask what it means if you don't know. Thus, you know how to use it.This only means that I know how to make questions. If you want, that I know how to use the words that are used in questions in general. It evidently doesn't mean that I know how to use the word I am asking about. Indeed, I could explicitely ask, "how do we use the word X?"; and of course, "you already know, since you just used it" would not be considered a satisfactory (and probably not even polite) answer.


How is that an example of ordinary language being full of ideology?Are you being purposefully obnoxious? That was to demonstrate that you actually took the time to (mis)interpret Hegel's sentence, not to give you an example about ordinary language and ideology.


Yes, what Hegel wrote was nonsense.I have already demonstrated that, if it is, it is not because of your grammatical argument.


Still not an explanation of the two meanings you proposed.You are trying hard not to understand. So let's leave at it, at least until you stop sticking your fingers into your ears and chanting "lalalalala, I'm not understanding it". You don't want to understand, and I am in no position to force you to understand. Just don't use your lack of understanding as evidence that it is ununderstandable.


You're absolutely right. We don't understand philosophical writings, and since no one can explain what is meant by them we're left to believe that no one else does either.I could say the same about your mantras: "account of the world", "non-sence", "ordinary language", etc. You are unable to explain them - indeed, you don't even try - so what's to keep me from believing it is just pompous pseudo-philosophic posturing of the kind "only initiates understand"?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

What is unclear to you?

How this is a description of the the process you claim that I supposedly do or go through when I claim I know what a word means? None of what you've given me is an explanation of a process.


In other words, you search the book and see whether there is a character called "God" there. This is called a "verification" in my book.

I didn't ask what "verification" meant. I asked what you meant by "verificationism."


Why do you think it is impossible to describe what has to be the case for "God exists" to be true?

Because we don't know what you mean by "to exist." I gave a specific example of how the word is normally used in ordinary language, and you have not. If you had said "God doesn't exist in the bible," that would be false because there are explicitly references to God and descriptions of Him saying and doing things.


Of course not. It only presupposes that I know how to mention it.

This only means that I know how to make questions. If you want, that I know how to use the words that are used in questions in general. It evidently doesn't mean that I know how to use the word I am asking about. Indeed, I could explicitely ask, "how do we use the word X?"; and of course, "you already know, since you just used it" would not be considered a satisfactory (and probably not even polite) answer.

To know how to make questions means you know how to make the grammatical form of a question or what a question looks like in general, such as "why is X the case and not Y." To know where to place unknown word in a question shows knowledge of using the unknown word.


Are you being purposefully obnoxious? That was to demonstrate that you actually took the time to (mis)interpret Hegel's sentence, not to give you an example about ordinary language and ideology.

Claiming something is nonsense is not an interpretation. Otherwise, you'll have to explain what it means to interpret something.


I have already demonstrated that, if it is, it is not because of your grammatical argument.

You've done a thoroughly poor job of it, then.


You are trying hard not to understand. So let's leave at it, at least until you stop sticking your fingers into your ears and chanting "lalalalala, I'm not understanding it". You don't want to understand, and I am in no position to force you to understand. Just don't use your lack of understanding as evidence that it is ununderstandable.

I could say the same about your mantras: "account of the world", "non-sence", "ordinary language", etc. You are unable to explain them - indeed, you don't even try - so what's to keep me from believing it is just pompous pseudo-philosophic posturing of the kind "only initiates understand"?

Luís Henrique

I never said just because I don't understand something that it makes it impossible to understandable. I've explained why Hegel's sentence doesn't make sense and you've given me two possible meanings of what you think Hegel's sentence has. But these explanations don't make any sense and you have yet to try to explain what you mean by them.

And I fail to see why I have to explain what "ordinary language" is when it's been done to death already. Your only catch is that you seem to believe it's filled with ideology (remember, you said that the way people ordinarily use words is filled with ideology, so showing that you at least know that ordinary language refers to the way a language is normally spoken), which you have not been able to demonstrate as being the case.

