Red Monroy
16th November 2010, 12:58
The Spanish section of the CWI had some internal discussion going on about working on or out of the "traditional mass organisations" since 1989, but stood firmly behind Ted Grant and Alan Woods in the international split of '91. A few years on however about 40% of the section would be "finding themselves outside the organisation".
As was posted on KarlMarx.net (http://www.karlmarx.net/analysis-and-criticism/thehistoryoftheexplusionofthenuevoclaridadgroupfro mtheimt), a recount of the happenings from the expelled group, Nuevo Claridad, 17 years later. Perhaps we can learn from such accounts.
I made some layout edits for readability.
The history of the explusion of the Nuevo Claridad group from the IMT
Our expulsion
We have been asked to explain how we were expelled 17 years ago. We are pleased that there are people interested in clarifying or discovering what happened in the Spanish section such a long time ago. We're pleased, not because we want to go over old rubbish but because this give us the opportunity to make clear that the expulsion was politically motivated and not a personal confrontation between the two leaders of the section as was said at the time. Nor was it a split. In fact, we did everything possible to stay in both the Spanish and, above all, the international organisation, because we began to understand that the sectarian degeneration represented by the PT. clique, was not an isolated infection, but ran through the veins of the international, starting with the leadership of the CIO and continuing with the leadership of some sections, especially ours.
The leaders of the International presented and justified the problem, as one of "personal conflicts" and "elements looking for an excuse to abandon activity". They did this to hide the symptoms and facts of the deepening process of degeneration of the Spanish organization. A process that gained speed dizzily after the surgical removal of 40% of the active members of the organization. We say "surgical removal" because we were accused of being a cancer that threatened the existence of the organization. They went so far as to say, in pure Stalinist style, "The organization will be stronger for purging itself" to justify getting rid of the so-called "minority." Sectarianism had really entered our ranks.
The process of expulsion began formally when the EC of the Spanish Section supported the "dissolution" of the leadership of the Navarra section using slander and libel that would make an agent provocateur proud. They knew that we would never accept such methods and we refused to acknowledge so great a crime, which had been hatched in collaboration with AW. Then, the EC voted the expulsion of three of its own members on July 7, 1993. In the same resolution they also approved the expulsion of anyone who shared or expressed solidarity with the positions of these three EC members. The three Comrades were Manu, Pulpo, Gorka, the latter, at that time was the Secretary General of the Students Union (SE). This decision was made with representation of the International Secretariat at the meeting, AW supported this bureaucratic behaviour. Later a note was found in AW's hand writing which was left by mistake at a faction meeting where he made clear his secret aim was to gain international support for our expulsion. (Manu later read the note at the meeting of the IS in Belgium and when Ted shouted "That's a lie" the photocopy we gave left no room for doubt). But best leave this dunghill and get down to the real issues. These were none other than a sectarian degeneration of the methods derived from political misunderstanding (of both the principles and the objective situation), impatience and the over valuation of our forces.
The expulsions were the culmination of a political showdown that went back to 1989 when there was a debate in the leadership regarding the direction we should take.
Some, who were later identified as "the minority", proposed entry into the United Left(IU) and put into practice one of our key ideas, working in mass organizations. Since being expelled from the PSOE, the UGT and Young Socialists in the late 70's, we were outside the traditional organizations and even temporarily leading alternative independent unions in two Spanish provinces (Alava - UST and Navarra - CST). At that time we thought we could build on the success and prestige of the SE to get a good position at IU. In fact, we were invited to enter by the leadership of IU.
Others, who later led the "majority", defended the perspective of independent work, reinforced by the great success we had had with the Students Union (some had even raised the possibility of standing SE candidates in the elections against the traditional parties), and putting the perspective of work in the PSOE indefinitely on the back burner. This orientation had been based on a perspective of crisis and rapid internal radicalisation in the PSOE as a result of the right-wing policies of the Felipe González governments, in the style of what happened in that Party in the 30's.
