The PCF's role in May 1968

[Die Neue Zeit]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_1968_in_France


The government was close to collapse at that point (de Gaulle had even taken temporary refuge at an air force base in Germany), but violence evaporated almost as quickly as it arose. Workers went back to their jobs, after a series of deceptions by the Confédération Générale du Travail (the leftist union federation) and the PCF. When the elections were finally held in June, the Gaullist party emerged even stronger than before.

May 1968 was a political failure for the protesters, but it had an enormous social impact.

Notwithstanding the PCF's reformist program, I'd like to ask exactly how in other aspects did the PCF sell out the French working class in May 1968, when considering that France did not have a genuinely revolutionary situation. Yes, there was mass hostility between the state and the workers, and there was a collapse in the French executive and bureaucracy, but there was no mass political party-movement organizing the wildcat strikes and gaining political support from the workers.

[DaringMehring]

"Not a genuinely revolutionary situation" is the mantra of the Mensheviks-Social-Democrats. If PCF was a revolutionary organization, and had been preparing itself for revolution, there could have been a revolutionary situation.

[Die Neue Zeit]

The features of a revolutionary period were defined by Karl Kautsky in The Road to Power: Political Reflections on Growing Into the Revolution. I have used the four features he outlined.

[S.Artesian]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_1968_in_France



Notwithstanding the PCF's reformist program, I'd like to ask exactly how in other aspects did the PCF sold out the French working class in May 1968, when considering that France did not have a genuinely revolutionary situation. Yes, there was mass hostility between the state and the workers, and there was a collapse in the French executive and bureaucracy, but there was no mass political party-movement organizing the wildcat strikes and gaining political support from the workers.


Fantastic: "Notwithstanding the PCF's reformist program... exactly how in other aspects did the PCF sold out the French working class in May 1968." Fucking genius.

"Other than the problem with the gunfire, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?"

WTF? How did the PCF not sell out, but prevent the revolution? Exactly through its reformist program. Exactly by proclaiming that there was no revolutionary situation, despite the fact that the bourgeoisie were paralyzed and the power was there to be taken by force, by the force of class organization.

HTF [not what, but How] did the CP of Chile destroy that revolution? Exactly the same way-- by proclaiming there was no revolutionary situation, by attempting the same old same old conciliation with the "national" "democratic" "anti-monopoly" bourgeoisie.

And while we're at it, how did the the CP of Czechoslovakia sell-out that revolution in 1968?

Can't make this stuff up, can you? Takes a self-proclaimed "proletariocrat" to prove how completely fucked up pseudo-Marxism is.

[Die Neue Zeit]

According to your logic, the Bolsheviks "sold out" on the July Days. Had the Provisional Government repressed the Bolsheviks successfully in later months (which would have meant suppressing Kornilov without relying on Bolshevik agitation), they would be remembered by the left as sellouts. Remember: the July Days were part of a broader revolutionary period, while 1968 wasn't.

[S.Artesian]

According to your logic, the Bolsheviks "sold out" on the July Days. Had the Provisional Government repressed the Bolsheviks successfully in later months (which would have meant suppressing Kornilov without relying on Bolshevik agitation), they would be remembered by the left as sellouts. Remember: the July Days were part of a broader revolutionary period, while 1968 wasn't.

No the Bolsheviks did not sell out in the July days, because the Bolsheviks had a revolutionary program, and were consistently agitating for no support to the provisional government, all power to the soviets, and were continuously moving "deeper" and deeper into working class self organization with the factory committees.

In Petrograd they urged against the premature confrontation with the provisional government. In Moscow, they, along with the workers adopted another, more confrontational stance, actually in defiance of the urging of the central soviet, by demonstrating against a sort of Great Conference of Anti-Revolutionary forces being held in that city.

The Bolsheviks did not engage in undermining of the revolutionary program that was actually energized by the July Days, as the workers in Petrograd and Moscow realized that only Bolshevik representatives were capable of representing their own needs for the soviets to take power.

You're analogy is so mistaken, so superficial as to be almost laughable. It was exactly their revolutionary program that distinguished the Bolsheviks from the PCF, not the tactical caution exhibited in the July Days.

1968 wasn't part of a revolutionary upsurge? Says who? You and the CP, I'm sure. Love the convergence of the remnants, the detritus of the 2nd and 3rd Internationals, a convergence built upon disavowal of the prospects and program for any revolutionary seizure of power.

