the REA: problem with Nietzsche

[Buffalo Souljah]

[These are just some thoughts, mostly in note form, about the place (or lack thereof) for Nietzsche within the revolution. Notes are below. I will add material as necessary. --fk]The real problem with Nietzsche, which was not properly addressed in my last post on Nietzsche (http://www.revleft.com/vb/whats-so-great-t133271/index.html) is what Lukacs points out in H&CC* late in the essay "Reification & the Consciousness of the Proletarian" (pp 186-188 in the 1967 edition), namely that he (Nietzsche) divests himself of the absolute "only in appearance", which means he's still claiming the primacy of "mind" over "matter" and towing that "conservative" line (take the idea that certain "races" are more advanced or "superior": science has proven the inconsistency of this claim). Therefore, by making such normative claims as he does throughout his oevre (pick any at random), he, in doing so is required to "bend" the "rules" of his system, ie. it (the system) is internally inconsistent**. Inconsistency diminishes any system's power by limiting the set of statements which it can prove or disprove, or in which sentences in it "make sense" (another way to say this would be that without consistency, a logical system cannot be "purposeful"). So, the skeptic would say that Nietzsche's works exist in relation to philosophy as Lewis Carroll's "Wonderland" does to mathematics: a "walk in the park" instead of a discrete logical (that is, "useful") system.

*History & Class Consciousness (Lukacs, G. 1967)
** albeit, perhaps purposefully--this would require further inquiry

[IllicitPopsicle]

:confused:

[Buffalo Souljah]

:confused:

Nietzsche's philosophical standpoint is rigorously logical, for all its irrationalism and wit. There are many individuals who feel that N was more useful to the purposes of analytical than continental philosophy. Categories like "will to power" "ressentement" "amor fati", etc. are all very logically/mathematically consistent (again, if we deprive them of their irrational content,) and it would be a simple task to remedy this crisis.

What I am saying is that the use Nietzsche's "system" has for the purposes of philosophical speculation or real material change is inhibited by the fact of internal inconsistencies within the system (if we accept Lukacs' qualification of it as such). This could, of course, be combated simply by excising the superfluous or contradictory material, thus rendering N's system consistent, if not complete. However, I am skeptical of the politically relevant nature of this "stripped" version of his phlosophical system, which is renowned and noteworthy in part preceisely for its idiosyncracy and inconsistency.

So, this is to say that we take the brunt of N's writings to be the constructs of an implicit formal system (that is, however, internally inconsistent). Then, theorems within that system may take on a new relation, being true in some cases and false in other, and in some cases both true and false, or neither! This is the artistic-philosophical interpretation of Nietzsche's works, rather than the ouright "philosophical" interpretation.[Note: I am interpreting "philosophy" in the Wittgensteininan sense, as a formal system or "language" complete with rules and "grammars", hence the scare quotes]

In other words, to say, as I quoted in the prior post that "der Mensch ist ein schmutziges See"/"man is but a dirty river" can be considered a theorem in the abstract sense. This theorem would "fit" crudely in various places within Nietzsche's philosophical framework, but would probably not be absolutely consistent, meaning there are probably places where the theorem would not be true, etc. So, in that sense, if we apply this filter to all of Nietzsche's writings, we find that his "system" is filled with such "holes".

What I did not address in the original post is what has come to mind since then in my mind: that this inconsistency-while-nevertheless-being-applicable-to-analytic-philosophy may have been entirely purposeful on Nietzsche's part--and that exactly this is what makes him problematic ("useless") to philosophy: he is a satyr, in the truest sense! In other words, no use for revolution/revolution has no use for him!

Does anyone see where Lukacs is going with this? SHould i pull the full quote (it's available at http://www.marxists.org, btw)?

[Blackscare]

the real problem with Nietzsche, which was not properly addressed in my last post on Nietzsche (http://www.revleft.com/vb/../whats-so-great-t133271/index.html) is what Lukacs points out in H&CC[Note:#] late in the essay "Reification & the Consciousness of the Proletarian" (pp 186-188 in the 1967 edition), namely that he (Nietzsche) divests himself of the absolute "only in appearance", and that by making such normative claims as he does (pick any), he resorts to methods that are [Note:@] internally contradictory, which inhibits the ability for his "system"[Note:*] to be internally consistent and, therefore, "purposeful". So, the skeptic would say that Nietzsche's works exist in relation to philosophy as Lewis Carroll does in relation with mathematics (which may say alot more about "philosophy" than it does about either man), a "walk in the park" rather than a rigid, concrete 9and therefore "useful"?) system.