As for "account of the world," I've given an example in response louisianaleftists' asking for an example of nonsense. It means to describe, e.g., a set of activities that corresponds to what has been said that needs to be the case for it to be true or false. For "I know I am typing this sentence" to be true, you would have to doubt somehow that you are typing but you have no grounds for it because you just typed that sentence. For it to be false, you'd have to not know you're typing but that doesn't work either because you are typing it. Thus, no account of the world (a set of activities) can be described to show it as being true or false.

[Meridian]

Is that "ordinary language"?

"the extension of words without extensions"

"are sought due to the presupposed descriptive function of language"

Sound to me like what Wittgenstein would call "non-sence".
If you think so, I suggest reading more Wittgenstein and other language philosophy.

[Luís Henrique]

How this is a description of the the process you claim that I supposedly do or go through when I claim I know what a word means? None of what you've given me is an explanation of a process.

Listen, when we communicate we expect certain reactions from people. If I ask you for a screwdriver, I expect to be handed a screwdriver. If you don't know what a scredriver is, or if you have a wrong notion of what it is, or if you cannot decide between different acceptions of the word, communication will fail: you will not hand me a screwdriver, but something else, or nothing at all. Or, if you don't understand what "to give" or "to pass" means, you will do something else with the screwdriver, and if your problem is with the word "me", then you might pass the screwdriver to someone else. How do you know what "pass", "me" or "screwdriver" means is irrelevant: to help a mechanic you need to have such notions (and many others, indeed), and to have them so ingrained that you won't lose time wondering about the meaning of the mechanic's demands. Otherwise you would be a lousy helper.


I didn't ask what "verification" meant. I asked what you meant by "verificationism."

The belief in the "verification principle": that knowing the truth value of empyrical propositions is only possible through empirical testing.


Because we don't know what you mean by "to exist." I gave a specific example of how the word is normally used in ordinary language, and you have not. If you had said "God doesn't exist in the bible," that would be false because there are explicitly references to God and descriptions of Him saying and doing things.

Oh, so your problem is with the verb "to exist"?

If I say "the WTC doesn't exist any more", this is usually understood as a the same as "the WTC is no more", or "there is no longer something like the WTC". So you can take "there is something (or "someone") as God". Is it more clear?


To know how to make questions means you know how to make the grammatical form of a question or what a question looks like in general, such as "why is X the case and not Y." To know where to place unknown word in a question shows knowledge of using the unknown word.

As I demonstrated to you, this argument is bogus. If you know how to use the word "screwdriver", you will hand one to the mechanic when he demands one. If, instead, you ask him "what is a 'screwdriver'", or "what does 'screwdriver' mean", or "what is this that you call 'screwdriver'", it is follows that you don't know how to use the word screwdriver.


Claiming something is nonsense is not an interpretation. Otherwise, you'll have to explain what it means to interpret something.

Well, of course not. But you tried to explain why was that sentence nonsence, and did that by assuming some peculiar interpretations of the words in it, that led you to an absurd misinterpretation of the sentence - from which you concluded that it was nonsencical.


You've done a thoroughly poor job of it, then.

Yes, I gather that's what you think.


I never said just because I don't understand something that it makes it impossible to understandable. I've explained why Hegel's sentence doesn't make sense and you've given me two possible meanings of what you think Hegel's sentence has. But these explanations don't make any sense and you have yet to try to explain what you mean by them.

No, you haven't explained why Hegel's sentence makes no sence. You have (grossly) misinterpreted it, and then claimed it has no sence because your skewed and absurd misinterpretation doesn't make sence.


And I fail to see why I have to explain what "ordinary language" is when it's been done to death already.

No, it wasn't. Never, indeed.