[Die Neue Zeit]

I'm not a supporter of the PCF, if you're trying to slander me as such.

Let me introduce another hypothetical scenario, going back to the four criteria a revolutionary period: Suppose that, instead of two of the four criteria being met, there were three. Specifically, add the existence of a mass political party-movement with a revolutionary program (up to and including not entering into government coalitions with bourgeois parties or reformist parties).

However, this mass political party-movement still doesn't have majority political support from the working class as a whole, maybe to some because of anti-coalition hostility.

Would this party-movement still be a group of sellouts for saying that the wildcat general strike isn't a revolutionary situation, for exposing any council fetish (up to and including the conn-the-masses-to-power canard of "all power to the workers councils") that may have erupted because of the strike, and for telling the workers to go back to their jobs?

[RED DAVE]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_1968_in_France



Notwithstanding the PCF's reformist program, I'd like to ask exactly how in other aspects did the PCF sold out the French working class in May 1968, when considering that France did not have a genuinely revolutionary situation. Yes, there was mass hostility between the state and the workers, and there was a collapse in the French executive and bureaucracy, but there was no mass political party-movement organizing the wildcat strikes and gaining political support from the workers.France most certainly was in a revolutionary situation. The working class was engaged in a political mass strike, which consisted of factory occupations; in many factories, rank-and-file movements were in control of the factories; the army could not be relied on to put the strike down; massive elements of the petit-bourgeoisie were in support of the workers.

It's amazing that you think that such a revolutionary situation requires a mass political party-movement. The sell-out of the PCF was that an organized mass party was necessary for the final blow against the bourgeois state, and the CP, which could have been this party, refused to the play this role. Instead, it used its political and economic strength (it controlled the largest federation of unions, the CGT) to negotiate a settlement.

I'm fairly knowledgeable about this: My brother was in France at the time and reported back constantly by phone, and I subsequently wrote a novel that took place during May-June, which required a fair amount of research.

RED DAVE

[Die Neue Zeit]

France most certainly was in a revolutionary situation. The working class was engaged in a political mass strike, which consisted of factory occupations; in many factories, rank-and-file movements were in control of the factories

Be careful about how you use the word "political," otherwise you promote the illusion of growing political struggles out of economic ones.


It's amazing that you think that such a revolutionary situation requires a mass political party-movement. The sell-out of the PCF was that an organized mass party was necessary for the final blow against the bourgeois state, and the CP, which could have been this party, refused to the play this role. Instead, it used its political and economic strength (it controlled the largest federation of unions, the CGT) to negotiate a settlement.

I'm fairly knowledgeable about this: My brother was in France at the time and reported back constantly by phone, and I subsequently wrote a novel that took place during May-June, which required a fair amount of research.

Another point I'm trying to make (at least for somewhat pro-party folks like yourself) is that organized mass parties do not crop up overnight. It takes a "voluntarist" process from well before a revolutionary period and culminates even before such a period with the emergence of such a mass party-movement. In the German case, for example, the culmination was the adoption of the Erfurt Program by an organization with an "alternative culture" (cultural societies, sports clubs, funeral homes, etc.), and 1891-1892 was hardly a revolutionary period.

[S.Artesian]

I'm not a supporter of the PCF, if you're trying to slander me as such.

Let me introduce another hypothetical scenario, going back to the four criteria a revolutionary period: Suppose that, instead of two of the four criteria being met, there were three. Specifically, add the existence of a mass political party-movement with a revolutionary program (up to and including not entering into government coalitions with bourgeois parties or reformist parties).

However, this mass political party-movement still doesn't have majority political support from the working class as a whole, maybe to some because of anti-coalition hostility.

Would this party-movement still be a group of sellouts for saying that the wildcat general strike isn't a revolutionary situation, for exposing any council fetish (up to and including the conn-the-masses-to-power canard of "all power to the workers councils") that may have erupted because of the strike, and for telling the workers to go back to their jobs?

Look you asked a question-- how, other than the reformist program, did the PCF, torpedo the struggle of May 68-- and my answer is, "Isn't that enough?" Isn't flogging a reformist program designed to keep the issue of power, class power, from ever arising, enough to undermine a revolutionary struggle?

Now you want to introduce more hypotheticals-- if,if,if,if,-- if a frog had wings he wouldn't bump his ass on the ground; if people in hell had ice water, they wouldn't be so hot etc etc etc.

