Is Historical Materialism Inductive?

[¿Que?]

Wikipedia explains inductive reasoning as follows:

Inductive reasoning, also known as induction or inductive logic, or educated guess in colloquial English, is a kind of reasoning (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasoning) that allows for the possibility that the conclusion is false even where all of the premises are true.[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning#cite_note-0) The premises of an inductive logical argument (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_argument) indicate some degree of support (inductive probability) for the conclusion but do not entail (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entailment) it; i.e., they do not ensure its truth. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

This is the opposite of deductive reasoning, which is explained by wikipedia as follows:

Deductive reasoning, also called Deductive logic, is reasoning (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasoning) which constructs or evaluates deductive arguments (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_%28logic%29). Deductive arguments are attempts to show that a conclusion necessarily follows (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_consequence) from a set of premises. A deductive argument is valid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valid) if the conclusion does follow necessarily from the premises, i.e., if the conclusion must be true provided that the premises are true. A deductive argument is sound (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soundness) if it is valid and its premises are true. Deductive arguments are valid or invalid, sound or unsound, but are never false or true.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive

The way I've been taught the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning is that deductive arguments begin from axiomatic principles. We know something is true, it doesn't have to be proven, and we follow those premises to their conclusion using deductive reasoning. Mathematics is deductive.

Induction also assumes the truth of its premises, but they are not axiomatic. They are merely statements of facts, like empirical observations. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises, since there is always the chance that new facts will surface which will result in different conclusions. The scientific method could be said to be inductive.

In the German Ideology, Marx states the following:

First Premises of Materialist Method

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.
(Emphasis mine).

Thus, Marx says, the premises for historical materialism are not dogmas (axioms) but the actual concrete facts on the ground of real existence. For me, this coheres with both an empirical and inductive approach. But does empiricism always equal induction, or is there a difference? If no difference, why the two terms?

But most importantly, the question I am asking is whether Marx's method, historical materialism, was inductive? Yes, no, maybe?

[Adil3tr]

In the sense that it is not supposed to be dogmatic, yes, i would say so. But we all accept this as fact most of the time.

[Victus Mortuum]

Wikipedia explains inductive reasoning as follows:

This is the opposite of deductive reasoning, which is explained by wikipedia as follows:

Wikipedia's descriptions are correct, as far as they can be (defining words is relatively subjective). Deductive is that which follows necessarily from the premises/generalizations (Truth in necessitates truth out). Inductive is that which draws an uncertain, but more or less probable, conclusion due to lack of sufficient information (all of science is based on inductive premises).


The way I've been taught the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning is that deductive arguments begin from axiomatic principles. We know something is true, it doesn't have to be proven, and we follow those premises to their conclusion using deductive reasoning. Mathematics is deductive.

Induction also assumes the truth of its premises, but they are not axiomatic. They are merely statements of facts, like empirical observations. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises, since there is always the chance that new facts will surface which will result in different conclusions. The scientific method could be said to be inductive.

You are thinking analytic v synthetic propositions and arguments, I believe.
In a way though, you are saying the same thing that the wiki article is.


Thus, Marx says, the premises for historical materialism are not dogmas (axioms) but the actual concrete facts on the ground of real existence. For me, this coheres with both an empirical and inductive approach. But does empiricism always equal induction, or is there a difference? If no difference, why the two terms?

The simple answer is yes, they are very different. As far as most use the words, empiricism simply means truth is found in the senses. Induction means the practice of generalizing the future from patterns in the past (drawing uncertain conclusions from incomplete information).


But most importantly, the question I am asking is whether Marx's method, historical materialism, was inductive? Yes, no, maybe?

Hm...well depends what you mean. The materialist conception of history, specifically Marx's version, was/is a theory of describing and understanding and predicting social/historical change. So in a sense, it is inductive in that the premises of the theory must at some point be based on induction - in the same way that General Relativity or the Modern Theory of Evolution are inductive...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

El V:


The way I've been taught the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning is that deductive arguments begin from axiomatic principles. We know something is true, it doesn't have to be proven, and we follow those premises to their conclusion using deductive reasoning. Mathematics is deductive.

This is an old, Aristotelian idea (already challenged in his day by Stoic logicians, since it leaves out of account hypothetical reasoning, which is the backbone of all the sciences).

In hypothetical reasoning, the truth (or falsehood) of the premisses might not be known, or they might even be known to be false, but the theorist concerned assumes for the purposes of the argument that they are true in order to see what follows from them.

The Pythagorean proof of the irrationality of the square root of two and Euclid's proof that there is an infinite number of primes are classical examples of this type of reasoning in mathematics:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_root_of_2

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_number#History

In science hypothetical reasoning will be used to test an hypothesis not known to be true, or suspected to be false, to show it is either true or false. Here is a classical example of it's use:


"The arguments which terminate in an hypothesis's positing the existence of some trans-Uranic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranus) object, the planet Neptune, and the structurally identical arguments which forced Leverrier (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urbain_Le_Verrier) to urge the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet, the planet 'Vulcan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulcan_(hypothetical_planet))', [not to be confused with the one on Star Trek! -- RL] to explain the precessional aberrations (http://physics.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/node98.html) of our 'innermost' solar system neighbour are formally one and the same. They run: (1) Newtonian mechanics is true; (2) Newtonian mechanics requires planet P to move in exactly this manner, x, y, z, …; (3) but P does not move à la x, y, z; (4) so either (a) there exists some as-yet-unobserved object, A, or (b) Newtonian mechanics is false. (5) 4b) contradicts 1) so 4a) is true -- there exists some as-yet-undetected body which will put everything right again between observation and theory. The variable 'A' took the value 'Neptune' in the former case; it took the value 'Vulcan' in the latter case. And these insertions constituted the zenith and the nadir of classical celestial mechanics, for Neptune does exist, whereas Vulcan does not." [Hanson (1970), p.257. I have slightly altered this to make it clearer.]

Hanson, N. (1970), 'A Picture Theory Of Meaning', in Colodny (1970), pp.233-74.

Colodny, R. (1970) (ed.), The Nature And Function Of Scientific Theories (University of Pittsburgh Press).

And the above was a significant moment in science since it was one of the motivating factors that finally led to the formation of the Theory of Relativity.


Induction also assumes the truth of its premises, but they are not axiomatic. They are merely statements of facts, like empirical observations. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises, since there is always the chance that new facts will surface which will result in different conclusions. The scientific method could be said to be inductive.

Induction need not always proceed from truth either, but it is far less interesting anyway, and despite what Wiki or introductory textbooks might tell you, it is rarely used in science. Scientists always work from (true or false) hypotheses.

This is true of Historical Materialism [HM], too.


Thus, Marx says, the premises for historical materialism are not dogmas (axioms) but the actual concrete facts on the ground of real existence. For me, this coheres with both an empirical and inductive approach. But does empiricism always equal induction, or is there a difference? If no difference, why the two terms?

But, he did not begin there. By the time he came to write this, he had already enjoyed an expensive education, which filled his head with all sorts of ideas and hypotheses (many of which he got from his reading of Hegel, Kant, Aristotle and the Scottish Historical Materialists (Smith, Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Hume and Stewart)). And it is from them that he appropriated the ideas that were later to become HM.

So, he was simply doing what scientists have always done -- working on the basis of a set of hypotheses. The difference is that in the social sciences things are far more complex than in the 'harder' sciences, and require different methods.

Hence, Marx 's method is hypothetical/deductive, with evidence thrown in to confirm.

[It is in fact far more complex than this, but to go into more details in Learning would be inappropriate.]

[Victus Mortuum]

Induction need not always proceed from truth either, but it is far less interesting anyway, and despite what Wiki or introductory textbooks might tell you, it is rarely used in science. Scientists always work from (true or false) hypotheses.

I feel like this statement is misleading. There are two aspects to the modern scientific process: theory and testing. Theorists most definitely work from hypothetical premises of uncertain truth-value. However, testers either test within the conclusions of these theories to check the conclusions' validity or test the premises to determine their validity (or to induce mathematical/logical patterns). This is the all important inductive aspect of science, which should not be ignored. This connects science to the real world. You are ignoring the huge category of scientists who spend their time inductively testing proposed theories and premises and try to discern patterns.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

And yet, what you describe is not induction, but hypothesis testing (mediated by deduction), as I alleged.

[Victus Mortuum]

And yet, what you describe is not induction, but hypothesis testing (mediated by deduction), as I alleged.

Fine, if you prefer, hypothesis testing based on the assumption of induction being valid. Regardless, there is the underlying assumption of induction's validity in science, insofar as it is purported to be able to reliably predict the future.

[¿Que?]

So Rosa,
Are you saying that the difference between induction and deduction is spurious? That we generally only use deduction, since we always base hypothesis on previous theoretical constructions?

