Does Anyone Actually Endorse Engels' Dialectic? [Archive]

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Proletarian Ultra

25th June 2010, 23:56

ChrisK

25th June 2010, 23:59

From what I've seen, especially in writings by other Marxists on dialectical materialism, these are generally accepted as the central laws of dialectics. This is one of the reason's I oppose dialectical materialism; the illogical laws are clearly flawed and should have never been accepted by anyone.

graymouser

26th June 2010, 01:59

Yes. When any Leninist from Lenin on talks about dialectics they are almost always talking about the logic laid out by Engels in Anti-Duhring and Dialectics of Nature. Different Leninist traditions have reaffirmed this presentation and its general outline.

ChrisK

26th June 2010, 03:13

There is no "logic" laid out by Engels. Its some natural laws infered from Hegel, using his flawed logic.

graymouser

26th June 2010, 05:06

There is no "logic" laid out by Engels. Its some natural laws infered from Hegel, using his flawed logic.
Hegel's logic was flawed, but because it was based on the Idea, not because it was wholesale mysticism as "Rosa" has tried to convince people here. The extremely idiosyncratic reading of Marx and Engels that says otherwise is supported by virtually no one, although some argue that there is a differentiation between Marx's "historical materialism" and the more general "dialectical materialism" referring specifically to the distorted version of the latter presented by the Stalinists.

ChrisK

26th June 2010, 05:29

Hegel's logic was flawed, but because it was based on the Idea, not because it was wholesale mysticism as "Rosa" has tried to convince people here. The extremely idiosyncratic reading of Marx and Engels that says otherwise is supported by virtually no one, although some argue that there is a differentiation between Marx's "historical materialism" and the more general "dialectical materialism" referring specifically to the distorted version of the latter presented by the Stalinists.

No, it was flawed because he used logic improperly. But first, a side note.

Hegel only learned and used Aristotelan formal logic, which means he missed out on predicate logic and the other logics developed after he died that worked better than Aristotle's logic. So in addition to using logic poorly, he also didn't know the vast majority of logic (which was developed in the twentieth century).

Anyway, here is how Hegel came up with the negation of the negation. He used a series of statements to prove this concept.
"The rose is red" and since is indicates identity,
"The rose is identical with red" but a particular (rose) can not be identical with a general (red) therefore,
"The rose is not identical with red" but is does mean identity, therefore
"The rose is not not identical with red" and so on and so forth.
For Hegel this proved that things are inherently made up of contradictions (Lenin did the same thing with "John is a man").

The main problem with this is that Hegel took the "is" in the first statement and made it an "is" of identity. However, the "is" was the "is" of predication in the first statement, not of identity. From this we see the flaw of Hegel's example.

For a more complete look at Hegel's full argument and a further, more superior critique see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm).

Now even it doesn't matter if this is ideal or material, the logic is still flawed.

BAM

26th June 2010, 07:34

It seems that Engels's dialectics of nature are only really taken seriously within Leninism and the various spin-offs from that.

The thing to remember about Hegel's dialectic is that it is inseparable from his political philosophy and system as a whole, in that the "real world" is nothing other than the outward manifestation of Geist. This is why opposites can be said to be in unity, etc.

Read Marx's critique of the Hegelian dialectic - which covers all this - from the 1844 Manuscripts. See also Colletti's Introduction to the Penguin edition of Marx's Early Writings (it is available on the web somewhere).

Zanthorus

26th June 2010, 10:53

Hegel's logic was flawed, but because it was based on the Idea, not because it was wholesale mysticism as "Rosa" has tried to convince people here. The extremely idiosyncratic reading of Marx and Engels that says otherwise is supported by virtually no one.

I don't think anyone disputes that Engels believed wholesale in the three laws of dialectics. The question is whether or not Marx himself did. Remember here that Marx and Engels were actually two separate people who lived two separate lives and it is not totally off the wall to suggest that despite his modesty and insistence that he was only repeating what Marx believed Engels was actually distorting Marx's thought partly because of his own philosophical and mathematical incompetence. The "idiosyncratic" reading of Marx that says he rejected not only the idealistic version of the laws of dialectics found in Hegel but rejected Hegelian dialectics as such has from what I've seen actually been gaining some ground, and with good reason. In the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Marx refers to Hegel's method as "logical pantheistic mysticism" and constantly criticises Hegel's uncritical stance toward everything. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 he similarly criticises the Hegelian dialectic for "uncritical positivism" and "equally uncritical idealism", and not only that but he also critiques the Left-Hegelians who tried to use Hegel's method for radical purposes. What Marx praises as the "outstanding achievment" of Hegel's work is the idea that human productive activity has to go through a process of self-estrangement in order to develop the productive forces (Although Hegel only conceives this in terms of mental labour and the abstract idea). Years later in Das Kapital he also writes not merely of standing Hegel on his head but of extracting the "rational kernel" from the "mystical shell".

graymouser

26th June 2010, 13:51

I don't think anyone disputes that Engels believed wholesale in the three laws of dialectics. The question is whether or not Marx himself did.
Actually the question was whether anyone believes in the laws of dialectics as presented by Engels. And the answer was yes. This view is prevalent in most versions of Leninism.

Remember here that Marx and Engels were actually two separate people who lived two separate lives and it is not totally off the wall to suggest that despite his modesty and insistence that he was only repeating what Marx believed Engels was actually distorting Marx's thought partly because of his own philosophical and mathematical incompetence.
The attempt to create a wall between Marx and Engels is entirely a revisionist project of the 20th and 21st centuries. Everything Engels wrote from 1845 until 1883, including Anti-Duhring, was done with the positive collaboration of Marx. Indeed, in the case of Anti-Duhring, Marx worked with Engels to the point of writing a chapter, and offered what Hal Draper called a blanket recommendation of the work. (The argument is presented quite well in the introduction to the first volume of Draper's masterwork, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution.) Had Marx thought differently, he could have easily told Engels exactly what was wrong. Certainly the idea that Engels was "incompetent" is a new idea in Marxism. Anti-Duhring was considered a very strong popular presentation of the core ideas of Marxist socialism, including by Marx himself.

The "idiosyncratic" reading of Marx that says he rejected not only the idealistic version of the laws of dialectics found in Hegel but rejected Hegelian dialectics as such has from what I've seen actually been gaining some ground, and with good reason. In the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Marx refers to Hegel's method as "logical pantheistic mysticism" and constantly criticises Hegel's uncritical stance toward everything. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 he similarly criticises the Hegelian dialectic for "uncritical positivism" and "equally uncritical idealism", and not only that but he also critiques the Left-Hegelians who tried to use Hegel's method for radical purposes. What Marx praises as the "outstanding achievment" of Hegel's work is the idea that human productive activity has to go through a process of self-estrangement in order to develop the productive forces (Although Hegel only conceives this in terms of mental labour and the abstract idea). Years later in Das Kapital he also writes not merely of standing Hegel on his head but of extracting the "rational kernel" from the "mystical shell".
Well, you're aiming somewhere a bit off from where Marx was going. He critiques the left-Hegelians for struggling with ideas, which is ironically exactly what the "anti-dialectics" people are doing. In the postface that "Rosa" ironically loves to comment on, Marx savagely attacks the epigonoi who considered Hegel a "dead dog."

S.Artesian

26th June 2010, 14:34

I'm a little confused by the debates on this board.

So, the anti-dialectic people seem to be using Engels' "laws of dialectic" from Dialectics of Nature and Anti-Duhring as their criteria, viz.

The law of the unity and conflict of opposites;
The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes;
The law of the negation of the negation

This confuses me a bit because I always assumed these were a clumsy Engelsian caricature of the many subtle and complex dialectic methods found in German philosophy. But maybe I was wrong. Rosa seems to think that they're generally accepted tenets of dialectic thought. Does anyone consider these to be a good summary of Hegelian - or other - dialectics?

Short answer: No, those are not a "good summary" of Hegel's idealist or Marx's social dialectic. Yes, those are a good summary of the those with claims to "dialectical materialism."

Critical shortcoming in the failure: failure to identify both the agent and the process by which any of these supposed laws achieve their "materiality." Marx, in critiquing agent and process in Hegel accomplishes something quite different, something that quite "transcends" Hegel's idealism, idealism that capitulates before the material world.

Zanthorus

26th June 2010, 15:06

Actually the question was whether anyone believes in the laws of dialectics as presented by Engels. And the answer was yes. This view is prevalent in most versions of Leninism.

Yes, I was presenting a new question which I then proceeded to give the broad outlines of an answer to in order to get my point across. I'm not particularly bothered what view is accepted by Leninists and I don't see how this is particularly relevant.

The attempt to create a wall between Marx and Engels is entirely a revisionist project of the 20th and 21st centuries.

The attempt to create a wall between Lenin and Stalin is entirely a revisionist project of petty-bourgeois Trotskyites.

Notice the similarity here?

Everything Engels wrote from 1845 until 1883, including Anti-Duhring, was done with the positive collaboration of Marx.

This is false. There was a substantial division of labour between Marx and Engels with the former mostly occupying himself with the critique of political economy and the latter engaging in the natural sciences. I've already given one example to you of Engels lack of understanding of Marx in the "Is Dialectical Materialism a Religion?" thread which you seem to have ignored:

For instance, on the 2nd of April 1858 Marx sent a letter Engels containing a short summary of his work. Engels reply reveals that he had had trouble with "abstract reasoning" and finding "dialectical transitions". At no point does he comment on any of the discoveries which were thought by Marx to be fundamental. Nor does he in any of his later writings on political economy touch on the foundations which Marx claimed the whole of his work rested - the two-fold character of labour, the development of the forms of value and the fetish character of the commodity.

Indeed, in the case of Anti-Duhring, Marx worked with Engels to the point of writing a chapter, and offered what Hal Draper called a blanket recommendation of the work.

The chapter written by Marx was on the subject of political economy and was unrelated to Engels writings on the dialectics of nautre. Towards the end of his life Marx was busy attempting to complete Das Kapital and getting preoccupied with the situation in Russia and there's no evidence that Marx ever read the rest of anti-duhring besides the claim by Engels in the 1886 preface ten years after the fact.

Had Marx thought differently, he could have easily told Engels exactly what was wrong.

He had been gravely ill since 1873 and in the same year as the publication of Anti-Duhring he had a relapse and was unable to work even on Capital. Originally Engels work was nothing more important than a polemic against a political opponent which neither Marx nor Engels regarded as of excessive importance. There are plenty of reasons why Marx would've showed little interest in what Engels was doing or had time to go through it extensively and make up his mind about it.

Certainly the idea that Engels was "incompetent" is a new idea in Marxism.

No it's not, Engels was always clear on the point that he was second rate compared to Marx:

What Marx accomplished, I would not have achieved. Marx stood higher, saw further, and took a wider and quicker view than all the rest of us. Marx was a genius, we others were at best talented.

And the noting of it as a "new idea" makes you look like some kind of stale dogmatist.

Anti-Duhring was considered a very strong popular presentation of the core ideas of Marxist socialism, including by Marx himself.

Certainly most of the second international era Marxists accepted practically everything in Engels book uncritically. But I've never seen anyone give any evidence that Marx himself thought of it as such. At the time it was written it was expected to be a brief critique of Duhring that would fade away when noone could remember who Duhring was anymore.

Well, you're aiming somewhere a bit off from where Marx was going. He critiques the left-Hegelians for struggling with ideas

No, he explicitly criticises the Left-Hegelians for taking a completely uncritical attitude to the Hegelian Method:

So powerful was modern German criticism’s preoccupation with the past – so completely was its development entangled with the subject-matter – that here prevailed a completely uncritical attitude to the method of criticising, together with a complete lack of awareness about the apparently formal, but really vital question: how do we now stand as regards the Hegelian dialectic? This lack of awareness about the relationship of modern criticism to the Hegelian philosophy as a whole and especially to the Hegelian dialectic has been so great that critics like Strauss and Bruno Bauer still remain within the confines of the Hegelian logic; the former completely so and the latter at least implicitly so in his Synoptiker (where, in opposition to Strauss, he replaces the substance of “abstract nature” by the “self-consciousness” of abstract man), and even in Das entdeckte Christenthum.

In the postface that "Rosa" ironically loves to comment on, Marx savagely attacks the epigonoi who considered Hegel a "dead dog."

Yes, because Hegel's work contains an understanding of the self-estrangement of the productive forces albeit in a one-sided way which only considers abstract mental labour. Not because Marx believes that the Hegelian method can be revived only replacing Hegel's "absolute idea" with "material". If that was indeed the case then he was being hypocritical in the 1844 manuscripts.

ChrisK

26th June 2010, 19:03

The attempt to create a wall between Marx and Engels is entirely a revisionist project of the 20th and 21st centuries. Everything Engels wrote from 1845 until 1883, including Anti-Duhring, was done with the positive collaboration of Marx. Indeed, in the case of Anti-Duhring, Marx worked with Engels to the point of writing a chapter, and offered what Hal Draper called a blanket recommendation of the work. (The argument is presented quite well in the introduction to the first volume of Draper's masterwork, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution.) Had Marx thought differently, he could have easily told Engels exactly what was wrong. Certainly the idea that Engels was "incompetent" is a new idea in Marxism. Anti-Duhring was considered a very strong popular presentation of the core ideas of Marxist socialism, including by Marx himself.

Draper make's quite the leap when he call's it a blanket recommendation. If you look at the note attached to this and then look at his sources, only one gives any hint that Marx approved.

Further, I don't consider Engels incompetent, but in terms of philosophy and logic, he was third-rate.

Also, do you still support those laws that were built upon, demonstratably, illogic?

mikelepore

26th June 2010, 19:08

The transformation of quantity into quality is basic to all of the natural science and now the social sciences. The other two come out of tracing a certain literary history, this philosopher said this and that philosopher said that.

ChrisK

26th June 2010, 19:12

mikelepore

26th June 2010, 20:20

How about an example of the transformation of quantity into quality in science?

The example that most people give is the phase change. Gradually lower the temperature of water to 276 kelvin: liquid state. 275: liquid. 274: liquid. 273.16 : liquid. 273.15 : solid. The abruptness is caused by the nonlinearity of a polynomial function, the electrical force between the molecules falls off suddenly with an increasing distance between the molecules. What the observer sees is that a gradual change along a number line causes an abrupt change in physical properties. A quantitative change in an independent variable has caused a qualitative transformation. Liquid: the sample has no fixed shape, assumes the shape of any container, molecules continuously tumbling around each other. Solid: the sample has a fixed shape, molecules held in a rigid array.

ChrisK

26th June 2010, 20:56

The example that most people give is the phase change. Gradually lower the temperature of water to 276 kelvin: liquid state. 275: liquid. 274: liquid. 273.16 : liquid. 273.15 : solid. The abruptness is caused by the nonlinearity of a polynomial function, the electrical force between the molecules falls off suddenly with an increasing distance between the molecules. What the observer sees is that a gradual change along a number line causes an abrupt change in physical properties. A quantitative change in an independent variable has caused a qualitative transformation. Liquid: the sample has no fixed shape, assumes the shape of any container, molecules continuously tumbling around each other. Solid: the sample has a fixed shape, molecules held in a rigid array.

I have quite a few problems with this example:

1. How do you define quality? Unless you give a different definition I will be using the same one as Hegel and other dialecticians. Quality is defined as the thing that is essential to a substance that without it, it would change into another thing.

2. This being the case, there was no change in quality, as the thing is still H2O, and not some other thing. This is because the quality of water is its molecular structure and freezing it does not consitute change this.

3. How do you define quantity? Dialecticians tend to define it as something that can increase or decrease without changing the thing itselft.

4. This being the case, heat would have to be a substance for it to increase or decrease, which during Hegel's time heat was considered a substance. But heat is not a substance, what is happening here is that molecules are interacting with other molecules that are moving at a different velocity.

5. That being the case, then the only quantitative change could be in velocity. But velocity cannot be measured in quantity as there is no such thing as a quantity of velocity.

So looking at this, there was neither a change in quality or quantity.

S.Artesian

27th June 2010, 02:29

Opposed as I am to "dialectical materialism," let's try an example of "quantity into quality" in materialism of capital accumulation.

Let's try this:

1. What is the "quality" that defines capitalism? Marx identifies that quality variously as "self-expanding value," "self-valorising," etc. etc.-- iterations on that theme.

2. How does capital accomplish this self-expansion, this self-valorising? Through the aggrandizement of surplus labor-time, which is surplus value.

3. As capital accumulates, how does the aggrandizement of this surplus labor-time change?

4. Capital moves from the formal domination to the real domination of wage-labor, and increases its proportional aggrandizement of surplus labor-time through the amplification of productivity. Through introduction of "labor -saving" [time saving] machinery, workers reproduce values equal to their own wages in relatively shorter time. Capitalists aggrandize the remaining, relatively larger amount of surplus labor-time. This relative surplus-value replaces "absolute" surplus value-- which is the product of extending the working day without improving the ability of labor to reproduce its wage in less time.

5. Consequently, self-expansion, accumulation of capital -- is the result of -- well, of accumulation of capital-- replacement of wage-labor by machinery. Profitability, self-expansion, valorisation, the essential qualities of capital are reproduced in this replacement process.

6. What happens as the means of production increase, as the accumulation of capital, the quantity of capital "injected" into the production process increases? The rate of profit has a tendency to fall. The fall of profitability forces the capitalists to "push harder," producing even more in an attempt to outrun the declining profitability. Overproduction is the result, and finally, as profitability is impaired, the accumulation of capital becomes its very opposite-- it is transformed into a devaluation of capital.

7. A change in quantity has produced a qualitative change in the reproduction of capital.

mikelepore

27th June 2010, 03:26

graymouser

27th June 2010, 03:43

The attempt to create a wall between Lenin and Stalin is entirely a revisionist project of petty-bourgeois Trotskyites.

Notice the similarity here?
Sure, but the difference is far more resounding. Engels was Marx's co-thinker for almost 40 years; Stalin was a functionary in Lenin's party who had to invent a relationship with him after the fact. That you think that this is an actual critique of the facts of the Marx-Engels relationship which are inconvenient for you is surprising only in its banality.

This is false. There was a substantial division of labour between Marx and Engels with the former mostly occupying himself with the critique of political economy and the latter engaging in the natural sciences. I've already given one example to you of Engels lack of understanding of Marx in the "Is Dialectical Materialism a Religion?" thread which you seem to have ignored:
There is little in that thread that doesn't deserve to be ignored.

As for your specific reference, it doesn't point to Engels's inadequacy in dialectics but how a short summary of a future work by Marx is insufficient for him to make out the dialectical transitions - quite a different thing. Your bringing this up is logic-chopping and quote-mining of the first order; Engels is not complaining of trouble understanding dialectics but understanding transitions in Marx's "very abstract abstract" of a book Marx is working on.

The chapter written by Marx was on the subject of political economy and was unrelated to Engels writings on the dialectics of nautre. Towards the end of his life Marx was busy attempting to complete Das Kapital and getting preoccupied with the situation in Russia and there's no evidence that Marx ever read the rest of anti-duhring besides the claim by Engels in the 1886 preface ten years after the fact.
So, the thesis of the anti-Engels camp is basically that Marx didn't read an important work Engels was working on, even though he wrote a chapter and Engels claimed to have read it to Marx - essentially claiming that Engels was engaged in some monumental cover-up involving his collaborator, whom he had considered a comrade and a superior intellect his entire life. Yeah, you can go on believing that if you want, but it's baseless speculation.

He had been gravely ill since 1873 and in the same year as the publication of Anti-Duhring he had a relapse and was unable to work even on Capital. Originally Engels work was nothing more important than a polemic against a political opponent which neither Marx nor Engels regarded as of excessive importance. There are plenty of reasons why Marx would've showed little interest in what Engels was doing or had time to go through it extensively and make up his mind about it.
Again, further speculation, nothing more to see here.

No it's not, Engels was always clear on the point that he was second rate compared to Marx:
The anti-dialectical revisionists are claiming that Engels was an utter incompetent who didn't understand an iota of Marx's mature theory and invented spurious theories of his own. That certainly wasn't what Engels meant when he acknowledged that Marx was a genius!

And the noting of it as a "new idea" makes you look like some kind of stale dogmatist.
You're right, most theoretical "novelties" are old revisionism cooked up in new forms. I think it's important for Marxists to say that we stand behind the theoretical conquests of the past, and that people who refuse to do so should in Lenin's memorable phase go into the swamp - but not insist that Marxists come down in the swamp with them.

Certainly most of the second international era Marxists accepted practically everything in Engels book uncritically. But I've never seen anyone give any evidence that Marx himself thought of it as such. At the time it was written it was expected to be a brief critique of Duhring that would fade away when noone could remember who Duhring was anymore.
Nothing about this validates the idea that Engels - Marx's closest friend and collaborator for decades - understood Marx's ideas less well than some Anglophones on an internet message board a hundred years and change later.

No, he explicitly criticises the Left-Hegelians for taking a completely uncritical attitude to the Hegelian Method:
And he criticizes them for having fought with ideas, in The German Ideology. But that was written with that incomparable lunkhead Engels who we obviously can't waste any time on. It's amazing Marx even put up with the guy. [/sarcasm]

Yes, because Hegel's work contains an understanding of the self-estrangement of the productive forces albeit in a one-sided way which only considers abstract mental labour. Not because Marx believes that the Hegelian method can be revived only replacing Hegel's "absolute idea" with "material". If that was indeed the case then he was being hypocritical in the 1844 manuscripts.
Marx was 25/26 when he wrote the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and had yet to develop even the fundamentals of his critique of capitalism. It's hard to say that the self-estrangement, a theme that doesn't show up (at least not in any explicit or clear form) in his mature analysis, was the main thing of value he took from Hegel. Marx is clear that his is the direct opposite of Hegel's dialectic (his word not mine), that his starts with the material world, that Hegel has mystified the dialectic but was the first to present it consciously and comprehensively, and that Marx recovered the rational kernel from the mystical shell. Engels's work confirms that this means what it plainly means - he used Hegel's dialectic but from a totally different basis, not the rarefied meaning that it can only take from message board participants that he was just fucking around in the most important work of his life and he really totally disavowed Hegel but never wrote about it.

graymouser

27th June 2010, 03:50

2. This being the case, there was no change in quality, as the thing is still H2O, and not some other thing. This is because the quality of water is its molecular structure and freezing it does not consitute change this.
But from this you don't seem to understand dialectics at all. In dialectical terms the water is not simply the aggregate of a number of molecules but a system, which has its own internal dynamics (temperature, flow, etc). The concrete body of water, whether it is a lake or a glass or a glacier, is what is being considered in the dialectical transformation of quantity of temperature into a change in quality of form. The whole dialectical method is intended to consider complex systems as systems and not as collections of aliquot parts. So this critique isn't a valid critique of quantity into quality at all.

S.Artesian

27th June 2010, 03:55

Marx was 25/26 when he wrote the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and had yet to develop even the fundamentals of his critique of capitalism. It's hard to say that the self-estrangement, a theme that doesn't show up (at least not in any explicit or clear form) in his mature analysis, was the main thing of value he took from Hegel.

Just a word here.... first, I consider nothing quite as absurd as debating what Engels did or didn't understand about Marx's analysis of capital. It's not that understanding that's in question.

There is a bit of question about Engels' own presentation of dialectics, his own extraction of the rational kernel.

Regarding the extracted portion of the paragraph from comrade Graymouser's post. The theme of self-estrangement repeatedly shows up in the "mature" Marx-- and not just in the Grundrisse but also in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1864-- see volumes 33 and 34 of the Collected Works.

mikelepore

27th June 2010, 05:02

It's still H2O because when you asked me to pick an example you left it up to me to choose it, and I didn't choose an example of a chemical change. If you want examples that have to do with chemical changes, you would need to refer to such energy measurements as ionization energy, electron affinity, and electronegativity. Once again, one factor is a point along a gradual numerical scale, and its value causes a sharp distinction in some other factor. For example, if the difference in the electronegativities of two atoms is less than a certain number they will tend to form a covalent bond, which results in a molecule, including H2O, but if the difference is more than that number they will tend to form an ionic bond, which results in a lattice and never a molecule, typically the case for salts.

ChrisK

27th June 2010, 06:29

In my example the quantity is the temperature, which since Boltzmann has been understood to be is a measure of the root-mean-square of the translational, rotational and vibrational kinetic energy of the molecules in a substance.

The quality is the phase: solid, liquid or gas, which can be identified by these:

solid: constant volume, yes. constant shape, yes.
liquid: constant volume, yes. constant shape, no.
gas: constant volume, no. constant shape, no.

But how is that quality? Defined as such, a quality is any possible characteristic of a thing. Yet dialecticains call it an essential part of a thing, that makes it what it is. Water is H2O and is unchanged by changing in phase.

Further, what is a quantity of temperature? That makes absolutely no sense, unless temperature is a substance.

ChrisK

27th June 2010, 06:34

But from this you don't seem to understand dialectics at all. In dialectical terms the water is not simply the aggregate of a number of molecules but a system, which has its own internal dynamics (temperature, flow, etc). The concrete body of water, whether it is a lake or a glass or a glacier, is what is being considered in the dialectical transformation of quantity of temperature into a change in quality of form. The whole dialectical method is intended to consider complex systems as systems and not as collections of aliquot parts. So this critique isn't a valid critique of quantity into quality at all.

You seemed to miss the parts of the critique, where I show that 1) temperature cannot be a quantity. 2) That according to Engels, Lenin and Hegel, a quality is only an essential characteristic, which means that its form cannot be a qualitative change, only its molecular structure. The essential "system" of water has not changed.

BAM

27th June 2010, 08:42

Just a quick point on this:

Marx was 25/26 when he wrote the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and had yet to develop even the fundamentals of his critique of capitalism. It's hard to say that the self-estrangement, a theme that doesn't show up (at least not in any explicit or clear form) in his mature analysis, was the main thing of value he took from Hegel.

Commodity fetishism. Material relations between people and social relations between things. When the workers' own products are turned against them so that they then work for the means of production instead of the means of production working for them, that sounds a lot like self-estrangement.

Being caught in the grip of capital, producing and reproducing this hostile power over ourselves - and the perverse absurdities this reaches - that's the basis of the argument in Capital. Just as Hegel's Geist works behind the backs of those who live in the real world, so is the movement of capital the result of the actions of individuals whose lives are dominated by it.

BAM

27th June 2010, 11:40

Opposed as I am to "dialectical materialism," let's try an example of "quantity into quality" in materialism of capital accumulation.

Even prior to that the quality/quantity distinctiom is vital to Marx's entire theory. Use-value and exchange vcalue, one qualitative, the other quantitative. And indeed the commodity is a unity of the two. Even between commodities, the exchange value of commodity A is expressed in the use-value of commodity B.

And quality/quantity also spills over into what he termed his own greatest discovery, the two-fold character of labour: concrete and abstract.

S.Artesian

27th June 2010, 12:50

Even prior to that the quality/quantity distinctiom is vital to Marx's entire theory. Use-value and exchange vcalue, one qualitative, the other quantitative. And indeed the commodity is a unity of the two. Even between commodities, the exchange value of commodity A is expressed in the use-value of commodity B.

And quality/quantity also spills over into what he termed his own greatest discovery, the two-fold character of labour: concrete and abstract.

Outstanding!

graymouser

27th June 2010, 14:19

You seemed to miss the parts of the critique, where I show that 1) temperature cannot be a quantity. 2) That according to Engels, Lenin and Hegel, a quality is only an essential characteristic, which means that its form cannot be a qualitative change, only its molecular structure. The essential "system" of water has not changed.
Again, you do not understand dialectics. It does not consider a system as merely being the sum of its aliquot parts - a body of water is not just a number of water molecules, by existing as a body of water it has characteristics like an aggregate temperature, a shape, tendencies to form waves, that individual water molecules do not. Likewise a human being cannot be approached as merely an aggregate of cells, or a society as merely an aggregate of humans.

Temperature is a quantity, in that there is a certain degree of agitation of the molecules in the body of water - this degree of agitation is not a "substance" but it is a characteristic of the body of water that is not characteristic of the molecules themselves. One H2O molecule does not have temperature, but one pot full of H2O molecules does. And it is a characteristic that is subject to change, and as it goes through its changes the qualitative form of the body - as a body of water - goes through a phase transition either into ice or steam.

The intent of dialectics is precisely to study not the individual molecules as you would in chemistry, but to study whole systems at a wider level. This is why it was the appropriate tool for Marx's analysis of capitalism - he was studying not one single capitalist (and in fact throughout his work he constantly ridicules political economists for their love of Robinson Crusoe examples) but of commodity producing society as a whole. Your attempts to resolve bodies of water down to the molecular level is precisely the kind of reductionism that dialectics is used to avoid.

S.Artesian

27th June 2010, 14:32

BAM

27th June 2010, 19:07

Just thinking about this some more. With regard to the formal and real subsumption of labour: The initial accumulation of capital, after a certain level, effects real changes in the production process.

Firstly capital uses the old production methods. However, capital then transforms the entire labour process through the expansion of fixed capital, the factory system, etc.

The accumulation of capital, though originally appearing as its quantitative extension only, is effected, as we have seen, under a progressive qualitative change in its composition, under a constant increase of its constant, at the expense of its variable constituent.

This is vital in Marx's distinction between absolute and relative surplus value.

And by accident, in the context of the transformation of the guild-master into a capitalist, I found the following quotation in Captial Vol 1:

Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into qualitative distinction.

Zanthorus

27th June 2010, 19:19

^

I already posted that in the "Is Dialectical Materialism a Religion Thread" and Rosa gave the old "coquetting" reply :D

BAM

27th June 2010, 19:25

I didn't see it. Anyway, it puts the question of Marx's relation to Engels and the Anti-Duhring in a different light.

Zanthorus

27th June 2010, 19:54

Anyway, I have a simple question for the Dialectical Materialists:

What exactly does the application of the three "laws" of Dialectics to the natural sciences add to Marxism? Imagine for a second that tomorrow some scientists discovers that there is actually a mechanism in the universe that causes everything to act according to Engels' three laws, and all respectable scientists suddenly became dialectical materialists. Do you really think those scientists would then make the jump to becoming socialists? I mean sure there would probably be a few red faces but there doesn't seem to be anything in the application of the laws of dialectics to the natural sciences that would force us to accept socialism. It is only the application of those laws to the economy and society that produces the Marxian Critique of Political Economy.

ChrisK

27th June 2010, 20:24

Again, you do not understand dialectics. It does not consider a system as merely being the sum of its aliquot parts - a body of water is not just a number of water molecules, by existing as a body of water it has characteristics like an aggregate temperature, a shape, tendencies to form waves, that individual water molecules do not. Likewise a human being cannot be approached as merely an aggregate of cells, or a society as merely an aggregate of humans.

Temperature is a quantity, in that there is a certain degree of agitation of the molecules in the body of water - this degree of agitation is not a "substance" but it is a characteristic of the body of water that is not characteristic of the molecules themselves. One H2O molecule does not have temperature, but one pot full of H2O molecules does. And it is a characteristic that is subject to change, and as it goes through its changes the qualitative form of the body - as a body of water - goes through a phase transition either into ice or steam.

Okay, how has water's essential charateristic been changed by freezing it? You have only described a characteristic, not an essential one as Hegel, Engels and Lenin say it is to be.

Further, how is that a quantity then? The definition you provided is that of non-essential quality. So does non-essential quality transform other non-essentail qualities? Is this your law?

The intent of dialectics is precisely to study not the individual molecules as you would in chemistry, but to study whole systems at a wider level. This is why it was the appropriate tool for Marx's analysis of capitalism - he was studying not one single capitalist (and in fact throughout his work he constantly ridicules political economists for their love of Robinson Crusoe examples) but of commodity producing society as a whole. Your attempts to resolve bodies of water down to the molecular level is precisely the kind of reductionism that dialectics is used to avoid.

So define a system. How large must a system be for these laws to appy? You already told me they don't apply at an atomic level, so I can assume they don't apply at a quantum level either. How large must a system before dialectics apply to it? Further, can the system be too large?

mikelepore

28th June 2010, 05:05

But how is that quality? Defined as such, a quality is any possible characteristic of a thing. Yet dialecticains call it an essential part of a thing, that makes it what it is. Water is H2O and is unchanged by changing in phase.

Further, what is a quantity of temperature? That makes absolutely no sense, unless temperature is a substance.

Your definitions are messed up. The phrases "it changed quantitatively" and "it changed qualitatively" are in common use in the language. A description of something is said to be quantitative if it is a number, such as 9.046 or cos(pi). Something is a quality if it's recognizable as a category but it's not a numerical value, such as fluid, elastic, brittle, flammable, magnetic. Engels was referring to the fact that changing a numerical value can recognizably put something into a new category.

This is an important argument for socialists because pro-capitalist conservatives frequently deny that changing the numerical value of something can put it into a new category, as when they say that my $10 shirt and a Getty's billion dollar inheritance are the same thing called "private property", or when they say that our conversation and the Time-Warner Corporation are the same thing called "free expression." Trying to correct that kind of thinking, Engels gave lot of examples from nature in which quantitative changes become qualitative changes. I think his approach isn't rigorously logical, because it is an argument by analogy, but that's what he was trying to do.

(How come Rosa hasn't called me a mystic yet? Is she away on vacation?)

Proletarian Ultra

28th June 2010, 05:32

Queercommie Girl

28th June 2010, 07:00

I'm a believer in Dialectical Materialism, which I consider as the fundamental theory that underpins all of material universe, in natural science, in economics and in society.

Partly it is because essentially I am a Leninist, though I am not a dogmatist and I reject any kind of "personality worship", so yes, even Lenin made mistakes. However, given that Lenin lived almost 100 years ago in an economically backwater part of the world, it is quite remarkable how progressive he was regarding feminism and LGBT issues, even though he obviously considered LGBT issues to be secondary since he never explicitly wrote anything about it, despite formally legalising homosexuality (as well as transgenderism, there was actually a single case of GRS in the 1920s - a little known fact). Lenin was ahead of his time in the sense that even leaders that emerged decades later, such as Che, were not supportive of homosexuality.

But partly it's also because I am Chinese. Dialectics underpins Chinese philosophy and Chinese dialectics was even more ancient than that of the Greeks, first emerging around 1000 BCE when the Greeks were still in the Dark Ages. The most important symbol of Chinese philosophy - the Yin-Yang symbol, is a graphical embodiment of dialectical thought. Yin-Yang is as important in the Chinese tradition as the cross is in Christianity and the crescent is in Islam. Traditional Chinese medicine is also based on dialectics, treating the entire human body and mind as a single system. There are a lot of empirical evidence in support of Traditional Chinese medicine, which in turn is evidence in support of dialectics.

Dialectics is also very useful in LGBT politics. The terms of Chinese dialectics, "yin" and "yang", could refer to "female" and "male". The Yin-Yang symbol demonstrates the principle of the inter-penetration of opposites, between the masculine and the feminine. There is an ancient Chinese saying which states "within the yin there is yang, and within the yang there is yin".

In fact, Maoism itself is a fusion of Leninist and Chinese dialectical thought.

I am suspicious of socialists and "Marxists" who claim that they reject dialectics. I find that often anti-dialecticians are also those who tend to be suspicious of LGBT rights and hold a rigid, mechanistic view of gender norms. (e.g. al8) I find this to be reactionary and unacceptable.

Queercommie Girl

28th June 2010, 07:03

Bad form to apply the dialectic to the natural sciences, I think. Isn't it precisely a re-inversion of the dialectic back to idealism? The whole reason Hegel was comfortable doing that was that in his philosophy Spirit develops itself through matter, so any law applicable to Spirit should be applicable to matter. (Something like) Hegel's categories for the investigation of Spirit actually are pretty useful for investigating human society; there's really no need to foul it up.

Objectively dialectics already exist in natural science, it's just not usually labelled in such a way.

E.g.

Ice changing into water which changes into steam is an example of quantitative and qualitative change.

The existence of "queer-ness" in humanity and the animal world is an example of the interpenetration of opposites between the masculine and the feminine.

ChrisK

28th June 2010, 07:57

Your definitions are messed up. The phrases "it changed quantitatively" and "it changed qualitatively" are in common use in the language. A description of something is said to be quantitative if it is a number, such as 9.046 or cos(pi). Something is a quality if it's recognizable as a category but it's not a numerical value, such as fluid, elastic, brittle, flammable, magnetic. Engels was referring to the fact that changing a numerical value can recognizably put something into a new category.

Sure, using ordinary language that is how it is defined. That's how I prefer to be defined. But we are talking about Engels and he seems to be using Hegel's definitions of quality and quantity. I say this because he claims to have derived these laws from Hegel, making it reasonable to assume that that is the definition used by Engels.

Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/glossary.htm#quality) and measure (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/hints.htm#measure).
Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker.

Measure, the third grade of being, which is the unity of the first two, is a qualitative quantity. All things have their measure: i.e. the quantitative terms of their existence, their being so or so great, does not matter within certain limits; but when these limits are exceeded by an additional more or less, the things cease to be what they were. From measure follows the advance to the second subdivision of the idea, Essence (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/hints.htm#essence).

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slbeing.htm#SL85n

So now we see that quality is understood by dialecticians to be the essential character of the thing; quantity is an unessential characteristic, which if changed won't change the thing.

Your definitional problem is not with me, but with Hegel and Engels.

This is an important argument for socialists because pro-capitalist conservatives frequently deny that changing the numerical value of something can put it into a new category, as when they say that my $10 shirt and a Getty's billion dollar inheritance are the same thing called "private property", or when they say that our conversation and the Time-Warner Corporation are the same thing called "free expression." Trying to correct that kind of thinking, Engels gave lot of examples from nature in which quantitative changes become qualitative changes. I think his approach isn't rigorously logical, because it is an argument by analogy, but that's what he was trying to do.

(How come Rosa hasn't called me a mystic yet? Is she away on vacation?)

Those problems have nothing to do with the three laws. They have to do with how words are used in language.

Rosa is away for a few days.

ChrisK

28th June 2010, 07:58

Objectively dialectics already exist in natural science, it's just not usually labelled in such a way.

E.g.

Ice changing into water which changes into steam is an example of quantitative and qualitative change.

The existence of "queer-ness" in humanity and the animal world is an example of the interpenetration of opposites between the masculine and the feminine.

Already took care of the water changing argument above.

mikelepore

28th June 2010, 08:09

Bad form to apply the dialectic to the natural sciences, I think. Isn't it precisely a re-inversion of the dialectic back to idealism? The whole reason Hegel was comfortable doing that was that in his philosophy Spirit develops itself through matter, so any law applicable to Spirit should be applicable to matter. (Something like) Hegel's categories for the investigation of Spirit actually are pretty useful for investigating human society; there's really no need to foul it up.

Or, is it the other way around -- something observed in the natural sciences, while there is no corresponding thing in human society?

What, if anything, is it useful for?

Queercommie Girl

28th June 2010, 08:19

Or, is it the other way around -- something observed in the natural sciences, while there is no corresponding thing in human society?

What, if anything, is it useful for?

For one thing, dialectics is useful for summarising and categorising the phenomena found in human society and the natural world.

Without a dialectical framework, there is the risk of treating phenomena as "metaphysical absolutes" that never changes with time. E.g. treating the bi-genderal division of humanity as an eternal absolute like some religious people do.

The earliest ancient Chinese text on dialectical philosophy is called the Book of Changes. It contains the idea that the only constant in the entire universe is change. Change is eternal. The ancient Greeks said something similar: everything that comes into being passes away.

Dialectics is like a general table you can fill empirical data into.

Queercommie Girl

28th June 2010, 08:20

Already took care of the water changing argument above.

And what about the queerness one? I hope you are not one of those bigots who think gender norms are rigid, eternal and absolute?

ChrisK

28th June 2010, 08:26

I'm a believer in Dialectical Materialism, which I consider as the fundamental theory that underpins all of material universe, in natural science, in economics and in society.

