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1st July 2010, 09:38
Mike Macnair (finally) replies to Paul Cockshott's critique of Revolutionary Strategy, the book by the former, presented in the article Democracy or Oligarchy? (I started a thread (http://www.revleft.com/vb/democracy-oligarchyi-t119643/index.html?t=119643) about it at the time). This is a two-part response, this is the first part which focuses on the role of the petty-bourgeoisie and middle class wage earners in a post-revolutionary society and, flowing from this, the need for a transitionary period. The second part will be published today in the new edition of the Weekly Worker and I'll post it here when it does.


Socialism is a form of class struggle

Why can’t the proletariat abolish capitalism immediately on taking power? The answer lies in the need for transition, argues Mike Macnair

http://cpgb.org.uk/images/1003992.jpg

This is a rather belated reply to Paul Cockshott’s critique of my book Revolutionary strategy.[1] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#1) In spite of the lapse of time it is worth replying, because Cockshott’s is in a certain sense the most serious and substantial criticism of the book so far offered. It has the great merit of (mostly) addressing my actual arguments, rather than simply assuming that I am a Kautskyite, as several reviewers have. Comrade Cockshott makes some serious and valid points about the question of democracy and concludes with a point with which I entirely agree: “to abolish the wages system we must first win the battle of democracy.”

Comrade Cockshott makes, in substance, three general criticisms of my book. The first concerns its “the lack of a theory of socialism” - meaning both a theory of the USSR and similar regimes, and a theory of the economic forms we should be fighting for as the immediate replacement of capitalism. In this connection, he disagrees with my characterisation of bureaucrats, managers and so on, as a section of the social class of petty proprietors.

The second, which appears to be a small point but is actually much larger, concerns the theory of the bourgeois state: he says that my account of this misses the power to tax, the (connected) “monopoly of armed force” and the parliamentary form. A connected issue is that of the existence of an international hierarchy of capitalist states: he points to Sweden as a counter-example to the connection I make between the ability to grant reforms and state status in the global pecking order of states.

The third criticism and the most elaborated in his article is that - like Kautsky - I buy into the parliamentary form. This, he argues, is a form of oligarchy; and the word republic means a Roman-style oligarchy, as opposed to what communists should be fighting for, which is an Athenian-style democracy.

There is a fourth, underlying theoretical issue which affects all these questions. This is about how to understand the historical transitions between different social formations: antiquity to feudalism, feudalism to capitalism, capitalism to communism. In my view humanity’s experience of previous historical transitions should affect our understanding of the last of those listed, the historical transition now in process; and this understanding has implications for present programmatic proposals.

My response will be in two parts. Comrade Cockshott’s first criticism, the “lack of a theory of socialism”, is partially legitimate, but shows a misunderstanding of what the book is basically about. However, one of his points under this head - the question of the class character of the labour and Soviet bureaucracies - is a really important question. To respond to it demands addressing my fourth issue, the general nature of historical transitions between modes of production and social formations; then the question of the petty-proprietor class, and its general implications for proposals for post-capitalist economic order. From this follows the question why I call bureaucrats and managers ‘petty proprietors of intellectual property’, and the implications of this analysis for understanding the Soviet and similar regimes.

At this point it is necessary to return - in the second part - to comrade Cockshott’s second point, the issue of the nature of the capitalist state and the hierarchy of capitalist states. In this context and that of what has gone before it is finally possible to address the issue of present proposals for political order to replace the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Theory of socialism

Comrade Cockshott complains that my book is characterised by “a failure to have any positive theory of socialism. This lack of a theory of socialism is first evident in the non-treatment of the history of the USSR and China, and later in a failure to spell out what sort of economy the socialist movement should be fighting for.”

It is quite true that the book has not much to say about the USSR and its satellites and imitators, less about their economic arrangements than their politics, and still less about “what sort of economy the socialist movement should be fighting for”.

However, the reason for this is that I was not attempting in the book to write a general theory of everything. Rather, in the series of articles which formed the basis of the book, I was originally responding to the debate on strategy in the French Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire. This response developed into an attempt to discriminate the minimum elements of Marxist strategy which could form the basis of practical unity of the Marxists: as opposed, on the one hand, to sects formed on the basis of a theory of everything and, on the other, to ‘broad left’ formations which end up as tails of the social-liberals.

I am extremely cautious about creating a schema of “what sort of economy the socialist movement should be fighting for”. There are two reasons for this. The first I argued in an article three years ago on the maximum-minimum form of programme.[2] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#2) The point was drawn from a letter of Marx to Sorge in 1880 on the Programme of the Parti Ouvrier, which appears to be the first use of “minimum programme”.

Marx wrote: “With the exception of some trivialities ... the economic section of the very brief document consists solely of demands that have spontaneously arisen out of the labour movement itself”.[3] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#3) Why did Marx insist on the ‘economic section’ consisting of “demands that have spontaneously arisen out of the labour movement itself”? The answer is that this approach is counterposed to utopian schemes about the nature of the organisation of the future communist society and about the transition which were then current.

The essence of the ‘Marxist’ policy was that the working class needed to take political power, and for that purpose to struggle for the democratic republic - as opposed to the Proudhonists’ fetishism of cooperatives, the Lassalleans’ state-sponsored cooperatives, and the Bakuninists’ fetishised general strike. Given that the proposal was that the working class take over the running of society, it was the working class itself which had to decide on economic and other policy priorities.

This was the approach of the First International: it was founded on a minimal set of claims about the need of the working class to organise, and the First International itself then discussed what concrete working class policy should be in relation to several areas.

We are obviously not in this situation today: there are mass working class trade unions, parties and so on, but they are controlled by bureaucracies loyal to the capitalist state. Hence Marxists are forced to organise independently of the pro-capitalist labour bureaucracy. So, while we cannot substitute for the decisions of the working class as a whole on how to reshape the economy, we are forced to put forward our own proposals for discussion in the workers’ movement.

Within this framework, however, a second and less fundamental point remains. Today’s splintered, self-identified Marxist left argues for the overthrow of capitalism. It does so in diverse ways, often ones which abandon Marx’s and Engels’ class-political conception in favour of popular frontism. But there are also entirely legitimate differences within the self-identified Marxist left about political economy issues. These affect the immediate economic implications of the overthrow of the capitalist power. My book is - as I said before - about the potential minimum basis of Marxist unity: not about a global alternative on everything.

In relation to the USSR and its satellites and imitators, this same point about the book meant that I drew two, and only two, very basic lessons from their failure. The first lesson is that the proletariat needs to take power on a scale which can defeat a centralised imperialist financial and military blockade. I think that this point - that the proletariat needs to aim to take power on a continental scale, not in a single country which can be blockaded until it is forced to give in - is agreed with comrade Cockshott.

The second lesson is that - contrary to the ideas propagated by Lenin, Trotsky and others in 1918-21 - the proletariat needs political democracy if it is to control a state. I think this point is agreed, too, though we have significant differences on what is meant here by ‘political democracy’.

Beyond this point, in my opinion a wide range of opinions as to the nature of the Soviet regime and its satellites and imitators is consistent with a common party affiliation. For example, I personally think that ‘Cliff state capitalism’ involves false conceptions of both classes and capitalism which are corrosive of the theoretical fundamentals of Marxism. But I would not dream of arguing that holding this theory is inconsistent with membership in a common party.

