A Marxist view of Logical Postivism

[heiss93]

This is a passage from the classic 1930s Leningrad Textbook on Marxist philosophy, although I think this particular section was added by British editors.

There has been a lot of debate about the relationship between dialectics and linguistic-analytic philosophy. The below passages are actually quite favorable to logical positivism in substance but object to the fact that the anti-metaphysical materialism is argued purely from the logical basis and not from historical social development. Thus it is anti-dialectical precisely because it rejects historical materialism. I don't think Dialecticians would disagree that metaphysics is also logically and linguistically "wrong", but it does not reduce the history of philosophy to a bunch of dead white men who didn't own a dictionary.

http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/archive/mpS1.htm

Dialectics and Metaphysics
Dialectical materialism takes up a somewhat hostile attitude to metaphysics. Why is this? It is because “the persistent problems of philosophy” are not, as is usually supposed, merely problems for thought, but problems inseparably connected with stages in social development which carry with them contradictions insoluble at these particular levels.
For instance the failure of a pre-scientific world to understand nature creates special intellectual problems for the philosophy of that period which only clear up when science advances. Or again, before the discovery of emergent evolution philosophy will be troubled with dualism and vitalism, and there will be no help for it.
These very problems of pre-Marxian philosophy indicate that men are not yet in the position to solve them. Now it is the false formulation of a problem that creates a philosophy. Restate it correctly and the problem disappears – and so does the philosophy! There are no insoluble problems in philosophy but only problems wrongly stated. Hence most contemporary metaphysics is due either to ignorance or to confusion of thought. The list of metaphysical problems which disappear as we proceed to higher organizational levels is a long one and in recent years a school of logical positivists has appeared which threatens to sweep the last of them away. In certain respects the logical-positivists approach the position of dialectical materialism but their view is a purely logical one and takes no cognizance of the changes in thought due to social evolution.
Ayer in his recent book, Language, Truth and Logic, says that metaphysics must eventually disappear, because it tries to say something about what is not matter of fact, whereas the only way to avoid senselessness is either to explain the use of the words and special terms we use (called by Ayer and Russell “symbols”) or to saysomething verifiable about matter of fact. To consider anything at all as existing prior to and independent of the concrete is complete folly unless we are working out mere logical possibilities, clearing up the meaning of language, stating in advance how we propose to think, and what is going to count for us as proof. Apart from this, which is the real job of philosophy, the only other kind of truth is matter of fact, which must be verifiable in principle by some future sense-experience. To affirm what is not empirically verifiable is to talk nonsense. Professor Schlick of Vienna, writes:

“What about metaphysics? It is evident that our view entirely precludes the possibility of such a thing. Any cognition we can have of ‘Being,’ of the inmost nature of things, is gained entirely by the special sciences; they are the true ontology, and there can be no other. Each true scientific proposition expresses in some way the real nature of things – if it did not, it would simply not be true. So in regard to metaphysics the justification of our viewis that it explains the vanity of all metaphysical efforts, which has shown itself in the hopeless variety of systems all struggling against each other. Most of the so called metaphysical propositions are no propositions at all, but meaningless combinations of words; and the rest are not ‘metaphysical’ at all, they are simply concealed scientific statements, the truth or falsehood of which can be ascertained by the ordinary methods of experience and observation. (In the future) Metaphysical tendencies will be entirely abandoned, simply because there is no such thing as metaphysics, the apparent descriptions of it being just nonsensical phrases.”
Dialectical Materialism and Contemporary Philosophy
The “logical-analytical method” of Wittgenstein and his followers is by no means the only modern philosophy that approximates in certain points to the new dialectic. Benedetto Croce, for all his errors, is condemning abstractness when he insists that philosophy is identical with history and that both are the self-consciousness of life itself. Troeltsch, many of whose positions are open to the gravest criticism, is right when he insists that the fundamental philosophical question is what is the main trend of historical matter of fact and how does it dominate each special domain, such as law, education, art, politics, and philosophy, and in his insistence that historical activism should supersede historical contemplation. Whitehead’s energetic opposition to the whole Kantian bifurcation of nature and mind is a wholesome reaction from dualism.
It would appear, in fact, that not only are scientific discoveries confirming the standpoint of dialectical materialism but that Western philosophers are increasingly discarding metaphysical concepts, though still reluctant to accept an outlook which undermines the buttresses of the existing order.
There is, however, one tendency in recent Western philosophy with which the dialectical materialists are thoroughly familiar, though we are not as thoroughly acquainted as we should be with their treatment of it. This is due to an historical accident. In 1908 a group of leading Russian socialists living in exile in Capri, became profoundly interested in the new positivism of Mach and Avenarius. They proceeded to recast philosophical Marxism along positivist lines. Lenin at once saw that this philosophy was both unsound and also anti-socialist in its implications. He proceeded to write an exhaustive criticism which displayed a surprising knowledge of philosophy and a clear grasp of the question at issue. Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism has never been sufficiently appreciated by philosophers although it was one of the first and most trenchant criticisms of a sceptical systemwhich so far from disappearing has grown widely in recent years. This scientific positivism has been popularized in recent years by Eddington, Bertrand Russell and others in science, and by Durkheim and Levy Bruhl in sociology. As Lenin rightly discerned, it opens wide the door to solipsism and superstition and has been eagerly seized upon by theologians to buttress irrationalism and supernaturalism. It therefore happens that this criticism as developed in modern dialectical materialism is immediately relevant to much contemporary philosophy and surprisingly up-to-date.

