scarletghoul
29th October 2010, 13:41
Rise of China's 'Princelings' Signals Return to Maoist Ideals
Iain Mills | Bio (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/authors/543/iain-mills) | 29 Oct 2010
Briefing (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/briefings)
BEIJING -- At its recent plenary session in Beijing on Oct. 14-18, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee rubber-stamped the country's latest five-year economic plan, oversaw the further emergence of a new generation of political leaders and issued a number of significant policy announcements. Taken together, these events signal a changing political tide (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6810/the-new-rules-the-two-chinas-long-road-to-common-ground) in Beijing and the ascendancy of the CCP's Maoist-influenced "Princeling" faction in the run-up to the 2012 leadership transition.
The Princeling faction is so named because many of its key figures are the sons of revolutionary heroes. The Princelings effectively represent the CCP's traditionalist wing, littering their speeches with quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong and emphasizing the "core objectives" of the party and the revolution. Their rise has been fuelled by growing concerns over social unrest and economic sustainability, and raises the question of whether, under their leadership, China will increasingly turn to Maoist ideology to moderate these threats and secure its economic survival.
Since Deng Xiaoping's death in 1997, both of China's subsequent leaders, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have come from what were perceived as more progressive factions. Their tenures in power, however, have been characterized by rapidly rising social inequality and a failure to both stamp out corruption and adequately control the market economy's destructive effects on human and environmental resources.
Despite rising per capita gross domestic product (GDP), many Chinese citizens are seeing their living standards fall. This is due in part to high underlying inflation, particularly for foodstuffs and other basic products, which means that the majority of Chinese are getting no wealthier in real terms. Environmental degradation is also a major concern. Sixteen of the world's 20 most-polluted cities are in China, and nearly all the country's river-systems are heavily contaminated. In extreme cases, entire towns have been rendered uninhabitable (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2010/jun/07/china-cancer-pollution) by industrial effluent.
Since 1978, the comprehensive welfare benefits offered by the Maoist "danwei," or "work unit," system have been largely withdrawn, but the state has failed to create adequate replacements. In 1978, nearly all of China's citizens enjoyed state-funded healthcare. By the 1990s, this figure had plummeted to 10 percent, and in 2000, China's healthcare system was ranked 188th out of 191 (http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/)countries in terms of equity by the World Health Organization. Even now, less than half the population is covered, at a time when pollution and unhealthy lifestyles are causing epidemics of expensive-to-treat medical conditions.
In general, there are few examples of improving qualitative socio-economic indicators in today's China, a damning indictment of the CCP's post-1978 governance and a far cry from the revolution's original ideals as laid out in the canon of Mao Zedong's political thought.
Party strategists are particularly concerned about growing social unrest among disenfranchised grass-roots supporters. As a result, Mao's ideas on equality, clean government and national solidarity have found new resonance in China's emerging market economy. The current leadership duo of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, members of the politically moderate Communist Youth League (CYL), have found themselves increasingly marginalized (http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/10/28/is-china%E2%80%99s-wen-backing-away-from-reform/?mod=google_news_blog) as their tenure has progressed, an analysis supported by the slowing pace of political reform and a more-hostile climate for foreign businesses.
Hu surprised many at last year's Central Committee plenary session by failing to appoint a leading Princeling, Vice-Premier Xi Jinping, as head of the Central Military Committee (CMC), a position traditionally held by leaders-in-waiting. Some saw this as an attempt to buy time for a potential CYL challenger to emerge, but none has. This year, Xi, whose father was a first-generation CCP leader, was elected head of the CMC by ballot, the first time the position has not been filled by appointment. This demonstrates Xi's broad popularity within the party and makes him the odds-on favorite for the top job in 2012.
Xi's promotion is the clearest sign yet of the Princelings' ascendancy in the 2012 transition, an ascendancy that is also mirrored in a number of recent policy announcements. The latest five-year plan is notable for its strong emphasis on sustainability, equitable development and cleaner government, signaling a move away from the growth-at-all-costs approach of the last decade. There has also been a softening, compared to explicit indications in the past, of China's commitment to continue reducing the role of the state in economic activity. Indeed, last year's economic stimulus package reversed the trend of declining government investment as a percentage of GDP. Large increases in welfare and defense expenditures slated for the short-to-medium term cast further doubt on hopes generated by China's 2001 World Trade Organization (WTO) accession that the next administration would move rapidly away from the statist model.
The fingerprints of an increasingly Maoist approach can be found on other recent policy developments, as well. The tightening of rare-earth export regulations effectively reclassifies the metals from economic to strategic resources (http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos) -- a move straight out of the Maoist playbook. China's more-assertive foreign policy of late, particularly during its recent standoff with Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands, is in stark contrast to its previously low-key approach. The recent rise in interest rates, the first in three years, may also be a harbinger of a more-aggressive monetary policy.
The CCP is understandably alarmed by the negative consequences of economic development, which only seem to have been exacerbated by rapid and poorly controlled marketization, particularly in the years surrounding WTO accession. While the Princelings are far from hostile to the market, their political rise responds to the perception that, in many instances, market forces may now be hindering rather than helping development. Moreover, with the Western financial system suffering a crisis of credibility, China has been emboldened in its attempts to design its own mixed-market model.
Taken to its extremes, Mao Zedong's political ideology caused China to implode. But as the country rebuilds its political economy, the Great Helmsman's ideals and strategic maneuvers could yet be embraced as the framework by which China averts a second such catastrophe.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6871/rise-of-chinas-princelings-signals-return-to-maoist-ideals
What do we know of these "maoists" ? Is this a degenerated/revisionist workers state on the edge, trying to turn itself around, or a capitalist state trying to appease its workers ?
