Kibbutznik
16th September 2010, 23:15
It's been a common question indeed, and for a term paper in one of my political science classes I decided to explore that question. I would like to post some excerpts from it here, mostly from the literature review and conclusions and see what you guys think
The central figure in studying the problem of American exceptionalism is undoubtedly Louis Hartz. His retrospective study of the nature of American political culture has been both widely celebrated and critiqued over the years, cementing his preeminent position among scholars of American exceptionalism. The nature of American political culture as a function of socio-economic conditions is the central facet of Hartz's scholarship on American exceptionalism. He argued that it was the twin factors of the absence of a feudal order in the United States and the resulting consensus on liberal ideology made socialism an alien ideology to America. He argued that the existence of a feudal power structure was a necessary condition for the development of mass socialist movements. Historically, he argues, “socialism arises not only to fight capitalism but the remnants of feudalism itself...” (1954, 9). Without an entrenched feudal order, a uniform, Lockean liberal ideology became hegemonic within American society.
The liberal tradition thesis has been strongly echoed among more modern scholars. Byron E. Shafer framed the issue of American exceptionalism in similar terms, arguing that “the United States was created differently, developed differently, and thus has to be understood differently, essentially on its own terms and within its own context.” He notes liberal, populist nature of American political culture, oriented less on ideology than “in terms of the 'little man' versus 'the interests'”, whether those interests be the state, business or special interest groups. Consequently, Americans have a unique notion of equality, “implying social but not material leveling” (Shafer 2003, 293, 299, 308).
There have been notable criticisms of Hartz's thesis. Kenneth McNaught strongly criticized Hartz's notion of a lack of a feudal tradition in the colonial era of American history. He notes that “If feudalism means landed estates, established churches, class privilege legally enforced, and an organic view of society...” then feudalism has not been an absent institution in American history. The reform of “illiberal institutions” like debt imprisonment and slavery also came much sooner in England than the United States, with considerably less difficulty (McNaught 1984, 347). Far from a triumphant democracy, he notes that Americans of the Populist-Progressive era “were engaged in a battle for democracy.” This battle both demanded and received the full cooperation from both liberals and socialists, in sharp contrast to Hartz's notion that these two groups could not cooperate in America (McNaught 1984, 350).
The notion of a hegemonic liberal democratic ideology in American political culture has received similar criticism from Rogers M. Smith. His central thesis is that the accounts depicting America as having a paradigm of liberal egalitarian political culture do not stand up to historical scrutiny and must be revised. Such accounts vastly underplay the existence of racial, ethnic and sexual hierarchies in American culture (Smith 1993, 549). He argues that theorists like Hartz have dismissed such hierarchies as primarily irrational thoughts of the undereducated and underprivileged, ignoring the pervasive nature of scientific and religious rationalizations for racial, ethnic and sexual hierarchies (Smith 1993, 552-3). Smith concludes that American political culture is a nexus of multiple apparently inconsistent traditions (liberalism, republicanism, nationalism) that are subject to continual conflict.
There have been notable alternative explanations for the failure of mass-based labor parties and union politics in the United States. An important factor that must be considered is the form of the institutional structures of the American political system. Unlike most European countries, the US Congress is elected entirely by a first-past-the-post system, in which the plurality candidate in each single member district wins the seat. It is no coincidence that countries with first-past-the-post electoral systems have weaker, often irrelevant third parties, as Maurice Duverger argued. The underrepresentation of third parties compared to their electoral support “is a mechanical phenomenon. Elections determined by a plurality vote on one ballot literally pulverize third parties ….” (Duverger 1972, 23). This would create a strong barrier to the growth of an independent, labor based party in the United States, and cause reform movements to spend their resources working within the existing two party structure. Michael Kammen noted a self-conscious trend among unionists away from establishing their own political party as well. He also notes that management and capital in the United States had far greater resources and incentives to wage anti-union campaigns, contributing towards the weaker position of labor (Kammen 1993, 4-5).