Where has it been observed to be a fundemental part of the universe? To claim so without scientific or empirical backing is simply disguised idealism.

Partly it is because essentially I am a Leninist, though I am not a dogmatist and I reject any kind of "personality worship", so yes, even Lenin made mistakes. However, given that Lenin lived almost 100 years in an economically backwater part of the world, it is quite remarkable how progressive he was regarding feminism and LGBT issues, even though he obviously considered LGBT issues to be secondary since he never explicitly wrote anything about it, despite formally legalising homosexuality (as well as transgenderism, there was actually a single case of GRS in the 1920s - a little known fact). Lenin was ahead of his time in the sense that even leaders that emerged decades later, such as Che, were not supportive of homosexuality.

Che also supported dialectical materialism. So no correlation between dialectics and LGBT rights.

But partly it's also because I am Chinese. Dialectics underpins Chinese philosophy and Chinese dialectics was even more ancient than that of the Greeks, first emerging around 1000 BCE when the Greeks were still in the Dark Ages. The most important symbol of Chinese philosophy - the Yin-Yang symbol, is a graphical embodiment of dialectical thought. Yin-Yang is as important in the Chinese tradition as the cross is in Christianity and the crescent is in Islam. Traditional Chinese medicine is also based on dialectics, treating the entire human body and mind as a single system. There are a lot of empirical evidence in support of Traditional Chinese medicine, which in turn is evidence in support of dialectics.

So because many mystical metaphysical doctrines support dialectics, you support dialectical materialism. You are using religion to support a belief in a Marxist theory.

Dialectics is also very useful in LGBT politics. The terms of Chinese dialectics, "yin" and "yang", could refer to "female" and "male". The Yin-Yang symbol demonstrates the principle of the inter-penetration of opposites, between the masculine and the feminine. There is an ancient Chinese saying which states "within the yin there is yang, and within the yang there is yin".

Sounds like a way to claim there are essential male and essential female characteristics.

In fact, Maoism itself is a fusion of Leninist and Chinese dialectical thought.

I am suspicious of socialists and "Marxists" who claim that they reject dialectics. I find that often anti-dialecticians are also those who tend to be suspicious of LGBT rights and hold a rigid, mechanistic view of gender norms. (e.g. al8) I find this to be reactionary and unacceptable.

Can't speak for al8, but I've never seen any anti-dialectician uphold such views. I know for a fact that I don't, and I can reasonably say that Rosa, Zarathorus, Maldordor, Syndicat and Meridian do not hold such views.

ChrisK

28th June 2010, 08:27

And what about the queerness one? I hope you are not one of those bigots who think gender norms are rigid, eternal and absolute?

See my last post.

Queercommie Girl

28th June 2010, 08:36

ChrisK

28th June 2010, 08:44

Ancient Chinese dialectics was actually materialistic, not mystical or idealistic. It was of a similar level to the ancient Greek dialectics of a similar period. In this sense although it is not as refined as modern dialectics, it is of a qualitatively higher level than Hegel's mystical-idealistic babble. Traditional Chinese medicine is actually an empirical science.

Ancient Greek dialectics were just debates. Is that what you are speaking of?

What I was saying before is that you have no proof that dialectics is what makes the whole universe run. You are forcing a theory onto the universe without proving that it applies to the universe. Only idealists can do that, materialists cannot, they must have emprical proof.

As to TCM, do you have an links to studies on this issue I might read. I, unfortunately, can only read English with the comprehension needed to understand a scientific study.

Proletarian Ultra

28th June 2010, 15:34

Or, is it the other way around -- something observed in the natural sciences, while there is no corresponding thing in human society?

Sorry, I don't understand the question. Could you rephrase it?

What, if anything, is it useful for?

I don't know...maybe investigating the logic of capital, for one thing.

I'm pro-dialectics, just to make my position clear. I just think Engels' list isn't complete (hardly deals with mediation, negative self-reference, overcoming the subject-object contradiction and other important dialectical tropes) and that 'applying' it to the natural sciences is - well, I don't think Rosa's charge of mysticism is far off there.

graymouser

28th June 2010, 21:10

Okay, how has water's essential charateristic been changed by freezing it? You have only described a characteristic, not an essential one as Hegel, Engels and Lenin say it is to be.

Further, how is that a quantity then? The definition you provided is that of non-essential quality. So does non-essential quality transform other non-essentail qualities? Is this your law?
This is a very strange way to look at things, I think you haven't quite gotten the "essential / non-essential" distinction down. At the level of a pot full of water, its state of being liquid water is an essential quality - that is, if it changes, the pot is no longer full of liquid water. Its temperature is not, changing the temperature 1 degree this way or that will not stop it from being liquid water unless it's already very near a transition point. When it boils the water is converted to steam, changing the essential quality. But the process of boiling was a slow accretion of heat, followed by a sudden change in state.

So define a system. How large must a system be for these laws to appy? You already told me they don't apply at an atomic level, so I can assume they don't apply at a quantum level either. How large must a system before dialectics apply to it? Further, can the system be too large?
It doesn't have to do with size. It's a question of scope - a system is anything with complex, interacting parts. Dialectics are rooted in understanding that systems work in ways that none of their component parts do. You are composed of billions of cells, but not one of those cells individually can eat, or sleep, or work, or debate on an internet message board, or whatever else it is you do. And it's an error to try and study you by studying your cells. Class struggle happens between massive layers of people, not between you and your individual boss. And so on. Studying water molecules as such can teach you a great deal, but each individual molecule doesn't tell you anything about the state of the whole pot of water. You were trying to reduce everything down to a level below the level of the example, and as such missed the realities. (Chemically it is true, for instance, that temperature really is an aggregate and not a property of the individual molecules.)

ChrisK

28th June 2010, 21:21

This is a very strange way to look at things, I think you haven't quite gotten the "essential / non-essential" distinction down. At the level of a pot full of water, its state of being liquid water is an essential quality - that is, if it changes, the pot is no longer full of liquid water. Its temperature is not, changing the temperature 1 degree this way or that will not stop it from being liquid water unless it's already very near a transition point. When it boils the water is converted to steam, changing the essential quality. But the process of boiling was a slow accretion of heat, followed by a sudden change in state.

And how is liquid water different from gas water or solid water? The thing is still water, it is just a different state of water. By changing the essential quality, then the thing must no longer be what it is. So then, what makes water water? Scientifically the only answer is its molecular structure. This has not changed, only the motion of the molecules has changed.

And if you try to argue that I'm not looking at the system, I am. The system changes, but is still the water system. Nothing new has been formed, just motion has changed. In fact, here is what you have just said to me; if you increase the velocity of water molecules, they move faster.

It doesn't have to do with size. It's a question of scope - a system is anything with complex, interacting parts. Dialectics are rooted in understanding that systems work in ways that none of their component parts do. You are composed of billions of cells, but not one of those cells individually can eat, or sleep, or work, or debate on an internet message board, or whatever else it is you do. And it's an error to try and study you by studying your cells. Class struggle happens between massive layers of people, not between you and your individual boss. And so on. Studying water molecules as such can teach you a great deal, but each individual molecule doesn't tell you anything about the state of the whole pot of water. You were trying to reduce everything down to a level below the level of the example, and as such missed the realities. (Chemically it is true, for instance, that temperature really is an aggregate and not a property of the individual molecules.)

Here's your problem. You claim molecules do not act dialectically, but they are also complex systems. They are further composed of atoms, which are composed of protons, neutrons and electrons, which protrons and neutrons are further composed of up and down quarks. These systems act in unpredicatable ways, etc. So then, why not this system?

As for comparing humans to water, I'm game. Give me an example of quantity transforming to quality as applied to humans.

Queercommie Girl

28th June 2010, 22:11

I'm pro-dialectics, just to make my position clear. I just think Engels' list isn't complete (hardly deals with mediation, negative self-reference, overcoming the subject-object contradiction and other important dialectical tropes) and that 'applying' it to the natural sciences is - well, I don't think Rosa's charge of mysticism is far off there.

But surely there is no absolute separation between the "natural sciences" and the "social sciences"? So if dialectics can apply to economics it can also apply to natural science. I think Engels originally believed in this too.

I am in principle in agreement with the transhumanist movement (though not necessarily where they think they are going), in that though humans are qualitatively apart from all else in the known universe, fundamentally we rest on exactly the same material basis. There is no "magical human soul". Humans literally are machines that have self-consciousness due to the fact that we've reached a certain threshold level of informational complexity. This is bringing in "science fiction" elements but if one-day we discover alien life which also has self-consciousness, and if we one-day construct AI which has self-awareness, then hypothetically they should have "human" rights too. "Human" is not necessarily limited to our current physical forms.

graymouser

28th June 2010, 22:22

And how is liquid water different from gas water or solid water? The thing is still water, it is just a different state of water. By changing the essential quality, then the thing must no longer be what it is. So then, what makes water water? Scientifically the only answer is its molecular structure. This has not changed, only the motion of the molecules has changed.

And if you try to argue that I'm not looking at the system, I am. The system changes, but is still the water system. Nothing new has been formed, just motion has changed. In fact, here is what you have just said to me; if you increase the velocity of water molecules, they move faster.
Yet this increase in velocity of the motion of the water molecules - an increase in the temperature - has ramifications at the level of the entire pot. We aren't trying to study the molecules here but the whole pot and what happens to the entire thing. And its contents have changed from a liquid to a gas. When you try to explain the whole in terms of only the parts, you lose entire categories of description. A water molecule doesn't have temperature, and it doesn't have a phase state - yet temperature and phase states are real things, and they change in a way that is describable with the law of the change of quantity into quality and vice versa.

Here's your problem. You claim molecules do not act dialectically, but they are also complex systems. They are further composed of atoms, which are composed of protons, neutrons and electrons, which protrons and neutrons are further composed of up and down quarks. These systems act in unpredicatable ways, etc. So then, why not this system?

As for comparing humans to water, I'm game. Give me an example of quantity transforming to quality as applied to humans.
I did not say molecules don't act dialectically, I said that they are the wrong thing to look at if you are trying to understand a pot of liquid water.

As far as human quantity transforming into quality, here's one: the development of a fertilized gamete. At first it's just one cell, a single thing with a cell wall, nucleus and organelles. Through nothing more than division according to the instructions of its DNA, and the absorption of nutrients from the mother, it goes through the transition from a zygote, to a blastocyst, to a fetus, and finally an embryo before it is born as a human being. You cannot understand this process by examining only the individual cells, yet by division you have gone from one cell to a whole living creature. Quantity (number of cells) gives way to quality (change to a blastocyst and so on).

ChrisK

28th June 2010, 22:30

Yet this increase in velocity of the motion of the water molecules - an increase in the temperature - has ramifications at the level of the entire pot. We aren't trying to study the molecules here but the whole pot and what happens to the entire thing. And its contents have changed from a liquid to a gas. When you try to explain the whole in terms of only the parts, you lose entire categories of description. A water molecule doesn't have temperature, and it doesn't have a phase state - yet temperature and phase states are real things, and they change in a way that is describable with the law of the change of quantity into quality and vice versa.

You do realize that you have said that an increase in a quanitity, increases its quantity, right?

Liquid to gas is molecules increasing in velocity, heat is increasing velocity. Nothing essential has changed, the substance is still water.

I did not say molecules don't act dialectically, I said that they are the wrong thing to look at if you are trying to understand a pot of liquid water.

How does one determine what we should look at to see it dialectically. Sounds like dialetics isn't all inclusive and that systems are arbitrarily created to support dialectics.

As far as human quantity transforming into quality, here's one: the development of a fertilized gamete. At first it's just one cell, a single thing with a cell wall, nucleus and organelles. Through nothing more than division according to the instructions of its DNA, and the absorption of nutrients from the mother, it goes through the transition from a zygote, to a blastocyst, to a fetus, and finally an embryo before it is born as a human being. You cannot understand this process by examining only the individual cells, yet by division you have gone from one cell to a whole living creature. Quantity (number of cells) gives way to quality (change to a blastocyst and so on).

Well that doesn't make sense. Cells are an essential quality to humans. Quantity, according to Hegel, is an unessential outside thing, but these cells are clearly essential to making up a human. You have now said that an increase in quality causes a new quality.

graymouser

28th June 2010, 23:43

You do realize that you have said that an increase in a quanitity, increases its quantity, right?

Liquid to gas is molecules increasing in velocity, heat is increasing velocity. Nothing essential has changed, the substance is still water.
At the level of molecules this is all true, at the level of a pot something quite dramatic has changed. If you refuse to grasp this distinction you aren't going to understand dialectics - it's about the forest not the trees.

How does one determine what we should look at to see it dialectically. Sounds like dialetics isn't all inclusive and that systems are arbitrarily created to support dialectics.
No, dialectics is about understanding something in its entirety, with its complex inner workings, and not reducing it to its constituent parts. So you can use dialectics to understand a pot of water, or to understand a hydrogen atom in that pot, but they are separate investigations. You insist on looking only at the parts, not at the whole, which is why I say you don't really understand the aims of dialectics at all.

Well that doesn't make sense. Cells are an essential quality to humans. Quantity, according to Hegel, is an unessential outside thing, but these cells are clearly essential to making up a human. You have now said that an increase in quality causes a new quality.
No, I said that increases in quantity (number of cells) lead to changes in quality: from a single-celled zygote to a multi-celled blastocyte, and then from an undifferentiated blastocyte to a differentiated embryo, and from that embryo to a well formed fetus, and finally to a living breathing human being. All that's happening in this whole process is cellular reproduction and consumption of food.

S.Artesian

28th June 2010, 23:58

No, I said that increases in quantity (number of cells) lead to changes in quality: from a single-celled zygote to a multi-celled blastocyte, and then from an undifferentiated blastocyte to a differentiated embryo, and from that embryo to a well formed fetus, and finally to a living breathing human being. All that's happening in this whole process is cellular reproduction and consumption of food.

I think there is a dis-service being performed in his sort of argument-- a disservice to Marx, whose own concentration, and focus, whose materialist dialectic was deliberately, exclusively concerned with history, with the social organization of labor and the conditions of labor-- and a disservice to molecular biology, genetics in attempting to force this sort of, IMO, faux dialectic upon a biological process.

The entire point of Marx's critique of Hegel, his extraction of the "rational kernel" of dialectic is that the components of the dialectic-- appearance and essence, mediation and manifestation, negation, inversion, shared identity of opposites are human products-- social products, and that the "anti-dialectical" "anti-critical" bourgeois ideologues fetishize human relations into "things"-- objects and then endows those objects with powers over humans.

There are real biochemical, genetic forces at work in the develop of an embryo. Nothing and I mean absolutely nothing is added to our understanding of those forces, or to examination of those forces by "overlaying" this type of "dialectical" explanation. On the contrary, the ideological component of such an effort actually obscures, and "chills" investigation of those forces, that physical development.

The development of a human embryo is not determined by an accumulation of cells somehow by the very number of their accumulation "rearranging" themselves as an embryo. Complex chemical triggers, and spatial reorientations of cells are at work, and the fact that a certain number of cells corresponds to moments of that change is likely to be derivative of the coded triggers, rather than causal.

And that, FWIW is the problem I have with "dialectics of nature."

ChrisK

29th June 2010, 02:18

At the level of molecules this is all true, at the level of a pot something quite dramatic has changed. If you refuse to grasp this distinction you aren't going to understand dialectics - it's about the forest not the trees.

The distiction you make is a forced one. You are trying to force dialectics onto something with word-play. The reality is nothing has changed, only motion has changed.

No, dialectics is about understanding something in its entirety, with its complex inner workings, and not reducing it to its constituent parts. So you can use dialectics to understand a pot of water, or to understand a hydrogen atom in that pot, but they are separate investigations. You insist on looking only at the parts, not at the whole, which is why I say you don't really understand the aims of dialectics at all.

And I say you are making a false distinction. Liquid is not a quality or a thing, it is a state. The thing that can change is water. Liquid water is not a thing, other than H2O in a slower moving state than gas.

No, I said that increases in quantity (number of cells) lead to changes in quality: from a single-celled zygote to a multi-celled blastocyte, and then from an undifferentiated blastocyte to a differentiated embryo, and from that embryo to a well formed fetus, and finally to a living breathing human being. All that's happening in this whole process is cellular reproduction and consumption of food.

Your not listening. You are using quantity and quality incorrectly, I have supplied the dialectical definitions. You are just using them wrong.

mikelepore

29th June 2010, 04:57

Sure, using ordinary language that is how it is defined. That's how I prefer to be defined. But we are talking about Engels and he seems to be using Hegel's definitions of quality and quantity. I say this because he claims to have derived these laws from Hegel, making it reasonable to assume that that is the definition used by Engels.

I'm telling Engels what he was talking about. He didn't know himself. His desultory notebook (now published as "The Dialectics of Nature") shows him searching and stumbling as he was trying to figure something out. I'm telling him that there really is something in nature similar to what he was looking for, but the idea is undeveloped in the form in which he left it. The correct form is this: There are many pairs of variables where a gradual numerical variation of the independent variable causes a categorical change in the dependent variable. That's the pattern that is common to all of his examples.

ChrisK

29th June 2010, 08:22

I'm telling Engels what he was talking about. He didn't know himself. His desultory notebook (now published as "The Dialectics of Nature") shows him searching and stumbling as he was trying to figure something out. I'm telling him that there really is something in nature similar to what he was looking for, but the idea is undeveloped in the form in which he left it. The correct form is this: There are many pairs of variables where a gradual numerical variation of the independent variable causes a categorical change in the dependent variable. That's the pattern that is common to all of his examples.

Your changing definitions that have been accepted for years by dialecticians to create a new law. This was not Engel's law, this is Mike Lepore's law. I was discussing Engel's law.

mikelepore

29th June 2010, 09:07

It's not a law at all, it's just a observation of the sort "Hey, I noticed an interesting thing that somethings happens." To be a law there would have to generalization that predicts when something in particular will be found, so that it might have a more universal application. What Engels wrote has no predictive power.

All the examples that Engels gives in his writings shows that it's his observation, not mine. Engels said "the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa." Then he gave a load of examples about the formation of the solar system, and the square root of negative one, and a great variety of things. His presentation requires some interpretation before anyone can make head or tail out of it. His manuscript is obviously a pile of book-reading notes of the type "maybe someday I can make use of this interesting fact to illustrate my point", but the point itself is largely absent.

Your explanation that the words "essence" and "being" have specific meanings, besides whatever I want them to mean, sounds like gibberish to me. But if you got that from Hegel, it's no wonder. Hegel's entire subject was his invented religion. He considered history to be an unfolding of God's mind.

ChrisK

29th June 2010, 09:17

Queercommie Girl

29th June 2010, 14:22

Dialectics is not directly a science, but a philosophy of science. It does not directly influence our theories of the natural world, but it does significantly influences our interpretations of such theories.

Such interpretations are important because they have cultural and social influences, and reflect the class character of the interpreters.

Science is a lot more than just straight theories, experiments and logic. We need to understand the human dimension of science.

Proletarian Ultra

29th June 2010, 16:39

Science is a lot more than just straight theories, experiments and logic. We need to understand the human dimension of science.

There's at least two human dimensions of science. One is history and philosophy of science, which yeah, dialectics is important for.

The other is phenomenology - the study of how we perceive things. Quantity into quality is for damn sure an accurate observation when we consider our perception of water boiling. In fact, that's what Hegel-style dialectics was meant to investigate in the first place.

mikelepore

29th June 2010, 18:51

In 'Dialectics of Nature' chapter 3, after Engels lists those three so-called laws, he says that they were "developed by Hegel" as "laws of thought". He speaks of "quantitative" changes as "addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)". His examples there of what he means by "qualitative" are "living body" and "nonliving body." In chapter 1 his example of this "transformation" is the process of a "purely mechanical change of place" resulting in "heat, electricity, chemical action or life." I try to assimilate his meaning from his examples, without paying much attention to whether he continues to use Hegel's terminology.

Queercommie Girl

30th June 2010, 12:38

Marxism rejects scientific positivism. We reject the idea that all there is to science is the experimental verification of logical statements. We do not hold a mechanistic world-view. What is also important in science is the observer, the experimenter, how he or she sees the world and interprets the universe.

Quantum mechanics has empirically proven that the subjective observer directly influences the outcome of a supposedly objective experiment. E.g. the double-slit experiment and quantum interference.

Scientific positivism would suggest that since dialectics does not directly add to our scientific knowledge, it must be useless. But dialectics is not a science, it is a philosophy of science. It significantly influences how we observe and interpret the world around us, from physical nature to human society itself.

Humans are not just robots that can only process raw sensory data. We always need a world-view to make sense of the material universe around us. In the past, religions served this role. Although scientific philosophy can replace religion, it cannot do away with the need for a philosophical world-view. This role must be filled. That's why we need dialectics.

Scientific positivists say science does not concern itself with value judgements. We say no branch of science can ever do away with the influence of value judgements, for the simple reason that all scientists are human and have self-consciousness.

REVLEFT'S BIEGGST MATSER TROL

30th June 2010, 13:03

mikelepore

1st July 2010, 02:58

Has there been any serious study of the universe at large to find out whether this "law" holds for it rather than a few casual assertions that it seems a lot like what happens when water boils?

If there hasn't, I don't think we can say it is scientific. If you wouldn't accept that kind of shoddy scientific claim in favour of a right wing theory, say, that intelligence is linked to race, I don't see why its acceptable to do so for dialectics.

If you mean what I said about, when the average kinetic energy changes slightly around a certain value, then the bonding force between the molecules changes drastically, yes, this is agreed upon by everyone in physics and chemistry. You can read about the intermolecular forces called van der Waals forces. But if you mean trying to interpret the physical fact in terms of Engel's description, no, science doesn't use that kind of language. In science people just say that the temperature of phase change is where the varying center-on-center distance between adjacent molecules causes the intermolecular force to jump abruptly to a new value. Unlike the inverse square law that we have with the electrical and gravitational forces, the van der Waals force falls off with the 7th power of the distance, which is a very steep change.

S.Artesian

2nd July 2010, 03:20

Bizarre, no? All quiet on the dialectic/anti-dialectic front? This thread, the ordinary thread, the dm=religion thread.

Rosa's away, Chris must be working too much.

mikelepore

2nd July 2010, 08:50

How about those other generalities? Unity of opposites: what the hell is that? The negation of the negation: what the hell is that? It sounds like wisdom received from a fortune cookie.

S.Artesian

2nd July 2010, 15:21

ChrisK

2nd July 2010, 20:38

ChrisK

2nd July 2010, 20:39

Bizarre, no? All quiet on the dialectic/anti-dialectic front? This thread, the ordinary thread, the dm=religion thread.

Rosa's away, Chris must be working too much.

Indeed. Double shifts suck.

S.Artesian

3rd July 2010, 02:14

Indeed. Double shifts suck.

Tell me about. The bourgeoisie like to say time is money.

We know that money is the absolute lack of time. Ask anybody who has to work overtime.

Hit The North

3rd July 2010, 14:48

You'll notice that he does not define quality. In such a case, we are left with Hegel's definition. This means the example still fails as the system does not change the water into anything but water. Added quantity creates more quantity.

Well, you are copying Engels by failing to define 'water'. Surely, H2O is 'water' when it is in liquid form, 'ice' when it is a solid, and 'steam' when it is a gas.

'Quality' for Engels, as a Marxist materialist, is surely a sensuous property, an aspect of the phenomenal world. In this sense, H2O exhibits different qualities in its various states.

However, according to you, there are no qualitative differences between these various states, only a difference in quantity. This sets your approach apart from that of common language use, as no one, who is not insane, fails to spot the differences between these states, or refers to them as 'less water' or 'more water'.

mikelepore

3rd July 2010, 19:19

You'll notice that he does not define quality. In such a case, we are left with Hegel's definition.

If he didn't define it, why doesn't that mean that he intends the definition found in the dictionary?

Here's a google hack that most people don't know. You can display dictionary definitions of any word by typing this into a google search box, the word "define" then a colon then the word, such as define:quality . It would generate this url:

http://www.google.com/search?&q=define:quality

mikelepore

3rd July 2010, 19:33

Channeling Rosa, Mike? Trying to make me less lonely?

The way Rosa disputes these dialectical proverbs is to give examples of occasions in which they don't apply, then say, oh look, they don't always work, therefore they are not laws. My approach is different. I say that Engels' point was that they _sometimes_ work, and that itself calls for an investigation. However, Engels was unable, as anyone would be unable, to put them into a form that would, in any kind of application, distinguish unambiguously between a true conclusion and a false conclusion. Therefore we don't have in these proverbs a form of logic or science. What they are, instead, are problem-solving heuristics, in the same category as "try solving the problem backwards", "try drawing a flowchart", etc. What Engels thought were laws are actually methods that may induce the intuition to realize a solution to a problem. However, that solution has to be checked by other methods.

Queercommie Girl

9th July 2010, 05:34

How about those other generalities? Unity of opposites: what the hell is that? The negation of the negation: what the hell is that? It sounds like wisdom received from a fortune cookie.

You are a scientific positivist. You think philosophy itself is useless, in fact, anything that does not directly give us empirical data is useless. The effort to philosophically interpret the universe is useless. Humans are nothing more than data-processing machines to you.

Marxism rejects scientific positivism. Scientific positivism is a reactionary ideology, as much as Christian fundamentalism is.

Queercommie Girl

9th July 2010, 05:47

How about those other generalities? Unity of opposites: what the hell is that? The negation of the negation: what the hell is that? It sounds like wisdom received from a fortune cookie.

By the way, as a Chinese person, I'd say your comment about "fortune cookies" is bordering on racism. Not that any Chinese person would believe in "fortune cookies".

Chinese invented philosophical dialectics before the Greeks did. Give credit where it's due.

Queercommie Girl

9th July 2010, 05:54

Ancient Greek dialectics were just debates. Is that what you are speaking of?

What I was saying before is that you have no proof that dialectics is what makes the whole universe run. You are forcing a theory onto the universe without proving that it applies to the universe. Only idealists can do that, materialists cannot, they must have emprical proof.

As to TCM, do you have an links to studies on this issue I might read. I, unfortunately, can only read English with the comprehension needed to understand a scientific study.

Ancient dialectics was much more crude than modern philosophy, but even Engels spoke of the "genius" of the ancient Greeks. Philosophical debate based on logical argument historically played a very progressive role in human society. It is the fundamental basis of all modern knowledge.

Marxists do not consider "science" to exist in an abstract vacuum. Science is intrinsically historical and social. We will never forget the great thinkers of antiquity. Without them there is no us. As Newton once said, if I have seen further, it is because I've stood on the shoulder of giants.

As for TCM, there are many links in Chinese, but unfortunately very few in English. Generally speaking TCM can be more effective in treating long-term chronic illnesses but less so with acute illnesses. TCM is more about preserving one's health as a whole rather than just treating a specific explicit illness.

I never said dialectics "makes the universe run". There is nothing that makes the universe run. The universe "simply is". (By the way, "just-so" or "simply is" is the literal meaning of the Chinese word for "nature" - nature exists without a creator or an external force to push it, in the Chinese language, that is the very definition of what "nature" is) Dialectics is not a science, (much less a "magical force" that makes the universe "run"!) it is a philosophy of science. Read some stuff written by Thomas Kuhn. His ideas on the philosophy of science is quite dialectical.

Queercommie Girl

9th July 2010, 07:08

How about those other generalities? Unity of opposites: what the hell is that? The negation of the negation: what the hell is that? It sounds like wisdom received from a fortune cookie.

Unity of opposites: ever heard of the wave-particle duality of quantum mechanics?

By the way, did you know that the great physicist Bohr actually used the Yin-Yang symbol as a philosophical representation of quantum physics?

Lyev

11th July 2010, 13:56

I think I can just about endorse Engels' dialectic. The three "laws" aren't exactly infallible, every paradigm of study of the world has its limits. And before we start, everything does not have an opposite, but an opposite can be found in most things. The anti-dialectic's line is usually something along the lines of: "does a banana have an opposite?". Why on earth would we be studying the opposite of a banana? It's a ridiculous argument. I prefer to apply to dialectic to relevant things like capitalist crisis and the contradiction between labour and capital, but I think noticing the three rules in these is harder, and something I can't really quite do. It doesn't exactly come alive when applied to fruit. So the three "laws" (I prefer to think of them as general rules):

(1) Everything has an opposite. For a start, the second law of thermodynamics argue that all objects have to held together by opposing forces. Also, an object or body can only move forward if a force causes it to, and I think this is Newton's laws of motion. For example, I got up this morning, and I went from being asleep to awake. The opposite of the proletariat is the bourgeoisie. The opposite of freedom is slavery. Concepts, as such, don't particularly have an opposite, but need opposites to be understand; i.e., good against bad, large against small and so forth.

(2) Quantitative changes lead to qualitative ones. In other words, gradual change can lead to a turning point, a crossroads, where one opposite overcomes the other. An example of this is blowing up a balloon until it pops: you fill it with an amount of air (quantitative) and then it bursts (qualitative), changing into it's opposite, i.e., it goes from being full of air, to having no air in it, because it just burst. The most simple example I can think of this is stacking up wooden blocks (quantitative) until they fall down (qualitative) and a stacked-up pile of wooden blocks is the opposite of a fallen-down pile of blocks.

(3) Lastly, perhaps the most difficult law (or general rule): the negation of the negation. It's easier to understand this as change moves in spirals, not circles. Change happens, but does not repeat itself exactly, rather it comes back as something similar; in a word, things evolve. A simple example is a seed falling out of a tree. The seed starts intact. The opposite of the starting point is its negation; it breaks apart and is destroyed as roots sprout from it in the ground. This negation is then negated when (in a spiral-like fashion) when the seed grows into a new tree, and the seed produces new and different seeds.

ChrisK

13th July 2010, 05:32

Tell me about. The bourgeoisie like to say time is money.

We know that money is the absolute lack of time. Ask anybody who has to work overtime.

Oh but they make up for it with time-and-a-fuck-half. See how good they are too us. We should worship them for be so kind.

ChrisK

13th July 2010, 05:37

Well, you are copying Engels by failing to define 'water'. Surely, H2O is 'water' when it is in liquid form, 'ice' when it is a solid, and 'steam' when it is a gas.

Nice try. I water is water no matter what state it is in. Water is H2O and that is it.

'Quality' for Engels, as a Marxist materialist, is surely a sensuous property, an aspect of the phenomenal world. In this sense, H2O exhibits different qualities in its various states.

Why would you assume that?

However, according to you, there are no qualitative differences between these various states, only a difference in quantity. This sets your approach apart from that of common language use, as no one, who is not insane, fails to spot the differences between these states, or refers to them as 'less water' or 'more water'.

Scientifically (which is what Engels thought he was doing) there is no quantitative change. If you boil water the amount does not change. The same amount is in steam form as is in liquid form.

ChrisK

13th July 2010, 05:38

If he didn't define it, why doesn't that mean that he intends the definition found in the dictionary?

Here's a google hack that most people don't know. You can display dictionary definitions of any word by typing this into a google search box, the word "define" then a colon then the word, such as define:quality . It would generate this url:

http://www.google.com/search?&q=define:quality

Probably because he derived this from Hegel, so it would make sense he uses Hegel's definition.

ChrisK

13th July 2010, 05:43

Ancient dialectics was much more crude than modern philosophy, but even Engels spoke of the "genius" of the ancient Greeks. Philosophical debate based on logical argument historically played a very progressive role in human society. It is the fundamental basis of all modern knowledge.

Right, but is was only an argument form. It was not the basis for the universe as Hegel claimed.

Marxists do not consider "science" to exist in an abstract vacuum. Science is intrinsically historical and social. We will never forget the great thinkers of antiquity. Without them there is no us. As Newton once said, if I have seen further, it is because I've stood on the shoulder of giants.

Your point?

As for TCM, there are many links in Chinese, but unfortunately very few in English. Generally speaking TCM can be more effective in treating long-term chronic illnesses but less so with acute illnesses. TCM is more about preserving one's health as a whole rather than just treating a specific explicit illness.

For right now I'll take that with a grain of salt.

I never said dialectics "makes the universe run". There is nothing that makes the universe run. The universe "simply is". (By the way, "just-so" or "simply is" is the literal meaning of the Chinese word for "nature" - nature exists without a creator or an external force to push it, in the Chinese language, that is the very definition of what "nature" is) Dialectics is not a science, (much less a "magical force" that makes the universe "run"!) it is a philosophy of science. Read some stuff written by Thomas Kuhn. His ideas on the philosophy of science is quite dialectical.

As I recall, Kuhn did not believe in a dialectic, rather, he wrote about paradigm shifts.

Queercommie Girl

21st July 2010, 11:31

Right, but is was only an argument form. It was not the basis for the universe as Hegel claimed.

Hegelianism is dialectical idealist. I don't believe in Hegelianism. Dialectical materialism does not claim to be the "ultimate truth" of the universe. There is no real "ultimate truth", revolution, including scientific progress, is an eternal process. Dialectics is a general abstraction based on general trends in nature, history and human thought at our current state of understanding of the universe at large.

Hypothetically, since the universe is only the universe as viewed through human eyes, maybe the reason the universe looks "dialectical" has more to do with the fundamental nature of the observers - humanity than it has to do with the universe itself. Perhaps dialectics in a fundamental evolutionary sense is somehow based on the fact that humans have two genders, and as this might change in the future, perhaps dialectics will become obsolete at some point. So no it's not the "ultimate truth" of the universe.

Your point?
At the very least, forget about natural dialectics for a moment, and just focus on dialectics as it is applied to history, society and culture, as Marxists often do. Since science fundamentally has a historical dimension like everything else, it is also subject to dialectical analysis, at least from this angle, if not directly as in natural dialectics.

As I recall, Kuhn did not believe in a dialectic, rather, he wrote about paradigm shifts.
People call things by different names and the term "dialectics" isn't all that popular in mainstream bourgeois philosophy today, perhaps there is a political reason for that. But objectively Kuhn's own paradigm of scientific revolutions is remarkable similar and runs parallel to Marx's theory of social and political revolutions, and is an example of quantitative into qualitative change at the level of the history of science.

ChrisK

22nd July 2010, 22:54

Hegelianism is dialectical idealist. I don't believe in Hegelianism. Dialectical materialism does not claim to be the "ultimate truth" of the universe. There is no real "ultimate truth", revolution, including scientific progress, is an eternal process. Dialectics is a general abstraction based on general trends in nature, history and human thought at our current state of understanding of the universe at large.

1. Apparantly you ignored Engels and Lenin as they claimed the univserse functioned dialectically.

2. So as it is an abstraction, you admit that by sitting and thinking, this theory was created; not by scientific method.

Hypothetically, since the universe is only the universe as viewed through human eyes, maybe the reason the universe looks "dialectical" has more to do with the fundamental nature of the observers - humanity than it has to do with the universe itself. Perhaps dialectics in a fundamental evolutionary sense is somehow based on the fact that humans have two genders, and as this might change in the future, perhaps dialectics will become obsolete at some point. So no it's not the "ultimate truth" of the universe.

We don't have two genders. We have two sexes, and numerous genders.

Also, am I right to assume that you think everything is subjective?

At the very least, forget about natural dialectics for a moment, and just focus on dialectics as it is applied to history, society and culture, as Marxists often do. Since science fundamentally has a historical dimension like everything else, it is also subject to dialectical analysis, at least from this angle, if not directly as in natural dialectics.

You have not yet proven that history functions dialectically. If you can't do that I have no reason to apply dialects to science, much less history.

People call things by different names and the term "dialectics" isn't all that popular in mainstream bourgeois philosophy today, perhaps there is a political reason for that. But objectively Kuhn's own paradigm of scientific revolutions is remarkable similar and runs parallel to Marx's theory of social and political revolutions, and is an example of quantitative into qualitative change at the level of the history of science.

1. Funnily enough, Marx's theory of history doesn't read a thing like it is dialectical.

2. How is that an example of quality to quantity.

learnitarian

19th August 2010, 01:53

The law of the unity and conflict of opposites;
The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes;
The law of the negation of the negation

I'm new to this, so I'm confused. Why are these contentious? I can easily give examples of each of these.

Up is the opposite of down. They're united because there can't be one without the other. They're in conflict because you can't go in both directions at once.
One person is too weak to change society. Add enough people and they become a force capable of changing society.
Going up, going down, going up, going down, going up...

scarletghoul

19th August 2010, 02:43

lol @ people criticising Engels because they dont dare to criticise the sacred Marx

Anyone opposed to dialectical materialism is opposed to the very core of Marxism

Luisrah

26th August 2010, 15:56

lol @ people criticising Engels because they dont dare to criticise the sacred Marx

Anyone opposed to dialectical materialism is opposed to the very core of Marxism

I was just thinking about that.

One of the laws, the unity and conflict of opposites can be applied to society and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie right?
The struggle between the two opposites is what brings about change and progress.

Also, the law of the negation of the negation can lead us to thinking about how society's changes are processed, in the sense that socialism negates capitalism in order to exist and society retains some of capitalism's things (like currency for example) and eliminates some of capitalism's things (such as opression and exploitation)

As for the quantitative changes leading to qualitative changes, I can't think of anything, unless it has to do with economics, which I'm not too good at.

I'm still a newbie at this, but I hope I'm starting to make some sense :lol:

learnitarian

28th August 2010, 15:42

As for the quantitative changes leading to qualitative changes, I can't think of anything, unless it has to do with economics, which I'm not too good at.

I'm a newbie too but I think my example works. One worker all alone is not a force capable of abolishing capitalism. But if you add enough workers (make a quantitative change) you eventually get a capable force (a qualitative change).

Luisrah

30th August 2010, 10:24

I'm a newbie too but I think my example works. One worker all alone is not a force capable of abolishing capitalism. But if you add enough workers (make a quantitative change) you eventually get a capable force (a qualitative change).

I think so

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 13:32

GrayRodent:

Hegel's logic was flawed, but because it was based on the Idea, not because it was wholesale mysticism as "Rosa" has tried to convince people here. The extremely idiosyncratic reading of Marx and Engels that says otherwise is supported by virtually no one, although some argue that there is a differentiation between Marx's "historical materialism" and the more general "dialectical materialism" referring specifically to the distorted version of the latter presented by the Stalinists

Where precisely have I argued as follows: "Hegel's sysyem is mystical, therefore his logic is flawed"?

Seems you mystics just can't resist the temptation to invent stuff to attribute to me.

Anyway, Chris has outlined my argument in his reply to you. The full argument can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

Summarised here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

Finally, as I have shown here repeatedly, Marx abandoned this mystical theory of yours when he wrote Das Kapital:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/scrapping-dialectics-would-t79634/index4.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158574&postcount=73

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158816&postcount=75

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1161443&postcount=114

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1163222&postcount=124

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-and-political-t118934/index.html

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 13:39

S Artesian:

Let's try this:

1. What is the "quality" that defines capitalism? Marx identifies that quality variously as "self-expanding value," "self-valorising," etc. etc.-- iterations on that theme.

2. How does capital accomplish this self-expansion, this self-valorising? Through the aggrandizement of surplus labor-time, which is surplus value.

3. As capital accumulates, how does the aggrandizement of this surplus labor-time change?

4. Capital moves from the formal domination to the real domination of wage-labor, and increases its proportional aggrandizement of surplus labor-time through the amplification of productivity. Through introduction of "labor -saving" [time saving] machinery, workers reproduce values equal to their own wages in relatively shorter time. Capitalists aggrandize the remaining, relatively larger amount of surplus labor-time. This relative surplus-value replaces "absolute" surplus value-- which is the product of extending the working day without improving the ability of labor to reproduce its wage in less time.

5. Consequently, self-expansion, accumulation of capital -- is the result of -- well, of accumulation of capital-- replacement of wage-labor by machinery. Profitability, self-expansion, valorisation, the essential qualities of capital are reproduced in this replacement process.