That said, the question of the bureaucracy is not just a matter of the fate of the USSR and its satellites and imitators. It also concerns the fate of the Second International and of the trade union movement, and is a burning question affecting the left today. The larger question of the class nature of the professional and managerial ‘employed middle class’, and the question of the place of the petty proprietors in general, also has major implications for what we should be fighting for as the immediate successor of capitalist rule.

Social transitions

In another polemic posted on the Reality home page he maintains, comrade Cockshott remarks that his view of historical materialism is influenced by the fact that he is by profession an engineer.[4] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#4) I make no criticism at all of this. Rather, I have to admit that my view of historical materialism is also affected by my profession: that is, that I am a ‘lawyer legal historian’. This background means that I am not, as ‘proper historians’ mostly are, a ‘period specialist’. I routinely work with the longue durée (long-term historical phenomena as distinct from the play of short-term events).

This background means that I have never been even slightly tempted by what is now the very common ‘academic Marxist’ view that pre-capitalist social formations of class rule, though very varied in superstructural forms, are all one at the base - ‘tributary’ - and do not develop the forces of production. This view is in reality simply flatly inconsistent with the evidence available both from archaeology and from surviving records of lawsuits, and so on.

The converse is that I also reject the view that capitalism is so different and inherits so little from pre-capitalist development that the phenomena of capitalism can be fully explained by the abstract laws of motion of capital developed in Marx’s critique of political economy. Historical materialism - or at least the Mediterranean-European historical sequence from slaveowner urbanism, through feudalism, to capitalism - is essential to understanding ‘real existing capitalism’.

The pure forms of the abstract dynamics of a society of slaveowners and slaves, or of landowners/clerics and serfs, or of capitalists and workers, are never found in any actual society. They are abstractions from the complexity of real, historical social orders, which are essential to grasping the fundamental dynamics of these social orders, not direct descriptions.

Firstly, what is found in the historical evidence is rising slave-based urbanism mixed with earlier social forms; declining slave-based urbanism mixed with proto-feudalism; risingfeudalism mixed with survivals of slave-based urbanism; declining feudalism mixed with proto-capitalism; risingcapitalism mixed with feudal survivals; and declining capitalism mixed with proto-communism. It is only at its apogee moment that a class regime looks close to its abstract conception; even then, the social order is one dominated by slavery, feudalism, capitalism ... not one purely characterised by these relations.[5] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#5)

This is because, secondly, petty family production for immediate consumption is a feature of all societies after hunter-gatherer ‘primitive communism’. In the imperialist countries it is marginalised into the forms of supplementation of market provisioning through housework, vegetable gardens/allotments, and the ability of rural producers to take for consumption a portion of a product mainly intended for market for direct consumption.

Going along with this, gift exchange persists as an element of the organisation of production in class societies, and remains an important social form at the base even in the imperialist countries.[6] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#6) And petty family commodity production for sale into localised markets is an important element of all societies having money or proto-money forms. Again, in those imperialist countries that have not artificially preserved small peasants and artisan food producers (eg, Britain, US and the Netherlands, as opposed to France, Italy ...) it is a relatively marginal element.

Petty bourgeoisie

The objective, long-run tendency of capitalism is to marginalise petty family production, and this is a contrast with previous forms of class society. It is this tendency which forms the objective basis for both the possibility of communism and the necessity of communism. Capitalism actually socialises the means of production in its own way: dominance of corporate businesses, etc. It thus tends to render transparent the fact that these are actually common assets, worked by forms of cooperation between large numbers of workers, and the capitalists merely thieving managers pilfering from the collective till. This transparency appears precisely when basic or infrastructural firms are at risk of general bankruptcy - as with the banks in the ‘credit crunch’.

However, this long-term tendency of capitalism is a long way from being completed. This is because of the global scale of the question: still hundreds of millions of Chinese and of Indian peasants, for example. It is also because of counter-tendencies within capitalist dynamics. Luxury and niche markets are occupied by petty bourgeois. And (especially in the countries of the periphery) severe unemployment leads to deproletarianisation, as people abandon hope of finding jobs and scrape a living from gardening, as petty pedlars, from theft, and so on. There is also in every imperialist country substantial state intervention to preserve and promote the middle classes as a political bulwark against the proletariat.

Britain is historically perhaps the country in which capitalist development has gone furthest. Yet there are above 4.5 million small businesses, so that the ‘classic’ petty bourgeoisie and small capitalists together amount to at least 14.5% of the working-age population. This leaves aside altogether for the moment the question of skills as intellectual property rights and the employed middle classes. For reasons of differences of fertility and mortality between classes, the percentage of children and youth of the petty bourgeoisie is lower, and the percentage of petty bourgeois of pensionable age is higher.

In addition, by virtue of the occupational pensions arrangements in this country, both retired ‘classic’ petty-bourgeois and retired members of the employed middle class and the upper (skilled) working class become rentiers living on the proceeds of savings and investments. Hence in terms of social self-identification the percentage of pensioners identifying as small rentiers, as opposed to identifying as retired workers, is considerably higher than the combined percentage of ‘classic’ petty bourgeois and of small rentiers in the working-age population.

This is a minority, but it is a non-trivial minority. And the ‘classic’ petty bourgeoisie and small capitalists together have practical control of significant segments of the means of production which have as yet not been concentrated and thereby ‘socialised’ by capitalist development. Though the businesses in question are largely interstitial, there is considerable potential for economic disruption - ie the reduction of available use-values - if their owners were to take to sabotage, or even merely to abandon them, as a response to being expropriated or subjected to forced collectivisation.

Agriculture is on the edge of this sector. British ‘family farmers’ cannot be characterised as peasants or petty bourgeois, since agriculture is now characteristically operated by family members with very small numbers of permanent workers, but very large amounts of capital in the form of land values, farm buildings and machinery. Only some forms of agriculture - particularly market gardening and fruit-farming - use substantial amounts of casual migrant labour in the harvest period. Again, however, the absence of concentration and the potential for serious economic disruption if a policy of simple expropriation or forced collectivisation were to be adopted is clear.

Once we go beyond Britain to continental Europe, there are in several countries substantial real peasantries and groups of artisan producers, so that the problem is sharper than it is in Britain.

The conclusion from these points is that, assuming the proletariat takes political power in the next 40-50 years, there will still be a substantial period of transition which falls between the complete overthrow of the global capitalist state system and the fully collective appropriation of the means of production (communism). This period of transition is properly the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class rule of the proletariat over the surviving petty bourgeoisie and small capital, in a contradictory economic order in which those means of production which the capitalists have already ‘socialised’ are collectively appropriated, but the participants in this collective appropriation have to trade with substantial groups of petty bourgeois and some small capitalists, who are politically subordinated to the proletarian majority.

The period can also be called for short-hand ‘socialism’, as we do in the CPGB Draft programme, provided it is clear that by ‘socialism’ we mean this transitional period of working class rule over other subsisting classes, and not a separate stage standing between the dictatorship of the proletariat and communism. ‘Dictatorship of the proletariat’ is in my opinion scientifically superior because it expresses the fact that the petty bourgeoisie and small capital continue to exist in this period, but are institutionally subordinated to the proletariat as a class.

Knowledge can be power

The same is true of the employed middle classes - and with sharper immediate political consequences. I characterise this group as a segment of the class of petty proprietors (or, traditionally but less scientifically, petty bourgeois): ‘petty proprietors of intellectual property’. I argue that the state, corporate and labour (trade union, co-op, party and left group) bureaucracies - including the Soviet bureaucracy - are part of this class segment.