#(History & Class Consciousness)
(albeit, perhaps purposefully--this would require further inquiry)
*(since he did not, after all, abandon the absolute [but "only in appearance" (187)])


This looks like purposely confusingly-worded and notated bullshit.

[Buffalo Souljah]

This looks like purposely confusingly-worded and notated bullshit.

I've edited it, calm down, mate. Try again!

[Meridian]

Perhaps this is because I haven't really read Nietzche himself, but I am not sure what you mean by "his system". So, I don't know what follows from it being consistent or inconsistent. Also, what does "his system" have to do with logic?

[Buffalo Souljah]

Perhaps this is because I haven't really read Nietzche himself, but I am not sure what you mean by "his system". So, I don't know what follows from it being consistent or inconsistent. Also, what does "his system" have to do with logic?


OK, so by Nietzsche's "system", I simply mean his general worldview, as explicated in his writings. Surely one would expect an individual to maintain some form of consistency in their views throughout their various applications, but this is not the case with Nietzsche! When applying traditional philosophical filters like logic (simple rules like the law of identity and so forth), there are many instances in Nietzsche's writings where he contradicts himself or his "world view", so this is perhaps fundamental to that view. This, I think, in itself is what is most seductive and at the same time most debilitating about figures like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and others who have experimented with pseudonymity and contradiction. Logic is merely a lens we use regularly to gauge the applicability or "use" of certain sets of theorems in relation with themselves and with the world they symbolize. In the case of Nietzsche, this approach is relatively infertile.

[Hit The North]

What I am saying is that the use Nietzsche's "system" has for the purposes of philosophical speculation or real material change is inhibited by the fact of internal inconsistencies within the system...This seems like an idealist position to me. As Marx demonstrated, material change is not achieved through the remedy of the internal inconsistencies of this or that philosophy, but through the remedy of the internal inconsistencies of man's material relations to his own kind. This is the only materialist and revolutionary position.

From my own understanding, which is very much as a layman (having read some of Zarathustra and the whole of Twilight of the Idols many moons ago), Nietzsche sought the perfection of the individual through an escape from the dead-weight of society and tradition. He did not seek the revolutionary transformation of society. Further, he certainly didn't identify capitalism as the main obstacle to human freedom and did not argue for a communist future. Therefore, I'd argue that his thought has no role to play in the coming revolution.

[Buffalo Souljah]

^I think you misunderstand me. I will post why later.

[Kuppo Shakur]

Surely one would expect an individual to maintain some form of consistency in their views throughout their various applications, but this is not the case with Nietzsche! When applying traditional philosophical filters like logic (simple rules like the law of identity and so forth), there are many instances in Nietzsche's writings where he contradicts himself or his "world view"
Can you give any specific examples from Nietzsche's writings where he contradicts himself?(Not counting The Will To Power, of course)

no use for revolution/revolution has no use for him!
I don't follow. What does Nietzsche's consistency have to do with revolution? What does Nietzsche at all have to do with revolution?

[Buffalo Souljah]

Can you give any specific examples from Nietzsche's writings where he contradicts himself?(Not counting The Will To Power, of course)

If we take the sum of Nietzsche's writings as a formal system (and this requires a bit of imagination), then at many points, his system (his writings) are in contradiction to one another. I think specifically of his writings before and after Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where the category of Uebermensche is formally introduced (you saw some mention of it in der Froehlichen Wissenschaft, but nowhere nearly as fully developed), in regards to the concept of "man". Man is many things, at many different points to Nietzsche, and it is from his failure to "connect" the empirical evidence ("herd mentality", "Lumpen-instinct", "ressentiment", etc.) within a larger material framework which takes into account the "structural" aspects of the former, which undermines any use his system could have for revolution.

