Logic is not magic

[Queercommie Girl]

The worship of logic could be just as philosophically wrong as worshipping a god or metaphysics in general.

The problem of logical positivism is that it upholds excessively mathematical and logico-linguistic constructs and takes them too seriously. Where does logic and language come from? For Marxist materialists physical matter is the only basic reality of the universe. Mathematics and language, and their internal logic, are nothing more than a very imperfect symbolic abstraction of the physical material world.

Mathematical logic is nothing but the creation of a highly imperfect and primitive human brain. It is not "magically" built into the physical universe in some kind of essentialist sense. It is just an abstraction and consequently the internal logic of mathematics is indeed incomplete, as Godel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates. To equate logic with physical matter "as itself" is just a modern version of neo-Platonism, not genuine materialism.

In other words, logic is an invention like language, it is not an intrinsic feature of the physical universe.

[Meridian]

I don't know of anyone who believes logic is magic. It seems you are attacking a strawman.


Where does logic and language come from? For Marxist materialists physical matter is the only basic reality of the universe. Mathematics and language, and their internal logic, are nothing more than a very imperfect symbolic abstraction of the physical material world.
I have no idea what "basic reality of the universe" means, and I somehow think you would have troubles explaining this one.

To say that language is an imperfect symbolic abstraction of the physical material (sic) world, is absolutely nothing new or radical. In fact, that is what philosophers have thought for centuries. Yet it is not really true. Language is primarily a means of communication. It is neither perfect nor imperfect, as its function is not measured against any external reality. It is only 'effective'.



Mathematical logic is nothing but the creation of a highly imperfect and primitive human brain. It is not "magically" built into the physical universe in some kind of essentialist sense. It is just an abstraction and consequently the internal logic of mathematics is indeed incomplete, as Godel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates. To equate logic with physical matter "as itself" is just a modern version of neo-Platonism, not genuine materialism.
Logic is about language, not reality. It's not a creation of a human brain. It's a study of language and its functions, so it's not an "abstraction" either.



In other words, logic is an invention like language, it is not an intrinsic feature of the physical universe.
You could say that, though it is also a study of language.

[ZeroNowhere]

Mathematics and language, and their internal logic, are nothing more than a very imperfect symbolic abstraction of the physical material world.Is that sentence also an imperfect symbolic abstraction of the material world? In fact, is this one?

Nonetheless, portraying our language as effectively a flawed method of representing reality is probably closer to the logical positivists than to Marx.

[Queercommie Girl]

I don't know of anyone who believes logic is magic. It seems you are attacking a strawman.


I was referring to the positivist's excessive confidence in logical constructs.



I have no idea what "basic reality of the universe" means, and I somehow think you would have troubles explaining this one.


In other words, matter-as-itself, not an interpretation or abstraction of matter in our own heads.



To say that language is an imperfect symbolic abstraction of the physical material (sic) world, is absolutely nothing new or radical. In fact, that is what philosophers have thought for centuries. Yet it is not really true. Language is primarily a means of communication. It is neither perfect nor imperfect, as its function is not measured against any external reality. It is only 'effective'.


Logic is about language, not reality. It's not a creation of a human brain. It's a study of language and its functions, so it's not an "abstraction" either.


You could say that, though it is also a study of language.


But I was also talking about logic in the mathematical sense, which is primarily an abstraction of the physical world (e.g. mountains abstracted into triangular cones), not a linguistic representation.

[Meridian]

I was referring to the positivist's excessive confidence in logical constructs.
Ah. I hope you realize that there is a difference between studying logic and being a logical positivist, though.


But I was also talking about logic in the mathematical sense, which is primarily an abstraction of the physical world (e.g. mountains abstracted into triangular cones), not a linguistic representation.
I have yet to come across this type of mathematical logic. I was under the impression that "logic in the mathematical sense" referred to formal logic, coupled with the study of the foundation of mathematics. This is a connection that may be discussed. Mathematics can also be seen as a language, or a use of language, with its own rules. Mathematics is not an abstraction at all, for the same reason I said about general language previously.


In other words, matter-as-itself, not an interpretation or abstraction of matter in our own heads.
As predicted, I don't understand what you mean. "Matter-as-itself"? That is quite the riddle. When we look at something, let's say a sweater, we do not see an interpretation, nor an abstraction. We see a sweater. Does there exist a "sweater-as-itself"? Obviously not. "Sweater" is a term we use, and there is no way to separate the word from the thing itself, because then there is no thing we can refer to. All this is besides the trouble we would have explaining what "matter" is; I certainly have never seen it.

[Queercommie Girl]

Ah. I hope you realize that there is a difference between studying logic and being a logical positivist, though.


