Popper's critique of Marxism, specifically historical materialism

[Lyev]

First of all let's clarify what they are. From what I understand, he argues in The Open Society And Its Enemies and The Poverty Of Historicism that historicism (in other words Marxist historicism; the materialist conception of history, right?*) is too deterministic. However, I believe it's probably a lot more nuanced than this. Here's wikipedia:
In The Open Society and Its Enemies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Open_Society_and_Its_Enemies) and The Poverty of Historicism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Poverty_of_Historicism), Popper developed a critique of historicism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historicism) and a defence of the 'Open Society'. Popper considered historicism to be the theory that history develops inexorably and necessarily according to knowable general laws towards a determinate end. He argued that this view is the principal theoretical presupposition underpinning most forms of authoritarianism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarianism) and totalitarianism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totalitarianism). He argued that historicism is founded upon mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of scientific law and prediction. Since the growth of human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history, and since "no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge", it follows, he argued, that there can be no predictive science of human history. For Popper, metaphysical and historical indeterminism go hand in hand. In After The Open Society (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=After_The_Open_Society&action=edit&redlink=1), which was published posthumously, a large collection of his previously unpublished and uncollected essays on social and political topics was assembled. In this, one can trace his ideas from material that pre-dated The Open Society and Its Enemies to something that was completed just as he died.

In a 1992 lecture, Popper explained the connection between his political philosophy and his philosophy of science. As he stated, he was in his early years impressed by communism and also active in the Austrian Communist party. What had a profound effect on him was an event that happened in 1918: during a riot, caused by the Communists, the police shot several people, including some of Popper's friends. When Popper later told the leaders of the Communist party about this, they responded by stating that this loss of life was necessary in working towards the inevitable workers' revolution. This statement did not convince Popper and he started to think about what kind of reasoning would justify such a statement. He later concluded that there could not be any justification for it, and this was the start of his later criticism of historicism.

[...]

Other critics seek to vindicate the claims of historicism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historicism) or holism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holism) to intellectual respectability, or psychoanalysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychoanalysis) or Marxism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxism) to scientific status.(emphasis mine.) What on earth does this last section (Other critics seek to...) mean? OI opinions and views (if they are some pro-Poppers out there, they are also more than welcome). Also, the second part in bold (...they responded by stating...), I assume, is a qualm with utilitarianism - again, how do we mount a defence of Marxism against Popper's criticism, or are some of criticisms completely valid perhaps? On the other hand, this "greater good" stance is not perhaps one universal to all Marxist strains of thought. I should mention that I may have misunderstood his criticism of Marx. And, as regards the first part in bold (Since the growth of human...), do you think there is a misunderstanding here? Historical materialism does not claim, at all, that it can predict the future. It is merely a tool for speculating on what might happen, that's all. Thanks very much comrades.

*I may have simply interpreted Popper's critique wrongly.

[bailey_187]

oh god, change the colours. then i might read and try reply

[Lyev]

You don't like them? :( Sorry, it was just an easy way of identifying key parts in the text. EDIT: fixed!

First of all, can we clarify Popper's critique of Marx? Have I got it right? Are they other points to go over?

[Publius]

Popper's argument against Marxism is that it doesn't make falsifiable claims or, alternatively, that it did make falsifiable claims and has been falsified, e.g. Marx's timetable for when the revolution would occur.

But he points out that when this fact is brought up, Marxists always have an ad hoc explanation why the revolution didn't happen when Marx said it would, or why capitalism hasn't resulted in the steady immiseration of the working class.

Popper gives the example of some pop psychology (like Freudian) and has us consider the case of a man seeing a drowning child in a fountain: if the man saves the child, we can come up with some plausible explanation (eg. he did it to help the child and thus demonstrate his inner strength) or a plausible explanation of him letting the child drown (eg. he let the child down to demonstrate his mastery over the world). Whatever. The point is this sort of psychology is not science but pseudo-science because it can't be falsified, because no matter what happens the proponent of the view can produce some ad hoc explanation.