The underlying assumption to your "query" is that all actions of struggle that are "wildcat," that are not organized or directed or called by a "revolutionary" party cannot be actions that are indicative of a revolutionary situation. But a party is only revolutionary based on its program, its actions, its feeding back of the best, most advanced actions of a section of the class into the class as a whole.

The very existence of a general strike, a general strike is evidence of a revolutionary struggle, of the class as a class having united itself in opposition to the continued rule of the class of capitalists.

Of course, such unity, such actions of the working class acting as a class for itself was anathema to the PCF and the official CPs. Still is anathema.

The crap argument that "there was no revolutionary situation" was heard in France in 68, Chile 71-73; Argentina in 74; Bolivia 1952 and Bolivia in 2003 and Bolivia again in 2005.

These arguments are not "materialist analysis," they are knee-jerk reflexive based fears of and hostility to the actual prospects of revolution whenever and wherever they emerge.

[S.Artesian]

France most certainly was in a revolutionary situation. The working class was engaged in a political mass strike, which consisted of factory occupations; in many factories, rank-and-file movements were in control of the factories; the army could not be relied on to put the strike down; massive elements of the petit-bourgeoisie were in support of the workers.

It's amazing that you think that such a revolutionary situation requires a mass political party-movement. The sell-out of the PCF was that an organized mass party was necessary for the final blow against the bourgeois state, and the CP, which could have been this party, refused to the play this role. Instead, it used its political and economic strength (it controlled the largest federation of unions, the CGT) to negotiate a settlement.

I'm fairly knowledgeable about this: My brother was in France at the time and reported back constantly by phone, and I subsequently wrote a novel that took place during May-June, which required a fair amount of research.

RED DAVE


What's the title of the novel and is it still available?

[Die Neue Zeit]

Look you asked a question-- how, other than the reformist program, did the PCF, torpedo the struggle of May 68-- and my answer is, "Isn't that enough?" Isn't flogging a reformist program designed to keep the issue of power, class power, from ever arising, enough to undermine a revolutionary struggle?

My answer to your rhetoric question is no. Political program is only part of a broader strategic orientation. If you alter the broader strategic orientation, the political program will follow suit. In this case, the partial answer you should have given is the strategic orientation (and not a mere tactic) of coalitions with the Parti Socialiste in order to implement quick-fix reforms without having a position of majority political support from the working class as a whole. The political program was tailored to fit this strategic orientation.


The underlying assumption to your "query" is that all actions of struggle that are "wildcat," that are not organized or directed or called by a "revolutionary" party cannot be actions that are indicative of a revolutionary situation. But a party is only revolutionary based on its program, its actions, its feeding back of the best, most advanced actions of a section of the class into the class as a whole.

When Kautsky wrote his best work (The Road to Power), he wanted to emphasize something else: that mass party-building alone wasn't enough to make the revolutionary period that spanned from the early 1900s all the way to 1920. The parties had to prepare themselves for openly taking power by using breakdowns in the state apparatuses.

Guess what? The reverse is true in "spontaneous" times outside a revolutionary situation for the working class: mass hostility and internal breakdowns in the state apparatus aren't enough! Mass party-movements are needed!


The very existence of a general strike, a general strike is evidence of a revolutionary struggle, of the class as a class having united itself in opposition to the continued rule of the class of capitalists.

The problem is that no concrete policies are on offer by those organizing general strikes out of fetishes for such activity, aside from the canard of "all power to the workers councils." You have the effect of conning the masses to power, which is as politically minoritarian as the reform coalition strategy.


The crap argument that "there was no revolutionary situation" was heard in France in 68, Chile 71-73; Argentina in 74; Bolivia 1952 and Bolivia in 2003 and Bolivia again in 2005.

Chile was in a reactionary situation. Don't tell me the Third Period in Germany, the closest analogy to Chile, constituted a revolutionary situation.

I would also include Venezuela in your list, because of the PSUV and because of the inability of the 2002 coup plotters to sustain the coup using the police and army.

[RED DAVE]

What's the title of [RED DAVE'S] novel and is it still available?It was never published. It was bounced around by about five major publishers for almost a year. I had a top agent, and she almost got to the point of a bid, but it never happened.

I still have the manuscript; however, by contemporary standards, the plot is sexist and homophobic.

