Marxism, Popper and the criterion of Falsibility.

[AnthArmo]

At the moment, I'm studying Popper and his criterion of falsifiability in my philosophy class.

For those of you who don't know, the general gist is that in order for something to be ranked as a science, it must be falsifiable. That is, it must make very specific and risky statements about the world, which have a probablility of being disproven by empirical tests.

What interested me about this theory is how he contrasts science with pseudo-science. For him, he equates pseudo-science with Freud, Adler and Marx. He defines these as being "closer to primitive myths than to science".

His basic problem is that these theories can, literally, explain away anything that comes before them. He makes reference to the fact that Adler's "Inferiority complex" can literally be applied to any case, no matter how varied and unusual.

This reminded me of the fact that, like Adler's inferiority complex and Feudian psychology, you can apply a Marxist analysis onto literally anything.

He also explains how these theories have a very "religious" effect on their adherents due to their sheer "Explanatory power". The fact that these theories explain so much about society and humanity, and that verifications for them exist nearly everywhere, has the effect of making a "weak mind" take these theories as gospel truth.

My philosophy teacher uses a specific example of how adherents to Adler's inferiority complex could explain away any criticism as proof of the critics "severe feelings of inferiority".

This reminded me of a lot about how Marxists like to disregard any objection directed towards them as being the result of a "class bias". I've heard theories been rejected, not on the basis of arguments or reasoning, but because they are from the "Bourgeoise" and the "Petite-Bourgeoise". Arguments are only considered within the marxist paradigm, and anything that doesn't cohere with that must be "Bourgeoise".

I also must admit that when I first learnt about Marxism, I had a very similar effect come upon me initially. It wasn't until seeing Marxists on this very site argue with one another purely by quoting large extracts from Marx and Engels did I start to become suspicious.

I've gone on a slight tangent, but the gist of my question here is, what is the Marxist reply to Popper's criterion of falisfiability? Is Marxism falsifiable? is Popper's criterion of falsifiability just stupid? Or is there a strawman argument somehwere in Popper's reasoning.

[ZeroNowhere]

Rising productivity causing a rise in prices. Other than that, historical materialism is not a theory, and Christians have adhered to the Bible far closer than Marxists have to Marx. Marx does see views as representing the perspectives of certain classes, but this is on the basis of flaws in them which he has already demonstrated.

Of course, there's an easier way to make the claims of Capital false as statements about the world. Namely, abolishing capitalism. That'd be cool. Of course, there are other flaws with Popper's 'falsifiability' ideas, such as his rather untenable ideas about scientific progress (Guy Robinson had dealt with that in the book on philosophy and mystification), as well as some involving evolution and so on, but I'm just addressing the fact that it has no real relevance to Marx anyhow. Which is not to imply that Popper is relevant to anything else, of course.

[Dean]

A recent thread in OI tackles the subject:

I would say one of the primary reasons is that the sciences primarily serve the interests of those who have the material means to produce studies in reference to them, a phenomenon which is intensified by the adherence to Popperian philosophy in general.

Skooma Addict may note, if he is reading this thread, that both Marxist and Austrian economics fall victim to this particular model of science, as do the works of characters like Einstein, Feuerbach, Hegel and Darwin, whose works present problems which cannot be definitively falsified or proved. Austrian science is notably distinct from Marxism in that it rejects both statistical and historical data as means in which its theories might define themselves - it seems to be diametrically opposed to popper on this count: manifest economic data and laboratory study is in general rejected, whereas for Popper, real-world studies and data are the only means by which we can come to "acceptable" theories - which the falsifiability doctrine indicates.

I think that to completely reject Popper's concepts is a mistake, however. Really, the doctrine ultimately prescribes a distinct set of facts - those verifiable in distinct settings - and grants greater weight to them; theories which don't fit this mold are abandoned. I think, in terms of these particular "trusted" theories, he is worth consideration. However, narrowing one's approach to such facts requires that one abandon a number of avenues of inquiry - such as many of the tendencies of psychology, sociology, economics, and even Quantum physics (some of Einstein's theories of which are notably non-falsifiable).