6. What happens as the means of production increase, as the accumulation of capital, the quantity of capital "injected" into the production process increases? The rate of profit has a tendency to fall. The fall of profitability forces the capitalists to "push harder," producing even more in an attempt to outrun the declining profitability. Overproduction is the result, and finally, as profitability is impaired, the accumulation of capital becomes its very opposite-- it is transformed into a devaluation of capital.

7. A change in quantity has produced a qualitative change in the reproduction of capital.

1. This fails to tell us what a 'quality' is.

2. Where does Marx define 'quality' this way?

3. The alleged changes above are all gradual, and not 'nodal'.

4. Where is the new 'quality' at the end? Seems to me that according to your 'definition' of 'quality':

What is the "quality" that defines capitalism? Marx identifies that quality variously as "self-expanding value," "self-valorising," etc. etc.-- iterations on that theme.

that capitalism does not change in 'quality' at any point -- or does it cease to be: "self-expanding value," "self-valorising,"?

Nice try, only it wasn't...

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 13:45

BAM:

Even prior to that the quality/quantity distinctiom is vital to Marx's entire theory. Use-value and exchange vcalue, one qualitative, the other quantitative. And indeed the commodity is a unity of the two. Even between commodities, the exchange value of commodity A is expressed in the use-value of commodity B.

And quality/quantity also spills over into what he termed his own greatest discovery, the two-fold character of labour: concrete and abstract.

But, according to Engels:

"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Dialectics of Nature, p.63. Emphasis added.]

Where is the 'addition of matter' and/or 'motion' in your example?

No wonder Marx abandoned these whacky ideas when he wrote Das Kapital -- see the links posted above.

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 13:54

Iseul:

I'm a believer in Dialectical Materialism, which I consider as the fundamental theory that underpins all of material universe, in natural science, in economics and in society.

Partly it is because essentially I am a Leninist, though I am not a dogmatist and I reject any kind of "personality worship", so yes, even Lenin made mistakes. However, given that Lenin lived almost 100 years ago in an economically backwater part of the world, it is quite remarkable how progressive he was regarding feminism and LGBT issues, even though he obviously considered LGBT issues to be secondary since he never explicitly wrote anything about it, despite formally legalising homosexuality (as well as transgenderism, there was actually a single case of GRS in the 1920s - a little known fact). Lenin was ahead of his time in the sense that even leaders that emerged decades later, such as Che, were not supportive of homosexuality.

But partly it's also because I am Chinese. Dialectics underpins Chinese philosophy and Chinese dialectics was even more ancient than that of the Greeks, first emerging around 1000 BCE when the Greeks were still in the Dark Ages. The most important symbol of Chinese philosophy - the Yin-Yang symbol, is a graphical embodiment of dialectical thought. Yin-Yang is as important in the Chinese tradition as the cross is in Christianity and the crescent is in Islam. Traditional Chinese medicine is also based on dialectics, treating the entire human body and mind as a single system. There are a lot of empirical evidence in support of Traditional Chinese medicine, which in turn is evidence in support of dialectics.

Dialectics is also very useful in LGBT politics. The terms of Chinese dialectics, "yin" and "yang", could refer to "female" and "male". The Yin-Yang symbol demonstrates the principle of the inter-penetration of opposites, between the masculine and the feminine. There is an ancient Chinese saying which states "within the yin there is yang, and within the yang there is yin".

In fact, Maoism itself is a fusion of Leninist and Chinese dialectical thought.

I am suspicious of socialists and "Marxists" who claim that they reject dialectics. I find that often anti-dialecticians are also those who tend to be suspicious of LGBT rights and hold a rigid, mechanistic view of gender norms. (e.g. al8) I find this to be reactionary and unacceptable.

Thanks for that, but this 'theory' has been demolished repeatedly at this board. See here for more details:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

However, a couple of points:

1. I agree that this 'theory' underpins Chinese philosophy, but that just confirms that it is part of the 'ruling ideas' that always rule.

2. I fail to see how this 'theory' is useful in LGBT politics. In fact, because it is so confused, I suspect that, if it were ever used, it would get in the way. The interpenetration of opposites idea is no help at all. If it were true, for example, change would be impossible. Or, males would turn into their 'opposites', females! See the links at the end.

3. I am an anti-dialectical Marxist, and I fully support LGBT rights, as do others like me here.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

For one thing, dialectics is useful for summarising and categorising the phenomena found in human society and the natural world.

Without a dialectical framework, there is the risk of treating phenomena as "metaphysical absolutes" that never changes with time. E.g. treating the bi-genderal division of humanity as an eternal absolute like some religious people do.

The earliest ancient Chinese text on dialectical philosophy is called the Book of Changes. It contains the idea that the only constant in the entire universe is change. Change is eternal. The ancient Greeks said something similar: everything that comes into being passes away.

Dialectics is like a general table you can fill empirical data into.

In fact, dialectics is guilty of doing just this -- it's alleged laws have been frozen into eternal metaphysical 'truths' -- none of which work anyway.

And, as I pointed out above, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

Dialectics is not directly a science, but a philosophy of science. It does not directly influence our theories of the natural world, but it does significantly influences our interpretations of such theories.

Such interpretations are important because they have cultural and social influences, and reflect the class character of the interpreters.

Science is a lot more than just straight theories, experiments and logic. We need to understand the human dimension of science.

Well, it's a remarkably poor 'philosophy of science' in that case. Anyway, we do not need it. Historical Materialism takes care of the "human dimension of science" quite nicely, thank you.

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 14:08

Scarlet:

Anyone opposed to dialectical materialism is opposed to the very core of Marxism

That must include Marx then.:lol:

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 14:10

Luisrah:

I was just thinking about that.

One of the laws, the unity and conflict of opposites can be applied to society and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie right?
The struggle between the two opposites is what brings about change and progress.

Also, the law of the negation of the negation can lead us to thinking about how society's changes are processed, in the sense that socialism negates capitalism in order to exist and society retains some of capitalism's things (like currency for example) and eliminates some of capitalism's things (such as opression and exploitation)

As for the quantitative changes leading to qualitative changes, I can't think of anything, unless it has to do with economics, which I'm not too good at.

I'm still a newbie at this, but I hope I'm starting to make some sense

Ok, but as I have shown, this theory would make change impossible:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

Moreover, since it tells us that opposites inevitably turn into each other (see the second of the two links above), if it were true, the proletariat must turn into the bourgeoisie, and vice versa!

graymouser

5th September 2010, 18:08

GrayRodent:
FWIW, a mouser is a cat. Personally I think this shows about how seriously it's worth taking you: not at all. Back on the ignore list!

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 18:26

GrayRodentCatcher:

FWIW, a mouser is a cat. Personally I think this shows about how seriously it's worth taking you: not at all. Back on the ignore list!

I can see you are keen to copy the advice of the Monty Python crew "Run Away! Run Away!"

And I bet you are no good at catching mice either.:lol:

Luisrah

5th September 2010, 21:36

Luisrah:

Ok, but as I have shown, this theory would make change impossible:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

Moreover, since it tells us that opposites inevitably turn into each other (see the second of the two links above), if it were true, the proletariat must turn into the bourgeoisie, and vice versa!

I didn't read all of your explanations because I have little time, but I will try to say something.

I'll take your example of T* and T**. T* struggles with T** and changes into it, while T** struggles with T* and turns into it right? They turn into each other as I will try to explain now:

The bourgeoisie and the proletariat may not turn into each other completely, but the proletariat does start to control the means of production, the political power, and becomes the dominant class. The bourgeoisie loses the means of production, becomes a non-dominan class and loses political power. There is in fact an inter-change between these two opposites.

As for the fact that it doesn't change completely, there is the law of the negation of the negation. When one thing changes into another and negates what it was before, it loses some of its characteristics, keeps some, and gains others. This can maybe be applied to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and society in general.

I hope that made sense

Rosa Lichtenstein

6th September 2010, 00:14

Luisrah:

The bourgeoisie and the proletariat may not turn into each other completely, but the proletariat does start to control the means of production, the political power, and becomes the dominant class. The bourgeoisie loses the means of production, becomes a non-dominan class and loses political power. There is in fact an inter-change between these two opposites.

As for the fact that it doesn't change completely, there is the law of the negation of the negation. When one thing changes into another and negates what it was before, it loses some of its characteristics, keeps some, and gains others. This can maybe be applied to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and society in general.

I hope that made sense

1. The phrase 'dominant class' is far too vague. Under capitalism this is the bourgeoisie. So, if the dialectical gospels are correct, the proletariat must change into the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie must change into the proletariat. The feudal class must change into the surfs, and the surfs must change into the feudal class. Slaves must change into the aristocrats, and the aristocrats must change into the slaves. And so on.

2. I covered the 'negation of the negation' defence in my original post (near the middle).

Here it is again:

Here's that demonstration again (followed in my next post by quotations from the Dialectical Classics that support what I allege about this 'theory'):

Surprisingly, DM-theorists are decidedly unclear as to whether objects/processes change because of (1) a contradictory relationship between their internal opposites, or because (2) they change into these opposites, or even whether (3) change itself creates such opposites.

As we are about to see, this idea -- that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites" (etc.), which cause change -- presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics (quoted in the next post).

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/ist; NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]

To see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites" O* and O**, and it thus changes as a result.

[The same problems arise if these are viewed as 'external' contradictions.]

But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory, O* could not change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.

Hence, it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it is now said to be what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!

So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (interpreting O** now as not-O*), how can O* possibly change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this hermetic hole. Either:

(1) O* 'changes' into not-O*, meaning there would now be two not-O*s where once there was one (unless, of course, one of these not-O*s just vanishes into thin air -- see below); or:

(2) O* does not change, or it disappears. Plainly, O* cannot change into what already exists -- that is, O* cannot change into its opposite, not-O* without there being two of them (see above). But even then, one of these will not be not-O* just a copy of it. In that case, O* either disappears, does not change at all, or changes into something else; or:

(3) Not-O* itself disappears to allow a new (but copy) not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if is has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict the new not-O* that afflicted the old. If it exists in order to allow O* to change, then we are back where we were to begin with.

Anyway, as should seem obvious, among other things already mentioned, alternative (2) plainly means that O* does not in fact change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- O* -- according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can either be destroyed or created from nowhere!

Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. This means that the dialectical process will grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence to start things up again.

But what could possibly engineer that?

Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too. [Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising either his error or the serious problems this creates.]

But, not-O* cannot have come from O* itself, since O* can only change because of the operation of not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems.

[However, on the NON, see below.]

Now, it could be objected that all this seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the above argument is entirely misguided.

Fortunately, repairs are easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O**, (the latter once again interpreted as not-O*) and it thus develops as a result.

The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing dialectical union of O* and not-O*, and O* 'develops' into not-O* as a result, how is it possible for O* to change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Of course, it could be argued that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' into O*.

[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]

But, if this were so, while it was happening these two would no longer be 'opposites' of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more.

But, if we ignore that 'difficulty' for now, and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O* while not-O* 'developed' into O*, and such process were governed by the obscure term "sublation", this alternative will still not work (as we are about to see).

Indeed, developing this option further before it is demolished, it could be argued that Engels had himself anticipated the above objections when he said:

"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976) Anti-Dühring, pp.172-73.]

"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....

"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81.]
Engels's argument seems to be that "dialectical negation" is not the same as ordinary negation in that it is not simple destruction. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, we have already seen here , that Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect, and we will also see below [again, this 'below' refers to a later section of the essay from which this was extracted] that this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as did Engels).

Well, despite all this, is it the case that the above comments neutralise the argument presented in this part of this post? Is the argument here guilty of the following:

"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]
To answer this, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and not-O*, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary, but not into not-O* -- incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.

Putting this minor quibble to one side, too, on this 'revised' view, let us suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "O*(1)" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').

If so, then O*(1) must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*(1) in existence to make it develop any further.

[Recall that on this 'theory', everything (and that must include O*(1)) changes because of a 'struggle' with its opposite.]

So, there must be a not-O*(1) to make O*(1) change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt O*(1) from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that O*(1) changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events contained in the DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process changes because of the operation of opposites (and O*(1) is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.

[This would also mean that the second 'Law' (discussed here) was not a 'law' either, just like the first.]

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to O*(1)) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change, and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.

Ignoring this, too, even if O*(1) were to change into not-O*(1) (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems simply reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*(1) already existed to make it happen! But not-O*(1) cannot already exist, for O*(1) has not changed into it yet!

Once more, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O* to produce not-O* is not ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.

In that case, let us say that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite not-O*(s), but if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Gospels, not-O*(s) must already exist! If so, and yet again, O* cannot turn into not-O*(s), for it already exists! On the other hand, if not-O*(s) does not already exist, then O* cannot change, for O* can only change if it struggles with what it changes into, i.e., not-O*(s).

Once more we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.

It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For example, it might be the case that John is a boy, but in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man. Now, the fact that other individuals are already men, does not stop John changing into a man (his opposite), as the above argues. So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists.

Or so it could be claimed.

But, this theory tells us that things/processes change because of a struggle with their opposites, and with what they become. Are we now to assume that John has to struggle with all the individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself (if we now treat all these other men as John's opposites)? And are we to suppose that John struggles with what he is to become, even before it exists? If not, then the above response is beside the point. And, in view of the fact that John must turn into his opposite, does that mean he has to turn into these other men, or even into one of them? But he must do so if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed.

Anyway, according to the DM-worthies quoted above, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. Are we now really supposed to believe that "John is a man" is struggling with "John is a boy" -- or that manhood is struggling with boyhood?

Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, in that case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the present. [Of course, adolescence cannot struggle with anything, since it is an abstraction.] But, John-as-a-man does not yet exist, and so 'he' cannot struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-man does exist, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy cannot change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!

To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that opposite cannot now exist otherwise John would not need to become him!

Looking at this more concretely, in ten or fifteen years time, John will not become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "Man-J". But, once again, Man-J must exist now or John cannot change into him (if the DM-worthies quoted earlier are to be believed), for John can only become a man if he is locked in struggle with his own opposite, Man-J. But, if that is so, John cannot become Man-J since Man-J already exists!

[This, of course, is simply a more concrete version of the argument outlined above.]

Consider another hackneyed example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? This must be so if the Dialectical Saints are to be believed.

Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!

In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!

In fact, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it, we shall call it "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into "S1". But, if the DM-Worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 could not change into it! Again, if that is so, where does S1 disappear to if W1 changes into it?

In fact, according to the Dialectical Magi, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1 at the same time as W1 is turning into S1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this Superscientific 'theory', steam must be turning back into the water you are boiling, and it must do so at the same rate!

One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.

This must be so, otherwise when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists, or W1 could not change into it -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be one! Matter created from nowhere!

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other alleged examples of DM-change).

It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas; so the dialectical classicists are correct. However, if we take them at their word, then that gas must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change. But that gas does not yet exist; in which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true. But even if it did, it is heat that causes the change not the gas! However we try and slice it, this 'theory' is totally useless -- that is, what little sense can be made of it.
This, of course, does not deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.

Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

Let us now consider that table; let us suppose it has internal opposites which cause it to change, say into a pile of dust.
But the dialectical classics tell us that everything in the entire universe changes into its opposite, [i]and it does so by struggling with that opposite.

In that case, a table must struggle with the pile of dust it is to become! But, it can't do that, since that pile of dust does not yet exist!

But, it could be replied that tables change because of their internal opposites. In that case, let us suppose a table has at least two internal opposites, call them T* and T**.

Now, and once more, the dialectical classics tell us that everything in the entire universe changes into its opposite, and it does so by struggling with that opposite.

In that case T* must both struggle with and change into T**. But it can't do that since T** already exists! If it didn't, T* could not struggle with it.

So, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall here -- dialectical tables can never change!

Buy one now before the bourgeoisie find out and snap up all these indestructible tables!

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

Quotations here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

Luisrah

6th September 2010, 10:51

Luisrah:

1. The phrase 'dominant class' is far too vague. Under capitalism this is the bourgeoisie. So, if the dialectical gospels are correct, the proletariat must change into the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie must change into the proletariat. The feudal class must change into the surfs, and the surfs must change into the feudal class. Slaves must change into the aristocrats, and the aristocrats must change into the slaves. And so on.

2. I covered the 'negation of the negation' defence in my original post (near the middle).

Here it is again:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

Quotations here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

I'd say it depends on what is struggling. For example, if 2 soccer teams, one is the champion, and the other isn't, are struggling for the 1st place, if change happens (the not-champion wins) then that team will become the champion. It doesn't mean their players turned into the other team's players physically, changing age and appearance, it means that the ''things'' (sorry, can't find a better word due to language) that struggle did switch.

When the proletariat struggles with the bourgeoisie, it is not their bodies that struggle, nor their way of dressing, (unless I'm not understanding your point) but their relations to the means of production, to the political power, to resources and goods, etc so it is those things that change/switch between classes.

When 2 species of animals are struggling for the top of the food chain (one is in the top, the other is trying to get there), the struggle between them is the power of being in the top of the food chain. While A (the one at the top of the food chain) might have elements that B (the other one) will need in order to get to the top (being able to run fast, having big teeth), it doesn't mean B has to turn into A (if A is a crocodile and B is a wolf, the wolf doesn't need to turn into a crocodile) in order to be on the top of the food chain, only some elements must change which are the ones involved in the struggle.
While B may evolve to grow some things that A has, what changes fundamentally (the turning into each other that you mention a lot in your post) is their relation to each other and the other animals in the food chain (the top of it).

Furthermore, I think you are forgetting some fundamental concepts of DM. One of these is that there aren't just contradictions between things, but there are also contradictiong within things (inside of them), and sometimes it isn't contradictions between things that bring about change, but contradicitons inside of things.

What brings about the growth of John (as is in your post) isn't his struggle with his future self (for that would in fact be ridiculous), but the struggle inside of him, which is the absortion and (can't find the word for the contrary of absortion) of nutrients. He absorbs more than he excrets (sp?) (inside his body, in the cells) so change progresses towards growth.

Lets take a capitalist society for example. DMs would be stupid to say that a capitalist society struggles with a socialist society, and then turn into a socialist society. What happens is that there is an internal struggle within the capitalist society that brings about change, turning it into a socialist society. It is the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (the internal elements of a capitalist society) that brings change to the society they are in.

I hope I made sense, you know I'm still a begginer, and portuguese :lol:

Rosa Lichtenstein

6th September 2010, 12:09

I'll respond to your comments later today, but I have already covered your points in the post to which I linked. You must not have read it very carefully.

Rosa Lichtenstein

6th September 2010, 22:22

Luisrah:

I'd say it depends on what is struggling. For example, if 2 soccer teams, one is the champion, and the other isn't, are struggling for the 1st place, if change happens (the not-champion wins) then that team will become the champion. It doesn't mean their players turned into the other team's players physically, changing age and appearance, it means that the ''things'' (sorry, can't find a better word due to language) that struggle did switch.

But, the dialectical classics tell us that:

1) all change in the entire universe is the result of a 'struggle of opposites', and,

2) everything in existence inevitably changes into its 'opposite'.

[Quotations supporting these claims can be found in the links I posted earlier.]

They do not tell us that opposites swap places, but that they change into one another.

So:

3) Whatever an object or process struggles with -- and thus changes as a result -- must be the 'opposite' of that object or process.

4) Whatever an object or process changes into must be the opposite of that object or process.

To take your example: Let's call the first term, 'A', and the second team, 'B'.

Now, team A struggles with team B, so, according to the dialectical gospels it must change into it. But you reply:

For example, if 2 soccer teams, one is the champion, and the other isn't, are struggling for the 1st place, if change happens (the not-champion wins) then that team will become the champion. It doesn't mean their players turned into the other team's players

But, team A does not struggle with an abstraction -- 'the champion', or '1st place'. The players of team A struggle with the players of team B. That is what causes the change. So, the 'opposite' here that brings about the change in team A is team B, or rather its players. '1st place' does not cause this change; neither does an abstraction 'the champion'.

If so, and if the dialectical gospels are to be believed, the players of team A must change into (not swap places with) the players of team B, and vice versa. But, this can't happen since the players of team B already exist! So, unless a set of duplicate team B players comes into existence, nothing can change -- as my long argument shows.

That argument was completely general; there is thus no way out for this beleaguered 'theory'. If it were true, nothing would change.

When the proletariat struggles with the bourgeoisie, it is not their bodies that struggle, nor their way of dressing, (unless I'm not understanding your point) but their relations to the means of production, to the political power, to resources and goods, etc so it is those things that change/switch between classes.

Well, the class struggle is not between such abstractions, it's between real live workers and bosses. If so, workers should change into bosses (in each strike) and bosses should turn into workers (in each strike). Both are struggling in the here and now, and according to points 1)-4), in the here and now, workers should change into whatever they are struggling with -- bosses --, and vice versa.

Does this happen in the here and now? No. This 'theory' therefore cannot account for the class struggle -- or, rather, it predicts ridiculous results.

No wonder then that it has failed us for 150 years.

When 2 species of animals are struggling for the top of the food chain (one is in the top, the other is trying to get there), the struggle between them is the power of being in the top of the food chain. While A (the one at the top of the food chain) might have elements that B (the other one) will need in order to get to the top (being able to run fast, having big teeth), it doesn't mean B has to turn into A (if A is a crocodile and B is a wolf, the wolf doesn't need to turn into a crocodile) in order to be on the top of the food chain, only some elements must change which are the ones involved in the struggle.

Well, if they change from being not 'top of the food' chain to being 'top of the food chain', then according to points 1)-4) above, these animals must struggle with what they change into -- they must struggle with 'top of the food chain'!

Do we see such odd things in nature? No. So, this 'theory' can't explain evolution -- or rather, it predicts ridiculous things, once more.

But you reply:

While A (the one at the top of the food chain) might have elements that B (the other one) will need in order to get to the top (being able to run fast, having big teeth), it doesn't mean B has to turn into A (if A is a crocodile and B is a wolf, the wolf doesn't need to turn into a crocodile) in order to be on the top of the food chain, only some elements must change which are the ones involved in the struggle

But, what does A actually struggle with? What brings about the change you describe? Is it a struggle with a pecking order in the food chain, or is it with other animals and/or the environment?

If it's the latter, and we believe all we read in the dialectical bible, then A must turn into these other animals -- or it must turn into the environment!

If it's the former, then the dialectical gospels are wrong, for they do not tell us that things swap places, but that they change into one another -- nor do they struggle with abstractions.

Yet another non-dialectical brick wall.

Furthermore, I think you are forgetting some fundamental concepts of DM. One of these is that there aren't just contradictions between things, but there are also contradictions within things (inside of them), and sometimes it isn't contradictions between things that bring about change, but contradictions inside of things.

I actually covered this in the lost post to which I linked.

Ok, let's run through it again:

Suppose object/process A is composed of two contradictory opposites, A* and A**. But, according to points 1)-4) A can only change into its opposite, say, not-A. In which case, not-A must struggle with A in the here and now, or A can't change. But, that can't happen, since not-A does not yet exist! If, on the other hand, not-A does exist, A can't change into it, since not-A already exists!

Let us now concentrate on A* and A**. For A to change, it must struggle with its opposite. So, A must struggle with A* or A**, and thus change into not-A.

If so, the dialectical holy books are wrong, for A does not change into that with which it struggles (A* or A**), it changes into not-A, when it should change into A* or A**.

Let us now concentrate on A * and A** exclusively. A* struggles with A** causing A to change. If so, A* must change into A**. But it can't do that since A** already exists!

Yet another non-dialectical dead end!

What brings about the growth of John (as is in your post) isn't his struggle with his future self (for that would in fact be ridiculous), but the struggle inside of him, which is the absorption and (can't find the word for the contrary of absorption) of nutrients. He absorbs more than he excretes (sp?) (inside his body, in the cells) so change progresses towards growth.

But, this can't work either. If John changes into a man because of a struggle going on inside him, then, according to, points 1)-4) above he can only change because he struggles with whatever he changes into. He must therefore struggle with his future self, or with what is inside him!

But, you have a reply:

but the struggle inside of him, which is the absorption and (can't find the word for the contrary of absorption) of nutrients. He absorbs more than he excretes (sp?) (inside his body, in the cells) so change progresses towards growth

Ok, take cell C (inside John). It can only change because it struggles with its opposite, and it changes into that opposite. Call this opposite C*. C must therefore struggle with C* and it must change into it. But, it can't do that since C* already exists! If C* did not already exist, C could not struggle with it.

But, perhaps C changes because of a struggle within its cell walls?

Ok, let's say C changes, at least, because of a struggle between two contradictory opposites inside its cell wall, M* and M*. M* changes, therefore, because it struggles with M**, and, if the dialectical bible is to believed, M* must change into M**. But, M* can't change into M** since M** already exists!

We hit the same brick wall again -- as we always must. That is why I made my argument completely general.

Let's take a capitalist society for example. DMs would be stupid to say that a capitalist society struggles with a socialist society, and then turn into a socialist society. What happens is that there is an internal struggle within the capitalist society that brings about change, turning it into a socialist society. It is the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (the internal elements of a capitalist society) that brings change to the society they are in.

They would indeed be stupid to say this, but they could only reject these ridiculous implications of DM by rejecting the 'dialectical theory of change'.

I hope I made sense, you know I'm still a beginner, and Portuguese

And that's why I have tried to make things crystal clear for you.:)

Luisrah

7th September 2010, 17:12

Surely there must be a mistake in here somehow, for Marx, Engels and Lenin would be stupid to believe in a theory that says that for something to change, it must struggle with it's future self, even if that future self doesn't yet exist.

I don't think I have studied enough to give you a complete answer, but I think my argument is the same.

The bourgeoisie struggles with the workers. When change is brought about (socialism) they change into each other in their relations to the means of production, political power, and class dominance.

But I have to study more, perhaps one day we will get back at this.

Rosa Lichtenstein

7th September 2010, 17:37

Luisrah:

Surely there must be a mistake in here somehow, for Marx, Engels and Lenin would be stupid to believe in a theory that says that for something to change, it must struggle with it's future self, even if that future self doesn't yet exist.

Well, there is no evidence that Marx acccepted this 'theory', but Engels, although a great revolutionary, was a very poor philosopher. I just do not think the dialectical classicists thought their ideas through all that carefully.

But, DM is no different from other philosophical 'theories'; they all collapse into non-sense on examination. Here is why:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold added.]

Traditional philosophy, of which DM is a part, only seems to work because of the systematic distortion and misuse of language. In this case, for instance, Hegel misused and distorted the word 'contradiction'.

I have tried to outline (for beginners) how this arose, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

The bourgeoisie struggles with the workers. When change is brought about (socialism) they change into each other in their relations to the means of production, political power, and class dominance.

Once more, if the dialectical classicists are to be believed, the workers must change into the bourgeoisie, and vice versa. Your view is not supported by what the DM-classics say.

But, we do not need this defective 'theory'. Historical Materialism [HM] is quite capable of explaining social change -- provided the useless jargon Hegel inflicted on humanity is thrown out.

That is why you find you have to explain your interpetation of HM in ordinary language (as Marx told us to) with no 'dialectical concepts' anywhere in sight -- and I agree with your view. But, if DM were true, this could not happen.

Lyev

7th September 2010, 21:24

Are Marxists better off if we de-emphasize Engels' interpretation of the dialectic and look it much more broadly, in the way that the influence of Hegel and Feuerbach effected Marx's system of thought in general? I mean, for example, I've heard some Marxist-influenced scholars and philosophers that the major contribution of Hegelian idealism is its insight into the essentially active relationship between man and the world, thought and matter. The way that Feuerbach and Hegel were combined into a one concrete collection of thought (i.e., DM) is that Marx, in distinction to Feuerbach, didn't regarded sensations as simply the experienced result of things but as a product of active,moving man in his social context; his surroundings. As wrote in The German Ideology (p.199.), in reference to Feuerbach's method:
The standpoint of the old type of materialism is civil society, the standpoint of the new materialism human society or social humanity.Once we take Hegelianism out of it's idealist, wishy-washy context, where it was applied to concepts of thought and God -- and concluded that Prussian society was humanity at its fullest and freest -- and then combine Hegel's thoughts on progress and change with an moving version of Feuebach's materialism in social context then this forms a springboard for our theories about change and revolution. There's this from Marx's Thesis on Feuerbach which is quite interesting:
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.

Rosa Lichtenstein

7th September 2010, 22:52

Lyev:

Are Marxists better off if we de-emphasize Engels' interpretation of the dialectic and look it much more broadly, in the way that the influence of Hegel and Feuerbach effected Marx's system of thought in general? I mean, for example, I've heard some Marxist-influenced scholars and philosophers that the major contribution of Hegelian idealism is its insight into the essentially active relationship between man and the world, thought and matter. The way that Feuerbach and Hegel were combined into a one concrete collection of thought (i.e., DM) is that Marx, in distinction to Feuerbach, didn't regarded sensations as simply the experienced result of things but as a product of active,moving man in his social context; his surroundings. As wrote in The German Ideology (p.199.), in reference to Feuerbach's method:

Well, Hegel mystified something that was apparent to earlier theorists (like Aristotle, Rousseau, Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Smith, Hume and Kant), so why we need to refer to his confused ideas escapes me.

Once we take Hegelianism out of it's idealist, wishy-washy context, where it was applied to concepts of thought and God -- and concluded that Prussian society was humanity at its fullest and freest -- and then combine Hegel's thoughts on progress and change with an moving version of Feuebach's materialism in social context then this forms a springboard for our theories about change and revolution. There's this from Marx's Thesis on Feuerbach which is quite interesting:

The idealism can't be taken out of Hegel.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

But even if it could, the alleged 'rational kernel' that is left behind is based on demonstrably defective, sub-Aristotelian logic:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

Zanthorus

7th September 2010, 23:02

and concluded that Prussian society was humanity at its fullest and freest

I'm not sure where you got this from, but I am fairly sure it's a myth. Hegel was a major supporter of the French revolution in his youth at the seminary in Tubingen along with Holderlin and Schelling. Later in life he moved to take up a position as a university professor in Berlin because of the growing reform movement there, but the Prussian state quickly shut down the movement and threw some of Hegel's students in jail. The main source of this confusion tends to be a misreading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right which at first sight appears to be a simple apologetic, but this element vanishes when we realise that Hegel is actually attempting to describe 'the rational in the real', the model which an ideal state would conform to. The model described in the PoR does not actually square up to Prussian reality at the time, and it's support for constitutionalism, public parliamentary debate, free elections and a strong civil service make it much closer to the visions of the progressive reformers of Hegel's day. There is good evidence that the Prussian state was somewhat hostile to Hegel, he was very rarely invited to court, and he never made it through the royal academy of science in Berlin because of pressure exerted by a conservative academic milieu.

Lyev

7th September 2010, 23:22

I'm not sure where you got this from, but I am fairly sure it's a myth. Hegel was a major supporter of the French revolution in his youth at the seminary in Tubingen along with Holderlin and Schelling. Later in life he moved to take up a position as a university professor in Berlin because of the growing reform movement there, but the Prussian state quickly shut down the movement and threw some of Hegel's students in jail. The main source of this confusion tends to be a misreading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right which at first sight appears to be a simple apologetic, but this element vanishes when we realise that Hegel is actually attempting to describe 'the rational in the real', the model which an ideal state would conform to. The model described in the PoR does not actually square up to Prussian reality at the time, and it's support for constitutionalism, public parliamentary debate, free elections and a strong civil service make it much closer to the visions of the progressive reformers of Hegel's day. There is good evidence that the Prussian state was somewhat hostile to Hegel, he was very rarely invited to court, and he never made it through the royal academy of science in Berlin because of pressure exerted by a conservative academic milieu.I've read it in several places I think, unless I'm getting names of places and people and whatnot confused - I thought this was all to do with Hegel's thoughts on development of human society. So the conclusion from what you're saying is that Hegel was actually more of a progressive thinker, and therefore distorted by the right Hegelians that followed him? Also what's the relevance of his support for the French revolution? Is this because the regime that followed after it hostile to Prussian state or something) (To show his support for the revolution I understand he planted a tree to symbolise the growth of "liberty", "equality" etc.).

Rosa Lichtenstein

7th September 2010, 23:32

In fact, despite many attempts to sanitise him, Hegel became an apologist for state reaction after the French Revolution failed (retreating into hard core mysticism to 'rationalise' it).

Lyev

7th September 2010, 23:46

Once more, if the dialectical classicists are to be believed, the workers must change into the bourgeoisie, and vice versa. Your view is not supported by what the DM-classics say.Well it's not that the proletariat exactly "change into" the bourgeoisie but a proletarian, socialist revolution has as its core aim overthrow of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class and establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus the working class are now in the position formerly occupied by the ruling class. So in a round-about way, I would argue that workers do "change" into their bosses - they become there own bosses. I suppose we're talking here of when something changes into it's opposite or something like this.

Rosa Lichtenstein

8th September 2010, 01:40

Lyev:

Well it's not that the proletariat exactly "change into" the bourgeoisie but a proletarian, socialist revolution has as its core aim overthrow of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class and establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus the working class are now in the position formerly occupied by the ruling class. So in a round-about way, I would argue that workers do "change" into their bosses - they become there own bosses. I suppose we're talking here of when something changes into it's opposite or something like this.

Indeed, and that is what Historical Materialism tells us, but if the dialectical classicists are to be believed, this cannot happen -- or, rather, since they tell us that things inevitably change into one another, this does indeed imply that the proletariat must change into the bourgeoisie, and vice versa.

Freedom-Hating Communist

8th September 2010, 16:39

BAM:

Seriously, is Rosa a troll? I'm pretty sure anyone with half a brain would look at this post of Rosa's and just laugh (I mean, the Engels quote itself included the words "in nature", which invalidate the point she was trying to make, sitting there, plain and clear, just before her emphasis! She didn't even try to hide them or leave them out! Surely only an idiot or a troll is capable of that)- but she's putting a lot of time and effort into this (and well done to her, because it's extremely funny, sometimes) if she is a troll. Please clarify.

Rosa Lichtenstein

8th September 2010, 16:59

FHC:

Seriously, is Rosa a troll? I'm pretty sure anyone with half a brain would look at this post of Rosa's and just laugh (I mean, the Engels quote itself included the words "in nature", which invalidate the point she was trying to make, sitting there, plain and clear, just before her emphasis! She didn't even try to hide them or leave them out! Surely only an idiot or a troll is capable of that)- but she's putting a lot of time and effort into this (and well done to her, because it's extremely funny, sometimes) if she is a troll. Please clarify.

Except, the dialectical holy books tell us the following:

"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]

"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... Mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891), p.414.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid., pp.311-18.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.

"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.

"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]

Bold emphases added.

References and links can be found at my site, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

So, according to the above dialectical mystics, this 'law' applies to everything in the entire universe. In that case, unless you think the class war takes place in another universe, you, my confused friend, appear to be the troll here.

Zanthorus

8th September 2010, 17:36

I've read it in several places I think, unless I'm getting names of places and people and whatnot confused - I thought this was all to do with Hegel's thoughts on development of human society.

I think your thinking of the whole 'end of history' thing in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History. What has to be understood is that Hegel is setting out a 'philosophical' history not an 'empirical' history. He says that the task of the philosopher is to look back through history and find it's essential rational structure apart from the chance deviations of 'empirical' history. According to Hegel we can't know the work of the spirit in history until after it's already occured, his philosophy rules out pronouncements on the future. It also has to be remembered that for Hegel, we are all bound up in our own time. "Philosophy is it's own time raised to the level of thought." So Hegel's pronouncements are intended as a backward looking exercise from his own vantage point. There is nothing that would rule out beggining the whole exercise again from our own vantage point and finding out that History is doing something other than realising freedom.

Aside from this, Hegel actually does make the prediction at the beggining of the book that history will find it's next great playing field in Russia and America.

So the conclusion from what you're saying is that Hegel was actually more of a progressive thinker, and therefore distorted by the right Hegelians that followed him?

He was distorted by both the Right and Left Hegelians. I don't think Hegel was an out and out reactionary or any kind of radical, his political stance could best be summed up as moderate liberal reformism.

In fact, despite many attempts to sanitise him, Hegel became an apologist for state reaction after the French Revolution failed (retreating into hard core mysticism to 'rationalise' it).

He was a fan of Napoleon, if that's what your referring to.

Rosa Lichtenstein

8th September 2010, 17:49

Z:

He was a fan of Napoleon, if that's what your referring to.

No, it wasn't.

Zanthorus

8th September 2010, 18:11

Well then what :confused:

Rosa Lichtenstein

8th September 2010, 20:20

He is taken to be a philosopher of freedom, but he was in fact its enemy.

Zanthorus

8th September 2010, 20:31

Well yeah, Hegel's vision isn't exactly liberatory. I think we agree there.

Rosa Lichtenstein

8th September 2010, 21:39

Which is why I said this earlier:

In fact, despite many attempts to sanitise him, Hegel became an apologist for state reaction after the French Revolution failed (retreating into hard core mysticism to 'rationalise' it).

Freedom-Hating Communist

9th September 2010, 02:18

FHC:

Except, the dialectical holy books tell us the following:

None of which makes any difference. I think greymouser has done the best job of putting a boot in your non-theory so far, so I won't wade into that. The point is, you used an Engels quote specifically refering to change in nature requiring an addition or subtraction (crudely speaking) of energy or matter in an attempt to refute an argument about Capitalism as an economic system behaving in a dialectical manner. Your argument, as presented, was hilariously irrelevant, though oh-so-confidently presented- you deliberately changed the terms of the argument to suit your ends, and made yourself look really quite silly in the process.

Rosa Lichtenstein

9th September 2010, 09:34

FHC:

None of which makes any difference.

I see. So, when Lenin tells us that this 'theory' covers everything in existence, he meant to leave out the class war, did he?

Now, the argument I have developed here applies to the 'theory' presented in the dialectical classics, not just Engels (but see below) -- and that 'theory' implies change cannot happen. You have yet to show where I do wrong.

I think greymouser has done the best job of putting a boot in your non-theory so far,

I don't have a theory, so that shows how much care you've devoted to this, doesn't it?

The point is, you used an Engels quote specifically referring to change in nature requiring an addition or subtraction (crudely speaking) of energy or matter in an attempt to refute an argument about Capitalism as an economic system behaving in a dialectical manner.

Where do I do that?

Your argument, as presented, was hilariously irrelevant, though oh-so-confidently presented- you deliberately changed the terms of the argument to suit your ends, and made yourself look really quite silly in the process.

Care to show where I have done that? Or are you more intent on clinging on to a dogma you can't defend?

The point is, you used an Engels quote specifically referring to change in nature requiring an addition or subtraction (crudely speaking) of energy or matter in an attempt to refute an argument about Capitalism as an economic system behaving in a dialectical manner.

In fact Engels says things like this:

"Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Anti-Dühring, p.180. Bold added.

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954) Dialectics of Nature, p.211, bold added.]

Perhaps you think human society is not part of nature?

"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development."

Here, these 'laws' are said to be part of 'universal inter-connection'. Does that involve social change? If not, then the latter must not be part of the universe, or sealed off from it.

And here, Engels applies this law to human society:

In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital — production of relative surplus-value — deals, in the field of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a "new power", which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces. [[I]Anti-Dühring, p.160. Bold added.]

So, it seems that you do not know your own 'theory' all that well!

I think greymouser has done the best job of putting a boot in your non-theory so far, so I won't wade into that.

In fact, I answered Graymouser. Care to show where my response to 'him' fails?

Thirsty Crow

9th September 2010, 09:55

Again, if you endorse Engels' vision of dialectical materialism presented in the quote "Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought"...you are actually endorsing a realization of materialist metaphysics since this theory presupposes the unity of the three mentioned "spheres", a unity which can be produced only mentally (by abstracting from the real differences) and thus it falls again into the metaphysical pit: it implies an Idea (the idea of interconnection) which is absolutely necessary if one would wish to grasp reality (and only reality based on an Idea may be grasped; at least according to old folks like Engels).

Ok, but it's not too clear from what you posted whether you agree with Engels or not.

