The political conditions of the 21st century and you

[Tzadikim]

I've found myself making essentially the same point in a few separate threads today, so I thought I'd try to summarize what I mean by it here:


I would consider socialism as practiced by the USSR and (to a far lesser extent) Maoist China as being limitedly successful; they accomplished in a brief period of time what would have taken significantly longer for a bourgeois revolution to do.

Rather, I am taking into consideration my attempt to forecast the material conditions of this century: I don't see any State on the horizon that will be strong enough to duplicate the attempt towards state-socialism that Lenin embarked on. It's fine and good to capture a bourgeois State and attempt to bend it to your will; but if that State has been crushed to smithereens under liberal reforms and debt-induced austerity measures, you will still find yourself without a position to act from. The Russian model required a State that was already highly centralized, and centralized enough that effective power could pass from the hands of the aristocracy into those of the Party. We should not rely on any State being so centralized by the time this century gets well and truly under swing.


I agree almost completely with the underlying concepts of Marxism, and believe it to have the most highly developed analysis of any radical ideology; at the same time I reject it faith in the State. How can a State - which we might add has existed in its modern incarnation only since the Treaty of Westphalia and the early prehistory of the bourgeoisie as a class - which has hitherto done nothing but support that class be used against it?

However, I think this is rather a false dichotomy. I am convinced now, and have been for some time, that the further development of capitalism will see the "withering away" of the State (it is a holdover from late feudalism and hence essentially incompatible with capitalism) as individual bourgeoisie grow to find it too confining. I'm not convinced that history will show that it remains intact until the final assumption of power by the workers.

Too often we make the mistake of assuming that our own time has reached a stable state; we too often share the "end of history" nonsense that inundated mass culture in the late 20th century. I for one believe that this isn't the beginning of the end for capitalism, but, rather, the end of the beginning.

Assuming, as I do, that the era of capitalism is still relatively young - after all, in the United States at least it can be said only to have entered its maturity during and after the Civil War, a meager 150 years ago -then I think it's prudent that we consider the possibility that the class struggle could be a far more protracted affair than any of us really wants to admit.

If this is so, if I am right, then it makes sense that we ought to stay "one step ahead of the game", so to speak. This century, the third of capitalism's maturity, is still young, but in my view its broad trends can already be discerned:

1. A turning-away from the hierarchical centralism of the 20th century and a breaking-down of the superstates borne from that era. We see this most clearly in the United States, with a demand for "smaller government"; we have to be prepared to accept this at its face-value and assume that this century will see a return to at least a partial-salvaging of the old dogma of states' rights on the part of the capitalist class.

However, this phenomenon is not entirely unknown in Europe. I would consider "EU skepticism" an emerging piece of this broader trend, with its greater focus on home-rule.

2. At the same time, however, the 20th century development of the transnational institution, both bureaucratic - the IMF, WHO, etc. - and the megacorporation represents a significant challenge to this fracturing tendency. I think it's entirely possible that the coming decades could see a conflict between national and international capital, between those bourgeois who trade and those who produce. The latter have the loyalties of most of the lower classes; the former most of the wealth and power and ideological momentum.

3. Either way, the 20th-century State, the liberal State, is trapped in the middle. As I've mentioned above, I wonder if we who incline to anarchism will not find our work being increasingly done for us in this new era.

Am I totally off base, or are these the realities we need confront and adapt to as materialists? If so, what modifications to theory are necessary for translation into effective praxis? Can the old Leninist model predicated upon the seizure of power from the bourgeois State survive under conditions under which that State has been severely curtailed?

[Zanthorus]

Can the old Leninist model predicated upon the seizure of power from the bourgeois State survive under conditions under which that State has been severely curtailed?

Sorry, but you haven't got a clue what your talking about. The 'seizure of power from the bourgeois state' is not a Leninist model of any kind, the Bolshevik party were the ones who called for the transfer of power from the provisional (Bourgeois) government to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets (What was that slogan again, I think it went something like... 'All Power to the Soviets!'), and Lenin places a great rhetorical emphasis on the fact that working-class cannot take hold of the ready made state machinery and wield it for it's own purposes, but has to smash this machiner in one of his most famous works, The State and Revolution. In this he was echoing the broader Marxist tradition which, contrary to your assertion, has maintained a consistent opposition to any kind of "servile faith in the state" (Marx in the GothaKritik referring to the Lassalean sect). In actual practice, central authority pretty much collapsed in Russia during the revolution. Even the Bolshevik party itself lost it's authority over a good deal of cadre on the ground. The strength of the Tsarist apparatus had nothing to do with the strength of the state during the Stalin era Soviet Union, it took years for strong central authority to return to Russia.