Then there is no such distinction as:
Concrete ----> Theory (induction)
Theory ------> Concrete (deduction)

[The Vegan Marxist]

So Rosa,
Are you saying that the difference between induction and deduction is spurious? That we generally only use deduction, since we always base hypothesis on previous theoretical constructions?

Then there is no such distinction as:
Concrete ----> Theory (induction)
Theory ------> Concrete (deduction)

To make a long story short, Rosa's saying that Dialectical Materialism is bullshit & is just as metaphysical as idealism. In which I wholeheartedly disagree with.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


Fine, if you prefer, hypothesis testing based on the assumption of induction being valid. Regardless, there is the underlying assumption of induction's validity in science, insofar as it is purported to be able to reliably predict the future.

Where did I say induction was valid. It manifestly isn't valid.

And, as Bertrand Russell pointed out, induction is very poor at predicting the future: every day for nearly a year the farmer feeds a chicken. On Xmas day, the chicken -- based on 363 inductive observations -- thinks the farmer will feed it. But he rings its neck.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

EL V:


So Rosa,
Are you saying that the difference between induction and deduction is spurious? That we generally only use deduction, since we always base hypothesis on previous theoretical constructions?

No, I'm not saying this: "the difference between induction and deduction is spurious".

Deductions can be valid or invalid; inductions can only be invalid.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vegan Clairvoyant:


Rosa's saying that Dialectical Materialism is bullshit & is just as metaphysical as idealism.

Where did I even so much as hint at this in this thread? You mystics are getting paranoid now!:lol:


In which I wholeheartedly disagree with.

Fine, but like all the other mystics here, you can't defend your dialectical mantras.

[¿Que?]

EL V:



No, I'm not saying this: "the difference between induction and deduction is spurious".

Deductions can be valid or invalid; inductions can only be invalid.
But given your chicken example, the chicken was making a reliable induction. It just wasn't valid.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

But it wasn't reliable, since the chicken died.

[Victus Mortuum]

Where did I say induction was valid. It manifestly isn't valid.

And, as Bertrand Russell pointed out, induction is very poor at predicting the future: every day for nearly a year the farmer feeds a chicken. On Xmas day, the chicken -- based on 363 inductive observations -- thinks the farmer will feed it. But he rings its neck.

...

Actually, if the chicken was properly using induction, he would've noticed that other chickens were being taken away. This criticism of induction is based on a reductionist and simplistic analysis of induction. Induction isn't just X happens a lot so it will always happen. Things in induction (at least, if we are referring to the reasoning process) are more variable based and probably akin to your 'hypotheses deduction' system. You should check out Mill's Methods in his System of Logic (wikipedia actually has a great article on this).

Besides, what would you offer as a plausible alternative to the inductive method that is any more justified?

[syndicat]

Induction is used but it could be regarded as relying ultimately on hypotheses. in his discusion of induction, Russell points out that if one assumes natural kinds, then inductive probabilities can be inferred, but a natural kind can be regarded as a kind of hypothesis. consider for example an induction where one notices that certain iron filings are attracted by a magnet. it is valid to infer that in the future other iron filings you encounter are also likely to be attracted by magnets.

so the method of hypothesis and test is more fundamental. induction is also not just inductive generalization, but includes a variety of other methods such as argument by analogy (which is used extensively in legal reasoning) and causal reasoning (which was accepted by Russell).

"Validity" can of course be defined as deductive validity, and of course inductive arguments or arguments to the best explanation are not valid in this sense, but some logicians have a different meaning for "valid" where it differentiates good from bad inductive inferences. so one can differentiate "dedutive validity" and "inductive validity" as two different concepts.

[¿Que?]

The point I'm making is based on the sociological concept of validity and reliability. Induction can be valid if your conclusions are correct, but then you can only know if it is valid after the fact (after you have either confirmed or denied its validity). But a certain set of claims can be reliable, even if they are not necessarily true. So for example, you can see that a majority of people buy coke from a coke machine. We can then make the claim that most people buy coke from that coke machine, this is a reliable claim (since we've observed it). However, we can't claim that most people prefer the taste of coke over other beverages, mostly because other factors could be influencing people's choice (say the fact that the coke machine only sells coke products).

This link better explains it. I like the diagrams with the targets. :)
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/relandval.php


But it wasn't reliable, since the chicken died.
it was reliable 363 times.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


Actually, if the chicken was properly using induction, he would've noticed that other chickens were being taken away.

The point is that the past is only ever an unreliable guide to the future -- unless we introduce other considerations that cannot be obtained by induction.


This criticism of induction is based on a reductionist and simplistic analysis of induction. Induction isn't just X happens a lot so it will always happen. Things in induction (at least, if we are referring to the reasoning process) are more variable based and probably akin to your 'hypotheses deduction' system. You should check out Mill's Methods in his System of Logic (wikipedia actually has a great article on this).

But, probability theory is also based on the same set of assumptions (that the future will be like the past), so they cannot lend support to induction.


Besides, what would you offer as a plausible alternative to the inductive method that is any more justified?

I'm not offering one. Induction is hoplessly flawed and has received far too sympathetic a hearing from empiricists.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

EL V:


The point I'm making is based on the sociological concept of validity and reliability. Induction can be valid if your conclusions are correct, but then you can only know if it is valid after the fact (after you have either confirmed or denied its validity).

I think you are confusing the logical sense of validity with its more everyday meaning.


But a certain set of claims can be reliable, even if they are not necessarily true. So for example, you can see that a majority of people buy coke from a coke machine. We can then make the claim that most people buy coke from that coke machine, this is a reliable claim (since we've observed it). However, we can't claim that most people prefer the taste of coke over other beverages, mostly because other factors could be influencing people's choice (say the fact that the coke machine only sells coke products).

Well all you get are trite accidental generalisations of use only to sociology lecturers, marketing firms and manipulative politicians.


it was reliable 363 times

You are missing the point; the farmer could have killed the chicken at any time. Unless the chicken knows this (and it cannot be obtained by induction), its use of the past to predict the future will always be unreliable and precarious.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


Induction is used but it could be regarded as relying ultimately on hypotheses. in his discussion of induction, Russell points out that if one assumes natural kinds, then inductive probabilities can be inferred, but a natural kind can be regarded as a kind of hypothesis. consider for example an induction where one notices that certain iron filings are attracted by a magnet. it is valid to infer that in the future other iron filings you encounter are also likely to be attracted by magnets.

But, we have already seen that, unless you believe in 'god', there are no 'natural kinds'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/possible-worlds-t129293/index2.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantum-vs-materialism-t124540/index.html


it is valid to infer that in the future other iron filings you encounter are also likely to be attracted by magnet

It is certainly safe to do so, but not on the basis of induction. Scientists (like William Gilbert) needed only one or two observations to convince themselves that magnets do what you say they do (and that is because they accepted the testimony of others).


so the method of hypothesis and test is more fundamental. induction is also not just inductive generalization, but includes a variety of other methods such as argument by analogy (which is used extensively in legal reasoning) and causal reasoning (which was accepted by Russell).

In fact, Russell was one of the harshest critics of causal reasoning. For example, he wrote this in Mysticism and Logic:


"In the following paper I wish, first, to maintain that the word 'cause' is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from philosophical vocabulary desirable....

"All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy the word 'cause' never occurs.... The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm." 'On the Notion of a Cause', in Mysticism and Logic, p.132.]

[¿Que?]

EL V:
I think you are confusing the logical sense of validity with its more everyday meaning.
Actually, the terms are associated with statistics. I assumed they pertained to the social sciences because that's how I learned them, but I think they're more generally concepts for quantitative measurements.

Well all you get are trite accidental generalisations of use only to sociology lecturers, marketing firms and manipulative politicians.
But isn't this whole discussion about making valid and reliable generalizations? I'm not sure what you're getting at.

You are missing the point; the farmer could have killed the chicken at any time.
I don't think I'm missing the point. You seem to be making the same argument against validity as against reliability, when in the context of research methods (and consequently theory building) the two terms mean two different things. You say because the chicken was killed by the farmer, her predictions were both invalid and unreliable. But given this example, her predictions were invalid, but her observations were reliable. And then you use a hypothetical (the farmer could have killed the chicken anytime) on top of the hypothetical example we were working with (the farmer kills the chicken on the 364th day) which to me seems like you're moving the goal post. So let's talk about what actually happened in this hypothetical, not about what could have happened, because that is ultimately irrelevant.

Unless the chicken knows this (and it cannot be obtained by induction), its use of the past to predict the future will always be unreliable and precarious.
You're saying induction cannot be valid, and I'm mostly taking you at your word for this. But you have to realize that even on the 364th day, right before the farmer kills the chicken, since the chicken observed 363 times that the farmer came in to feed it, this is in fact a reliable measure. Reliability does not describe whether a prediction is accurate or not, rather whether or not observations are consistent.