Iain Mills | Bio (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/authors/543/iain-mills) | 29 Oct 2010
Briefing (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/briefings)
BEIJING -- At its recent plenary session in Beijing on Oct. 14-18, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee rubber-stamped the country's latest five-year economic plan, oversaw the further emergence of a new generation of political leaders and issued a number of significant policy announcements. Taken together, these events signal a changing political tide (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6810/the-new-rules-the-two-chinas-long-road-to-common-ground) in Beijing and the ascendancy of the CCP's Maoist-influenced "Princeling" faction in the run-up to the 2012 leadership transition.
The Princeling faction is so named because many of its key figures are the sons of revolutionary heroes. The Princelings effectively represent the CCP's traditionalist wing, littering their speeches with quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong and emphasizing the "core objectives" of the party and the revolution. Their rise has been fuelled by growing concerns over social unrest and economic sustainability, and raises the question of whether, under their leadership, China will increasingly turn to Maoist ideology to moderate these threats and secure its economic survival.
Since Deng Xiaoping's death in 1997, both of China's subsequent leaders, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have come from what were perceived as more progressive factions. Their tenures in power, however, have been characterized by rapidly rising social inequality and a failure to both stamp out corruption and adequately control the market economy's destructive effects on human and environmental resources.
Despite rising per capita gross domestic product (GDP), many Chinese citizens are seeing their living standards fall. This is due in part to high underlying inflation, particularly for foodstuffs and other basic products, which means that the majority of Chinese are getting no wealthier in real terms. Environmental degradation is also a major concern. Sixteen of the world's 20 most-polluted cities are in China, and nearly all the country's river-systems are heavily contaminated. In extreme cases, entire towns have been rendered uninhabitable (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2010/jun/07/china-cancer-pollution) by industrial effluent.
Since 1978, the comprehensive welfare benefits offered by the Maoist "danwei," or "work unit," system have been largely withdrawn, but the state has failed to create adequate replacements. In 1978, nearly all of China's citizens enjoyed state-funded healthcare. By the 1990s, this figure had plummeted to 10 percent, and in 2000, China's healthcare system was ranked 188th out of 191 (http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/)countries in terms of equity by the World Health Organization. Even now, less than half the population is covered, at a time when pollution and unhealthy lifestyles are causing epidemics of expensive-to-treat medical conditions.
In general, there are few examples of improving qualitative socio-economic indicators in today's China, a damning indictment of the CCP's post-1978 governance and a far cry from the revolution's original ideals as laid out in the canon of Mao Zedong's political thought.
Party strategists are particularly concerned about growing social unrest among disenfranchised grass-roots supporters. As a result, Mao's ideas on equality, clean government and national solidarity have found new resonance in China's emerging market economy. The current leadership duo of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, members of the politically moderate Communist Youth League (CYL), have found themselves increasingly marginalized (http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/10/28/is-china%E2%80%99s-wen-backing-away-from-reform/?mod=google_news_blog) as their tenure has progressed, an analysis supported by the slowing pace of political reform and a more-hostile climate for foreign businesses.
Hu surprised many at last year's Central Committee plenary session by failing to appoint a leading Princeling, Vice-Premier Xi Jinping, as head of the Central Military Committee (CMC), a position traditionally held by leaders-in-waiting. Some saw this as an attempt to buy time for a potential CYL challenger to emerge, but none has. This year, Xi, whose father was a first-generation CCP leader, was elected head of the CMC by ballot, the first time the position has not been filled by appointment. This demonstrates Xi's broad popularity within the party and makes him the odds-on favorite for the top job in 2012.
Xi's promotion is the clearest sign yet of the Princelings' ascendancy in the 2012 transition, an ascendancy that is also mirrored in a number of recent policy announcements. The latest five-year plan is notable for its strong emphasis on sustainability, equitable development and cleaner government, signaling a move away from the growth-at-all-costs approach of the last decade. There has also been a softening, compared to explicit indications in the past, of China's commitment to continue reducing the role of the state in economic activity. Indeed, last year's economic stimulus package reversed the trend of declining government investment as a percentage of GDP. Large increases in welfare and defense expenditures slated for the short-to-medium term cast further doubt on hopes generated by China's 2001 World Trade Organization (WTO) accession that the next administration would move rapidly away from the statist model.
The fingerprints of an increasingly Maoist approach can be found on other recent policy developments, as well. The tightening of rare-earth export regulations effectively reclassifies the metals from economic to strategic resources (http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos) -- a move straight out of the Maoist playbook. China's more-assertive foreign policy of late, particularly during its recent standoff with Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands, is in stark contrast to its previously low-key approach. The recent rise in interest rates, the first in three years, may also be a harbinger of a more-aggressive monetary policy.
The CCP is understandably alarmed by the negative consequences of economic development, which only seem to have been exacerbated by rapid and poorly controlled marketization, particularly in the years surrounding WTO accession. While the Princelings are far from hostile to the market, their political rise responds to the perception that, in many instances, market forces may now be hindering rather than helping development. Moreover, with the Western financial system suffering a crisis of credibility, China has been emboldened in its attempts to design its own mixed-market model.
Taken to its extremes, Mao Zedong's political ideology caused China to implode. But as the country rebuilds its political economy, the Great Helmsman's ideals and strategic maneuvers could yet be embraced as the framework by which China averts a second such catastrophe.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6871/rise-of-chinas-princelings-signals-return-to-maoist-ideals
What do we know of these "maoists" ? Is this a degenerated/revisionist workers state on the edge, trying to turn itself around, or a capitalist state trying to appease its workers ?