In the book I wrote of the USSR: “What happened instead was to render concrete the 1850s warnings of Marx and Engels against the premature seizure of power in Germany, which formed the basis of Kautsky’s caution in the 1890s and 1900s. By choosing to represent the peasantry and other petty proprietors (especially state bureaucrats), the workers’ party disabled itself from representing the working class, but instead became a sort of collective Bonaparte.”

Comrade Cockshott responds: “... so long as petty peasant production existed, it created wings within the CPs which defended its interest: Bukharin, Gomulka, Deng. But these were just one wing, and in most cases they did not come out on top.” And: “The crisis of the socialist system, Poland aside, was not generally precipitated by the demands of petty proprietors in agriculture, and the identification of state bureaucrats with petty proprietors is an unconvincing throwaway phrase, not justified by any argument.”

I did not write about this issue at length in the book for the reasons given above. But I have written about it elsewhere: in a review of some books on intellectual property rights in 2003, as a small point in a reply to John Robinson’s critique of the Strategy book in 2008, and most particularly in a review of David Priestland’s Stalinism and the politics of mobilisation, also in 2008, which formed part of a three-part reply to comrade Tony Clark’s defence of Stalinism.[7] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#7) Part of the last is worth repeating; but I would also refer readers to the whole series.

A substantial class of information and skills are part of the means of production. Going back to the stone age, knowing how knap flint gives you variety of tools once you can find a flint. Conversely, if someone gave me a capstan lathe, it would be - to me - a heap of junk, not a means of production, until I learned how to work it. Some ‘managerial’ skills, of coordinating the work of others, fall into this category: for example, in a car factory, if nobody works out how many screws need to be ordered from the supplier, the factory will run out of screws and cease production.

Capitalism tends to socialise information and skills - through general education, through publishing, through replacement of skills by machines and so on. But to the extent that information and skills are not socialised they are private property.

Large property in information takes the form of technical monopolies which receive technical rents (usually patents and other intellectual property rights; but there are also unpatented ‘trade secrets’ in many machines, which require ‘reverse engineering’ by skilled engineers to allow duplication of the machine). The tsarist empire specialised in exporting raw materials, mainly grain, in the hope of gaining access to Dutch and British, and later French, intellectual property in various forms. The USSR had to break its back exporting in 1928-31 in order to gain access to US intellectual property in the form of machines.[8] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#8)

Under capitalism, small private property in skills or information can in some cases be used to run a small business (like plumbers, dentists or practising lawyers). Similarly, a family farm (or peasant holding) does not just consist of land. It also involves movable capital (animals, etc) and a very wide range of skills. Adam Smith made the point that the farmer or farmworker needs more skills than the urban specialist artisan.[9] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#9)

In other cases, the collective monopoly of the skill held by a group of people allows them in wage bargaining to insist on some sort of premium over the wage. This premium can be in money; or it can be in better working conditions (white-collar workers), in partial freedom from managerial control, or in managerial control over others.

The classical petty bourgeois “self-exploit”: that is, they and their family members often work longer hours for less reward than employed workers. They do so partly in the hope of making the breakthrough to getting rich - for most as illusory as buying lottery tickets. But also, and perhaps mainly, they prefer the (limited) control which “running their own business” gives them to the subordination of working for wages. This includes control over family members who help in the business - hence petty bourgeois patriarchalism; it also involves the exclusion of others from decision-making.

The employed middle class share the classical petty bourgeois aspiration to ‘make it big’, in this case the hope of climbing the career pyramid to one of the few places at the top. They also share the preference for control over subordination. In their case, however, control is immediately exercised over others - their subordinates. And what others are to be excluded from is access to information and decision-making. Bureaucrats and managers defend their ‘turf’ against all-comers. Marx commented on the point in the Critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right.[10] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#10) The US government has found it expressed in the ‘war on terror’ in ‘turf wars’ between intelligence agencies.[11] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#11)

The proletariat as a class can only defend its interests by collective organisation. If bureaucracy and management are not to be instantly abolished - ie, everyone to take their turn for a month or two as chief of general staff, national statistician and so on - the proletariat needs to subordinate the employed middle class to itself. To do so it requires freedom to organise against the officials, ‘cadres’, and so on.

Under capitalism, ownership/possession of information and skills is subordinate to ownership/possession of money liquidity. (This is, in fact, also true of ownership/possession both of land and of ships, machinery and so on).

If we take away the capitalist market when there has not already been extensive socialisation of intellectual property (and other small production), we take away with it the dynamic which tends to socialise intellectual property rights, etc. The possessors of small property then confront the rest of the society as monopolists. Unless they are coerced, they will refuse to work until they get what they want - whether it is money, working conditions or being in charge.

Russian Revolution

This is part of what happened to the Russian Revolution. The Russian revolutionaries thought in October 1917 that they were starting the European revolution. When the German workers had not come to their aid by February-March 1918, they were in a situation like cartoon characters who have walked off a cliff and suddenly notice that nothing is holding them up: the economy was collapsing because the possessors of specialist information - whether they were civil servants and army officers, technicians, managers or peasant farmers - were withholding their services from the general economy. To meet this problem the Bolsheviks used coercion (Cheka, hostage-taking and so on). But they also had to provide a carrot: and this carrot was concessions to the spetsy, which meant the end of workers’ control and a return to the subordination of the working class to the managers.

They had also sucked most of the members of the Bolshevik Party into the new state apparatus. As of October 1917 the party had around 250,000 members, mostly workers. As of 1921 it had a slightly larger membership, but now two-thirds composed of state officials.[12] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#12) The ‘cadres’ had become a new section of the intelligentsia - petty private proprietors of information and skills.

Over 1918-21 the freedom of the working class to organise against the ‘cadres’ was taken away by successive bans on parties and then the ban on factions in the Communist Party. As long as formally illegal organising was still possible, the removal of power from the proletariat was not complete. Once the bans were actually carried into practical operation from the later 1920s and enforced by the new economic regime of the plans, nothing was possible but ‘court intrigue’ within the bureaucracy. Subsequent satellites and imitators of the Soviet regime copied this political order.

Of course - as comrade Cockshott says, citing J Arch Getty - sections of workers could mobilise behind one or another court clique and obtain at least temporary sectional gains by doing so. The same was true in the Chinese ‘cultural revolution’.[13] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992#13) But that is no more workers’ political power than the similar ability of medieval peasants to play off parson against squire and so on was peasant political power.

Modern Europe

In modern Europe the level of capitalist socialisation of production is massively higher than in the early 20th century, and still more so than in Russia in 1917. The same is also true of the socialisation of information and skills. Literacy and some degree of formal education are pretty much general. Skills are made available through formal education and training more than by apprenticeship. Much is codified in books or available online.

Even so, however, we are not yet in a position - if capitalist rule was by a miracle overthrown tomorrow - to do without bureaucratic and managerial spetsy altogether: that is, for everyone to take their turn for a month or two as chief of general staff, national statistician and so on.

More immediately, there are many more people who are perfectly capable of doing managerial and bureaucratic jobs, of holding political leadership positions and so on than there are jobs for them to do. In the far left, the result is that people are less willing to defer for long periods to bureaucratic dictatorship. But the result is paradoxically negative: the endless splintering of the left groups and the cacophony of ‘independent’ voices. As long as we do not find ways to overcome this problem we will not even approach the ability to overthrow capitalism.

