Determinism.

[ContrarianLemming]

All events are predetermined, all actions were caused by a casual chain of events since the creation of the universe, incapable of happening any other way. All that we do are are is predetermined by our environment, our heredity, our ancestors, culture and biology, nothing in history could have happened any other way. What we perceive as free will is simply another link in the chain, our will is simply another predetermined event. though we may make a choice when offered one, our choice was always going to be the same, decided since the big bang that this is how I will be because this is how the past was. There is exactly one way for the universe could ever be. "Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity."

As long as our mind is one cause in the causal chain, then we can be responsible for our actions

"If determinism is true, we are not free. If indeterminism is true, our actions are random and our will lacks the control to be morally responsible."

Determinism

Thoughts?

[ZeroNowhere]

Under what conditions would one say that an event was not 'predetermined'? What are the criteria for a person being able to do a different thing in a given situation? If the negation has no sense, then neither does the assertion.

For that matter, one cannot deduce moral responsibility from facts (that is, a moral 'ought' from a descriptive 'is').

[Widerstand]

All events are predetermined, all actions were caused by a casual chain of events since the creation of the universe, incapable of happening any other way. All that we do are are is predetermined by our environment, our heredity, our ancestors, culture and biology, nothing in history could have happened any other way. What we perceive as free will is simply another link in the chain, our will is simply another predetermined event. though we may make a choice when offered one, our choice was always going to be the same, decided since the big bang that this is how I will be because this is how the past was. There is exactly one way for the universe could ever be. "Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity."

I can see the arguments for this, but I think quantum physics have shown that at the most fundamental level, according to to my narrow understanding at least, most processes are totally random and best explained by probability instead of physical laws. This would mean that while every action may be a reaction to a cause, the very nature of that reaction is random, so that one cannot possibly predict the course of events even if all causes were known to us, and as thus predetermination is wrong.


As long as our mind is one cause in the causal chain, then we can be responsible for our actions

"If determinism is true, we are not free. If indeterminism is true, our actions are random and our will lacks the control to be morally responsible."

If determinism is true, our minds are determined as well - every thought we have, every idea we create, every choice we make, etc., ultimately has one or more causes. Some would argue that we can hardly be held responsible for something we had no control over.

I find the whole determinism vs indeterminism debate quite useless to be honest. In the end, it always seems to end up as some excuse to act irresponsibly or fatalist. I have yet to discover the benefits of knowing whether my decisions, thoughts and actions are random or not - it won't stop me from deciding, thinking or acting the way I do, since apparently that would be impossible anyway.



Under what conditions would one say that an event was not 'predetermined'? What are the criteria for a person being able to do a different thing in a given situation? If the negation has no sense, then neither does the assertion.

For that matter, one cannot deduce moral responsibility from facts (that is, a moral 'ought' from a descriptive 'is').

Good point, further demonstrates the uselessness of this debate.

[ContrarianLemming]

Now let the synapses fire and the brain cells multiply!


Under what conditions would one say that an event was not 'predetermined'?

Quantum machanics are the only avenue where there is true randomness apperantly (as chammer pointed out), but I don't pretend to be an expert, so I can't comment.

If was I was to pick a side, at least on the macro level, like human interactions, what we actually see, then I am a determinist, but when it comes to subatomic stuff I really can't venture a guess, can anyone here?


Some would argue that we can hardly be held responsible for something we had no control over.

I don't think determinists ever actually argue "don't blame him! He couldn't help it!" or "Don't congratulate him! he was always going to do well".
It's not an ethical stance like Deontology or altruism, I see it simply as a statement: whats happening now was always going to happen this way, you can perceive in whatever way you choose, knowing that that choice was always going to be the same anyway.



I find the whole determinism vs indeterminism debate quite useless to be honest. In the end, it always seems to end up as some excuse to act irresponsibly or fatalist. I have yet to discover the benefits of knowing whether my decisions, thoughts and actions are random or not - it won't stop me from deciding, thinking or acting the way I do, since apparently that would be impossible anyway.

I have found that almost all philosophy is useless and completely irrelevant to day to day life.

That maybe all can agree on :)

Even those ethical stances like utilitarianism and such, which are based around day to day stuff, seems irrelevant, we just do what we do.
I am a utilitarian, but when I make a decision I don't say to myself "hm, which action brings happiness to the most people?" I just decide how most normal people would decide. Utilitarianisms claim to be useful in day to day operations doesn't really seem accurate to me, who asseses day to day situations like that? A vulcan?

However, it is in armchair thinking like this, where we discuss the morality of the nuking of Japan and whether or not communism is ethical where this useless nonsense comes in handy.