[Victus Mortuum]

The point is that the past is only ever an unreliable guide to the future -- unless we introduce other considerations that cannot be obtained by induction.

Okay, so what you are saying is that the following proposition alone is invalid, but becomes valid with certain other considerations:

The world operates on patterns. We can use observed patterns to predict the future.

?

What are your other considerations, if I am understanding you properly?


But, probability theory is also based on the same set of assumptions (that the future will be like the past), so they cannot lend support to induction.

I'm not sure what probability theory has to do with what I mentioned. But, I mean the inductive method is obviously based on an assumption of the uniformity of nature...but what is your point?


I'm not offering one. Induction is hoplessly flawed and has received far too sympathetic a hearing from empiricists.

Okay, let me rephrase the question. What method would you offer that validly predicts the future that isn't hopelessly flawed?

[syndicat]

well, apparently you've not read Russell's "Human Knowledge," published in 1948. I'd suggest reading chapter VI "Structure and Causal Laws" and especially his summary of his postulates in Chapter IX. He calls them "postulates needed to validate scientific method."

In his discussion of natural kinds, he also points out that it isn't necessary to postulate an exact identity of structure to validate inductive inferences. In the case of cats, say, their structure...if we think of the genotype as the structure...is not identical. But there is a causal relationship among cats such that it limits the degree of variation of structure and causes much overlap in traits. Even before DNA was discovered, the assumption was that there was something not immediately observable which would account for the strong overlap in traits among members of a species.

Each atom or molecule has its own structure as does each living thing. There are various overlaps or close similarities or commonalities that enable them to be grouped into "kinds".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


well, apparently you've not read Russell's "Human Knowledge," published in 1948. I'd suggest reading chapter VI "Structure and Causal Laws" and especially his summary of his postulates in Chapter IX. He calls them "postulates needed to validate scientific method."

Indeed, I have, and it's a vastly inferior work -- testimony to the fact that as he got older, Russell's intellect declined alarmingly. And, I have failed to find anything there that answers his earlier criticism of 'cause'; perhaps you can point it out?


In his discussion of natural kinds, he also points out that it isn't necessary to postulate an exact identity of structure to validate inductive inferences. In the case of cats, say, their structure...if we think of the genotype as the structure...is not identical. But there is a causal relationship among cats such that it limits the degree of variation of structure and causes much overlap in traits. Even before DNA was discovered, the assumption was that there was something not immediately observable which would account for the strong overlap in traits among members of a species.

But, not even DNA is a natural kind!

Moreover, inferences based on a rather vague notion even of a cat are hardly the stuff of an exact science. Indeed, such 'inductive inferences' require other assumptions that are not obtainable by induction, as I pointed out above.


Each atom or molecule has its own structure as does each living thing. There are various overlaps or close similarities or commonalities that enable them to be grouped into "kinds".

As I have pointed out to you before, this is not even true of atoms -- except in the abstract world of a priori philosophy. In nature there are no pure atoms, or molecules. They exist as ions, or as isotopes, or as resonance isomers, or as...

Why you cling onto this example of pseudo-science is therefore something of a mystery.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


Okay, so what you are saying is that the following proposition alone is invalid, but becomes valid with certain other considerations:

The world operates on patterns. We can use observed patterns to predict the future.

No, I'm not saying this. Whatever gave you that idea?


What are your other considerations, if I am understanding you properly?

I'm sorry, I don't follow you.


I'm not sure what probability theory has to do with what I mentioned. But, I mean the inductive method is obviously based on an assumption of the uniformity of nature...but what is your point?

Apologies, I misconstrued your earlier point.


What method would you offer that validly predicts the future that isn't hopelessly flawed?

Again, I'm not offering one. It's not up to me to do the work of scientists.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

EL V:


But isn't this whole discussion about making valid and reliable generalizations? I'm not sure what you're getting at.

The point I'm making is that wherever these generalisations come from, they aren't arrived at by induction.


I don't think I'm missing the point. You seem to be making the same argument against validity as against reliability, when in the context of research methods (and consequently theory building) the two terms mean two different things. You say because the chicken was killed by the farmer, her predictions were both invalid and unreliable. But given this example, her predictions were invalid, but her observations were reliable. And then you use a hypothetical (the farmer could have killed the chicken anytime) on top of the hypothetical example we were working with (the farmer kills the chicken on the 364th day) which to me seems like you're moving the goal post. So let's talk about what actually happened in this hypothetical, not about what could have happened, because that is ultimately irrelevant.

I'm not saying that its observations were unreliable (in the sense that the chicken relied on each day's observation that it was fed that day) only that these observations could never reliably support the conclusion: 'The farmer will always feed me...' (**)


You're saying induction cannot be valid, and I'm mostly taking you at your word for this. But you have to realize that even on the 364th day, right before the farmer kills the chicken, since the chicken observed 363 times that the farmer came in to feed it, this is in fact a reliable measure. Reliability does not describe whether a prediction is accurate or not, rather whether or not observations are consistent.

Not so, the above generalisation (**) was false.

If you want to call this 'reliable' then you are no better off than that chicken.

[syndicat]

if we think of inductions being based on hypotheses then the conclusion "the farmer will feed me tomorrow" seems to assume that the best explanation for the farmer feeding me up to now is that he wants me to stay alive. but a more plausible explanation is that he's fattening me for slaughter...based on the facts we know about farmers and chickens. hence it's a bad induction.

[Victus Mortuum]

No, I'm not saying this. Whatever gave you that idea?

I'm sorry, I don't follow you.

Apologies, I misconstrued your earlier point.

Again, I'm not offering one. It's not up to me to do the work of scientists.

Lol, I think that the two of us are having a miscommunication. I'll try to re-elaborate what I've been trying to say, in light of our preceding dialogue.

Basically, I'm arguing that the fundamental assumption behind the inductive/hypothetical-deductive systems, that there is uniformity in nature, that the future will operate on patterns of the past, currently has no valid justification. It is an irrational/arational (something along those lines) assumption that we make, as far as I am aware. I mean, how could one even go about deductively concluding that 'the future will reflect the past'?

Hope that makes sense! :D

[ckaihatsu]

But most importantly, the question I am asking is whether Marx's method, historical materialism, was inductive? Yes, no, maybe?





There are two aspects to the modern scientific process: theory and testing. Theorists most definitely work from hypothetical premises of uncertain truth-value. However, testers either test within the conclusions of these theories to check the conclusions' validity or test the premises to determine their validity (or to induce mathematical/logical patterns). This is the all important inductive aspect of science, which should not be ignored. This connects science to the real world. You are ignoring the huge category of scientists who spend their time inductively testing proposed theories and premises and try to discern patterns.





The scientific method could be said to be inductive.


http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/Assets/images/rel&val1.gif





Concrete ----> Theory (induction)
Theory ------> Concrete (deduction)


Okay, let me "mop up" here....

As VM mentioned, science -- including historical materialism -- cycles through two 'phases': theory (hypothesizing)(induction)(steps 1 & 2), and testing (categorizing)(deduction)(steps 3 & 4).





In the twentieth century, a hypothetico-deductive model for scientific method was formulated (for a more formal discussion, see below):

1. Use your experience: Consider the problem and try to make sense of it. Look for previous explanations. If this is a new problem to you, then move to step 2.

2. Form a conjecture: When nothing else is yet known, try to state an explanation, to someone else, or to your notebook.

3. Deduce a prediction from that explanation: If you assume 2 is true, what consequences follow?

4. Test: Look for the opposite of each consequence in order to disprove 2. It is a logical error to seek 3 directly as proof of 2. This error is called affirming the consequent.[13]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method


So the hypothesizing part *is* induction.





Concrete ----> Theory (induction)


For historical materialism this would consist of gathering up all evidence that supports the conclusion that there are two classes in society, the working class and the ruling class.


---


To *apply*, or use, the theory in any concrete way, as for a specific historical period, we use our (possibly hypothetical or tentative) conclusions -- in this case, about the existence of the class divide -- to *deductively* sort social phenomena into either [1] working class, or [2] ruling class. The *null hypothesis* (see step #4 in the scientific method) would simply be the *opposite* -- for example, if one might say that the emergence of the Soviet Union's Stalinism could be blamed on the country's working class, then the *null hypothesis* would be the opposite -- that the emergence of the Soviet Union's Stalinism could be blamed on the country's *ruling class*.





Theory ------> Concrete (deduction)


To gather evidence / support for one or the other hypothesis would be an *inductive*, *hypothesizing* step, so we would "leave" the deducing we were just doing based on the theory of antagonistic classes driving history forward, and "flip over" to the *inductive* side -- steps 1 and 2 in the scientific method.

This process can be iterated as many times as needed until one's case for one's conclusion is clear and cogent to others.