I'm not stating that this observation is at all significant. I was more trying to develop a foundation as to why this is. The point is not controversial, as has already been pointed out to me, and many Marxist theorists reject N's categories as historical and antiquated, or at least not relevant outside of the "artistic-philosophical" project (ie., no overt emphasis on workers' struggles & other salient features of Marxism.

I don't follow. What does Nietzsche's consistency have to do with revolution? What does Nietzsche at all have to do with revolution?[/QUOTE]

Tha'ts what I am saying: revolutionary theory needs a consistent theory from which to approach the process of revolutionary praxis, and Nietzsche is, in fact, of very little use to this, primarily from the aphoristic nature of his writings.

[Qayin]

Cool story bro.

Please refrain from posting such irrelevant one-liners!

- Bob The Builder.

[Dean]

This seems like an idealist position to me. As Marx demonstrated, material change is not achieved through the remedy of the internal inconsistencies of this or that philosophy, but through the remedy of the internal inconsistencies of man's material relations to his own kind. This is the only materialist and revolutionary position.
I think he's saying that Nietzsche's system fails to fully reflect the reality of material systems because Nietzsche's system has internal inconsistencies.


From my own understanding, which is very much as a layman (having read some of Zarathustra and the whole of Twilight of the Idols many moons ago), Nietzsche sought the perfection of the individual through an escape from the dead-weight of society and tradition. He did not seek the revolutionary transformation of society. Further, he certainly didn't identify capitalism as the main obstacle to human freedom and did not argue for a communist future. Therefore, I'd argue that his thought has no role to play in the coming revolution.
Though I don't much care for Nietzsche or his hyper-idealism, I think this is totally false, and it mirrors the criticism leftists have of Freud and other analytical theorists that were not 100% in line with Marxist materialism.

Indeed, the main problem I see in fellow communists is that they expect all philosophers to be judged from the same orthodoxy - namely, Marxism. But I've found that not only is such a viewpoint misleadingly narrow, but it also tends to shut people off from some of the value - and more importantly the similarity to Marxism present in a lot of dissenting authors or authors with a different general focus.

In fact, most of the aforementioned theorists follow a similar trend as that seen in Marx's writings:

-Assessment of human social relations
-Attempt to liberate human(s) by the social or individual realization of these social relations,
-especially where deliberate human activity is discovered to foster relationships contrary to interests endemic to the deliberate act (in example, your paranoid/selfish nature in terms of sharing with neighbor has the net result of reducing utility and commodity value for you both, for instance)

Nietzsche, Freud and Jung all practiced theoretizations with these key goals in mind, in their own varying manifestations. There can be a lot of criticism of these authors, and I want to explain how I think we can evaluate the worth of these theorists by bringing up another one which follows the same model:

Ayn Rand. She is a good example precisely because of the hack job she did, primarily because she had predetermined interests that severely hampered her ability to create a successful system. The point is, Freud, Jung, Nietzsche, Feuerbach, Hegel and the rest all followed these models and came to astounding conclusions - sometimes they were way off the mark, but often they achieved knowledge that had hardly been spoken of socially or written down coherently. Sometimes, when they couldn't truly escape the assumptions of their systems (like Christianity) they were still able to succintly and plainly describe founding concepts of their systems which hadn't really been openly discussed.

I think the OP is dead-on that Nietzsche had some interesting and revolutionary ideas.

[Hit The North]

I think he's saying that Nietzsche's system fails to fully reflect the reality of material systems because Nietzsche's system has internal inconsistencies.


Sure, but as the OP concedes, you have to do violence to Nietzsche's work in order call it a system in the first place. From what I recall, this is because Nietzsche wasn't pursuing a totalising system of thought which would reflect "the reality of material systems". In fact, I always thought that his opposition to such system-building was one of his disctinctive contributions to philosophy.


Indeed, the main problem I see in fellow communists is that they expect all philosophers to be judged from the same orthodoxy - namely, Marxism.
As Marxists we attempt to analyse all thought in terms of its ideological articulation of historically emergent social relations. We judge it from its role or potential role in the class struggle.


I think the OP is dead-on that Nietzsche had some interesting and revolutionary ideas.So feel free to list these revolutionary ideas and then we can attempt to assess their utility to the revolutionary emancipation of the working class.