RED DAVE

[S.Artesian]

Chile was in a reactionary situation. Don't tell me the Third Period in Germany, the closest analogy to Chile, constituted a revolutionary situation.


Try looking at an event a struggle, just once, on its own terms rather than through the reverse telescope of Kautsky's Germany [and vice-versa, Germany's Kautsky].

If you don't think there was a revolutionary struggle underway in Chile-- that Allende's government was doomed based on its rejection of revolutionary struggle, that the Allende government actively worked to prevent the workers from effecting, completing the struggle through an expropriation and suppression of the bourgeoisie, then you simply don't know what you are talking about.

Doesn't surprise me, though, since you don't know what you're talking about when it comes to France 68 either.

[Die Neue Zeit]

The Third Period in Germany wasn't "Kautsky's Germany" (the Germany before WWI). I was referring to the rise of the Nazis, unless you don't know what the Third Period was.

Allende's government was doomed. The question I posed, however, was whether this doom posed a revolutionary or reactionary situation. I have answered in the latter.

[S.Artesian]

The Third Period in Germany wasn't "Kautsky's Germany" (the Germany before WWI). I was referring to the rise of the Nazis, unless you don't know what the Third Period was.

Allende's government was doomed. The question I posed, however, was whether this doom posed a revolutionary or reactionary situation. I have answered in the latter.

Yeah I know what the 3rd period was, and still, you look at everything from th position that Kautsky was assuming in the 1900-1920 period.

You haven't answered the question about the situation in Chile, because you haven't examined Chile a single bit-- you made a predetermined determination without knowing, or displaying a single iota of knowledge about the problems of the Chilean economy and the actual movement of the working class in response to those problems.

Historical reality might as well simply drop away from the discussion as you're preconvinced there can be no revolutionary situation until some new iteration of the Erfurt Program and the SPD of Kautsky appears on the scene. What you really have in your schema is a version, an exaggerated version of the old Trotskyist maxim that "the crisis of humanity reduces itself to the crisis of revolutionary leadership." That's another good way of avoiding concrete history and what actually happens in class struggle.

And that, avoiding actual concrete history whether it be in France in 68 or Chile in 73 is what makes you a real Kautskyist.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Yeah I know what the 3rd period was, and still, you look at everything from the position that Kautsky was assuming in the 1900-1920 period.

You haven't answered the question about the situation in Chile, because you haven't examined Chile a single bit-- you made a predetermined determination without knowing, or displaying a single iota of knowledge about the problems of the Chilean economy and the actual movement of the working class in response to those problems.

Historical reality might as well simply drop away from the discussion as you're preconvinced there can be no revolutionary situation until some new iteration of the Erfurt Program and the SPD of Kautsky appears on the scene. What you really have in your schema is a version, an exaggerated version of the old Trotskyist maxim that "the crisis of humanity reduces itself to the crisis of revolutionary leadership." That's another good way of avoiding concrete history and what actually happens in class struggle.

And that, avoiding actual concrete history whether it be in France in 68 or Chile in 73 is what makes you a real Kautskyist.

For the most part, I'll take your attempt at an insult as a compliment. However, the response of the Chilean working class to economic problems didn't address the bourgeois nature of the Chilean state. Nobody called for recalls of Chilean politicians or bureaucrats. Nobody called for average workers wages. Nobody called for sovereign commoner juries replacing judges altogether. Etc.

Re. "you're preconvinced there can be no revolutionary situation until some new iteration of the Erfurt Program and the SPD of Kautsky appears on the scene": I don't subscribe to the grossly reductionist Trotskyist maxim which you mentioned. Proponents of a Kautsky Revival do, however, subscribe to a less sectarian rendition of his most well-known disciple's maxim on "revolutionary theory" and "revolutionary movement" - one that fitted perfectly with the historical context (RSDLP just formed, but no program): Without a revolutionary program there can be no revolutionary movement.

Such a program should be based, naturally on the "Locations" in my Profile: Eisenach, Gotha, and Erfurt. :D

[S.Artesian]

For the most part, I'll take your attempt at an insult as a compliment. However, the response of the Chilean working class to economic problems didn't address the bourgeois nature of the Chilean state. Nobody called for recalls of Chilean politicians or bureaucrats. Nobody called for average workers wages. Nobody called for sovereign commoner juries replacing judges altogether. Etc.

You really don't know anything about Chile, and the history from 1964-1973 do you?

