DaringMehring
28th October 2010, 19:22
Exclusive to RevLeft, an unpublished essay of mine on Nepal. It's a couple years old but expresses my views more or less the same as I would today. Feel free to replicate (2nd part, analysis, in 2nd post):
History
Tucked away in the Himalayas between India and China, the inhabitants of Nepal endured the 20th century in conditions of backwardness and misery. Poverty was on a scale comparable with the worst places in the world: many were without electricity, telephones, and roads. Slavery was given a legal form in the kamaiya debt bondage system. Stories are told of the poor selling their entire family in order to obtain malaria medication. The bondage was not only national - Nepal was a source country for men, women, and children trafficked internationally for commercial sexual exploitation and involuntary servitude.
The troubled mountain nation was an absolute monarchy until 1990. In that year discontent culminated in tens of thousands marching on the royal palace in Kathmandu. Police and troops fired on the crowd. The king, sensing danger, granted a constitutional monarchy. The king's act was internationally lauded and hailed as a great victory. But no sooner did he grant a parliament than the king set about limiting, undermining, and negating its power. The system of dual power was resolved in favor of the monarchy, and by extension the most reactionary elements of the owning classes. The people of Nepal's demands, hopes, and needs were not fulfilled by the puppet parliament, whose limited capacity was "consumed by infighting, corruption and venal ambition" (1). The disillusionment of the people grew into anger. The most advanced segments among them, in the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), began a rebellion in 1996. Their aim: to establish a "New Democracy" by a "historical revolt against feudalism, imperialism and so-called reformists."
The rebellion was disparaged by the western press. They accused the revolutionaries of disrespecting democracy. Couldn't they see that they had a parliament? Human rights groups raised a cry that grew in intensity as did the revolt. Amnesty International condemned "human rights abuses committed by both government security forces and Maoist cadres" (2). Human Rights Watch gravely found that "both sides... commit abuses against civilians..." (3). Meanwhile the US government, while making symbolic noises at the appropriate moments about human rights abuses, continued to provide military aid to the royalist government (4). The European Commission Delegation to Nepal similarly used the human rights violations of the CPN(M) to launch one-sided attacks on the group and thereby give succor to the monarchy (5, 6).
The breakdown of the international class forces was typical. The big bourgeoisie, represented by the US government, made hypocritical statements to obfuscate their role, and gave material aid to its class allies. The bourgeois and petit-bourgeois democrats were enthralled by the puppet parliament and thereby made to provisionally support the monarchy. Meanwhile leftist, anti-imperialist forces were largely entrapped by a pacifistic, universalizing morality. The savage business of civil war was too visceral for them to reconcile with their consciences. Their confusion allowed their own big bourgeoisie to disguise its actions with moral overtures. Their wish for a premature end to the violence and a "peaceful solution" was exactly in line with the desires of the big bourgeoisie and the Nepalese monarchy: violence to end; royal rights to be recognized and bargained with rather than destroyed; a return to the empty parliamentary game with the addition of "dialogues" that would keep the people hopeful while providing nothing but delay.
The CPN(M) was not beholden to international opinion nor did it look abroad for salvation. Nor were they unwilling to violently challenge the ruling class. They owe these facts to their ideological basis in Marxism. Nonetheless, the pressure of the pacifism of the CPN(M)'s international should-be allies undoubtedly hurt them. For instance, the pressure of human rights organizations was one of the factors that forced the CPN(M) to called off their 2004 blockade of Kathmandu (7). Still, the CPN(M) was capable of continuing their struggle in relative isolation, and more and more won the sympathy of the Nepalese population.
As the struggle went on the Maoists gained ground, and so the crisis deepened. In 2002 King Gyanendra dissolved the puppet parliament, which according to his rationalizing was not capable of combating the rebellion. The rebels had adopted a Maoist strategy of building up their power in the countryside, but the time had come to move on the cities. In August 2004 they blockaded the capital and victory seemed within grasp, but as was mentioned they were forced to abandon the blockade after a month. In 2005 Gyanendra dismissed the entire government and assumed full executive powers with the stated aim of destroying the Maoist rebellion. In March 2006 the rebels blockaded every city and town in the country. They had already struck an important blow against the king - in December 2005 they had achieved an alliance with the Seven Party Alliance, a mix of bourgeois democrats and social democrats. This alliance, angered by the king's intractability and scared by the popular forces' power, decisively went over to the side of the rebellion. They summoned their strength for a general strike April 5th-9th, 2006. Three hundred thousand to a million took to the streets in Kathmandu. The monarchy could not endure the storm of all-out popular mobilization. King Gyanendra agreed to the SPA's demand to restore the old parliament, and pleaded to the SPA to take control of the situation.