[Widerstand]

Quantum machanics are the only avenue where there is true randomness apperantly (as chammer pointed out), but I don't pretend to be an expert, so I can't comment.

Chances are that it's not random at all, but the underlying laws/mechanic just hasn't been discovered yet.



If was I was to pick a side, at least on the macro level, like human interactions, what we actually see, then I am a determinist, but when it comes to subatomic stuff I really can't venture a guess, can anyone here?


I wouldn't say there is such thing as a distinction between macro and micro levels if you follow through on deterministic implications. Determinism says that every event is a cause and has a cause. Now if we think of this in terms of physics, we could say that everything that happened since the Big Bang is a necessary and inevitable result of the chain reaction set in motion back then - even our thoughts, since the brain (and ultimately our mind) is subject to physics (chemicals, electric charges, etc.), just like everything else.


I don't think determinists ever actually argue "don't blame him! He couldn't help it!" or "Don't congratulate him! he was always going to do well".
It's not an ethical stance like Deontology or altruism, I see it simply as a statement: whats happening now was always going to happen this way, you can perceive in whatever way you choose, knowing that that choice was always going to be the same anyway.

Actually, when we discussed this in philosophy class, this was the main conclusion drawn, should determinism be correct. It doesn't matter if it's an ethical stance or not, if determinism is true all ethics are irrelevant. Without free will, moral responsibility as a concept is falsified, because then we are mere automations unable to break out of our predetermined course. You have no option to act differently (not even a theoretical one), so how could you be held responsible for it?



I have found that almost all philosophy is useless and completely irrelevant to day to day life.

That maybe all can agree on :)


Nah, I think a lot of philosophy has a very practical use, because it can change our perspective on things, and therefore changes the way we interact with the world or ourselves. It's simple things ideas like "all humans should be treat equally" (which is a philosophical conclusion) that can have a very big effect on your life. Think of the enlightenment and how it radically changed the world view of millions.



Even those ethical stances like utilitarianism and such, which are based around day to day stuff, seems irrelevant, we just do what we do.
I am a utilitarian, but when I make a decision I don't say to myself "hm, which action brings happiness to the most people?" I just decide how most normal people would decide. Utilitarianisms claim to be useful in day to day operations doesn't really seem accurate to me, who asseses day to day situations like that? A vulcan?

I agree, no one does that. But there's still a remarkable difference between a utilitarian and, say, a Kantian approach to a moral issue, and therefore, in a lot of cases, a different outcome. That being said, I just realized that I have no fucking clue what my current approach to moral issues is, I might want to look into that >_<

[ZeroNowhere]

This would mean that while every action may be a reaction to a cause, the very nature of that reaction is random, so that one cannot possibly predict the course of events even if all causes were known to us, and as thus predetermination is wrong.
Technically speaking, if one knew every 'cause', one would still presumably need to know the results of these causes in order to predict their results accurately, quantum physics or not. In other words, one could not know that I fall down after being pushed by some bloke simply by knowing that I am being pushed; even if one knew the person's size, the force applied, and my strength, one could not know simply from this that I would fall down. One would need to know that a person of this strength and size being pushed with this much force would always fall down. Of course, it is also debatable what counts as knowing 'causes' here; if I fall down, I exert a force on the ground 'caused' by my falling. In fact, I also, while falling, occupy space which was previously occupied by air, which is also caused by my falling. Usually we have context which makes it clear what the word 'cause' is being used to mean, but here not so much. In a football match, one knows when and how a goal is scored if one knows that a player caused the ball to enter the net; on the other hand, one may also know that the linesman caused the goal to be called offside.

Now to go back to 'knowing that a person of this size and strength pushed with this amount of force will always fall down.' Perhaps it would be better to consider the statement 'A person who jumps off the side of the Empire State Building will always fall.' Now, generally this takes the form of a hinge-proposition, or part of a paradigm; for example, if one were planning to commit suicide, one could think, "Hm, I suppose I could just jump off the Empire State Building." It could alternatively be demonstrated; for example, imagine a situation in which a child is not sure that somebody who jumps off the Empire State Building does in fact fall, in which case an adult could jump off themselves to prove it. If they were more sensible, they may instead throw a rock off instead.

"Yet if a rock falls down, it does not mean that a human would!"

Similarly, if the person jumped off themselves, one could object, "Yet just because it happened in the past, it does not mean that it happened in the future!" Alternatively, "Yet just one person fell down, it does not mean that all would!" Here we can see that even when the proposition itself does not function as a hinge-proposition, it can only be verified given other hinges which allows for a particular method of verification to verify it. Of course, this does not mean that one should doubt everything; after all, the meaning of words is an empirical fact, yet if one doubt that one's own words are not meaningless, perhaps one should shut up. Of course, it also only makes sense to say that things are 'true' and 'false' within a language-game (essentially a form of language and the actions into which it is woven), and these language-games involve hinge-propositions.