Didn't address the bourgeois nature of the Chilean state? Oh yes, the workers certainly did, creating their own cordones industriales in opposition to the bourgeois constitutionalist program and actions of the Unidad Popular govt, and to the bureaucrats of the CUT.

And yes, there were programs and demands for equality of wages, at the workers levels.

You actually should take the time to read one or two things about the struggle in Chile before making your pronouncements.

[mazaire]

I do not read the previous posts because is too hard for me.
I give to you my opinion (simplified because I write in English language).

The situation in France in 1968 do not was revolutionary.
These events are linked:
- a mutation of the mores;
- a mutation of the forces of the capital.

1/ Several decade after 1968, we see that the leaders of the movement had individualist claims, their base did not demand really the human emancipation but mostly this base wanted participate at the consumption of mass.
2/ Much of the bourgeoisie leaves the reactionary Right (Gaullists for example) for rejoin the liberal Right.

Even if the PCF is prisoner of the strategy of the “common program” with the PS, it transforms (with the CGT) a riot of the students in social advantages (Grenelle agreement).

This situation was not really revolutionary; the elections after these sevent were favourable at the “Party of the fear”.

Excuse me but if I do not reply at the next messages but my level in English language is low… :(
And Reverso and Google traduction have limits !:lol:

[S.Artesian]

I do not read the previous posts because is too hard for me.
I give to you my opinion (simplified because I write in English language).

The situation in France in 1968 do not was revolutionary.
These events are linked:
- a mutation of the mores;
- a mutation of the forces of the capital.

1/ Several decade after 1968, we see that the leaders of the movement had individualist claims, their base did not demand really the human emancipation but mostly this base wanted participate at the consumption of mass.
2/ Much of the bourgeoisie leaves the reactionary Right (Gaullists for example) for rejoin the liberal Right.

Even if the PCF is prisoner of the strategy of the “common program” with the PS, it transforms (with the CGT) a riot of the students in social advantages (Grenelle agreement).

This situation was not really revolutionary; the elections after these sevent were favourable at the “Party of the fear”.

Excuse me but if I do not reply at the next messages but my level in English language is low… :(
And Reverso and Google traduction have limits !:lol:

Write in French, or whatever language you're most comfortable.

[Honggweilo]

excelent book on the subject for the ones who speak dutch; May 68 by Ludo Martens & Kris Mercx

link (https://www.epo.be/uitgeverij/boekinfo_boek.php?isbn=9789064457487)

[Die Neue Zeit]

You really don't know anything about Chile, and the history from 1964-1973 do you?

Didn't address the bourgeois nature of the Chilean state? Oh yes, the workers certainly did, creating their own cordones industriales in opposition to the bourgeois constitutionalist program and actions of the Unidad Popular govt, and to the bureaucrats of the CUT.

And yes, there were programs and demands for equality of wages, at the workers levels.

You actually should take the time to read one or two things about the struggle in Chile before making your pronouncements.

Those demands re. wages were levied with managers and trade union officials in mind. When I said "Nobody called for average workers wages," I had the Chilean politicians, high-ranked civil servants, and high-ranked military officials in mind.

Those cordones industriales were set up in opposition to the economic policies of Allende and not the nature of the state itself.

[S.Artesian]

The more you say about Chile, the more obvious it is that you don't know very much about the struggle in Chile. Case in point, this:


Those cordones industriales were set up in opposition to the economic policies of Allende and not the nature of the state itself.

The cordones industrials were set up in opposition to the rule of capital.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Marta Harnecker knew full well what happened in Chile:

http://www.monthlyreview.org/100701harneckerPart2-2.php


We should distinguish three kinds of transition to socialism: transition in advanced countries, transition in backward countries where state power has been conquered, and finally, transition in countries where only the government is in our hands.

[...]

However, even if there are similarities between what happened in the Soviet Union and what is happening now in Latin America, the situation facing our “left” governments is even more complex than that which faced the Soviet government. The dilemma is how to advance toward that horizon using the government when—as Álvaro García Linera, says—the cultural and economic conditions that could serve as the foundation for that progression do not exist. This was the dilemma Lenin spoke of in 1917, and of which many of our current heads of state speak, but with the added difficulty that, in our case, we have not conquered state power.