In sum. Suppose the working class takes power in Europe in the next period. The result will not be an immediate overcoming of class. It will be a contradictory regime. Though big capital will be collectivised, there will remain class conflict between the proletariat and what are now the middle classes: both the ‘classic’ petty bourgeoisie and small capital, and employed middle class. The political forms we fight for as the immediate alternative to capitalist rule have to be able to reflect that continuing class conflict and to allow the proletariat to organise for it - including against ‘its own’ state.

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Notes


P Cockshott, ‘Democracy or oligarchy?’ Weekly Worker October 8 2009. A slightly variant version is also available at reality.gn.apc.org/polemic/notesonmcnair.pdf (http://reality.gn.apc.org/polemic/notesonmcnair.pdf)
‘For a minimum programme!’ Weekly Worker August 30 2007.
Marx to Sorge, November 5 1880: www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/letters/80_11_05.htm (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/letters/80_11_05.htm)
‘Historical materialism and the repudiation of subjectivism’: reality.gn.apc.org/polemic/op-phil.htm (http://reality.gn.apc.org/polemic/op-phil.htm)
The appropriate Marxist method for approaching class orders is thus that of GEM de Ste Croix The class struggle in the ancient Greek world New York 1991.
M Mauss The gift (1923-24) London 2001; M Sahlins Stone age economics Chicago 1972; RM Titmuss The gift relationship New York 1972; F Adloff, S Mau, ‘Giving social ties, reciprocity in modern society’ (2006) 68 European Journal of Sociology 93-123. I do not mean to endorse the general theoretical method of any of these texts, but only to rely on the point of the existence and persistence of gift exchange.
‘A bridge too far’ Weekly Worker December 18 2003; ‘Against philosopher kings’, December 11 2008; ‘Bureaucracy and terror’, September 11 2008 - to be read with ‘Taking Stalinism seriously’, September 4 2008, and ‘Stalinist illusions exposed’, September 18 2008.
See B Kagarlitsky Empire of the periphery London 2008.
A Smith Wealth of nations book 1, chapter 10, part 2: www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b1-c10-pt-2.htm (http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b1-c10-pt-2.htm)
K Marx Critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right Cambridge 1970, pp41-54.
For example, ‘Obama sacks intelligence chief after turf wars’ Financial Times May 21 2010.
E Acton Rethinking the Russian Revolution London 1990, pp193-94, 207.
D Priestland Stalinism and the politics of mobilisation Oxford 2007 (pp200-210) goes beyond Getty; cf also EJ Perry, Li Xun Proletarian power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution Boulder 1997.

While the article does what it sets out for - explaining the need for a transitionary period - it doesn't come up with a political alternative and is therefore only a onesided (negative) reply to Cockshott's idea of a jury-democracy. I hope part 2 will offer a positive reply to this.

Q
1st July 2010, 14:39
And part 2 (haven't read this one yet):


Representation, not referendums

The basis of decision-making under the dictatorship of the proletariat is not the same as under communism, argues Mike Macnair

http://cpgb.org.uk/images/1004002.jpg Last week in the first part of my reply to Paul Cockshott, I argued that the nature of the transitions between social formations, and the continuing significance of the petty-proprietor class - including both the ‘classic’ petty-bourgeoisie and the employed middle class - meant that if the proletariat is to take political power in Europe in this period what will follow will still be a transitional form characterised by class conflicts between the proletariat and the petty proprietors.[1] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#1)

I concluded that the political forms we fight for as the immediate alternative to capitalist rule have to be able to reflect that continuing class conflict and to allow the proletariat to organise for it - including workers mobilising against ‘their own’ state. To quote Marx’s notes on Bakunin’s Statism and anarchy, “the proletariat organised as ruling class” means merely “that the proletariat, instead of struggling sectionally against the economically privileged class, has attained a sufficient strength and organisation to employ general means of coercion in this struggle.”[2] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#2)

In this part I move in the first place to a highly abstract issue: the problems of collective decision-making in general - and temporarily abstracting from class society. In fact, of course, we live in class society, we have done for some thousands of years and if capitalism were overthrown worldwide tomorrow we would still live in class society, albeit under working class rule, for at least a generation or two. So the things that can be said about collective decision-making in a society without classes have to be very tentative. They can be partly, but only partly, drawn from decision-making within ruling classes, like Athenian slave-trader pirates and slave-owning artisans and farmers, as comrade Cockshott does. They can be partly, but also only partly, drawn from the positive and negative problems of decision-making in working class collective organisations.

It is necessary to go to this level of abstraction for two reasons. The first is that comrade Cockshott de facto does so. He says that communists should seek an ‘Athenian’ democracy, not a ‘Roman’ oligarchy. In a sense he is right. But to argue at this level necessarily abstracts from the political-economic and military foundations of the Athenian politeia and the Roman res publica. The second and more fundamental reason is that class society is at the end of the day a form of organisation of collective social decision-making: the ruling class, and its individual members, make the collective decisions ‘for’ the rest of us.

Collective decisions

Every society has to have modes of taking collective decisions. Some individual decisions affect the individual alone. Many others - especially those concerning production - necessarily impact on other people. The standard example is Garret Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the commons’: if every commoner individually decides to put a few more beasts on the common, the common will be destroyed.[3] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#3) This is usually used as an argument for private property and against communism, but since some things - like highways, or property law - must be common in even the most individual property-rights set-up,[4] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#4) all it really proves is the necessity of social decision-making with a view to the common good.

Individual conscious thought and collective discussion leading to consensus or votes, and so on, are only a sub-set of decision-making mechanisms. Individual training and habits, collective traditions and customs, and formally adopted rules (like traffic regulations) are all decision rules. They are individual or collective ‘default settings’ in frequently encountered choices: followed unless there are strong reasons to displace them. The delegation of decisions to individuals or sub-groups is also a kind of decision rule, for the society - or organised social groups, like parties and unions - considered as a whole

Within this framework, private property in the means of production is a decision rule under which decisions affecting the common welfare are collectively delegated to the individual owner. Contrary to the fantasies of the libertarians, this delegation is in no society ever complete. On the contrary, private property produces as its inherent negation: the idea of the ‘public’, whether in the form of religious organisations, the political state or both; limits on private property; and ‘takings’ of private property for public purposes (like road-building).

The existence of ruling classes is even more clearly a decision rule which delegates decision-making power to members of the ruling class or to this class as a whole. The slaveowner directs the work of his slaves, the manorial landlord of his villeins, the capitalist of his employees. Moreover, the institutions of slavery, feudal rents, etc, and capitalist profits, fund a class elite which specialises in group public decision-making. Ruling classes do not, of course, usually emerge through a conscious decision of society as a whole to delegate decision-making power to them. Rather, their role in collective decision-making leads to them being seen as something more than simple thieves, and hence to them not being rapidly overthrown.

Private property and class do not arise by a conscious decision to allocate social decision-making power to property owners and ruling classes. But a formal and intentional delegation of decision-making power to an individual or group on a permanent or renewable basis creates what is in substance a private property right. The fact that it is not recognised in law as a property right and is not (directly) an inheritable one does not alter its character as a property right in substance.[5] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#5) It is this private-property character which forms the basis of the turf wars between bureaucrats which I referred to in last week’s article. And it formed the interest of the Soviet bureaucracy in converting what they owned into inheritable property through the restoration of capitalism.

Capitalism is a sub-variant of the general phenomena of private property and class. It allocates social decision-making power to a ruling class, taking the particular form of the holders of accumulations of money (including in money a wide variety of debt claims). But, contrary to the various ideologies of neoclassical, Austrian, etc economics, the money regime does not dissolve class. The substructure of capitalism remains a class order, one in which social decision-making power is delegated to the capitalist class and its individual members.