Hell no.

Rosa Lichtenstein

9th September 2010, 10:00

Ok, but it's not too clear from what you posted whether you agree with Engels or not.

Freedom-Hating Communist

10th September 2010, 14:22

Let's break the post down, shall we?

S Artesian wrote a relatively long argument on the dialectical thread running through Marx's economic investigations and theories. Rosa replied, then tacked on a comment at the end, quoting a section of S Artesian's post:

Even prior to that the quality/quantity distinctiom is vital to Marx's entire theory. Use-value and exchange vcalue, one qualitative, the other quantitative. And indeed the commodity is a unity of the two. Even between commodities, the exchange value of commodity A is expressed in the use-value of commodity B.

And quality/quantity also spills over into what he termed his own greatest discovery, the two-fold character of labour: concrete and abstract.

...and comparing it to this quote of Engels:

"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Dialectics of Nature, p.63. Emphasis added.]

She concluded:

Where is the 'addition of matter' and/or 'motion' in your example?

So, she dismissed his example as not being a demonstration of the validity of dialectics in some or all cases based on the fact that there is no change in matter/energy going on in Marxist economics (strictly disputable in itself; but not the point). This argument rests on an assumption:

1a. Engels intended to say, in that quote, that matter/energy addition/subtraction is the only form of quantitative change, ie, that this concrete example is the only form that the abstract quantity into quality can take-

1b. Or, if I am more charitable, that human society is totally indistinguishable from nature, and therefore the Engels quote applies to economics as much as to the natural world. This more charitable interpretation is backed by elements of a subsequent post, in which she replied to my criticism that she was deliberately messing with the terms and parameters of discussion to suit her ends:

"Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Anti-Dühring, p.180. Bold added.]

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954) Dialectics of Nature, p.211, bold added.]

Perhaps you think human society is not part of nature?

In countering the assumptions (I will counter both the charitable and the uncharitable assumptions, in order) I will demonstrate that a) Engels in this quote was demonstrating that addition and/or subtraction of matter/energy being the cause of qualitative change is a general rule for natural systems (he still believed that the dialectical law of quantity into quality applied to human society, but not in the specific concrete form he elaborated in that quote) and b) the study of human systems and society is seperate from a study of nature.

(Corresponding to the claim Engels meant this quote to be a general law of dialectics, rather than a specific example to demonstrate its validity)-

Let's take another look at that quote, but this time with my emphasis, rather than Rosa's:

"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Dialectics of Nature, p.63. Emphasis added.]

Why would he specifically qualify, "in nature", if he intended this to be a general dialectical law? And why would he only mention in "Dialectics of Nature" (a work that makes use of dialectics, rather than spelling out the laws of dialectics) this general law, meant for use in all applications of the dialectic? As he never elsewhere mentions the law of addition/subtraction of matter/energy as a central law of dialectics, but does elswehere mention the law of quantity into quality as a key law of dialectics, I think we can be fairly confident in my presentation of this statement as a concrete example and not an abstract generalisation. So, let's apply this to another quote:

"In proof of this law we have cited hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital — production of relative surplus-value — deals, in the field of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a "new power", which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces. [Anti-Dühring, p.160. Bold added.]

How strange that, while he mentions the law of quantity into quality a number of times, he makes no mention of matter/energy into quality! This is because the quote from Dialectics of Nature is a specific example, and NOT a general law of dialectics. Perhaps another quote, while we have time?

"Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Anti-Dühring, p.180. Bold added.

Yes, indeed, he does argue that dialectics is nothing more than the science of general laws of motion and development in nature, human society, and thought; however, as I have shown above, this does not mean he argues the same of matter/energy into quality.

(Corresponding to the more charitable argument, that, as human society is just an extention of nature, Engels quote can be taken to mean that addition/subtraction of matter/energy corresponds with a change in quality is a general law of dialectics by default)-

While human society is indeed a part of nature, its laws cannot be reduced back to natural laws. One does not study a photosynthesis to understand English Literature, or kinetic theory to understand economics. However much English Lit and economics depend ultimately upon biology, chemistry and physics, and, moreover, exist in a universe governed by these disciplines of natural science, if you tried to explain English lit in terms of the fusion of carbon dioxide and water via chlorophyl and sunlight you would be laughed at, an if you tried to explain economics by explaining the concept and rules attached to the concept that all matter is perpetually in motion, you would again be laughed at. These rules dominate in nature; they do not dominate in human society, however much human society is, in final analysis, a part of nature.

For these reasons, I consider your post to have been irrelevant, and stupidly arrogant, and, because of this, hilarious.

Freedom-Hating Communist

10th September 2010, 14:41

And thus, for these reasons, your claim that S Artesian's example of the dialectical method at the heart of Marx is irrelevant is flawed.

Rosa Lichtenstein

10th September 2010, 17:03

FHC:

How strange that, while he mentions the law of quantity into quality a number of times, he makes no mention of matter/energy into quality! This is because the quote from Dialectics of Nature is a specific example, and NOT a general law of dialectics. Perhaps another quote, while we have time?

Nice try attempting to defend Engels, but it won't wash.

If we look at how Engels uses this 'law', we will see my characterisation of him is correct. Here is how he describes this 'law' in the Dialectics of Nature:

It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three:

The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa;
The law of the interpenetration of opposites;
The law of the negation of the negation....

Moreover, anyone who is even only slightly acquainted with his Hegel will be aware that in hundreds of passages Hegel is capable of giving the most striking individual illustrations from nature and history of the dialectical laws.

We are not concerned here with writing a handbook of dialectics, but only with showing that the dialectical laws are really laws of development of nature, and therefore are valid also for theoretical natural science. Hence we cannot go into the inner interconnection of these laws with one another.

1. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

All qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious....

In biology, as in the history of human society, the same law holds good at every step, but we prefer to dwell here on examples from the exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately measurable and traceable....

But to have formulated for the first time in its universally valid form a general law of development of nature, society, and thought, will always remain an act of historic importance. And if these gentlemen have for years caused quantity and quality to be transformed into one another, without knowing what they did, then they will have to console themselves with Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain who had spoken prose all his life without having the slightest inkling of it.

Bold added.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/ch02.htm

In the above, Engels tells us that "In biology, as in the history of human society, the same law holds good at every step".

And what is this 'same law'? Why this:

1. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

Sure, he tells us that this relates to nature, but then it must also relate to "the history of human society" otherwise it won't be the "same law", which is why he could then assert that this 'same law' was a:

universally valid form a general law of development of nature, society, and thought

And what do we find in Anti-Dühring?

In this "expurgated" presentation by Herr Dühring that statement certainly seems curious enough. Let us see how it looks in the original, in Marx. On page 313 (2nd edition of Capital), Marx, on the basis of his previous examination of constant and variable capital and surplus-value, draws the conclusion that "not every sum of money, or of value, is at pleasure transformable into capital. To effect this transformation, in fact, a certain minimum of money or of exchange-value must be presupposed in the hands of the individual possessor of money or commodities." He takes as an example the case of a labourer in any branch of industry, who works daily eight hours for himself — that is, in producing the value of his wages — and the following four hours for the capitalist, in producing surplus-value, which immediately flows into the pocket of the capitalist. In this case, one would have to have at his disposal a sum of values sufficient to enable one to provide two labourers with raw materials, instruments of labour and wages, in order to pocket enough surplus-value every day to live on as well as one of his labourers. And as the aim of capitalist production is not mere subsistence but the increase of wealth, our man with his two labourers would still not be a capitalist. Now in order that he may live twice as well as an ordinary labourer, and turn half of the surplus-value produced again into capital, he would have to be able to employ eight labourers, that is, he would have to possess four times the sum of values assumed above. And it is only after this, and in the course of still further explanations elucidating and substantiating the fact that not every petty sum of values is enough to be transformable into capital, but that in this respect each period of development and each branch of industry has its definite minimum sum, that Marx observes: "Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel in his Logic, that merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences."

Bold added.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch10.htm

Is this the 'same law'? If it is then I was right.

If it isn't then Engels hasn't discovered the:

general law of development of nature, society, and thought

Since it won't be the 'same law'.

And here he is again, in the same section of Anti-Duhring:

In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital — production of relative surplus-value — deals, in the field of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a "new power", which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces.

Is this the 'same law'? Engels does not say it operates differently in nature and society, in fact he lumps the two together.

And he does it again, here:

In conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation of quantity into quality, namely — Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but lacked discipline, as follows:

"Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes."

Just as with Marx a definite, though varying, minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation into capital, so with Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline, embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least as brave as the former. But what does this prove as against Herr Dühring? Was not Napoleon miserably vanquished in his conflict with Europe? Did he not suffer defeat after defeat? And why? Solely in consequence of having introduced the confused, hazy Hegelian notion into cavalry tactics!

Bold added.

Here the addition of extra matter (i.e., additional soldiers) changes their quality. So, this is the 'same law' after all, and it applies to society.

Hence, I was right.

Or, as I have shown here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

this 'law' -- that is, where any sense can be made of it -- is far to vague to do anything with.

FHC:

Yes, indeed, he does argue that dialectics is nothing more than the science of general laws of motion and development in nature, human society, and thought; however, as I have shown above, this does not mean he argues the same of matter/energy into quality.

In fact, as we have seen, there are only two viable conclusions we can draw from Engels's words

Either:

1. This 'law' applies to both nature and human society, and it implies that qualitative change in both spheres can only come about through the addition or subtraction of matter and/or energy -- otherwise it's not the 'same law'. [And Engels himself applied it to human society -- in the example he considered involving those soldiers.]

Or, far more likely:

2. Engels's 'law' is far too confused to do anything with.

I can live with either of these.

While human society is indeed a part of nature, its laws cannot be reduced back to natural laws.

Can we have your proof of this, or are you happy to impose this idea on nature and society, in defiance of Engels?

Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976) Anti-Duhring, p.13. Bold emphasis added.]

And Trotsky:

Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…. [Trotsky (1973) Problems of Everyday Life, p.233. Bold emphasis added.]

FHC:

One does not study a photosynthesis to understand English Literature, or kinetic theory to understand economics. However much English Lit and economics depend ultimately upon biology, chemistry and physics, and, moreover, exist in a universe governed by these disciplines of natural science, if you tried to explain English lit in terms of the fusion of carbon dioxide and water via chlorophyll and sunlight you would be laughed at, an if you tried to explain economics by explaining the concept and rules attached to the concept that all matter is perpetually in motion, you would again be laughed at. These rules dominate in nature; they do not dominate in human society, however much human society is, in final analysis, a part of nature.

This does not imply these cannot be done. People used to laugh at the idea that the earth moved.

So, it now seems that this applies to you, not me:

For these reasons, I consider your post to have been irrelevant, and stupidly arrogant, and, because of this, hilarious.

Freedom-Hating Communist

10th September 2010, 18:11

As repeatedly stressed in my previous post: YES, he applies the law of quantity into quality to human society as a part of the general approach of applying the dialectical method in general. I approve heartily of this. But he applies this in the general, the abstract, quantity into quality; you mistake examples he uses for general laws. It is this which jutifies the quote:

1. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

"For our purpose..."

Literally every single time you have quoted him as using the quantity-to-quality rule in the form of matter/energy-to-quality he has qualified it by saying in nature- indeed, in the quote above, he went further! He explicitly said, "for our purposes," (ie, not in general)"we could express this by saying [etc etc]". Why would he bother if he considered this single example to apply in all cases? Why would he say, again and again: "quantity into quality"- when he could more easily say, "matter/energy into quality"? Your interpretation of this particular example as an example of a general law makes no sense, whatsoever. No wonder no-one with any credibility takes you seriously.

In conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation of quantity into quality, namely — Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but lacked discipline, as follows:

"Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes."

Just as with Marx a definite, though varying, minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation into capital, so with Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline, embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least as brave as the former. But what does this prove as against Herr Dühring? Was not Napoleon miserably vanquished in his conflict with Europe? Did he not suffer defeat after defeat? And why? Solely in consequence of having introduced the confused, hazy Hegelian notion into cavalry tactics!

And you use this as an example of him using the rule, "matter/energy into quality"? (NOTE: the next few paragraph's also deal with your objection that "This does not imply these cannot be done. People used to laugh at the idea that the earth moved.")
In the strict, technical sense, you could say this is the case. Just as you must say that in the strict, technical sense, English Literature is subject to the laws of physics. But, as with the English Literature/laws of physics example, you are not actually explaining anything. In the natural sciences, one can say, "matter/energy" and explain and describe a great deal. But if you want to go into English Literature, you have to start using terms like metaphor, similie, personification, etc, etc. If you want to explain the dynamics of Napoleon's army, you have to start using words like soldier, cavalry, detachment, etc. This quote is an example of dialectics as used to describe a human system- namely, Napoleon's army. Not once in this quote does he mention matter/energy- only quantity into quality. Yes, it is the same underlying law; but in each case, it is an example which applies strictly to the thing Engels is attempting to describe, and absolutely not a general law. Matter/motion into quality is no more a dialectical law than cavalry into quality. Both are examples of a dialectical law- quantity into quality- as applied in the concrete, and not laws in themselves. Your total inability to grasp this basic fact is revealing, to say the least.

Thirsty Crow

10th September 2010, 18:20

@Freedom-Hating Communist: do you understand the fact that the notion of dialectical materialism espoused in Engels ("Dialectics of Nature") is grounded on metaphysics?

Freedom-Hating Communist

10th September 2010, 18:22

@Menocchio: A loaded question, how very original. Clearly, you're of the Rosa school of 'logic'.

Thirsty Crow

10th September 2010, 18:40

@Menocchio: A loaded question, how very original. Clearly, you're of the Rosa school of 'logic'.

Wait a minute.
I've come to a conclusion that it is so.
And I want an input from you. Instead of that, I was dismissed for superficially resembling another user whom you don't like.
OK, I might have worded it wrongly.
Let's rephrase the question and see if you will be willing to answer it:
Do you think that the notion of DM espoused in Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" is grounded in metaphysics? Or do you think it is not and why?

Rosa Lichtenstein

10th September 2010, 19:19

FHC:

As repeatedly stressed in my previous post: YES, he applies the law of quantity into quality to human society as a part of the general approach of applying the dialectical method in general. I approve heartily of this. But he applies this in the general, the abstract, quantity into quality; you mistake examples he uses for general laws. It is this which justifies the quote:

Yes I saw all that, but your view would mean that this isn't the 'same law', as I pointed out several times too.

Literally every single time you have quoted him as using the quantity-to-quality rule in the form of matter/energy-to-quality he has qualified it by saying in nature- indeed, in the quote above, he went further! He explicitly said, "for our purposes," (ie, not in general)"we could express this by saying [etc etc]". Why would he bother if he considered this single example to apply in all cases? Why would he say, again and again: "quantity into quality"- when he could more easily say, "matter/energy into quality"? Your interpretation of this particular example as an example of a general law makes no sense, whatsoever. No wonder no-one with any credibility takes you seriously.

And then he goes on to say (on the same page!) it's the 'same law' applied to human history:

In biology, as in the history of human society, the same law holds good at every step, but we prefer to dwell here on examples from the exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately measurable and traceable....

But to have formulated for the first time in its universally valid form a general law of development of nature, society, and thought, will always remain an act of historic importance. And if these gentlemen have for years caused quantity and quality to be transformed into one another, without knowing what they did, then they will have to console themselves with Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain who had spoken prose all his life without having the slightest inkling of it.

Not much wiggle room there.

He then went on to apply it to soldiers (and in it's in the 'addition of matter and motion' form too):

In conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation of quantity into quality, namely — Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but lacked discipline, as follows:

"Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes."

Just as with Marx a definite, though varying, minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation into capital, so with Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline, embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least as brave as the former. But what does this prove as against Herr Dühring? Was not Napoleon miserably vanquished in his conflict with Europe? Did he not suffer defeat after defeat? And why? Solely in consequence of having introduced the confused, hazy Hegelian notion into cavalry tactics!

Or perhaps you think soldiers aren't part of human history/society?:lol:

And he even connects this with Marx's analysis:

Just as with Marx a definite, though varying, minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation into capital, so with Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline, embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters,

Even less wiggle room now!

But you have a reply:

And you use this as an example of him using the rule, "matter/energy into quality"? (NOTE: the next few paragraph's also deal with your objection that "This does not imply these cannot be done. People used to laugh at the idea that the earth moved.") In the strict, technical sense, you could say this is the case. Just as you must say that in the strict, technical sense, English Literature is subject to the laws of physics. But, as with the English Literature/laws of physics example, you are not actually explaining anything. In the natural sciences, one can say, "matter/energy" and explain and describe a great deal. But if you want to go into English Literature, you have to start using terms like metaphor, simile, personification, etc, etc. If you want to explain the dynamics of Napoleon's army, you have to start using words like soldier, cavalry, detachment, etc. This quote is an example of dialectics as used to describe a human system- namely, Napoleon's army. Not once in this quote does he mention matter/energy- only quantity into quality. Yes, it is the same underlying law; but in each case, it is an example which applies strictly to the thing Engels is attempting to describe, and absolutely not a general law. Matter/motion into quality is no more a dialectical law than cavalry into quality. Both are examples of a dialectical law- quantity into quality- as applied in the concrete, and not laws in themselves..

Perhaps you think soldiers are not made of matter?

Anyway, I acknowledged all this (about literature), but what has it got to do with you being able to prove a reduction cannot be made?

Nothing at all.

My case still stands, therefore.

Your total inability to grasp this basic fact is revealing, to say the least

Exceeded perhaps only by your singular incapacity to defend Engels effectively -- and then your endearing tendency to resort to personal abuse when you fail.:lol:

LeftistLord

10th September 2010, 19:37

I think Rosa is a bit like Chomsky who is a perfectionist, not a realist. Chomsky said that Lenin and Trotsky were evil right-wingers. I think that Noam Chomsky is plain dumb, crazy or a dogmatic-anarchist

.

Hegel's logic was flawed, but because it was based on the Idea, not because it was wholesale mysticism as "Rosa" has tried to convince people here. The extremely idiosyncratic reading of Marx and Engels that says otherwise is supported by virtually no one, although some argue that there is a differentiation between Marx's "historical materialism" and the more general "dialectical materialism" referring specifically to the distorted version of the latter presented by the Stalinists.

Rosa Lichtenstein

10th September 2010, 22:29

LL:

I think Rosa is a bit like Chomsky who is a perfectionist, not a realist.

On what do you base this odd conclusion?

Chomsky said that Lenin and Trotsky were evil right-wingers. I think that Noam Chomsky is plain dumb, crazy or a dogmatic-anarchist

I am a Leninist and a Trotskyist!

And I have already pointed out that Graymouser has made this up:

not because it was wholesale mysticism as "Rosa" has tried to convince people here.

It does not represent anything I have argued nor anything that could reasonably be inferred from what I have argued.

My argument is in fact that Hegel's 'logic' is flawed because Hegel committed some very basic logical errors, not because he was a mystic:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

He certainly used this defective 'logic' to support his mysticism, but that is a different issue.

Zanthorus

10th September 2010, 22:46

I am a Leninist and a Trotskyist!

Wait, don't you support the political line of the SWP?

/sectarian :tt2:

Rosa Lichtenstein

10th September 2010, 22:54

Z:

Wait, don't you support the political line of the SWP?

Off topic...

Freedom-Hating Communist

11th September 2010, 05:19

Wait a minute.
I've come to a conclusion that it is so.
And I want an input from you. Instead of that, I was dismissed for superficially resembling another user whom you don't like.
OK, I might have worded it wrongly.
Let's rephrase the question and see if you will be willing to answer it:
Do you think that the notion of DM espoused in Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" is grounded in metaphysics? Or do you think it is not and why?

When you put it that way (though I am still wary- the fact that you worded it as a loaded question the first time makes me very suspicious of where this is going)...
No, I do not, necessarily. It is hardly his best work, or his most relevant work, really (it was never finished; he never actually intended to have it published- attached to the manuscript found after his death was an inscription: 'All this to be revised'). However, the dialectial method on which he bases the work, and the theory that dialectics can explain the natural world aswell as the human (to a greater or lesser degree- but that's not the argument here) are basically sound and valid. For a more thorough explanation, I suggest reading greymouser's earlier posts on this board.

Not much wiggle room there.

He then went on to apply it to soldiers (and in it's in the 'addition of matter and motion' form too):

Yes, the same law, not the same example. Quantity into Quality, not Matter/energy into Quality.

Perhaps you think soldiers are not made of matter?

Yes, they are made of matter; I qualified everything I said about soldiers in the above post by saying that technically, in the final analysis, soldiers' are simply bits of matter, like everything else- however, in order to understand war and the arrangement of armies, one must look at the soldiers themselves, not at the atoms or particles that make them up. I will elaborate further with my response to the next quote:

Anyway, I acknowledged all this (about literature), but what has it got to do with you being able to prove a reduction cannot be made?

Nothing at all.

My case still stands, therefore.

Incorrect.

To quote Trotsky:

"'The cause of chemical reaction lies in the physical and mechanical properties of compounds.' This formula of Mendeleyev is completely materialist in character. Chemistry instead of resorting to some new super-mechanical and super-physical force to explain its phenomena, reduces chemical processes to the mechanical and physical properties of its compounds.
Biology and physiology stand in a similar relationship to chemistry. Scientific, that is, materialist physiology does not require a special super-chemical vital force (as is the claim of Vitalists and neo-Vitalists) to explain phenomena in its field. Physiological processes are reducible in the last analysis to chemical ones, just as the latter – to mechanics and physics.
Psychology is similarly related to physiology. It is not for nothing that physiology is called the applied chemistry of living organisms. Just as there exists no special physiological force, so it is equally true that scientific, i.e., materialist psychology has no need of a mystic force – soul – to explain phenomena in its field, but finds them reducible in the final analysis to physiological phenomena. This is the school of the academician Pavlov; it views the so-called soul as a complex system of conditioned reflexes, completely rooted in the elementary physiological reflexes which in their turn find, through the potent stratum of chemistry, their root in the subsoil of mechanics and physics.
The same can be said of sociology also. To explain social phenomena it is not necessary to adduce some kind of eternal source, or to search for origin in another world. Society is a product of the development of primary matter, like the earth’s crust or the amoeba. In this manner, scientific thought with its methods cuts like a diamond drill through the complex phenomena of social ideology to the bed-rock of matter, its component elements, its atoms with their physical and mechanical properties.
Naturally, this does not mean to say that every phenomenon of chemistry can be reduced directly to mechanics; and even less so, that every social phenomenon is directly reducible to physiology and then – to laws of chemistry and mechanics. It may be said that this is the uppermost aim of science. But the method of gradual and continuous approach toward this aim is entirely different. Chemistry has its special approach to matter; its own methods of research, its own laws. If without the knowledge that chemical reactions are reducible in the final analysis to mechanical properties of elementary particles of matter, there is not and cannot be a finished philosophy linking all phenomena into a single system, so, on the other hand, the mere knowledge that chemical phenomena are themselves rooted in mechanics and physics does not provide in itself the key to even one chemical reaction. Chemistry has its own keys. One can choose among them only from experience and generalization, through the chemical laboratory, chemical hypothesis and chemical theory.
This applies to all sciences. Chemistry is a powerful pillar of physiology with which it is directly connected through the channels of organic and physiological chemistry. But chemistry is no substitute for physiology. Each science rests on the laws of other sciences only in the so-called final instance. But at the same time, the separation of the sciences from one another is determined precisely by the fact that each science covers a particular field of phenomena, i.e. a field of such complex combinations of elementary phenomena and laws as require a special approach, special research technique, special hypotheses and methods." (Leon Trotsky, Speech delivered to the Mendeleyev Congress on 17 September, 1925)

I think I will just let the case presented by the (far) superior thinker to either of us stand. So you see; English Literature, for example, is technically and in the final analysis reducble to the laws of physics. But you will get nowhere by doing so; your understanding of English Literature will not be enhanced (though, along the way, your knowledge of physics and neuroscience might be). Different fields have different rules, different basic methods- so, to say that S Artesian's post in economics is invalid because he did not reduce it at every step to basic physical laws (based on a quote where you purport that Engels demands he does- though this is easily disprovable) is invalid in itself, and should be dismissed. In my case, its dismissal was accompanied by intense amusement- this should all be very, very basic. Especially to someone who claims to understand the dialectic (whether you reject it or not)- the whole point of dialectical analysis is that it is a holistic analysis, and that more than a little reductionism is foreign to its logic.

Freedom-Hating Communist

11th September 2010, 05:28

I am a Leninist and a Trotskyist!

How can you claim that? Every aspect of Trotskyism that makes it different from simple Marxism is based, fundamentally, totally, and consciously on dialectics! Permanent Revolution- consciously a dialectical theory! The theories of the Party and its relation to the class- saturated in dialectics! The analysis of the class-roots of Fascism, the various theories of the nature of Stalinist Russia- all consciously based on the dialectic (and hence on Marx- oh, wait, you don't believe that. Based on what, again? Oh, right. Based on your interpretation of a single word).

Rosa Lichtenstein

11th September 2010, 11:05

FHC:

However, the dialectical method on which he bases the work, and the theory that dialectics can explain the natural world as well as the human (to a greater or lesser degree- but that's not the argument here) are basically sound and valid. For a more thorough explanation, I suggest reading greymouser's earlier posts on this board.

Not so. It cannot even account for change! In fact, if your 'theory' were true, change would be impossible:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

Yes, the same law, not the same example. Quantity into Quality, not Matter/energy into Quality.

Then it's not the 'same law' -- you have altered it.

On the very same page as he runs through the 'addition of matter and energy' part of that 'law', Engels refers to 'the same law' applied to human history, and he calls it a 'general law' to account for all of human history and thought. In your hands it loses its generality.

And, as if to rub it in, he even applies it to human warfare, in the Mamelukes example, which is about the addition of matter and energy (to human development), linking that directly to Marx's economics.

So Engels certainly applies this law in the same way to both nature and society, as the above shows.

Yes, they are made of matter; I qualified everything I said about soldiers in the above post by saying that technically, in the final analysis, soldiers' are simply bits of matter, like everything else- however, in order to understand war and the arrangement of armies, one must look at the soldiers themselves, not at the atoms or particles that make them up. I will elaborate further with my response to the next quote:

But, it's the addition of extra soldiers, extra matter, that causes a change in 'quality', according to Engels. So he reduced things to matter and energy in this instance.

And thanks for the Trotsky quote, but he, like you, fails to show how and why reductionism is impossible, or unhelpful.

I think I will just let the case presented by the (far) superior thinker to either of us stand. So you see; English Literature, for example, is technically and in the final analysis reducible to the laws of physics. But you will get nowhere by doing so; your understanding of English Literature will not be enhanced (though, along the way, your knowledge of physics and neuroscience might be). Different fields have different rules, different basic methods- so, to say that S Artesian's post in economics is invalid because he did not reduce it at every step to basic physical laws (based on a quote where you purport that Engels demands he does- though this is easily disprovable) is invalid in itself, and should be dismissed. In my case, its dismissal was accompanied by intense amusement- this should all be very, very basic.

Well, you are just repeating an article of faith, here -- something you have clearly accepted without much thought. It means you have to dance around the issue in order to avoid providing a proof that reductionism cannot work here, too. It might, or it might not, but you are still happy to impose dialectics on the world in advance of a proof either way -- and in defiance of Engels's and Trotsky's claims that dialecticians never do this.

Especially to someone who claims to understand the dialectic (whether you reject it or not)- the whole point of dialectical analysis is that it is a holistic analysis, and that more than a little reductionism is foreign to its logic.

Well, 'dialectical holism' is a joke too:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011%2002.htm

But, even if it weren't it is plain that you, like all other dialecticians, are happy to impose this belief system on nature and society in defiance of what Engels and Trotsky say you lot never do.

How can you claim that? Every aspect of Trotskyism that makes it different from simple Marxism is based, fundamentally, totally, and consciously on dialectics! Permanent Revolution- consciously a dialectical theory! The theories of the Party and its relation to the class- saturated in dialectics! The analysis of the class-roots of Fascism, the various theories of the nature of Stalinist Russia- all consciously based on the dialectic (and hence on Marx- oh, wait, you don't believe that. Based on what, again? Oh, right. Based on your interpretation of a single word).

In the same way one can claim to be a Newtonian but reject all the mystical gobbledygook he used to derive his 'laws', and which in the end do not depend on it.

And, of course, as you no doubt know, every one of the many hundreds of Trotskyist sects uses this theory to prove all the others are wrong, just as they use it to show that the Maoists and Stalinists are wrong -- who return the favour, using it to show us Trotskyists are wrong, and each other is wrong.

And that's because it can be used to justify anything you like and its opposite (since it glories in contradiction).

For example Orthodox Trotskyists [OTs] use it to show that Cliff's theory of state capitalism is wrong, and Cliff used it to show the opposite. Similarly, the OTs use it to justify substitutionism (arguing that a workers' state, for example, can be created by non-workers -- the red army, third world guerillas, etc.). So what if that is contradictory -- only those 'ignorant of dialectics' will disagree.

In which case, I say a plague on both your houses, taking Marx's advice seriously:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

You:

Every aspect of Trotskyism that makes it different from simple Marxism is based, fundamentally, totally, and consciously on dialectics! Permanent Revolution- consciously a dialectical theory! The theories of the Party and its relation to the class- saturated in dialectics! The analysis of the class-roots of Fascism, the various theories of the nature of Stalinist Russia- all consciously based on the dialectic (and hence on Marx- oh, wait, you don't believe that. Based on what, again? Oh, right. Based on your interpretation of a single word).

Not so.

To repeat the above analogy. Newton's scientific work was heavily affected by his mystical beliefs. For example, his belief in action at a distance through gravity was based on his belief in 'god', who was the real cause of action at a distance. But his mathematics wasn't. So, one can accept the mathematics while rejecting the mysticism.

Now, the problem was solved by Einstein, who replaced the force of gravity with the warping of Spacetime by a gravitational field.

So, remove Newton's mystical stuff and the mathematics is unaffected. Remove Trotsky's mystical stuff and much of his Politics and Sociology (etc.) remains intact.

We do not need dialectics to explain change for example. We have literally hundreds, if not thousands of words in ordinary language that will help us do that nicely enough -- namely all those verbs and adverbs, adjectives and nouns you learnt as you learnt to speak. Add in the vocabulary of historical materialism and mathematics, and ordinary language can cope with change far better than the obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that wasn't broken (as Marx suggested). In fact, as I have shown in the above links, dialectics cannot even explain change!:

Oh, right. Based on your interpretation of a single word

Again, not so. My objections to DM are far wider than even you can begin to imagine. The above is just a tiny fraction of my case against it.

Freedom-Hating Communist

11th September 2010, 17:29

Not so. It cannot even account for change! In fact, if your 'theory' were true, change would be impossible:

Well, 'dialectical holism' is a joke too:

But, even if it weren't it is plain that you, like all other dialecticians, are happy to impose this belief system on nature and society in defiance of what Engels and Trotsky say you lot never do.

Don't throw book-length rants at me. If you want me to take your ideas even remotely seriously, present them concisely and logically. That way we know you aren't hiding a pathetic quality behind the imposing quantity, or a lack of logic behind a profusion of rhetoric. This smells suspiciously of a tendency within the Spanish revoutionary movement, wherein, due to a lack of focus and care in the application of democratic centralism- and indeed, often due to a complete rejection of democratic centralism- middle-class intellectuals and anyone else with time to spare won arguments and debates by default, because they had such time to make and elaborate their arguments that their working-class opponents simply did not stand a chance. Unlike yourself, clearly, I simply do not have the time to be trawling through your essays- I have work, study, a social life, active participation in political campaigns, and a wide variety of pressing matters demanding my attention. A handful of paragraphs, minus all rhetoical flourishes and boorish insults, should be all it takes. I'll even give you a formula to work with: premise, premise, conclusion, expand, repeat (if necessary).

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

As I'm sure you have been told before, quoting this before or after posting the above-mentioned wordy, (superficially) technical 'book-length rants' makes you a massive hypocrite. Do you just not see that, or have you just not been informed?

Then it's not the 'same law' -- you have altered it.

On the very same page as he runs through the 'addition of matter and energy' part of that 'law', Engels refers to 'the same law' applied to human history, and he calls it a 'general law' to account for all of human history and thought. In your hands it loses its generality.

This all rests on the assumption that one can replace any and all terms for 'quantity' with the words 'matter and energy' and accurately explain everything- ie, that one could reduce the workings of human society back entirely to the laws of physics and accurately explain every single aspect of human relationships. This is the only possible justification for claiming that Engels meant "matter/energy into quality" to be a general law rather than a particular example- without this assumption, the deliberate inclusion of in naure as a qualification every time he mentions matter/energy carries immense significance. I will continue this argument further on in the post, but for now, I will repeat the thesis I have presented in every post thus far- While it is technically true that, for example, Chemistry can be reduced back to the laws of physics, and that it depends on these laws in the long-term, it is not true that you can sufficiently or accurately explain it on these terms- new, seperate terms are required to properly explain the phenomenon within the jurisidiction of Chemistry properly. You cannot simply substitute physics for chemistry, though chemistry ultimately depends upon physics.

And, as if to rub it in, he even applies it to human warfare, in the Mamelukes example, which is about the addition of matter and energy (to human development), linking that directly to Marx's economics.

So Engels certainly applies this law in the same way to both nature and society, as the above shows.

This also depends upon the above assumptions (and totally ignores without addressing my objections and qualifications).

But, it's the addition of extra soldiers, extra matter, that causes a change in 'quality', according to Engels. So he reduced things to matter and energy in this instance.

Engels did nothing of the sort. You have read this reductionism into his argument, based again on the above assumptions. As all too often, your entire argument can be reduced back (oh the irony!) to an interpretation of quotes and texts which seem to be almost deliberately misrepresenting the arguments made within by either a) focusing on the worst possible interpretation for the reputation of the author and/or the best possible interpretation for your own case, despite all evidence and protestations otherwise; or, b) basing your interpretations of the quotes/texts on assumptions that were not held by the author or by anyone else possessed of common-sense.

And thanks for the Trotsky quote, but he, like you, fails to show how and why reductionism is impossible, or unhelpful.

And here comes the elaboration I was talking about earlier. It's really quite simple.

It is a fact that we have different fields of knowledge, and different means of research and inquiry, for different phenomenon. There are three possible explanations for this:

1. Because we simply do not know enough to totally unite these fields, and make the distinctions redundant; ie, the link between physics and chemistry is simply not strong enough to make the body of knowledge and methods called 'Chemistry' redundant yet.

2. Because the different bodies of knowledge/methodology are fundamentally and absolutely distinct from each other.

3. Because atleast some of the bodies of knowledge/methodology can only partially explain each other, and/or because it is entirely unhelpful to abolish the distinctions, though it would be technically valid (so, while it is technically true that chemistry can, at some level, be reduced back to physics, to do so merely causes more problems than it solves; the methods and terms that make up chemistry are those best suited to investigate and describe the phenomenon that fall under the label chemical, even though the methods and terms that make up physics could do the job in theory).

I'm pretty sure you've already guessed which way I lean.

Possibility 1 can be disproved quite simply- if it were true, then, as our knowledge of, say, physics and chemistry advanced, the distinction between them would eventually fade out to nothing; physics would not only be able to investigate and describe traditionally chemical phenomenon, as it clearly can, but it would be the field in the best possible position to do so. While this is true to a point- thus disproving possibility (2) with its absolute distinctions- this process has basically ceased with the disovery of the most important link between physics and chemistry- modern atomic theory. Chemistry remains chemistry, physics remains physics- ie, the methods and terms of chemistry remain those best suited for describing chemical phenomenon, despite the fact that physics is now also in a position to do so.

This is what Trotsky means when he says:

Naturally, this does not mean to say that every phenomenon of chemistry can be reduced directly to mechanics; and even less so, that every social phenomenon is directly reducible to physiology and then – to laws of chemistry and mechanics. It may be said that this is the uppermost aim of science. But the method of gradual and continuous approach toward this aim is entirely different. Chemistry has its special approach to matter; its own methods of research, its own laws. If without the knowledge that chemical reactions are reducible in the final analysis to mechanical properties of elementary particles of matter, there is not and cannot be a finished philosophy linking all phenomena into a single system, so, on the other hand, the mere knowledge that chemical phenomena are themselves rooted in mechanics and physics does not provide in itself the key to even one chemical reaction. Chemistry has its own keys. One can choose among them only from experience and generalization, through the chemical laboratory, chemical hypothesis and chemical theory.

So how does this relate to the Engels' quote? Because, although in the final analysis economics can be reduced to physics and chemistry, and physics and chemistry cannot be reduced back to economics, economic terms and methods remain distinct from physics or chemistry terms because the latter cannot explain the phenomenon traditionally filed under 'economics' as well as the methods and terms traditionally filed under 'economics' can; the reduction is unhelpful and does not infact explain anything new about the phenomenon traditionally filed under economics; it is therefore unnecessary, and the distinction between physics and economics remains a justified distinction.

Therefore: The fact that the distinction between fields of knowledge remains justified today- and indeed, was more so in Engels' day- means that it cannot be assumed that when Engels elaborated the example in nature of matter/motion as a form of quanitity for the purposes of quantity into qulaity, he intended the example to be the elaboration of the general rule, to be applied in all cases in place of quantity into quality; means that your reading of the quote using Napoleon's army is, while technically possible (like any and all other interpretations), not justified by the evidence; and means that your post demanding that S Artesian reduce his elaboration of the dialectical thread running through Marxist economics is silly and unjustified.

In the same way one can claim to be a Newtonian but reject all the mystical gobbledygook he used to derive his 'laws', and which in the end do not depend on it.

This assumes that Lenin and Trotsky's politics, as well as the thoeries of Marx, make sense without the dialectic. As to Marx, I would simply be repeating S Artesian's post, so I won't go there; as to Lenin and Trotsky- on what grounds, if not dialectical grounds, do you base the theories of a) The vanguard party, based as it is on the contradictory consciousness of workers and he fundamental contradictions in society giving impulse to resisitance; b) Permanent Revolution, based as it is on the dialectical unity of feudal and capitalist relations in Russia and on the inevitable contradiction between workers and peasants aftr the revolution; c) Trotsky's class analysis of Fascism, relying as it does on the middle-class's poition within the conflict between the two main opposing forces in society, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat?

And, of course, as you no doubt know, every one of the many hundreds of Trotskyist sects uses this theory to prove all the others are wrong, just as they use it to show that the Maoists and Stalinists are wrong -- who return the favour, using it to show us Trotskyists are wrong, and each other is wrong.

And that's because it can be used to justify anything you like and its opposite (since it glories in contradiction).

Disputes wherein both sides make use of the scientific method come up all the time. Disputes wherein both sides use the same approach to literature and art come up all the time. This does not prove that the particular means of artistic interpretation- let alone the scientific theory- are just free-for-alls that can be used to prove anything and everything willy-nilly. It only proves that those who use these methods are human, and that humans do not always have the same intellectual capacities, access to data, understanding of the proper use of the methods, or personal experiences as each other. Disputes within dialectics prove nothing. What is indicative about all this is your implicit demand for absolute unity and perfection from dialectics, where you do not demand it of any other method.

For example Orthodox Trotskyists [OTs] use it to show that Cliff's theory of state capitalism is wrong, and Cliff used it to show the opposite. Similarly, the OTs use it to justify substitutionism (arguing that a workers' state, for example, can be created by non-workers -- the red army, third world guerillas, etc.). So what if that is contradictory -- only those 'ignorant of dialectics' will disagree.

Again, this proves nothing but that dialectics is a method used by humans. As in any dispute in science, the winner in the long-run will be the one who uses the method the most effectively, and is truest to the core principles of the method (though, ofcourse, this being a dispute in the social sciences, where convincing proof is rar and hard to come by- further evidence that, while human society can, in the long run, be reduced back to scientific laws, scientific laws and methods are not those best suited to describing human systems- it will take a lot longer, and the final result will be a lot more tentative). I personally believe that, if that is the criteria, the 'winner' will be Cliff and the IST; but only time will tell.