[Thirsty Crow]

I always understood the notion of the overman (or is it superman) in terms of "anthropological typology" (philosophical anthropology) of a given class society...I other words, when Marx speaks of systemic phenomena, Nietzsche offers a subjective reflectio nwhich pertains to the existential status of the worker.
In this sense, the insistence on "overcoming" (which is a crucial "subnotion" in relation to the overman/superman) is conducive to the insistence on real and material overcoming of the capitalist mode of production, its social relations AND the resulting "types of human character"...So the overman, in my interpretation, is the emancipated worker who actively produces his/her own conditions of existence.

Does that make sense?

[Buffalo Souljah]

I think he's saying that Nietzsche's system fails to fully reflect the reality of material systems because Nietzsche's system has internal inconsistencies. Yes, in a nutshell. I would agree with that assessment.



Though I don't much care for Nietzsche or his hyper-idealism, I think this is totally false, and it mirrors the criticism leftists have of Freud and other analytical theorists that were not 100% in line with Marxist materialism.

Indeed, the main problem I see in fellow communists is that they expect all philosophers to be judged from the same orthodoxy - namely, Marxism. Well, putting aside for the moment the issue of "vulgar" Marxism and other forms of sloppy and/or dogmatic ieological perspectives, I would say that, as an empirical science/theory that progresses "from consciousness to the world, and vice versa"), Marxism offers the most consistent formulation of a theorem for understanding social relations in relation to their material ground and their historical context. Internal consistency is not a very high bar to set, I think, for criticizing particular "viewpoints". I do not think the need exists to accommodate contradictory and/or false theorems and/or points of view. After all, Nietzsche is not sitting here with us today, so his writings are all we have to go on to judge his merit, so to speak, in any present social struggle. So, I would argue that you're wrong here, comrade.
But I've found that not only is such a viewpoint misleadingly narrow, but it also tends to shut people off from some of the value - and more importantly the similarity to Marxism present in a lot of dissenting authors or authors with a different general focus. I guess in this sense, I was lucky: I actually discovered existentialism, Freud, Hegel & Co. well before reading Marx, and would nevertheless proffer the view that Marxian materialism (that is, historical materialism), offers the highest stage and most fully developed theory connecting material conditions with the process of social cognition and organization in a context upon which the influence of historical forces is evident. What I am saying of Nietzsche applies to others as well--Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Dilthey as well as many theologians, who seem to be "on the right track", but have not yet fully developed an understanding of the systematic (that is, political, economic & social) forces at hand which are responsible for the various situations that they introduce (eg., "decadence", the decline of organized religion, "herd" mentality, Uebermensch, "Knight of Faith", usw. usw.) and are (thereby) *** limited in their potential contribution to/use in revolutionary theory and praxis***

In fact, most of the aforementioned theorists follow a similar trend as that seen in Marx's writings:

-Assessment of human social relations
-Attempt to liberate human(s) by the social or individual realization of these social relations,
-especially where deliberate human activity is discovered to foster relationships contrary to interests endemic to the deliberate act (in example, your paranoid/selfish nature in terms of sharing with neighbor has the net result of reducing utility and commodity value for you both, for instance)

Nietzsche, Freud and Jung all practiced theoretizations with these key goals in mind, in their own varying manifestations. There can be a lot of criticism of these authors, and I want to explain how I think we can evaluate the worth of these theorists by bringing up another one which follows the same model:

Ayn Rand. She is a good example precisely because of the hack job she did, primarily because she had predetermined interests that severely hampered her ability to create a successful system. The point is, Freud, Jung, Nietzsche, Feuerbach, Hegel and the rest all followed these models and came to astounding conclusions - sometimes they were way off the mark, but often they achieved knowledge that had hardly been spoken of socially or written down coherently. Sometimes, when they couldn't truly escape the assumptions of their systems (like Christianity) they were still able to succintly and plainly describe founding concepts of their systems which hadn't really been openly discussed.

I think the OP is dead-on that Nietzsche had some interesting and revolutionary ideas.I agree with the above, but my point, I think, stands nonetheless.