I'm not saying logic is useless, I'm just against the over-reliance on logic.



I have yet to come across this type of mathematical logic. I was under the impression that "logic in the mathematical sense" referred to formal logic, coupled with the study of the foundation of mathematics. This is a connection that may be discussed. Mathematics can also be seen as a language, or a use of language, with its own rules. Mathematics is not an abstraction at all, for the same reason I said about general language previously.


Mathematics is not just a logical language, but also a quantitative representation of the physical world.



As predicted, I don't understand what you mean. "Matter-as-itself"? That is quite the riddle. When we look at something, let's say a sweater, we do not see an interpretation, nor an abstraction. We see a sweater. Does there exist a "sweater-as-itself"? Obviously not. "Sweater" is a term we use, and there is no way to separate the word from the thing itself, because then there is no thing we can refer to. All this is besides the trouble we would have explaining what "matter" is; I certainly have never seen it.


There is a qualitative difference between a thing-in-itself and the words we use to describe the thing, because things-in-themselves existed long before human civilisation came into existence, and will exist long after humanity has ceased to be human. You can't say since we can never observe a thing-in-itself without attaching a word or label to it, then things-in-themselves don't exist independently of our labelling it. Not all knowledge comes from direct observation, some originate from deduction and inference.

[Meridian]

I'm not saying logic is useless, I'm just against the over-reliance on logic.
But it seems to me that you have little knowledge about what logic actually is.


Mathematics is not just a logical language, but also a quantitative representation of the physical world.
I did not say that it was a logical language, only that many who study this subject see mathematics as a use of language. Different language-uses comes with their different rules. Mathematics is generally a useful application of rules. Why they are useful is a more interesting question. Geometry, for example, started as a measurement of things around us, and especially of the land. Of course, in order to measure, you need something to operate with. You need to divide, for example the land, into 'pieces'. It could be that mathematics is useful, and so ingrained into our way of living, simply because of the way our language(s) works. We have words for stuff, which is a necessity for mathematics. That way, you can replace "stone, stone, stone" with "3 stones", giving us numbers we can operate with. I think this part of mathematics runs side by side with language.

But, to me personally, the above doesn't seem like the full story. Whether or not mathematics is invented, depends on what exactly we mean by "mathematics". If we mean the application of rules in the form of the symbols we use, and practices regarding them, I think those are entirely 'invented'. But, whenever we experience that phenomena fit directly to mathematical rules or principles, without any precognition that this would be the case, that seems interesting to me. For example, we find that tones that are pleasing to listen to together (creating scales), correspond to basic ratios of frequencies.


There is a qualitative difference between a thing-in-itself and the words we use to describe the thing, because things-in-themselves existed long before human civilisation came into existence, and will exist long after humanity has ceased to be human. You can't say since we can never observe a thing-in-itself without attaching a word or label to it, then things-in-themselves don't exist independently of our labelling it. Not all knowledge comes from direct observation, some originate from deduction and inference.
If you are to claim something exists, you have to say what it is you claim exists. Name one "thing-in-itself". If you are unable to do so, you can not positively make the claim that it exists, because there is no "it" specified. If you are able to do so, you will name the "thing-in-itself", thus using a word and rendering it a non-"thing-in-itself" by that fact.

You have confused the role of language, creating this contradiction. You (along with many) think it is description, while in reality it is communication. It is impossible to use purely language to figure out truths about the world, and sentences become nonsensical when we use our own terms for another use than communication. All our words and our rules for using them have their own historical, social, communicative role. That is why it becomes nonsensical when we try applying language to "the world", "existence", "being", etc. In short; metaphysical language which says nothing about how things are, is nonsensical.

[Queercommie Girl]

But it seems to me that you have little knowledge about what logic actually is.


Why? Because I didn't give a formal definition of what logic is?



I did not say that it was a logical language, only that many who study this subject see mathematics as a use of language. Different language-uses comes with their different rules. Mathematics is generally a useful application of rules. Why they are useful is a more interesting question. Geometry, for example, started as a measurement of things around us, and especially of the land. Of course, in order to measure, you need something to operate with. You need to divide, for example the land, into 'pieces'. It could be that mathematics is useful, and so ingrained into our way of living, simply because of the way our language(s) works. We have words for stuff, which is a necessity for mathematics. That way, you can replace "stone, stone, stone" with "3 stones", giving us numbers we can operate with. I think this part of mathematics runs side by side with language.