For example, consider a game of cricket. An awesome leg-spinner (one can tell that this tale is not set in the present) gets the batsman caught behind. "Yet what if the ball does not exist?" Well, what would this mean? A word's meaning is its use in a language-game, and the best use I can imagine for this is as an objection to call of caught behind. "If you don't know that the ball exists, one can't have them be caught behind!" At this point we would probably show them the ball. "Yet this carries further assumptions!" Quite aside from the fact that the meaning of words is also a 'presupposition' (unless we are checking them or some such, in which case one could apply the same objection), the words 'true' and 'false' are only used the context of certain shared paradigms, and if one claims to be working without premises, it is not entirely clear what you could mean by them. Nonetheless, it would not be particularly useful to our game of cricket. "This only means that you are assuming it true due to its usefulness!" No, 'true' is a word used in various language-games; you operate with it as something that transcends language, yet without language one could not speak. If one were to say that nothing could possibly be known true, we would simply have to ask what one meant. If one cannot give sense to the utterance, then you would simply be speaking nonsense and should probably come back to speaking English, lest one be caraboued by the jabberwocky and those slithy toves. "The question [of] whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."

However, to come off the extended tangent, which hopefully somewhat illuminated what I meant, when we make predictions we generally operate with certain things as hinge-propositions. For example, one may predict that a rock dropped from the leaning tower of Pisa would hit the ground at approximately the same time as a far heavier metal with the same surface area ('approximately' is fine here, no more precision is necessary. Is it 'perfect'? If exact parameters would not improve things, I don't see why not.) In this case, one may take it as a hinge that acceleration due to gravity is equal regardless of the mass of the object in question. At other times, this may be tested for.

Yet what if it then ceased to be the case? Perhaps suddenly lighter or heavier objects fall a lot faster. In that case, we would probably not use the same hinges in predicting the results of the falling rock and metal. Now, to return to the point, at long last, the proposition that, 'When a person of such and such size and strength is pushed with so many Newtons of force, they will fall down', is similar. Its usages as a hinge-proposition (for example, a bully may use it as this) and as something demonstrable are both intertwined. In that case, how would a person knowing these regularities allow them to predict the future with 'exact certainty'? This would seem to mean that the future cannot in any way depart from this proposition, it is as it were ruled by it, which hardly fits with our ordinary usage of it. The language-game of prediction is intertwined with certain forms of action, and this is how it gains its use; we have often, after all, found exceptions to previous regularities, yet this does not invalidate the language-game because the purpose of language is communication. "Well, as long as the law of gravity holds, things will not fall upwards." This is a tautology. "Yet surely it is true that if Paul the Octopus predicts a result, it must be the case?" Well, no. Rather, 'Paul the Octopus is always right' could be used as a hinge-proposition in the context of prediction. "Well, but what if one already knows that every time the rock and metal are dropped off the tower, they must hit the ground at the same time?" Why use the word 'must' here? It's not as if they are being forced to. Nonetheless, discarding that, it would seem that in this case one simply knows the future already; every time the rock and metal fall, they will hit the ground at the same time. This is simply knowing the correlation over, say, the next 100 years, rather than simply the past; yet in this case one already knows the future, rather than deducing it from 'causes'. One is not saying, "Ah, so there is this cause, and I know only causes, yet based on this cause, this must happen," but rather, "Well, this happens, and I already know what happens next." One knows more than simply 'causes'. One may as well know that every year in which Kenya win the Cricket World Cup (let's say they win it once sometime in the future), 2,400 people die from jumping off the Empire State Building to demonstrate that they would fall. In that case, one would not make a prediction based on 'causes' (does Kenya winning the World Cup cause the people dying? Perhaps), rather one already knows more than simply 'causes'. As such, then, it would seem that this 'exact prediction as criterion for predetermination' thing fails to get off the ground.


Quantum machanics are the only avenue where there is true randomness apperantly (as chammer pointed out), but I don't pretend to be an expert, so I can't comment.In which case one is simply defining 'predeterminateness', as it were, in opposition to what takes place on the subatomic level ("When is something not predetermined? Well, when it's like that.") In which case the proposition that everything not on the subatomic level is predetermined could only mean that the two are different in some way, in this case that we can't predict one with much accuracy. Here, we are using 'predict' in a way that describes scientific practice, in which experiments are done to find regularities, which may then be used to predict other things, and perhaps then as a hinge in engineering and so on. There have been many things which we have not been able to predict in the past (the movement of planets, etc). Nonetheless, how may one say that therefore all things which are not on the subatomic level are 'predictable' in this sense? Indeed, if something is not repeated, it may not be 'predictable' here. One could also hardly deduce a priori that all repeatable things are in this sense 'predictable': the word has a practical usage, and is interwoven with this practice, it is not something which one may just take out of its practical context and chuck around randomly. Anyhow, this is hardly our ordinary usage of 'predetermined', and as such it would not seem particularly profound.