Your only catch is that you seem to believe it's filled with ideology (remember, you said that the way people ordinarily use words is filled with ideology, so showing that you at least know that ordinary language refers to the way a language is normally spoken)

I sure know what "ordinary language" means in ordinary language. It is a particular way to use language. I don't know what "ordinary language" means in your specific jargon, because you explicitly deny it is a way to use language, and attribute to it qualities that make me believe you equate it with "language" without adjectives.


As for "account of the world," I've given an example in response louisianaleftists' asking for an example of nonsense. It means to describe, e.g., a set of activities that corresponds to what has been said that needs to be the case for it to be true or false. For "I know I am typing this sentence" to be true, you would have to doubt somehow that you are typing but you have no grounds for it because you just typed that sentence. For it to be false, you'd have to not know you're typing but that doesn't work either because you are typing it. Thus, no account of the world (a set of activities) can be described to show it as being true or false.

Perhaps I would follow you better if you gave an example in which it is possible to "give an account of the world" to decide whether a proposition is or is not true. The above seems to me completely devoid of any sence, to be honest. And "give an account of the world" looks like philosophical jargon of the worst kind.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

If you think so, I suggest reading more Wittgenstein and other language philosophy.

Which will give me more impenetrable jargon that is everything except "ordinary language". And if it cannot be explained in ordinary language - remember this is your argument - it is nonsence, gibberish, even garbage. So spare me that.

Let me be honest to you: the arrogance, the conceited ignorance, the intellectual dishonesty, the lack of common politeness that you, JazzRemington, Christopher Koch, and Rosa Lichtentstein display when discussing this subject leads me to believe that such philosophies are deeply noxious to the integrity of those who hold them. More so because not all of you display such repulsive characteristics when discussing other subjetcs.

It may perhaps be attractive to teenagers who want to be badass and pretend to be important, but the time when I would do that is long past.

And so, I am very weary of even looking on it altogether.

If you want to me to change my initial view of this subject, it would be a good idea to show that it is possible to hold such ideas without coming out as a dissembler, a liar, a word-player, a name-caller, a sophist, and a prick in general.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Listen, when we communicate we expect certain reactions from people. If I ask you for a screwdriver, I expect to be handed a screwdriver. If you don't know what a scredriver is, or if you have a wrong notion of what it is, or if you cannot decide between different acceptions of the word, communication will fail: you will not hand me a screwdriver, but something else, or nothing at all. Or, if you don't understand what "to give" or "to pass" means, you will do something else with the screwdriver, and if your problem is with the word "me", then you might pass the screwdriver to someone else. How do you know what "pass", "me" or "screwdriver" means is irrelevant: to help a mechanic you need to have such notions (and many others, indeed), and to have them so ingrained that you won't lose time wondering about the meaning of the mechanic's demands. Otherwise you would be a lousy helper.

You stated that one searches through possible contexts that a word can be used in and selecting the one that appears to make sense. This still isn't an explanation of this process, because I don't know what sort of activity constitutes this searching and choosing, at what point the activity is happening, where it occurs, how this is different from guessing, how you use this to learn what words mean in contexts that you weren't originally aware of, etc. The only thing I know at this time is that it happens when one isn't sure about what is meant, but it doesn't seem any different from simply guessing. Until we receive confirmation of some sort, it's just guessing.


The belief in the "verification principle": that knowing the truth value of empyrical propositions is only possible through empirical testing.

I don't believe I've said anything of the sort. Can you give me an example of where I've said something like this and explain why you feel this is an example of verificationism as you've described it?


Oh, so your problem is with the verb "to exist"?

I have no problem with the verb. I have a problem with your use of it.


If I say "the WTC doesn't exist any more", this is usually understood as a the same as "the WTC is no more", or "there is no longer something like the WTC". So you can take "there is something (or "someone") as God". Is it more clear?

Not really, because the WTC can still exist in people's memories, stories, film or video footage taken, etc.


As I demonstrated to you, this argument is bogus. If you know how to use the word "screwdriver", you will hand one to the mechanic when he demands one. If, instead, you ask him "what is a 'screwdriver'", or "what does 'screwdriver' mean", or "what is this that you call 'screwdriver'", it is follows that you don't know how to use the word screwdriver.