[BAM]

One of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists, one of its leading members no less, was a Marxist, Otto Neurath.

However, I don't know much about his philosophical stuff, only his writings on economics and his contribution to the old "socialist calculation debate".

My guess is that Rosa Lichtenstein will be able to tell you more.

[Queercommie Girl]

Logical positivism is itself a kind of metaphysics, or rather "metaphysics disguised as anti-metaphysics", just as Stalinism is "aristocratism disguised as proletarian populism".

Where does logic come from? Humanity is fundamentally underpinned by proletarian life, not by dead abstract logic. How is it not a new kind of metaphysics to posit empirical logic as the "new god"?

Of course, not only must Marxists reject metaphysics, we must also reject the kind of academic historical and social analysis that is cut off from real life. What we need is a living philosophy that is outside the university and is intimately connected with the real daily lives of the workers, peasants and other oppressed peoples of the world. Only such a philosophy is real philosophy.

Marx said up to now philosophers have only interpreted the world, but the key is to transform it. Mao said philosophers should abandon their ivory towers and walk directly into the proletarian masses. There is no inherent distinction between philosophy and empiricism, between life and work. Neither absolute metaphysics nor dead logic provides the way forward. Intellectuals must totally absorb themselves into the masses of ordinary workers and peasants, for they are the real "philosopher's stone", the real "fountain of wisdom" for an eternity.

"Class struggle is the fundamental basis of all existence" - Mao Zedong. So both metaphysics and logical positivism are wrong, because both of them live in their own ivory towers, aloof from the masses of the world, both are dead.

[Queercommie Girl]

Lenin was explicitly critical of logical positivism, but actually there is no surprise that Stalinists would pick up logical positivism again, as the "new metaphysics" for their "new aristocratism" cut-off from the masses.

[Queercommie Girl]

Ordinary workers and peasants, and oppressed peoples of the world are the fundamental source of all philosophical wisdom. Understanding and strategising the political work to be done on their behalf is the primary branch of dialectical philosophy. All kinds of ivory tower philosophy are reactionary.

This statement sums up my ultimate position on this philosophical matter.

[black magick hustla]

class struggle is not the fundamental issue of existence. the sun will be there regardless if humanity ceases to exist

[Queercommie Girl]

class struggle is not the fundamental issue of existence. the sun will be there regardless if humanity ceases to exist

It is fundamental as far as human existence is concerned.

[blake 3:17]

Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism has never been sufficiently appreciated by philosophers although it was one of the first and most trenchant criticisms of a sceptical systemwhich so far from disappearing has grown widely in recent years. This scientific positivism has been popularized in recent years by Eddington, Bertrand Russell and others in science, and by Durkheim and Levy Bruhl in sociology. As Lenin rightly discerned, it opens wide the door to solipsism and superstition and has been eagerly seized upon by theologians to buttress irrationalism and supernaturalism. It therefore happens that this criticism as developed in modern dialectical materialism is immediately relevant to much contemporary philosophy and surprisingly up-to-date.