Nah, I think a lot of philosophy has a very practical use, because it can change our perspective on things, and therefore changes the way we interact with the world or ourselves. It's simple things ideas like "all humans should be treat equally" (which is a philosophical conclusion) that can have a very big effect on your life.No, that's a moral conclusion.

[Widerstand]

As such, then, it would seem that this 'exact prediction as criterion for predetermination' thing fails to get off the ground.

I certainly agree that the prediction thing is a bit tricky, if you think strictly within the boundaries of the human mind, but wouldn't you agree that if predetermination is true, as in everything is predetermined and there is only one possible turn the future can take, it would be, given a complete - yet realistically unattainable - understanding of physical laws. Anyway, the point I was trying to make is related to your example with the stairs: I would argue that if the reaction to a cause is not set-in-stone, there is no predetermination, yet there is some sort of determinism.

[ZeroNowhere]

Regarding physical laws, I tend to take a similar view to Norman Swartz, although I think that he misuses terms like 'doomed' and has an unhealthy liking for verificationism. Nonetheless, he makes up for this with Francophone Martians schooled in Regularism. His book on the subject is available free here (http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/index.htm), and there is a shorter article here (http://www.iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/). Ludwig Wittgenstein made a similar point regarding trains and rails here (http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=NvmBArQ6ASQC&pg=PA429&lpg=PA429&dq=wittgenstein+freedom+of+the+will+rails&source=bl&ots=wjERx92nFl&sig=ZSyTTwLy_yphBgeHK6mJzapBilU&hl=en&ei=CNo4TKq2MM2RrAeJtOi2CA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false).


What on Earth would it mean [to say] that the natural law compels a thing to go as it goes? The natural law is correct, and that's all. It would seem rather queer to suggest that a proposition forces things to be a certain way. After all, what would one mean if one said that one knew that something must always happen, except that it always did happen? "I do not mean that, I mean that it is a natural law; it is not simply the case, but it must be the case." Well, then you must give sense to your language, else you are simply talking nonsense. Italicizing the word 'must' does not get us any further. Perhaps one means that not only is it the case, but it is also forced to be the case by something or the other: yet what is doing the compelling here? "Well, there is a god who makes sure that every time the rock and metal fall off the leaning tower of Pisa, they land at the same time." Even if one did exist, why the hell would they bother doing that? "God works in mysterious ways." Indeed. However, is it the case that this god must always do this? After all, it is omnipotent, or so I hear, so who would be compelling it?

[Widerstand]

It's purely empirical deduction, yes. Since it has always behaved that way, we have no reason to assume it will not behave that way again. Of course one can never with absolute certainty say that stones won't start floating in the air one day. But I find this approach quite futile, since its merely mind games with little actual usefulness to the issue at hand.

[ZeroNowhere]

Nonetheless, even if one could say that with absolute certainty, one would simply know the future (and not simply 'causes'), as I had said in the previous long post. One would not know these physical laws which 'must' be the case.


"Well, but what if one already knows that every time the rock and metal are dropped off the tower, they must hit the ground at the same time?" Why use the word 'must' here? It's not as if they are being forced to. Nonetheless, discarding that, it would seem that in this case one simply knows the future already; every time the rock and metal fall, they will hit the ground at the same time. This is simply knowing the correlation over, say, the next 100 years, rather than simply the past; yet in this case one already knows the future, rather than deducing it from 'causes'. One is not saying, "Ah, so there is this cause, and I know only causes, yet based on this cause, this must happen," but rather, "Well, this happens, and I already know what happens next." One knows more than simply 'causes'. One may as well know that every year in which Kenya win the Cricket World Cup (let's say they win it once sometime in the future), 2,400 people die from jumping off the Empire State Building to demonstrate that they would fall. In that case, one would not make a prediction based on 'causes' (does Kenya winning the World Cup cause the people dying? Perhaps), rather one already knows more than simply 'causes'.

[Widerstand]

Nonetheless, even if one could say that with absolute certainty, one would simply know the future (and not simply 'causes'), as I had said in the previous long post. One would not know these physical laws which 'must' be the case.

Correct. What I mean was that one must know how things will behave, which I paraphrased with knowing physical laws.