We do not need dialectics to explain change for example. We have literally hundreds, if not thousands of words in ordinary language that will help us do that nicely enough -- namely all those verbs and adverbs, adjectives and nouns you learnt as you learnt to speak. Add in the vocabulary of historical materialism and mathematics, and ordinary language can cope with change far better than the obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that wasn't broken (as Marx suggested).

You mistake explaining for describing. Describing something does not necessarily explain it. That's where dialectics steps in. As in science, ordinary language describes the what, the observations, the results; the jargon deals with the why.

Freedom-Hating Communist

11th September 2010, 17:39

Again, not so. My objections to DM are far wider than even you can begin to imagine. The above is just a tiny fraction of my case against it.

a) I was refering to your claim that Marx wasn't a dialectician- learn to read before you respond.

b)

Originally Posted by Karl Marx, Afterword to (2nd German Ed) Das Kapital
...Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction.

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire.

Karl Marx
London
January 24, 1873

In order to prove that Marx had extirpated the Hegel from his thought in Capital, you have to prove that this quote does not mean what it immediately seems to mean. You cannot dismiss it based on the time of Marx's life (this was written well after the supposed 'turning point' between early and late Marx), or the unimportance of the work in question (it's an afterword to Capital! It doesn't get much more important!). The only part of the quote which is really open to serious, credible interpretation and investigation is 'coquetted'. Your entire case against the idea that Marx was a Hegelian rests squarely on your interpretation of the word 'coquetted'. And even then, your interpretation, given the context of the quote and the content of the next few sentences, is very, very weak. More like the sort of thing a conspiracy nut would sieze on than anything a serious historian or biographer would use to understand his relationship to Hegel's thought.

Rosa Lichtenstein

11th September 2010, 22:00

FHC:

Don't throw book-length rants at me.

That's a bit rich coming from someone who has just posted a book length rant against me.

If you want me to take your ideas even remotely seriously

What on earth makes you think I want to be 'taken seriously' by an obnoxious mystic like you?:lol:

present them concisely and logically.

Again, that's a bit rich coming from someone who thinks we have anything useful to learn from that sub-logical idiot, Hegel -- a Hermetic Hair-brain not known for his concision.

That way we know you aren't hiding a pathetic quality behind the imposing quantity, or a lack of logic behind a profusion of rhetoric.

Well, given the fact that you seem impressed by 'dialectical logic', your facility with logic (formal or informal) can't be up to much. So, I can do without sanctimonious lectures from you.

This smells suspiciously of a tendency within the Spanish revolutionary movement, wherein, due to a lack of focus and care in the application of democratic centralism- and indeed, often due to a complete rejection of democratic centralism- middle-class intellectuals and anyone else with time to spare won arguments and debates by default, because they had such time to make and elaborate their arguments that their working-class opponents simply did not stand a chance.

May I suggest you look up the meaning of the word 'relevant'? You seem to have as good as grasp of this word as you have of logic.

Unlike yourself, clearly, I simply do not have the time to be trawling through your essays-

Ok, stay ignorant -- see if I care.

A handful of paragraphs, minus all rhetorical flourishes and boorish insults, should be all it takes.

I'm sorry, what was that again? I fell asleep before I got to the end of that sentence.

I'll even give you a formula to work with: premise, premise, conclusion, expand, repeat (if necessary).

Too bad you don't seem capable of following your own advice.:(

As I'm sure you have been told before, quoting this before or after posting the above-mentioned wordy, (superficially) technical 'book-length rants' makes you a massive hypocrite.

I'm sorry but what has this got to do with Marx's comment on ordinary language? -- advanced, may I remind you in a book length 'rant', as an idiot like you might call it, against German Idealism, among other things. The German Ideology runs to over 550 pages -- easily dwarfing my humble essays in length and density, and by at least one order of magnitude.

Do you just not see that, or have you just not been informed?

Only by similar, ignorant numpties like you.:thumbup1:

This all rests on the assumption that one can replace any and all terms for 'quantity' with the words 'matter and energy' and accurately explain everything- ie, that one could reduce the workings of human society back entirely to the laws of physics and accurately explain every single aspect of human relationships. This is the only possible justification for claiming that Engels meant "matter/energy into quality" to be a general law rather than a particular example- without this assumption, the deliberate inclusion of in nature as a qualification every time he mentions matter/energy carries immense significance. I will continue this argument further on in the post, but for now, I will repeat the thesis I have presented in every post thus far- While it is technically true that, for example, Chemistry can be reduced back to the laws of physics, and that it depends on these laws in the long-term, it is not true that you can sufficiently or accurately explain it on these terms- new, separate terms are required to properly explain the phenomenon within the jurisdiction of Chemistry properly. You cannot simply substitute physics for chemistry, though chemistry ultimately depends upon physics.

Well, we needn't speculate, since Engels very helpfully interpreted this 'law' for us -- in Anti-Duhring, when he applied this law, in its 'matter and motion' form, to soldiers and other human beings (which you apparently do not think are made out of matter or can move):

"In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces." [Anti-Duhring, p.160. Bold emphasis added.]

Here, this 'Law' is applied to social change, and in its 'addition of matter and motion' form, too, for Engels specifically refers to the:

"co-operation of a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces."

And human beings are, plainly, made of matter.

He then adds:

"In conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation of quantity into quality, namely -- Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but lacked discipline, as follows:

"'Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes.'

"Just as with Marx a definite, though varying, minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation into capital, so with Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline, embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least as brave as the former. But what does this prove as against Herr Dühring? Was not Napoleon miserably vanquished in his conflict with Europe? Did he not suffer defeat after defeat? And why? Solely in consequence of having introduced the confused, hazy Hegelian notion into cavalry tactics!" [Ibid., pp.163-64. Bold emphasis added.]

Here Engels tells us this 'Law' operates in Marx's work in the same way ("Just as with Marx"), and that an increase in the numbers of soldiers involved in this example (i.e., an increase in matter) changes their quality. So, no wonder he called this a "general law", and "the same law" applying to the "development of nature, society, and thought", as I pointed out earlier..

While it is technically true that, for example, Chemistry can be reduced back to the laws of physics, and that it depends on these laws in the long-term, it is not true that you can sufficiently or accurately explain it on these terms- new, separate terms are required to properly explain the phenomenon within the jurisdiction of Chemistry properly.

Maybe not, but what has this got to do with Engel's 'Law'? When has anyone ever claimed that in any of its forms it can 'explain everything'. The point is that, according to him, it applies universally to all changes in quality. Universal explanation was not mentioned by him. You have added that.

Engels did nothing of the sort. You have read this reductionism into his argument, based again on the above assumptions. As all too often, your entire argument can be reduced back (oh the irony!) to an interpretation of quotes and texts which seem to be almost deliberately misrepresenting the arguments made within by either a) focusing on the worst possible interpretation for the reputation of the author and/or the best possible interpretation for your own case, despite all evidence and protestations otherwise; or, b) basing your interpretations of the quotes/texts on assumptions that were not held by the author or by anyone else possessed of common-sense.

But, as I have shown, my assumptions are shared by Engels, who uses the 'addition of matter and motion' ideas in the above examples.

Now, I have found places in his published work where he connects this 'law' in this form with social change. What you need to do is find a passage where he denies this can be done.

Can you find even one?

I think not.

In which case, your assumptions are not supported by what Engels actually says, whereas mine are.

As all too often, your entire argument can be reduced back (oh the irony!) to an interpretation of quotes and texts which seem to be almost deliberately misrepresenting the arguments made within by either a) focusing on the worst possible interpretation for the reputation of the author and/or the best possible interpretation for your own case

Interpreted this reads: "I do not like your interpretation, since it disagrees with my assumptions."

But, as we have seen, you have yet to find a single passage that supports your separation of this 'law' into two sub-varieties: one that applies solely to nature, and a slightly different version (without the 'matter and motion' codicil) that applies to human society.

Hence, my allegedly defective interpretation is more faithful to what Engels actually said -- while yours is not.

May I suggest therefore that you ransack Engels's work desperately trying to find a passage that let's you off the non-dialectical hook?

Until then, my 'defective' interpretation turns, by a miraculous dialectical inversion, into its opposite.:)

It is a fact that we have different fields of knowledge, and different means of research and inquiry, for different phenomenon. There are three possible explanations for this:

1. Because we simply do not know enough to totally unite these fields, and make the distinctions redundant; ie, the link between physics and chemistry is simply not strong enough to make the body of knowledge and methods called 'Chemistry' redundant yet.

2. Because the different bodies of knowledge/methodology are fundamentally and absolutely distinct from each other.

3. Because at least some of the bodies of knowledge/methodology can only partially explain each other, and/or because it is entirely unhelpful to abolish the distinctions, though it would be technically valid (so, while it is technically true that chemistry can, at some level, be reduced back to physics, to do so merely causes more problems than it solves; the methods and terms that make up chemistry are those best suited to investigate and describe the phenomenon that fall under the label chemical, even though the methods and terms that make up physics could do the job in theory).

I'm pretty sure you've already guessed which way I lean.

Possibility 1 can be disproved quite simply- if it were true, then, as our knowledge of, say, physics and chemistry advanced, the distinction between them would eventually fade out to nothing; physics would not only be able to investigate and describe traditionally chemical phenomenon, as it clearly can, but it would be the field in the best possible position to do so. While this is true to a point- thus disproving possibility (2) with its absolute distinctions- this process has basically ceased with the discovery of the most important link between physics and chemistry- modern atomic theory. Chemistry remains chemistry, physics remains physics- ie, the methods and terms of chemistry remain those best suited for describing chemical phenomenon, despite the fact that physics is now also in a position to do so.

I do not see why 'different fields of knowledge' implies that one cannot be reduced to the other. You just assert this without proof.

Yet another imposition onto nature of your 'defective' theory, I see!

Taking each of your reasons in turn:

1. Because we simply do not know enough to totally unite these fields, and make the distinctions redundant; ie, the link between physics and chemistry is simply not strong enough to make the body of knowledge and methods called 'Chemistry' redundant yet.

And how does that prove we may not know enough in 100 years time? Indeed, you half concede this point.

After all, creationists used to argue this about evolution 170 or so years ago. Fortunately, Darwin's theory united several areas of science once thought separate or subject only to miracle. So, you half sound like the creationists of the 1830s -- which is no surprise given the origin of your 'theory' in mystical Christianity.

2. Because the different bodies of knowledge/methodology are fundamentally and absolutely distinct from each other.

How do you know they will always remain this way? [Again you half admit they might not.]

3. Because at least some of the bodies of knowledge/methodology can only partially explain each other, and/or because it is entirely unhelpful to abolish the distinctions, though it would be technically valid (so, while it is technically true that chemistry can, at some level, be reduced back to physics, to do so merely causes more problems than it solves; the methods and terms that make up chemistry are those best suited to investigate and describe the phenomenon that fall under the label chemical, even though the methods and terms that make up physics could do the job in theory).

Alas you are confusing epistemological and methodological, and ontological and/or nomothetic reductionism with one another.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reduction-biology/

I claim that Engels was an ontological reductionist. Your argument above does not show that this form of reductionism is impossible. And good luck with that one, you'll need it...

So how does this relate to the Engels' quote? Because, although in the final analysis economics can be reduced to physics and chemistry, and physics and chemistry cannot be reduced back to economics, economic terms and methods remain distinct from physics or chemistry terms because the latter cannot explain the phenomenon traditionally filed under 'economics' as well as the methods and terms traditionally filed under 'economics' can; the reduction is unhelpful and does not in fact explain anything new about the phenomenon traditionally filed under economics; it is therefore unnecessary, and the distinction between physics and economics remains a justified distinction.

Therefore: The fact that the distinction between fields of knowledge remains justified today- and indeed, was more so in Engels' day- means that it cannot be assumed that when Engels elaborated the example in nature of matter/motion as a form of quantity for the purposes of quantity into quality, he intended the example to be the elaboration of the general rule, to be applied in all cases in place of quantity into quality; means that your reading of the quote using Napoleon's army is, while technically possible (like any and all other interpretations), not justified by the evidence; and means that your post demanding that S Artesian reduce his elaboration of the dialectical thread running through Marxist economics is silly and unjustified.

Except, you have still not shown that reduction is impossible, nor have you shown that your assumptions are supported by anything Engels wrote -- unlike my assumptions, which are.

So, all this was wasted effort on your part.

This assumes that Lenin and Trotsky's politics, as well as the theories of Marx, make sense without the dialectic. As to Marx, I would simply be repeating S Artesian's post, so I won't go there; as to Lenin and Trotsky- on what grounds, if not dialectical grounds, do you base the theories of a) The vanguard party, based as it is on the contradictory consciousness of workers and he fundamental contradictions in society giving impulse to resistance; b) Permanent Revolution, based as it is on the dialectical unity of feudal and capitalist relations in Russia and on the inevitable contradiction between workers and peasants after the revolution; c) Trotsky's class analysis of Fascism, relying as it does on the middle-class's position within the conflict between the two main opposing forces in society, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat?

In that case you will find it easy to say how this 'theory' of your is integral to their politics etc. Up to now, like so many others here, you have just asserted this. Anti-dialecticians like me have been asking you mystics for at least five years at this site to show how this 'theory' of yours is integral in this way -- up to now all we have received is abuse or deafening silence.

And, the contradiction you allege here isn't one -- it does not even look like one. Unless, of course, you can show otherwise.

And, as I have argued, this 'theory' can be used to 'justify' anything you like and its opposite. So, even if you succeeded in the above impossible task, that would simply show that this 'theory' of yours is also integral to the opposite of Leninism and Trotskyism. After all, the Maoists and the Stalinists use it to 'prove' us Trotskyists are wrong. Just as fellow Trotskyists use it to prove other Trotskyists are in error.

But, you have a reply to this:

Disputes wherein both sides make use of the scientific method come up all the time. Disputes wherein both sides use the same approach to literature and art come up all the time. This does not prove that the particular means of artistic interpretation- let alone the scientific theory- are just free-for-alls that can be used to prove anything and everything willy-nilly. It only proves that those who use these methods are human, and that humans do not always have the same intellectual capacities, access to data, understanding of the proper use of the methods, or personal experiences as each other. Disputes within dialectics prove nothing. What is indicative about all this is your implicit demand for absolute unity and perfection from dialectics, where you do not demand it of any other method.

This is not about disputation, since the very same theory in science cannot be used prove anything you like and its opposite, unlike dialectics. And that is because this 'theory' of yours is almost unique in this regard. [I can think only of Zen Buddhism that has a similar capacity.] Since it glories in contradiction, anything and its contradictory can be resolved.

So, if you want to justify the oppression and exploitation of the working class in the former USSR, along with arguing that they are still the ruling class, you appeal to the 'contradictory' nature of the state -- as Trotsky did.

On the other hand, if you want to deny workers any say in 'their state' (increasing the oppressive power of the state as you do so), all the while arguing that the state is withering away, you appeal to 'Marxist dialectics' as Stalin did:

It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics. [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27, 1930. Bold emphasis added.]

Or, if you want to argue in one breath that only a working class revolution can create socialism, but in the next that Stalin's tanks managed to do this in E Europe (or third world guerillas did this in Cuba, etc., or a peasant army did this in China) then you appeal to the 'contradictory' nature of the class struggle, or the workers state, and all is 'resolved'.

Plenty more examples of the many and varied things that dialectics has been used to 'justify' can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

Use the 'Quick Links' at the top to jump to section (7) Case Studies.

I hasten to add, FHC, that I have not added this link for you, since you prefer to stay ignorant, but for any other comrades here who prefer not to remain in outer darkness.

Again, this proves nothing but that dialectics is a method used by humans. As in any dispute in science, the winner in the long-run will be the one who uses the method the most effectively, and is truest to the core principles of the method (though, of course, this being a dispute in the social sciences, where convincing proof is rare and hard to come by- further evidence that, while human society can, in the long run, be reduced back to scientific laws, scientific laws and methods are not those best suited to describing human systems- it will take a lot longer, and the final result will be a lot more tentative). I personally believe that, if that is the criteria, the 'winner' will be Cliff and the IST; but only time will tell.

This response of yours is also covered by the comments I added above.

I personally believe that, if that is the criteria, the 'winner' will be Cliff and the IST; but only time will tell.

I agree with you -- I used to be in the UK-SWP. I will re-join one day, when my anti-dialectical project is finished -- if they will have me back(!).

You mistake explaining for describing. Describing something does not necessarily explain it. That's where dialectics steps in. As in science, ordinary language describes the what, the observations, the results; the jargon deals with the why.

But, dialectics cannot explain change -- or, rather, if it were true, change would be impossible, as I have shown here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

And ordinary language can explain change, as Marx indicated:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) [I]The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Rosa Lichtenstein

11th September 2010, 22:01

I'll respond to your other post presently.

Rosa Lichtenstein

11th September 2010, 22:31

FHC:

I was referring to your claim that Marx wasn't a dialectician-

Where did I claim this?

learn to read before you respond.

Seems this now applies to you not me.:lol:

In order to prove that Marx had extirpated the Hegel from his thought in Capital, you have to prove that this quote does not mean what it immediately seems to mean.

We have been through this passage literally scores of times here; here are a few places:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/scrapping-dialectics-would-t79634/index4.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158574&postcount=73

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158816&postcount=75

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1161443&postcount=114

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1163222&postcount=124

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-and-political-t118934/index.html

There I have been able to show that your mystical reading of this passage is pure fantasy.

I challenge you to show otherwise

Anyway, it is some cheek on your part to assert what you do. In this quote from Marx, what precisely supports your fanciful reading? You appear to think it is obvious, when it isn't.

You cannot dismiss it based on the time of Marx's life (this was written well after the supposed 'turning point' between early and late Marx), or the unimportance of the work in question (it's an afterword to Capital!

Which I do not do. So, you can stop inventing.

The only part of the quote which is really open to serious, credible interpretation and investigation is 'coquetted'. Your entire case against the idea that Marx was a Hegelian rests squarely on your interpretation of the word 'coquetted'

Yet another invention. What is it with you mystics? Have your brains been addled by too much dialectics? I fear Max Eastman was right:

Hegelism is like a mental disease -- you cannot know what it is until you get it, and then you can't know because you have got it -- Max Eastman.

You:

And even then, your interpretation, given the context of the quote and the content of the next few sentences, is very, very weak. More like the sort of thing a conspiracy nut would seize on than anything a serious historian or biographer would use to understand his relationship to Hegel's thought.

You are clearly far better at abuse and invention that you are at addressing my actual arguments.

No surprise there then! You are just like the scores of mystics here I have had slap some materialist sense into over that last five years.:lol:

Freedom-Hating Communist

12th September 2010, 03:23

Holy Lenin, she's at it again, deliberately misreading both me and Engels, and going through the motions of her circular psuedo-logic. The conspiracy nut in her is also still alive and well, I see! (Oh dear, her dependence on a single word to justify he case against the idea of Marx being a dialectician has jumped up to three or four words! My whole case is ruined! :laugh: )

I'll deal with this in a couple of hours. I'm going to go do something actually useful for society in the meantime.

Rosa Lichtenstein

12th September 2010, 15:59

FHC:

Holy Lenin, she's at it again, deliberately misreading both me and Engels,

Well, you are the one who ignores Engels when he tells us that it's the "same law" he used when applied to nature and society, and where his own use of this 'law' (applied to soldiers and other human beings) agrees with my application of it.

So, you are to one who wants to distort Engels.

and going through the motions of her circular psuedo-logic.

And what is 'circular' about my argument?

And it's a bit rich you accusing me of using 'pseudo-logic' when you are happy to take advice about logic from an idiot like Hegel (and other dialecticians).

I can support my allegations about Hegel (and other dialecticians) -- details supplied on request -- can you support yours about me?

The conspiracy nut in her is also still alive and well,

And what 'conspiracy' is this then? Do tell...:rolleyes:

Seems that all you have left in your defence of this mystical 'theory' of yours are personal attacks!:lol:

(Oh dear, her dependence on a single word to justify he case against the idea of Marx being a dialectician has jumped up to three or four words! My whole case is ruined!

Once more, my argumet is not based on a single word -- reduced to lying now, are you?

Just like the vast majority of mystics, your last line of defence is abuse and lies.:lol:

Freedom-Hating Communist

13th September 2010, 06:04

That's a bit rich coming from someone who has just posted a book length rant against me.

Just for future reference, this is called the Tu Quoque ('You too') fallacy, a variation of ad hominem.

Again, that's a bit rich coming from someone who thinks we have anything useful to learn from that sub-logical idiot, Hegel -- a Hermetic Hair-brain not known for his concision.

I would argue that this, too, is an example of the Tu Quoque fallacy.

Well, given the fact that you seem impressed by 'dialectical logic', your facility with logic (formal or informal) can't be up to much. So, I can do without sanctimonious lectures from you.

That's just flat ad hominem. Insulting someone after making an argument or as a conclusion to be drawn from an argument (as I have done) is one thing; replacing argument for insults is quite another.

May I suggest you look up the meaning of the word 'relevant'? You seem to have as good as grasp of this word as you have of logic.

I was not arguing anything to do with Spain. I was using the Spanish example as a way of explaining why I- and anyone else with strong Leninist leanings- will not take you remotely seriously if you simply spam excessive essays at us.

Perhaps you aught to get out more, Rosa? It may improve your grasp of social and conversational conventions.

Too bad you don't seem capable of following your own advice.

Tu Quoque. If you're going to point out that I'm a hypocrite, don't make it your entire counter-argument, you'll get yourself nowhere.

Well, we needn't speculate, since Engels very helpfully interpreted this 'law' for us -- in Anti-Duhring, when he applied this law, in its 'matter and motion' form, to soldiers and other human beings (which you apparently do not think are made out of matter or can move):

Here, this 'Law' is applied to social change, and in its 'addition of matter and motion' form, too, for Engels specifically refers to the:

He then adds:

This again only proves that quantity into quality was a general law.

Maybe not, but what has this got to do with Engel's 'Law'? When has anyone ever claimed that in any of its forms it can 'explain everything'. The point is that, according to him, it applies universally to all changes in quality. Universal explanation was not mentioned by him. You have added that.

It's like talking to a brick wall...

a)

The law of the unity and conflict of opposites;
The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes;
The law of the negation of the negation
I see no mention of matter/motion. Only quantity and quality. Seeing as this list is meant to be an elucidation of the general laws of dialectics, I think it's pretty safe to assume I'm not just making shit up when I say that it is quantity not matter/motion which is the general rule.

b) The point is, going back to the original topic of discussion- your silly response to S Artesian- demanding that S Artesian demonstrate a shift in the quantity of matter/motion in his example pertaining to economics is silly, because S Artesian was speaking in terms of the laws and rules of economics, while you were speaking in the terms and rules of physics and chemistry. Reducing the economic to the physical and chemical is technically valid, but in another discussion altogether. You're dragging a conversation about the relationship between human systems and nature into an argument about and within a human system- you'e changing the terms and boundaries of the discussion for your own ends, a trick you use often.

And human beings are, plainly, made of matter.

But, as I have shown, my assumptions are shared by Engels, who uses the 'addition of matter and motion' ideas in the above examples.

Again, indeed, human beings are made of matter. But you do not have to refer to matter, particles, atoms and the such, in order to explain that a quantitative increase in the number of soldiers will lead to a qualitative shift. You just have to refer to the soldiers as soldiers, not as lumps of matter. It is unnecessary, and unhelpful, to call them anything but soldiers. To claim that Engels would have done so, based on a single quote from an unfinnished book (which came with an inscription when it was found after his death which read, "All this to be revised", as though as a warning to folks like you- or the Stalinists- who would take it as a finished representation of his thought) which didn't necessarily mean what you take it to mean anyway, rather than from the general rule of the dialectical method as expounded numerous times as quantity into quality rather than matter/motion into quality, is dodgy at best.

Here Engels tells us this 'Law' operates in Marx's work in the same way ("Just as with Marx"), and that an increase in the numbers of soldiers involved in this example (i.e., an increase in matter) changes their quality. So, no wonder he called this a "general law", and "the same law" applying to the "development of nature, society, and thought", as I pointed out earlier..

Indeed. Matter/motion into quality works the same way as an increase in the number of soldiers leads to a qualitative shift in the effectiveness of the army against the enemy. And, what's more, the second is technically reducible to the first. But it is not in any way helpful to do so- far better for the purposes of explanation and investigation to just leave it as 'soldiers'. One does not have to refer to matter/motion in order to understand this example. Suppose the soldiers were not made out of matter, for just a moment. Matter/motion into quality no longer applies; but quantity into quality does. Ofcourse, this is purely theoretical; in the real world, all examples of quantity into quality are technically, in the final analysis, reducible to matter/motion into quality, in the same way as chemistry is technically and in the final analysis reducible to physics. But, like the example of chemistry, this does not actually help you to understand the example of the soldiers and the military- it is, indeed, entirely unneccessary, and unhelpful.

It's taken plenty of posts now, but maybe you'll finally get it (?).

But, ofcourse, this all remains valid as an argument against you so long as we remain in the terms you set out earlier:

And thanks for the Trotsky quote, but he, like you, fails to show how and why reductionism is impossible, or unhelpful.

Funny that, in your more recent post, you have shifted the name of the game:

I claim that Engels was an ontological reductionist. Your argument above does not show that this form of reductionism is impossible. And good luck with that one, you'll need it...

No mention of 'unhelpful'. Huh. That seems odd. Until we remember you're fond of changing the parameters of an argument to suit your own purposes.

Taking each of your reasons in turn:

Um, they weren't each reasons. Again, read me before you attack me. They were each possibilities, of which I was only trying to prove number 3.

There are three possible explanations for this:

I'm pretty sure you've already guessed which way I lean.

Possibility 1 can be disproved quite simply- if it were true, then, as our knowledge of, say, physics and chemistry advanced, the distinction between them would eventually fade out to nothing; physics would not only be able to investigate and describe traditionally chemical phenomenon, as it clearly can, but it would be the field in the best possible position to do so. While this is true to a point- thus disproving possibility (2) with its absolute distinctions- this process has basically ceased with the disovery of the most important link between physics and chemistry- modern atomic theory. Chemistry remains chemistry, physics remains physics- ie, the methods and terms of chemistry remain those best suited for describing chemical phenomenon, despite the fact that physics is now also in a position to do so.

---------

In that case you will find it easy to say how this 'theory' of your is integral to their politics etc. Up to now, like so many others here, you have just asserted this. Anti-dialecticians like me have been asking you mystics for at least five years at this site to show how this 'theory' of yours is integral in this way -- up to now all we have received is abuse or deafening silence.

I have hardly the time to be elaborating this at too great a length, so let's take Permanent Revolution as an example. This is a particularly important example- none of Trotsky's positions make sense without it.

It's really quite simple and basic. Permanent Revolution makes the case that socialist revolution is actually possible in a backward, under-developed country like Russia, so long as international revolution quickly follows. What is the basis of this? The theory of combined and uneven development:

The possibility of skipping over intermediate steps is of course by no means absolute. Its degree is determined in the long run by the economic and cultural capacities of the country. The backward nation, moreover, not infrequently debases the achievements borrowed from outside in the process of adapting them to its own more primitive culture. In this the very process of assimilation acquires a self-contradictory character. Thus the introduction of certain elements of Western technique and training, above all military and industrial, under Peter I, led to a strengthening of serfdom as the fundamental form of labour organisation. European armament and European loans – both indubitable products of a higher culture – led to a strengthening of tzarism, which delayed in its turn the development of the country.
The laws of history have nothing in common with a pedantic schematism. Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms. Without this law, to be taken of course, in its whole material content, it is impossible to understand the history of Russia, and indeed of any country of the second, third or tenth cultural class. (Leon Trotsky, "The History of the Russian Revolution", Chapter One, 1930)

The theory of Permanent Revolution, the bedrock of Trtosky's politics, is based on the fact that Russia was both a Capitalist and a feudal society. If it were simply feudal, socialist revolution would be impossible. If it were simply Capitalist, he would not need to prove that socialist revolution was on the agenda- it would be apparent to all Marxists. What's more, it rests further on the fact that Russia was both ripe for bourgeois revolution and not; the material preconditions existed, but the bourgeoisie was too terrified of the working class to shake up society to the extent necessary to depose the Tsar.

And still more- Russian society both was and wasn't ready for a socialist revolution. The class will and consciousness necessary were there- but the material conditions were not (the reverse of the position of the bourgeoisie). This is why the revolution had to spread so quickly- the subjective will and consciousness of the working class is only powerful and sustainable so long as the material conditions favourable to working-class rule existed.

This is not about disputation, since the very same theory in science cannot be used prove anything you like and its opposite, unlike dialectics. And that is because this 'theory' of yours is almost unique in this regard. [I can think only of Zen Buddhism that has a similar capacity.] Since it glories in contradiction, anything and its contradictory can be resolved.

On the contrary- scientists use the scientific method to prove things and their opposites all the time. Think of the intense debates that rage over the truth or falsity of evolution! While most of those on the other side are not trained scientists, atleast some are. The difference lies in the competence and relative bias of the scientist, in the reliability of the data produced, on the care the scientist has paid to conducting fair tests, not in the fundamental methods or philosophy of science. In science, it is simply easier to prove that the scientist in question is not conducting their tests properly, or is biased, or is deliberately tampering with results, or whatever. Seeing as proponents of dialectical materialism are- naturally- more interested in social questions, which are, by definition, far more difficult to resolve, and- as is demonstrated by this very discussion- the texts behind the method are more open to interpretation, whether innocent or deliberately obfuscatory, than the tenets of the scientific method.

I agree with you -- I used to be in the UK-SWP. I will re-join one day, when my anti-dialectical project is finished -- if they will have me back(!).

I'm sincerely ashamed to have you on our side.

Freedom-Hating Communist

13th September 2010, 06:28

I will leave the debate on the passage from the afterword to others. The links you forwarded in no way convince me that your case is based on anything but unjustified interpretations of a handful of words (especially in light of this-

Marx himself had earlier drawn Engels' attention to these passages in Capital, explicitly stating his belief that dialectical laws were in evidence in natural science: 'in that text I quote Hegel's discovery regarding the law that merely quantitative changes turn into qualitative changes and state that it holds good alike in history and natural science'. (Marx, Selected Correspondence, op cit, p177, via John Rees, "Engels' Marxism")

- ), but that's another argument.

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 08:29

FHC:

Just for future reference, this is called the Tu Quoque ('You too') fallacy, a variation of ad hominem.

And that one is called pretetious git.

And despite what you might have read on the back of bus tickets, ad hominem is not always a fallacy. It is used by logicians when pointing out the inconsistency of another's argument/position. Hence, I use it here to point out that your personal attacks on me imply an inconsitency on your part. So, you accuse me of lengthy replies, for example, when you do the same, and rely on authors who wrote very lengthy books. So, you make a personal attack on me when you do the very same thing.

Inconsistent.

I would argue that this, too, is an example of the Tu Quoque fallacy.

Same point.

That's just flat ad hominem. Insulting someone after making an argument or as a conclusion to be drawn from an argument (as I have done) is one thing; replacing argument for insults is quite another.

Well, you have just confused ad hominem with personal abuse -- it seems you can abise me, but I can't return the same to you.

Another inconsistency.

And, since your knowledge of logic seems to be deficient (you do not know what is and what isn't an example of ad hominem) this might help put you straight:

One of the most widely misused terms on the Net is "ad hominem". It is most often introduced into a discussion by certain delicate types, delicate of personality and mind, whenever their opponents resort to a bit of sarcasm. As soon as the suspicion of an insult appears, they summon the angels of ad hominem to smite down their foes, before ascending to argument heaven in a blaze of sanctimonious glory. They may not have much up top, but by God, they don't need it when they've got ad hominem on their side. It's the secret weapon that delivers them from any argument unscathed.

In reality, ad hominem is unrelated to sarcasm or personal abuse. Argumentum ad hominem is the logical fallacy of attempting to undermine a speaker's argument by attacking the speaker instead of addressing the argument. The mere presence of a personal attack does not indicate ad hominem: the attack must be used for the purpose of undermining the argument, or otherwise the logical fallacy isn't there. It is not a logical fallacy to attack someone; the fallacy comes from assuming that a personal attack is also necessarily an attack on that person's arguments.

Therefore, if you can't demonstrate that your opponent is trying to counter your argument by attacking you, you can't demonstrate that he is resorting to ad hominem. If your opponent's sarcasm is not an attempt to counter your argument, but merely an attempt to insult you (or amuse the bystanders), then it is not part of an ad hominem argument.

Actual instances of argumentum ad hominem are relatively rare. Ironically, the fallacy is most often committed by those who accuse their opponents of ad hominem, since they try to dismiss the opposition not by engaging with their arguments, but by claiming that they resort to personal attacks. Those who are quick to squeal "ad hominem" are often guilty of several other logical fallacies, including one of the worst of all: the fallacious belief that introducing an impressive-sounding Latin term somehow gives one the decisive edge in an argument.

But enough vagueness. The point of this article is to bury the reader under an avalanche of examples of correct and incorrect usage of ad hominem, in the hope that once the avalanche has passed, the term will never be used incorrectly again. I will begin with some invented examples, before dealing with some real-life misuses of the term at the end.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow. By your own argument, the set of rodents is a subset of the set of mammals; and therefore, a weasel can be outside the set of rodents and still be in the set of mammals."

Hopefully it should be clear that neither A's argument nor B's argument is ad hominem. Perhaps there are some people who think that any disagreement is an ad hominem argument, but these people shouldn't be allowed out of fairyland.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow."

B's argument is less comprehensive, but still not ad hominem.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow. You evidently know nothing about logic."

B's argument is still not ad hominem. Note that B directly engages A's argument: he is not attacking the person A instead of his argument. There is no indication that B thinks his subsequent attack on A strengthens his argument, or is a substitute for engaging with A's argument. Unless we have a good reason for thinking otherwise, we should assume it is just a sarcastic flourish.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You evidently know nothing about logic. This does not logically follow."

B's argument is still not ad hominem. B does not imply that A's sentence does not logically follow because A knows nothing about logic. B is still addressing the substance of A's argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You evidently know nothing about logic."

B's argument is, most probably, still not ad hominem. The word "evidently" indicates that B is basing his opinion of A's logical skills on the evidence of A's statement. Therefore, B's sentence is a sarcastic way of saying that A's argument is logically unsound: B is attacking A's argument. He is not attacking the person instead of the argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You know nothing about logic."

Even now, we can't conclude that B's reply is ad hominem. It could well be, and probably is, the case that B is basing his reply on A's argument. He is not saying that A's argument is flawed because A knows nothing about logic; instead, he is using A's fallacious argument as evidence to present a new argument: that A knows nothing about logic.

Put briefly, ad hominem is "You are an ignorant person, therefore your arguments are wrong", and not "Your arguments are wrong, therefore you are an ignorant person." The latter statement may be fallacious, but it's not an ad hominem fallacy.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow. And you're an asshole."

B is abusive, but his argument is still not ad hominem. He engages with A's argument. There is no reason to conclude that the personal abuse of A is part of B's argument, or that B thinks it undermines A's argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You're an asshole."

B's reply is not necessarily ad hominem. There is no evidence that's his abusive statement is intended as a counter-argument. If it's not an argument, it's not an ad hominem argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You evidently know nothing about logic. And you're an asshole."

Again, B's reply is not necessarily ad hominem.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Fuck you."

Not ad hominem. B's abuse is not a counter-argument, but a request for A to cease the discussion.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Well, you've never had a good grasp of logic, so this can't be true."

B's argument here is ad hominem. He concludes that A is wrong not by addressing A's argument, but by appealing to the negative image of A the person.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Well, you're a moron and an asshole, so there goes your argument."
B's reply here is ad hominem and abusive.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Well, you're a rodent and a weasel, so there goes your argument."

B's argument here might appear on superficial inspection to be sound, but it is in fact ad hominem. He is using the terms "rodent" and "weasel" in different senses to those used by A. Although he tries to make it appear that he is countering A's argument by invalidating one of the premises, he is in fact trying to counter A's argument by heaping abuse on A. (This might also be an example of an ad homonym argument.)

A: "All murderers are criminals, but a thief isn't a murderer, and so can't be a criminal."
B: "Well, you're a thief and a criminal, so there goes your argument."

Harder to call this one. B is addressing A's argument, but perhaps unwittingly.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Wrong! If a weasel isn't a rodent, then it must be an insectivore! What an asshole!"

B's argument is logically fallacious, and he concludes with some gratuitous abuse, but nothing here is ad hominem.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "I'm sorry, but I'd prefer to trust the opinion of a trained zoologist on this one."

B's argument is ad hominem: he is attempting to counter A not by addressing his argument, but by casting doubt on A's credentials. Note that B is polite and not at all insulting.

A: "Listen up, asshole. All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

A is abusive, and his argument is fallacious, but it's not ad hominem. B's reply, ironically, is ad hominem; while he pretends to deal with A's argument, in using the term "ad hominem" incorrectly, B is in fact trying to dismiss the argument by imputing that A is resorting to personal attacks.

A: "Listen up, asshole. All rodents are mammals, and a lizard isn't a mammal, so it can't be a rodent."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

A's argument is sound, and not ad hominem. B's reply is again ad hominem.

A: "B is a convicted criminal and his arguments are not to be trusted."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

A's argument is ad hominem, since it attempts to undermine all of B's (hypothetical) arguments by a personal attack. B's reply is not ad hominem, since it directly addresses A's argument (correctly characterising it as ad hominem).

A: "All politicians are assholes, and you're just another politician. Therefore, you're an asshole."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument."

If you accept the premises, A's argument is sound. Either way, from the given context, we cannot conclude that it is ad hominem: it's not an attempt to undermine B's (hypothetical) arguments by abusing him, but instead an attempt to establish that B is an asshole. B's reply is ad hominem, since by incorrectly using the term "ad hominem", he is trying to undermine A's argument by claiming that A is resorting to personal attacks.

A: "All politicians are liars, and you're just another politician. Therefore, you're a liar and your arguments are not to be trusted."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument."

If you accept the premises, A's argument is sound; but I think most of us would sympathise with B and class it as fallacious, and ad hominem. This is because we do not accept the premise that all politicians are liars. There is a false premise that lies behind all ad hominem arguments: the notion that all people of type X make bad arguments. A has just made this premise explicit.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "That does not logically follow."
A: "*Sigh* Do I have to spell it out for you? All rodents are mammals, right, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal! What's so hard to understand???!?"
B: "I'm afraid you're mistaken. Look at it logically. If p implies q, then it does not follow that not-p implies not-q."
A: "I don't care about so-called logic and Ps and Qs and that stuff, I'm talking COMMON SENSE. A weasel ISN'T a mammal."
B: "Okay, this guy's an idiot. Ignore this one, folks."
A: "AD HOMINEM!!!! I WIN!!!!!"

Although the last line of B, taken out of context, might look ad hominem (and was seized upon as such by A), it should be clear that taken as a whole, B's argument is not ad hominem. B engaged thoroughly with A's argument. He is not countering A's argument by saying A is an idiot; on the contrary, having logically countered A's argument, and having seen A's reaction, he is arguing that A is an idiot.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some real-life examples:

A: "I agree that the writing is first class, but I am left with the distinct impression that the author is using the game as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement rather than to entertain the player. "
B: "... let's refrain from ad hominem arguments, and accept that we have different tastes, shall we?"

A's argument was not ad hominem. "The author is using the game as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement" is the conclusion of his argument, not an attempt to undermine the said author's (unseen) arguments by casting aspersions on him.

A: "I can even handle misplaced apostrophes every now and then. Not excessive amounts of them, [...]"
B: "Perhaps double-check your grammar before you write a grammar rant that refers to 'amounts of apostrophes'."
C: " ...the ad hominem nature of [B's reply] takes the sanctimonious angle that any who criticize must be without stain."