That doesn't seem like a very serious engagement or critique of the ideas. I'm hostile to any kind of positivism, but this seems like a pretty terrible way to go about it.

Critiquing non-Marxist or non-Orthodox Marxism on the basis that they aren't Marxist or Orthdox Marxist seems intellectually feeble.

[Meridian]

Logical positivism is itself a kind of metaphysics, or rather "metaphysics disguised as anti-metaphysics", just as Stalinism is "aristocratism disguised as proletarian populism".
No.


Where does logic come from? Humanity is fundamentally underpinned by proletarian life, not by dead abstract logic. How is it not a new kind of metaphysics to posit empirical logic as the "new god"?
What the frack are you talking about? "New god"? Seriously, get a clue. Logic is not metaphysical or based on metaphysics, it is a study of rules of language.


Of course, not only must Marxists reject metaphysics, we must also reject the kind of academic historical and social analysis that is cut off from real life.
Yes, academic historical and social analysis that is cut off from real life must be rejected. True enough.


What we need is a living philosophy that is outside the university and is intimately connected with the real daily lives of the workers, peasants and other oppressed peoples of the world. Only such a philosophy is real philosophy.
Philosophy is nonsense, besides the Wittgensteinian application of the word "philosophy".


Marx said up to now philosophers have only interpreted the world, but the key is to transform it. Mao said philosophers should abandon their ivory towers and walk directly into the proletarian masses. There is no inherent distinction between philosophy and empiricism, between life and work. Neither absolute metaphysics nor dead logic provides the way forward. Intellectuals must totally absorb themselves into the masses of ordinary workers and peasants, for they are the real "philosopher's stone", the real "fountain of wisdom" for an eternity.
I don't understand the point of your writing. Some forms of language philosophy is based on empirical studies, so they are not at all without use. Traditional philosophy, though, is wholly useless. And there is an "inherent" distinction between this (regular) form of philosophy and empiricism, namely that the former is based on misapplying words.


"Class struggle is the fundamental basis of all existence" - Mao Zedong. So both metaphysics and logical positivism are wrong, because both of them live in their own ivory towers, aloof from the masses of the world, both are dead.
Wow, what a great argument. First off, Great Leader Mao made a metaphysical statement himself, so what you are saying is a complete contradiction. Second off, your argument is basically like this: "The weather changes based on our moods" said He, glorious leader Meridian. This proves that meteorology and climatology is wrong.

[Hit The North]

"Class struggle is the fundamental basis of all existence" - Mao Zedong.

It is this kind of unqualified mode of expression which helps to discredit Marxism in the minds of our enemies and those who could be potential allies. Class struggle might be the fundamental basis of human existence within class societies, but it is not the fundamental basis of all existence, that is, of non-human entities existing in non-class based environments (trees in the forest, for instance).

EDIT: I now see you've qualified Mao's remark to only encompass human existence, but equally we could ask, why is class struggle more 'fundamental' to human existence than, say, sexual love?

EDIT # 2: I just think we should be a little more circumspect and demonstrate a little more modesty in the claims we make about the scope of our knowledge.

[Hit The North]

This scientific positivism has been popularized in recent years by Eddington, Bertrand Russell and others in science, and by Durkheim and Levy Bruhl in sociology. As Lenin rightly discerned, it opens wide the door to solipsism and superstition and has been eagerly seized upon by theologians to buttress irrationalism and supernaturalism. It therefore happens that this criticism as developed in modern dialectical materialism is immediately relevant to much contemporary philosophy and surprisingly up-to-date.

We could also add that the tenets of dialectical materialism have been taken up by anti-worker ideologues like Stalin in order to buttress irrationalism and dictatorship. In short to justify the existing order of exploitation and alienation, on the basis of a superstition in the infallibility of the Communist Party and the mystical beneficence of history.

The point is that all ideas can be hijacked and abused and to point this out, is not a very convincing critique of the ideas themselves. I'd like to know how positivism inevitably "opens wide the door to solipsism and superstition" and how this manifests itself in the work of Eddington, Bertrand Russell, Durkheim and Levy Bruhl.