This, in short, is Popper's opinion of Marxism: it makes no truly testable predictions because even when its predictions are falsified Marxists make up excuses or change the goal posts.

If this is the case Marxism isn't falsifiable, meaning it's pseudo-science.

Now all of this is tied up with Popper's notion of what science is. Namely for Popper science is falsifiability -- to be scientific something must be falsifiable.

But his view of science is problematic for many reasons.

[Lyev]

Popper's argument against Marxism is that it doesn't make falsifiable claims or, alternatively, that it did make falsifiable claims and has been falsified, e.g. Marx's timetable for when the revolution would occur.

But he points out that when this fact is brought up, Marxists always have an ad hoc explanation why the revolution didn't happen when Marx said it would, or why capitalism hasn't resulted in the steady immiseration of the working class.

Popper gives the example of some pop psychology (like Freudian) and has us consider the case of a man seeing a drowning child in a fountain: if the man saves the child, we can come up with some plausible explanation (eg. he did it to help the child and thus demonstrate his inner strength) or a plausible explanation of him letting the child drown (eg. he let the child down to demonstrate his mastery over the world). Whatever. The point is this sort of psychology is not science but pseudo-science because it can't be falsified, because no matter what happens the proponent of the view can produce some ad hoc explanation.

This, in short, is Popper's opinion of Marxism: it makes no truly testable predictions because even when its predictions are falsified Marxists make up excuses or change the goal posts.

If this is the case Marxism isn't falsifiable, meaning it's pseudo-science.

Now all of this is tied up with Popper's notion of what science is. Namely for Popper science is falsifiability -- to be scientific something must be falsifiable.
But his view of science is problematic for many reasons.If you have the time, do you think you could explain Popper's views on scientific investigation? Marxism is not so rigid though, that the whole ideology is based on exactly every single word that Marx ever wrote - he was not a prophet and needs to be understood contextually. Marxism as a critique of capitalism and a guide for radical emancipatory politics hasn't fallen apart because the "revolution didn't happened when Marx said it would". And I might be tempted to argue that capitalism has resulted in the steady immiseration of the working class. The world is a fucking mess: 2 billion people globally live on less than the equivalent of $2 a day, whilst 1 billion live on less that $1. 10 million people die every year due to starvation or related diseases; 2 million of diarrhea and a further 2 million of malaria. The combined wealth of the 3 richest people is greater than that the poorest 48 countries in the world.

And neither Marx did not create a "timetable", he merely observed some reasonable criteria that could be conducive to a socialist transformation of society. Like this, in Luxemburg, the "scientific basis of socialism rests, as is well known, on three principal results of capitalist development. First, on the growing anarchy of capitalist economy, leading inevitably to its ruin. Second, on the progressive socialisation of the process of production, which creates the germs of the future social order. And third, on the increased organisation and consciousness of the proletarian class, which constitutes the active factor in the coming revolution." Marxist analysis posits that as these three factors, along with hundreds of other important details that comprise an immensely complex capitalist mode of production, mature and come to a head then the likelihood of a socialist revolution becomes more and more likely (and possible). It's not exactly a timetable. But it is a bit of a very loose "timetable" when it's remarked in many works of Marxian economics that capitalist economic crises are quite a regular occurrence. But, Marxism is not rigid or fixed stiffly to one particular moment in time - it should be, in my opinion, dynamic and flexible, willing to change and mould around any specific circumstances if the material conditions necessitate it.

[Dean]

Now all of this is tied up with Popper's notion of what science is. Namely for Popper science is falsifiability -- to be scientific something must be falsifiable.

But his view of science is problematic for many reasons.
I would say one of the primary reasons is that the sciences primarily serve the interests of those who have the material means to produce studies in reference to them, a phenomenon which is intensified by the adherence to Popperian philosophy in general.