Communism

Communism is transhistorically attractive because the delegation of social decision-making power to a ruling elite, with a subordinate class excluded from social decision-making power, is in contradiction with the nature of the human species. Hence the recurrence of utopian communisms, from variants of early Christianity and Mazdakism, through various medieval heresies, to the 19th century utopian socialists.

Communism is presently posed, in a historical sense, for two reasons. The first is that capitalism tends to concentrate production to such an extent that private decision-making about productive activities produces systemically irrational results. This irrationality is expressed most starkly in periodic economic crises, like the one now going on, in which too much material wealth and productivity produces impoverishment. Through the link between capital and the state (above) it is also expressed in increasingly destructive wars.

The second reason why communism is posed is that capitalism produces and constantly expands the proletariat - a class which, because it lacks property in the means of production, needs collective, as opposed to private, decision-making in order to defend its interests. In doing so, capitalism creates the underlying conditions for a society without private property and class.

It follows that communism will need decision-making mechanisms which form the basis for voluntary solidarity: mechanisms which do not exclude anyone from social decision-making. Communism abandons the default decision rules provided by private property and money. But its mechanisms will necessarily include other decision rules, which provide default decisions or which delegate decision-making power.

To recognise this it is only necessary to imagine the case of a decision to adopt, or not to adopt, a new bicycle design at a minor bicycle factory in a small town, whether this town is to be in northern England, southern India or any other location. It would be plainly irrational for this decision and the numberless similar decisions which arise every day to be taken collectively by the five billion-odd people in the world above the age of 15. This is true even if we assume universal literacy and net access and (trustworthy) instant electronic referenda. Global decisions will need to be of rough frameworks, which are then more closely specified by local decisions; ‘local’ here including both a range of geographical instances, from continent level down to village level, and a range of sectoral instances, from the level of global shipping, through continental rails and power grids, down to workplace levels.

A different form of the problem is that of narrowing the range of possible positions to the point at which a collective decision is possible. Comrade Cockshott and his co-author, Allin Cottrell, have demonstrated that von Mises’ objection to socialism - that planning is impossible because of the complexity of the calculations involved - is false in the light of modern computing power.[6] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#6) However, the planning exercise proposed presupposes general choices of plan goals. Put another way, the planning exercise could contribute to narrowing the range of choices by excluding impossible combinations (like capitalist politicians’ promises of both lower taxes and improved public services). But a range, very likely a large range, of different combinations of plan objects and means remain possible. To reach decisions for action among a large range of possibilities it is necessary to have means to narrow down the options.

The process of narrowing down options to get to the point where a decision is possible necessarily involves delegation arrangements. The problem is simply the natural limits of time and numbers. Consider our five billion people (above) deciding among (at a fairly conservative estimate) 850 different options for a global set of annual plan priorities ...

Take, for example, the old and somewhat more democratic form of Labour Party conference: 650 constituency parties, 20-odd affiliated trade unions and various other affiliated organisations each had the right to submit a single motion to party conference. To enable a week-long conference to take place some means was necessary to reduce the number of these that went to the vote. The means was in practice bureaucratic selection of agenda topics and ‘compositing’ of related motions. Procedural distinctions between motion and amendment, between counterposed motions and those that are not, and so on, play a similar role. I do not recommend the particular bureaucratic solutions traditional in the labour movement, but the problem is a real problem.

Comrade Cockshott argues that “If Macnair really wanted to follow the logic of the working class party being the most consistent advocate of democracy, what he should be demanding is:


the replacement of all parliaments, councils, assemblies and quangos by juries drawn randomly from the population;
the right of initiative and referendum, with taxes and the budget to be submitted to popular vote; declarations of war only by popular vote; ...[7] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#7)
abolition of the judiciary and magistracy; juries to be supreme in courts; no loss of liberty without jury trial.”

Under full global communism, I think that the first and third of these slogans would in principle be entirely correct; though the particular forms of decision-making organisation will, of course, be decided by future generations. The reason they would be correct is that communism involves the supersession of the ‘social division of labour’: ie, it ceases to be the case that people specialise for life in particular tasks, and in particular that some people specialise in decision-making tasks and others in doing what they are told.[8] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#8) Doing decision-making tasks for a period of time then becomes a tedious chore, which the individuals involved are obliged to do from time to time, like jury service.

Universal decision-making by referendum with an unrestricted right of initiative would, however, be wrong even under full communism. The reason is that, completely irrespective of access and trustworthiness issues, it ignores the delegation problems - both of local decision-making and of narrowing the agenda for decision - discussed above. Imagine for a moment: you get up in the morning and log on, and find in your inbox 20 million referendum proposals to be read and voted on ...

Exactly the same problem affects a common far-left idea, that ‘representatives’, whether elected or selected at random, should be replaced by ‘delegates’ subject to imperative mandates in all their voting. If fully implemented in practice, the effect is that the meeting of the body at which the delegates vote is a complete waste of time: what has actually happened is a referendum with the voting taking place in the delegating bodies. Precisely because the effect is actually a referendum, there is only an illusion of delegation.

Transitional forms

We do not leap instantly from capitalism to full communism. In the first part of this reply I emphasised the continuing presence of the petty bourgeoisie and the employed middle class after the immediate overthrow of capitalist rule.

Because the petty proprietors continue to exist, the immediate abolition of law and lawyers is not feasible. Comrade Cockshott’s proposal for the supremacy of the jury - the old slogan, ‘Juries judges both of law and fact’, is sound as an immediate measure. But “abolition of the judiciary and magistracy” would amount to an attempt to immediately abolish law and lawyers. They would resurface in black-market form, as they did in revolutionary France.

There is a continuing class struggle between the proletariat and the small proprietors. This class struggle is somewhat different in character from the ‘classic’ class struggle between proletarians and capitalists, which is driven by the obvious antagonism that wage cuts, longer hours and speed-up increase profits and vice versa. Rather the small proprietors have three interests opposed to those of the proletariat.

The first is an interest in obtaining an enlarged share of the social product relative to proletarians and to their competitors in the small-proprietor class (which is partially, but only partially, justified due to the higher costs of reproduction of skilled labour-power). This is reflected in conflict over the prices of products and services provided by members of the petty-proprietor class - in extreme forms the ‘scissors crises’ seen at various times in the USSR, China and Cuba. It is also reflected in managerial and bureaucratic self-dealing for special privileges.

The second is an interest in the exploitation of family labour with a view to accumulation, both to keep the small proprietor ‘above’ proletarians, and in competition with other small proprietors. This is ideologically reflected as patriarchalism, commitment to the subordination of women and of youth, and therefore opposed to the interest of the proletariat in solidarity across gender and age. It is as true of the managerial middle class as of rural small proprietors: this is seen every day in divorce-court battles over assets.

The third is an interest in retaining monopoly control of their tangible or intangible property and therefore excluding ‘outsiders’ of one sort or another both from competing access, and from decisions. This is expressed in one form in - for a couple of examples - village and small-town suspicion of ‘incomers’, and practising lawyers’ hostility to any reform which might undermine their monopoly. It takes another form in - also examples - bureaucratic ‘turf wars’, and the dictatorship of the bureaucracy in the organisations of the workers’ movement.