The former is an example of understanding what "screwdriver" means, not using the word. The latter is an example of use, because you're using it in a question.


Well, of course not. But you tried to explain why was that sentence nonsence, and did that by assuming some peculiar interpretations of the words in it, that led you to an absurd misinterpretation of the sentence - from which you concluded that it was nonsencical.

You asked me to explain why it's nonsense, so it's an explanation of what I said of it, not an interpretation.


Yes, I gather that's what you think.

You haven't explained what your potential meanings mean, so I know you've done a poor job.


No, you haven't explained why Hegel's sentence makes no sence. You have (grossly) misinterpreted it, and then claimed it has no sence because your skewed and absurd misinterpretation doesn't make sence.

My original charge is that no account can be given of the world in which what Hegel said can be true or false. You gave what you thought Hegel meant but haven't explained what either of the two mean. So, I'm beginning to think what I said was the case.



No, it wasn't. Never, indeed.

I sure know what "ordinary language" means in ordinary language. It is a particular way to use language. I don't know what "ordinary language" means in your specific jargon, because you explicitly deny it is a way to use language, and attribute to it qualities that make me believe you equate it with "language" without adjectives.

For Wittgenstein, "ordinary language" is something of a technical term used to differentiate normal use of a language and an abnormal use of a language.


Perhaps I would follow you better if you gave an example in which it is possible to "give an account of the world" to decide whether a proposition is or is not true. The above seems to me completely devoid of any sence, to be honest. And "give an account of the world" looks like philosophical jargon of the worst kind.

Luís Henrique

Consider a statement like "Enemies in Diablo 2 can do cold damage." Assuming you know what Diablo 2 is, you'd know already what would have to be the case for it to be true and what would not have to be the case for it to be false. For it to be true, there would have to be enemies in the game that can do cold damage. For it to be false, there would have to not be enemies in the game that can do cold damage.

If you didn't know what Diablo 2 was, this statement wouldn't make any sense but not in the Wittgensteinian meaning of the word. Whatever the meaning of the sentence is, it can be explained to you, e.g., in the least by showing you the game. If you can't find anyone to explain it to you via any means, then you'd have to settle the matter yourself. But it still wouldn't be nonsense in the Wittgensteinian sense.

[Luís Henrique]

You stated that one searches through possible contexts that a word can be used in and selecting the one that appears to make sense. This still isn't an explanation of this process, because I don't know what sort of activity constitutes this searching and choosing, at what point the activity is happening, where it occurs, how this is different from guessing, how you use this to learn what words mean in contexts that you weren't originally aware of, etc. The only thing I know at this time is that it happens when one isn't sure about what is meant, but it doesn't seem any different from simply guessing. Until we receive confirmation of some sort, it's just guessing.

What "isn't sure about is meant", darnit?


I don't believe I've said anything of the sort. Can you give me an example of where I've said something like this and explain why you feel this is an example of verificationism as you've described it?

I think you very clearly have, and are being dishonest about it.


I have no problem with the verb. I have a problem with your use of it.

Not really, because the WTC can still exist in people's memories, stories, film or video footage taken, etc.

Oh please. That's not what is ordinarily meant by "exist". You perfectly understand what I mean, and are playing word games.


The former is an example of understanding what "screwdriver" means, not using the word. The latter is an example of use, because you're using it in a question.

No, it is not. It is an example of mentioning a word. If this is what you call "Wittgenstein's philosophy", sorry, but it is based in sophistry.


You asked me to explain why it's nonsense, so it's an explanation of what I said of it, not an interpretation.

Call it what you want, it is bogus, and probably dishonest the same.


You haven't explained what your potential meanings mean, so I know you've done a poor job.

I have explained you why I won't. Want to understand it better? Read Hegel. Should be there.