Incidentally, "proving" historical materialism in the first place is premised on a society / civilization that produces a surplus, and so must deal with the question of how to *dispose* of that surplus -- thus the surplus gives rise to the class division, and the ongoing antagonistic dynamic between the two counterposed classes is what creates events large and small through time, going forward, thus creating history.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


if we think of inductions being based on hypotheses then the conclusion "the farmer will feed me tomorrow" seems to assume that the best explanation for the farmer feeding me up to now is that he wants me to stay alive. but a more plausible explanation is that he's fattening me for slaughter...based on the facts we know about farmers and chickens. hence it's a bad induction.

In everyday circumstances, inference to the best explanation does indeed often work, but not in areas where we are breaking new (often radically new) ground -- there, we do not always (or typically) know what the 'best explanation' is.

The discovery of Neptune and the non-discovery of Vulcan, which I quoted earlier, is a good example of this.

"The arguments which terminate in an hypothesis's positing the existence of some trans-Uranic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranus) object, the planet Neptune, and the structurally identical arguments which forced Leverrier (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urbain_Le_Verrier) to urge the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet, the planet 'Vulcan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulcan_(hypothetical_planet))', [not to be confused with the one on Star Trek! -- RL] to explain the precessional aberrations (http://physics.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/node98.html) of our 'innermost' solar system neighbour are formally one and the same. They run: (1) Newtonian mechanics is true; (2) Newtonian mechanics requires planet P to move in exactly this manner, x, y, z, …; (3) but P does not move à la x, y, z; (4) so either (a) there exists some as-yet-unobserved object, A, or (b) Newtonian mechanics is false. (5) 4b) contradicts 1) so 4a) is true -- there exists some as-yet-undetected body which will put everything right again between observation and theory. The variable 'A' took the value 'Neptune' in the former case; it took the value 'Vulcan' in the latter case. And these insertions constituted the zenith and the nadir of classical celestial mechanics, for Neptune does exist, whereas Vulcan does not." [Hanson (1970), p.257. I have slightly altered this to make it clearer.]

Hanson, N. (1970), 'A Picture Theory Of Meaning', in Colodny (1970), pp.233-74.

Colodny, R. (1970) (ed.), The Nature And Function Of Scientific Theories (University of Pittsburgh Press).

Indeed, then history of science is littered with 'best explanations' that were in fact false. Here is a greatly truncated list:


"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

P. Stanford, (2001), 'Refusing The Devil's Bargain: What Kind Of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?', in Barrett and Alexander (2001), pp.1-12.

Barrett, J., and Alexander, J. (2001), (eds.), PSA 2000, Part 1, Supplement to Philosophy of Science 68, 3 (University of Chicago Press).

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

So, an appeal to the 'best explanation' in science has historically, often (if not invariably), turned out not to be the best.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ckaihatsu:


For historical materialism this would consist of gathering up all evidence that supports the conclusion that there are two classes in society, the working class and the ruling class.

But this isn't induction. In HM, we begin with an hypothesis and select evidence that supports it. We then neutralise anomalies or explain them away (or ignore them).

This is quite normal in science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


Basically, I'm arguing that the fundamental assumption behind the inductive/hypothetical-deductive systems, that there is uniformity in nature, that the future will operate on patterns of the past, currently has no valid justification. It is an irrational/arational (something along those lines) assumption that we make, as far as I am aware. I mean, how could one even go about deductively concluding that 'the future will reflect the past'?

Well, I do not think it the least bit irrational to assume that there are regularities in nature -- except I do not think we assume this, since such an assumption, were we to make it, would itself be an example of just such a regularity, and would thus be circular.

[Victus Mortuum]

VM:



Well, I do not think it the least bit irrational to assume that there are regularities in nature -- except I do not think we assume this, since such an assumption, were we to make it, would itself be an example of just such a regularity, and would thus be circular.

So...you have simply lost me. All you have provided are negatives. Do you have anything that justifies your use of the hypo-deductive method or with the uniformity of nature? Or is it something you just irrationally operate on? I'm trying to understand your perspective here.

[ckaihatsu]

For historical materialism this would consist of gathering up all evidence that supports the conclusion that there are two classes in society, the working class and the ruling class.





But this isn't induction. In HM, we begin with an hypothesis and select evidence that supports it. We then neutralise anomalies or explain them away (or ignore them).

This is quite normal in science.


*Still* not a fan, huh?

Looks like you're describing *your own* process, if anything. I can understand the pessimistic tone regarding the sciences overall, though, especially since moneyed interests are often shaping the parameters of the research.

We *could* say that truly 'pure' science would, by definition, have to be *boundless* and require *infinite* time and resources to be done entirely properly. Ah, trade-offs, trade-offs....

Regarding historical materialism I'll stick by the definition I already put forward:





Incidentally, "proving" historical materialism in the first place is premised on a society / civilization that produces a surplus, and so must deal with the question of how to *dispose* of that surplus -- thus the surplus gives rise to the class division, and the ongoing antagonistic dynamic between the two counterposed classes is what creates events large and small through time, going forward, thus creating history.

[syndicat]

But this isn't induction. In HM, we begin with an hypothesis and select evidence that supports it. We then neutralise anomalies or explain them away (or ignore them).


And why do we do this? Do we do this because we don't think this is a good hypothesis? And what makes it a good hypothesis? and why should anyone accept it just because it's a "hypothesis"? some whacko conspiracy theory is also a hypothesis.

surely it's explanatory value would have something to do with why it might be worthwhile as a hypothesis.

[¿Que?]

I have not taken the time to closely re-read all the posts in this thread or follow all the references, but I'm not sure if anyone has mentioned something about the way scientific work is framed. I am particularly concerned with how science is supposed to predict the future (and in doing so, possibly manipulate the material world) however, scientists are only privy to the present. As such, they must assume that the past and the future operate on the same "laws of the universe" that operates on the present. The point is, induction is an application of some type of "logical method" that is mostly applicable to explaining what is, not what will be, but possibly what has been.

[ckaihatsu]

The point is, induction is an application of some type of "logical method" that is mostly applicable to explaining what is, not what will be, but possibly what has been.


Our strength as a "wise" -- collectively self-conscious -- species comes from our ability to make inductively derived predictions about the future. My favorite example is about the sun coming up tomorrow -- hardly a controversial claim, yet it's based on an *inductive* method, from past experience.

[¿Que?]

Our strength as a "wise" -- collectively self-conscious -- species comes from our ability to make inductively derived predictions about the future. My favorite example is about the sun coming up tomorrow -- hardly a controversial claim, yet it's based on an *inductive* method, from past experience.
This is a bad example, because it is not difficult to confirm the present conditions (memory and phenomena). In other situations, our ultimate aim is to predict the future, if science is to have an ultimate aim, or you may be a pragmatist, whatever, the point is that there are things which require modes of induction to describe in their "present" condition. This is what Marx is referring to. He is "abstracting" not "predicting."

[ckaihatsu]

I am particularly concerned with how science is supposed to predict the future (and in doing so, possibly manipulate the material world) however, scientists are only privy to the present.





In other situations, our ultimate aim is to predict the future [...] the point is that there are things which require modes of induction to describe in their "present" condition. This is what Marx is referring to. He is "abstracting" not "predicting."


Our concern as revolutionaries is to be assured, as well as possible, that objective conditions are most suitable for successful class struggle. Simply put, the political social cohesion of the international bourgeoisie is what we're looking at, since their weakness is our strength. As a corollary, our collective strength as workers is at a high point when the international bourgeoisie is most *dependent* on us, as during WWII when they needed greatly increased industrial production for their international warfare.

We have a direct interest in deriving a method for predicting favorable conditions for class struggle based on the balance of class forces worldwide -- this would be open to inductive-based reasoning using historical materialism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


So...you have simply lost me. All you have provided are negatives. Do you have anything that justifies your use of the hypo-deductive method or with the uniformity of nature? Or is it something you just irrationally operate on? I'm trying to understand your perspective here.

Well, I do not use it. I merely allege that it is one of the methods that scientists use.

And I do not seek to 'justify' the uniformity of nature, since, as I pointed out, any attempt to attack this idea -- or indeed to argue in its favour -- must make an overt or covert appeal to this very idea.

It's one of the few things Kant was right about.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ckiahatsu:


*Still* not a fan, huh?

Looks like you're describing *your own* process, if anything.

Er.., no I'm not describing 'my own process'.


I can understand the pessimistic tone regarding the sciences overall, though, especially since moneyed interests are often shaping the parameters of the research.

I'm not pessimistic; what we need is more and better science -- and less dogmatism.


We *could* say that truly 'pure' science would, by definition, have to be *boundless* and require *infinite* time and resources to be done entirely properly. Ah, trade-offs, trade-offs....

I deny there is such a thing as 'pure' science, and I'd like tol see you try to show there is.


Regarding historical materialism I'll stick by the definition I already put forward:

It will do for starters!:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


And why do we do this? Do we do this because we don't think this is a good hypothesis? And what makes it a good hypothesis? and why should anyone accept it just because it's a "hypothesis"? some whacko conspiracy theory is also a hypothesis.

surely it's explanatory value would have something to do with why it might be worthwhile as a hypothesis.