Robin Archer, however, rules out the first-past-the-post factor, as well as others, in his comparison study of the United States and Australia. Australia, which had similar geographic concentrations of labor, a similar electoral system as well as similar problems of nativism towards immigrants, developed a mass-based labor party while the United States did not. Had these factors been the definitive culprit, Australia would be similarly absent a labor party. Instead, he attributes the lack of an American labor party to three main factors: the strength of political repression that American workers faced, the unusual salience of religion in American society, and a peculiar brand of socialist sectarianism that crippled the ideological portions of the American left (Archer 2008, 234-6, 240-41).
Richard Franklin Bensel's application of world systems theory to interregional conflicts within the United States has been particularly notable. His theory begins with the premise of that America's relative absence of religious and ethnic rivalry “has meant that sectional stress in the United States has usually been grounded in economic competition.” This competition is best understood to be a “struggle for control of the national political economy” (Bensel 1984, 4).
This sectional stress is rooted in a geographic division of labor between an industrial core in the Northeast and Midwest and an extractive periphery in the South. The high degree of sectionalism and the relatively regional bases of both major parties led to the Democrats, the party of the disenfranchised periphery, “to exploit class conflict in the core” to remain competitive on a national level (Bensel 1984, 22, 71).
This resulted in curiously strange political bedfellows. The Democratic Party relied on the support of the poorer classes in the core region and channeling class conflict into their party while simultaneously constructing a system of disenfranchisement that resulted in the periphery being utterly dominated by a small caste of white elites. Poor whites and poor blacks were set against each other in the South and mutually exploited while poor Northern whites looked to the Democrats for a redress of their grievances (Bensel 1984, 81).
The New Deal coalition of the Depression era represents the culmination of this strategy. The New Deal political revolution created an entirely new political economy. Previously, both parties exclusively represented the interests of sectional elites. The periphery Democrats only controlled the national government when it had successfully exploited class conflict in the core, and such alliances were always short lived. “By transforming the political economy, the New Deal made possible a pluralistic system in which the core lower class, represented by organized labor, could permanently participate in the councils of the periphery party” (Bensel 1984, 148). From this analysis, it is easy to see the incorporation of organized labor into existing political coalitions in some way forms a substitute for labor based political parties of other Western nations.
From this review of the literature, two important facts bear through. First, while the disparity may not be as great as suggested by Hartz, important differences exist between the development of the United States and the rest of the industrialized world. In turn, these different formative experiences have created a different political culture. What remains unknown is to what extent and how significant this issue is.
Second, accidents of geography and history have created unique pressures on American class consciousness.
The industrialized European nations lacked an internal periphery, instead depending on external colonies to fulfill the role of resource extraction. What is currently debatable is the development of the internal periphery has to class conflict. Also, it merits exploration of why labor did not become the central force within the Democratic Party after its incorporation into the party apparatus. The conditions existed within the New Deal coalition to allow labor to become a hegemonic force within American politics, yet in spite of the great mobilizing factors of the Great Depression, labor's influence has gradually receded.
Bibliography (for those interested)
Archer, Robin. Why is There No Labor Party in the United States? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Duverger, Maurice. “Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System.” In Party Politics and Pressure Groups, 23-32. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972.
Bensel, Richard Franklin. Sectionalism and American Political Development 1880-1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution. New York: Hartcourt, Brace and Company, 1955.
Kammen, Michael. “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration.” In American Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1993),1-43.
McNaught, Kenneth. “Comment on The Liberal Tradition.” In Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism, edited by John H.M. Lasset and Seymour Artin Lipset, 345-356. Berkley: University of California Press, 1984.
Shafer, Byron E. “What is the American Way?: Four Themes in Search of Their Next Incarnation.” In The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics, 293-319. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
Smith, Rogers M. “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America.” American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 549-566.That's just the literature review so far, which is probably the most important part of the paper. Anyway, in case you were wondering, I did get a good grade on the paper, in spite of my prof's rather conservative political opinions.