If petty-proprietor skill monopolies were not real, we could move immediately from capitalism to communism. But they are real, and because of this the proletariat is required not only to trade with small family producers, but also to employ the managerial middle class in the form of union, party, cooperative, state, etc. officials.

The problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat is how to keep the officials in a state of subordination to the proletarian majority, and to use an appropriate combination of carrot and stick to force them to accept a gradual process of socialisation of their monopolised skills and information.

The primary measures of this class struggle are economic. They are general reduction of working hours, and increased availability of education (especially adult education) and retraining, in order to ‘overproduce’ holders of the skills monopolised by the managerial middle class, and other such measures.

The problem can also be tackled directly through rotation of office: that is, compulsory and short term limits, which require officials to stand down completely at the end of their period of office and return to their prior jobs or the normal labour market for a period of time before they are eligible again to stand for office.

Most fundamental, however, is the enforcement as far as practically possible of transparency. The reason is that, as I have already said, what the managerial middle class monopolises is precisely access to information.

This, in turn, requires that class-political struggle should itself take a transparent form. Under full communism, comrade Cockshott is correct that decision-makers should in principle be appointed by lot, like jurors. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, however, it is in the interest of the proletariat that the class interest of the petty proprietors should be openly expressed in the form of political parties and factions - and therefore there has to be some form of elective, representative institutions for decision-making.

The alternative, as the experience of the USSR and its satellites and imitators makes clear, is not that the class interests of the petty proprietors go unrepresented. It is that, excluded from open representation, these interests are promoted in an obscure and subterranean way in secret-factional and clique struggles within the party and state apparatus. Precisely because this form of representation of petty-proprietor interests is obscure and subterranean, it actually subordinates proletarian interests to the interests of the managerial middle class.

The capitalist state

Is this argument - that the dictatorship of the proletariat needs to employ elective, representative forms, in which the small proprietors are openly represented - ‘parliamentarism’ and therefore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie? Comrade Cockshott argues that it is an ‘aristocratic’ or ‘oligarchic’ form, and this I have addressed above: it is a transitional form. But he also argues, in relation to the question of the nature of the capitalist state, that it is central to the bourgeois character of this state.

In my book Revolutionary strategy I write: “The inner secret of the capitalist state form is not bourgeois democracy. Rather it has three elements: 1. the rule of law - ie the judicial power; 2. the deficit financing of the state through organised financial markets; and 3. the fact that capital rules, not through a single state, but through an international state system, of which each national state is merely a part.”

Comrade Cockshott responds: “This seems a little idiosyncratic, particularly point 2. True, states often do use deficit financing, and indeed one can argue that the growth in the money supply necessary for the circuit M-C-M’ can often occur this way. But why is deficit finance the key? Surely the power to tax is more important than that, and in particular the power to levy taxes in money rather than in kind. Along with this goes the right to issue money.

“... Why too does he miss out the monopoly of armed force held by the state, the existence of a standing army and salaried police? Why does he not mention the parliamentary state as the characteristic constitutional form of civil society?”

As to the “monopoly of armed force, the existence of a standing army and salaried police”, on the one hand no state anywhere has ever had an actual monopoly of armed force, and in the US and Britain in the 19th century - surely capitalist states - the standing armies were trivial in size, and salaried police an innovation which dated considerably after the seizure of power by the capitalist class. The role of ‘Pinkerton men’ and other employer-hired goons in late 19th-early 20th century US strike-breaking provides one example among many of non-state organised armed force in capitalist states. Non-state organised armed auxiliaries of the capitalist class (not just fascist bands, though they are the most striking form) also surface wherever the class struggle attains a high level of intensity.

On the other hand, every state from Pharaonic Egypt and the ancient Mesopotamian empires onward, and including the feudal kingdoms, has disposed of a sufficient preponderance of organised armed force - an ‘army in being’ or the ability to assemble one - to allow it to extract surplus in the form of tax from the inhabitants of a territory and to prevent rival states, or predatory pastoralists or sea-raiders, from interfering with this surplus-extraction.

This is comrade Cockshott’s second point - the state’s power to tax. Military preponderance and ability to assemble an army are sufficient to support territorial coherence and the extraction of tax: witness - for example - the ‘geld’ of later Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman England or the more elaborate tax operations of later medieval England: at none of these periods were there standing armies.

As comrade Cockshott says, and as he and his co-authors argue at more length in Classical econophysics, state taxation is the basis of money - and money is also a prerequisite of capitalism. But money long antedates capitalism: I do not suppose that comrade Cockshott and his co-authors would characterise Lydia in the 7th century BCE, and so on, as capitalist states.

Tax and the preponderance of armed force give us a state; they do not by any means give us a capitalist state. I suggest that states - after the very earliest temple-states - are created by new ruling classes (slaveowners, feudal lords, capitalists) in particular forms which tie them to the new ruling class. These forms are then the basis of the loyalty of the state officials to the state as an organisation. This loyalty allows the state to act coherently rather than collapsing into a mass of competing small-scale protection rackets (which is the fate of failed states).

My “idiosyncratic” summary account of the capitalist state form is, then, not designed to distinguish state from non-state societies, but to distinguish capitalist states from feudal or other pre-capitalist states and from the dictatorship of the proletariat.

As to deficit finance, it is true that pre-capitalist states can and do borrow - and default on their debts. The distinctive aspect of capitalist states is the creation of organised markets in a standing state debt and the hypothecation (mortgaging) of tax income in the first place to payment of the interest charges on this debt. The practice was invented in the interstitial-capitalist, medieval Italian city-states. It became a decisive feature of the form of the capitalist state with the late 16th century Dutch revolt and the aftermath of 1688 in England. Lending to the new state was initially and for some time afterwards an overtly political, as well as an economic, act.[9] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#9) The effect of this standing debt is that creditors become stakeholders in the state in the same sense that a company’s ‘stockholders’ or ‘debenture holders’ of standing debt stock are stakeholders in the company. The standing debt and the financial market grown up around it is the core of the integration of the capitalist class as a ruling class, one which rules the state.

Intimately linked is the ‘rule of law’, which comrade Cockshott does not discuss. The standing debt requires that the ‘first mortgage’ of tax revenue to pay debt interest must be a ‘credible commitment’. This credibility is given by the ‘rule of law’: the commitment that the state will act only by making rules which will be enforced in courts or under rules which will be enforced in courts.[10] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#10) Feudal and antique states, whether based on personal monarchy or (some ancient cities) on the direct sovereignty of citizens or oligarchs, cannot give such commitments.

Finally and centrally, Comrade Cockshott says that I miss “the parliamentary state as the characteristic constitutional form of civil society”. ‘Civil society’ is a slippery expression here. I assume that what comrade Cockshott means is bourgeois society, rather than the ‘civil society’ of non-state public discourse, clubs, groups, etc.[11] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#11) The reason for making this assumption is that the parliamentary constitution is a state form, not a non-state form, and parliament a component of the state order.

Having made this assumption, the answer is that, though the parliamentary state form is a common form of capitalist state, it is not a necessary form of capitalist rule. The ‘rule of law state’ requires a sharp conceptual separation of the acts of legislating (making rules for the future) adjudication (judging disputes as to the application of existing rules) and the executive power (other governmental decision-making). Such a separation is absent in Ottoman or Mughal firman, or in Tudor and early Stuart privy council and star chamber orders.

However, this conceptual separation does not require the US-style full personal separation of legislature, judiciary and executive. Witness 18th century England - certainly a ‘rule of law state’, but one where the lord chancellor was both minister and judge, and the House of Lords both ultimate court of appeal and part of the legislature.