But, to me personally, the above doesn't seem like the full story. Whether or not mathematics is invented, depends on what exactly we mean by "mathematics". If we mean the application of rules in the form of the symbols we use, and practices regarding them, I think those are entirely 'invented'. But, whenever we experience that phenomena fit directly to mathematical rules or principles, without any precognition that this would be the case, that seems interesting to me. For example, we find that tones that are pleasing to listen to together (creating scales), correspond to basic ratios of frequencies.


There is no conscious precognition, but there may indeed be sub-conscious factors involved that are based on darwinian evolution. Perhaps there are underlying evolutionary reasons why humans find certain tone combinations to be pleasing. There is no need to go back in the direction of Platonism.



If you are to claim something exists, you have to say what it is you claim exists. Name one "thing-in-itself". If you are unable to do so, you can not positively make the claim that it exists, because there is no "it" specified. If you are able to do so, you will name the "thing-in-itself", thus using a word and rendering it a non-"thing-in-itself" by that fact.

You have confused the role of language, creating this contradiction. You (along with many) think it is description, while in reality it is communication. It is impossible to use purely language to figure out truths about the world, and sentences become nonsensical when we use our own terms for another use than communication. All our words and our rules for using them have their own historical, social, communicative role. That is why it becomes nonsensical when we try applying language to "the world", "existence", "being", etc. In short; metaphysical language which says nothing about how things are, is nonsensical.


I am inferring the existence of things which I cannot observe directly.

But we do this all the time. I assume that after I die, the world will carry on as before, without even the potential possibility of direct observation. There is no direct observational way for me to be sure that the observed reality around me is actually real, and I'm not just a "brain-in-a-vat" of some kind. Similarly I assume that "things-in-themselves" exist even if no human observers are there, even those I could never directly observe such things by definition.

The point is that firstly not all knowledge is acquired through induction, sometimes it is acquired through deduction and inference, and secondly, there is never absolute certainty in anything, even inductive knowledge can be shown to be false in the future, but something can still count as knowledge as long as it is justifiable.

[Meridian]

I am inferring the existence of things which I cannot observe directly.

But we do this all the time. I assume that after I die, the world will carry on as before, without even the potential possibility of direct observation. There is no direct observational way for me to be sure that the observed reality around me is actually real, and I'm not just a "brain-in-a-vat" of some kind. Similarly I assume that "things-in-themselves" exist even if no human observers are there, even those I could never directly observe such things by definition.

The point is that firstly not all knowledge is acquired through induction, sometimes it is acquired through deduction and inference, and secondly, there is never absolute certainty in anything, even inductive knowledge can be shown to be false in the future, but something can still count as knowledge as long as it is justifiable.
But I have not even mentioned observation. My point is not about epistemology, or that we can only know what we observe or something like that.

I tried to show you clearly that your idea about "things-in-themselves" is contradictory. It is misuse of language.

If you are to claim something exists, you have to say what it is you claim exists. Name one "thing-in-itself". If you are unable to do so, you can not positively make the claim that it exists, because there is no "it" specified. You would be saying nothing.

Language can not be used to name things 'outside' of language. There is no term 'outside' of language.

If you are able to specify what it is that exists, you will name the "thing-in-itself", thus using language and showing that it is really not a "thing-in-itself" at all by extension. After all, you would have to refer to it using language, and if language is as you said only an "imperfect symbolic abstraction" then this can not be a "thing-in-itself". You would showing yourself to be wrong.

[Queercommie Girl]

But I have not even mentioned observation. My point is not about epistemology, or that we can only know what we observe or something like that.

I tried to show you clearly that your idea about "things-in-themselves" is contradictory. It is misuse of language.

If you are to claim something exists, you have to say what it is you claim exists. Name one "thing-in-itself". If you are unable to do so, you can not positively make the claim that it exists, because there is no "it" specified. You would be saying nothing.

Language can not be used to name things 'outside' of language. There is no term 'outside' of language.

If you are able to specify what it is that exists, you will name the "thing-in-itself", thus using language and showing that it is really not a "thing-in-itself" at all by extension. After all, you would have to refer to it using language, and if language is as you said only an "imperfect symbolic abstraction" then this can not be a "thing-in-itself". You would showing yourself to be wrong.

You sound like "things cannot exist independent of the language we use to describe them", which is a subjective if not idealistic viewpoint. I can infer the existence of things I cannot directly name from the things I can name, I can infer the existence of things outside of direct description just as I can infer the existence of things outside of direct observation. I don't need to specify a thing for it to exist. It is the other way around, a thing exist before I ever specified it. I infer the existence of a "thing-in-itself" before I specified it from what I know of it after I've specified it.

[Meridian]

You sound like "things cannot exist independent of the language we use to describe them"
I disagree with that. The function of language is not to describe things. "Thing" and "exist" are words in our language, thus it is nonsensical to say that a thing exists independent of our word for it. If it does, you can not name what it is that exists, so your statement is empty.