To strike the blow, the CPN(M) had allied with alien forces. But had they done so only to turn over their hard-won victory to the flabby and self-serving compromisers, the “so-called reformists,” they had initially aimed to oust? The CPN(M)'s actions showed signs of uncertainty. Restoring the parliament would not be enough, they declared. They demanded that the monarchy be unequivocally overturned and a Constituent Assembly be elected to draft a new constitution. They promised to continue fighting the government until their demands were met, but then, under international pressure from both governmental and non-governmental organizations and national pressure from the SPA, they declared a three month break in their military actions. In November 2006 the Maoists gave up their arms to the UN on the promise of the SPA's chosen prime minister, G. P. Koirala, to name them as part of an interim government.
The fighting had ended but the state power was still up in the air. The Maoists were adamant that the monarchy be ended. But treating with the compromisers in parliament was not working out as they had hoped. The CPN(M)'s reputation among the masses diminished as inaction dragged on. The CPN(M) withdrew from the government in frustration in September 2007. "The king and his supporters have been behind all the recent troubles" declared Maoist leader K. B. Mahara, whose venom must have been matched by rue for not finishing off the monarchical foe when the opportunity was ripe (8). "Declare the country a republic state. Kick out the king," chanted an estimated 5,000 activists and supporters who marched through the streets of Kathmandu (8). Though they had been disarmed, the Maoists could still make a credible threat of violence, which their withdrawal from the government implicitly did. The parliament was jolted into action. The historic moment came in December 2007. With an agreement in place the Maoists rejoined proceedings for the decisive vote: the king is stripped of his powers. The country will become a "federal democratic republican state" (9).
The monarchists were bitter to the last. S. S. Rana, a minion of Gyanendra, declared the vote "an unconstitutional drama being enacted with total impudence" (9). The indignation of this historically obsolete man shows how accustomed the monarchy was to shielding itself from the popular will with empty legalistic maneuvering. Formerly the small-minded bourgeois and social democrats had accepted the legal charade, for they were more inclined towards the monarchy, which established stability favorable to the landed and wealthy, than they were towards the stirred-up people, who they feared. But the relative strengths of the forces had shifted. The people had asserted themselves through the CPN(M), and the monarchy's allies were, despite all their attempts at tricks, compromises, delays, etc., forced to go over to the popular side whenever crisis threatened, because the people were stronger. If the so-called “democratic” forces held to the monarchy they would simply be destroyed alongside it.
In May 2008 elections were held for the Constituent Assembly, realizing the long-held demand of the CPN(M). The CPN(M) took the most seats of any party, 220, disproving all the slanders that painted them as a violent minority loathed by the masses. The social democratic Nepali Congress was second with 110, and the moderate Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist) was third with 103. A large number of other parties scraped up seats here and there. At its first meeting, the Assembly officially abolished the Hindu kingdom and declared a federal, democratic republic. Gyanendra was evicted from the royal palace.
The Constituent Assembly went to work designing the new state. A conflict quickly developed over the position of President. The CPN(M) argued they were due this position on account of their having taken the most seats, but Congress and the CPN(UML) resisted. The CPN(M) relented and offered that a “neutral” person become president, but Congress pressed for its leader, G. P. Koirala. The Assembly hit a deadlock. Frustrated once more, the CPN(M) threatened to withdraw. The CPN(UML) made a compromise offer that again had Koirala as President, but the CPN(M) refused, calling the deal a “dishonor to the people's mandate.” Having made the revolution, they were not eager to give away the top position to a past critic and waffler.
June and July of 2008 were a bitter period of threats, walkouts, and hostile negotiations. The CPN(M) were afraid that if they did not acquire enough power in the government, then they would be unable to effect the radical changes they had promised, and their covenant with the people would be broken.
In the end an election was held in the Constituent Assembly to determine who would be Nepal's first President. The CPN(M) ran the unaffiliated leftist, R. P. Singh, while Congress ran its former General Secretary, R. B. Yadav. The CPN(UML) ran its own candidate in the first round, but in the runoff backed Congress, enabling Yadav to beat Singh, 308-282.
Tension remains high. CPN(M) cadres, having risked their lives in the long revolutionary struggle, are angered by the victory of Congress's Yadav. They consider the other parties to be backsliders and foreign puppets (10). The other parties in turn are fearful of the CPN(M)'s preeminence. A second round of fighting is possible on the basis of these difficult to resolve antagonisms. It has so far proved impossible to integrate the Maoist Army, the People's Liberation Army, into the national military. Further, the Nepali Army released a report January 17, 2010 outlining how the CPN(M)'s Young Communist League, which is an armed organization, is “more dangerous” to the “peace process” than even the PLA fighters (11).