My original charge is that no account can be given of the world in which what Hegel said can be true or false.

And I have already told you that your ridiculous phrase "account of the world" means nothing to me, and that I believe it is pseudo-philosophical hocus-pocus to mistify people. And if I haven't, now I have.


You gave what you thought Hegel meant but haven't explained what either of the two mean. So, I'm beginning to think what I said was the case.

Hegel's view relies in his comprehension of what the Geist is. I have absolutely no intention of makinf further research on an entity that I am pretty sure doesn't exist. So if you are really interested in Hegel, go read him.


For Wittgenstein, "ordinary language" is something of a technical term used to differentiate normal use of a language and an abnormal use of a language.

Ah, so it is a use, or a way to use, language.

Finally, an attempt at an explanation.

But then, the pompous statements about it having or not having presuppositions, which are all based on a conflation between "ordinary language" and "language", are bogus.

What is the "normal" use of language, and who sets down the normative rules for it?


Consider a statement like "Enemies in Diablo 2 can do cold damage." Assuming you know what Diablo 2 is, you'd know already what would have to be the case for it to be true and what would not have to be the case for it to be false. For it to be true, there would have to be enemies in the game that can do cold damage. For it to be false, there would have to not be enemies in the game that can do cold damage.


In other words, it is up to a verification.

Luís Henrique

[RHIZOMES]

You're absolutely right. We don't understand philosophical writings, and since no one can explain what is meant by them we're left to believe that no one else does either.

You aren't actually bothering so you can stay on your high horse. This is emblematic of a reactionary tendency in ultraleft activist circles to deride anything that doesn't fit into their own psuedo-Marxist dogma.

Maybe this will help: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism

Also a related philosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_%28philosophy%29

And I don't even *like* Existentialism. It is far too individualist in its emphasis on subjective experience and contingency for my liking. But at least I took the time to understand the basics before dismissing it. I mean christ, it's even one of the easier to understand philosophical outlooks (paging Derrida...).

[Meridian]

Which will give me more impenetrable jargon that is everything except "ordinary language". And if it cannot be explained in ordinary language - remember this is your argument - it is nonsence, gibberish, even garbage. So spare me that.

Let me be honest to you: the arrogance, the conceited ignorance, the intellectual dishonesty, the lack of common politeness that you, JazzRemington, Christopher Koch, and Rosa Lichtentstein display when discussing this subject leads me to believe that such philosophies are deeply noxious to the integrity of those who hold them. More so because not all of you display such repulsive characteristics when discussing other subjetcs.
Don't confuse me with others, and read my responses to your objections. I get tired when someone repeats a sentiment which I feel I've already responded to, and this in turn drops the point of responding further.


It may perhaps be attractive to teenagers who want to be badass and pretend to be important, but the time when I would do that is long past.
You think Wittgenstein is 'attractive to teenagers who want to be badass...'? Well, we all know the amount of street cred garnered by understanding of analytical philosophy so perhaps you have a point.


And so, I am very weary of even looking on it altogether.
And I become weary of objections which I've thought over and have already argued against, which points remain uncontested. When all you do is repeating those initial objections, discussion is indeed pointless.


If you want to me to change my initial view of this subject, it would be a good idea to show that it is possible to hold such ideas without coming out as a dissembler, a liar, a word-player, a name-caller, a sophist, and a prick in general.I'm sorry, I found it difficult to find any point here besides name-calling. I tried my best to discuss your objections without prickliness; whatever interpreted prickliness was not meant as such, from my end.

[ZeroNowhere]

Which will give me more impenetrable jargon that is everything except "ordinary language". And if it cannot be explained in ordinary language - remember this is your argument - it is nonsence, gibberish, even garbage. So spare me that.

Let me be honest to you: the arrogance, the conceited ignorance, the intellectual dishonesty, the lack of common politeness that you, JazzRemington, Christopher Koch, and Rosa Lichtentstein display when discussing this subject leads me to believe that such philosophies are deeply noxious to the integrity of those who hold them. More so because not all of you display such repulsive characteristics when discussing other subjetcs.