Sure, but as the OP concedes, you have to do violence to Nietzsche's work in order call it a system in the first place. I don't think so. I don't think this was implied by what I stated. I mean, if it were not possible to extrapolate a theoretical "structure" from Nietzsche's writings, you wouldn't have all of these self-ascribed "Nietzscheans" running around like you do. What this says is more that individuals have understood the problems inherent in their social situation only in the "existential" setting, whereas, the underlying economic and social situation that contributes to these circumstances (aforementioned) is largely ignored. I see [his work] then as an aesthetic system, more than anything else (which is not to say it doesn't have practical applications).
From what I recall, this is because Nietzsche wasn't pursuing a totalising system of thought which would reflect "the reality of material systems". In fact, I always thought that his opposition to such system-building was one of his disctinctive contributions to philosophy.The difficult thing with this reading of him is that, we all have a "world view", or a set of prejudices we apply to the world around us---otherwise we wouldn't get up in the morning! It is therefore not difficult to extrapolate from the sum of Nietzsche's writings, from Gebuert der Tragoedie and his writings of the contemporaneous education system to his posthumous books, a general "line"; and what I am saying is, this general line is not straight! While there is no inherent problem in this (it can sometimes, in fact, be quite amusing!), it renders the system, I thnk, of little use in revolutionary praxis outside of the building of general class consciousness (to be aware of what people have thought and how they have lived/developed in the past). What I am saying amounts to this: if you are engaged in a revolutionary struggle, and you have a choice to carry along with you Marx's Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts and the former's Zarathustra, you would be more likely to benfit from having understood the former than the latter. Capiche?


As Marxists we attempt to analyse all thought in terms of its ideological articulation of historically emergent social relations. We judge it from its role of potential role in the class struggle. So feel free to list these revolutionary ideas and then we can attempt to assess their utility to the revolutionary emancipation of the working class. Well, I would gladly do so, but unfortunately all my copies of Nietzsche's works were thrown away by my landlord last year while I was incarcerated! However, I will pull from my memory several sections that are imperative to understanding revolutionary/polemical class consciousness (as a precursor to Adorno's negative dialectics).


Giebt es einen Pessimismus der Stärke? Eine intellektuelle Vorneigung für das Harte, Schauerliche, Böse, Problematische des Daseins aus Wohlsein, aus überströmender Gesundheit, aus Fülle des Daseins? Giebt es vielleicht ein Leiden an der Ueberfülle selbst? Eine versucherische Tapferkeit des schärfsten Blicks, die nach dem Furchtbaren verlangt, als nach dem Feinde, dem würdigen Feinde, an dem sie ihre Kraft erproben kann? an dem sie lernen will, was "das Fürchten" ist?
He is asking here for a "raw" consciousness, a "strong pessimism" that interprets reality that is both world-affirming and skeptical, like the Greeks Heraclitus, Epicurus, Parmenideis, & others, who were very much cocnerned with both the beautiful, the eternal and who Nietzsche believed were full of a "health" that had declined and deteriorated in th ensuing millenia, and the onslaught of Judaeo-Protestan "ressentiment". We can certainly related this "strong pessimism" with the idea of a "tragic world view" as is seen in figures like Pascal, Unamuno, and most recently in Lukacs' protege Lucien Goldmann, who all shared Nietzsche's general sense of being "ill at ease in an ambiguous world."

I would certainly not discount the notion that this perspective is rife with potentially fruitful revolutionary ideas/ideals--but they are hard to pick out in the midst of attacks, principally, on underlying mores of the time. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's understanding of the relationship between language and the world (he believed in the primacy of "Appearance"/"Schein" over and against "reality") is one such thought; his idea of the demoralization of modern man through industry, usw. usw.--everywhere you see touches of "sociological" analysis, much of which I think can be cannon fodder for the revolution: one must know what one is looking for, however!


I always understood the notion of the overman (or is it superman) in terms of "anthropological typology" (philosophical anthropology) of a given class society...I other words, when Marx speaks of systemic phenomena, Nietzsche offers a subjective reflectio nwhich pertains to the existential status of the worker.
In this sense, the insistence on "overcoming" (which is a crucial "subnotion" in relation to the overman/superman) is conducive to the insistence on real and material overcoming of the capitalist mode of production, its social relations AND the resulting "types of human character"...So the overman, in my interpretation, is the emancipated worker who actively produces his/her own conditions of existence.