There was a third position, championed by the representative of the International Secretariat, AW, which was to remain as we were, refusing entry into IU, but creating a public front -Marxist Left, which would allow us to grow.
But in the absence of agreement, we made the mistake of settling the debate without bringing it to the organization. The discussion of the various options was hidden from the ranks. It was not even presented to the CC , staying hidden in the EC. We missed a good opportunity to train cadres in a situation where there are political differences. While there is unanimity all seems very democratic. But when there is fear of the consequences of an open discussion of political differences, something goes wrong. "The proof of the pudding is in the eating."
Then came the crisis of the International. Curiously, in the Spanish case there was not the division that occurred in most sections between Taffists (supporters of independent work and creating a new party to stand in the elections) and Grantists (in favour of maintaining the orientation of work in the mass organizations). No, in the Spanish case, there was virtual unanimity. The section stood firm in supporting the thesis of Ted Grant through the political role played by some who were later identified as the "minority who wanted to destroy the organization." The leaders of the later "majority" were too surprised to play any role in this crisis.
But the contradiction between the advocacy work in the traditional mass organizations as a distinctive orientation of the organization and, in practice, working 100% independently, could not be maintained indefinitely, it had to crack open and it did. The organisation was to be pulled in many directions.
In fact, in the same way that "success" in the movement against the Poll Tax in Britain was not digested by the leaders of the section, and part of the international leadership, drawing the conclusion that it was no longer necessary to work in the traditional organizations, the "success" of the SE led the organization to reach the same conclusion in Spain. Through the Students Union we could talk face to face with the leadership of labour organizations, parties and unions. This meant working directly with the masses without having to work in traditional organizations. The short cut of independent work.
Influenced by this atmosphere, guided by an incorrect analysis based on the "mere postponement" of the revolutionary which could explode at any moment (characterized the 90's as the "Red Decade") and the need of success to present to the"New International", led to increasing emphasis on the need to grow and grow and grow. There was an immediate objective to reach 2,000 members. The organization worked at 150% to get it, but the harder they worked the more distant and difficult the goal. A phenomenon began that the "minority" later characterized as the "revolving door syndrome." Youth entered the organization, spent a time as mere activists and soon left. With the same ease as they entered, they left. To hide this the leadership reacted by not recognising the drop outs and this with the consent of the International leadership. Thus the actual level of militancy was becoming more and more unreal, more false. This led to have a membership list of 1,500 of whom only a third were real dues paying members. This obsession with winning youth meant that many worker militants and many veteran cadres were being relegated to second or third place.
These worker militants and veteran cadres would have their say again when the difference between the practice of independent work and the professed theory of work in the mass organisations was put to the test in 1992 in a very practical and immediate sense. In Alava the UGT offered negotiations for the reunification of the UST (expelled from the UGT more than 10 years previously). This was to bring the debate to the central committee and the ranks of the organisation. The comrades in Alava wanted it raised at the central committee for a decision and the division on the EC was to reflect the future division within the organisation just as it reflected the differences in 1989. The position of the majority of EC was that this was a trap set by the bureaucracy of the UGT aimed at undermining the position built through our independent/revolutionary trade union activity.
They argued that the UST (like the SE) was a jewel in the crown of our organisation and should not be sullied. We argued that this approach by the UGT reflected both the needs of the bureaucracy and the pressure from their ranks and we had to negotiate in good faith as our political orientation had always been for workers unity within the mass organisations. The debate at the CC was very sharp and it was clear that the majority of the central committee opposed the position of the EC. We did not force the vote but, in the interest of maintaining the unity of the organisation argued that the EC should take on board the discussion and re-discuss the issue. This was agreed and as a result, the "EC minority" position became the position of the organisation the UST was fully reintegrated back into the UGT.
Looking back, however, one can see that "invisible" battle lines were drawn. There was not real agreement but rather a tactical retreat by the so called EC majority. It opened up issues that had been papered over during and after the fight with the Taafists. It was probably the first and last really open debate that there was in the Spanish section prior to our expulsion.