I agree, but that is because HM is grounded in everyday experience. That cannot be said of the sciences in general. And that is why IBE cannot be made into a general rule covering all the sciences.

[ckaihatsu]

*Still* not a fan, huh?

We *could* say that truly 'pure' science would, by definition, have to be *boundless* and require *infinite* time and resources to be done entirely properly. Ah, trade-offs, trade-offs....





I deny there is such a thing as 'pure' science, and I'd like tol see you try to show there is.


...The idea being that, at some extent, the practice of science is an art, because *someone* has to make the decision as to what will be included for consideration in the research, and what will not be. This drawing-the-line may be fairly subjective, may be determined by funding, could be influenced by ideology, etc. So every scientific practice is constrained by material factors, just as we have to be scientifically conscious of our own *personal* life-boundaries. The only "pure" science would be that which could not be shown to have methodological shortcomings, and therefore would require *infinite* amounts of time and resources, in order to be *more* than possibly thorough.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^Ok, but that fails to show that there is any such thing as 'pure science'.

In fact, what we have are many different sciences, all with their own methods and ideological and social -- shall we say -- 'problems'.

[RedMaterialist]

[QUOTE=Rosa Lichtenstein;1894077
Well, I do not use it. I merely allege that it is one of the methods that scientists use. [/QUOTE]

I'm having a little trouble following your argument. If you can bear with my simpleness:

Can the future be predicted?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KM:


I'm having a little trouble following your argument. If you can bear with my simpleness:

Can the future be predicted?

I knew you'd say that!:lol:

Of course it can. But so what?

[syndicat]

I agree, but that is because HM is grounded in everyday experience. That cannot be said of the sciences in general. And that is why IBE cannot be made into a general rule covering all the sciences.

Your statement here is inconsistent. IBE isn't a theory about "the sciences in general." It's a type of reasoning.

HM is a theory of history. It assumes there is some trans-historic tendency towards ever greater human productivity. This is "grounded in everyday experience"? Give me a break. It was "grounded" in Marx's study of history. There is such a tendency in capitalism, but that is specific to this type of social formation. But HM is supposed to be a theory about the changes from one social formation to another.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


Your statement here is inconsistent. IBE isn't a theory about "the sciences in general." It's a type of reasoning.

The rationale behind it is indeed a theory.

And the method itself? As I have shown, if it has been used in the sciences (and I'd like to see the sociological evidence that is has), then it has failed in most cases, since the vast majority of scientific theories and hypotheses have turned out to be false.

So, one more application of IBE suggests that this is a defective method (when applied in the sciences).


HM is a theory of history. It assumes there is some trans-historic tendency towards ever greater human productivity. This is "grounded in everyday experience"? Give me a break.

I presume, therefore, that you think it is grounded in Martian experience, or Venusian, or Klingonian...?:lol:


It was "grounded" in Marx's study of history.

I may be wrong here, but wasn't history written by humans about humans?


There is such a tendency in capitalism, but that is specific to this type of social formation. But HM is supposed to be a theory about the changes from one social formation to another.

I agree.

Soooo...

[RedMaterialist]

KM:



I knew you'd say that!:lol:

Of course it can. But so what?

OK, the future can be predicted.

So the chicken (who gets fed by the farmer for 364 days) can predict the future, or is just not very good at it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KM:


So the chicken (who gets fed by the farmer for 364 days) can predict the future, or is just not very good at it?

The point is that the future cannot be predicted on the basis of an induction.

[RedMaterialist]

Our strength as a "wise" -- collectively self-conscious -- species comes from our ability to make inductively derived predictions about the future. My favorite example is about the sun coming up tomorrow -- hardly a controversial claim, yet it's based on an *inductive* method, from past experience.

About the sun coming up. First, as we all know, from recent scientific discoveries, mainly by Kepler, the sun actually doesn't move; the earth rotates and the sun "appears" to come up.

We can predict that tomorrow the sun will "come up," not because of past experience, but because we understand the physics of the motion of planets around the sun. Tonight a gigantic asteroid could hit the earth, throw it into a new orbit, and the sun might not "come up" for years. We also know that the sun will "come up" at a very, very slightly later time tomorrow because the rotation of the earth is slowing down.

[RedMaterialist]

KM:



The point is that the future cannot be predicted on the basis of an induction.

So the future can be predicted on the basis of a deduction?

[ckaihatsu]

In fact, what we have are many different sciences, all with their own methods and ideological and social -- shall we say -- 'problems'.


Yes, obviously different types of investigations fall under different "umbrellas" of science, each with their own particular characteristics, but the reason they may all be called 'science' is because they all use the scientific method.





^^^Ok, but that fails to show that there is any such thing as 'pure science'.


Oh, okay, what you're getting at is research that is independent of being *applied* directly, in tangible problem-solving ways....





Fundamental science (or basic science, pure science) is science that describes the most basic objects, forces, relations between them and laws governing them, such that all other phenomena may be in principle derived from them following the logic of scientific reductionism. Physics is a typical fundamental science, chemistry is sometimes included. There is a difference between fundamental science and applied science (or practical science)[1]. Fundamental science, in contrast to applied science, is defined as a fundamental knowledge it develops. The progress of fundamental science is based on well controlled experiments and careful observation. Fundamental science is dependent upon deductions from demonstrated truths, or is studied without regard to practical applications. Fundamental science has traditionally been associated with the natural sciences, however, research in the social and behavioral sciences can be deemed fundamental (e.g., cognitive neuroscience, personality).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_science

[ckaihatsu]

My favorite example is about the sun coming up tomorrow -- hardly a controversial claim, yet it's based on an *inductive* method, from past experience.





About the sun coming up. First, as we all know, from recent scientific discoveries, mainly by Kepler, the sun actually doesn't move; the earth rotates and the sun "appears" to come up.

We can predict that tomorrow the sun will "come up," not because of past experience, but because we understand the physics of the motion of planets around the sun. Tonight a gigantic asteroid could hit the earth, throw it into a new orbit, and the sun might not "come up" for years. We also know that the sun will "come up" at a very, very slightly later time tomorrow because the rotation of the earth is slowing down.


Okay, thanks for the, uh, fine-tuning there....

Back to the *point* of the discussion -- and this is related to the chicken-predicting-breakfast example -- is that since future events are, by definition, *contingent* on a broad interaction of complex factors, however routinely regular and predictable, the existence of *some degree* of uncertainty means that our predictive reasoning *must* be based on *past* experience, to the same degree, and thus includes *inductive* reasoning, to the same degree.

[Victus Mortuum]

I knew you'd say that!:lol:

Of course it can. But so what?

How do you know that? What is your justification for being so confident about the validity of that claim?

[RedMaterialist]

Okay, thanks for the, uh, fine-tuning there....

Back to the *point* of the discussion -- and this is related to the chicken-predicting-breakfast example -- is that since future events are, by definition, *contingent* on a broad interaction of complex factors, however routinely regular and predictable, the existence of *some degree* of uncertainty means that our predictive reasoning *must* be based on *past* experience, to the same degree, and thus includes *inductive* reasoning, to the same degree.

OK. So you are saying the future can be predicted with some degree of certainty by using induction?

[syndicat]

me:
Your statement here is inconsistent. IBE isn't a theory about "the sciences in general." It's a type of reasoning.

RL:
The rationale behind it is indeed a theory.

what do you mean by a "rationale"?

to live, humans have to act. to act, they need to have assumptions or beliefs that are the ground or presupposition or guidance for action. if we act on the basis of false assumptions, this could be rather dangerous or at often lead us to failure.

to put this another way, if we want a plausible evolutionary explanation as to why we have the belief formation and modification capacity, it was highly adaptive to be able to form beliefs (forming a possible base for future action) through communication with others and them providing reasons for and against beliefs, and our experience also providing such reasons, and thus we can change beliefs to better adapt to reality. this capacity must have helped out ancestors to survive and prosper often enough to be able to account for its survival. but we need not suppose it works all the time.

some inferential strategies that humans are psychologically disposed to use seem to make sense in a context of hunter/gatherer life but work less well in more complex settings...such as the Exemplar strategy studied by psychologists, which ends up often leading people into fallacies based on stereotyped thinking.

now, in fact we do gain knowledge about the world through the hypothesis and test method, based on our interactions with the world.

as to what methods "scientific communities" use, well, that's a sociological question. but i think they use a variety of techniques, including deduction, creation of models, probabilistic reasoning, practical test of hypotheses, analogy and other forms of induction, and others.

but if you aren't proposing a dictatorship of "scientists" over the movement, I'm not quite sure why this is relevant.


And the method itself? As I have shown, if it has been used in the sciences (and I'd like to see the sociological evidence that is has), then it has failed in most cases, since the vast majority of scientific theories and hypotheses have turned out to be false.