B's reply was not ad hominem. It was not a counter-argument to A, but an attempt to point out what B saw as A's hypocrisy. C's use of language, by the way, demonstrates that he is clearly out of his depth.

A: "Can someone please direct me to the ad hominem attacks in the TADS competition game "Futz Mutz"?"

There are no ad hominem attacks in Futz Mutz. Just a lot of stupid abuse.

A: "OK, I've been following this thread for a while, and I hate to say it, but you're being an asshole. You're really taking this whole thing too personally, and seriously misconstruing everyone else's arguments. Nobody here is arguing that copyright infringement is ethically, morally, legally, or otherwise justifiable. They're simply arguing that equating it with theft is simplistic and inaccurate."
B: "...calling me an asshole is called an ad hominem attack, which does not show me wrong."

No, calling you an asshole is just abuse. A's argument is not ad hominem. A has carefully pointed out what he sees as the flaws in B's argument, and based on B's failure to acknowledge them and general behaviour, has concluded that B is an asshole. This conclusion is quite independent of A's treatment of B's arguments.

A: "But the capability is, of course, there, and if you 'fail to see' how any of the standard systems can handle realtime then you clearly have zero understanding of virtual machines."
B: "...your over-reaching ad hominim[sic] judgements about what people do and do not know..."

A's argument is not ad hominem: he is not attempting to undermine B's arguments by claiming that B knows nothing about VMs. Instead, based on B's arguments about VMs, he has reached the conclusion that B has no understanding of them, and presented this as a new argument. (B later even had the nerve to direct A to the Wikipedia page on ad hominem, which he clearly didn't understand.)

Bold added.

http://plover.net/~bonds/adhominem.html

I'll repond to the rest of what you say in my next post.

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 09:34

FHC:

I was not arguing anything to do with Spain. I was using the Spanish example as a way of explaining why I- and anyone else with strong Leninist leanings- will not take you remotely seriously if you simply spam excessive essays at us.

Even though you will quote/depend on authors who wrote at great length (such as Hegel Marx, Lenin, and John Rees).

Another inconsistency.

Perhaps you aught to get out more, Rosa?

Yet another personal attack

An idiot like you would call the above 'ad hominem', and claim this was a 'fallacy'.

It may improve your grasp of social and conversational conventions

And you should stay in more, and read a textbook of logic (not written by that incompetent, Hegel).

Tu Quoque.

Same point. You accuse me of something you yourself are guilty of.

Another inconsistency.

If you're going to point out that I'm a hypocrite, don't make it your entire counter-argument, you'll get yourself nowhere.

Not the least bit inconsistent -- just false.

I do not just claim you are a hypocrite -- I also claim you are an obnoxious mystic, an idiot, a logical incompetent and an inconsistent and pretentious twerp.

This again only proves that quantity into quality was a general law.

Which 'law' Engels himself applies in the 'addition of matter and motion' form to social change, a fact you keep ignoring.

It's like talking to a brick wall...

Stop doing it then.

I see no mention of matter/motion. Only quantity and quality. Seeing as this list is meant to be an elucidation of the general laws of dialectics, I think it's pretty safe to assume I'm not just making shit up when I say that it is quantity not matter/motion which is the general rule.

Except there is when he applies it to social change in the same way as Marx does, as Engels, not me, says.

Again, you keep ignoring this.

b) The point is, going back to the original topic of discussion- your silly response to S Artesian- demanding that S Artesian demonstrate a shift in the quantity of matter/motion in his example pertaining to economics is silly, because S Artesian was speaking in terms of the laws and rules of economics, while you were speaking in the terms and rules of physics and chemistry. Reducing the economic to the physical and chemical is technically valid, but in another discussion altogether. You're dragging a conversation about the relationship between human systems and nature into an argument about and within a human system- you're changing the terms and boundaries of the discussion for your own ends, a trick you use often.

Well, pick a fight with Engels, not me, since he applies this 'law' in this way. as I have shown.

And you have yet to show that reduction is 'invalid'. You keep asserting this, and you keep trying to impose this on reality, in defiance of what Engels, Trotsky and John Rees said:

Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976) Anti-Duhring, p.13. Bold emphasis added.]

Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…. [Trotsky (1973) Problems of Everyday Life, p.233. Bold emphasis added.]

The dialectic is not a calculator into which it is possible to punch the problem and allow it to compute the solution. This would be an idealist method. A materialist dialectic must grow from a patient, empirical examination of the facts and not be imposed on them…. [The Algebra of Revolution, p.271.]

Bold added.

Looks like you do not read your own Holy Books too carefully either.:lol:

Again, indeed, human beings are made of matter. But you do not have to refer to matter, particles, atoms and the such, in order to explain that a quantitative increase in the number of soldiers will lead to a qualitative shift. You just have to refer to the soldiers as soldiers, not as lumps of matter. It is unnecessary, and unhelpful, to call them anything but soldiers. To claim that Engels would have done so, based on a single quote from an unfinished book (which came with an inscription when it was found after his death which read, "All this to be revised", as though as a warning to folks like you- or the Stalinists- who would take it as a finished representation of his thought) which didn't necessarily mean what you take it to mean anyway, rather than from the general rule of the dialectical method as expounded numerous times as quantity into quality rather than matter/motion into quality, is dodgy at best.

And yet, in the examples I quoted, Engels does precisely this. The increase in the numbers of human beings and soldiers changes their quality (this is therefore an increase in matter, as I pointed out).

To claim that Engels would have done so, based on a single quote from an unfinished book (which came with an inscription when it was found after his death which read, "All this to be revised", as though as a warning to folks like you- or the Stalinists- who would take it as a finished representation of his thought)

Another misrepresentation since I used two examples from Anti-Duhring, a published work.

But even if you are right, you have yet to find a single quote from Engels's work, published or unpublished, that supports your view that he intended to apply this law differently to cases drawn from nature and those that apply to social change.

I can, and have, produced examples from both sorts of sources.

Indeed. Matter/motion into quality works the same way as an increase in the number of soldiers leads to a qualitative shift in the effectiveness of the army against the enemy. And, what's more, the second is technically reducible to the first. But it is not in any way helpful to do so- far better for the purposes of explanation and investigation to just leave it as 'soldiers'. One does not have to refer to matter/motion in order to understand this example. Suppose the soldiers were not made out of matter, for just a moment. Matter/motion into quality no longer applies; but quantity into quality does. Of course, this is purely theoretical; in the real world, all examples of quantity into quality are technically, in the final analysis, reducible to matter/motion into quality, in the same way as chemistry is technically and in the final analysis reducible to physics. But, like the example of chemistry, this does not actually help you to understand the example of the soldiers and the military- it is, indeed, entirely unneccessary, and unhelpful.

I agree with you, this is ridiculous. And that is because I reject this 'law' as confused at best.

But once again, pick a fight with Engels, since he does precisely this.

It's taken plenty of posts now, but maybe you'll finally get it (?).

You have to 'get it' first.

No mention of 'unhelpful'. Huh. That seems odd. Until we remember you're fond of changing the parameters of an argument to suit your own purposes.

So you say, but you have yet to show I have changed the 'parameters'.

Me:

I claim that Engels was an ontological reductionist. Your argument above does not show that this form of reductionism is impossible. And good luck with that one, you'll need it...

In the post where you first mentioned 'reductionism', you did not qualify it. You did not specify what sort of reductionism you were against. So, you set no 'parameters'.

I went on to point out that in later posts you are:

confusing epistemological and methodological, and ontological and/or nomothetic reductionism with one another.

The only reply you have is that I am altering the 'parameters'.:lol:

Um, they weren't each reasons. Again, read me before you attack me. They were each possibilities, of which I was only trying to prove number 3.

In fact you said:

There are three possible explanations for this:

And a 'possible explanation' is a reason.

And thanks for this quotation from Trotsky, since it confirms what I alleged:

The possibility of skipping over intermediate steps is of course by no means absolute. Its degree is determined in the long run by the economic and cultural capacities of the country. The backward nation, moreover, not infrequently debases the achievements borrowed from outside in the process of adapting them to its own more primitive culture. In this the very process of assimilation acquires a self-contradictory character. Thus the introduction of certain elements of Western technique and training, above all military and industrial, under Peter I, led to a strengthening of serfdom as the fundamental form of labour organisation. European armament and European loans – both indubitable products of a higher culture – led to a strengthening of tzarism, which delayed in its turn the development of the country.

The laws of history have nothing in common with a pedantic schematism. Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms. Without this law, to be taken of course, in its whole material content, it is impossible to understand the history of Russia, and indeed of any country of the second, third or tenth cultural class. (Leon Trotsky, "The History of the Russian Revolution", Chapter One, 1930)

Which just goes to show that this 'theory' of yours can be used to 'prove' anything you like and its opposite, since the Stalinists use the same 'theory' to prove the opposite.

But, Trotsky does not actually do what he says, for the process he points out is not 'self-contradictory'. Which also confirms my other allegation, that it is not possible to use this theory in practice.

And in case you think I am being inconsistent in the above two paragraphs, I am not.

My claim is that this 'theory' is so confused, it can't be used to do anything practical (other than confuse those who attempt to employ it) -- but that does not stop its acolytes attempting to use it to prove anything they like and its opposite. And that attempt itself is ham-fisted since, as the quote from Trotsky showed: he did not actually use this 'theory' he gestured at it, since the 'contradiction' he alluded to isn't one to begin with.

We saw Stalin try to do something similar in my last post. Here is Mao:

"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below'.... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'how opposites can be ... identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.

"But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.

"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?

"The Kuomintang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counter-revolutionary party after 1927 because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions); but it has been compelled to agree to resist Japan because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies a definite identity....

"To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the people is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing this dictatorship and advancing to the higher stage when all state systems are eliminated. To establish and build the Communist Party is in fact to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the Communist Party and all political parties. To build a revolutionary army under the leadership of the Communist Party and to carry on revolutionary war is in fact to prepare the conditions for the permanent elimination of war. These opposites are at the same time complementary....

"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another'." [Mao (1961), pp.337-40. Bold emphases added.]

Here Mao also gestures at using your 'theory' to 'justify' class collaboration with the Guomindang, and to 'rationalise' the centralisation of undemocratic state power.

Just like Trotsky and Stalin, he uses the alleged 'contradictory' nature of something to prove whatever he likes.

The theory of Permanent Revolution, the bedrock of Trotsky's politics, is based on the fact that Russia was both a Capitalist and a feudal society. If it were simply feudal, socialist revolution would be impossible. If it were simply Capitalist, he would not need to prove that socialist revolution was on the agenda- it would be apparent to all Marxists. What's more, it rests further on the fact that Russia was both ripe for bourgeois revolution and not; the material preconditions existed, but the bourgeoisie was too terrified of the working class to shake up society to the extent necessary to depose the Tsar.

And still more- Russian society both was and wasn't ready for a socialist revolution. The class will and consciousness necessary were there- but the material conditions were not (the reverse of the position of the bourgeoisie). This is why the revolution had to spread so quickly- the subjective will and consciousness of the working class is only powerful and sustainable so long as the material conditions favourable to working-class rule existed.

Yes, I am familiar with all this. I have been a Trotskyist for longer than most RevLefters have been alive.

But what you do not do is show why any of this is a 'contradiction' -- so you too merely gesture at using your 'theory'.

On the contrary- scientists use the scientific method to prove things and their opposites all the time. Think of the intense debates that rage over the truth or falsity of evolution! While most of those on the other side are not trained scientists, at least some are. The difference lies in the competence and relative bias of the scientist, in the reliability of the data produced, on the care the scientist has paid to conducting fair tests, not in the fundamental methods or philosophy of science. In science, it is simply easier to prove that the scientist in question is not conducting their tests properly, or is biased, or is deliberately tampering with results, or whatever. Seeing as proponents of dialectical materialism are- naturally- more interested in social questions, which are, by definition, far more difficult to resolve, and- as is demonstrated by this very discussion- the texts behind the method are more open to interpretation, whether innocent or deliberately obfuscatory, than the tenets of the scientific method.

But none of them use a 'theory' which glories in contradiction to prove anything they like and its opposite.

So, and once more, all this is wasted effort on your part.

I'm sincerely ashamed to have you on our side.

Yet more personal abuse.

Once more, you are allowed to abuse me, but you scream 'ad hominem' when I abuse you.

Another inconsistency.

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 09:52

FHC:

I will leave the debate on the passage from the afterword to others. The links you forwarded in no way convince me that your case is based on anything but unjustified interpretations of a handful of words (especially in light of this-

Marx himself had earlier drawn Engels' attention to these passages in Capital, explicitly stating his belief that dialectical laws were in evidence in natural science: 'in that text I quote Hegel's discovery regarding the law that merely quantitative changes turn into qualitative changes and state that it holds good alike in history and natural science'. (Marx, Selected Correspondence, op cit, p177, via John Rees, "Engels' Marxism")

but that's another argument.

Yes, I am familiar with all this (as you would have known had you followed the links I posted earlier to the scores of debates we have had on such quotations here at RevLeft over the last two years), just as I am familiar with John's book -- my essays began in 1998 when his rather poor book was published, and were specifically targeted at that book, to begin with.

As you point out in your reply to me, no unpublished source can countermand a published source, and we already know that Marx had waved 'good-bye' the mystical gobbledygook Hegel inflicted on humanity (upside down or the 'right way up'), and was content only to 'coquette' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

You should emulate him -- or even better, go on step further, and, like me, reject it all as mystical guff.

Freedom-Hating Communist

13th September 2010, 12:26

Stop doing it then.

I think I will. This isn't going anywhere, except into the most vulgar quarrelling. One last note, which I can't resist making-

I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker...

Who would avow themselves the pupil of a thinker they reject? I was once quite enamoured with Nietzsche, and continue to think of him as a 'great thinker'- but I would never call myself his 'pupil' now.

Ofcourse, the obvious rebuttal is that it was in the past tense that Marx wrote that line. But could he not mean that as in, 'I have avowed myself his pupil', implying continuation? This is especially strong given:

But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring
and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore avowed myself...

*- who rejected Hegel and dialectics outright- indeed, heaped abuse on both-, and frequently attacked Marxism, prompting Engels to respond by way of "Anti-Duhring". To quote an article on the subject by the International Socialist Review:

Dühring calls Kant “childish,” Hegel’s ideas “crudities,” and Darwin’s thought “a piece of brutality directed against humanity.” Fourier has a “childish mind,” Lassalle is “pedantic, hair-splitting,” and Marx is noted for his “narrowness of conception…impotence of the faculties of concentration and logical arrangement…barren conceptions…logical fantasy…vile mannerisms…philosophical and scientific backwardness.”

This would place his 'avowal' in the recent past, and as a reaction against the tendency to reject Hegel as a "dead dog" which was fashionable while he was writing Capital.

Enjoy, and good-bye, for now.

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 18:48

FHC:

I think I will. This isn't going anywhere, except into the most vulgar quarrelling.

I accept your capitulation.

Who would avow themselves the pupil of a thinker they reject? I was once quite enamoured with Nietzsche, and continue to think of him as a 'great thinker'- but I would never call myself his 'pupil' now.

Easy, Aristotle, for example, was a pupil of Plato's, but within years he had rejected much of what Plato had taught him.

There are many examples of this: so Wittgenstein was a pupil of Russell's (before WW1), but by the late 1930s, the former had rejected practically everything the latter believed. Frank Jackson (the Australian philosopher) was a pupil of Wittgenstein's, but he came to reject practically everything his former teacher had taught (but he still calls himself one of Wittgenstein's pupils). I used to be a Platonist, but by the early 1980s I had rejected virtually everything I had learnt from Plato only a few years earlier. I put my reference to being a pupil of Plato's in the past tense too. Even you would out your reference to being a pupil of Nietzsche's in the past tense. There are plenty more examples of this.

So, this phenomenon is quite common.

Of course, the obvious rebuttal is that it was in the past tense that Marx wrote that line. But could he not mean that as in, 'I have avowed myself his pupil', implying continuation? This is especially strong given:

That is certainly possible, but there is no published evidence that this is so.

However, you argue as follows:

But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore avowed myself...

Except, he had already told us this:

"What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken another look by mere accident, Freiligrath having found and made me a present of several volumes of Hegel, originally the property of Bakunin. If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified." [Marx to Engels, 16/01/1858; MECW, Volume 40, p.248.]

So, he did not even possess his own copy of the 'Logic', and had to borrow one (indirectly) from Bakunin. This hardly suggests he was a keen and avid student of Hegel.

Moreover, he could not even find time to write the above summary of this 'method', even though he wasted a whole year writing that awful book Herr Vogt. But he did publish a summary of 'the dialectic method', which contained not one atom of Hegel.

From this we may conclude that by the time he came to write Das Kapital, he had moved on, and had rejected Hegel root and branch.

This would place his 'avowal' in the recent past, and as a reaction against the tendency to reject Hegel as a "dead dog" which was fashionable while he was writing Capital.

You base this on an article in the ISR:

*- who rejected Hegel and dialectics outright- indeed, heaped abuse on both-, and frequently attacked Marxism, prompting Engels to respond by way of "Anti-Dühring".

To quote an article on the subject by the International Socialist Review:

Dühring calls Kant “childish,” Hegel’s ideas “crudities,” and Darwin’s thought “a piece of brutality directed against humanity.” Fourier has a “childish mind,” Lassalle is “pedantic, hair-splitting,” and Marx is noted for his “narrowness of conception…impotence of the faculties of concentration and logical arrangement…barren conceptions…logical fantasy…vile mannerisms…philosophical and scientific backwardness.”

I do not see how this shows it was recent. After all Marx says this:

"I criticised the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago, at a time when is was still the fashion. But just when I was working on the first volume of Capital, the ill-humoured, arrogant and mediocre epigones who now talk large in educated German circles began to take pleasure in treating Hegel in the same way as the good Moses Mendelssohn treated Spinoza in Lessing's time, namely as a 'dead dog'. I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Capital, pp.102-03. Bold emphases added.]

Where and when did he 'openly avow' this? Well Hegel was treated as a 'dead dog' in the 1840s and 1850s. By the 1860s hardly anyone even bothered with him.

So, your 'evidence' is at best very weak.

graymouser

13th September 2010, 19:27

But he did publish a summary of 'the dialectic method', which contained not one atom of Hegel.
Marx did no such thing. The extract from the review of Capital was not a summary of "the dialectic method." Your entire case about Marx's method falls apart from this point onward, but you are unwilling to actually address the content of the Postface to the second German edition of Capital honestly. Because of this you make the same inane claim over and over and over and refuse to deal with what Marx actually wrote or any of the content of his work.

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 19:51

GrayPretendCat:

Marx did no such thing. The extract from the review of Capital was not a summary of "the dialectic method." Your entire case about Marx's method falls apart from this point onward, but you are unwilling to actually address the content of the Postface to the second German edition of Capital honestly. Because of this you make the same inane claim over and over and over and refuse to deal with what Marx actually wrote or any of the content of his work.

Well:

1. Marx published it.

2. He called it the 'dialectic method'.

3. It was very brief.

4. Brief precis are called 'summaries'.

5. It contained not one atom of Hegel -- no 'contradictions', no 'unity of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'universal interconnecton'...

Now, you are reasonably bright. Run through 1)-5) above and tell me why this conclusion does not follow:

"Marx published a summary of 'the dialectic method' which contained not one atom of Hegel."

You have three weeks to complete -- look smart, no time to waste...:)

Lyev

13th September 2010, 21:48

Sorry to interrupt this debate (I am very much enjoying it though), but can I ask Rosa, can you give your own basic definition of historical materialism? You see, I have read numerous sources that will refer to HM as being grounded in Marx's dialectic materialism (perhaps not in the Plekhanovian sense - I mean before it was properly formalized by anyone post-Marx, including Engels). In this context I just mean Marx's general philosophical viewpoint, such as his critique of Feuerbach's materialism. Or perhaps I should ask: do you think Marx's general philosophical outlook is totally superfluous and unnecessary in relation to our study and application of the "materialist conception of history"?

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 22:32

Lyev:

but can I ask Rosa, can you give your own basic definition of historical materialism? You see, I have read numerous sources that will refer to HM as being grounded in Marx's dialectic materialism (perhaps not in the Plekhanovian sense - I mean before it was properly formalized by anyone post-Marx, including Engels). In this context I just mean Marx's general philosophical viewpoint, such as his critique of Feuerbach's materialism. Or perhaps I should ask: do you think Marx's general philosophical outlook is totally superfluous and unnecessary in relation to our study and application of the "materialist conception of history"?

HM is off-topic in this thread, but how I would explain HM can be found (partly) in the following books:

G Cohen Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defence -- but without the technological Determinism and the Functionalism.

A Callinicos Making History -- but without his theory of Agency.

P Bleckledge, Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History -- but without the gesture toward 'dialectics'.

do you think Marx's general philosophical outlook

After the mid-1840s, I do not think Marx had a 'philosophical outlook', and nor did he need one -- and neither do we.

S.Artesian

13th September 2010, 22:38

After the mid-1840s, I do not thnk Marx had a 'philosophical outlook', and nor did he need one -- and neither do we.

Do you consider the "mystification" you claim Marx exhibits in his unpublished manuscripts prior to [and coincident with] Capital through his continued references to and use of "contradiction" and "dialectic" to be a "philosophical outlook," a residue of a philosophical outlook, or simply a fundamental mistake of analysis?

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 22:49

Smarty Pants:

Do you consider the "mystification" you claim Marx exhibits in his unpublished manuscripts prior to [and coincident with] Capital through his continued references to and use of "contradiction" and "dialectic" to be a "philosophical outlook," a residue of a philosophical outlook, or simply a fundamental mistake of analysis?

I will be happy to answer your question when you answer the many I have asked you, which you just ignore.

Lyev

13th September 2010, 22:56

Lyev:

HM is off-topic in this thread, but how I would explain HM can be found (partly) in the following books:

G Cohen Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defence -- but without the technological Determinism and the Functionalism.

A Callinicos Making History -- but without his theory of Agency.

P Bleckledge, Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History -- but without the gesture toward 'dialectics'.

After the mid-1840s, I do not think Marx had a 'philosophical outlook', and nor did he need one -- and neither do we.I think it quite pertinent here (although I can only speak for myself) because my understanding of dialectical materialism informs how I interpret the materialist conception of history, but I don't know how other people feel about this.

Rosa Lichtenstein

13th September 2010, 22:58

Fine, but you asked for my opinion, and I gave it.

graymouser

14th September 2010, 00:51

1. Marx published it.

2. He called it the 'dialectic method'.

3. It was very brief.

4. Brief precis are called 'summaries'.

5. It contained not one atom of Hegel -- no 'contradictions', no 'unity of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'universal interconnecton'...
Well, 2 is incorrect, so it can only follow that points 3-5 are irrelevant.

In the postface to the second German edition of Capital, Marx sets out to describe the confusion that abounded among reviewers of the work, and to set it straight. He begins (from here on all quotes are from the postface, translation available on MIA, unless otherwise noted):

That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.
So at the heart of it, what Marx is doing is to demonstrate that the reviews of Capital have not understood his method, have misrepresented it, and that their contrary notions of what his method actually is have more or less illustrated this.

Marx goes on to discuss the review which you believe contains a relatively accurate summation of Marx's dialectic method. He introduces it as follows:

The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical.
We must remember that Marx is discussing the misunderstandings held by the reviewers of Capital, as he told us. Here he is detailing the fact that the reviewer (never named here) in the European Messenger complains about a marked contrast between the realistic (i.e. materialist) inquiry behind Capital, and the work's "German-dialectical" presentation. This can only refer to Marx's presentation in a method inspired by Hegel; to say "German-dialectical" and mean Kantian, much less the Scottish historical school as you claim, would be unthinkable.

For the rest of the treatment of the review, we must keep in mind - during both Marx's commentary and that of the writer - that the latter has failed to comprehend Marx's method in writing Capital. He is not dealing with reviews that present his ideas in their correct and accurate format.

Now, having briefly quoted the reviewer, he makes the following prefatory remark to a much longer quotation:

After a quotation from the preface to my “Criticism of Political Economy,” Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on...
Given that we are discussing Marx's method, this quotation is vitally important. He specifically points to the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, a text which contains the very Hegelian terminology that you detest, as discussing "the materialistic basis of [Marx's] method." This is an extreme problem for the anti-dialectical interpretation of this postface, which you have yet to deal with.

Moving on, Marx quotes at some length from the European Messenger review. It is a severe misunderstanding to look at this as an accurate understanding of Marx's method, since Marx here has set out to correct the reviewers of Capital. After giving the long extract, Marx sets out with what you have implied is his endorsement of the review:

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?
This is not an endorsement but actually the negation of the review. We have to remember why we are reading from the European Messenger review: the writer has contrasted Marx's "realistic" inquiry with the "German-dialectical" method of presentation. In this context, it is impossible to assume that "the dialectic method" could possibly mean anything but the "German-dialectic" method, that is, the method as developed by Hegel.

For the remainder of the postface, Marx is explaining precisely what he means by his method - which clearly cannot have no relation whatsoever to Hegel's, since it is the "German-dialectic" method dismissed by the European Messenger reviewer. Your understanding of the rest of this is severely problematic but I don't believe you have a case after losing this presentation without "one atom of Hegel."

Rosa Lichtenstein

14th September 2010, 09:21

GrayM:

Well, 2 is incorrect, so it can only follow that points 3-5 are irrelevant.

Well, you see, I gave you 3 weeks to work this out, but you rushed it, and no surprise you screwed up.

1. This is correct -- you do not say either way.

3. This is correct, since it is essential for a summary to be brief. So, this is relevant to your denial that Marx published a summary of 'the dialectic method'.

4. This is also integral to the argument that something that is both brief and a précis is a summary.

5. This is also relevant to the conclusion that this summary contained not one atom of Hegel.

But you reply:

In the postface to the second German edition of Capital, Marx sets out to describe the confusion that abounded among reviewers of the work, and to set it straight. He begins (from here on all quotes are from the postface, translation available on MIA, unless otherwise noted):

That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.

So at the heart of it, what Marx is doing is to demonstrate that the reviews of Capital have not understood his method, have misrepresented it, and that their contrary notions of what his method actually is have more or less illustrated this.

Marx goes on to discuss the review which you believe contains a relatively accurate summation of Marx's dialectic method. He introduces it as follows:

The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical.

We must remember that Marx is discussing the misunderstandings held by the reviewers of Capital, as he told us. Here he is detailing the fact that the reviewer (never named here) in the European Messenger complains about a marked contrast between the realistic (i.e. materialist) inquiry behind Capital, and the work's "German-dialectical" presentation. This can only refer to Marx's presentation in a method inspired by Hegel; to say "German-dialectical" and mean Kantian, much less the Scottish historical school as you claim, would be unthinkable.

Fortunately, Marx clarified things when he added that summary -- and called it 'the dialectic method'. He did not add:

"this is partially the dialectic method..."

If I were to post a summary of 'the dialectic method' that left out 'contradiction', 'unity of opposites', 'quantity passing over into quality', 'universal interconnection', 'universal change', 'Totality', etc., you lot would accuse me of serious distortion/omission.

Not one single dialectical mystic since then (not Engels, not Plekhanov, not Lenin, not Trotsky, not Mao, not Stalin, not Bukharin, not Mandel, not Novack, not...) has summarised this 'theory'/'method' this way.

No one here, at RevLeft, when asked to summarise this 'theory'/'method', has summarised it this way.

Not one single website (run by a Marxist party), as far as can be ascertained, summarises it this way. Not one (Marxist) blogger or commentator has summarised it this way. No one in the entire history of Marxism has summarised it this way -- unless, of course, you know differently.

And no wonder; if they did, they'd be accused of 'Revisionist!' and would be the target of the sort of abuse I get here all the time from the faithful.

This is not only the only summary Marx published and called 'the dialectic method' in his entire life, it is the only summary that contains not one Hegelian term that has ever been published -- unless, of course you know of another.

But you mystics refuse to listen to Marx, and are quite happy to re-mystify his work, and have been doing this ever since Engels put pen to misuse.

This can only refer to Marx's presentation in a method inspired by Hegel; to say "German-dialectical" and mean Kantian, much less the Scottish historical school as you claim, would be unthinkable.

It is not unthinkable for us to do this, and the evidence is quite good -- much stronger than the opposite.

I have set out some of it here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1195129&postcount=57

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1356284&postcount=68

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1693775&postcount=260

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1693776&postcount=261

You continue:

Moving on, Marx quotes at some length from the European Messenger review. It is a severe misunderstanding to look at this as an accurate understanding of Marx's method, since Marx here has set out to correct the reviewers of Capital. After giving the long extract, Marx sets out with what you have implied is his endorsement of the review:

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

This is not an endorsement but actually the negation of the review. We have to remember why we are reading from the European Messenger review: the writer has contrasted Marx's "realistic" inquiry with the "German-dialectical" method of presentation. In this context, it is impossible to assume that "the dialectic method" could possibly mean anything but the "German-dialectic" method, that is, the method as developed by Hegel.

Alas, your attempt to re-write what Marx meant founders on this rock: he calls this summary 'the dialectic method'.

But you reply:

Given that we are discussing Marx's method, this quotation is vitally important. He specifically points to the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, a text which contains the very Hegelian terminology that you detest, as discussing "the materialistic basis of [Marx's] method." This is an extreme problem for the anti-dialectical interpretation of this postface, which you have yet to deal with.

However, this summary leaves this Hegelian jargon out, but that does not prevent Marx from calling it 'the dialectic method'. So, far from it being a 'problem' for us non-mystics, it completely destroys your argument.

Returning to this comment of yours:

This is not an endorsement but actually the negation of the review. We have to remember why we are reading from the European Messenger review: the writer has contrasted Marx's "realistic" inquiry with the "German-dialectical" method of presentation. In this context, it is impossible to assume that "the dialectic method" could possibly mean anything but the "German-dialectic" method, that is, the method as developed by Hegel.

We have been through this several times. Here is the entire passage:

That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.

Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat economics metaphysically, and on the other hand — imagine! — confine myself to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing receipts [4] (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. In answer to the reproach in re metaphysics, Professor Sieber has it:

“In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are common to the best theoretic economists.”

M. Block — “Les Théoriciens du Socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des Economistes, Juillet et Août 1872” — makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: “Par cet ouvrage M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus eminents.” German reviews, of course, shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. It says:

“At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German, i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his forerunners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist.”

I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.

After a quotation from the preface to my “Criticism of Political Economy,” Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

“The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. ... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx’s book has.”

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

Bold added.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm

And what is this writer picturing? He is not picturing A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, since it leaves out all that Hegelian stuff. Had it been doing this, Marx would have pointed this error/omission out, since that was the nub of the criticism of Marx's method:

The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical.

It makes little sense for Marx to answer this criticism of his method by saying the reviewer has pictured 'the dialectic method' if that picture does the very thing you claim Marx is trying to correct.

For the remainder of the postface, Marx is explaining precisely what he means by his method - which clearly cannot have no relation whatsoever to Hegel's, since it is the "German-dialectic" method dismissed by the European Messenger reviewer. Your understanding of the rest of this is severely problematic but I don't believe you have a case after losing this presentation without "one atom of Hegel."

On the contrary, we can now see that my version is correct.

graymouser

14th September 2010, 11:08

Fortunately, Marx clarified things when he added that summary -- and called it 'the dialectic method'.
No, you haven't gone anywhere in this discussion, because what Marx quoted is neither a summary, nor is it an accurate description of his method. Marx explicitly sets out in this postface to deal with the fact that the reviewers, and at greatest length the review in the European Messenger, did not understand his inquiry at all. (You have not dealt with this yet.) Marx is not quoting this to show that the reviewer had accurately described his method, but precisely the opposite - to show that the reviewer did not understand that he (Marx) had used the "German-dialectical" method that the reviewer turned his nose up at. To claim that this is an accurate precis of "the dialectic method" when it was quoted specifically to show that the author did not see the dialectic method Marx used, is sophistry.

You make great hay out of "what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" when this is nothing but the rhetorical question that demolishes this review. Remember, Marx is covering a review that contrasts his "realistic" method with his "German-dialectical" presentation. So when he says his method is dialectic at the end of this extract, he is negating the extract (showing that it is wrong) and confirming that not only is his presentation dialectical, but also his method. The review is not affirmed at all, but rather founders on precisely this point.

The rest of your claims rely on this extract from the European Messenger having been a summary of "the dialectic method" when it was not. Since you have nothing else to add here that's all the response I feel it necessary to give.

Rosa Lichtenstein

14th September 2010, 11:28

GM:

No, you haven't gone anywhere in this discussion, because what Marx quoted is neither a summary, nor is it an accurate description of his method. Marx explicitly sets out in this postface to deal with the fact that the reviewers, and at greatest length the review in the European Messenger, did not understand his inquiry at all. (You have not dealt with this yet.) Marx is not quoting this to show that the reviewer had accurately described his method, but precisely the opposite - to show that the reviewer did not understand that he (Marx) had used the "German-dialectical" method that the reviewer turned his nose up at. To claim that this is an accurate précis of "the dialectic method" when it was quoted specifically to show that the author did not see the dialectic method Marx used, is sophistry.

1. Q: Is it brief? Yes.

2. Q: Is it about 'the dialectic method'? A: Yes.

3. Q: Does it 'picture' this method. A: Yes.

4. Q: Says who? A: Marx, not Rosa.

So I was right.

But you have a reply:

Marx is not quoting this to show that the reviewer had accurately described his method, but precisely the opposite - to show that the reviewer did not understand that he (Marx) had used the "German-dialectical" method that the reviewer turned his nose up at. To claim that this is an accurate précis of "the dialectic method" when it was quoted specifically to show that the author did not see the dialectic method Marx used, is sophistry

Again that founders on this rock:

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

So, this was a "picture" of the "dialectic method", as I alleged. Marx is endorsing it as such. It is a short "picture" and so purports to be a summary of it. So it is a summary of that method. Marx nowhere denies this, or attempts to correct it, or add to it -- but calls it a picture of that method.

Case closed.

But you reply:

You make great hay out of "what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" when this is nothing but the rhetorical question that demolishes this review. Remember, Marx is covering a review that contrasts his "realistic" method with his "German-dialectical" presentation. So when he says his method is dialectic at the end of this extract, he is negating the extract (showing that it is wrong) and confirming that not only is his presentation dialectical, but also his method. The review is not affirmed at all, but rather founders on precisely this point

I do not make great 'hay' of anything -- I merely quote Marx's words.

when this is nothing but the rhetorical question that demolishes this review.

1. Then why did he quote it at length?

2. Where is this alleged 'demolition'?

3. Where is the evidence that this is a 'rhetorical question'?

But you reply:

So when he says his method is dialectic at the end of this extract, he is negating the extract (showing that it is wrong) and confirming that not only is his presentation dialectical, but also his method. The review is not affirmed at all, but rather founders on precisely ties point

In fact, he says:

what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

No 'negating' anywhere in sight.

Perhaps you have better eyesight than me...

The rest of your claims rely on this extract from the European Messenger having been a summary of "the dialectic method" when it was not. Since you have nothing else to add here that's all the response I feel it necessary to give.

And, as we can now see, you have failed to show this.

Next case...

graymouser

14th September 2010, 12:31

So, this was a "picture" of the "dialectic method", as I alleged. Marx is endorsing it as such. It is a short "picture" and so purports to be a summary of it. So it is a summary of that method. Marx nowhere denies this, or attempts to correct it, or add to it -- but calls it a picture of that method.
Incorrect. Marx was not "endorsing" the review, he was refuting it.

You say that the review extract is a "picture." This is not what Marx said. He is showing that the reviewer, who has tried to contrast the "realistic" method with the "German-dialectical" presentation, is wrong. The method, which the writer has in mind, is in fact "German-dialectical." Marx is not talking about what the reviewer presents as a literal "picture", but the incorrect understanding he has shown of Marx's method.

It's actually quite funny, because you share exactly the same misunderstanding of Marx as did the reviewer in the European Messenger and have tried to canonize this mistaken view of Marx's method as the genuine article.

1. Then why did he quote it at length?
Marx tells us why he quotes it at length: it "may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible." No mystery here. He specifically does not say he is quoting it at length because it contains an accurate summary of his method.

2. Where is this alleged 'demolition'?
If you read the entire section on this review, it is clear that Marx has used the fact that his method was dialectical to demolish the review.

3. Where is the evidence that this is a 'rhetorical question'?
It's in the context of the entire treatment of the review. Unfortunately you ignore any context that is inconvenient for you. Marx was showing that the contrast between the "realistic" method and the "German-dialectical" presentation was a false one, and the reviewer had totally misunderstood him.

No 'negating' anywhere in sight.

Perhaps you have better eyesight than me...
I would grant you the latter point, since you seem to have completely misunderstood Marx's method - just like the reviewer he is debating against. Tremendous irony there!

S.Artesian

14th September 2010, 12:56

Smarty Pants:

I will be happy to answer your question when you answer the many I have asked you, which you just ignore.

Typical Rosa distortion. I've answered all your "questions," which aren't questions at all but positions, distortions, false assertions, sophistry, and last but foremost in your lame repertoire, evasion-- which you demonstrate once again as your stock in trade.

The fact is that you have nothing to say of substance about the subject of Marx's, and Engels', inquiries, the labor process under capitalism, the organization and extraction of surplus value, the development of and conflict between the means and relations of production.

And therefore clearly you have nothing of substance to say, period.

Word.

Rosa Lichtenstein

14th September 2010, 14:42

GM:

Incorrect. Marx was not "endorsing" the review, he was refuting it.

It's an odd sort of 'refutation' that ends up recommending it as a "picture" of the "dialectic method".

But you reply:

You say that the review extract is a "picture." This is not what Marx said. He is showing that the reviewer, who has tried to contrast the "realistic" method with the "German-dialectical" presentation, is wrong. The method, which the writer has in mind, is in fact "German-dialectical." Marx is not talking about what the reviewer presents as a literal "picture", but the incorrect understanding he has shown of Marx's method.

And yet he says:

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

So, this writer thinks he is "picturing" Marx's method, which Marx indicates he does in a "striking and generous way" (so he does not reject it as a "picture" of his method, he warmly welcomes it) -- but, according to Marx, he is in fact "picturing the dialectic method".

So, your slant on this founders yet again on this non-dialectical rock.

It's actually quite funny, because you share exactly the same misunderstanding of Marx as did the reviewer in the European Messenger and have tried to canonize this mistaken view of Marx's method as the genuine article.

And yet Marx's own words suggest that it is you who has misconstrued this.

Marx tells us why he quotes it at length: it "may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible." No mystery here. He specifically does not say he is quoting it at length because it contains an accurate summary of his method.

Why quote an inaccurate summary, that Marx calls "striking and generous" at length. And why say it "pictures" the "dialectic method" if it doesn't?

If you read the entire section on this review, it is clear that Marx has used the fact that his method was dialectical to demolish the review.

In fact, the wording suggests the opposite; that he accepts this as a summary of his method, which he then equates with the "dialectic method".

No refutation here -- but and endorsement, yes.

It's in the context of the entire treatment of the review. Unfortunately you ignore any context that is inconvenient for you. Marx was showing that the contrast between the "realistic" method and the "German-dialectical" presentation was a false one, and the reviewer had totally misunderstood him.

And you ignore Marx's greeting of this summary with the words "striking and generous", and the fact that he equates it with "the dialectic method".

Honesty at last:

I would grant you the latter point, since you seem to have completely misunderstood Marx's method - just like the reviewer he is debating against. Tremendous irony there!

As we can now see again, it is you who has misconstrued this section.

Rosa Lichtenstein

14th September 2010, 14:46

Dead Horse Flogger:

Typical Rosa distortion. I've answered all your "questions," which aren't questions at all but positions, distortions, false assertions, sophistry, and last but foremost in your lame repertoire, evasion-- which you demonstrate once again as your stock in trade.