Our ongoing crime was to suggest that something was wrong, saying we had to admit that in many ways the organization was retreating rather than advancing. We raised the need for a thorough debate on the situation of the organization and to contribute to this we presented an alternative document to the 1993 Congress (Easter) in which the real and fictitious figures and data of militancy, sales newspaper, oversized apparatus, the role of SE were all raised... this presented a critical analysis of the situation of the organization and proposed as an alternative entry into IU. At first, our political and organizational analysis was not complete, it was a search for explanations and a way out of the quagmire in which we found ourselves. However, the reaction of most of the leadership was defensive, conservative and highly virulent. There was nothing to discuss, change or criticize. The conclusion of the Congress was that the duty of the minority was "obey" what the majority decided, "that's it." Otherwise, we were placing ourselves outside the organization. At the moment of truth when there were major policy differences, the organization showed that it was not able to deal with them with a revolutionary attitude. The bourgeois concept (or Stalinist) of democracy won the day: Majority crushes minority. All the principles which for years we had defended concerning internal democracy, all we had opposed in the international clique of PT, all this remained a dead letter.
The only arguments against us were that our doubts, our criticisms and our choices were a reflection that we were "tired" and we were justifying abandoning the organization and the political struggle. Ironically he truth is that 17 years later, we are still here while the main leader of the triumphant "majority" left everything within a few months. AW and TG told us that we has 6 months in IU before we would be expelled, because the PCE was still a Stalinist organization, or we would be absorbed by the apparatus And above all, in less than a year, we would disappear from the Spanish political map.
We must admit that the "majority" was such mostly because we refused to proselytize at the beginning of the crisis, speaking with comrades who asked our opinion, but without chasing anyone to give our version of events, and, particularly, because we believed the hypocritical "neutral" position of the leadership of the International. After an initial meeting with TG who said we were right in all that we raised, there was a radical change and the International leadership became part of the majority block , proof of which we presented to the International Committee. We know now that AW thought that the breakup was inevitable, and the leaders of the "majority" would ensure the continuity of the section. As T himself told us: "If we have to chose, we chose R. in whose veins runs the organization" (seems that they dried up within a few months). Without the full and disloyal support of the IS , the "majority" surely would not have been such. And the only thing this support guaranteed was the deepening degeneration until the Spanish section finally broke with AW.
After the 93 Congress the "majority" supported by the IS, was dedicated to preparing the expulsion, which took shape as we have said in little more than two months, on 7 July. It just needed ratifying by the Central Committee. But at that meeting they were surprised by the appearance of two Greek comrades. Expelling us so obviously in front of International witnesses was too blatant and risky so they retreated with an agreement to try to find other solutions. This was to buy time to gain the support of the International in the summer meeting and then act. And they did. Manu was expelled from the EC in early October and fired as a fulltimer. Despite this we kept trying to find a solution. Manu continued attending the EC meetings as a member of the International Secretariat. In November, the "majority" of the EC sent a letter to IS asking them to intervene; in other words, to excluded Manu from the IS, in order to separate him permanently from the Spanish leadership. The harassment and persecution of the "minority"comrades was constant to ensure a stifling environment in the organization. We were being blatantly pushed out.
We offered negotiations in various fields. For example, the apparatus needed resizing. An apparatus of more than 40 fulltimers was unsustainable in an organization of 500 active members. Both for political reasons which only we defended, because the apparatus had replaced the militancy and working conditions bordered on a lumpenisation of the fulltimers, as well as for economic reasons that were obvious to almost everyone. We said we were willing to negotiate a reduction, starting with the 60-40 proportions (proportional from the Congress votes) and do it as organized as possible to try to avoid unnecessary suffering to the comrades involved. But it was useless.