As a side note...

What is interesting in the history of these two competing approaches to scientific knowledge is how historical materialism, when shed of its real dialectical content, as with the 2nd International and the DM of Stalin's "Short Course", is the way in which it come as to resemble a type of positivism.

[Hyacinth]

What is interesting in the history of these two competing approaches to scientific knowledge is how historical materialism, when shed of its real dialectical content, as with the 2nd International and the DM of Stalin's "Short Course", is the way in which it come as to resemble a type of positivism.
While I can see this said of analytical Marxism, I fail to see how Stalinist dialectical materialism at all resembles logical positivism. (And even with the former, it depends on what you mean by 'logical positivism', it was not a homogeneous movement). So if you could elaborate on what you take to be 'positivistic' about diamat, and how exactly it was stripped of its 'real dialectical content'. And, for that matter, what is the 'real dialectical content' of historical materialism?

[JimFar]

One of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists, one of its leading members no less, was a Marxist, Otto Neurath.

However, I don't know much about his philosophical stuff, only his writings on economics and his contribution to the old "socialist calculation debate".

My guess is that Rosa Lichtenstein will be able to tell you more.

Yes, Otto Neurath was a Marxist. In fact he spent much of his life in service to the workers movement in Austria and Germany. During the 1919 revolution in Germany, the Social Democratic administration in Bavaria appointed him to a commission to draw up plans for socializing the state's economy. When that administration was replaced by the Soviet Republic of Bavaria, the revolutionary regime retained Neurath in that role. After the revolution had been crushed he was put on trial for treason. The intercession of the Austrian government and protests from leading German academics eventually led to the treason charges being dropped and he was released. He returned to his native Austria where he was active in the SDP there, especially in workers' education. In that capacity he would develop his method of isotypes as a means of conveying complex statistical information to people who might be barely literate or numerate.

He saw logical positivism as providing a firm philosophical basis for Marxism, and was explicit about this when, in collaboration with Rudolf Carnap, he co-authored the manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World; The Vienna Circle."
(http://gnadav.googlepages.com/TheScientificConceptionoftheWorldeng.doc)

A number of writers have written concerning Neurath's Marxism including,
Otto Neurath: philosophy between science and politics, ed. by Nancy Cartwright et al., and George A. Reisch in his book, How the Cold War Trsnformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic.

[Hit The North]

While I can see this said of analytical Marxism, I fail to see how Stalinist dialectical materialism at all resembles logical positivism. (And even with the former, it depends on what you mean by 'logical positivism', it was not a homogeneous movement).

Well, I was careful not to use the term "logical positivism". I am referring to the general form of positivism as it develops in the 19thcentury through Comte and Durkheim. It is a philosophy of science which argues that scientific knowledge is the uncovering of regular patterns of cause and effect relationships in nature, and then argues that, likewise, we can reach a similar understanding of human society. My argument is that degenerate versions of the dialectic approach a similar understanding.


So if you could elaborate on what you take to be 'positivistic' about diamat, and how exactly it was stripped of its 'real dialectical content'. And, for that matter, what is the 'real dialectical content' of historical materialism? As Cyril Smith argues, the materialism at the heart of Marxism is not the objective material universe of nature existing independently of human praxis, but is the objective social relations which are the product of specific human actions.

I don't have the time to elaborate fully on this. Suffice to say, in both Plekhanov’s monism and in Stalin’s DM, we find this understanding of the material missing, in favour of an older form of materialism which emphasises the objective and regular motion of nature. In other words, the so-called dialectic of nature is seen to be primary to the dialectic of the social which is posited to be an emergent property of the natural. Hence the idea that dialectical materialism is the primary source of knowledge and that historical materialism is merely a sub-species of this, which we find in the official philosophy of the USSR.

There are many similar but different critiques of official Soviet DM in the works of Henri Lefebvre, Sartre, Cyril Smith, most of which are described as Marxist-humanism. The clearest and easiest to read for a contemporary English speaking audience is Smith:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/smith-cyril/works/millenni/smith2.htm

[Thirsty Crow]

What the frack are you talking about? "New god"? Seriously, get a clue. Logic is not metaphysical or based on metaphysics, it is a study of rules of language.