The fact is that you have nothing to say of substance about the subject of Marx's, and Engels', inquiries, the labor process under capitalism, the organization and extraction of surplus value, the development of and conflict between the means and relations of production.

And therefore clearly you have nothing of substance to say, period.

Word.

So, given up the search, I see...:(

S.Artesian

14th September 2010, 14:48

I refer the dishonorable lady to my previous comment.... although I do agree that you are a dead horse.

graymouser

14th September 2010, 15:08

It's an odd sort of 'refutation' that ends up recommending it as a "picture" of the "dialectic method".
Okay, I will put this up in simple terms for you.

1. The reviewer has asserted that Marx's method is "realistic" but his presentation is "German-dialectical."
2. Marx gives a lengthy extract from the writer describing the realistic concerns of Marx's method.
3. Marx acknowledges the review as being favorable to his realism but says that his (Marx's) method is in fact dialectical.

This is the actual argument that Marx is making. It does not make sense for him to be endorsing the review that his postface is actually interested in countering. If you read the context of the quote, the words above it as well as the ones below it, it is clear that Marx is interested in demonstrating that the contrast drawn by the reviewer between the "realistic" method and the "German-dialectical" presentation is false because the method is German-dialectical. (He goes on to clarify this, but I am focusing for the moment on the extract you inaccurately claim to be a "summary.")

So, this writer thinks he is "picturing" Marx's method, which Marx indicates he daoe in a "striking and generous way" (so he does not reject it as a "picture" of his method, he warmly welcomes it) -- but, according to Marx, he is in fact "picturing the dialectic method".

So, your slant on this founders yet again on this non-dialectical rock.
It founders on the "non-dialectical" rock of revealing that Marx's method is the dialectical method? That's funny.

Why quote an inaccurate summary, that Marx calls "striking and generous" at length. And why say it "pictures" the "dialectic method" if it doesn't?
You've engaged in polemics, correct? You must have. So why would someone quote an inaccurate summary that is then followed immediately by a clarification of what is wrong with it? For polemical effect, particularly in this case when Marx notes that the original was unavailable (and in Russian). Again, there is no mystery here; Marx has told us exactly why he quotes at length from this review, and it is not for the reason you are implying.

Marx notes that the reviewer is "striking and generous" toward the material concern that he (the reviewer) sees evidence of in Capital. It isn't hard, if you actually read the postface, to see what Marx is doing in his refutation of the European Messenger review. He is saying that, while the reviewer sees Marx's method favorably as being "realistic," what the reviewer has missed is precisely that Marx's method is "German-dialectical." Marx says above that "the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood" and goes on to show how little the reviewers from the Paris Revue Positiviste and the European Messenger have understood of his method. Calling a quotation, even a "striking and generous" one, from one of these reviews an endorsement is an impossibility.

By the way, this is one of the most amusing debates I've ever been in on RevLeft, because you are asserting exactly what Marx was correcting in his Postface. You have taken a polemic against anti-dialectics, and tried to twist it into a polemic for anti-dialectics (there's something funny about contradictions in there, but I'm afraid you wouldn't understand the "jargon"). Fortunately the plain words Marx wrote are there to refute you.

Rosa Lichtenstein

14th September 2010, 15:12

Dead Horse Flogger:

I refer the dishonorable lady to my previous comment.... although I do agree that you are a dead horse.

So, nothing to show from your search, eh?

Rosa Lichtenstein

14th September 2010, 15:13

GM, I have to go out for a while. I'll reply later today.

S.Artesian

14th September 2010, 15:16

So, nothing to show from your search, eh?

As I already told you, there is no need for a search. The proof is in the content, something you are woefully short of, of Marx's chapter on value in Capital.

Anytime you're ready to discuss the actual content of what Marx was investigating, anytime you're feel confident to actually venture beyond your distortion of the afterword to the 2nd edition, let me know.

Until then, I refer the dead horse to my earlier comment...

Hit The North

14th September 2010, 18:47

Greymouser is correct to interpret the Postface as an attempt to clarify Marx's method and address the confusion surrounding it, particularly the Russian critic's (apparently I. I. Kaufman, a political economist) observation that there is a confusion between the method of inquiry and the mode of presentation. Marx's answer to this is to show, by utilising Kaufman's summary, that the method is realistic, but also dialectical. In other words, what Kaufman calls "realistic" is, according to Marx, his "dialectic method". It is realistic because the reality under consideration (the capitalist mode of production) is itself dialectical. Therefore, to present the findings dialectically is the only realistic manner of presentation. The presentation follows from the facts. To show it fixed and eternal, as bourgeois political economy does, would be unrealistic.

The content of the large extract by the Russian reviewer is, for me, perfectly compatible with the Marxist dialectic, with its emphasis on the denial of abstract laws, the avowal of historically grounded laws of development, the depiction of variegated social phenomena "transition[ing] from one form into another" from "one series of connections into a different one", "the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over" and the replacement of one set of social relations by a higher set.

So I disagree with Greymouser that Marx is dismissive of Kaufman's synopsis. It seems apparent that Marx does warmly regard this attempt to summarize his method, however it is a "picture", not a detailed exegesis. There's no reason to believe it is a comprehensive and complete depiction. Also, the fact that it lacks Hegelian terminology is no problem, when one considers it is an attempt to describe Marx's method and not Hegel's - and by a critic who is probably not schooled, as Marx and Engels were, in the Hegelian tradition. This is not sufficient evidence, however, to suggest that Marx employed terms such as 'contradiction' in anything except a serious manner. So when he ends the Postface, arguing that "capitalist society is full of contradictions", he's not making a joke (as Rosa would have us believe), he is spelling out the eventual doom of the existing order.

Thirsty Crow

15th September 2010, 11:41

It is realistic because the reality under consideration (the capitalist mode of production) is itself dialectical.
Please, could you explain what does this exactly mean?
I have a feeling that this could be a short cut for a possible resolution of my exasperating confusion regarding "dialectics".

graymouser

15th September 2010, 12:47

So I disagree with Greymouser that Marx is dismissive of Kaufman's synopsis. It seems apparent that Marx does warmly regard this attempt to summarize his method, however it is a "picture", not a detailed exegesis. There's no reason to believe it is a comprehensive and complete depiction. Also, the fact that it lacks Hegelian terminology is no problem, when one considers it is an attempt to describe Marx's method and not Hegel's - and by a critic who is probably not schooled, as Marx and Engels were, in the Hegelian tradition. This is not sufficient evidence, however, to suggest that Marx employed terms such as 'contradiction' in anything except a serious manner. So when he ends the Postface, arguing that "capitalist society is full of contradictions", he's not making a joke (as Rosa would have us believe), he is spelling out the eventual doom of the existing order.
I think the difference here is primarily one of emphasis. Marx is, at the core, correcting Kaufman's review. The issue at heart is not that Kaufman offers a summary of Marx's method, but that even given the generous consideration of his "realism," Kaufman misunderstands that Marx was using a dialectical method. It remains a severe distortion to attempt to use Kaufman's description of Marx's method to remove the dialectic from it when Marx was using it precisely to show that the dialectic was missing from Kaufman's understanding.

Hit The North

15th September 2010, 15:08

Please, could you explain what does this exactly mean?
I have a feeling that this could be a short cut for a possible resolution of my exasperating confusion regarding "dialectics".

In the Postface, after the long quote from the Russian review, Marx goes on to address the apparent contradiction between his realistic method of inquiry and his dialectical presentation:

Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htmBasically, that it is capitalism which is in motion and that only a dialectical presentation can present it as it really is. Moreover, the important stages in the realistic method "to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion" are themselves dialectical methods.

I'm not schooled in philosophy and I've never read Hegel, except a bit on the internet, last Tuesday :lol:, but I've always had a general idea of what his work amounts to (which I've taken from various Marxist summaries) and its only real value for me is that it can be used to contrast against Marx's method and help illustrate the key features of Marx's dialectic.

So in very general (and no doubt simplistic) terms...

The Hegelian dialectic concerns the history of thought in motion and resolves itself in the conclusion that self-developing thought is the driver of history.

The Marxist dialectic concerns the history of material relations in motion and resolves itself in the conclusion that self-developing relations of production is the driver of history.

It's all there in the Postface, if we take it at face value and not as a work of parody, as Rosa would have it.

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx...1867-c1/p3.htmThe Marxist dialectic is materialist because it accepts the primacy of the material relations of living men as the condition upon which their intellectual life develops. Following from this, if our thinking is alienated and contradictory it is because it is attempting to make sense of the alienating and contradictory conditions in which it is rooted.

In this sense, it is an inversion of the (Young) Hegelian dialectic which diagnoses an imperfect world by reference to the imperfect ideas which create it.

ZeroNowhere

15th September 2010, 17:51

Please, could you explain what does this exactly mean?
I have a feeling that this could be a short cut for a possible resolution of my exasperating confusion regarding "dialectics".Essentially, Hegel's dialectic was the immanent logic of an object itself; that is, something 'internal' to it, rather than something brought to it by outside forces. I shall go into more detail on this later. He viewed this as being based on 'contradictions', which are "the principle of all self-movement". For example:
Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite.

[...] All things, we say - that is, the finite world as such — are doomed; in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and stable it may deem itself. The category of power does not, it is true, exhaust the depth of the divine nature of the notion of God; but it certainly forms a vital element in all religious consciousness.

Apart from this general objectivity of Dialectic, we find traces of its presence in each of the particular provinces and phases of the natural and spiritual world. Take as an illustration the motion of the heavenly bodies. At this moment the planet stands in this spot, but implicitly it is the possibility of being in another spot; and that possibility of being otherwise the planet brings into existence by moving. Similarly the ‘physical’ elements prove to be Dialectical. The process of meteorological action is the exhibition of their Dialectic. It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every natural process, and, as it were, forces nature out of itself.
This is essentially a theological idea. Following is an explanation which I had written a while ago, which should make sense of the above passage:

He [Hegel] attempts to carry out the function of philosophy in his eyes, that is, “recognizing that the finite has no veritable being,” and only the infinite, God, has true being. He says of finite things, such as the material world, that, “non-being constitutes their nature and being. Finite things are, [...] but the truth of their being is their end.” He explains that, “The finite not only alters, like something in general, but it ceases to be; and its ceasing to be is not merely a possibility, so that it could be without ceasing to be,” but rather, “The hour of their birth is the hour of their death.” Therefore, philosophy can only be consistent if it puts an end to the finite and validates only the infinite, thereby “annihilating the world and replacing it with ‘true’ reality”, as Lucio Colletti puts it. He contends that no philosophy before him had succeeded at this, as they had always been inconsistent in their method, in the adoption of the principle of non-contradiction, the mutual exclusion of opposites, and the law of identity, which he calls taking the point of view of the ‘intellect’. Therefore, they present the finite as “irreconcilable with the infinite,” saying that it, “cannot be united with it, that the finite is utterly opposed to the infinite.” This means that the finite “remains absolutely on its own side”, the possibility of it passing over into the ‘other’ is excluded. Since its non-being is understood here as a negation that stands in “abrupt contrast to its affirmative”, the finite is regarded as “imperishable and absolute.” Finitude is thus made eternal, and the infinite, which should have been the totality, is only one of the two, while the finite lives on. The infinite thus is “not the whole but only the one side; it has its limit in what stands over and against it; it is thus the finite infinite”, only one of two finites, rather than only the infinite existing. Therefore, “the finite is represented as independent and persisting on its own vis-à-vis the infinite, completely separated from the latter and delivered from annihilation.” Thus, the infinite manages to exist only as, “the negative [...] of determinateness in general, as the empty beyond.”

Therefore, Hegel expunges the principles of non-contradiction and identity from his philosophy, seeking to bring God into the ‘here and now’, rather than being confined to the ‘beyond’, separated from the world, and make God a subject, rather than as an object, as philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz did by considering particular motions and activities, as well as objects as independent from God. Therefore, Hegel says that the finite has as its essence what is other than itself, the infinite. The finite is not when it is finite, and it is when it ‘is not’, itself when it is the ‘other’. Therefore, “It is in the very nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation (ie. Its actual finitude or ‘illusory being’) and to become infinite. Thus the infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to the finite, as if the finite had an enduring being apart from or subordinate to the infinite.” This takes place as a purely internal movement, not caused by something external: the finite is ‘dialectical’. The true finite is thus the finite within the infinite, within the Idea. As the finite is has no being in and of itself, it becomes only the appearance, illusory being, of the infinite, through which it becomes flesh, in it “the absolute is reflected, it is the positive manifestation of the absolute." So, for example, Hegel states the something moves not because it is here and later there, but because in this ‘here’, it at once is and is not.

To expand on the above, essentially this dialectic involves things 'being' and 'not being' at the same time (a logical contradiction), and thus the finite being compelled to negate itself and pass over into the infinite; corresponding to this, the finite has only "illusory being", but "this illusory being is not nothing, but is a reflection, a relation to the absolute; or, it is illusory being in so far as in it the absolute is reflected. This positive exposition thus arrests the finite before it vanishes and contemplates it as an expression and image of the absolute." In other words, the finite is only a manifestation of the absolute, and as such Hegel realizes his purpose of arguing that only the absolute has veritable being, "there is nothing in the finite which could preserve for it a distinction against the absolute". The finite is not the finite, but the positive manifestation of the infinite.

As Marx points out, this simply means that, everything "is left, just as it is; but now it has received the meaning of a determination of the Idea." A world was there before, and it still is. "Empirical reality is therefore taken up just as it is. It is also declared to be rational, although not on account of its own intrinsic rationality, but because the empirical fact has in its empirical existence another significance other than itself. The fact which is one's point of departure is not apprehended as such, but only as mystical effect."

Now, there is a flaw in this theory. Remember the whole 'logical contradictions are real' thing? Yeah, the problem is that it is simply nonsense. Logic is comparable to a sort of grammar, as it were, and, rather than illuminating the inner nature of an object, saying that it both is and is not has no meaning in our ordinary language, and as such one may do with it what one will. A similar thing applies to Hegel's statement that, "External, sensuous motion itself is contradiction's immediate existence. Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because in this 'here', it at once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself," or similar statements by Hegel's sometimes unwitting followers, "Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." It is not that they are wrong, it is that they are speaking nonsense; similarly, it is not wrong to say that the slithy toves are jabberwockies, it is rather simply nonsense.

However, it should also be clear what Marx took from the above, which makes capitalism 'dialectical'. It is what he expresses when discussing capitalism's 'laws of motion'; that is, capitalism's immanent logic, the laws and relationships internal to itself, rather than relationships to other things. The capital-relation, wage-labour, is something internal to capitalism itself, yet it is what provides it its motion, through class struggle, valorization of value, and so on. Indeed, capitalism's immanent laws of motion come to stand over the human beings within them; for example, people's own labour takes the form of commodities, and then capital, which hires them, and sets them to work. Indeed, crises are a rather striking example of this, inasmuch as no human ill will is involved, but rather the economy collapses and people suffer simply due to the economy, rather than human decisions; however, capital, money and so on can hardly exist independent of humans within a certain form of society, so that here our own social relations come to stand independent of and over us. I had gone over this in more detail here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/political-philosophy-final-t135534/index.html?p=1749966#post1749966), and as such shall not elaborate here.

However, as capitalism is defined by an internal relation, Marx then has to deal with how this relation became established; once it was established, capitalism was afoot, yet then how did the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist social relations take place? That is, if the relationship which defines capitalism is one between various people, then how did it take place given other social relations predominating in pre-capitalist societies? Capitalism means that value must be valorized, yet the valorization of value already presupposes wage-labour, whereas wage-labour presupposes the dispossession of the masses from the means of production. From here, he finds that primitive accumulation took place based on the expropriation of the peasants, and it is this which provided sufficient capital and wage-labour for capitalism to come about, whereas before, as capitalism was not existent, feudal social relations predominated. Thus, capitalism's basis in internal relations meant that its establishment meant the eradication of the previous mode of production, and the forceful creation of the conditions and relations which it requires to function, rather than simply being slid into gradually by feudalism (as feudalism is based on different, mutually exclusive internal relations; as such, these must be smashed and transformed into those fit for capitalism. If it were simply a difference in external forces, the external force could change; here, it is a matter of one mode of production being incompatible with the internal relations which define another).

Finally, capitalism is based on various conflicts: the proletariat is ruled over by its own past labour, and hence class struggle is born, and the capitalist must accumulate and adopt new technology in order to not go out of business, yet this leads to overproduction and the falling rate of profit, and hence crises. Capitalism functions through the contradiction between labour-power and capital; capital, past labour, rules over living labour, as something opposite and external to it. It is through that that capitalism attains self-movement, for if not for the valorization of value, one could have no capital, and hence no capitalism; without self-movement, capitalism would cease to exist. Crises are clearly where capitalism's dialectic, its laws of motion, asserts itself as a "universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay however secure and stable it may deem itself"; it is not because of external forces, but capitalism's own internal relations and immanent laws, that it goes into crises. Hence, Marx says, "The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire."

Hence, we again have the dialectic, contradictions which cause motion, and so on, and yet in a highly different context from Hegel's; no logical contradictions, no God, but rather materialism. Hegel identified materialism in form, the adoption of the principle of non-contradiction, as the main flaw in earlier philosophy; here, on the other hand, we begin from real, material things, social relations between concrete people, and a materialist outlook which does not even try to deny the finite veritable being, but rather begins from it. What Hegel would call 'unphilosophie', materialism, is here the basis of investigation.

Of course, some Marxists have not been content with this whole 'materialism' thing, and have decided that it is not Hegelian enough; indeed, one has already been quoted in this post echoing Hegel's views on motion.

If you're interested in going into more depth on the subject, a great book on the Marx-Hegel relationship is Lucio Colletti's 'Marxism and Hegel', and an essay by him on the subject may be read for free online here (http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/colletti1.html), and his great introduction to Marx's Early Works can be found on Libcom (http://libcom.org/library/intro-Marx-early-writings-Colletti). While the book is more detailed, and goes into far more subjects, including the relationship between Marx, Feuerbach, and Kant, the above are worth it to decide whether you wish to get the book, if you are interested in the subject.

Zanthorus

15th September 2010, 18:04

Good post ZN, just one point: Hegel does not take existing empirical reality as rational. He thinks that various features of reality contain rational structures and that actual empirical existence can better or worse approximate this rationality. That is why he embraced a form of moderate reformist politics. Marx himself said that Hegel is not to be blamed for describing the state as it is, but for describing the nature of the state.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st September 2010, 01:48

GM, apologies for my delay in replying -- I will respond (no more delays!) to your post (and those of others) later today.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st September 2010, 17:13

GM:

Okay, I will put this up in simple terms for you.

Thanks for making your errors so easy to see -- I gave you three weeks to figure this out for yourself, but you had to go and rush things didn't you?

1. The reviewer has asserted that Marx's method is "realistic" but his presentation is "German-dialectical."
2. Marx gives a lengthy extract from the writer describing the realistic concerns of Marx's method.
3. Marx acknowledges the review as being favorable to his realism but says that his (Marx's) method is in fact dialectical.

This is the actual argument that Marx is making. It does not make sense for him to be endorsing the review that his postface is actually interested in countering. If you read the context of the quote, the words above it as well as the ones below it, it is clear that Marx is interested in demonstrating that the contrast drawn by the reviewer between the "realistic" method and the "German-dialectical" presentation is false because the method is German-dialectical. (He goes on to clarify this, but I am focusing for the moment on the extract you inaccurately claim to be a "summary.")

Maybe so, maybe not -- but this reply of yours founders once again on the same rocks: the picture/summary (which Marx endorses as such) of 'the dialectic method' contains not one atom of Hegel (upside down, or 'the right way up'). Marx's calls this 'the dialectic method' -- not 'part of the dialectic method', or a 'bowdlerised version of the dialectic method', but 'the dialectic method.

But you have a reply:

It founders on the "non-dialectical" rock of revealing that Marx's method is the dialectical method?

Indeed it does -- I thought you lot liked contradictions? (**)

That's funny.

Not much gets past your Hermetic Third Eye does it?

You've engaged in polemics, correct? You must have. So why would someone quote an inaccurate summary that is then followed immediately by a clarification of what is wrong with it? For polemical effect, particularly in this case when Marx notes that the original was unavailable (and in Russian). Again, there is no mystery here; Marx has told us exactly why he quotes at length from this review, and it is not for the reason you are implying.

So, your entire case is based on reading into Marx's words the opposite of what they actually say. And you have the cheek to accuse me of twisting his words!:lol:

But you reply:

Marx notes that the reviewer is "striking and generous" toward the material concern that he (the reviewer) sees evidence of in Capital. It isn't hard, if you actually read the postface, to see what Marx is doing in his refutation of the European Messenger review. He is saying that, while the reviewer sees Marx's method favorably as being "realistic," what the reviewer has missed is precisely that Marx's method is "German-dialectical." Marx says above that "the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood" and goes on to show how little the reviewers from the Paris Revue Positiviste and the European Messenger have understood of his method. Calling a quotation, even a "striking and generous" one, from one of these reviews an endorsement is an impossibility.

Once again, this attempt to read into what Marx says the opposite of what he in fact says founders on the same rock: he labelled this review as a picture/summary of 'the dialectic method' -- and it contained not one picogram of Hegel. Far from refuting this reviewer, he endorsed his summary.

But you retort:

Calling a quotation, even a "striking and generous" one, from one of these reviews an endorsement is an impossibility

Looks like one to me. If he was rejecting/attempting to refute it he'd hardly call it 'striking and generous', nor would he call it a picture of 'the dialectic method'.

By the way, this is one of the most amusing debates I've ever been in on RevLeft, because you are asserting exactly what Marx was correcting in his Postface. You have taken a polemic against anti-dialectics, and tried to twist it into a polemic for anti-dialectics (there's something funny about contradictions in there, but I'm afraid you wouldn't understand the "jargon"). Fortunately the plain words Marx wrote are there to refute you.

Except, you are the one twisting Marx's words so that they say the opposite of what they actually say

'Amusing'?

I can think of another, less complimentary word, however.

(there's something funny about contradictions in there, but I'm afraid you wouldn't understand the "jargon").

As we can see from (**) above: looks like it's you who does not understand the highlighted word.

Now that is funny.http://www.politicalcrossfire.com/forum/images/smiles/rotf.gif

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st September 2010, 17:21

Smarty Pants:

As I already told you, there is no need for a search. The proof is in the content, something you are woefully short of, of Marx's chapter on value in Capital.

So, are you telling me there are no sources published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supportyour fanciful and mystical re-write of his work!? I can't believe it!

Are you sure? I think you need to go back and look again.

Anytime you're ready to discuss the actual content of what Marx was investigating, anytime you're feel confident to actually venture beyond your distortion of the afterword to the 2nd edition, let me know.

And yet you (and the other mystics here) have signally failed to show how and where I am 'distorting' Marx's work.

That's why you need to resume your search...

Until then, I refer the dead horse to my earlier comment...

Talking to dead horses now, I see.

I knew you were a mystic, but I didn't know you were a psychic too...:lol:

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st September 2010, 17:29

BTB:

Greymouser is correct to interpret the Postface as an attempt to clarify Marx's method and address the confusion surrounding it, particularly the Russian critic's (apparently I. I. Kaufman, a political economist) observation that there is a confusion between the method of inquiry and the mode of presentation. Marx's answer to this is to show, by utilising Kaufman's summary, that the method is realistic, but also dialectical. In other words, what Kaufman calls "realistic" is, according to Marx, his "dialectic method". It is realistic because the reality under consideration (the capitalist mode of production) is itself dialectical. Therefore, to present the findings dialectically is the only realistic manner of presentation. The presentation follows from the facts. To show it fixed and eternal, as bourgeois political economy does, would be unrealistic.

As I am sure you can now see, GM was in fact re-writing Marx's words so that they could be made to say the opposite of what they in fact say.

The content of the large extract by the Russian reviewer is, for me, perfectly compatible with the Marxist dialectic, with its emphasis on the denial of abstract laws, the avowal of historically grounded laws of development, the depiction of variegated social phenomena "transition[ing] from one form into another" from "one series of connections into a different one", "the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over" and the replacement of one set of social relations by a higher set.

Except, it leaves out all that Hegelian jargon (which not even you can explain), upon which you dote. So, this method is indeed 'dialectical' but it resmebles the 'dialectic' in Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up') about as much as George W Bush resembles Albert Einstein.

So I disagree with Greymouser that Marx is dismissive of Kaufman's synopsis. It seems apparent that Marx does warmly regard this attempt to summarize his method, however it is a "picture", not a detailed exegesis. There's no reason to believe it is a comprehensive and complete depiction. Also, the fact that it lacks Hegelian terminology is no problem, when one considers it is an attempt to describe Marx's method and not Hegel's - and by a critic who is probably not schooled, as Marx and Engels were, in the Hegelian tradition. This is not sufficient evidence, however, to suggest that Marx employed terms such as 'contradiction' in anything except a serious manner. So when he ends the Postface, arguing that "capitalist society is full of contradictions", he's not making a joke (as Rosa would have us believe), he is spelling out the eventual doom of the existing order.

Where did I say he was making a 'joke'?

After well over four years of making stuff up about me and my ideas, seems you still can't resist the temptation to do so yet again.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st September 2010, 17:38

For those interested, I have ascertained from that expert in German grammar with whom I was in contact, what the correct punctuation would be in German for Marx's famous 'coquette' quote, and what the correct translation is. However, I have one or two additional questions to ask him before I post his final response.

Up to now, I can reveal that he agrees with the English version found in MECW:

and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm

graymouser

21st September 2010, 17:44

Except, you are the one twisting Marx's words so that they say the opposite of what they actually say
There's not much of substance in this response except for old assertions, and certainly nothing that indicates that you have grasped Marx's correction of Kaufman's review. You are relying on the sole fact that Kaufman does not consider the dialectical method in his review, when this is precisely what Marx is correcting in this section of the postface. I am not changing Marx's words but pointing out that Marx was giving not a blanket endorsement to Kaufman's review but pointing out what it had missed - which is precisely what you want to excise from Marx's method altogether. You and Kaufman, in other words, take precisely the same wrong approach to Marx's method, to the point where in your reply above you refer to Kaufman's review as "Marx's words."

Your whole summary of this review founders on the fact that Marx points out at the beginning of his consideration of reviews that they did not understand his (Marx's) method. Kaufman's review is called "striking" and "generous" but Kaufman didn't understand Marx's method, and Marx had to clarify that this method was precisely German-dialectical (i.e. Marx's dialectic which was formed by a critique of Hegel's) and at the same time realistic. You can't deal with this by saying "but it's a summary" - you are ignoring, crucially, the context of the extract from Kaufman's review.

Hit The North

21st September 2010, 18:15

As I am sure you can now see, GM was in fact re-writing Marx's words so that they could be made to say the opposite of what they in fact say.

Actually that is precisely your method of interpretation, as anyone who has read your inverted reading of the Postface will know.

Except, it leaves out all that Hegelian jargon (which not even you can explain), upon which you dote. So, this method is indeed 'dialectical' but it resmebles the 'dialectic' in Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up') about as much as George W Bush resembles Albert Einstein.

Strawman much? How clever of you to point out what we all knew in the first place. Marx explicitly tells us that his dialectic is not identical with Hegel's, and no one in this thread has claimed it is. Certainly not me. There is the question of what debt Marx thought he owed to Hegel and he is also explicit on this in the Postface:

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

Now that you concede that Marx's method is 'indeed dialectical', it would only be polite to point out that you are the one who proclaims herself anti-dialectical. But this should be no surprise as on practically every question regarding Marx's method - dialectics, the use of abstraction, etc. - you prove that you are no Marxist.

Where did I say he was making a 'joke'?

It's the only conclusion we can come to under your interpretation where every instance in Capital where Marx refers to a contradiction, he is merely coquetting, meaning he is non-serious.

After well over four years of making stuff up about me and my ideas, seems you still can't resist the temptation to do so yet again.
Oh, pleeease! You'll have me choking on my tears in a minute.

Incidentally, just because somebody points out a fault in your ideas which you are too blind to see, this does not mean lies are being told.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st September 2010, 18:35

GM:

There's not much of substance in this response except for old assertions,

Well, you would say that, wouldn't you?:lol:

and certainly nothing that indicates that you have grasped Marx's correction of Kaufman's review.

Except, you have failed to show he did correct him.

You are relying on the sole fact that Kaufman does not consider the dialectical method in his review, when this is precisely what Marx is correcting in this section of the postface. I am not changing Marx's words but pointing out that Marx was giving not a blanket endorsement to Kaufman's review but pointing out what it had missed - which is precisely what you want to excise from Marx's method altogether. You and Kaufman, in other words, take precisely the same wrong approach to Marx's method, to the point where in your reply above you refer to Kaufman's review as "Marx's words."

Not so; if you bothered to read what I posted, and resisted the temptation to skim-read it, you'd see that I base what I allege on the fact that Marx praised (and thus endorsed) a picture/summary of 'the dialectic method' which contained no trace of Hegel whatsoever.

And, may I remind you, that it is you who wants to twist Marx's words so that they say the exact opposite of what they actually say -- not me.

But you reply:

Your whole summary of this review founders on the fact that Marx points out at the beginning of his consideration of reviews that they did not understand his (Marx's) method. Kaufman's review is called "striking" and "generous" but Kaufman didn't understand Marx's method, and Marx had to clarify that this method was precisely German-dialectical (i.e. Marx's dialectic which was formed by a critique of Hegel's) and at the same time realistic. You can't deal with this by saying "but it's a summary" - you are ignoring, crucially, the context of the extract from Kaufman's review.

However, I note you have to add this:

Kaufman didn't understand Marx's method

which words can be found nowhere in the Postface. By way of contrast, Marx praised this reviewer for his 'striking and generous' picture of 'the dialectic method'.

Nice try, again, except it wasn't.

Hey, isn't that another of your 'amusing' 'contradictions'?

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st September 2010, 19:06

BTB:

Actually that is precisely your method of interpretation, as anyone who has read your inverted reading of the Postface will know.

Well, they won't unless you point out where I have done this -- up to now you have been long on assertion, short on proof.

Strawman much?

No thanks -- we've had enough from you already.

How clever of you to point out what we all knew in the first place. Marx explicitly tells us that his dialectic is not identical with Hegel's, and no one in this thread has claimed it is. Certainly not me. There is the question of what debt Marx thought he owed to Hegel and he is also explicit on this in the Postface:

Not only is it not identical with Hegel's it does not contain any of the following obscure terms (many of which you dote upon, but cannot explain): 'contradiction', 'unity of opposites', 'negation of the negation', 'quantity passing over into quality', 'inter-connected totality'...

But then you quote Marx:

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

1. Not even you believe this. Not only have you (on your own admission) never read Hegel, you reject his idea as mystical nonsense.

2. Let us suppose, however, that you do not reject it as nonsensical; in that case, explain to us what precisely is the rational form, or the 'conscious and comprehensive' form of the dialectic contained in Hegel's work?

3. You will no doubt note that Marx says this:

by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner

Indeed, this does not prevent Hegel from being the first; what prevents him is that he did not do this at all -- as Marx knew.

So, this quotation lends your attempt to re-mystify Marx no support at all -- as you have had pointed out to you many times.

Now that you concede that Marx's method is 'indeed dialectical', it would only be polite to point out that you are the one who proclaims herself anti-dialectical. But this should be no surprise as on practically every question regarding Marx's method - dialectics, the use of abstraction, etc. - you prove that you are no Marxist.

As I have also pointed out here many times, but you prefer to make stuff up rather than confront what I actually say, the problem here is that you mystics have hijacked this word ('dialectics'). I am quite happy to use this word in its classical sense, and that is the sense I attribute to Marx (the form of argument that first appears in Plato's work, which Aristotle developed, and which Kant extended -- but which Hegel screwed around with).

However, when arguing with you mystics, I also have to use this word as you lot do. And that is the connotation in 'anti-dialectics'.

If I had to post these qualifications every time I used this word in its two senses, you'd still moan (that I was being 'long-winded', etc.).

And, given the fact that Marx rejected the 'dialectic' as you mystics understand it (as the summary he endorsed in the Postface attests), this applies to you, not me:

you are no Marxist

You:

It's the only conclusion we can come to under your interpretation where every instance in Capital where Marx refers to a contradiction, he is merely coquetting, meaning he is non-serious.

So, you admit I did not say this.

And 'non-serious' is not synonymous with 'joke'.

May I also remind you that 'coquette' was Marx's word, not mine. You argue as if you think it was I who inserted this into the Postface!:lol:

Oh, pleeease! You'll have me choking on my tears in a minute.

What makes you think I expect remorse from a serial liar like you?

What I expect, and predict, is that you will continue to make stuff up.

You mystics are far better at this sort of thing than you are at defending your threadbare 'theory'.

Incidentally, just because somebody points out a fault in your ideas which you are too blind to see, this does not mean lies are being told.

Indeed, but the difference is that you alter my views, attack that altered version, claiming you have refuted my ideas, and not a figment of your own imagination.

And, as I noted, you will continue to do this since that is the only way you can 'defend' your class-compromised 'ideas'.

graymouser

21st September 2010, 19:16

which words can be found nowhere in the Postface. By way of contrast, Marx praised this reviewer for his 'striking and generous' picture of 'the dialectic method'.

Nice try, again, except it wasn't.
This is why it's important actually read the entire Postface:

That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.
(Emphasis mine.)

Marx goes on to dissect several reviews that did not understand his method: one from the Paris Revue Positiviste, one by an "M. Block," and the third from the European Messenger of St. Petersburg (the Kaufman review that you call "Marx's words"). Kaufman's review is the one he treats at the greatest length, because it is "striking" and "generous" but its author does not grasp that the "realistic" method is nothing other than the "German-dialectical" method. These reviewers are clearly culprits in not having understood Marx's method, even though Kaufman comes the closest.

S.Artesian

21st September 2010, 20:11

Smarty Pants:

So, are you telling me there are no sources published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supportyour fanciful and mystical re-write of his work!? I can't believe it!

Are you sure? I think you need to go back and look again.

And yet you (and the other mystics here) have signally failed to show how and where I am 'distorting' Marx's work.

That's why you need to resume your search...

Talking to dead horses now, I see.

I knew you were a mystic, but I didn't know you were a psychic too...:lol:

I repeat, the proof of Marx's use of dialectic, containing the elements of determination, opposition, contradiction, negation, identity is in the chapter on value.

Anytime you're ready to consider the substance of Marx's critique of capital, his engagement through opposition and contradiction, let me know.

Obviously, you feel much more at home in the shallow end of the kiddie pool, your own peculiar distortion of the afterword to the 2nd edition than you do with anything Marx actually wrote about value and capital.

Which again is why you are irrelevant.

Lenina Rosenweg

21st September 2010, 21:39

Smarty Pants:

I knew you were a mystic, but I didn't know you were a psychic too...:lol:

Rosa,
I don't have a huge background in philosophy (yet). I am reading Marx and I've read fairly extensively about Marx. In Marx's discussion of value in vol 1 of Capital he posits value as having both use value and exchange value. Value itself is a result of the conditions prevailing in capitalism-labor power as a commodity and workers alienated from their labor. Exchange value and use value are in contradiction to one another. There are a zillion further contradictions resulting from this.

As I understand you posit a "Wittgensteinian Marxism" I haven't read Wittgenstein. What I understand of him is that he uses linguistic analysis to reach conclusions somewhat similar to Foucault, undermining structures.

How would you use this approach in Marx's discussion of value?

I would agree that "diamat" and even "histomat" are reductionist mechanist interpretations of Marxism. I would agree that Engel's Dialectics of Nature has been misused to support this (no fault of Engels). I'd also agree that George Novack was very reductionist. Still dialectics seems integral to the Marxist approach.

Dialectics also seems to have risen independently in civilizations around the world. Sergei Eisenstein wrote an interesting essay on dialectics in traditional Japanese aesthetics.

Hit The North

21st September 2010, 22:01

R:

Well, they won't unless you point out where I have done this -- up to now you have been long on assertion, short on proof.

You do it in the same post which begins with this question.

You will no doubt note that Marx says this:

Quote:
by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner
Indeed, this does not prevent Hegel from being the first; what prevents him is that he did not do this at all -- as Marx knew.

Marx doesn't account for anything preventing Hegel from being the first to do this, and gives no indication that he thinks Hegel was not the first! You interject that point arbitrarily to fit into what you want Marx to be saying rather than what he actually says. Next you'll be arguing that our whole reading of Capital hinges on the placement of one comma in Marx's second preface! Oh, wait... :lol:

1. Not even you believe this. Not only have you (on your own admission) never read Hegel, you reject his idea as mystical nonsense.

2. Let us suppose, however, that you do not reject it as nonsensical; in that case, explain to us what precisely is the rational form, or the 'conscious and comprehensive' form of the dialectic contained in Hegel's work?

1. This is a distortion as I've never claimed that Hegel was 'nonsense'. Mysticism, yes.

2. Marx tells us what he considers the 'rational form':

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

And by this, he has already told us in the paragraph above:

To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

It is by establishing the material basis of human history that we find the rational core that escapes Hegel. Human, social relations are the rational core of Marx's dialectic. I thought everyone knew that.

Now, let's assume that you don't think Marx was joking when he ended the Postface with this:

The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire.

Explain what you think he really means by 'contradictions' and 'dialectics'?

What makes you think I expect remorse from a serial liar like you?
You whine about it a lot, so I just presumed.

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd September 2010, 00:58

GM:

This is why it's important actually read the entire Postface:

That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.

(Emphasis mine.)

And where does he say that this particular reviewer misunderstood him?

In fact, he indicates the opposite, when he praised his summary as 'striking and generous', calling it a picture of 'the dialectic method'.

Marx goes on to dissect several reviews that did not understand his method: one from the Paris Revue Positiviste, one by an "M. Block," and the third from the European Messenger of St. Petersburg (the Kaufman review that you call "Marx's words"). Kaufman's review is the one he treats at the greatest length, because it is "striking" and "generous" but its author does not grasp that the "realistic" method is nothing other than the "German-dialectical" method. These reviewers are clearly culprits in not having understood Marx's method, even though Kaufman comes the closest.

This is your re-write of what Marx says, but it founders once again on the fact that Marx recommends this summary as a 'picture' of 'the dialectic method', which contains no trace of Hegel at all.

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd September 2010, 01:10

Lenina:

I don't have a huge background in philosophy (yet). I am reading Marx and I've read fairly extensively about Marx. In Marx's discussion of value in vol 1 of Capital he posits value as having both use value and exchange value. Value itself is a result of the conditions prevailing in capitalism-labor power as a commodity and workers alienated from their labor. Exchange value and use value are in contradiction to one another. There are a zillion further contradictions resulting from this.

1. But these aren't contradictions -- since they are not indicative sentences or clauses -- they do not even look like contradictions.

2. So, no wonder Marx said he was merley 'coquetting' with this and other Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

As I understand you posit a "Wittgensteinian Marxism" I haven't read Wittgenstein. What I understand of him is that he uses linguistic analysis to reach conclusions somewhat similar to Foucault, undermining structures.

Well, no, his work is nothing like Foucault's. What Wittgenstein does can best be summarised by examining what Marx himself said:

The philosophers would only have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

[This is from the German Ideology, bold added.]

Wittgenstein's later work was aimed at showing how traditional philosophy managed to do this -- to distort language in order to build 'houses of cards', empty, non-sensical 'theories', based on just such a systematic distortion of language.

How would you use this approach in Marx's discussion of value?

Well, I wouldn't since Marx's theory is a scientific, not a philosophical theory.

I would agree that "diamat" and even "histomat" are reductionist mechanist interpretations of Marxism. I would agree that Engel's Dialectics of Nature has been misused to support this (no fault of Engels). I'd also agree that George Novack was very reductionist. Still dialectics seems integral to the Marxist approach.