In fact, falsifiability presents its own dilemma, namely in that the focus of science must be shifted away from the above fields and towards those fields which have prevalent and undeniable study. However, it is a logical consequence of this approach that (again) the focus is shifted toward the interests of a particular demographic - that which has the means, avenue and interest to study the given issue.

I think this is a strong indicator as to why one of the biggest markets (twice as large as the net held assets in the whole world!) is being ignored in Macroeconomics classes and other mainstream academic and ideological arenas - that is the derivatives market, whose presence has since the 1980s come to dwarf the other, traditional (more tied to production rather than changes in value) markets. I think that the derivatives market provides for a means of investment which further insulates the investor from the net social value of production since derivatives require no growth, but can just as easily gain on the losses of its subject.

The range, focus and variables in scientific studies are dictated by the same norms as that of media broadcasting or academic dissemination (via private and public schools, libraries, seminaries and the like) - those means are always the net gains and losses in reference to the particular value that those entities surround - almost universally gains tied to the organization, for instance, which is the same mode of economic activity extant under capitalism.

This is a good resource on the topic:

I would recommend this article by Hristos Verikukis, Popper's Double Standard of Scientificity in Criticizing Marxism, if there is interest in reading quite sophisticated philosophic critique of Popper:

http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Verikukis.pdf

And to answer your question:

I've gone on a slight tangent, but the gist of my question here is, what is the Marxist reply to Popper's criterion of falisfiability? Is Marxism falsifiable? is Popper's criterion of falsifiability just stupid? Or is there a strawman argument somehwere in Popper's reasoning.
It is:

Popper’s scheme of social science involves a law, the R.P, which is both nontestable,
therefore not amenable to falsifiability, and false (it has been falsified); yet, he
claims that this is the way to go about it. This indicates a different conception of
science23 since it blatantly contradicts what he has been preaching all along, the gospel of
falsifiability and falsification (Marxism is dismissed along these lines); it also contradicts
the unity-of-method thesis.

[REVLEFT'S BIEGGST MATSER TROL]

I'm unfamilar with this question, so perhaps i'm missing something which is why others who seem more informed have passed this point by, but surely something can be classified as a science if it can be eventually falsified, rather than can be falsified right away or not.

So for instance, the "discovery" of Pluto by scientists who predicted the existence of this planet in line with their current theories, in defiance of observable facts at the time (Pluto was not detectable by current technologies.) was still scientific since their hypothesis could eventually be confirmed or disproved.

Surely Marxism is the same? It will eventually be confirmed IF a communist revolution happens?

[anticap]

Here's the obligatory link to Feyerabend (http://marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/feyerabe.htm).

(I'm not staking a position here, just posting what will inevitably be posted.)

[mikelepore]

For those of you who don't know, the general gist is that in order for something to be ranked as a science, it must be falsifiable. That is, it must make very specific and risky statements about the world, which have a probablility of being disproven by empirical tests.


Popper exaggerated the importance of "all" and "none" statements, which can be falsified by finding even one exception. A problem with his criterion is that that is not all science is composed of strict "all" and "none" statements.

For example, we have discovered and are communicating some anatomical knowledge when we say that human beings have 12 pairs of ribs. However, if I were born with a defect and had 11 pairs of ribs, you wouldn't throw away the generalization that has been so useful in anatomy education up until now, and neither would you deny that I'm a human being; you would simply note that we have an exception. The recognized pattern is still valid.

Another example, in chemistry we know that compounds whose formula is C(n) H(2n+2) tend to be flammable. Methane CH4, ethane C2H6, propane C3H8, butane C4H10, etc., are all flammable. But an integer like n can go to infinity. Are we lacking any scientific knowledge when we identify this useful pattern, merely because we cannot check all possible values of n through infinity to see if an exception will be found?

Popper's criterion would make us too quick to belittle useful discoveries and say that they are not part of science.

I prefer John Stuart Mill's definition of science: we are performing science whenever we go into a field where some regularities are found and we ascertain the conditions under which the regularities occur.

Marxism strives to be scientific in Mill's sense.