[Tzadikim]

Sorry, but you haven't got a clue what your talking about. The 'seizure of power from the bourgeois state' is not a Leninist model of any kind, the Bolshevik party were the ones who called for the transfer of power from the provisional (Bourgeois) government to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets (What was that slogan again, I think it went something like... 'All Power to the Soviets!'), and Lenin places a great rhetorical emphasis on the fact that working-class cannot take hold of the ready made state machinery and wield it for it's own purposes, but has to smash this machiner in one of his most famous works, The State and Revolution. In this he was echoing the broader Marxist tradition which, contrary to your assertion, has maintained a consistent opposition to any kind of "servile faith in the state" (Marx in the GothaKritik referring to the Lassalean sect). In actual practice, central authority pretty much collapsed in Russia during the revolution. Even the Bolshevik party itself lost it's authority over a good deal of cadre on the ground. The strength of the Tsarist apparatus had nothing to do with the strength of the state during the Stalin era Soviet Union, it took years for strong central authority to return to Russia.

The rhetoric and the reality of the Russian Revolution never really matched up; the Tzarist State was never really "smashed". So far as I understand it - and, admittedly, I am not an expert on the Russian Revolution - the "Lenin Levy" was essentially an admission that the new USSR still required many of the old mechanisms and actors of the old Tzarist regime to maintain stability. Lenin began to call back into power many of the old technocrats that had served under the Provisional Government.

Central authority certainly collapsed for a time under the Revolution. Many of the Tzarist elements were purged. But many of the old traditions and systems lived on straight through into the Bolshevik period. This continuity is what I consider to be the kernel of failure for the Revolution.

Moreover, this is rather a digression from what I had originally intended to ask. And that question is, simply: does it make sense to attempt to duplicate the Soviet model - one reliant on nationalism and centralized authority - if the broad trend of the times is against both nationalism and centralization?

[Zanthorus]

The rhetoric and the reality of the Russian Revolution never really matched up; the Tzarist State was never really "smashed". So far as I understand it - and, admittedly, I am not an expert on the Russian Revolution - the "Lenin Levy" was essentially an admission that the new USSR still required many of the old mechanisms and actors of the old Tzarist regime to maintain stability. Lenin began to call back into power many of the old technocrats that had served under the Provisional Government.

Central authority certainly collapsed for a time under the Revolution. Many of the Tzarist elements were purged. But many of the old traditions and systems lived on straight through into the Bolshevik period. This continuity is what I consider to be the kernel of failure for the Revolution.

I'm not an expert either, however as I understand it the old mechanisms were not brought back in willingly. Rather, when they were brought back in, they were justified at the time as temporary measures, which would be scrapped in less than a year in all probability, once stability in all areas had returned (Going off of Lenin's Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government). The continuance of the Tsarist apparatus was not the cause but the symptom of much larger problems like the fact that the Bolsheviks were engaged in a civil war with armies backed by major imperialist powers, the economic crisis which had been engendered by the revolution, and even flaws in the Soviet form of organisation itself (The All-Russia congress was very infrequent. The congress which created the Council of People's Commisars and affirmed the Bolsheviks as the ruling power with the Left-SR's in tow was the first since late June/early July. If anything, the Russian revolution should be more food for thought for those advocating a straight, anti-partyist, spontaneist 'All Power to the Workers' Councils' line than 'Leninists').


one reliant on nationalism and centralized authority

The Bolshevik revolution was in no way reliant on nationalism. It was nationalism and isolationism that empowered the counter-revolution.

[Tzadikim]

I'm not an expert either, however as I understand it the old mechanisms were not brought back in willingly. Rather, when they were brought back in, they were justified at the time as temporary measures, which would be scrapped in less than a year in all probability, once stability in all areas had returned (Going off of Lenin's Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government). The continuance of the Tsarist apparatus was not the cause but the symptom of much larger problems like the fact that the Bolsheviks were engaged in a civil war with armies backed by major imperialist powers, the economic crisis which had been engendered by the revolution, and even flaws in the Soviet form of organisation itself (The All-Russia congress was very infrequent. The congress which created the Council of People's Commisars and affirmed the Bolsheviks as the ruling power with the Left-SR's in tow was the first since July. If anything, the Russian revolution should be more food for thought for those advocating a straight, anti-partyist, spontaneist 'All Power to the Workers' Councils' line than 'Leninists').

I agree with you that we oughtn't be too hard on Lenin and the Soviets. They did what they felt at the time to be essential to re-establishing order after the Revolution and the Civil War. All the same, it's important to acknowledge that they failed, and try to understand why they failed. I think the answer it pretty plain: they gradually began to establish continuity with the old regime, which failed because it must fail. Whether they did so voluntarily or as a result of conditions forced upon them from the outside is quite beside the point.




The Bolshevik revolution was in no way reliant on nationalism. It was nationalism and isolationism that empowered the counter-revolution.