So, one more application of IBE suggests that this is a defective method (when applied in the sciences).

Not sure that's the best hypothesis. if we take the example of the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury, mentioned by Hansen. the hypothesis that there was a planet, vulcan, that explained this was falsified by empirical observation. now, Einstein's replacement for Newtonian theory of gravity was able to account for those movements of Mercury without positing a planet that didn't exist. so this meant that Einstein's hypothesis was able to explain something the Newtonian theory couldn't. this was considered to be a point in favor of the Einsteining hypothesis. but it doesn't mean that the Newtonian theory was simply tossed out and not used. in reality it is still used by engineers. it is used because its math is simpler and for many situations here on our terrestrial environment the differences between those "theories" are irrelevant.

so to simply say that the Newtonian theory was "false" is an exaggeration or an inaccurate description of the situation. if it were simply false and that's it, then why is it still used?


There is such a tendency in capitalism, but that is specific to this type of social formation. But HM is supposed to be a theory about the changes from one social formation to another.

and you ask, "So?" I don't see any reason to generalize this tendency to human history as a whole. in fact we can't overcome the tendency of capitalism towards ecological destruction without building an economy that isn't productivist. hence the productivist tendencies in HM are bad advice.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


what do you mean by a "rationale"?

Look it up.

Try here:

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/rationale


to live, humans have to act. to act, they need to have assumptions or beliefs that are the ground or presupposition or guidance for action. if we act on the basis of false assumptions, this could be rather dangerous or at often lead us to failure.

to put this another way, if we want a plausible evolutionary explanation as to why we have the belief formation and modification capacity, it was highly adaptive to be able to form beliefs (forming a possible base for future action) through communication with others and them providing reasons for and against beliefs, and our experience also providing such reasons, and thus we can change beliefs to better adapt to reality. this capacity must have helped out ancestors to survive and prosper often enough to be able to account for its survival. but we need not suppose it works all the time.

some inferential strategies that humans are psychologically disposed to use seem to make sense in a context of hunter/gatherer life but work less well in more complex settings...such as the Exemplar strategy studied by psychologists, which ends up often leading people into fallacies based on stereotyped thinking.

now, in fact we do gain knowledge about the world through the hypothesis and test method, based on our interactions with the world.

Thanks for all that, but you'll be reminding me that grass is green next!

I have already agreed that we use strategies like this in everyday situations. But these are ones with which we are familiar. That is not so in the sciences -- which is why most theories and hypotheses have been duds.

An IBE here would tell us that this is because in the sciences we are always operating in uncharted territory, and we often do not know our way about for many centuries, if ever.

But you have an answer:


Not sure that's the best hypothesis. if we take the example of the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury, mentioned by Hansen. the hypothesis that there was a planet, Vulcan, that explained this was falsified by empirical observation. now, Einstein's replacement for Newtonian theory of gravity was able to account for those movements of Mercury without positing a planet that didn't exist. so this meant that Einstein's hypothesis was able to explain something the Newtonian theory couldn't. this was considered to be a point in favor of the Einsteinian hypothesis. but it doesn't mean that the Newtonian theory was simply tossed out and not used. in reality it is still used by engineers. it is used because its math is simpler and for many situations here on our terrestrial environment the differences between those "theories" are irrelevant.

so to simply say that the Newtonian theory was "false" is an exaggeration or an inaccurate description of the situation. if it were simply false and that's it, then why is it still used?

And yet there are many scientists who think that Einstein's explanation isn't 'the best', and that there are far better ways to account for it. MOND, for example.

They might be right, they might be wrong, but that just shows that in science what constitutes an IBE is often controversial and up for grabs -- there are always competing explanations, as that quotation I posted from Stanford showed.

Then, generations later, scientists change their minds (as the almost invariably do) and a new set of IBEs is up for grabs.


so to simply say that the Newtonian theory was "false" is an exaggeration or an inaccurate description of the situation. if it were simply false and that's it, then why is it still used

In the context, I clearly meant that it gave a false prediction for Vulcan. Moreover, Newton's causal explanations and assumptions (an appeal to the 'force of gravity', 'absolute space and time', no difference between 'rest mass' and 'inertial mass', etc.) are now almost universally regarded as false/metaphysical.

Yet another set of defunct IBEs from the 18th century.


and you ask, "So?" I don't see any reason to generalize this tendency to human history as a whole. in fact we can't overcome the tendency of capitalism towards ecological destruction without building an economy that isn't productivist. hence the productivist tendencies in HM are bad advice.

I still fail to see the relevance of this homily.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KM:


So the future can be predicted on the basis of a deduction?

I'm not sure its a deduction. It's more the way we act and what we count as relevant and/or secure.

Us Wittgensteinians call this a 'form of representation'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


How do you know that? What is your justification for being so confident about the validity of that claim?

Because we do it every day of our lives, when we act.

I presume you do things -- like open and close doors, make a meal, take a walk...

And, as I pointed out earlier, any attempt to attack this, or any attempt to defend it, will have to depend on the very thing in question, vitiating both.

[Victus Mortuum]

Because we do it every day of our lives, when we act.

That doesn't mean it is rational. This alone reduces to a Humean conclusion of it being wholly irrational and being simply the result of instinctual 'habit'.




I presume you do things -- like open and close doors, make a meal, take a walk...

Yes I do lots of things, and some of them irrationally. That doesn't mean that the premise of the uniformity of nature is a rational premise. It may be wholly irrational. If this is so, then those who choose to go against it (for example, crazy religious extremists) would be equally as rational, or rather irrational, as you. That's why this is a problem.


And, as I pointed out earlier, any attempt to attack this, or any attempt to defend it, will have to depend on the very thing in question, vitiating both.

No it wouldn't. Abstracting/remembering is different than assuming the uniformity of nature. Knowing whether a statement is deductively true is qualitatively different than whether the universe necessarily operates on patterns.

You could argue that the fact that I'm arguing with you means I'm assuming that the future will reflect the past. This is true, but that doesn't mean that it isn't irrational. You could conceive of a possible world where there were no distinguishable necessary patterns in experience, and that means that it is not a necessary proposition.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


That doesn't mean it is rational. This alone reduces to a Humean conclusion of it being wholly irrational and being simply the result of instinctual 'habit'.

Depends what you mean by 'rational'.


Yes I do lots of things, and some of them irrationally. That doesn't mean that the premise of the uniformity of nature is a rational premise. It may be wholly irrational. If this is so, then those who choose to go against it (for example, crazy religious extremists) would be equally as rational, or rather irrational, as you. That's why this is a problem.

Where did I say it was a 'rational premise'?


No it wouldn't. Abstracting/remembering is different than assuming the uniformity of nature. Knowing whether a statement is deductively true is qualitatively different than whether the universe necessarily operates on patterns.

In that case, you'd have to assume you 'remembered' right, and that the word 'remember' meant the same from moment to moment -- and that the word 'assume' did too.


You could argue that the fact that I'm arguing with you means I'm assuming that the future will reflect the past. This is true, but that doesn't mean that it isn't irrational. You could conceive of a possible world where there were no distinguishable necessary patterns in experience, and that means that it is not a necessary proposition.

No, that's not what I'd argue.

[Victus Mortuum]

Depends what you mean by 'rational'.

Where did I say it was a 'rational premise'?

So you admit to being no different in justification than a religious extremist?


In that case, you'd have to assume you 'remembered' right, and that the word 'remember' meant the same from moment to moment -- and that the word 'assume' did too.

No. I could certainly accept that I don't know what the past actually was, only what I seem to remember in this present moment. There may even be no past, this moment may be the first moment ever. Same applies to your claim about the continuation of definitions. What matters is what I believe words mean in the present moment.

My point remains, I could be wholly irrational in basing my assumptions and beliefs and definitions on the idea that there is a uniformity of nature.

[syndicat]

I have already agreed that we use strategies like this in everyday situations. But these are ones with which we are familiar. That is not so in the sciences

again, this is not quite accurate. people in "scientific communities" go thru a very long training that involves becoming very familiar with the body of data that subject has collected, the various hypotheses that have been advanced, some history of the subject, of theories tossed out and why, and failiarity with the various techniques that have been developed by practitioners in that field, and these in turn have been changed over time through practice and test and so on. so in fact they are coming up with hypotheses about "situations" they are familiar with.

but in reality these methods are all variations or developments of various techniques of inference and reasoning that all humans have an innate capacity to grasp. so your hard and fast distinction between scientific communities and everyday situations isn't very plausible...as if "scientists" were gods not humans.

[RedMaterialist]

KM:



I'm not sure its a deduction. It's more the way we act and what we count as relevant and/or secure.

Us Wittgensteinians call this a 'form of representation'.

So, we can predict the future by the way we act and what we count as relevant and/or secure, or, predict the future by a "form of representation." How does this work or not work for the chicken?