Does that make sense?That's an interesting interpretation Menocchio, but I would argue, then, that this very idea you are discussing is more fully developed in writers like Marx and Lukacs (for instance, in the idea of an independant and autonomous class consciousness that exists despite relationships mediated by exploitation & repression at the hands of the bourgeoisie).I think Nietzsche's views on "personal" emancipation are definitely worth noting. His influence on individuals like Foucault and Derrida is decided (especially the former), and his a-moralism is certainly a jab against prevailing orthodoxies and doctrines of all sorts. Don't get me wrong--I don't think existentialism is at all an enemy to a proletarian-led revolution, but you have to keep in mind reservations individuals may hold with [Nietzsche's] (oft-times racist, sexist) views, which could be interpreted, in part, to be reactionary in nature no,[/COLOR] I am[I]not referring to Will to Power]. So, I suppose you can a) "take the bad with the good" (understand him as the product of certain social and historical conditions), b) try to extrapolate what's useful and don't touch the rest, or c) discard the whole system. I guess the proper methods depend on the individual and their intentions...

[black magick hustla]

I do not know if nietzche is revolutionary or not but I think his skepticism for systems is very. useful and his genealogy of morality. Like Benjamin said, its hard to imagiine Nietzche behind a desk, meaning that its stupid to ascribe him a political program.

[Kuppo Shakur]

So, if I understand correctly, the point you are trying to emphasize is that revolutionary thought requires a totally consistent base, and you are simply using Nietzsche's writings as an example?
If this is the case, let me just say that while, obviously, Marx's "world view" is much more consistent than Nietzsche's, it is by no means perfectly so.

Everyone who has good ideas has a similar number of bad ideas. The only reason I don't think Nietzsche has any relevance towards a communist revolution, is because I don't think the things he said regarding politics are even worth noting.

[Buffalo Souljah]

I do not know if nietzche is revolutionary or not but I think his skepticism for systems is very. useful and his genealogy of morality. Like Benjamin said, its hard to imagiine Nietzche behind a desk, meaning that its stupid to ascribe him a political program. But many do this, nevertheless, even those who consider themselves "radical" or "revolutionary"; not so much anymore, but "Nietzscheans" were like termites in big American cities in the 1920's and 30's--a sort of fusion of social Darwinism that became very popular as more translations became available--sort of "vogue", as was Kierkegaard in the 60's and 70's, after the translations by that husband and wife team (Chong? Hong? Wong? I forget which, doesn't matter) became readily available.

Marx and Engels both rejected many of their earlier works as "of merely historical value", and I wonder if N would have done the same had he lived longer.

As to this:

meaning that its stupid to ascribe him a political program.I think you are wrong here: what use would the work of a writer have if it didn't have some practical use or aplication to reality? I think it's rather harsh to call my argument "stupid". I don't think it is that. What I do believe that Nietzsche's brand of "storng pessimism" constitutes a nihilistic, idealistic (nearly solipsistic) world-view, which, as that establishes a "political program", so to speak (whether this was intended by him or not). One has only to look to groups like Chicago's "Bug Club"; or San Francisco's Cacophonic Society for real world manifestations of that political platofrm (which itself amounts to a rejection of and disavowel of politics--think Stirner here: great comparison).

So, if I understand correctly, the point you are trying to emphasize is that revolutionary thought requires a totally consistent base, and you are simply using Nietzsche's writings as an example?I have stated before that I don't think my argument is a particularly controversial one to make. However, from the rise of "Nietzschean Marxists" and black nationalism in the 70's, there seems to be a resurgance of this bastardized amalgam of Marxian terminology and a (normally) racial or national platform, which I think undermines the movement for a United Left Front, not to mention being nihilistic and, furthermore, incoherent. This, I think is the problem with integrating writers like N into the revolutionary "fold".


Everyone who has good ideas has a similar number of bad ideas. The only reason I don't think Nietzsche has any relevance towards a communist revolution, is because I don't think the things he said regarding politics are even worth noting.I will agree with the above, but add that this condition arises primarily out of his "strong pessimism"/abandonment of organized resistance as an alternative to oppression. Moreover, his oft-times shocking reliance on irony and wit can prove to be ultimately nothing more than defense mechanisms for facing an "ambiguous" and "lonely" world.