It is not only that the economic, material, and cultural conditions in our countries are not very favorable to building socialism but also that the most important condition is lacking, one that, until now, has been considered indispensable: we do not have the whole of state power, we only have a tiny part of it. Let us remember that the power of the state is not limited to the executive branch, but includes the legislative and judicial branches, the armed forces, local government bodies (municipal and state governments), and other institutions.

Therefore, taking government power is not the same thing as conquering state power. This was one of the errors made by some sectors of the left in Chile. People said, ignoring the existing balance of forces, that we had conquered power and thus, all we had to do was implement our program.

The fact that we were the government meant, it cannot be denied, that we had gained a portion of political power. But it must not be forgotten that, although we had very large left parties and a fairly strong labor movement on our side, we didn’t have the armed forces and were a minority in Parliament. In fact, we never won an absolute majority in any election. The Christian Democrats still had a large following, not only in the middle and upper classes but also among workers and peasants. This partly explains why Popular Unity, the political coalition that supported Allende, never proposed holding a constituent assembly. What it did was to use the existing legislation to look for legal loopholes. Some laws passed in the 1930s by a socialist government, which had existed for one hundred days, were still in effect. Using those laws, we were able to nationalize the most strategic sectors of the economy, referred to by Popular Unity as the “area of social property.”

I agree with Pomar that the “conquest of state power is a complex process,” and that one of its more important aspects is having the support of the armed forces or what is referred to as “the monopoly of violence” (or at least an important part of it). It is because of this need for military support that Chávez insists there is a fundamental difference between the process led by Allende in Chile and the Bolivarian revolutionary process in Venezuela: the first was a peaceful, unarmed transition, the second, a peaceful armed transition—not because the Venezuelan people are armed but because most of the armed forces support the process.

[S.Artesian]

Marta Harnecker knew full well what happened in Chile:

http://www.monthlyreview.org/100701harneckerPart2-2.php

That' a bunch of shit. Harnecker doesn't know what she's talking about in either the case of Chile or the case of Venezuela.

She, and the entire Fidelista, [and MR crew] supported the popular front, that collaboration with a section of the bourgeoisie, government of Allende, which government was doomed from the getgo. Allende sealed his own doom with every move he made, up to and including bringing in the military that later led the overthrow into his own government to "oversee" it.

The UP govt was not just tailing behind the actions of the workers, particularly in the smaller industries, excluded from the "socialized sector" that the UP attempted to manage, but actually opposed the organization of the workers in their cordones, with the CP taking the lead in that opposition.

Anybody who has a real interest in this process, the process of revolution and counterrevolution, a counterrevolution facilitated by the supposed socialist themselves, will find a useful analysis in Stefan de Vylder's Allende's Chile: The political economy of the rise and fall of the Unidad Popular.

As for Harnecker and co.-- these types are only eager to learn nothing from the past the better to repeat as a compulsion for defeat, all the while pretending that there's a real, substantial, class difference in their actions today, from the actions of those yesterday who also were convinced there was a real, substantial class difference in their actions of that former today from all former yesterday.

[chegitz guevara]

The features of a revolutionary period were defined by Karl Kautsky in The Road to Power: Political Reflections on Growing Into the Revolution. I have used the four features he outlined.

Well, Karl can define all he wants. Doesn't make it the be all and end all of reality. Revolutionary situations can come out of nowhere, and Mai 68 did. If the PCF hadn't sold out the movement, who knows what could have happened. Very likely, an imposition of martial law.

[chegitz guevara]

Another point I'm trying to make (at least for somewhat pro-party folks like yourself) is that organized mass parties do not crop up overnight. It takes a "voluntarist" process from well before a revolutionary period and culminates even before such a period with the emergence of such a mass party-movement. In the German case, for example, the culmination was the adoption of the Erfurt Program by an organization with an "alternative culture" (cultural societies, sports clubs, funeral homes, etc.), and 1891-1892 was hardly a revolutionary period.

You're falling in to the very trap Kautsky himself fell into, a mechanical thinking that there there is only one golden road to revolution.

[Die Neue Zeit]

There are many "golden roads" to revolution. Only a few, however, address the very real issue of mastering the bureaucracy question and not dissing it. I just call these roads or perhaps single road the Platinum Road. :D

George Washington's quote is quite apt here as applied to bureaucracies being dangerous servants and fearful masters.

[blake 3:17]

Chile was in a reactionary situation. Don't tell me the Third Period in Germany, the closest analogy to Chile, constituted a revolutionary situation.