The extreme form of this sort of unification is a capitalist military junta. In such state orders capital is still in command - mainly via the financial markets, but also via personal corruption of state officials. However, electoral representation is removed. The legislative acts of the junta are still formally marked off from their administrative acts, and the judicial system remains formally independent, though subject to certain political limits. Less extreme are pseudo-absolute empires, like the French ‘Second Empire’ of Napoleon III, Meiji Japan or Wilhelmine Germany, which had elected bodies, but with less powers than those of parliamentary regimes.

Once we recognise that these military and pseudo-absolute regimes are all still capitalist states and not pre-capitalist ones, it becomes clear that parliamentarism is not a necessary form of capitalist rule. Where capital or the state has pressing needs to avoid electoral representation or limit its effects, capital can perfectly well rule through military juntas and formally autocratic constitutions.

Kautsky

Karl Kautsky argued in Parliamentarism, plebiscites and socialism (1893) that “the parliamentary form can be an arm which has been capable of serving and has served very varied classes and parties”; and that “We can already see that a really parliamentary regime can be the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat just as it has been that of the bourgeoisie”.[12] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#12) It is clear enough that Kautsky’s and his followers’ attachment to parliamentary forms was critical to his opposition to the October revolution in Russia, and to the hopeless roles of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany in the 1918-19 revolution in Germany, and the Austro-Marxists in the contemporary Austrian revolution - in both cases leading to the eventual victory of fascism.

But parliamentary forms are not the same thing as representative forms; and contrary to Kautsky, the parliamentary form is a form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. It is this because the elected parliament is part merely of the general form of rule-of-law constitutionalism. The parliament is purely a lawgiver, framed within an autonomous executive and an autonomous judiciary. Even within the role of lawgiver, the elected parliament is cramped by its dependence on the specialist lawyers in the parliamentary draftsman’s office - required by the autonomy of the judicial power.

Kautsky in Parliamentarism takes these limitations for granted. Indeed, he positively endorses them. His case against legislation by referendum is partly based on real decision difficulties, but equally strongly on the importance of the lawyers’ ‘technical assistance’ in drafting. He thinks the role of ‘technical assistance’, the growth of the state bureaucracy and the separate judicial power are results of the general extension of the division of labour, necessary in any ‘modern state’. He is a positive advocate of the ‘rule of law’.[13] (http://cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004002#13)

To advocate or defend the rule of law is to support the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The same is not true of the advocacy of elected representative institutions in general.

Representative institutions do not on their own amount to the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Revolutionary Strategy I produced a short list of proposals. I went on to say that “There are certainly other aspects; more in the CPGB’s Draft programme. These are merely points that are particularly salient to me when writing.” Comrade Cockshott, like several other reviewers of the book, ignored this sentence. The redraft version of the Draft programme in my opinion strengthens what we have to say about the minimum political programme and the dictatorship of the proletariat. No doubt these proposals could be improved further. Comrade Cockshott’s ‘Athenian’ argument for an immediate shift to juries in place of elected bodies and for plebiscites would in my opinion weaken them.
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Notes


‘Socialism is a form of class struggle’ (http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003992) Weekly Worker June 24.
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1874/04/bakunin-notes.htm (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1874/04/bakunin-notes.htm)
(1968) 162 Science pp1243-1248. There is a massive literature on the issue, not relevant to my present point.
C Rose Property and persuasion Boulder 1994, p20 and chapters 2 and 5, makes this point within the framework of acceptance in general of pro-private-property arguments.
See ‘A bridge too far’ (http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1001109) Weekly Worker December 18 2003; cf also ‘The procedural is political’ (http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=357), November 15 2007.
‘Computers and economic democracy’: www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/quito.pdf (http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/%7Ewpc/reports/quito.pdf); also ‘Mises, Kantorovich and economic computation’: mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6063/1/MPRA_paper_6063.pdf (http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6063/1/MPRA_paper_6063.pdf)
I have omitted the third point in the list: “full political rights, including the right to elect officers in the armed forces;” because I agree with it without reservation (it is already in the CPGB Draft programme).
More exactly the social specialisation of function. The division of labour, properly so called, will undoubtedly continue: we will not all be doing identical tasks at any one time. But ‘social division of labour’ is, though not fully scientifically accurate, the conventional expression for the lifelong specialisation I have described in the text.
Netherlands: MC ’t Hart The making of a bourgeois state Manchester 1993; England: BG Carruthers City of capital Princeton 1996.
Some evidence for financial market views of the issue of judicial independence in D Klerman, PG Mahoney, ‘The value of judicial independence: evidence from 18th century England’ (2005) 7 American Law and Economics Review 1-27.
‘Bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ - the expression usually translated as ‘civil society’ in Hegel and Marx. It is true that in the Critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right Marx interprets ‘civil society’ to mean the non-state part of the society, but in doing so he departs some way from Hegel’s argument - and, I think, makes a mistake. More in my article, ‘Law and state as holes in Marxist theory’ (2006) 34 Critique 211-236.
K Kautsky Der Parlamentarismus, die Volksgesetzgebung und die Soziademokratie (Stuttgart 1893) cited here from the French translation, Parlementarisme et socialisme (Paris 1900), pp147, 165.
Chapter 8 (decision difficulties); chapter 9, especially pp94, 98 (drafting and technical assistance); p113 (division of labour); pp102-04 (rule of law).

Die Neue Zeit
1st July 2010, 14:52
He barely mentions random selections! He never compares them to elections at all! :glare:

The most he can come up with is:

"Under full communism, comrade Cockshott is correct that decision-makers should in principle be appointed by lot, like jurors. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, however, it is in the interest of the proletariat that the class interest of the petty proprietors should be openly expressed in the form of political parties and factions - and therefore there has to be some form of elective, representative institutions for decision-making."

-----
In his usage of the philosopher Immanuel Kant to read Marx and vice versa, Kojin Karatani wrote this profoundly true and important historical lesson in the Transcritique:

There is one crucial thing we can learn from Athenian democracy in this respect. The ancient democracy was established by overthrowing tyranny and equipped itself with a meticulous device for preventing tyranny for reviving. The salient characteristic of Athenian democracy is not a direct participation of everyone in the assembly, as always claimed, but a systematic control of the administrative power. The crux was the system of lottery: to elect public servants by lottery and to surveil the deeds of public servants by means of a group of jurors who were also elected by lottery [...] Lottery functions to introduce contingency into the magnetic power center. The point is to shake up the positions where power tends to be concentrated; entrenchment of power in administrative positions can be avoided by a sudden attack of contingency. It is only the lottery that actualizes the separation of the three powers. If universal suffrage by secret ballot, namely, parliamentary democracy, is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the introduction of a lottery should be deemed the dictatorship of the proletariat.”
-----
[Copied and pasted from my programmatic WIP]

Now, Macnair wrote that "it is in the interest of the proletariat that the class interest of the petty proprietors should be openly expressed in the form of political parties and factions - and therefore there has to be some form of elective..."

However, Paul Cockshott has written elsewhere this:

Clearly in a lottery system you also need mass parties, even more masssive ones, since any party member may be an MP. Hence the party needs a significant fraction of the population if it is to be effective. It has to train or ideologise a large fraction of the class it organises. It would be unlike the vote gathering parties of today and more like mass movements like CND or the Protestant or Muslim sects.