Skooma Addict may note, if he is reading this thread, that both Marxist and Austrian economics fall victim to this particular model of science, as do the works of characters like Einstein, Feuerbach, Hegel and Darwin, whose works present problems which cannot be definitively falsified or proved. Austrian science is notably distinct from Marxism in that it rejects both statistical and historical data as means in which its theories might define themselves - it seems to be diametrically opposed to popper on this count: manifest economic data and laboratory study is in general rejected, whereas for Popper, real-world studies and data are the only means by which we can come to "acceptable" theories - which the falsifiability doctrine indicates.

I think that to completely reject Popper's concepts is a mistake, however. Really, the doctrine ultimately prescribes a distinct set of facts - those verifiable in distinct settings - and grants greater weight to them; theories which don't fit this mold are abandoned. I think, in terms of these particular "trusted" theories, he is worth consideration. However, narrowing one's approach to such facts requires that one abandon a number of avenues of inquiry - such as many of the tendencies of psychology, sociology, economics, and even Quantum physics (some of Einstein's theories of which are notably non-falsifiable).

In fact, falsifiability presents its own dilemma, namely in that the focus of science must be shifted away from the above fields and towards those fields which have prevalent and undeniable study. However, it is a logical consequence of this approach that (again) the focus is shifted toward the interests of a particular demographic - that which has the means, avenue and interest to study the given issue.

I think this is a strong indicator as to why one of the biggest markets (twice as large as the net held assets in the whole world!) is being ignored in Macroeconomics classes and other mainstream academic and ideological arenas - that is the derivatives market, whose presence has since the 1980s come to dwarf the other, traditional (more tied to production rather than changes in value) markets. I think that the derivatives market provides for a means of investment which further insulates the investor from the net social value of production since derivatives require no growth, but can just as easily gain on the losses of its subject.

The range, focus and variables in scientific studies are dictated by the same norms as that of media broadcasting or academic dissemination (via private and public schools, libraries, seminaries and the like) - those means are always the net gains and losses in reference to the particular value that those entities surround - almost universally gains tied to the organization, for instance, which is the same mode of economic activity extant under capitalism.

[KC]

Popper's "critique" of Marxism is absolutely pitiful in the same vein that almost all criticisms of Marxism are.

[Publius]

If you have the time, do you think you could explain Popper's views on scientific investigation?

At the end of my post.


Marxism is not so rigid though, that the whole ideology is based on exactly every single word that Marx ever wrote - he was not a prophet and needs to be understood contextually.True.

But clearly Marx thought he was applying his own theories in his prediction of a proletarian revolution before 1900.



Marxism as a critique of capitalism and a guide for radical emancipatory politics hasn't fallen apart because the "revolution didn't happened when Marx said it would".That's the issue.

Marxism isn't a science, then, even if it is still a social movement.

But Marxism is labeled as "scientific socialism".


And I might be tempted to argue that capitalism has resulted in the steady immiseration of the working class.Not in the way Marx meant.

Marx thought workers would lose wealth, not gain it, when in fact countries like the UK, Germany, the US, etc. have seen huge growths in working class wages (thought interestingly these have stalled for 30 or so years).



The world is a fucking mess: 2 billion people globally live on less than the equivalent of $2 a day, whilst 1 billion live on less that $1. 10 million people die every year due to starvation or related diseases; 2 million of diarrhea and a further 2 million of malaria. The combined wealth of the 3 richest people is greater than that the poorest 48 countries in the world. Sure, but that's not because those countries that are poor are industrial capitalist nations.

It's because they're not.



And neither Marx did not create a "timetable", he merely observed some reasonable criteria that could be conducive to a socialist transformation of society. Like this, in Luxemburg, the "scientific basis of socialism rests, as is well known, on three principal results of capitalist development. First, on the growing anarchy of capitalist economy, leading inevitably to its ruin. Second, on the progressive socialisation of the process of production, which creates the germs of the future social order. And third, on the increased organisation and consciousness of the proletarian class, which constitutes the active factor in the coming revolution." Marxist analysis posits that as these three factors, along with hundreds of other important details that comprise an immensely complex capitalist mode of production, mature and come to a head then the likelihood of a socialist revolution becomes more and more likely (and possible). It's not exactly a timetable. But it is a bit of a very loose "timetable" when it's remarked in many works of Marxian economics that capitalist economic crises are quite a regular occurrence. But, Marxism is not rigid or fixed stiffly to one particular moment in time - it should be, in my opinion, dynamic and flexible, willing to change and mould around any specific circumstances if the material conditions necessitate it.The point is merely that Marxism either makes testable predictions or it doesn't.