It may perhaps be attractive to teenagers who want to be badass and pretend to be important, but the time when I would do that is long past.
I don't think that it is necessarily advisable to base your view of thinkers to any extent on one's impression of their exponents on Revleft. Because, you know, it is Revleft.

[JazzRemington]

You aren't actually bothering so you can stay on your high horse. This is emblematic of a reactionary tendency in ultraleft activist circles to deride anything that doesn't fit into their own psuedo-Marxist dogma.

Maybe this will help: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism

Also a related philosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_%28philosophy%29

And I don't even *like* Existentialism. It is far too individualist in its emphasis on subjective experience and contingency for my liking. But at least I took the time to understand the basics before dismissing it. I mean christ, it's even one of the easier to understand philosophical outlooks (paging Derrida...).

What the hell are you even talking about?

[JazzRemington]

What "isn't sure about is meant", darnit?

In other words, you can't explain this process.


I think you very clearly have, and are being dishonest about it.

Give me an example where I said knowing whether something is true or false depends upon "empirical testing."


Oh please. That's not what is ordinarily meant by "exist". You perfectly understand what I mean, and are playing word games.

According to the Collin's Dictionary (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/exist), "to exist" can also mean something is "present under specified conditions or in a specified place." Now, it can mean just "to have actual being," but that would just depend upon what is meant by "actual being."


No, it is not. It is an example of mentioning a word. If this is what you call "Wittgenstein's philosophy", sorry, but it is based in sophistry.

What do you mean by "mentioning," then?


Call it what you want, it is bogus, and probably dishonest the same.

In other words you're incapable of explaining why saying something is nonsense is itself an interpretation.


I have explained you why I won't. Want to understand it better? Read Hegel. Should be there.

Why? Can't you explain Hegel?


And I have already told you that your ridiculous phrase "account of the world" means nothing to me, and that I believe it is pseudo-philosophical hocus-pocus to mistify people. And if I haven't, now I have.

That's your opinion.


Hegel's view relies in his comprehension of what the Geist is. I have absolutely no intention of makinf further research on an entity that I am pretty sure doesn't exist. So if you are really interested in Hegel, go read him.

So, you can't explain what your explanations mean.


Ah, so it is a use, or a way to use, language.

[...]

But then, the pompous statements about it having or not having presuppositions, which are all based on a conflation between "ordinary language" and "language", are bogus.

The specific term "ordinary language" is a technical term that relies on making a distinction between ordinary and non-ordinary use of a specific language (technical, philosophical, etc.). The term, and maybe also the distinction, is only useful and meaningful when "doing" philosophy. So, in this context "ordinary language" and "language" aren't the same thing because one is something like a subset of the other. Outside of "doing" philosophy, the term, as a technical term, is meaningless. Outside of this context, "ordinary language" would refer to just language and thus would be either a synonym or redundant.

And how would it mean that ordinary language or language not having presumptions be bogus? People have presumptions, not languages.


What is the "normal" use of language, and who sets down the normative rules for it?

A normal use of language is the way you're using it right now. And the people who "set down the normative rules for it" are the people who develop the normative rules to make sense of a language - linguists, English teachers, people who study languages scientifically, etc. The grammar you learn in school is normative and proscriptive. Outside of this context, the question of "who sets down the normative rules for using a language" doesn't make sense.


In other words, it is up to a verification.

Knowing whether it is true not that there are enemies in Diablo 2 that do cold damage doesn't have to rely on "empirical testing." One could know it's true by reading about the game or being told that it is true. Remember, you said knowing the truth-value of something and not knowing if something has a truth-value.

[RHIZOMES]

What the hell are you even talking about?

I am arguing against the philistine "existentialism/philosophy is meaningless because I can't personally understand the complicated language" vibe I am getting from this thread.