Ughh. I don't buy it. Steps could have been taken by the Chilean SP and CP to suppress reaction. They didn't. The stupid Third Period in Germany wasn't necessary either.

None of this is to say that France in 68 could have gone much further. The PCF had a commitment, from above and below, to moderate reformism. The real revolutionaries went as far as they could, but were estranged from the working class base. A French Socialism in 68 would've been terribly isolated to its West and East. Both French and Italian Communism were formed by their anti-fascist histories along side relatively moderate social class demands.

An anecdote that often comes to mind is when the Italian Communists went to Vietnam and asked what they could do to support the Vietnamese revolution. The Vietnamese communists told them to have their own revolution. The PCI didn't like that answer much.

Luckily Chavez and Morales have learnt from these defeats. The contemporary Venezuelan and Bolivian revolutions have been very realistic about building their social base and thwarting internal and external reactionary racist and imperial threats. The irony of their situation is that a great deal of their success has been due to the invasion of Iraq and the over extension of imperial ambition.

[blake 3:17]

If the PCF hadn't sold out the movement, who knows what could have happened. Very likely, an imposition of martial law.

And then there'd have been French fascism...

The effect of 68 was broadly international and utopian. I'd have been with the anarchists, Trotskyists and Maoists trying to push it as far as possible. The revolution failed without fascist reaction. Not so exciting, but maybe the best we sould hope for.

[Die Neue Zeit]

The problem is that May 1968 fed spontaneous illusions that prevail up to this day that you don't really need highly organized party-movements before a revolutionary period. This isn't offset in any way by increased public cynicism towards electoral "parties."

[S.Artesian]

The problem is that May 1968 fed spontaneous illusions that prevail up to this day that you don't really need highly organized party-movements before a revolutionary period. This isn't offset in any way by increased public cynicism towards electoral "parties."

That's not a problem with May '68. That's an ossified sectarian's view of May 68. These events, great historical events, events of social conflict, don't organize themselves around somebody's notion of what's needed to bring the explosion to a successful conclusion. And the event can not be responsible for what those who follow after the event want to make of it.

Listen to this ass-backwards argument:

1]the social struggle of May '68 burst forth without and opposed to [and opposed by] highly organized parties, parties that were part of, party to, and committed to maintain the social organization that May '68 confronted, exposed, and intended to abolish.

2] those highly organized parties sought consistently to divert, deflect, canalize, the social movement represented by and inherent in May 68 from expanding itself, its consciousness, its organization for power; from creating itself as a new authority, a new power in opposition to all the elements of the old power. Those highly organized parties, having nationwide and international organizations and affiliations worked diligently to prevent the spread of May 68 beyond borders of cities, beyond the borders of France.

3]those highly organized parties were successful, May 68 was contained, and once contained, defeated.

4]The highly organized parties that opposed the social movement of May 68 are still highly organized parties determined to buttress, maintain, support, augment the rule of capital.

5] Therefore: The problem with May 68 was.... not the actions of those highly organized parties in isolating, canalizing the movement; it was in May 68 daring to occur without first having produced a highly organized party which might too be first recuperated into the means of social control by the very system May 68 had to oppose.


Or... short version... in the immortal words of Private Hudson: "How do I get out of this chicken-shit outfit?"

[Die Neue Zeit]

"Considering, that against this collective power of the propertied classes the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes." (Karl Marx)

The problem with May 1968 was with the actions of those highly organized parties and especially with May 1968 daring to occur without having first produced a highly organized political party distinct from and opposed to all non-worker parties, all class-conciliationist parties, their individual coalitions, and their combined hegemony.

[S.Artesian]

"Considering, that against this collective power of the propertied classes the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes." (Karl Marx)

Gee, if only Lassalle had remembered that...

No shit, Karl actually said that?-- but hey, you know what you don't see or hear? What you don't see is Karl saying the problem with the Paris Commune was that it didn't wait for highly organized party to tell it, the Commune, it was OK to take power; you don't see or hear old Karl saying, the problem with the Paris Commune was that it just didn't wait.

Difference between being a Marxist, and an ossified sectarian.

Word.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Sure there were parties in the Paris Commune. There was a coalition between the local Proudhonists and the local Blanquists. Together they went past typical coalitions to form an informal Communitarian Populist Front.

[S.Artesian]

Sure there were parties in the Paris Commune. There was a coalition between the local Proudhonists and the local Blanquists. Together they went past typical coalitions to form an informal Communitarian Populist Front.