Um, wait a minute.
So we have two scientific disciplines dealing with the "rules of language".
So what sets them apart?
(I'm guessing that you meant that logic deals with the validity of assertions produced by means of a human language; if you didn't, I don't think that a reduction of logic to the study of inherently linguistic phenomena is justifiable.)

[Hyacinth]

Well, I was careful not to use the term "logical positivism". I am referring to the general form of positivism as it develops in the 19thcentury through Comte and Durkheim. It is a philosophy of science which argues that scientific knowledge is the uncovering of regular patterns of cause and effect relationships in nature, and then argues that, likewise, we can reach a similar understanding of human society. My argument is that degenerate versions of the dialectic approach a similar understanding.
Fair enough, I was reading more into what you said than was there.


As Cyril Smith argues, the materialism at the heart of Marxism is not the objective material universe of nature existing independently of human praxis, but is the objective social relations which are the product of specific human actions.

I don't have the time to elaborate fully on this. Suffice to say, in both Plekhanov’s monism and in Stalin’s DM, we find this understanding of the material missing, in favour of an older form of materialism which emphasises the objective and regular motion of nature. In other words, the so-called dialectic of nature is seen to be primary to the dialectic of the social which is posited to be an emergent property of the natural. Hence the idea that dialectical materialism is the primary source of knowledge and that historical materialism is merely a sub-species of this, which we find in the official philosophy of the USSR.
I don't see how 'the objective material universe existing independently of human praxis' conflicts with 'the objectivity of social relations which are a product of human praxis'.

In fact, perhaps I have a 'degenerate' understand of materialism here, but this is exactly what I would have understood historical materialism to be: the application of the general principles of materialism to the study of the social. Of course social systems are in many respects more complex than certain physical systems, in that they're not purely mechanistic, so our understanding of social systems will be a systemic (systems theoretic) one rather than a mechanistic one.

At least in this respect official Soviet philosophy seems to have gotten things correct.

But I'll reserve judgment until I hear the alternative: what exactly is the correct understanding of historical materialism?

[Hit The North]

In fact, perhaps I have a 'degenerate' understand of materialism here, but this is exactly what I would have understood historical materialism to be: the application of the general principles of materialism to the study of the social.

Well this is a common misunderstanding from those who do not accept the dialectical core of Marxist materialism, which sets it apart from the mechanical materialism of the Enlightenment. You have no means of differentiating one from the other. In fact, one definition of positivism as found in Comte, Spencer and Durkheim, is the application of the rules of mechanical materialism (or natural science) to the realm of the social. It ends up producing heavily deterministic models of social life - puppet theatre models.


Of course social systems are in many respects more complex than certain physical systems, in that they're not purely mechanistic, so our understanding of social systems will be a systemic (systems theoretic) one rather than a mechanistic one.
It's more than just levels of complexity - or at least this is a good example of where an increase in complexity leads to a qualitatively difference. The social is ontologically distinct from the natural world in that natural systems do not include self-conscious, reflective, imaginative and purposeful beings. Whereas any accounts of social system which ignore these (human) beings are doomed to a one-sided and impartial view. The same is true of the opposite tendency in social science explanations towards voluntarism, ignoring the impact of structural logics in social life. They also produce one-sided accounts.

Historical Materialism, on the other hand, provides us with an overcoming of these polarities (which are found in bourgeois social science), but only if one accepts that its method is dialectical: i.e. that it analyses social life as a series of oppositional relations, all of which result from the contradictions inherent in the particular, historically transient, mode of production, based on class exploitation.

Now, by 'dialectical', I mean two or more things which stand in a necessary and mutually determining set of relations, whereby change in one produces a change in the other.

We can identify a number of key dialectical relationships in historical materialism, the primary or overarching one being that between the forces and relations of production. Another is the particular forms of class struggle between rulers and ruled, exploiters and exploited. Yet another, is the tension between social structure and social action ("men make history, but not under circumstances chose by themselves..." - the opening salvo of the 18th Brumaire, etc.). This is important not only in order to understand history but also to understand our own capacity to transform our own relations.