It is a vibe I have noticed in a lot of far left circles, so I am rather passionate about it. lol

[JazzRemington]

I am arguing against the philistine "existentialism/philosophy is meaningless because I can't personally understand the complicated language" vibe I am getting from this thread.

It is a vibe I have noticed in a lot of far left circles, so I am rather passionate about it. lol

I really never said it was meaningless. Something like that can be very meaningful to some people. The point is, none of it makes sense. And since no one seems able to explain it, I'm left to conclude that it never did in the first place.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

The point is, none of it makes sense. And since no one seems able to explain it, I'm left to conclude that it never did in the first place.

Has it ever occurred to the comrades that if they can't make sense of something it just might be because they're STUPID?

[#FF0000]

Has it ever occurred to the comrades that if they can't make sense of something it just might be because they're STUPID?

this is a helpful and reasonable stance to take.

[ZeroNowhere]

Has it ever occurred to the comrades that if they can't make sense of something it just might be because they're STUPID?
It seems that you cannot make sense of what they mean in referring to senseless statements. I wonder why that is.

[Luís Henrique]

It seems that you cannot make sense of what they mean in referring to senseless statements. I wonder why that is.

Probably because they cannot answer simple questions about what they are saying without contradicting themselves, changing their definitions to meet their debating needs, etc.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Has it ever occurred to the comrades that if they can't make sense of something it just might be because they're STUPID?

And what's to prohibit this from being applied to the people who claim to understand something but yet cannot explain it? As said, this is a really helpful and constructive stance to take.

btw, I was being sarcastic with that last statement.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

btw, I was being sarcastic with that last statement.

No, you weren't.

[Lenina Rosenweg]

I'm not sure if this was intentional but the last six posts were hysterical.

[JazzRemington]

No, you weren't.

Do you have any evidence to support your claim, or are you just making an empty, petty statement in an attempt to drag me into an equally petty and childish gainsaying argument?

[JazzRemington]

Probably because they cannot answer simple questions about what they are saying without contradicting themselves, changing their definitions to meet their debating needs, etc.

Luís Henrique

I answered your questions, so I don't get where this is coming from.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

Do you have any evidence to support your claim, or are you just making an empty, petty statement in an attempt to drag me into an equally petty and childish gainsaying argument?

Yes.

[Luís Henrique]

I answered your questions, so I don't get where this is coming from.

You answered one, when you stated that "ordinary language" means a particular way to use language. It evidently contradicts your own argument that "ordinary language cannot have presuppositions". You tried to answer another one, about Hegel's sentence, but you actually couldn't, merely giving us a demonstration on how not to analyse a sentence. And about "giving an account of the world", of course, you never even tried.

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

You answered one, when you stated that "ordinary language" means a particular way to use language. It evidently contradicts your own argument that "ordinary language cannot have presuppositions".
If ordinary language is a way to use language, (this formulation strikes me as misfitting given that it's used as a term for the shared, common grammar, but no matter) and presupposition is a part of that ordinary language-use (and only a part of it, to the degree its common meaning is intact), then it follows that ordinary language itself can't be based on presupposition.

It would be interesting for someone to try to show exactly what presuppositions our ordinary language is based on. Such an attempt would be based on presuppositions.


Why do philistines such as the above even bother to post in the Philosophy forum...
Philistine? This term is no longer used as much as a derogatory term as it is used ironically, making fun of the arrogant, snobbish utterer. That's fitting.




If you think so, I suggest reading more Wittgenstein and other language philosophy.Which will give me more impenetrable jargon that is everything except "ordinary language".
Here we have a self-proclaimed ignorant-by-choice trying to argue against what is widely recognized as one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, and even language philosophy in general! Had you read Wittgenstein, especially his later work, you would find a complete (disappointing to you, I am sure) lack of jargon and instead indepth study of how language is actually used relating to various philosophical problems. You're only doing yourself a disservice by not reading it, if you are interested to the point of arguing here.