[Zanthorus]

Well, according to Marx at least, Marxism strives to be scientific in the sense that it limites itself "to the knowledge of the social movement made by the people itself;" as opposed to "utopian socialism, which wants to attach the people to new delusions". I also think there is some ambiguity around the word "science", as the german wissenschaft does not necessarily mean science in our modern sense. Hegel, for example, contends that his philosophy is wissenschaftliche, but that anatomy, strictly speaking, has no real right to the name wissenschaft, and is merely a collection of items of knowledge.

[Kayser_Soso]

There are ways Marxist theory could be falsifiable. For example, let's see a country go from capitalist production back to feudalism. Or let's see the ruling class willingly adopt socialism. This would seriously undermine Marx's theories.

I haven't read Popper as closely as many here have, but from what I have read it seems that Popper likes to attach religious terminology to predictions Marx made, so he can attack him for revising his theories. When one finds one's hypothesis refuted, one needs to go back and revise the hypothesis. Either there was an error or some factor was not taken into account.

Also it seems to me that Popper had a shallow understanding of Marxist theory and history in general. He claimed Marx was wrong about revolutions occuring in industrial Europe before 1900 but there was such a revolution, and several more occured in 1918. Popper's stories about how he came to doubt Marxism sound like he was just being over-sentimental. He was upset that in the course of some riots, several of his friends were killed and other Communists said that this kind of thing is necessary. He didn't like cold hard reality so eventually he sought to disprove it.

[JimFar]

I also must admit that when I first learnt about Marxism, I had a very similar effect come upon me initially. It wasn't until seeing Marxists on this very site argue with one another purely by quoting large extracts from Marx and Engels did I start to become suspicious.

I've gone on a slight tangent, but the gist of my question here is, what is the Marxist reply to Popper's criterion of falisfiability? Is Marxism falsifiable? is Popper's criterion of falsifiability just stupid? Or is there a strawman argument somehwere in Popper's reasoning.

This issue has been dealt with any number of times in the past on this board. For example, see:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/karl-poppers-falsifiability-t119074/index.html?t=119074

[AnthArmo]

Popper exaggerated the importance of "all" and "none" statements, which can be falsified by finding even one exception. A problem with his criterion is that that is not all science is composed of strict "all" and "none" statements.

For example, we have discovered and are communicating some anatomical knowledge when we say that human beings have 12 pairs of ribs. However, if I were born with a defect and had 11 pairs of ribs, you wouldn't throw away the generalization that has been so useful in anatomy education up until now, and neither would you deny that I'm a human being; you would simply note that we have an exception. The recognized pattern is still valid.

Another example, in chemistry we know that compounds whose formula is C(n) H(2n+2) tend to be flammable. Methane CH4, ethane C2H6, propane C3H8, butane C4H10, etc., are all flammable. But an integer like n can go to infinity. Are we lacking any scientific knowledge when we identify this useful pattern, merely because we cannot check all possible values of n through infinity to see if an exception will be found?

Popper's criterion would make us too quick to belittle useful discoveries and say that they are not part of science.

I prefer John Stuart Mill's definition of science: we are performing science whenever we go into a field where some regularities are found and we ascertain the conditions under which the regularities occur.

Marxism strives to be scientific in Mill's sense.

But the human analogy you gave was a problem with definitions and categorisation. The label of "human" that we attach onto organisms that have a tendency to have a series of characteristics is merely a way of categorising the world. I tend to prefer his example of how Einstein made a risky prediction about light bending around enourmous masses, an enourmous "all" statement that could be disproven, only to be verified by a photograph of an eclipse showing light going around the moon. That's a statement about a function of physics, rather than one of definitions.


There are ways Marxist theory could be falsifiable. For example, let's see a country go from capitalist production back to feudalism. Or let's see the ruling class willingly adopt socialism. This would seriously undermine Marx's theories.

Interestingly enough, Popper argued that Marxism was already "falsified" when the living standards of the working classes increased. You could argue that the adoption of the welfare state by the ruling classes is an example of marxism being "falsified". Popper criticises marxists for adding on an "ad hoc" hypothesis that discounted this, making marxism unfalsifiable. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that this "ad hoc twist" is the argument that living standards will decline in the long-term.



This issue has been dealt with any number of times in the past on this board. For example, see:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/karl-poppers-falsifiability-t119074/index.html?t=119074

I was reading through that. A lot of people seem to reject Popper in favour of Kuhn. My class studied Kuhn as well, and the general consensus we reached is that the two theories of science were very compatible with one another, complementing each other. Were we wrong in this?

