Buffalo Souljah
23rd July 2010, 07:32
So, I'm trying to apply this nifty conundrum to Russell's epistemology. According to me, this following paragraph proves that provabiliy is weaker than truth in Russell's system, but, also according to me, I am left somehow unconvinced. Perhaps I haven't connected some dot or crossed some i or whatever. Take a look:
“All knowledge,” Russell argues, “both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation.i (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#sdendnote1sym)” There is a problem with this statement-- let us figure out what it is. Upon closer scrutiny of his statement, we see the term “acquaintance” is viewed by Russell to mean a relationship between the individual and the world she is observing, which itself consists of “Sense-data” or “universals”, (ie., abstract “ideas”, which we will get into later in the essay) “absolutes” which underly that world. All statements of knowledge (both by “description” and “acquaintance”) must, therefore, derive from “acquaintance” with these “ideas”.The circularity of this argument is obvious, and need not be spelled out here. If we, by Russell's logic, derive the statement, “This statement is not derivable through acquaintance,” we see that the system is, in fact “incomplete”: there exist statements for which the methods of proof of his system are too weak to demonstrate. .....(and so on)
i (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#sdendnote1anc)ibid
“All knowledge,” Russell argues, “both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation.i (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#sdendnote1sym)” There is a problem with this statement-- let us figure out what it is. Upon closer scrutiny of his statement, we see the term “acquaintance” is viewed by Russell to mean a relationship between the individual and the world she is observing, which itself consists of “Sense-data” or “universals”, (ie., abstract “ideas”, which we will get into later in the essay) “absolutes” which underly that world. All statements of knowledge (both by “description” and “acquaintance”) must, therefore, derive from “acquaintance” with these “ideas”.The circularity of this argument is obvious, and need not be spelled out here. If we, by Russell's logic, derive the statement, “This statement is not derivable through acquaintance,” we see that the system is, in fact “incomplete”: there exist statements for which the methods of proof of his system are too weak to demonstrate. .....(and so on)
i (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#sdendnote1anc)ibid