Note; all this is about the role of language. I am not saying anything about how the world is, I am pointing out a wrong way to use language.


I can infer the existence of things I cannot directly name from the things I can name,
We don't 'infer' things that we can not name. We may infer, for example, that a person will be coming home late. We don't infer things "outside" of language, inference is a linguistic act after all.


I don't need to specify a thing for it to exist. It is the other way around, a thing exist before I ever specified it.
You misunderstand. If you are to claim that "X exists", you have to fill in X in order for the sentence to have a meaning. Otherwise, you have an empty statement. Again; you can not say that something exists without having a name for it, because you have to use the name in doing so. Thereby contradicting yourself.

[Ocean Seal]

Logic is simply a tool. Sometimes it doesn't work especially given the scientifically complex world that we live in.

[syndicat]

There are many features and particular things in the world that we have no name for in our language. this must be so because, for example, the number of physical particles is extremely large and we don't have names for particular physical particles. humans create words to track features and objects when these things are of interest to us.

but the OP never said what he/she meant by "logic" so the comment is really pretty empty. not worth responding to, in my opinion.

[Meridian]

There are many features and particular things in the world that we have no name for in our language.
Well, I am not sure if this was a response to my argument, but anyways... You just called them by their names, "features" and "particular things".


this must be so because, for example, the number of physical particles is extremely large and we don't have names for particular physical particles.
If we did not have a name for them we would not understand your sentence. "Physical particles".


humans create words to track features and objects when these things are of interest to us.
But we develop our language through communication, not through simply naming things that appear. Language evolves. If a meteor should fall on Earth tomorrow, we could name it something specific from the fact that we already refer to meteors. If that were not so we would not be able to name it because there would be no 'it', there would not be a meteor falling in the first place we could refer to. Obviously, if we didn't have the word for meteor we would perhaps say that it was a rock falling, the sky falling, etc. But it is thinkable that there are people who would consider the situation entirely differently because of their language use.

Also, what kind of features or objects are "and", "also", "what", "if", "so", "because", "a", "to", etc.? These are words too, and they do not 'track' objects or features. Yet, they are fully functional.

I would say that language changes not despite our particular use of it but directly because of our use of it. So, through use does it change, not through finding new "blanks" that we name, that is impossible.

[Queercommie Girl]

I disagree with that. The function of language is not to describe things. "Thing" and "exist" are words in our language, thus it is nonsensical to say that a thing exists independent of our word for it. If it does, you can not name what it is that exists, so your statement is empty.

Note; all this is about the role of language. I am not saying anything about how the world is, I am pointing out a wrong way to use language.


We don't 'infer' things that we can not name. We may infer, for example, that a person will be coming home late. We don't infer things "outside" of language, inference is a linguistic act after all.


You misunderstand. If you are to claim that "X exists", you have to fill in X in order for the sentence to have a meaning. Otherwise, you have an empty statement. Again; you can not say that something exists without having a name for it, because you have to use the name in doing so. Thereby contradicting yourself.

But materialism suggests that it is meaningless to discuss anything which is not related to the material world in some way. To talk of "pure logic" or "pure language" is a meaningless activity.

[Queercommie Girl]

There are many features and particular things in the world that we have no name for in our language. this must be so because, for example, the number of physical particles is extremely large and we don't have names for particular physical particles. humans create words to track features and objects when these things are of interest to us.

but the OP never said what he/she meant by "logic" so the comment is really pretty empty. not worth responding to, in my opinion.

You seem to think that I must provide a lengthy protracted formal definition of logic otherwise I can't even talk about it. Interestingly this precisely ties into my criticism of logical positivism here.

My point is that logical positivism takes logical, mathematical and linguistic constructs "in-themselves" too seriously.

The only use and meaning of a logical, mathematical or linguistic construct is precisely to describe the world. If it does not describe the material world in some way, it is useless and meaningless.

[ChrisK]

You seem to think that I must provide a lengthy protracted formal definition of logic otherwise I can't even talk about it. Interestingly this precisely ties into my criticism of logical positivism here.

My point is that logical positivism takes logical, mathematical and linguistic constructs "in-themselves" too seriously.

The only use and meaning of a logical, mathematical or linguistic construct is precisely to describe the world. If it does not describe the material world in some way, it is useless and meaningless.

Boy you're really good at jumping to conclusions. His reason behind that is that you apparantly don't know what formal logic actually is.

Also, we don't take them too seriously, you are the one who thinks we do. We simply use them as a tool, not a be-all-end-all.