After the summer, lay-offs began. Coincidentally it was the "minority" fulltimers. Finally, 14 minority fulltimers were laid off. All the centre technical team (4) and most of the editorial board of the newspaper (3), and 4 Students Union fulltimers and another 3 from areas outside Madrid. Some had been FT for over 15 years. Most were on the street without even the right to unemployment benefits because the Social Security had never been paid by their "employer". It was a shameful revenge. Even bourgeois labour law leaves some provision for compensation. They were left on the street overnight, without means of subsistence. This measure alone and the support from the IS shows the political and moral degeneration of these elements. The madness that sectarianism leads to, in which comrades become the main enemy, the embodiment of "class enemies" as they came to define us. The then leader, R. even said that after cleansing the organization with our expulsion,they would double the membership figures in a few months. The tactics of the "majority" was to keep the expulsion in the cupboard and push forward with dismissals and other provocations, until the final break occurring in January 1994, when (inter alia) they refused to pay the salaries of those remaining "minority" fulltimers. In this way they could present to the rest of the International as an irresponsible split, trying to hide the shameful reality of a patent expulsion.
The only thing that saved the minority was the understanding that the roots of the problem was political. We made every effort to survive, to get the means to continue and to go back to study the sources of Marxism: rereading Marx and Engels.
The result was that, one year after, we believe we began to understand the key political factors. Such as the position that the Spanish transition, did not mean the "postponement" of a revolution that could come any day, but rather represented a defeat for the labour movement with profound consequences. We realized that in the International, especially the Spanish section, had established the theory of "continuous revolution" instead of recognizing the objective situation. A good example was that in the year 95, we posed the probability of two consecutive terms of bourgeois party (the PP), while the now "official selection" said in its paper (with the support of the IS) that the prospect after the PP government there would be "a kind of Kerensky government" (sic). And above all, we understood, through discussion and experience, that we must be a part of the labour movement, not something alien to it.
We have not invented anything, our basic ideas are in the Communist Manifesto. Paradoxically, we feel we have developed the ideas of TG on the role of organizations of the working class, while we see our old friends as a sect (i.e. various sects) of the global constellation of sectarianism.
Manu, Pulpo
11.11.10
Madrid
As was posted on KarlMarx.net (http://www.karlmarx.net/analysis-and-criticism/thehistoryoftheexplusionofthenuevoclaridadgroupfro mtheimt), a recount of the happenings from the expelled group, Nuevo Claridad, 17 years later. Perhaps we can learn from such accounts.
I made some layout edits for readability.
The history of the explusion of the Nuevo Claridad group from the IMT
Our expulsion
We have been asked to explain how we were expelled 17 years ago. We are pleased that there are people interested in clarifying or discovering what happened in the Spanish section such a long time ago. We're pleased, not because we want to go over old rubbish but because this give us the opportunity to make clear that the expulsion was politically motivated and not a personal confrontation between the two leaders of the section as was said at the time. Nor was it a split. In fact, we did everything possible to stay in both the Spanish and, above all, the international organisation, because we began to understand that the sectarian degeneration represented by the PT. clique, was not an isolated infection, but ran through the veins of the international, starting with the leadership of the CIO and continuing with the leadership of some sections, especially ours.
The leaders of the International presented and justified the problem, as one of "personal conflicts" and "elements looking for an excuse to abandon activity". They did this to hide the symptoms and facts of the deepening process of degeneration of the Spanish organization. A process that gained speed dizzily after the surgical removal of 40% of the active members of the organization. We say "surgical removal" because we were accused of being a cancer that threatened the existence of the organization. They went so far as to say, in pure Stalinist style, "The organization will be stronger for purging itself" to justify getting rid of the so-called "minority." Sectarianism had really entered our ranks.