[black magick hustla]

As to this:
I think you are wrong here: what use would the work of a writer have if it didn't have some practical use or aplication to reality? I think it's rather harsh to call my argument "stupid". I don't think it is that. What I do believe that Nietzsche's brand of "storng pessimism" constitutes a nihilistic, idealistic (nearly solipsistic) world-view, which, as that establishes a "political program", so to speak (whether this was intended by him or not). One has only to look to groups like Chicago's "Bug Club"; or San Francisco's Cacophonic Society for real world manifestations of that political platofrm (which itself amounts to a rejection of and disavowel of politics--think Stirner here: great comparison).
on m

im sorry if you feel offended. i wasnt calling stupid anybody in particular.

i think people making out a platform out of nietzche are missing the points of his writings. the more technical aspects of his philosophy, i.e. the rejection of bombastic idealistic systems like hegelianism and his genealogy on morality, are obviously of universal importance. the other aspect of him, his musings of the ubermensch, his quasi schopenhauerist pessimism, his wit, etcetera i think are meant for personal reflection rather than politics. nietzche rarely commented about specific policies or parties and when he criticized politics he did it in very general and abstract ways.

you make a good point about political stirnerites. it was a while ago i read stirner, but i do remember him making specific attacks against the state and very specific institutions. regardless, you might be right BUT i think its more accurate to say that stirnerite politics are inspired on stirner rather than stirner having politics. i mean, its kindof like saying that there is a political programme in james joyce ulysses.

[Buffalo Souljah]

its kindof like saying that there is a political programme in james joyce ulysses.
Joyce is a-political like Shia Islam is a-political...

[black magick hustla]

Also the cacophony society is a prankster society. i do not think they have any politics at all. granted we can go on the route that everything is political, which in a sense is true but i think it is in a very different sense to the things we are dealing with in this discussion. i mean, i guess out of ulysses you can take the late modernism and compare it to late modernity politics, like anarchism or anticlerical liberalism, or socialism, etcetera but ulysses itself has no political program at all, it only reflects the cultural values of that particular time, like reality tv shows or violent video games. nietzche and stirner where exactly like that, and they represented a particular tendency within the rise of late modernity.

[black magick hustla]

Joyce is a-political like Shia Islam is a-political...

yet you can find liberal muslims, conservative muslims, and once upon a time, communist muslims.

[black magick hustla]

to add more to the discussion, there where fascist nietzcheans, and there where even marxist and anarchist nietzcheans. so who holds the correct political interpretation, is there even one after all.

[Thirsty Crow]

yet you can find liberal muslims, conservative muslims, and once upon a time, communist muslims.
This is offtopic, but i disagree completely that Joyce was apolitical, or more precisely, that his creative work is apolitical.
For instance, one of the prominent aspects of Ulysses are the notions of anti-militarism (most evident in "Cyclops" chapter, the famous quarrel with the ultra-nationalist Citizen), and connected to this is the narrator's subtle and/or not so subtle criticism of nationalism (both English and narrow-minded Irish), national myths (for instance, the before mentioned chapter employs a wonderful technique of bitter parodies, e.g. on old Irish sagas, legal language and so on), and bourgeios culture and modes of behaviour.

And when it comes to Stephen Dedalus, his famous line "...in here I must kill the priest and the king" (pointing to his head) is political as hell, at least in my opinion, although it is confined to singular and individual experience.

It doesn't follow some prescribed line as did the authors of so called socialist realism, but nevertheless I do think that there is a political backdrop to Joyce's writing ("Finnegans Wake" is a verbal monster that maybe doesn't fit in here).

I think that Frederic Jameson even argues that there cannot be an apolitical writing, in hs "Political Unconscious". I didn't examine his thesis to full extent, but I think that the claim is plausible.


to add more to the discussion, there where fascist nietzcheans, and there where even marxist and anarchist nietzcheans. so who holds the correct political interpretation, is there even one after all.
In "Beyond Good and Evil" Nietzsche claims that Jews are "the strongest race in Europe" and not only that they shouldn't be persecuted, but that anyone who argues for such a prosecution, or worse, should eb banished from the country (Germany). I don't have the time to pull up the exact quote, but I will later.
So that's it for the nazi interpretation.