The central figure in studying the problem of American exceptionalism is undoubtedly Louis Hartz. His retrospective study of the nature of American political culture has been both widely celebrated and critiqued over the years, cementing his preeminent position among scholars of American exceptionalism. The nature of American political culture as a function of socio-economic conditions is the central facet of Hartz's scholarship on American exceptionalism. He argued that it was the twin factors of the absence of a feudal order in the United States and the resulting consensus on liberal ideology made socialism an alien ideology to America. He argued that the existence of a feudal power structure was a necessary condition for the development of mass socialist movements. Historically, he argues, “socialism arises not only to fight capitalism but the remnants of feudalism itself...” (1954, 9). Without an entrenched feudal order, a uniform, Lockean liberal ideology became hegemonic within American society.
The liberal tradition thesis has been strongly echoed among more modern scholars. Byron E. Shafer framed the issue of American exceptionalism in similar terms, arguing that “the United States was created differently, developed differently, and thus has to be understood differently, essentially on its own terms and within its own context.” He notes liberal, populist nature of American political culture, oriented less on ideology than “in terms of the 'little man' versus 'the interests'”, whether those interests be the state, business or special interest groups. Consequently, Americans have a unique notion of equality, “implying social but not material leveling” (Shafer 2003, 293, 299, 308).
There have been notable criticisms of Hartz's thesis. Kenneth McNaught strongly criticized Hartz's notion of a lack of a feudal tradition in the colonial era of American history. He notes that “If feudalism means landed estates, established churches, class privilege legally enforced, and an organic view of society...” then feudalism has not been an absent institution in American history. The reform of “illiberal institutions” like debt imprisonment and slavery also came much sooner in England than the United States, with considerably less difficulty (McNaught 1984, 347). Far from a triumphant democracy, he notes that Americans of the Populist-Progressive era “were engaged in a battle for democracy.” This battle both demanded and received the full cooperation from both liberals and socialists, in sharp contrast to Hartz's notion that these two groups could not cooperate in America (McNaught 1984, 350).
The notion of a hegemonic liberal democratic ideology in American political culture has received similar criticism from Rogers M. Smith. His central thesis is that the accounts depicting America as having a paradigm of liberal egalitarian political culture do not stand up to historical scrutiny and must be revised. Such accounts vastly underplay the existence of racial, ethnic and sexual hierarchies in American culture (Smith 1993, 549). He argues that theorists like Hartz have dismissed such hierarchies as primarily irrational thoughts of the undereducated and underprivileged, ignoring the pervasive nature of scientific and religious rationalizations for racial, ethnic and sexual hierarchies (Smith 1993, 552-3). Smith concludes that American political culture is a nexus of multiple apparently inconsistent traditions (liberalism, republicanism, nationalism) that are subject to continual conflict.
There have been notable alternative explanations for the failure of mass-based labor parties and union politics in the United States. An important factor that must be considered is the form of the institutional structures of the American political system. Unlike most European countries, the US Congress is elected entirely by a first-past-the-post system, in which the plurality candidate in each single member district wins the seat. It is no coincidence that countries with first-past-the-post electoral systems have weaker, often irrelevant third parties, as Maurice Duverger argued. The underrepresentation of third parties compared to their electoral support “is a mechanical phenomenon. Elections determined by a plurality vote on one ballot literally pulverize third parties ….” (Duverger 1972, 23). This would create a strong barrier to the growth of an independent, labor based party in the United States, and cause reform movements to spend their resources working within the existing two party structure. Michael Kammen noted a self-conscious trend among unionists away from establishing their own political party as well. He also notes that management and capital in the United States had far greater resources and incentives to wage anti-union campaigns, contributing towards the weaker position of labor (Kammen 1993, 4-5).
