Rakhmetov
22nd September 2010, 15:09
http://www.marxist.com/where-is-cuba-going-capitalism-or-socialism.htm
What is truly amazing is the fact that the Cuban revolution has managed to resist after the collapse of Stalinism in the Soviet Union, on which it was completely dependent from an economic point of view (this is explained in more detail in Cuba 50 years later - part two (http://www.marxist.com/cuba-50-years-later-part-two.htm)). This is a testimony to the deep roots the Cuban revolution still has within the population. The so-called Special Period showed the determination of a whole people not to allow themselves to be enslaved again.
http://www.marxist.com/images/thumbs/250x187-images-stories-cuba-stttijn-crowd_on_26_July.jpg (http://www.marxist.com/images/stories/cuba/stttijn-crowd_on_26_July.jpg)(Crowd celebrating the Cuban Revolution on 26 July. Photo by stttijn.)
So what attitude should we take to these proposals? It is true that, in itself, the opening of small businesses is not a negative measure. A planned economy does not need to nationalise everything, down to the last barber shop. This was always a Stalinist caricature. In Cuba the nationalisation of all small and medium enterprises took place as part of the “Revolutionary Offensive” in 1968, when 58,000 small businesses, mainly in the cities, were expropriated. Ice cream vendors, barber shops, shoe repair shops, etc, all were nationalised.
This was a completely unnecessary step, which only resulted in the creation of a further layer of bureaucracy to oversee and manage these really small productive units. In the transition towards socialism, it is inevitable that elements of capitalism will continue to exist alongside the elements of a socialist planned economy. That includes a certain number of small businesses, shops and small peasant plots, etc.
In itself, that should pose no threat to socialism, as long as the key points of the economy remain in the hands of the state, and the state and industry is in the hands of the working class. On that condition, and only on that condition, a small private sector could and should be allowed, as long as the state maintains firm control over the commanding heights of the economy.
In the 1920s the Russian revolution was forced to make concessions to private production (mainly in agriculture) and offer concessions to foreign capital, through the New Economic Policy. Lenin was even prepared to offer to lease parts of Siberia to foreign capitalists. Given the extreme poverty of the young Soviet state, the Bolsheviks had no means of developing the colossal mineral potential of that huge region.
In exchange for investment and foreign technology, both of which the Revolution lacked, Lenin was prepared to allow foreign businessmen to open factories and mines on Soviet territory, employ workers and make profits, on condition that they respected Soviet labour laws and paid taxes. But the prior condition for making such concessions was that the working class, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, maintained control of the state. In reality, these offers were rejected because the imperialists were determined to overthrow the Soviet state, not trade with it.
However, such historical analogies have definite limits and can be misleading. The truth is always concrete. It is not a question of repeating general truths about the transitional economy but of analysing concrete facts and trends. We have to ask ourselves the basic question: in the given historical context, what will the concrete results of these policies be for Cuba?
The first problem is that Cuba has an extremely weak economic basis. The second is that it is only a few miles from the most powerful capitalist economy in the world. The third is that, as a result of years of bureaucratic mismanagement, the state owned enterprises are in a very bad state. Last but by no means least, the workers have no sense of controlling the industries where they work, and therefore no interest in questions such as productivity, efficiency and so on. There is a general sense of malaise and discontent that can lead to a mood of alienation that can pose the most serious danger of all to the future of the Revolution.
Everybody agrees that the present situation cannot continue, that “something must change” and “something must be done”. The question of questions is: what is to be done?
What is truly amazing is the fact that the Cuban revolution has managed to resist after the collapse of Stalinism in the Soviet Union, on which it was completely dependent from an economic point of view (this is explained in more detail in Cuba 50 years later - part two (http://www.marxist.com/cuba-50-years-later-part-two.htm)). This is a testimony to the deep roots the Cuban revolution still has within the population. The so-called Special Period showed the determination of a whole people not to allow themselves to be enslaved again.
http://www.marxist.com/images/thumbs/250x187-images-stories-cuba-stttijn-crowd_on_26_July.jpg (http://www.marxist.com/images/stories/cuba/stttijn-crowd_on_26_July.jpg)(Crowd celebrating the Cuban Revolution on 26 July. Photo by stttijn.)
So what attitude should we take to these proposals? It is true that, in itself, the opening of small businesses is not a negative measure. A planned economy does not need to nationalise everything, down to the last barber shop. This was always a Stalinist caricature. In Cuba the nationalisation of all small and medium enterprises took place as part of the “Revolutionary Offensive” in 1968, when 58,000 small businesses, mainly in the cities, were expropriated. Ice cream vendors, barber shops, shoe repair shops, etc, all were nationalised.
This was a completely unnecessary step, which only resulted in the creation of a further layer of bureaucracy to oversee and manage these really small productive units. In the transition towards socialism, it is inevitable that elements of capitalism will continue to exist alongside the elements of a socialist planned economy. That includes a certain number of small businesses, shops and small peasant plots, etc.
In itself, that should pose no threat to socialism, as long as the key points of the economy remain in the hands of the state, and the state and industry is in the hands of the working class. On that condition, and only on that condition, a small private sector could and should be allowed, as long as the state maintains firm control over the commanding heights of the economy.
In the 1920s the Russian revolution was forced to make concessions to private production (mainly in agriculture) and offer concessions to foreign capital, through the New Economic Policy. Lenin was even prepared to offer to lease parts of Siberia to foreign capitalists. Given the extreme poverty of the young Soviet state, the Bolsheviks had no means of developing the colossal mineral potential of that huge region.
In exchange for investment and foreign technology, both of which the Revolution lacked, Lenin was prepared to allow foreign businessmen to open factories and mines on Soviet territory, employ workers and make profits, on condition that they respected Soviet labour laws and paid taxes. But the prior condition for making such concessions was that the working class, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, maintained control of the state. In reality, these offers were rejected because the imperialists were determined to overthrow the Soviet state, not trade with it.
However, such historical analogies have definite limits and can be misleading. The truth is always concrete. It is not a question of repeating general truths about the transitional economy but of analysing concrete facts and trends. We have to ask ourselves the basic question: in the given historical context, what will the concrete results of these policies be for Cuba?
The first problem is that Cuba has an extremely weak economic basis. The second is that it is only a few miles from the most powerful capitalist economy in the world. The third is that, as a result of years of bureaucratic mismanagement, the state owned enterprises are in a very bad state. Last but by no means least, the workers have no sense of controlling the industries where they work, and therefore no interest in questions such as productivity, efficiency and so on. There is a general sense of malaise and discontent that can lead to a mood of alienation that can pose the most serious danger of all to the future of the Revolution.
Everybody agrees that the present situation cannot continue, that “something must change” and “something must be done”. The question of questions is: what is to be done?