You know what Ripley said, don't you?

"Did I IQs drop dramatically while I was away?"

You argued before that the problem with May 68 is that it "fed" an illusion that revolution didn't require a highly organized party.

I responded by saying... short version-- What a crock of shit. Here a social struggle bursts out, and the parties that call themselves socialist and communist pull out all the stops to maintain the rule of capital, and you're saying that the problem with May 68 is that it didn't wait for a party. Exactly how far can you see, with your head stuck that far up your ass?

Then you trot out Marx's evaluation that the working class must organize itself as a party independently of and against all the parties of the exploiters-- excepting of course, although Marx forgot to add it, if its Germany and Lassalle is in the mood to exchange bodily fluids with Bismarck.

I reply by pointing out how Marx does not criticize the Paris Commune for seizing power prematurely, without the proletariat being led by a highly developed -- which would mean beyond the borders of Paris-- "revolutionary" party [although in his private correspondence he does express fears that the workers will do that and be slaughtered], and you come back with the homilies about Blanqui and Proudhon.

Well, strip my gears and call me shiftless. If only I hand known that that's what you consider a highly developed and mass revolutionary party.

Like Ripley said.......

[Die Neue Zeit]

You know what Ripley said, don't you?

"Did I IQs drop dramatically while I was away?"

You're too much in the mood for popular culture and sex talk. Calm down. ;)



You argued before that the problem with May 68 is that it "fed" an illusion that revolution didn't require a highly organized party.

Yes.


I responded by saying... short version-- What a crock of shit. Here a social struggle bursts out, and the parties that call themselves socialist and communist pull out all the stops to maintain the rule of capital, and you're saying that the problem with May 68 is that it didn't wait for a party. Exactly how far can you see, with your head stuck that far up your ass?

Far enough to re-evaluate the basis of my signature: the history of the center tendency of the Second International. "Ossified sectarians" care only to build sectlets before revolutionary periods. I'm saying the organizational fortitude is much higher than this.


Then you trot out Marx's evaluation that the working class must organize itself as a party independently of and against all the parties of the exploiters-- excepting of course, although Marx forgot to add it, if its Germany and Lassalle is in the mood to exchange bodily fluids with Bismarck.

Try discussing this topic and the book quoted then:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/origins-marxists-call-t137206/index.html

I don't think Lassalle had any intention of doing what Louis Blanc or Alexandre Millerand did by actually becoming a minister in a coalition government.


I reply by pointing out how Marx does not criticize the Paris Commune for seizing power prematurely, without the proletariat being led by a highly developed -- which would mean beyond the borders of Paris-- "revolutionary" party [although in his private correspondence he does express fears that the workers will do that and be slaughtered]

Thanks for pointing out the limits of localism.


and you come back with the homilies about Blanqui and Proudhon

The Proudhonists and Blanquists in Paris were nevertheless organized groups. The latter aimed for Blanquist rule at some point, after all. I'm sure French Socialism was still stuck with the "club" label, but the two clubs were in substance political parties.


Well, strip my gears and call me shiftless. If only I hand known that that's what you consider a highly developed and mass revolutionary party.

I didn't say "sure there were mass parties in the Paris Commune."

[bricolage]

Sure there were parties in the Paris Commune. There was a coalition between the local Proudhonists and the local Blanquists.
Neither Proudhonists or Blanquists at the time could be called political parties in anyway. What you can say to be 'Proudhonists' (ignoring the views of Proudhon himself 'All parties without exception, when they seek for power, are varieties of absolutism') were by no means a coherent group, for starters going far beyond the ideas of Proudhon himself and secondly forming no unified structure. Those that were closer to his ideas than that of Marx held dominance in the Paris section of the International but that didn't make them a party, especially seeing as the operated alongside those with conflicting views and anyway the influence of the International in the Commune was negligible at best. In terms of Blanquists the only structure they had was the secretive cell structure in which you hardly knew who else was involved, hardly a political party. Yet most importantly you fail to factor in that these labels have in most cases simply been thrown back in time and applied to the various participants in the Commune. The Communards would (mostly) not have spoken of themselves as 'Proudhonists' or 'Blanquists' or 'Socialists' or 'Jacobins', etc as these ideas all interlinked with each and were very fluid. Whatever you want to say though there were most definitely not political parties involved.