[blake 3:17]

to add more to the discussion, there where fascist nietzcheans, and there where even marxist and anarchist nietzcheans. so who holds the correct political interpretation, is there even one after all.


He's wildly inconsistent, uses strange bullying tactics, was misogynist and anti-socialist (I'm not gonna touch on anti-Semitism) and asked truly amazing questions that by their asking undermine the common framework of authority, Christianity, hierarchies of sense.

Twilight of the Idols is a fabulous read!

Two of his aphorisms have been pretty constant in my head for the past few months: "My geatest hope is to be delivered from the spirit of revenge." & "Battle not with monsters lest you become a monster." The Left could learn a lot from those two sentences.

[Decolonize The Left]

Nietzsche's philosophical standpoint is rigorously logical, for all its irrationalism and wit. There are many individuals who feel that N was more useful to the purposes of analytical than continental philosophy. Categories like "will to power" "ressentement" "amor fati", etc. are all very logically/mathematically consistent (again, if we deprive them of their irrational content,) and it would be a simple task to remedy this crisis.

Having read almost all of Nietzshce's corps as well as having studied him both formally and informally, I will attempt to respond to your ideas below.

I'm not exactly sure what you're driving at with this thread, but you should remember that Nietzsche was explicitly apolitical. In short and common terms, he could give less of a shit about political parties, agendas, movements, etc... regardless of their political roots. What he was concerned with was the individual and more importantly, the relationship of the individual to his/her actions - i.e. the relationship of the will.

Nietzsche and Marx were not talking about the same thing, unless you consider Marx's earliest writings and exclude the rest. Marx was analytically looking at the economic realities of a time period, and the psychological and philosophically impacts of these realities on the various social groups and changing strata of society. In short, Marx was looking at a really, really, big picture (the socio-economic workings of a given society/economy) all the way down to the smallest aspect (the individual worker's relationship to his/her work) whereas Nietzsche was looking at the structural development of ideas and the impact of these ideas upon the individual both emotionally and developmentally.

We should remember that for all of Marx's successes and genius, he could not possibly provide a complete and total picture of the human condition. Nietzsche's analysis of the development of religious ideals, human self-worth, and nihilism are not irrelevant or wrong, they are simply addressing something which Marx considered 'secondary' to the economic functioning of an individual's life. This notion of 'secondary' is also not irrelevant or wrong, simply a matter of perspective. If you are focusing on the economy, then the individual is secondary. If you are focusing on the individual, then the economy is secondary. It's all a matter of how you choose to approach the situation.

- August

[Hit The North]

Two of his aphorisms have been pretty constant in my head for the past few months: "My geatest hope is to be delivered from the spirit of revenge."
"Battle not with monsters lest you become a monster." The Left could learn a lot from those two sentences.

You mean like let's not battle the monstrous capitalist system lest we become monstrous ourselves?

Sounds like a useless aphorism for revolutionaries.

[blake 3:17]

You mean like let's not battle the monstrous capitalist system lest we become monstrous ourselves?

Not so much to abstain, but to be cautious and conscious of becoming like the enemy. In the course of struggle it is not uncommon mirror what one opposes -- you can see this in unions, in left parties which achieve electoral victories, radical social movements which end up in skirmishes with fascists or police, or the simple dynamics of any social group with oppositional or minoritarian trends.


Sounds like a useless aphorism for revolutionaries.

Given how the revolutions of the last couple of hundred years have gone, it may not be useful but may be necessary.

[PeacefulRevolution]

I think that, aside from his occasional remarks about men being naturally unequal, Nietzsche could be very helpful to the revolution. Before we can overcome capitalism, we must first learn to overcome ourselves. The individual is the greatest weapon against fascism. We must have individuals who can think on their own, who can see through the opium haze and realize their actual situation. I think that if we can teach individuals to sever their imprinted circuitry, to embrace their own divinity, then maybe we can reach them -- despite the walls the bourgeiosie have built up around them.

I realize that his works aren't perfect (and if I remember correctly, he mentioned once or twice that he opposed democracy), but that doesn't mean that some of his stuff is still relevant and, in some ways, pertains to a communist/socialist/anarchist revolution.