Random selection is intended to yield a proletarian majority, yet there can still be petit-bourgeois lawmakers selected by chance.

I have also argued that demarchy is better than elections even on purely technocratic grounds: hard qualifications are set in at least some institutions (because it needs x physicists, y geographers, etc.), and if you meet them, you are eligible to be randomly selected - a sort of genuine aristoi over cheap personality contests.

Q
1st July 2010, 15:22
Random selection is intended to yield a proletarian majority, yet there can still be petit-bourgeois lawmakers selected by chance.

Didn't Cockshott also argue (if he didn't, I will) for councils of delegates as opposed to single-person posts (minister or whatever)? In this case it would mean that the petty-bourgeoisie might be in all councils, but will hardly ever have an actual majority in any of them. I think this is where the 30 person groupings came from from the earlier discussion we had on this (30 because it would statistically mean genuine representation of the population). In any case, this would undermine even that last vestige of opposition towards jury-democracy.

Paul Cockshott
1st July 2010, 20:19
Didn't Cockshott also argue (if he didn't, I will) for councils of delegates as opposed to single-person posts (minister or whatever)? In this case it would mean that the petty-bourgeoisie might be in all councils, but will hardly ever have an actual majority in any of them. I think this is where the 30 person groupings came from from the earlier discussion we had on this (30 because it would statistically mean genuine representation of the population). In any case, this would undermine even that last vestige of opposition towards jury-democracy.
I have argued for committees drawn by lot to be in charge of all executive functions rather than having government ministers or commissars.

Die Neue Zeit
1st July 2010, 21:30
Sovnarkom was that (a collection of committees, if not drawn by lot) for a short time, though:


Every people's commissariat was run by a people's commissar assisted and advised by a board, and in practice all members of the boards often attended Sovnarkom meetings.

http://books.google.ca/books?id=dV_Gufwx31UC&pg=PA54&lpg=PA54&dq=lenin+%22maly+sovnarkom%22&source=bl&ots=A5b_12Dfc1&sig=O75-jFxpk9fOOaLk77kgE6HwUzY&hl=en&ei=VPosTL-qNpPQngfW2uC0Aw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=lenin%20%22maly%20sovnarkom%22&f=false

Read pages 52-54. In response to this, the Maly Sovnarkom and Defence Council were formed as smaller bodies.

Q, are you arguing that every single executive portfolio be handled by separate groups of 25-30 people? If they meet together, they would make the later Sovmin look like a small group meeting (of over 100 members, LOL).

[The Paris Communal Council was a group of 92 people.]

If they don't meet together, then this would further extend my basic premise of "sovereign socioeconomic governments" (regular "public" politics handled by separate organs apart from high "state politics" like defense and foreign affairs)... all the way to what John Burnham argued for in his book on demarchy.



P.S. - Here's an interesting find: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/ias/networks/russia/cook.pdf (‘Collegiality’ in the People’s Commissariats 1917-20)

Q
2nd July 2010, 02:55
Q, are you arguing that every single executive portfolio be handled by separate groups of 25-30 people? If they meet together, they would make the later Sovmin look like a small group meeting (of over 100 members, LOL).

I can see why that would be unworkable. Perhaps delegations of five or so randomly selected individuals can go to a meeting? (with 5 others at the next meeting, etc).

S.Artesian
2nd July 2010, 03:16
I have argued for committees drawn by lot to be in charge of all executive functions rather than having government ministers or commissars.


Now there's something we can actually agree on.

Die Neue Zeit
2nd July 2010, 05:02
Related to this discussion is some ongoing exchange between comrade Dave Zachariah and the folks at Though Cowards Flinch. He has just written a paper outlining problems with the strategy of "social democracy" but tailored to a reformist audience (the Swedish labour movement's researcher network):

http://thoughcowardsflinch.com/2010/06/29/the-limits-of-social-democracy/
http://thoughcowardsflinch.com/2010/07/01/the-limits-of-social-democracy-2/


These problems will increasingly bring the question to the fore: is the goal of social democracy to be a party in government or an organization for social transformation? Whilst this may at one point have been synonymous to its members, it will be argued why it necessarily ceases to be so with the passage of time.

[...]

Classical social democracy (see for instance Karl Kautsky’s “Road to Power”) was a more successful strategy in a stable Europe — most clearly in Scandinavia — than the model adopted by the followers of Comintern. But the condition of ‘stability’ follows largely in retrospect; it was far from obvious in a Europe where fascist mass movements held state power.

In subsequent posts the issue and implications of ‘parliamentary’ in ‘Western European parliamentary socialism’ will be raised. However, I should say that Scandinavian social democracy gained its strength largely because it was a significant *extra*-parliamentary force.

[...]

Note that my article is not intended as a polemic but as way to open up discussion with social democrats.


But the social democratic conception of the state would also prove to be simplistic. Firstly, the workers’ movement’s struggle for universal suffrage was not based on the classical theory of democracy as a form of government.

None of the central institutions of Athenian democracy had elected representatives, instead they were drawn randomly among the citizens.

[...]

Secondly, even if the state can be a juridical subject, and at times act unitarily, it is a hierarchy of state apparatuses that do not always act in concert. The most extreme example is Chile during 1970-3 when the class bias within the military establishment made it perceive the government of Allende as a threat to the order and decided to end it in blood.

[...]

Thirdly, the power of the state apparatuses flow from the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. No decisions taken within the state, no executive orders by ministries, no laws passed by parliament, would be effective without the possibility to sanction those whom do not follow them. To the extent that this state power is used to reproduce the capitalist mode of organizing society it is effectively capitalist regardless of the what party or intentions are in government.

Fourthly, and most significantly, is the structural dependence between the state apparatuses and the capitalist sector. This is the central problem of the reformists’ instrumental conception of the state and needs to be elaborated at greater length below.


Concepts of philia and xenia saw that the wealthy maintained trains of supporters and a cosmopolitan existence. The nature of the lawcourts allowed the financial element to Athens to professionalise the practice of law, to bring and defend against prosecutions using the most advanced speeches.

We know wealth allowed men to purchase favour – through the funding of dinners, of a trireme and so on – from the Athenian demos.

In fact of all of those men for whom we have names, the men who largely shaped Athenian policy from 508 until the final extinction of the democracy after the Lamian War, were all wealthy. Whether it was Strombychides and Leon – who gave their lives in defence of the democracy, after the Peloponnesian War, or to the Thirty or the various others who consorted with the enemies of the democracy – many of whom had previously served with distinction in office – those in power were all wealthy.

This was arbitrated by the courts or the Assembly – from the Heliaia down to the lowliest dikasteria – and these courts were populated by normal people who required a wage to take time off work or were old enough not to work. Yet could a class interest contrary to that of the men of leisure, the few, the good (or their ‘democratic counterparts) have been evinced here or were there too many difficulties? I suggest the latter – and my point is reinforced by the monopolisation of power by professional, wealthy politicians who by the middle C4th eschewed election in favour of wielding their power via resolutions proposed by their minions and by lawsuits.

Basically my point is this: the Athenian democracy and selection by lot did not prevent the emergence of a political class distinct from the ‘farmers and artisans’ you claim wielded power. Those professionals wielded the real power – even at deme level, the presence of wealth was felt, despite the superior conditions Athenian citizens enjoyed, such as the right not to be struck by someone of higher social rank.

[...]

Democracy was not an expression of the power of Athenian workers, it bears thinking about. Statistical representation didn’t change any of this; it was just another filter through which to mediate class-based forces.