The process of expulsion began formally when the EC of the Spanish Section supported the "dissolution" of the leadership of the Navarra section using slander and libel that would make an agent provocateur proud. They knew that we would never accept such methods and we refused to acknowledge so great a crime, which had been hatched in collaboration with AW. Then, the EC voted the expulsion of three of its own members on July 7, 1993. In the same resolution they also approved the expulsion of anyone who shared or expressed solidarity with the positions of these three EC members. The three Comrades were Manu, Pulpo, Gorka, the latter, at that time was the Secretary General of the Students Union (SE). This decision was made with representation of the International Secretariat at the meeting, AW supported this bureaucratic behaviour. Later a note was found in AW's hand writing which was left by mistake at a faction meeting where he made clear his secret aim was to gain international support for our expulsion. (Manu later read the note at the meeting of the IS in Belgium and when Ted shouted "That's a lie" the photocopy we gave left no room for doubt). But best leave this dunghill and get down to the real issues. These were none other than a sectarian degeneration of the methods derived from political misunderstanding (of both the principles and the objective situation), impatience and the over valuation of our forces.
The expulsions were the culmination of a political showdown that went back to 1989 when there was a debate in the leadership regarding the direction we should take.
Some, who were later identified as "the minority", proposed entry into the United Left(IU) and put into practice one of our key ideas, working in mass organizations. Since being expelled from the PSOE, the UGT and Young Socialists in the late 70's, we were outside the traditional organizations and even temporarily leading alternative independent unions in two Spanish provinces (Alava - UST and Navarra - CST). At that time we thought we could build on the success and prestige of the SE to get a good position at IU. In fact, we were invited to enter by the leadership of IU.
Others, who later led the "majority", defended the perspective of independent work, reinforced by the great success we had had with the Students Union (some had even raised the possibility of standing SE candidates in the elections against the traditional parties), and putting the perspective of work in the PSOE indefinitely on the back burner. This orientation had been based on a perspective of crisis and rapid internal radicalisation in the PSOE as a result of the right-wing policies of the Felipe González governments, in the style of what happened in that Party in the 30's.
There was a third position, championed by the representative of the International Secretariat, AW, which was to remain as we were, refusing entry into IU, but creating a public front -Marxist Left, which would allow us to grow.
But in the absence of agreement, we made the mistake of settling the debate without bringing it to the organization. The discussion of the various options was hidden from the ranks. It was not even presented to the CC , staying hidden in the EC. We missed a good opportunity to train cadres in a situation where there are political differences. While there is unanimity all seems very democratic. But when there is fear of the consequences of an open discussion of political differences, something goes wrong. "The proof of the pudding is in the eating."
Then came the crisis of the International. Curiously, in the Spanish case there was not the division that occurred in most sections between Taffists (supporters of independent work and creating a new party to stand in the elections) and Grantists (in favour of maintaining the orientation of work in the mass organizations). No, in the Spanish case, there was virtual unanimity. The section stood firm in supporting the thesis of Ted Grant through the political role played by some who were later identified as the "minority who wanted to destroy the organization." The leaders of the later "majority" were too surprised to play any role in this crisis.
But the contradiction between the advocacy work in the traditional mass organizations as a distinctive orientation of the organization and, in practice, working 100% independently, could not be maintained indefinitely, it had to crack open and it did. The organisation was to be pulled in many directions.
In fact, in the same way that "success" in the movement against the Poll Tax in Britain was not digested by the leaders of the section, and part of the international leadership, drawing the conclusion that it was no longer necessary to work in the traditional organizations, the "success" of the SE led the organization to reach the same conclusion in Spain. Through the Students Union we could talk face to face with the leadership of labour organizations, parties and unions. This meant working directly with the masses without having to work in traditional organizations. The short cut of independent work.