[ckaihatsu]

OK. So you are saying the future can be predicted with some degree of certainty by using induction?


No, to clarify, I'm saying that only under conditions of absolute certainty can we rely on *deductive* reasoning alone -- the realm of mathematics is ideal for this kind of logic. To the extent that we are *uncertain* is the same degree to which we have to rely on past experience for our reasoning, and thus we're relying on an *inductive* type of reasoning for that same proportion of prediction.





[S]cience -- including historical materialism -- cycles through two 'phases': theory (hypothesizing)(induction)(steps 1 & 2), and testing (categorizing)(deduction)(steps 3 & 4).





1. Use your experience: Consider the problem and try to make sense of it. Look for previous explanations. If this is a new problem to you, then move to step 2.

2. Form a conjecture: When nothing else is yet known, try to state an explanation, to someone else, or to your notebook.

3. Deduce a prediction from that explanation: If you assume 2 is true, what consequences follow?

4. Test: Look for the opposite of each consequence in order to disprove 2. It is a logical error to seek 3 directly as proof of 2. This error is called affirming the consequent.[13]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VM:


So you admit to being no different in justification than a religious extremist?

Where on earth did you get that odd and offensive idea?


No. I could certainly accept that I don't know what the past actually was, only what I seem to remember in this present moment. There may even be no past, this moment may be the first moment ever.

In which case, may I suggest you see a neurologist?


Same applies to your claim about the continuation of definitions. What matters is what I believe words mean in the present moment

Then how so how know what you mean even by 'the present moment'?


My point remains, I could be wholly irrational in basing my assumptions and beliefs and definitions on the idea that there is a uniformity of nature.

Speak for yourself, but seek medical help immediately. In your present state you are only a danger to yourself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KM:


So, we can predict the future by the way we act and what we count as relevant and/or secure, or, predict the future by a "form of representation." How does this work or not work for the chicken?

No, in our actions we show what we mean by such words (such as 'predict the future'), but in our reflection on questions like this we impose a 'form of representation' on the world.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


again, this is not quite accurate. people in "scientific communities" go thru a very long training that involves becoming very familiar with the body of data that subject has collected, the various hypotheses that have been advanced, some history of the subject, of theories tossed out and why, and familiarity with the various techniques that have been developed by practitioners in that field, and these in turn have been changed over time through practice and test and so on. so in fact they are coming up with hypotheses about "situations" they are familiar with.

I agree with all this, but the fact that scientists get the vast majority of their IBEs wrong suggests an IBE itself: where science is probing new areas of knowledge, researchers do not know their way about, and that is why they err so many times.


but in reality these methods are all variations or developments of various techniques of inference and reasoning that all humans have an innate capacity to grasp. so your hard and fast distinction between scientific communities and everyday situations isn't very plausible...as if "scientists" were gods not humans.

The point is that science typically operates in areas where everyday experience is only of limited assistance. And that is why extrapolating from our everyday use of IBEs to their use in most areas of science is so unreliable.

[RedMaterialist]

No, to clarify, I'm saying that only under conditions of absolute certainty can we rely on *deductive* reasoning alone -- the realm of mathematics is ideal for this kind of logic. To the extent that we are *uncertain* is the same degree to which we have to rely on past experience for our reasoning, and thus we're relying on an *inductive* type of reasoning for that same proportion of prediction.

OK. Under conditions of absolute certainty we can predict the future by using deduction alone, mathematics. Under conditions of less than absolute certainty we can only rely on induction, past experience.

So, when the chicken is absolutely certain she is going to be fed, she can predict that she will get fed using deduction. When she is less certain she can predict that she will get fed using past experience?

Can you give me an example of absolute certainty?

[RedMaterialist]

KM:


No, in our actions we show what we mean by such words (such as 'predict the future'), but in our reflection on questions like this we impose a 'form of representation' on the world.

Two points: 1. When we act to predict the future we show what we mean by "predicting the future." Aren't there still, at least, two actions to predict the future: induction and deduction?

2. "Imposing" something on the world. That sounds like some kind of ideological domination by a ruling class; how otherwise can "we" impose something other than as a ruling class?

[Dean]

Thus, Marx says, the premises for historical materialism are not dogmas (axioms) but the actual concrete facts on the ground of real existence. For me, this coheres with both an empirical and inductive approach. But does empiricism always equal induction, or is there a difference? If no difference, why the two terms?

But most importantly, the question I am asking is whether Marx's method, historical materialism, was inductive? Yes, no, maybe?
Yes. Further, deductive logic is consistently nothing but word games / linguistic fact.

[Dean]

VM:



Where did I say induction was valid. It manifestly isn't valid.

And, as Bertrand Russell pointed out, induction is very poor at predicting the future: every day for nearly a year the farmer feeds a chicken. On Xmas day, the chicken -- based on 363 inductive observations -- thinks the farmer will feed it. But he rings its neck.

and once we see that farmers wring their necks, we start to expect that as a potential (or inevitable) outcome. If we knew nothing of them, then, that they wring the necks of or feed their chicken, we expect one or the other in their given ratios.

[syndicat]

The point is that science typically operates in areas where everyday experience is only of limited assistance. And that is why extrapolating from our everyday use of IBEs to their use in most areas of science is so unreliable.

all you're doing is repeating yourself. you've not defined what "everyday experience" means or why it's different.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KM:


Two points: 1. When we act to predict the future we show what we mean by "predicting the future." Aren't there still, at least, two actions to predict the future: induction and deduction?

I did not say:


When we act to predict the future


2. "Imposing" something on the world. That sounds like some kind of ideological domination by a ruling class; how otherwise can "we" impose something other than as a ruling class?

Not at all; scientists do this all the time.

For example, geographers impose lines of latitude and longitude on the earth, physicists impose sets of geodesics on the universe, biologists impose species on the natural world, and so on.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dean:


and once we see that farmers wring their necks, we start to expect that as a potential (or inevitable) outcome. If we knew nothing of them, then, that they wring the necks of or feed their chicken, we expect one or the other in their given ratios.

But tomorrow they might use an axe.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


all you're doing is repeating yourself.

Yes and it would help if you took note to save me having to say it again.:)


you've not defined what "everyday experience" means or why it's different.

1. You've not defined 'defined'.

2. Or 'different'.

[syndicat]

okay, so you're just blowing smoke.

[ckaihatsu]

No, to clarify, I'm saying that only under conditions of absolute certainty can we rely on *deductive* reasoning alone -- the realm of mathematics is ideal for this kind of logic. To the extent that we are *uncertain* is the same degree to which we have to rely on past experience for our reasoning, and thus we're relying on an *inductive* type of reasoning for that same proportion of prediction.





OK. Under conditions of absolute certainty we can predict the future by using deduction alone, mathematics.




Can you give me an example of absolute certainty?


Mathematics is a special "realm", if you will, because it is 100% precise and regular, regardless of time. Chess would be another example of the same. Very few things, though, are like this, and, of course, most dynamics we deal with in regular, everyday life are *not* like this.

Deduction can be used once the material in front of us has been made into discrete elements and is finalized. (Again, think of math or chess.) For real-world word-problem situations, the tricky part is *getting to that point* where we can say with good-enough certainty that we *have* a discrete, finalized element or elements. Good-enough certainty will most likely have to reference the *past*, and in doing so we're necessarily using an inductive method, then, for that element / those elements.

For people we refer to their past habits or 'credibility' or 'reputation'. We use inductive reasoning to make a *probabilistic* prediction about if they'll be reliable for something we need to depend on them for, or would like them to do. We do the same thing for inanimate objects, too, but, depending on the object, the process may be much more *deductive* since objects are tied much closer to base physical laws of motion and are most likely to continue functioning *exactly* as they did the previous day.

Interestingly certain macro qualities about people *may* be subject to deductive logic -- this, then, can become the material of investigations for social-type reasoning, whether between friends, lovers, around the workplace, etc. For example, someone can't readily get to the other side of the world in half a day, so that would rule out certain physical movements for someone, etc.

For the sake of visualization think of Monument Valley where there are those remaining rock formations with flat tops. The flat tops may be thought of as finalized discrete elements that can be the basis for deductive logic. But those plateaus *must* be well-supported from below by *inductive* reasoning, based on past events.





Under conditions of less than absolute certainty we can only rely on induction, past experience.


No, under conditions of less than absolute certainty we are *displaced* from being able to use *deductive* logic because we are less than certain about the *premises* of the discrete elements we're reasoning about.

But this doesn't mean that we would have to *only* rely on induction, or past experience. A good example here would be betting on a race -- we'd want to know the reputations of all of the racers, which would be inductive reasoning. But at the same time we may use some kind of less-than-precise *deductive* reasoning, perhaps based on their physical appearances in front of us.