History
Tucked away in the Himalayas between India and China, the inhabitants of Nepal endured the 20th century in conditions of backwardness and misery. Poverty was on a scale comparable with the worst places in the world: many were without electricity, telephones, and roads. Slavery was given a legal form in the kamaiya debt bondage system. Stories are told of the poor selling their entire family in order to obtain malaria medication. The bondage was not only national - Nepal was a source country for men, women, and children trafficked internationally for commercial sexual exploitation and involuntary servitude.
The troubled mountain nation was an absolute monarchy until 1990. In that year discontent culminated in tens of thousands marching on the royal palace in Kathmandu. Police and troops fired on the crowd. The king, sensing danger, granted a constitutional monarchy. The king's act was internationally lauded and hailed as a great victory. But no sooner did he grant a parliament than the king set about limiting, undermining, and negating its power. The system of dual power was resolved in favor of the monarchy, and by extension the most reactionary elements of the owning classes. The people of Nepal's demands, hopes, and needs were not fulfilled by the puppet parliament, whose limited capacity was "consumed by infighting, corruption and venal ambition" (1). The disillusionment of the people grew into anger. The most advanced segments among them, in the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), began a rebellion in 1996. Their aim: to establish a "New Democracy" by a "historical revolt against feudalism, imperialism and so-called reformists."
The rebellion was disparaged by the western press. They accused the revolutionaries of disrespecting democracy. Couldn't they see that they had a parliament? Human rights groups raised a cry that grew in intensity as did the revolt. Amnesty International condemned "human rights abuses committed by both government security forces and Maoist cadres" (2). Human Rights Watch gravely found that "both sides... commit abuses against civilians..." (3). Meanwhile the US government, while making symbolic noises at the appropriate moments about human rights abuses, continued to provide military aid to the royalist government (4). The European Commission Delegation to Nepal similarly used the human rights violations of the CPN(M) to launch one-sided attacks on the group and thereby give succor to the monarchy (5, 6).
The breakdown of the international class forces was typical. The big bourgeoisie, represented by the US government, made hypocritical statements to obfuscate their role, and gave material aid to its class allies. The bourgeois and petit-bourgeois democrats were enthralled by the puppet parliament and thereby made to provisionally support the monarchy. Meanwhile leftist, anti-imperialist forces were largely entrapped by a pacifistic, universalizing morality. The savage business of civil war was too visceral for them to reconcile with their consciences. Their confusion allowed their own big bourgeoisie to disguise its actions with moral overtures. Their wish for a premature end to the violence and a "peaceful solution" was exactly in line with the desires of the big bourgeoisie and the Nepalese monarchy: violence to end; royal rights to be recognized and bargained with rather than destroyed; a return to the empty parliamentary game with the addition of "dialogues" that would keep the people hopeful while providing nothing but delay.
The CPN(M) was not beholden to international opinion nor did it look abroad for salvation. Nor were they unwilling to violently challenge the ruling class. They owe these facts to their ideological basis in Marxism. Nonetheless, the pressure of the pacifism of the CPN(M)'s international should-be allies undoubtedly hurt them. For instance, the pressure of human rights organizations was one of the factors that forced the CPN(M) to called off their 2004 blockade of Kathmandu (7). Still, the CPN(M) was capable of continuing their struggle in relative isolation, and more and more won the sympathy of the Nepalese population.
As the struggle went on the Maoists gained ground, and so the crisis deepened. In 2002 King Gyanendra dissolved the puppet parliament, which according to his rationalizing was not capable of combating the rebellion. The rebels had adopted a Maoist strategy of building up their power in the countryside, but the time had come to move on the cities. In August 2004 they blockaded the capital and victory seemed within grasp, but as was mentioned they were forced to abandon the blockade after a month. In 2005 Gyanendra dismissed the entire government and assumed full executive powers with the stated aim of destroying the Maoist rebellion. In March 2006 the rebels blockaded every city and town in the country. They had already struck an important blow against the king - in December 2005 they had achieved an alliance with the Seven Party Alliance, a mix of bourgeois democrats and social democrats. This alliance, angered by the king's intractability and scared by the popular forces' power, decisively went over to the side of the rebellion. They summoned their strength for a general strike April 5th-9th, 2006. Three hundred thousand to a million took to the streets in Kathmandu. The monarchy could not endure the storm of all-out popular mobilization. King Gyanendra agreed to the SPA's demand to restore the old parliament, and pleaded to the SPA to take control of the situation.