Influenced by this atmosphere, guided by an incorrect analysis based on the "mere postponement" of the revolutionary which could explode at any moment (characterized the 90's as the "Red Decade") and the need of success to present to the"New International", led to increasing emphasis on the need to grow and grow and grow. There was an immediate objective to reach 2,000 members. The organization worked at 150% to get it, but the harder they worked the more distant and difficult the goal. A phenomenon began that the "minority" later characterized as the "revolving door syndrome." Youth entered the organization, spent a time as mere activists and soon left. With the same ease as they entered, they left. To hide this the leadership reacted by not recognising the drop outs and this with the consent of the International leadership. Thus the actual level of militancy was becoming more and more unreal, more false. This led to have a membership list of 1,500 of whom only a third were real dues paying members. This obsession with winning youth meant that many worker militants and many veteran cadres were being relegated to second or third place.
These worker militants and veteran cadres would have their say again when the difference between the practice of independent work and the professed theory of work in the mass organisations was put to the test in 1992 in a very practical and immediate sense. In Alava the UGT offered negotiations for the reunification of the UST (expelled from the UGT more than 10 years previously). This was to bring the debate to the central committee and the ranks of the organisation. The comrades in Alava wanted it raised at the central committee for a decision and the division on the EC was to reflect the future division within the organisation just as it reflected the differences in 1989. The position of the majority of EC was that this was a trap set by the bureaucracy of the UGT aimed at undermining the position built through our independent/revolutionary trade union activity.
They argued that the UST (like the SE) was a jewel in the crown of our organisation and should not be sullied. We argued that this approach by the UGT reflected both the needs of the bureaucracy and the pressure from their ranks and we had to negotiate in good faith as our political orientation had always been for workers unity within the mass organisations. The debate at the CC was very sharp and it was clear that the majority of the central committee opposed the position of the EC. We did not force the vote but, in the interest of maintaining the unity of the organisation argued that the EC should take on board the discussion and re-discuss the issue. This was agreed and as a result, the "EC minority" position became the position of the organisation the UST was fully reintegrated back into the UGT.
Looking back, however, one can see that "invisible" battle lines were drawn. There was not real agreement but rather a tactical retreat by the so called EC majority. It opened up issues that had been papered over during and after the fight with the Taafists. It was probably the first and last really open debate that there was in the Spanish section prior to our expulsion.
Our ongoing crime was to suggest that something was wrong, saying we had to admit that in many ways the organization was retreating rather than advancing. We raised the need for a thorough debate on the situation of the organization and to contribute to this we presented an alternative document to the 1993 Congress (Easter) in which the real and fictitious figures and data of militancy, sales newspaper, oversized apparatus, the role of SE were all raised... this presented a critical analysis of the situation of the organization and proposed as an alternative entry into IU. At first, our political and organizational analysis was not complete, it was a search for explanations and a way out of the quagmire in which we found ourselves. However, the reaction of most of the leadership was defensive, conservative and highly virulent. There was nothing to discuss, change or criticize. The conclusion of the Congress was that the duty of the minority was "obey" what the majority decided, "that's it." Otherwise, we were placing ourselves outside the organization. At the moment of truth when there were major policy differences, the organization showed that it was not able to deal with them with a revolutionary attitude. The bourgeois concept (or Stalinist) of democracy won the day: Majority crushes minority. All the principles which for years we had defended concerning internal democracy, all we had opposed in the international clique of PT, all this remained a dead letter.
The only arguments against us were that our doubts, our criticisms and our choices were a reflection that we were "tired" and we were justifying abandoning the organization and the political struggle. Ironically he truth is that 17 years later, we are still here while the main leader of the triumphant "majority" left everything within a few months. AW and TG told us that we has 6 months in IU before we would be expelled, because the PCE was still a Stalinist organization, or we would be absorbed by the apparatus And above all, in less than a year, we would disappear from the Spanish political map.
We must admit that the "majority" was such mostly because we refused to proselytize at the beginning of the crisis, speaking with comrades who asked our opinion, but without chasing anyone to give our version of events, and, particularly, because we believed the hypocritical "neutral" position of the leadership of the International. After an initial meeting with TG who said we were right in all that we raised, there was a radical change and the International leadership became part of the majority block , proof of which we presented to the International Committee. We know now that AW thought that the breakup was inevitable, and the leaders of the "majority" would ensure the continuity of the section. As T himself told us: "If we have to chose, we chose R. in whose veins runs the organization" (seems that they dried up within a few months). Without the full and disloyal support of the IS , the "majority" surely would not have been such. And the only thing this support guaranteed was the deepening degeneration until the Spanish section finally broke with AW.