I was under the impression that the replacement of one paradigm with another is an example of the paradigm being "falsified", wereas philosophy often retains multiple schools of thought surrounding one problem, due to the unfalsifiable nature of philosophical theories.

[Kayser_Soso]

Interestingly enough, Popper argued that Marxism was already "falsified" when the living standards of the working classes increased. You could argue that the adoption of the welfare state by the ruling classes is an example of marxism being "falsified". Popper criticises marxists for adding on an "ad hoc" hypothesis that discounted this, making marxism unfalsifiable. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that this "ad hoc twist" is the argument that living standards will decline in the long-term.

Popper should have made sure he understood what Marx wrote before he made that claim. The idea of "absolute impoverishment" is not Marx's. The welfare state is not an example of Marxism being falsified because to an extent it is necessary for the ruling class, and not just to stave off revolution. Workers must have a certain level of education, health, and the ability to buy back the commodities capitalists produce. If the government doesn't contribute to this, private companies would have to, and therefore it would be detrimental to them. Of course they don't always realize this any more, but this is no surprise given their penchant for bourgeois economics.

[Zanthorus]

Interestingly enough, Popper argued that Marxism was already "falsified" when the living standards of the working classes increased. You could argue that the adoption of the welfare state by the ruling classes is an example of marxism being "falsified". Popper criticises marxists for adding on an "ad hoc" hypothesis that discounted this, making marxism unfalsifiable. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that this "ad hoc twist" is the argument that living standards will decline in the long-term.

I have never read anything in Marx about a decline in living standards for the working-classes, wether in the short-term or long-term. Popper may be confusing Marx for Malthus, a somewhat understandable mistake given that both of their surnames begin with the letters 'M' and 'a', and the fact that Popper's aim was to discredit Marx, and doing so while acknowledging what Marx actually wrote would require some degree of intellectual honesty.

[mikelepore]

Well, according to Marx at least, Marxism strives to be scientific in the sense that it limites itself "to the knowledge of the social movement made by the people itself;" as opposed to "utopian socialism, which wants to attach the people to new delusions".

I remember Marx's famous reply to Bakunin, but I don't understand what he meant by limiting it to the contrast with utopian socialism. Marx tried very hard to make his summary of world history scientific, and to make his summary of capitalist economics scientific.


I also think there is some ambiguity around the word "science", as the german wissenschaft does not necessarily mean science in our modern sense. Hegel, for example, contends that his philosophy is wissenschaftliche, but that anatomy, strictly speaking, has no real right to the name wissenschaft, and is merely a collection of items of knowledge.

I don't know German, but the dictionaries say that Wissenschaft means science or any systematic knowledge. Those English speakers who use such terms as military science, the science of urban planning, etc., prefer a broad meaning to the word "science." Some people will want to narrow the meaning of the word and insist on being shown the hypothesis testing with experiments. I expect to find Marxian descriptions of social relationships to be somewhere between those two extremes.

To some extent it was Engels who exaggerated the situation, saying that "socialism became a science" (first chapter of Anti-Duhring, and repeated in _Socialism: Utop. and Sci._ ). It would have been better to say that we wish to be as scientific as the field makes possible. Without having some spare Earths to perform tests on, the opportunity to be scientific is limited.

It is not scientific that some Marxian conclusions are drawn from a sample size of 1, as in the case of Marx saying what lessons should be learned from the Paris Commune.

[mikelepore]

There are ways Marxist theory could be falsifiable. For example, let's see a country go from capitalist production back to feudalism. Or let's see the ruling class willingly adopt socialism. This would seriously undermine Marx's theories.

I see two difficulties there.

(1) Even if we saw a case of capitalaism going back to feudalism, or a ruling class supporting socialism, we wouldn't be able to tell whether it's an exceptional case that leaves the generalization untouched. This happens in science if the sample size is too small. Fish are a class of vertebrates, but you'd never know if the only samples you had available to check were some cartilaginous fish that have no bones. Maybe history usually moves a particular way, except in those cases when it moves some other way.