Robin Archer, however, rules out the first-past-the-post factor, as well as others, in his comparison study of the United States and Australia. Australia, which had similar geographic concentrations of labor, a similar electoral system as well as similar problems of nativism towards immigrants, developed a mass-based labor party while the United States did not. Had these factors been the definitive culprit, Australia would be similarly absent a labor party. Instead, he attributes the lack of an American labor party to three main factors: the strength of political repression that American workers faced, the unusual salience of religion in American society, and a peculiar brand of socialist sectarianism that crippled the ideological portions of the American left (Archer 2008, 234-6, 240-41).
Richard Franklin Bensel's application of world systems theory to interregional conflicts within the United States has been particularly notable. His theory begins with the premise of that America's relative absence of religious and ethnic rivalry “has meant that sectional stress in the United States has usually been grounded in economic competition.” This competition is best understood to be a “struggle for control of the national political economy” (Bensel 1984, 4).
This sectional stress is rooted in a geographic division of labor between an industrial core in the Northeast and Midwest and an extractive periphery in the South. The high degree of sectionalism and the relatively regional bases of both major parties led to the Democrats, the party of the disenfranchised periphery, “to exploit class conflict in the core” to remain competitive on a national level (Bensel 1984, 22, 71).
This resulted in curiously strange political bedfellows. The Democratic Party relied on the support of the poorer classes in the core region and channeling class conflict into their party while simultaneously constructing a system of disenfranchisement that resulted in the periphery being utterly dominated by a small caste of white elites. Poor whites and poor blacks were set against each other in the South and mutually exploited while poor Northern whites looked to the Democrats for a redress of their grievances (Bensel 1984, 81).
The New Deal coalition of the Depression era represents the culmination of this strategy. The New Deal political revolution created an entirely new political economy. Previously, both parties exclusively represented the interests of sectional elites. The periphery Democrats only controlled the national government when it had successfully exploited class conflict in the core, and such alliances were always short lived. “By transforming the political economy, the New Deal made possible a pluralistic system in which the core lower class, represented by organized labor, could permanently participate in the councils of the periphery party” (Bensel 1984, 148). From this analysis, it is easy to see the incorporation of organized labor into existing political coalitions in some way forms a substitute for labor based political parties of other Western nations.
From this review of the literature, two important facts bear through. First, while the disparity may not be as great as suggested by Hartz, important differences exist between the development of the United States and the rest of the industrialized world. In turn, these different formative experiences have created a different political culture. What remains unknown is to what extent and how significant this issue is.
Second, accidents of geography and history have created unique pressures on American class consciousness.
The industrialized European nations lacked an internal periphery, instead depending on external colonies to fulfill the role of resource extraction. What is currently debatable is the development of the internal periphery has to class conflict. Also, it merits exploration of why labor did not become the central force within the Democratic Party after its incorporation into the party apparatus. The conditions existed within the New Deal coalition to allow labor to become a hegemonic force within American politics, yet in spite of the great mobilizing factors of the Great Depression, labor's influence has gradually receded.
Bibliography (for those interested)
Archer, Robin. Why is There No Labor Party in the United States? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Duverger, Maurice. “Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System.” In Party Politics and Pressure Groups, 23-32. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972.
Bensel, Richard Franklin. Sectionalism and American Political Development 1880-1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution. New York: Hartcourt, Brace and Company, 1955.
Kammen, Michael. “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration.” In American Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1993),1-43.
McNaught, Kenneth. “Comment on The Liberal Tradition.” In Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism, edited by John H.M. Lasset and Seymour Artin Lipset, 345-356. Berkley: University of California Press, 1984.
Shafer, Byron E. “What is the American Way?: Four Themes in Search of Their Next Incarnation.” In The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics, 293-319. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
Smith, Rogers M. “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America.” American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 549-566.That's just the literature review so far, which is probably the most important part of the paper. Anyway, in case you were wondering, I did get a good grade on the paper, in spite of my prof's rather conservative political opinions.