After the 93 Congress the "majority" supported by the IS, was dedicated to preparing the expulsion, which took shape as we have said in little more than two months, on 7 July. It just needed ratifying by the Central Committee. But at that meeting they were surprised by the appearance of two Greek comrades. Expelling us so obviously in front of International witnesses was too blatant and risky so they retreated with an agreement to try to find other solutions. This was to buy time to gain the support of the International in the summer meeting and then act. And they did. Manu was expelled from the EC in early October and fired as a fulltimer. Despite this we kept trying to find a solution. Manu continued attending the EC meetings as a member of the International Secretariat. In November, the "majority" of the EC sent a letter to IS asking them to intervene; in other words, to excluded Manu from the IS, in order to separate him permanently from the Spanish leadership. The harassment and persecution of the "minority"comrades was constant to ensure a stifling environment in the organization. We were being blatantly pushed out.
We offered negotiations in various fields. For example, the apparatus needed resizing. An apparatus of more than 40 fulltimers was unsustainable in an organization of 500 active members. Both for political reasons which only we defended, because the apparatus had replaced the militancy and working conditions bordered on a lumpenisation of the fulltimers, as well as for economic reasons that were obvious to almost everyone. We said we were willing to negotiate a reduction, starting with the 60-40 proportions (proportional from the Congress votes) and do it as organized as possible to try to avoid unnecessary suffering to the comrades involved. But it was useless.
After the summer, lay-offs began. Coincidentally it was the "minority" fulltimers. Finally, 14 minority fulltimers were laid off. All the centre technical team (4) and most of the editorial board of the newspaper (3), and 4 Students Union fulltimers and another 3 from areas outside Madrid. Some had been FT for over 15 years. Most were on the street without even the right to unemployment benefits because the Social Security had never been paid by their "employer". It was a shameful revenge. Even bourgeois labour law leaves some provision for compensation. They were left on the street overnight, without means of subsistence. This measure alone and the support from the IS shows the political and moral degeneration of these elements. The madness that sectarianism leads to, in which comrades become the main enemy, the embodiment of "class enemies" as they came to define us. The then leader, R. even said that after cleansing the organization with our expulsion,they would double the membership figures in a few months. The tactics of the "majority" was to keep the expulsion in the cupboard and push forward with dismissals and other provocations, until the final break occurring in January 1994, when (inter alia) they refused to pay the salaries of those remaining "minority" fulltimers. In this way they could present to the rest of the International as an irresponsible split, trying to hide the shameful reality of a patent expulsion.
The only thing that saved the minority was the understanding that the roots of the problem was political. We made every effort to survive, to get the means to continue and to go back to study the sources of Marxism: rereading Marx and Engels.
The result was that, one year after, we believe we began to understand the key political factors. Such as the position that the Spanish transition, did not mean the "postponement" of a revolution that could come any day, but rather represented a defeat for the labour movement with profound consequences. We realized that in the International, especially the Spanish section, had established the theory of "continuous revolution" instead of recognizing the objective situation. A good example was that in the year 95, we posed the probability of two consecutive terms of bourgeois party (the PP), while the now "official selection" said in its paper (with the support of the IS) that the prospect after the PP government there would be "a kind of Kerensky government" (sic). And above all, we understood, through discussion and experience, that we must be a part of the labour movement, not something alien to it.
We have not invented anything, our basic ideas are in the Communist Manifesto. Paradoxically, we feel we have developed the ideas of TG on the role of organizations of the working class, while we see our old friends as a sect (i.e. various sects) of the global constellation of sectarianism.
Manu, Pulpo
11.11.10
Madrid