If it does, and it doesn't live up to them, it's false.

If it doesn't, then it's not scientific since it doesn't make genuine predictions, whatever else it may do.

In short Popper's notion of science is that scientific claims can never be verified, only falsified. This, by itself, is a radical claim which many proponents of Popperian theories (most scientists, I think, ascribe to quasi-Popperian views without realizing this downside) fail to understand. It basically no scientific theory that hasn't been falsified is any better than any other scientific theory that hasn't been falsified.

An experiment or test is just a a chance for falsification. If it passes, the theory survives to be tested again. But at no point in time are you ever done testing, certain that this is the true theory.

The primary of scientific theories is that they make testable predictions. This is generally true of science, even though Popper's characterization of science is wrong.

But there are serious logical problems with Poppers view. One is that he holds that the more falsifiable (that is the more radical or more easily testable) a theory is, the better it is (until, of course, it's falsified).

So the theory that Quantum Mechanics is true AND that the world will end is 5 minutes is, according to the falsifiability criteria, a better theory than Quantum Mechanics by itself because the first theory makes bolder predictions.

Of course it will turn out to be false, but that's a realization from OUTSIDE the Popperian framework.

Also, Popper's failure to give any account of verification sinks his theory since scientific progress entails that we're hitting upon correct theories. But Popper thinks there's no way to gain evidence for this.

Also, falsifiability is problematic because one experimental result need not falsify a theory. What if your testing machine was broken? What if you misinterpreted the results such that the theory and the results really were compatible? Falsifiability sounds good, but science isn't that clear cut. Furthermore theories can and do change along with experimental results such that a result which seems to disconfirm a theory might result in subtle changes to the theory.

But why, according to Popper, should we change a current theory as opposed to just scrapping the whole thing and coming up with a new one?

Presumably because our old theory approximated the truth and a revised theory would better approximate the truth.

But Popper's view of science doesn't have the theoretical resources to state this.

[Kiev Communard]

I would recommend this article by Hristos Verikukis, Popper's Double Standard of Scientificity in Criticizing Marxism, if there is interest in reading quite sophisticated philosophic critique of Popper:

http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Verikukis.pdf

[Dimentio]

Popper is often allowed to pass by as a social democrat, but wasn't he an acquaintance of Mises and the Austrian school?

[Dean]

Popper is often allowed to pass by as a social democrat, but wasn't he an acquaintance of Mises and the Austrian school?

If he was, he was bedding down with his academic contradiction:

"Austrian School principles advocate strict adherence to methodological individualism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodological_individualism) – analyzing human action exclusively from the perspective of an individual agent (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_%28economics%29).[9] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school#cite_note-Mises-8) Austrian economists also argue that mathematical models and statistics are an unreliable means of analyzing and testing economic theory, and advocate deriving economic theory logically from basic principles of human action, a method called praxeology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxeology). Additionally, whereas experimental research (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_economics) and natural experiments (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_experiment) are often used in mainstream economics, Austrian economists contend that testability in economics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_techniques) is virtually impossible since it relies on human actors who cannot be placed in a lab setting without altering their would-be actions. Mainstream economists are generally critical of methodologies used by modern Austrian economists;[10] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school#cite_note-Caplan-9) in particular, a primary Austrian School method of deriving theories has been criticized by mainstream economists as a priori "non-empirical" analysis[5] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school#cite_note-tremble-4) and differing from the practices of scientific theorizing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge#Scientific_knowledge), as widely conducted in economics.[11] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school#cite_note-10)[12] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school#cite_note-white1-11)[10] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school#cite_note-Caplan-9)"

"Critics of the Austrian school contend that by rejecting mathematics and econometrics, it has failed to contribute significantly to modern economics. Additionally, they contend that its methods currently consist of post-hoc analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-hoc_analysis) and do not generate testable implications; therefore, they fail the test of falsifiability (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability) as prescribed by the scientific method."

http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/whyaust.htm


As we see (and have seen reflected in discussions here), Austrians consistently repudiate the very value of historical, statistical and mathematical data, preferring instead to rely on "axiomatic" prejudices about the human being, and further rejecting analysis of human socio-economic relations. Really a pitiful, highly presumptive methodology.