But I'll reserve judgment until I hear the alternative: what exactly is the correct understanding of historical materialism? I think it's best to see it as a methodological programme for study, rather than a doctrinal statement, so it's not about "correct understanding" as such. Nevertheless, if we are to take it seriously as a method, then we need to clear up any conceptual confusions by properly recognising its ontological and epistemological claims.

Marx wrote that to be radical is to grasp things at the root and that, for man, the root is man himself. This is why historical materialism is primary to DM.

[Hyacinth]

There's nothing in your last post with which I disagree, sans perhaps calling that account of historical materialism 'dialetical', but that's merely a verbal disagreement.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Well this is a common misunderstanding from those who do not accept the dialectical core of Marxist materialism, which sets it apart from the mechanical materialism of the Enlightenment. You have no means of differentiating one from the other. In fact, one definition of positivism as found in Comte, Spencer and Durkheim, is the application of the rules of mechanical materialism (or natural science) to the realm of the social. It ends up producing heavily deterministic models of social life - puppet theatre models.

But this is not so. It is easy to tell the difference between historical materialism [HM] and the mystical variety that has a grip on most comrades (dialectical materialism or 'materialist dialectics', whichever you finally decide you believe): the former reject all forms of traditional thought infecting HM. The latter do not.

The strategy, of course, shows that both determinsism and indeterminism, are non-sensical theories, imposed a priori on the world by traditional theorists (and Dialectical Marxists), as I have shown:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

[norwegian commie]

Problem with RL and other marxists of that type, is their general interpretation of marxist dialectics as something necessarily mystical. Well, i would agree that certain members of our marxist tradition has mystified the concept and reduced dialectics to a collection of categories. Problem is, dialectical reason has progressed since 1945.

http://folk.uio.no/regie/litteratur/Artikler/Validity.htm This article, On the problem of validity in social science, examines truth and validity in dialectical materialism - in a highly scientific manner. (The author is professor in sociology, University of Oslo.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Sure, dialectics has 'progressed' since 1945. Most revolutionaries would call this 'Revisionism'. And the vast majority of the work done has had no impact whatsoever on the class war. It is therefore politically irrelevant.

However, I have been studying this 'theory' now for nearly 30 years, and I have yet to read anything that makes sense of it. It strikes me that all we ever get from dialecticians are yet more epicylces pasted on to a non-sensical 'theory'.

Small wonder then that 'dialectical marxism' is a bye-word for failure.

Thanks for the link. I'll read the article and comment on it later this week.

[Hit The North]

But this is not so. It is easy to tell the difference between historical materialism [HM] and the mystical variety that has a grip on most comrades (dialectical materialism or 'materialist dialectics', whichever you finally decide you believe): the former reject all forms of traditional thought infecting HM. The latter do not.



You must be referring to the "historical materialism" of Cohen and its reliance on functionalist explanation (a la Durkheim). Or perhaps its the anti-dialectical "historical materialism" of Eduard Bernstein, the proponent of non-revolutionary development and reformism. So much for rejecting "traditional thought" (whatever that means).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


You must be referring to the "historical materialism" of Cohen and its reliance on functionalist explanation (a la Durkheim). Or perhaps its the anti-dialectical "historical materialism" of Eduard Bernstein, the proponent of non-revolutionary development and reformism. So much for rejecting "traditional thought" (whatever that means).

Not at all. What on earth makes you think that?

And you have already had it pointed out to you that there are far more (vastly more) dialecticians who are counter-revolutionaries and/or reformists than there are those who are revolutionaries (namely the Stalinists and Maoists).

So, adherence to your mystical 'theory' is nothing to feel superior about.

Anyway, you only half believe it.:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oh, and I'm happy to go along with Marx's characterisation of traditional thought:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphasis added.]

And:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Ibid., pp.64-65, quoted from here.]

Let me know if you need any more help comprehending this 'difficult' idea...:)

[blake 3:17]

Sure, dialectics has 'progressed' since 1945. Most revolutionaries would call this 'Revisionism'. And the vast majority of the work done has had no impact whatsoever on the class war. It is therefore politically irrelevant.


So Cliff, Khrushchev and Debord are all the same?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Blake:


So Cliff, Khrushchev and Debord are all the same?

Where did I say they were?