You may want to look into 'fuzzy logic' here, which does a good job at systematizing the blending of types of reasoning based on formalized relationships (deductive), with those of less-than-certain starting values (inductive):





Fuzzy logic is a form of multi-valued logic derived from fuzzy set theory to deal with reasoning that is approximate rather than accurate. In contrast with "crisp logic", where binary sets have binary logic, fuzzy logic variables may have a truth value that ranges between 0 and 1 and is not constrained to the two truth values of classic propositional logic.[1] Furthermore, when linguistic variables are used, these degrees may be managed by specific functions.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic





So, when the chicken is absolutely certain she is going to be fed, she can predict that she will get fed using deduction. When she is less certain she can predict that she will get fed using past experience?


Now, with this information I've provided, why don't *you* answer this question? Explain your reasoning.

[Victus Mortuum]

Where on earth did you get that odd and offensive idea?

Right here:



That doesn't mean it is rational. This alone reduces to a Humean conclusion of it being wholly irrational and being simply the result of instinctual 'habit'.

Depends what you mean by 'rational'.


Yes I do lots of things, and some of them irrationally. That doesn't mean that the premise of the uniformity of nature is a rational premise. It may be wholly irrational. If this is so, then those who choose to go against it (for example, crazy religious extremists) would be equally as rational, or rather irrational, as you. That's why this is a problem.

Where did I say it was a 'rational premise'?


In which case, may I suggest you see a neurologist?

Then how so how know what you mean even by 'the present moment'?

Speak for yourself, but seek medical help immediately. In your present state you are only a danger to yourself.


1. You've not defined 'defined'.

2. Or 'different'.

Appeal to ridicule, argument from repetition, ad hominem, personal attacks, red herrings everywhere. I have lost respect for you and not going to continue this discussion unless you can shape up your ability to have a rational dialogue. Please try to grow up a little.

[RedMaterialist]

KM:



No, in our actions we show what we mean by such words (such as 'predict the future'), but in our reflection on questions like this we impose a 'form of representation' on the world.

Well, can we predict the future? I think you said yes. But not by induction. And "deduction" is a way of showing what we mean by "predicting the future." OK. How can we predict the future with deduction? How does that help the chicken?

[Dean]

Dean:



But tomorrow they might use an axe.
A fair enough point - but how would anything you've proposed let us know any more than inductive logic might know? If not, what are you arguing against?

[ckaihatsu]

Well, can we predict the future?


I *knew* you were going to say that...!


= D


Btw, I figure I may as well post an illustration I did -- it seems appropriate here....

The main structure (in blue) shows the relative left-right principled positioning of any given political stance. It's derived from the collection of the political *points* made to support it, in the style of the social science precision-vs-accuracy (reliable-vs-valid) "bullseye target" that El Vagoneta posted in #17 (#29).

In turn the political principle can be part of supporting a more-generalized political *platform* of several policies, or policy proposals.


Ideologies & Operations -- Bottom-Up

http://i47.tinypic.com/jiz508.jpg

[RedMaterialist]

You may want to look into 'fuzzy logic' here, which does a good job at systematizing the blending of types of reasoning based on formalized relationships (deductive), with those of less-than-certain starting values (inductive):


Now, with this information I've provided, why don't *you* answer this question? Explain your reasoning.

Well, you say I have to use both inductive and deductive reasoning, which is "fuzzy logic." I'm not sure this helps the chicken any. There's nothing fuzzy about getting your neck wrung.

[ckaihatsu]

Well, you say I have to use both inductive and deductive reasoning, which is "fuzzy logic." I'm not sure this helps the chicken any. There's nothing fuzzy about getting your neck wrung.


Guys!!!!!!!!!

Can we just *stop the bullshit*, pleeeeeeeeeaaaaaazzzzzeeeee, for just *one* moment here...???????


What! About! The! Chicken!!!!!!!!!!


x D

[RedMaterialist]

Guys!!!!!!!!!

Can we just *stop the bullshit*, pleeeeeeeeeaaaaaazzzzzeeeee, for just *one* moment here...???????


What! About! The! Chicken!!!!!!!!!!


x D

Its a good example. The chicken cannot use inductive logic to determine if she is going to be fed. Thus, past experience, according to this example, cannot be used to predict the future. However, we all know from past experience that the sun will almost certainly "come up" tomorrow. How can we be so certain of this?

Its an important question because historical materialism is based on induction; while dialectical materialism, in my opinion, is based on deduction.

[ckaihatsu]

Its a good example. The chicken cannot use inductive logic to determine if she is going to be fed. Thus, past experience, according to this example, cannot be used to predict the future.


Okay, so we're done with this one, I hope.... (And so is the chicken.)





However, we all know from past experience that the sun will almost certainly "come up" tomorrow. How can we be so certain of this?


You mentioned some astronomical facts -- (I'd say) those are solid enough for *deducing* that the sun will come up tomorrow.





Its an important question because historical materialism is based on induction;


If we accept the consistent physical laws underlying the motion of the planets around the sun then, by the same kind of empiricism, we can note the *current* existence of the class division and class forces. The *past* existence of the class division can *reinforce* (through induction) our grounds that the class division exists, but what's *more* important is the *theoretical* basis -- (to enable deduction) -- for claiming at any given point in time that the class division exists:





Incidentally, "proving" historical materialism in the first place is premised on a society / civilization that produces a surplus, and so must deal with the question of how to *dispose* of that surplus -- thus the surplus gives rise to the class division, and the ongoing antagonistic dynamic between the two counterposed classes is what creates events large and small through time, going forward, thus creating history.





while dialectical materialism, in my opinion, is based on deduction.


Yeah, I think any given "practitioner" of dialectical materialism would tend to use fairly solid elements to begin with, for the "operation" -- I myself like to include aspects from complexity theory (fuzzy logic), and so the starting premises for the dialectical process do *not necessarily* have to be 100% certain.... (We may be trying to predict how a handful of people's hectic schedules may play out throughout the course of a day, to determine if a meeting scheduled for the evening will in fact be possible.)

[Victus Mortuum]

You mentioned some astronomical facts -- (I'd say) those are solid enough for *deducing* that the sun will come up tomorrow.

You're right, but those facts are acquired and fundamentally predicted by induction. We watch the sky, we watch the way objects behave toward each other, and then we describe the patterns we see. Then we reapply these (via induction) patterns and laws and facts to the future.

[ckaihatsu]

You're right, but those facts are acquired and fundamentally predicted by induction. We watch the sky, we watch the way objects behave toward each other, and then we describe the patterns we see. Then we reapply these (via induction) patterns and laws and facts to the future.


Hmmmmmmmm, being stubbornly dialectical here, eh?


= D


Well, all I can say is that we *do* have universally accepted *laws* of physics that we can say are *theoretical* -- meaning, of course, that they are *so* consistent that they are timeless and can be considered unwavering, and well beyond anyone's own subjective observations.

If you're going to take up contentions with the $%#*&@! LAWS OF PHYSICS then I don't know what to say, dude -- have a good trip, I guess....

Likewise, the existence of the class division is unassailable, too, since it's based on the existence and furtherance of a physical, societally produced material surplus, so... (drum roll)...

Historical materialism is *not* inductive -- it *is* objective, based on theory, and can be the basis for deductive-type reasoning.

[Armchair War Criminal]

You mentioned some astronomical facts -- (I'd say) those are solid enough for *deducing* that the sun will come up tomorrow.
And yet we still rely on induction to conclude that physics will work tomorrow like it has in the past. So we've just traded in "why can we assume the sun will rise tomorrow?" to "why can we assume gravity and thermodynamics will operate tomorrow?"

I think the intuitive answer is: well, it works! And on logical grounds there's something fishy about this, because the reason we assume induction will tend to work in the future... is because induction has tended to work in the past. (Consider the alternate epistemic rule of anti-induction, where you do the opposite of what induction suggests: you should do it because it works! And how do you know it will work? Because it never has yet!)

As much as I think evolutionary explanations of specific cognitive phenomena are overused[1], I think the answer has to be this: we happen to live in a universe where, much more often than not[2], there's a positive correlation between things occurring together in the past and them occurring together in the future. Thus selective pressure results in rats that learn how to press levers for pellets or to avoid electric shocks, and what have you, and eventually big-brained organisms like us can afford to learn rules without direct reward/punishment features. We're hardwired and very quick inductors, which is why the three-beat joke works.

[1] The general objection to such things - that they can be explained in terms of simpler phenomena - doesn't apply here. Basic learning mechanisms are what allow sociological explanations to be more parsimonious.

[2] And up until now, ha ha.

[ckaihatsu]

If you're going to take up contentions with the $%#*&@! LAWS OF PHYSICS then I don't know what to say, dude -- have a good trip, I guess....





(Consider the alternate epistemic rule of anti-induction, where you do the opposite of what induction suggests: you should do it because it works! And how do you know it will work? Because it never has yet!)


(I warned them!)


x D