To strike the blow, the CPN(M) had allied with alien forces. But had they done so only to turn over their hard-won victory to the flabby and self-serving compromisers, the “so-called reformists,” they had initially aimed to oust? The CPN(M)'s actions showed signs of uncertainty. Restoring the parliament would not be enough, they declared. They demanded that the monarchy be unequivocally overturned and a Constituent Assembly be elected to draft a new constitution. They promised to continue fighting the government until their demands were met, but then, under international pressure from both governmental and non-governmental organizations and national pressure from the SPA, they declared a three month break in their military actions. In November 2006 the Maoists gave up their arms to the UN on the promise of the SPA's chosen prime minister, G. P. Koirala, to name them as part of an interim government.
The fighting had ended but the state power was still up in the air. The Maoists were adamant that the monarchy be ended. But treating with the compromisers in parliament was not working out as they had hoped. The CPN(M)'s reputation among the masses diminished as inaction dragged on. The CPN(M) withdrew from the government in frustration in September 2007. "The king and his supporters have been behind all the recent troubles" declared Maoist leader K. B. Mahara, whose venom must have been matched by rue for not finishing off the monarchical foe when the opportunity was ripe (8). "Declare the country a republic state. Kick out the king," chanted an estimated 5,000 activists and supporters who marched through the streets of Kathmandu (8). Though they had been disarmed, the Maoists could still make a credible threat of violence, which their withdrawal from the government implicitly did. The parliament was jolted into action. The historic moment came in December 2007. With an agreement in place the Maoists rejoined proceedings for the decisive vote: the king is stripped of his powers. The country will become a "federal democratic republican state" (9).
The monarchists were bitter to the last. S. S. Rana, a minion of Gyanendra, declared the vote "an unconstitutional drama being enacted with total impudence" (9). The indignation of this historically obsolete man shows how accustomed the monarchy was to shielding itself from the popular will with empty legalistic maneuvering. Formerly the small-minded bourgeois and social democrats had accepted the legal charade, for they were more inclined towards the monarchy, which established stability favorable to the landed and wealthy, than they were towards the stirred-up people, who they feared. But the relative strengths of the forces had shifted. The people had asserted themselves through the CPN(M), and the monarchy's allies were, despite all their attempts at tricks, compromises, delays, etc., forced to go over to the popular side whenever crisis threatened, because the people were stronger. If the so-called “democratic” forces held to the monarchy they would simply be destroyed alongside it.
In May 2008 elections were held for the Constituent Assembly, realizing the long-held demand of the CPN(M). The CPN(M) took the most seats of any party, 220, disproving all the slanders that painted them as a violent minority loathed by the masses. The social democratic Nepali Congress was second with 110, and the moderate Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist) was third with 103. A large number of other parties scraped up seats here and there. At its first meeting, the Assembly officially abolished the Hindu kingdom and declared a federal, democratic republic. Gyanendra was evicted from the royal palace.
The Constituent Assembly went to work designing the new state. A conflict quickly developed over the position of President. The CPN(M) argued they were due this position on account of their having taken the most seats, but Congress and the CPN(UML) resisted. The CPN(M) relented and offered that a “neutral” person become president, but Congress pressed for its leader, G. P. Koirala. The Assembly hit a deadlock. Frustrated once more, the CPN(M) threatened to withdraw. The CPN(UML) made a compromise offer that again had Koirala as President, but the CPN(M) refused, calling the deal a “dishonor to the people's mandate.” Having made the revolution, they were not eager to give away the top position to a past critic and waffler.
June and July of 2008 were a bitter period of threats, walkouts, and hostile negotiations. The CPN(M) were afraid that if they did not acquire enough power in the government, then they would be unable to effect the radical changes they had promised, and their covenant with the people would be broken.
In the end an election was held in the Constituent Assembly to determine who would be Nepal's first President. The CPN(M) ran the unaffiliated leftist, R. P. Singh, while Congress ran its former General Secretary, R. B. Yadav. The CPN(UML) ran its own candidate in the first round, but in the runoff backed Congress, enabling Yadav to beat Singh, 308-282.
Tension remains high. CPN(M) cadres, having risked their lives in the long revolutionary struggle, are angered by the victory of Congress's Yadav. They consider the other parties to be backsliders and foreign puppets (10). The other parties in turn are fearful of the CPN(M)'s preeminence. A second round of fighting is possible on the basis of these difficult to resolve antagonisms. It has so far proved impossible to integrate the Maoist Army, the People's Liberation Army, into the national military. Further, the Nepali Army released a report January 17, 2010 outlining how the CPN(M)'s Young Communist League, which is an armed organization, is “more dangerous” to the “peace process” than even the PLA fighters (11).