Old articles on DPRK which might be of interest

[milk]

British economist Joan Robinson visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1964, which resulted in a glowing report for the Monthly Review in January 1965, called Korean Miracle, saying that its remarkable achievements in economic terms put the post-war construction efforts of other countries, in the shade.

In 1981 Jon Halliday wrote an article for New Left Review, called The North Korean Enigma, in which he pointed to the remarkable economic success of DPRK (at the time), using Robinson's data, while he also said that the “political system is one of the most dreadful ever constructed in the name of socialism.”

He also included in his article a conversation he'd had with Genaro Carnero Checa, a Latin American socialist, journalist and poet, and author of Korea: Rice and Steel, which shows both his deep admiration and dislike of that society in which he volunteered to help build:


I once asked a Peruvian writer and militant who visited the DPRK many times, wrote a laudatory book about it, talked at length with Kim several times and played an active part in the 100 per cent solidarity movement why he did it. He answered: ‘They fought the North Americans; they have done incredible things in the economy; it’s the only Third World country where everyone has good health, good education and good housing.’ So I asked him what he really thought about it, as a poet. His reply: ‘It is the saddest, most miserable country I’ve ever been in in my life. As a poet, it strikes bleakness into my heart.’

These articles are old, one from 1965 and 1981, and of course do not reflect the reality of DPRK now, with the present militarised stagnation, where the country has been experiencing de-industrialisation since its free petroleum supplies dried up, and its frustrated attempts to develop nuclear power, as well as its exporting of regional insecurity in order to secure fuel and food aid.

The below, then, might be of interest and used for reference.

Korean Miracle (http://padevat.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/MRJAN1965-RobinsonKorea.pdf) (PDF)

The North Korean Enigma (http://padevat.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NLR-HallidayKorea.pdf) (PDF)

[Red Future]

The DPRK had so much hope for its future in the 1960s,1970s , what is saddening is that it never managed to reach the heights that it could have achieved.

[milk]

It's stagnantion is familiar in some ways to other now-defunct states of the old Socialist world bloc.

As for its present "real existing stagnation," Halliday's article made for interesting reading with regard to the transformation from the war until the early 1970s, with the author's sources being sketchy both prior to that and thereafter, even though he admitted that if I remember correctly. I also thought the fact that he really relied on this idea of DPRK being a Third World country was interesting, showing its time, possibly a back to when it was a more precisely defined term to use, but there were also hints there which probably wouldn't be contextualised in quite the same way today given the great achievements of the Asian Tigers, even though those aren't socialist.

All the seeds of their later problems are already referred to in the article, perhaps: their debt in the 1970s, the rigidity of the Juche ideology, the extensive concentration on heavy industry ... From an early 1980s standpoint, it might have been possible to perceive the DPRK economy as something impressive indeed and mighty, albeit founded on repression. I suppose by Stalinist standards and infrastructure-wise the country built itself up impressively after the war, but with that unacceptable level of repression, and stagnation no longer quilted by the old Socialist world bloc, it has become something rather tragic.

It's also not necessarily true that the economic success of DPRK in the late 1950s, 60s and early 70s in some way directly caused the later failures, and you might be able to make the case that were it not for the response to the oil price shocks of the 70s, DPRK could still be doing relatively, and I use that word advisedly, well. But these are counterfactual hypotheticals and therefore not really worth much. What you can say about the economic sucess of the late 50s, 60s and early 70s, despite its raising of living standards, was that it created a set of conditions: a reliance on foreign aid, the incipient Juche ideology, a rigid and relatively undiversified economy, and a large set of debts along with correspondingly unwise capital investment that set DPRK up for a fall. Global conditions beyond their control and poor leadership did the rest.

[Kiev Communard]

It's stagnantion is familiar in some ways to other now-defunct states of the old Socialist world bloc.

As for its present "real existing stagnation," Halliday's article made for interesting reading with regard to the transformation from the war until the early 1970s, with the author's sources being sketchy both prior to that and thereafter, even though he admitted that if I remember correctly. I also thought the fact that he really relied on this idea of DPRK being a Third World country was interesting, showing its time, possibly a back to when it was a more precisely defined term to use, but there were also hints there which probably wouldn't be contextualised in quite the same way today given the great achievements of the Asian Tigers, even though those aren't socialist.

All the seeds of their later problems are already referred to in the article, perhaps: their debt in the 1970s, the rigidity of the Juche ideology, the extensive concentration on heavy industry ... From an early 1980s standpoint, it might have been possible to perceive the DPRK economy as something impressive indeed and mighty, albeit founded on repression. I suppose by Stalinist standards and infrastructure-wise the country built itself up impressively after the war, but with that unacceptable level of repression, and stagnation no longer quilted by the old Socialist world bloc, it has become something rather tragic.

It's also not necessarily true that the economic success of DPRK in the late 1950s, 60s and early 70s in some way directly caused the later failures, and you might be able to make the case that were it not for the response to the oil price shocks of the 70s, DPRK could still be doing relatively, and I use that word advisedly, well. But these are counterfactual hypotheticals and therefore not really worth much. What you can say about the economic sucess of the late 50s, 60s and early 70s, despite its raising of living standards, was that it created a set of conditions: a reliance on foreign aid, the incipient Juche ideology, a rigid and relatively undiversified economy, and a large set of debts along with correspondingly unwise capital investment that set DPRK up for a fall. Global conditions beyond their control and poor leadership did the rest.

In my view, you have summarised the basic problems of DPRK pretty well. To this one has to add only one fact - the extremely high level of military spending, partially justified by the real threat of war with the South and the U.S., but still too high to bear. Until the Soviet aid was pouring in, the North Korean rulers could ignore the problems this entailed, now they are no longer able to get away with that.