[Skooma Addict]

Popper is often allowed to pass by as a social democrat, but wasn't he an acquaintance of Mises and the Austrian school?

He was a social democrat and an acquantance of Hayek.

[Dimentio]

Apparently he was the member of some club which Hayek had. Wasn't Hayek vehemently opposed to all kinds of regulation?

[Dean]

Apparently he was the member of some club which Hayek had. Wasn't Hayek vehemently opposed to all kinds of regulation?
Sure, but that couldn't have influenced his theories. :rolleyes:

In any case, Austrian Economics don't meet Popper's criteria, so the friendliness of their adherents bears little consequence here.

[Dimentio]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mont_Pelerin_Society

The Mount Pelerin Society was more than a social club. Apparently its a bit odd with a social democrat amongst right-wing crazies.

[Revolution starts with U]

The revolution didnt happen? Min. wage laws, overtime laws, legal protection for trade unions, civil rights, social security, pension programs rewarded through the tax code, universal healthcare.... and on and on
It is absurd to think the revolution didnt happen. It is happening right now. And more people by the day are waking up to the destruction corporate capitalism has sewn across the world.
the revolution didnt happen... what kind of joke is this?

[Lyev]

At the end of my post.

True.

But clearly Marx thought he was applying his own theories in his prediction of a proletarian revolution before 1900.Right OK, but even having established that Marx was of course no prophet, who was really just as human as the rest of us, who sometimes got things wrong, do you think we should all just give up on the communist project, pack up and go home, because revolution didn't happen before 1900? Anyway, there was plenty of revolutionary fervour whilst Marx was around. Marx and his comrades, whilst they were missing a universally communistic character, were actively involved in the revolutions and uprising of 1848 that swept across Europe. In fact, I think several of his friends died fighting on the side of the poor and oppressed. And of course the Paris Commune is another huge example of revolution in the 19th c., which, again, Marx wrote, whilst one of his correspondents (and his son-in-law), Paul Lafargue took part in.


That's the issue.

Marxism isn't a science, then, even if it is still a social movement.

But Marxism is labeled as "scientific socialism".I don't Marxism is a science in the strict sense that biochemistry, nuclear physics etc. are. It is just that it employs scientific methods such as the following:
Science attempts to apply some of the following criteria:

1) Skepticism of unsupported claims

2) Combination of an open mind with critical thinking

3) Attempts to repeat experimental results.

4) Requires testability

5) Seeks out falsifying data that would disprove a hypothesis

6) Uses descriptive language

7) Performs controlled experiments

8) Self-correcting

9) Relies on evidence and reason

10) Makes no claim for absolute or certain knowledge

11) Produces useful knowledgeI have never thought that Marxism was a science, and I think in this context especially there is a difference between being a "science" and simply being "scientific".


Not in the way Marx meant.

Marx thought workers would lose wealth, not gain it, when in fact countries like the UK, Germany, the US, etc. have seen huge growths in working class wages (thought interestingly these have stalled for 30 or so years).Yes and thanks to the tireless work and struggle of proletarian-based organisation that have constantly pressured, from below, the ruling class to concede every possible inch to the benefit of the working class.


Sure, but that's not because those countries that are poor are industrial capitalist nations.