(2) We have a hell of a job finding places where Marx summarizes his conclusions, or even definitions of his vocabulary words. We have to read hundreds of pages and hopefully we get the point. Instead of expressing a general conclusion, Marx often tells stories, sometimes about current events, sometimes about ancient history, and sometimes just to denounce another writer as an idiot, and if we learn the lesson by osmosis that's terrific. In a few minutes I could find paragraph where Newton said that an object at rest will remain at rest unless acted upon by a force, but I don't know where we would look to find Marx saying that history progresses from feudalism to capitalism and will not cycle back.

[mikelepore]

I have never read anything in Marx about a decline in living standards for the working-classes, wether in the short-term or long-term. Popper may be confusing Marx for Malthus, a somewhat understandable mistake given that both of their surnames begin with the letters 'M' and 'a', and the fact that Popper's aim was to discredit Marx, and doing so while acknowledging what Marx actually wrote would require some degree of intellectual honesty.

In _Wage-Labour and Capital_ Marx talks about wages rising over time, but the share taken by the capitalist rises at a faster rate, so the worker's proportion relative to the capitalist's portion decreases. The conservatives won't understand this point, and will say that the Marxist is "jealous." Since they deny the fact that the workers have produced all of the wealth, the workers' portion as well as the capitlaists' portion, they can't understand why the workers' should be concerned when their portion rises but the capitalists' portion rises faster. A daily-occuring robbery continuously increases in magnitude, but the conservatives can only see that "a rising tide lifts all boats."

________________________________________________


From Marx, _Wage-Labour and Capital_:


"Wages are determined above all by their relations to the gain, the profit, of the capitalist. In other words, wages are a proportionate, relative quantity. Real wages express the price of labor-power in relation to the price of commodities; relative wages, on the other hand, express the share of immediate labor in the value newly created by it, in relation to the share of it which falls to accumulated labor, to capital."

"Real wages may remain the same, they may even rise, nevertheless the relative wages may fall."

"If capital grows rapidly, wages may rise, but the profit of capital rises disproportionately faster. The material position of the worker has improved, but at the cost of his social position. The social chasm that separates him from the capitalist has widened."

[ckaihatsu]

This reminded me of a lot about how Marxists like to disregard any objection directed towards them as being the result of a "class bias". I've heard theories been rejected, not on the basis of arguments or reasoning, but because they are from the "Bourgeoise" and the "Petite-Bourgeoise". Arguments are only considered within the marxist paradigm, and anything that doesn't cohere with that must be "Bourgeoise".




He also explains how these theories have a very "religious" effect on their adherents due to their sheer "Explanatory power". The fact that these theories explain so much about society and humanity, and that verifications for them exist nearly everywhere, has the effect of making a "weak mind" take these theories as gospel truth.


This is just a 'sour grapes' argument -- *any* analysis of (class) society will have to address the issue of how a society disposes of its surplus. This issue is at the very heart of Marxism.





At the moment, I'm studying Popper and his criterion of falsifiability in my philosophy class.

For those of you who don't know, the general gist is that in order for something to be ranked as a science, it must be falsifiable.


This is just a *methodological* issue. Depending on the nature of the *specific* scientific investigation it may be done well -- in which case there is a [1] hypothesis and a [2] null hypothesis -- or it may be done poorly, in which case it would *not* have a null hypothesis and so would be unfalsifiable.

This Popper argument is a generalization of a generalization -- thus making a pure abstraction. In the realm of art it would be a critique (creative effort)(2nd) of a critique (creative effort)(1st), which would *also* be removed from the original thing being critiqued.





That is, it must make very specific and risky statements about the world, which have a probablility of being disproven by empirical tests.





Scientific Method

In the twentieth century, a hypothetico-deductive model for scientific method was formulated (for a more formal discussion, see below):

1. Use your experience: Consider the problem and try to make sense of it. Look for previous explanations. If this is a new problem to you, then move to step 2.

2. Form a conjecture: When nothing else is yet known, try to state an explanation, to someone else, or to your notebook.

3. Deduce a prediction from that explanation: If you assume 2 is true, what consequences follow?

4. Test: Look for the opposite of each consequence in order to disprove 2. It is a logical error to seek 3 directly as proof of 2. This error is called affirming the consequent.[13]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method