The idea of the "Great Patriotic War" doesn't entail nationalism? Certainly the ideology of 'Great Russia' had been well instilled by the time Stalin assumed power.

But, again, we are digressing here. My contention is simply this:

1. The coming century will likely see a conflict between what I call 'national' and 'international' capitalists, with the 'national capitalists' taking up a (relatively) reactionary position. They look to be set to win in the short-term, particularly in the U.S., where, for instance, the Republicans are threatening to end tax-breaks for companies that outsource. This will not set well with businesses that rely on either foreign production or are deeply involved in international trade.

2. The national capitalists (at least in this nation, which, being the only one I live in, is the only one I'm really qualified to discuss) have adopted a line against State centralization; many of them have already revived the old mantra of states' rights and attack the central government. This seems to be roughly mirrored in Europe by 'Euroskeptic' parties.

3. The internationalist bourgeois are exerting a counter-pressure on the traditional State from the opposite direction: they are increasingly finding the old boundaries and borders too restrictive in their dealings and are constantly pushing against them.

Consider, for instance, a basic division in our own Republican Party: there has been in recent years a revival of old protectionist concepts among a certain class of voters that profess loyalty to it; these are often dressed up in national-populist rhetoric. On the other hand, there is certainly a strong pro-trade bloc within that same Party.

4. Given that these basic facts are accurate, we will see in this century one of two things happen to the Westphalian ('bourgeois') State: it will either undergo a reduction in its dimensions, or it will be once and finally evaporated into the international aether, dependent upon which faction of the owning class wins out.

5. As a Communist, I think I should prefer the latter, insofar as it would result in the creation of the conditions required for a truly internationalized working class independent of national boundaries. However, as an anarchist, the former seems preferable, for obvious reasons.

So then, provided my analysis is correct - and bear in mind this is and will be vague until the events themselves actually occur - how ought we to gear ourselves in relation to the actions of the capitalist class(es)? And if I am wrong in my analysis, where am I wrong?

[Zanthorus]

I will get back to you on the question of wether or not your analysis is correct. I don't think it is, your position seems to rely on the fact that capitalists as a class control the system, but the point about capitalism is that no-one is actually in the reigns, not even the capitalists. They just go along for the ride and manage to reap a decent profit out of human misery. The destruction of the state is simply not on the agenda, as the state is necessary for capitalism to (Temporarily at least) regulate it's crisis tendencies. For now though I'd just like to clear up one point:


The idea of the "Great Patriotic War" doesn't entail nationalism? Certainly the ideology of 'Great Russia' had been well instilled by the time Stalin assumed power.

I don't think you quite understand. The school of thought I come from sees Stalinism as being the result of a beuracratic counter-revolution as a result of the international wave of counter-revolution that met the revolution in countries like Italy, Germany etc. Bordiga directly accused Stalin to his face as being the 'gravedigger of the revolution'. The Bolshevik revolution was initially premised on the working-class taking power in the west, and Lenin refers to Russia as being a single outpost in the world revolution.

[Tzadikim]

I want to focus just on this, as it's essential for this thread and what I came in here to discuss:


I will get back to you on the question of wether or not your analysis is correct. I don't think it is, your position seems to rely on the fact that capitalists as a class control the system, but the point about capitalism is that no-one is actually in the reigns, not even the capitalists. They just go along for the ride and manage to reap a decent profit out of human misery. The destruction of the state is simply not on the agenda, as the state is necessary for capitalism to (Temporarily at least) regulate it's crisis tendencies.

My position hinges on the idea that there is one fundamental division between the capitalist class into two different factions, and most capitalists fall into one or the other:

1. National capitalists, those who rely on a single nation for the bulk of its power (I would consider defense contractors to be the definitive form of this faction, insofar as they rely upon a strong sovereign nation to purchase their goods), and

2. International capitalists, who are reliant upon foreign trade and produce for their business, and as such are not intimately tied into one nation at the expense of the others (Microsoft and other, similar 'megabusinesses' would fall into this faction).

Now there is a great deal of intermingling between these two factions, for instance, many computers in the defense industry rely on Microsoft products for their operating systems. However, what's good for one faction - say, heightened tensions between two nations which lead to the production of more weapons - may very well not be good for the other - for instance, those tensions, if continued for very long, may lead to one of the nations developing its own computer operating system.

And I think that the recently increased partisanship of the capitalist class, particularly in the United States, is evidence of a schism between these two forms of capitalist production. And neither of them particularly want to destroy the State, or the concept of nationality, but their actions, taken together, are weakening it, and if either one should fully win out we can expect the State to weaken in power either way.

Now I could be wrong, and very likely am. But this seems to my rather limited mind the best explanation behind recent events in the United States.