It's because they're not.Surely you can see that the poverty of these nations (in Africa, South America, Asia) is wedded to their colonialist past. Imperialist domination and hegemony over resources, trade etc. surely retarded growth. Furthermore, the vacuum left after imperialist powers loosened their grip after WWII was conducive, as still evidently, to civil unrest in said countries, in the way of juntas and civil war which further destabilise these countries and their economies, whilst still subordinate to the developed western world for trade. Starvation, disease, lack of clean water, war, famine, etc. etc. further exacerbate or are an outgrowth of these aforementioned problems.


The point is merely that Marxism either makes testable predictions or it doesn't.

If it does, and it doesn't live up to them, it's false.

If it doesn't, then it's not scientific since it doesn't make genuine predictions, whatever else it may do.

In short Popper's notion of science is that scientific claims can never be verified, only falsified. This, by itself, is a radical claim which many proponents of Popperian theories (most scientists, I think, ascribe to quasi-Popperian views without realizing this downside) fail to understand. It basically no scientific theory that hasn't been falsified is any better than any other scientific theory that hasn't been falsified.

An experiment or test is just a a chance for falsification. If it passes, the theory survives to be tested again. But at no point in time are you ever done testing, certain that this is the true theory.

The primary of scientific theories is that they make testable predictions. This is generally true of science, even though Popper's characterization of science is wrong.

But there are serious logical problems with Poppers view. One is that he holds that the more falsifiable (that is the more radical or more easily testable) a theory is, the better it is (until, of course, it's falsified).

So the theory that Quantum Mechanics is true AND that the world will end is 5 minutes is, according to the falsifiability criteria, a better theory than Quantum Mechanics by itself because the first theory makes bolder predictions.

Of course it will turn out to be false, but that's a realization from OUTSIDE the Popperian framework.

Also, Popper's failure to give any account of verification sinks his theory since scientific progress entails that we're hitting upon correct theories. But Popper thinks there's no way to gain evidence for this.

Also, falsifiability is problematic because one experimental result need not falsify a theory. What if your testing machine was broken? What if you misinterpreted the results such that the theory and the results really were compatible? Falsifiability sounds good, but science isn't that clear cut. Furthermore theories can and do change along with experimental results such that a result which seems to disconfirm a theory might result in subtle changes to the theory.

But why, according to Popper, should we change a current theory as opposed to just scrapping the whole thing and coming up with a new one?

Presumably because our old theory approximated the truth and a revised theory would better approximate the truth.

But Popper's view of science doesn't have the theoretical resources to state this.EDIT: I just found this - "To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis." (Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific) which sort of discredits the original assertion that Marxism doesn't claim to be a science. As I understand your logic, you're arguing that because Marx made some predictions that he got wrong, the ideology is then rendered superfluous? But your second to last paragraph highlights a very important aspect of scientific investigation: if something appears anomalous or doesn't quite add up, the correct next step that follows is that this out-of-place aspect must be revised and because, as you said a "revised theory would better approximate the truth".

[Dean]

I would recommend this article by Hristos Verikukis, Popper's Double Standard of Scientificity in Criticizing Marxism, if there is interest in reading quite sophisticated philosophic critique of Popper:

http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Verikukis.pdf
I've been reading this and I think it offers a critically valuable narrative in terms of the question raised in the OP (simply reading the emboldened parts can do for the tl;dr lurkers):



Popper’s writings on the social sciences comprise only a small fraction of his
output (1994), (1985), (1976a), (1944/45), (1945). His intention is to distinguish between
“good” and “bad” social science because there is a practical issue that “. . . the social
problems of our time are urgent and that philosophers ought to face the issues; that we
should not be content to interpret the world but should help to change it.”15 In his work
on the social sciences, Popper draws attention to a doctrine which he calls “historicist”
and which had become dominant, at the time, in Europe, in politics and philosophy.
After criticising the “historicist” doctrines, he proposes his own approach to social
science.16 His method for the social sciences is what he terms “situational analysis.” For
Popper, social explanations should be given in terms of the situation the agents find
themselves in. Given the objective situation, there will be a unique action, which follows
naturally from the “logic” of the situation. The resulting action is called a rational
response to the objective situational environment in which the agent found him/herself.
Such explanations should be accompanied by a “Rationality Principle” (henceforth, R.P.)
which states that agents act in a way appropriate to the situation.17

The R.P. that Popper employs in his “situational analysis” raises a number of
questions because it is difficult to see what exactly Popper’s view of it is. The clearest
exposition of it is the “The Rationality Principle” in his (1985). Here Popper raises some
important questions regarding the R.P.: is it true or false? Is it falsifiable? Can it be
replaced if falsified? However, on all those questions, Popper’s answers are not very
clear and, at times, they create ambiguities.

Popper employs the same deductive schema of explanation in the social sciences
that he employs in the natural sciences: the explanans form the antecedent, while the
explanandum the consequent, where the validity of an inference depends on the truth of
all statements; in other words, explanations in the social sciences, for Popper, have the
same nomological causality as in the natural sciences: “I am going to propose a doctrine
of the unity of method; that is to say, the view that all theoretical or generalizing sciences
make use of the same method, whether they are natural sciences or social sciences . . . the
methods always consist in offering deductive causal explanations, and in testing
them. . . . ”18 The “unity-of-method” thesis is essential to Popper because his motivation
to provide a demarcation criterion in terms of testability, that is, falsifiability, is to
develop a theory of science designed specifically to exclude Marxism from the corpus of
science. If there is no unity-of-method, his critique of Marxism fails to hit the mark.

...

What Popper says regarding the status of the R.P. is not very clear; actually, at
times, it is confusing. For example, at one point, he claims that the R.P. is a) “an almost
empty principle”21 and that it should not be regarded as an empirical or psychological
assertion that a wo/man acts always rationally. And, then, he adds that b) the R.P. is both
“clearly false,” and that, though false, it is “a good approximation to the truth”22 ( b)
contradicts a) for if it is false it cannot be empty; it has a content that is false). In other
words, Popper’s scheme of social science involves a law, the R.P, which is both nontestable,
therefore not amenable to falsifiability, and false (it has been falsified); yet, he
claims that this is the way to go about it. This indicates a different conception of
science23 since it blatantly contradicts what he has been preaching all along, the gospel of
falsifiability and falsification (Marxism is dismissed along these lines); it also contradicts
the unity-of-method thesis.

[anticap]

The 'rational man' stuff is at least half nonsense. Humans act at least as often on emotion as on reason (given the fact that we're as much emotional animals as rational ones), then we rationalize our actions after the fact; but this post hoc rationalization does not constitute rational action.

[Dean]

I wanted to point out something I was thinking about on the drive to work:

Later on, Verikukis points out:

Popper’s scheme of social science involves a law, the R.P, which is both nontestable,
therefore not amenable to falsifiability, and false (it has been falsified); yet, he
claims that this is the way to go about it. This indicates a different conception of
science23 since it blatantly contradicts what he has been preaching all along, the gospel of
falsifiability and falsification (Marxism is dismissed along these lines); it also contradicts
the unity-of-method thesis.


Earlier I noted:

Skooma Addict may note, if he is reading this thread, that both Marxist and Austrian economics fall victim to this particular model of science, as do the works of characters like Einstein, Feuerbach, Hegel and Darwin, whose works present problems which cannot be definitively falsified or proved. Austrian science is notably distinct from Marxism in that it rejects both statistical and historical data as means in which its theories might define themselves - it seems to be diametrically opposed to popper on this count: manifest economic data and laboratory study is in general rejected, whereas for Popper, real-world studies and data are the only means by which we can come to "acceptable" theories - which the falsifiability doctrine indicates.

In fact, I was wrong: both Austrian theory and Popper's social theory rely on "praxeology," though Popper is notable in his adherence to the "experimental" model. Both reject statistical and historical data.

By pointing out the "non-falsifiable" character of praxeological dogma, I was actually uncovering an internal inconsistency in Popper's ideology which led him to give lip service to the extremes offered in Austrian economics. While the Austrians can be said to be fundamentally different in their approach, Popper achieves the same conclusions with a disparate approach - an approach which refutes the conclusions.