Dialectics also seems to have risen independently in civilizations around the world. Sergei Eisenstein wrote an interesting essay on dialectics in traditional Japanese aesthetics.

I agree, and that is why dialectics is part of the ruling ideas that have always ruled.

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd September 2010, 01:34

BTB:

You do it in the same post which begins with this question.

You will no doubt note that Marx says this:

by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner

Indeed, this does not prevent Hegel from being the first; what prevents him is that he did not do this at all -- as Marx knew.

Marx doesn't account for anything preventing Hegel from being the first to do this, and gives no indication that he thinks Hegel was not the first! You interject that point arbitrarily to fit into what you want Marx to be saying rather than what he actually says. Next you'll be arguing that our whole reading of Capital hinges on the placement of one comma in Marx's second preface!

In that case, you must think Marx was ignorant of the history of thought, for Hegel wasn't the first to do this, since he did not do it at all.

Not even you think he did this first, so why you think Marx thought he was, is something of a mystery.

And we are still waiting for you to explain to us what precisely is the rational form, or the 'conscious and comprehensive' form of the dialectic contained in Hegel's work?

Why so shy? If Hegel did indeed do this, it should be easy for you to explain it to us. (**)

The fact that you haven't done this, and can't do it, shows that despite your 'brave' words, not even you believe Hegel did this, and that you agree with Marx that this fact did indeed prevent Hegel from doing it.

1. This is a distortion as I've never claimed that Hegel was 'nonsense'. Mysticism, yes.

Fair enough I withdraw it and apologise (notice the difference between us; if I make a mistake, I apologise and withdraw what I have alleged -- you do not).

But, if it's not nonsense, perhaps you can explain to us what sense mysticism does in fact make?

However, my challenge above (**) still stands.

But, you have a reply:

2. Marx tells us what he considers the 'rational form':

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

1. Is that it? Where is Marx's summary here of the 'conscious and comprehensive' form of the dialectic contained in Hegel's work?

2. But, we already know what the 'rational core' of the 'dialectic method' is, for Marx added this summary of it:

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02.]

In this passage not a single Hegelian concept is to be found -- no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality" --, and yet Marx calls this the "dialectic method". So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two here and there with which he merely "coquetted". In that case once more, Marx's "dialectic method" more closely resembles that of Aristotle and Kant.

So, the 'rational core' of Hegel contains no Hegel at all!

And that is what prevents Hegel from being this first to "present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner."

It is by establishing the material basis of human history that we find the rational core that escapes Hegel. Human, social relations are the rational core of Marx's dialectic.

And, as that summary shows, Marx's dialectic contains no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality" -- so why you still want to use some/all of these is rather strange.

I thought everyone knew that

Just as everyone used to 'know' that the earth was at the centre of the universe, eh?:lol:

Explain what you think he really means by 'contradictions' and 'dialectics'?

I will just as soon as you explain the many things I have asked you to explain/answer over the last four years which you just ignore (one or two of these can be found above).

graymouser

22nd September 2010, 02:33

And where does he say that this particular reviewer misunderstood him?

In fact, he indicates the opposite, when he praised his summary as 'striking and generous', calling it a picture of 'the dialectic method'.
It's plain that you are not arguing in good faith here. I have presented, repeatedly, the following basic facts:

1. Marx shows that he is discussing reviews that do not understand his method in writing Capital.
2. Kaufman writes in his review about the contrast between Marx's "realistic" method of inquiry and the "German-dialectical" presentation.
3. Marx corrects Kaufman by saying that, while Kaufman's description is "striking" and "generous," his (Marx's) method is in fact dialectic.

There is no other possible reading of the Postface. I will stand on these points, and consider your attempts to rebut them to have failed completely. Your interpretation makes a hash of Marx's actual context, and can only be considered a bad-faith attempt to distort what Marx said (ironically, through the exact same mistake Marx was correcting in Kaufman).

Rosa Lichtenstein

24th September 2010, 20:10

GM:

It's plain that you are not arguing in good faith here.

I could say the same of you, but I'm far too polite.:)

I have presented, repeatedly, the following basic facts:

1. Marx shows that he is discussing reviews that do not understand his method in writing Capital.
2. Kaufman writes in his review about the contrast between Marx's "realistic" method of inquiry and the "German-dialectical" presentation.
3. Marx corrects Kaufman by saying that, while Kaufman's description is "striking" and "generous," his (Marx's) method is in fact dialectic.

And I have had to remind you of the following words Marx saw fit to add to Das Kapital:

The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. It says:

“At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German, i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his forerunners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist.”

I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.

After a quotation from the preface to my “Criticism of Political Economy,” Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

“The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. ... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx’s book has.”

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

Bold added.

Here Marx does not correct this reviewer, as you claim, he quotes his words and tells us that this 'pictures' the 'dialectic method', praising it for its generosity.

There is no other possible reading of the Postface. I will stand on these points, and consider your attempts to rebut them to have failed completely. Your interpretation makes a hash of Marx's actual context, and can only be considered a bad-faith attempt to distort what Marx said (ironically, through the exact same mistake Marx was correcting in Kaufman).

In fact, there is: the one Marx himself indicated when he endorsed this summary, which contained not one atom of Hegel, as 'the dialectic method'.

Your interpretation makes a hash of Marx's actual context, and can only be considered a bad-faith attempt to distort what Marx said (ironically, through the exact same mistake Marx was correcting in Kaufman).

I know you mystics like to turn things into their opposites, but I didn't think this applied to Marx's words, too!:lol:

graymouser

24th September 2010, 21:32

Rosa:

How do you justify your "not one atom of Hegel" statement? It's pretty clear that if we consider the three basic laws of dialectics:

1. The unity and interpenetration of opposites;
2. The change of quality to quantity and vice versa;
3. The negation of the negation

at least two of these are evident in Kaufman's description of Marx's method.

The unity and interpenetration of opposites:

The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period.
The "mutual connexions" described by Marx in Capital are dialectical contradictions: between exchange-value and use-value, and between wage-labor and capital. Kaufman appreciates the "connexions" but fails to comprehend that they are contradictions.

The negation of the negation:

Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one.
The very idea of the transition from one set of contradictions ("connexions" to Kaufman) to another is the large scale view of dialectics, the negation of the negation. Implicit in them (and described by Marx but not by Kaufman) are the transitions of quantity to quality and vice versa.

As S. Artesian has pointed out, it is a grave mistake to claim to be able to understand Capital as being in any way free of dialectics. The book is widely regarded as a dialectical masterwork because it applies these ideas precisely to everything. Unfortunately you don't understand dialectics, and therefore are incapable of seeing them expressed in non-Hegelian language.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th September 2010, 06:01

GM:

Rosa:

How do you justify your "not one atom of Hegel" statement? It's pretty clear that if we consider the three basic laws of dialectics:

1. The unity and interpenetration of opposites;
2. The change of quality to quantity and vice versa;
3. The negation of the negation

at least two of these are evident in Kaufman's description of Marx's method.

The unity and interpenetration of opposites:

The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period.

'Mutual connection' is not 'interpenetration of mutually exclusive opposites.'

If a DM-fan wrote a book on this 'theory' of yours using 'mutual connection' (and not 'interpenetration of mutually exclusive opposites') you heresy hunters would immediately round on him/her with accusations of 'Revisionism!!'.

The negation of the negation:

Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one.

No sign of the obscure 'negation of the negation' here either.

You remind me of those sad souls who tell us they can see the face of Jesus in their breakfast cereal, or the Blessed Virgin in a current bun!:lol:

The very idea of the transition from one set of contradictions ("connexions" to Kaufman) to another is the large scale view of dialectics, the negation of the negation. Implicit in them (and described by Marx but not by Kaufman) are the transitions of quantity to quality and vice versa.

Except, you have to insert 'contradiction' here to try to sell us this fairy tale -- the reviewer nowhere uses this word, nor implies it.

And you have to use 'implicit', too, which shows you are grasping at non-dialectical straws.

As S. Artesian has pointed out, it is a grave mistake to claim to be able to understand Capital as being in any way free of dialectics. The book is widely regarded as a dialectical masterwork because it applies these ideas precisely to everything. .

You are just repeating the tradition I am challenging.

Unfortunately you don't understand dialectics, and therefore are incapable of seeing them expressed in non-Hegelian language

In that case, I am in good company, since no one (not Hegel, not Engels, not Plekhanov, not Lenin, not Trotsky, not Novack...) 'understands' this 'theory' -- or if they do, they have kept that secret well hidden for nigh on 200 years.

graymouser

25th September 2010, 11:54

You remind me of those sad souls who tell us they can see the face of Jesus in their breakfast cereal, or the Blessed Virgin in a current bun!:lol:
Your presentation of "anti-dialectic" material is, to anyone who's actually read and studied the material, like waving a sign that says "I don't understand dialectics and I don't like it either!" Marx's method in Capital is, by Marx's own admission, dialectical. You desperately want that to mean something other than what it means, and twist and squirm to get it to do so. But it remains there.

What are the "mutual connexions" that Kaufman describes if they are not the dialectical contradictions between use-value and exchange-value, and between wage-labour and capital, that Marx treats at length in vol. 1 of Capital? You are incapable of explaining that, because you don't understand dialectics and by extension you don't understand Marx's work. If Marx says that his method is "the dialectic method," what could Kaufman mean by "their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one" other than the negation of the negation? Anyone who's read any basic work on dialectics should be able to see that this is what Kaufman is referring to without realizing that it is dialectical. It's your responsibility, as a critic of dialectics, to show how this review - and Capital as a whole, because it's a volume that deals with nothing but a few central dialectical contradictions - contains "not one atom of Hegel." I'm calling you on it, now prove it.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th September 2010, 12:24

GM:

Your presentation of "anti-dialectic" material is, to anyone who's actually read and studied the material, like waving a sign that says "I don't understand dialectics and I don't like it either!"

And your responses up to now have been, for all your rhetoric: "And I am at a loss to explain it, too!"

Marx's method in Capital is, by Marx's own admission, dialectical. You desperately want that to mean something other than what it means, and twist and squirm to get it to do so. But it remains there.

As I pointed out in my reply to Artesian, the word 'dialectical' has been hi-jacked by you mystics. The older, classical sense of 'the dialectic', to which Marx plainly returns when he quotes a summary of it, I have no problem with. I prefer not to use this word since its use confuses you lot. I prefer much more neutral terms; I only use it because Marx did. This is 'the dialectic' as Aristotle and Kant meant it.

The Hegelian use of this word, on the other hand (that is, what little sense can be made of it), is plainly not the one Marx intended, and for reasons I have explained several times.

What are the "mutual connexions" that Kaufman describes if they are not the dialectical contradictions between use-value and exchange-value, and between wage-labour and capital, that Marx treats at length in vol. 1 of Capital?

The mutual connections are plainly those between labour and capital, to give one example, and which can be explained without the use of a single Hegelian 'concept', as Marx showed in Das Kapital

You are incapable of explaining that, because you don't understand dialectics and by extension you don't understand Marx's work.

Once more, if that is so, I am in good company, since no one understands this theory -- certainly you can't explain it.

If Marx says that his method is "the dialectic method," what could Kaufman mean by "their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one" other than the negation of the negation?

They are exactly what he says, and what Marx says in Das Kapital -- without the use of mystical jargon (upon which you dote).

We have yet to see you even so much as attempt to explain the 'negation of the negation', and no wonder. As I have shown, if your 'theory' were true, change would be impossible.

You can, of course, shut me up by showing where my demolition of the 'dialectical theory of change' goes wrong:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

Until then, your attempt to sell us genuine materialists this mystical mess is no more successful than if you tried to sell us snake oil.

It's your responsibility, as a critic of dialectics, to show how this review - and Capital as a whole, because it's a volume that deals with nothing but a few central dialectical contradictions - contains "not one atom of Hegel." I'm calling you on it, now prove it.

Except, this summary of the 'dialectic method' leaves the word 'contradiction' out, and Marx tells us that he was only 'coquetting' with it in Das Kapital.

The onus is therefore on you to show us why we should go along with you in your attempt to re-mystify Marx's theory.

graymouser

25th September 2010, 13:30

And your responses up to now have been, for all your rhetoric: "And I am at a loss to explain it, too!"
There's a saying: you can lead a horse to water but you can't make it drink. You refuse to understand dialectics, and I'm not going to sit and explain them to you since you've demonstrated your unwillingness to make any attempt to actually understand the concepts.

As I pointed out in my reply to Artesian, the word 'dialectical' has been hi-jacked by you mystics. The older, classical sense of 'the dialectic', to which Marx plainly returns when he quotes a summary of it, I have no problem with. I prefer not to use this word since its use confuses you lot. I prefer much more neutral terms; I only use it because Marx did. This is 'the dialectic' as Aristotle and Kant meant it.

The Hegelian use of this word, on the other hand (that is, what little sense can be made of it), is plainly not the one Marx intended, and for reasons I have explained several times.
In context, Marx could not have meant "the dialectic" in the terms of Aristotle and Kant, precisely because he used the words "German-dialectical" and went on not to discuss how Aristotle, Kant, Hume, or any of the Scots developed the idea, but discusses precisely and only Hegel. Saying that this has reference to anything but Hegelian dialectics as developed in Marx's critique (which is a critique of idealism and not of the method as a whole) is sheer fantastic creation, out of whole cloth.

The mutual connections are plainly those between labour and capital, to give one example, and which can be explained without the use of a single Hegelian 'concept', as Marx showed in Das Kapital
Volume 1 of Capital is a sustained discussion of the contradiction between labor-power and capital.

Once more, if that is so, I am in good company, since no one understands this theory -- certainly you can't explain it.
I'm not going to teach you dialectics, since you actively refuse to grasp the basic concepts involved. I've tried that engagement, and I'm not going to bother again. Everything you write displays an utter lack of comprehension of what you read - to the point, honestly, where I don't think it's worth arguing with you over this. I've demonstrated what needs to be demonstrated here for anybody unfortunate enough to blunder into one of your threads. I'm not going to sit here as you evade the demands for clarification with squeals of "you can't explain it" - to your satisfaction no one could, because you are not arguing in good faith.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th September 2010, 16:43

GM:

There's a saying: you can lead a horse to water but you can't make it drink. You refuse to understand dialectics, and I'm not going to sit and explain them to you since you've demonstrated your unwillingness to make any attempt to actually understand the concepts.

In that case, we can add you to the ever-lengthening list of those who either do not understand this incomprehensible 'theory' of yours, or cannot explain it to anyone, or both.

In context, Marx could not have meant "the dialectic" in the terms of Aristotle and Kant, precisely because he used the words "German-dialectical" and went on not to discuss how Aristotle, Kant, Hume, or any of the Scots developed the idea, but discusses precisely and only Hegel. Saying that this has reference to anything but Hegelian dialectics as developed in Marx's critique (which is a critique of idealism and not of the method as a whole) is sheer fantastic creation, out of whole cloth.

Recall, the inference that Marx's 'dialectic' more closely resembles that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical School, is mine, not Marx's, so you misconstrue what I have alleged.

My inference is based however on evidence you refuse to examine; here is some of it:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1693775&postcount=260

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1693776&postcount=261

And it's not true that Marx discusses Hegel -- in fact he is hardly mentioned at all in Das Kapital. Aristotle and the Scottish School receive far more attention there, as you will see if you examine the above evidence, or check out the Index to the hard copy of the MECW version.

Moreover, Marx 'coquettes' with (i.e., he uses non-seriously) Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital; he nowhere treats Aristotle (or the Scottish School) in the same dismissive way.

Volume 1 of Capital is a sustained discussion of the contradiction between labor-power and capital.

1. But they aren't contradictions' and do not even look like contradictions.

2. No wonder then that the best Marx could do was 'coquette' with this word.

I'm not going to teach you dialectics, since you actively refuse to grasp the basic concepts involved.

Well, I have been studying this 'theory' since the late 1970s, and have yet to come across a single dialectician who can explain it (and I have read and studied literally hundreds of books and articles devoted to it, the vast majority of which are highly repetitive -- they all say the same things, and fail to examine a single DM-concept critically). I have added a greatly shortened reading list of these books and articles to the resources page of the Dialectical Materialism Group, or rather I wrote it after the comrade who set that group up asked me to do it for him. You can see it here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/group.php?do=discuss&group=&discussionid=1172

Not one of the sad characters who wrote these works explains with any clarity what they mean by their obscure use of language, and they all make the same basic errors -- all of which (and more) I detail in my Essays.

And we can now add you to this list.

No surprise there then -- just like you, practically every DM-fan with whom I have debated this 'theory' (here and elsewhere) has bottled it when asked to explain this theory, advancing the same lame excuse as you do. I have linked to most of these here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

But, let us suppose for one nanosecond you are right. If so you will find it easy to show where I go wrong in my demolition of the 'dialectical theory of change':

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

I've tried that engagement, and I'm not going to bother again. Everything you write displays an utter lack of comprehension of what you read - to the point, honestly, where I don't think it's worth arguing with you over this. I've demonstrated what needs to be demonstrated here for anybody unfortunate enough to blunder into one of your threads. I'm not going to sit here as you evade the demands for clarification with squeals of "you can't explain it" - to your satisfaction no one could, because you are not arguing in good faith.

But, this is not debating dialectics; we haven't done that yet. So, this is yet another pathetic excuse on your part.:rolleyes:

graymouser

25th September 2010, 16:55

Rosa:

As I said, I refuse to debate the substance of dialectics with you, because you debate in bad faith. That is, you project your misunderstood premises onto the basic texts of dialectical thought, and in so doing actively refuse to even attempt to comprehend them. I cannot help that. I was here trying to correct for the benefit of anyone unfortunate enough to stumble into the Philosophy section of this board, which you have turned into something of a bad joke, your falsification of the postface to the second German edition of Capital. I've put forward both the correct understanding of what Kaufman missed in Capital, and why your perverse interpretation of it is irrelevant in any case. There is nothing more to debate with you.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th September 2010, 17:06

GM:

As I said, I refuse to debate the substance of dialectics with you, because you debate in bad faith. That is, you project your misunderstood premises onto the basic texts of dialectical thought, and in so doing actively refuse to even attempt to comprehend them. I cannot help that. I was here trying to correct for the benefit of anyone unfortunate enough to stumble into the Philosophy section of this board, which you have turned into something of a bad joke, your falsification of the postface to the second German edition of Capital. I've put forward both the correct understanding of what Kaufman missed in Capital, and why your perverse interpretation of it is irrelevant in any case. There is nothing more to debate with you.

So, I was right; you either can't defend your 'theory' or are too scared of me to defend it. http://www.mysmiley.net/imgs/smile/scared/scared0016.gif

S.Artesian

25th September 2010, 17:24

No, Rosa, you are wrong. Of course Marx's use of dialectic can be and is defended by Marx himself.

No, Rosa, nobody is afraid of you. You simply distort what Marx wrote, refuse to engage with the content of Marx's analysis of capital, and despite your supposed adherence to "historical materialism," are incapable of recognizing the materialism, and the history, in Marx's identification of the origin, and reproduction of capital in the conflict, the opposition, the contradiction of labor to the conditions of labor; of the labor process to the valorisation process.

You are an irrelevancy.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th September 2010, 17:32

Smarty Pants:

No, Rosa, you are wrong. Of course Marx's use of dialectic can be and is defended by Marx himself.

Except, as we now know, his 'dialectic' contains no Hegel at all (upside down or 'the right way up').

No, Rosa, nobody is afraid of you.

In that case, GM will be happy to show where I go wrong.

You simply distort what Marx wrote

Not so; I merely quote him and sit back as you mystics try to bend his words out of shape.

refuse to engage with the content of Marx's analysis of capital, and despite your supposed adherence to "historical materialism," are incapable of recognizing the materialism, and the history, in Marx's identification of the origin, and reproduction of capital in the conflict, the opposition, the contradiction of labor to the conditions of labor; of the labor process to the valorisation process.

No need to. Marx did a pretty good job himself -- you seem not to know...:rolleyes:

You are an irrelevancy.

If that were so, you would not have spent the last year, and hundreds of posts, trying to take me on.

The fact that you have done this shows that not even you believe it.:lol:

graymouser

25th September 2010, 17:39

So, I was right; you either can't defend your 'theory' or are too scared of me to defend it.
No, Rosa. People don't argue with you because it is like arguing with a revolving brick wall. It's not a mystery what your modus operandi is. You assert the same banal points over and over, and then follow it up with a wall of unreadable text that demonstrates that you have no command of the dialectics you claim to debunk. It's not interesting, and since your arguments are based on total misunderstandings from which you refuse to be corrected, there is simply nothing to debate.

S.Artesian

25th September 2010, 17:39

I undertook refuting your distortion of Marx because it is a distortion. Same as I took on those who distort Trotsky's record of achievement in the Russian Revolution.

It's a question of historical accuracy, and by exposing your historical inaccuracy, your inability to find anything in Marx's writings that amounts to mystification of the relations between labor and capital, your irrelevancy has been exposed and proven.

Keep refusing to engage with the substance of Marx's analysis of the relations that determine the movement of capital in history. It's what makes you what you are, which is a zero.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th September 2010, 17:40

GM:

No, Rosa. People don't argue with you because it is like arguing with a revolving brick wall. It's not a mystery what your modus operandi is. You assert the same banal points over and over, and then follow it up with a wall of unreadable text that demonstrates that you have no command of the dialectics you claim to debunk. It's not interesting, and since your arguments are based on total misunderstandings from which you refuse to be corrected, there is simply nothing to debate.

Still scared I see....:lol:

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th September 2010, 17:42

Smarty Pants:

I undertook refuting your distortion of Marx because it is a distortion. Same as I took on those who distort Trotsky's record of achievement in the Russian Revolution.

Except you failed to refute me.

It's a question of historical accuracy, and by exposing your historical inaccuracy, your inability to find anything in Marx's writings that amounts to mystification of the relations between labor and capital, your irrelevancy has been exposed and proven.

Except, I have.

Keep refusing to engage with the substance of Marx's analysis of the relations that determine the movement of capital in history. It's what makes you what you are, which is a zero.

And you keep repeating this point, to which I will always reply:

1. No need to. Marx did a pretty good job himself.

2. It's more important for me to stem the flow of Hermetic poision into Marxism, a flow you are intent on increasing.

S.Artesian

25th September 2010, 17:56

Your repetition compulsion, and distortion of Marx's afterward, have been refuted, numerous times.

Hermetic poison, huh? Please provide us with the results, the influence of such hermetic poison on the actual content and practice of Marxist analysis.

ChrisK

25th September 2010, 21:57

Hermetic poison, huh? Please provide us with the results, the influence of such hermetic poison on the actual content and practice of Marxist analysis.

She has a whole essay on it. She includes case studies that are far from complete. Which sounds funny when you see how long they are.

Case Studies
[As noted at the beginning of this Essay, the next three sub-sections form the most incomplete part of this Essay. More supporting evidence and argument will be added as my researches continue, and as I regain full access to my books and papers.]

Many of the remarks aired in the first half of this Part of Essay Nine are largely theoretical/abstract. What is needed now are concrete examples of the deleterious effects on Marxists of the use dialectical concepts.43a (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note-43a)

Fortunately, because of the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm), these are not too hard to find -- in fact, it's rather surprising that no one has noticed them before (which in itself confirms the narcoleptic (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/narcoleptic) effect Hegelian concepts have had on the minds of the vast majority of revolutionaries, and on those comrades who have written about the history of our movement).

In that case, what follows is, I think, the first study of its kind.

Three preliminary points however need making:

(1) The following section will need far more attention devoting to it before its conclusions can be regarded as in any way definitive. I will, however, add more detail and evidence as the months and years unfold.

(2) The search for evidence has been hampered by the fact that every single Marxist history I have read of the periods I am about to analyse (indeed, about any period in our history) omits all mention of 'Materialist Dialectics'/DM as in any way to blame (partially or otherwise) for the defeats and set-backs our side has suffered since the 1860s. As far as I can determine, this 'theory' does not even get so much a mention in this regard!

Of course, that in itself is quite revealing given the centrality of dialectics to all that revolutionaries are alleged to have said, done and thought.

Why then this selective blindness?

The answer is pretty clear; as Marx suggested: to blame this theory in any way at all, directly or indirectly, for the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism would be to undermine the only source of consolation available to dialectically-distracted comrades. And this is why this theory has never been tested in practice (in the sense that practice has been allowed to deliver its unambiguous verdict (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm#Revolutionary-Practice)).

(3) Any Stalinists and/or Maoists who disagree with my assessment of their respective traditions (below) are encouraged to shelve knee-jerk reactions (to what I have to say) until the end of this main section, by which time they will see the point of it all.

[Fellow Trotskyists will already have switched off anyway; experience has taught me that they are among the most closed-minded of comrades, often warning others not to read these Essays for fear the pristine purity of their ideas might be 'tainted' as a result. Many examples of this can be found at RevLeft (http://www.revleft.com/favicon.ico); on that see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm).]

In the details posted below, I have included lengthy passages from dialecticians in order to show how deep Hegelian concepts have seeped into our movement, exposing the pernicious effect they have had on every aspect of revolutionary theory and practice.

Apologies must be offered in advance for this, but there is no way these objectives could have been attained otherwise.

Long experience has taught me that dialecticians tend to deny certain allegations unless they are backed-up by chapter and verse. Even then, with passages from Engels, Lenin or Mao staring them in the face, many comrades remain locked in 'deny-everything-mode'! [An excellent recent example of this can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm#Note_10b1).]

I propose therefore to consider three 'case studies': the effect DM has had on (1) The increasingly Stalinised Bolshevik Party post-1925; (2) Dialectical Maoists from the early 1930s onward; and (3) the Trotskyist movement post-1929.

There are other examples that I could have chosen (indeed, I might consider including them here at a later date, perhaps in an Appendix to this Essay), but given the fact that these three cover periods when workers (and others) were entering upon arguably the biggest wave of revolutionary agitation in human history, and given the further fact that all this energy was squandered by the activities of dialecticians, these should be enough to prove to all but the most rabidly partisan, or the most heavily dialectically-doped of comrades, that 'Materialist Dialectics' is among the very worst doctrines ever to have colonised the human brain.

When the working class was ready to move, Dialectical Marxists seriously screwed up.

We will be lucky if they ever trust us again.

[1] Stalinism

DM/'Materialist Dialectics' was used by the Stalinised Bolshevik Party (after Lenin's death) to 'justify' the imposition of an undemocratic (if not an openly anti-democratic and terror-based) structure on both the Communist Party and the population of the former USSR (and later, elsewhere).

The catastrophic effects of these moves hardly need underlining.

This new and vicious form of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was justified by Stalin on the grounds that since Marxist theory holds that everything is 'contradictory', increasingly centralised control by the party was compatible with greater democratic freedom. The "withering-away of the state" was in fact confirmed by moves in the opposite direction: the ever-growing concentration of power at the centre. So, and paradoxically: less democracy was in fact more democracy!

Indeed, that very contradiction illustrated the truth of dialectics!

As Stalin himself put it:

"It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm)Report (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm) of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27, 1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

And, he went on to add this rather ominous note:

"Anyone who fails to understand this peculiar feature and 'contradiction' of our transition period, anyone who fails to understand these dialectics of the historical processes, is dead as far as Marxism is concerned.

"The misfortune of our deviators is that they do not understand, and do not wish to understand, Marx's dialectics." [Ibid (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm). (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm) Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

As many leading Bolsheviks were later to find out, Stalin was not joking when he said this.

Indeed, this theory formed part of Stalin's 'justification' for his line on the National Question, specifically linking these two issues in the previous quotation:

"Lenin sometimes depicted the thesis on national self-determination in the guise of the simple formula: "disunion for union". Think of it -- disunion for union. It even sounds like a paradox. And yet, this 'contradictory' formula reflects that living truth of Marx's dialectics which enables the Bolsheviks to capture the most impregnable fortresses in the sphere of the national question." [Ibid (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm). (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm) Bold emphasis added.]

This allowed Stalin to claim that the merging of all national cultures (in the former USSR) into one was at the same time to show respect for, and to preserve their differences! We can be sure the Chechens (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_transfer_in_the_Soviet_Union) and the Cossacks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cossack) appreciated this 'dialectical' solution to the national question.

Earlier, Stalin had argued against Trotsky's demand for "inner party democracy" as follows:

"Consequently, we have here recognition of freedom for factional groupings in the Party right up to permitting political parties in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, disguised by phrases about 'inner party democracy', about 'improving the regime' in the Party. That freedom for factional squabbling of groups of intellectuals is not inner-party democracy, that the widely-developed self-criticism conducted by the Party and the colossal activity of the mass of the Party membership is real and genuine inner-party democracy -- Trotskyism cannot understand." [Ibid (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm). (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/aug/27.htm) Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Greater democracy from less democracy; all eminently contradictory, all quintessentially 'dialectical'.

Moreover, it became possible to 'justify' the idea that socialism could be built in one country by, among other things, the dubious invention of "internal" versus "external" contradictions, later bolstered by the concoction of "principal" and "secondary" contradictions, along with the highly convenient idea that some contradictions were, and some were not, "antagonistic". Hence, the obvious class differences that remained, or which soon emerged in the former USSR were either non-existent or were in fact "harmonious". The real enemies (i.e., the source of all those nasty, "principal" (or perhaps even the "antagonistic") contradictions) were the external, imperialist powers.

This 'analysis' allowed STD's to argue that socialism could be built in one country because the intrinsic nature of the USSR could be defined by its internal relations, not the relations it held with the rest of the Capitalist world. This then 'allowed' them to claim that the actions of the imperialist powers, for example, constituted just such a set of 'external contradictions', in relation to the former USSR, and hence to argue that the real nature of their state could be defined internally based on its own internal, but 'non-antagonistic' contradictions. This in turn 'enabled' them to conclude (or, rather, it allowed them to rationalise a conclusion already arrived at for other reasons) that socialism could be built in one country. Clearly, this hyper-plastic theory can be bent into any required shape that is found to be convenient or expedient.

As Stalin argued:

"If the possibility of victory of socialism in a single country means the possibility of solving the internal contradictions which can be completely overcome in a single country (we are of course thinking about our own country), the possibility of the definitive victory of socialism means the possibility to overcome the external contradictions between the country of socialism and the countries of capitalism, and these contradictions can only be overcome thanks to the victory of the proletarian revolution in a certain number of countries". [XVth conference of the CPSU. Quoted from here (http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:iKxc-TDqFGAJ:newleftreview.org/?getpdf=NLR05510+"Hitler+Stalin+pact"+++"dialectic"&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=72&gl=uk).]43a1 (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note-43a1)

[How 'contradictions' can be "overcome" is, of course, a deep mystery which we will have to pass over in silence.]

Nevertheless, as Tom Weston has shown in a recent article in Science & Society (http://www.scienceandsociety.com/) [Weston (2008)], the distinction between "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic contradictions" [henceforth, AC and NAC, respectively] cannot be traced back to Lenin, as many suppose:

"Antagonism and contradiction are not at all the same thing. In socialism, the first will disappear, but the latter will remain" [Lenin, quoted in Weston (2008), p.433. This was in fact a marginal note Lenin wrote in his copy of a book by Bukharin!]

Weston goes on to say:

"This note has often been treated as evidence that Lenin accepted or even invented the NAC concept (e.g., Mitin (http://marxistphilosophy.org/Mitin.htm) and Mao), but it surely does not show this. Like Marx, Lenin distinguished contradiction from antagonism, and this raises a philosophical question about the relation between the two. Lenin did not answer this question, however, and he did not claim that antagonism is a special kind of contradiction." [Weston (2008), p.433.]

[Incidentally, Weston, who knows his logic (after all, he teaches the subject (http://philosophy.sdsu.edu/Weston.htm)!), is remarkably accommodating here. For example, he nowhere asks why 'dialectical contradictions' are indeed contradictions to begin with. As we have seen (in Essay Five (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2005.htm), Eight Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_01.htm), Eight Part Two (here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm#Real), here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm#True-Contradictions-01) and here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm#Contradictions-In-Das-Kapital)), Essay Eight Part Three (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm), and Essay Eleven Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm#flatycontradictory)), little sense can be made of the term "dialectical contradiction". Nor does Weston ask how Lenin could possibly have known that "antagonism" and "contradiction" either are or aren't the same, or that one will disappear under socialism while the other won't. (The answer is, of course, that Lenin couldn't possibly have known this -- unless he was imposing these views on nature and society, contrary to what dialecticians tell us they never do (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm#Note 1).)]

Weston goes on to point out that the idea that there are NACs and ACs in nature and society began to take shape in the work of Bukharin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Bukharin) and Deborin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abram_Deborin), but the first explicit appearance of either notion was in 1930, in an article that appeared in the Party's theoretical journal Bol'shevik written by Nicolai Karev (who was later to play a role in Boris Hessen's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Hessen) demise):

"The theme of this article was a critique of Bukharin's and Alexandr Bogdanov's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bogdanov) conceptions of contradiction and equilibrium. As part of his argument that antagonism of classes is not analogous to antagonism of physical forces acting in different directions, Karev gave the following definition: 'Antagonism is in general that type of contradiction in which the opposite sides have become completely isolated from one another and externally confront one another'". [Ibid., p.440. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

However, it is quite clear from what Weston says that these two forms of 'contradiction' were introduced in order to rationalise the CPSU's claim that there was no class war in the former USSR, and that workers and peasants were neither oppressed nor exploited -- even if they had conflicting interests -- and to 'justify' the murderous collectivisation of the land (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectivization_in_the_USSR) and subsequent purges:

"From the 1930s, the most important application of the NAC concept was the soviet policy toward the peasantry...." [Ibid., p.436.]

Production by peasants was based on privately owned small-holdings, and there would naturally arise conflict between the peasantry and the urban working class over the prices they charged for their produce. However:

"The Bolsheviks...considered the poor and middle peasants and agricultural workers to be allies of the urban working class, forming a 'bond' which was the official basis of the soviet state." [Ibid., p.437.]

This was not so with respect to the "kulaks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kulak)" and the urban traders (the so-called "NEPmen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NEPmen)"), who were regarded as enemies -- whose ACs were soon 'resolved' (i.e., these groups were eradicated -- "No man, no problem" -- yes, I know Stalin probably didn't say this (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Joseph_Stalin#Misattributed)!):

"The...official view was that the contradiction of the labouring classes versus the kulaks tend to become more intense, while the contradictions inside the 'bond' tend to die out. Stalin wrote that inside the 'bond', there existed 'a struggle whose importance is out-weighed by...the community of interests, and which should disappear in the future...when they become working people of a classless society'.... Similar claims were made for the contradictions between manual workers and the soviet 'intelligentsia'...." [Ibid., p.437. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]43b (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note-43b)

[STD = Stalinist Dialectician.]

Nevertheless, a couple of generations later and STDs were still arguing the same line. Here is Cornforth (also misusing Lenin!):

"In general, social contradictions are antagonistic when they involve conflicts of economic interest. In such cases one group imposes its own interests on another, and one group suppresses another by forcible methods. But when conflicts of economic interest are not involved, there is no antagonism and therefore no need for the forcible suppression of any group by any other. Once class antagonisms are done away with in socialist society, all social questions can be settled by discussion and argument, by criticism and self-criticism, by persuasion, conviction and agreement....

"So Lenin remarked that 'antagonism and contradiction are utterly different. Under socialism antagonism disappears, but contradiction remains' (Critical Notes on Bukharin's 'Economics of the Transition Period')." [Cornforth (1974), pp.105-06.]

In which case, under 'socialism' strikes are 'unnecessary' (or they 'do not happen'); hence, they should not happen, and when they do they must be suppressed --, and so they were, with a level of violence rarely seen anywhere else outside of openly fascist states. [On this, see Haynes (2002) and Kozlov (2002).]

Any attempts made by workers to rebel (e.g., Hungary 1956 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian_Revolution_of_1956)) were blamed (http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/WCRC68.html) on "external forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian_Revolution_of_1956#Soviet_version_of_the _events)", or agents outside the working class (http://www.osa.ceu.hu/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/54-3-139.shtml) (a familiar (http://www.crmvet.org/nars/peter1.htm) excuse used by ruling classes the world over (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e2vetUPTks4C&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq="blame+outside+forces"&source=web&ots=M2WwU5YL_h&sig=8o8j5FR8eFfLbYmRfPk1q-xLJE8&hl=en) to account for, and thus ignore the significance of strikes and riots -- all caused, of course, by the ubiquitous "external agitator"), i.e., in this case, "imperialist powers", "fascists", or even Tito (http://www.osa.ceu.hu/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/54-3-139.shtml) (but not ordinary workers fighting for and on behalf of their own interests), once more.44 (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note 44)

We will merely note, alongside Cornforth, the calm way that the NACs in Hungary (in 1956) were resolved by Russian tanks (i.e., using "discussion and argument...persuasion, conviction and agreement").

To be sure, howsoever hard one tries, it is difficult not to be "persuaded" by an armoured column.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/hungary18.jpg

Figure Six: Hungary 1956 -- How To Resolve
'Contradictions', The STD (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2001.htm#Abbreviations) Way

Cornforth also tried to defend the idea that socialism could be created in one country -- referring his readers to Trotsky's counter-claim, allegedly based on "abstract" and fixed categories:

"After the proletarian revolution was successful another scheme was propounded -- this time by Trotsky. 'You can't build socialism in one country. Unless the revolution takes place in the advanced capitalist countries, socialism cannot come in Russia.' Lenin and Stalin showed that this scheme, too, was false....

"In all these examples it will be seen that the acceptance of some ready-made scheme, some abstract formula, means passivity, support for capitalism, betrayal of the working class and of socialism. But the dialectical approach which understands things in their concrete interconnections and movement shows us how to forge ahead -- how to fight, what allies to draw in. That is the inestimable value of the Marxist dialectical method to the working class movement." [Ibid., pp.79-80. Bold emphasis added.]

Since the USSR is no more, and with the benefit of hindsight, one should rightly conclude that Cornforth ought to have remained loyal to Lenin's own 'fixed' and 'abstract' scheme that the revolution would have to spread or die:

"The facts of history have proved to those Russian patriots who will hear of nothing but the immediate interests of their country conceived in the old style, that the transformation of our Russian revolution into a socialist revolution, was not an adventure but a necessity since there was no other choice; Anglo-French and American imperialism will inevitably strangle the independence and freedom of Russia unless the world-wide socialist revolution, world-wide Bolshevism, triumphs." [Lenin, quoted from here (http://www.marxists.org/archive/grant/1969/lat/8.htm). Bold emphasis alone added.]

"We always staked our play on an international revolution and this was unconditionally right... we always emphasised...the fact that in one country it is impossible to accomplish such a work as a socialist revolution." [Lenin, Sochineniia, 25, pp.473-74; quoted from Cliff (1991), p.90. Bold emphasis added.]45 (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note 45)

Anyone who thinks these comments are prejudicial to Stalinism should reflect on the fact that the contrary idea -- that socialism could be built in one country -- has been refuted by history.

The additional fact that not a single proletarian hand (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/index.htm#WorkersdefendingUSSR) was raised in defence of the 'workers' states' (in the former USSR and Eastern Europe) between 1989 and 1991, as they were toppled, merely confirms Lenin's assessment. Indeed, many workers actually helped overthrow these 'People's Democracies'. Compare this with the way that workers in many countries have fought (sometimes to the death) to defend or promote even limited forms of bourgeois democracy since. Indeed, contrast it with the way workers and others have fought (http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=8726) in Nepal in 2006 (http://www.rajeshkc.com/phalano/?m=200604&paged=2), in Lebanon (http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=9531), Serbia (http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj89/german.htm), France (http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=156&issue=109), Mexico (http://www.isreview.org/issues/49/oaxaca.shtml), Argentina (http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj94/harman.htm), Venezuela (http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=180&issue=110), Peru (http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=3873) and Bolivia (http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=211&issue=111) recently (http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=8636) -- and now in Burma (http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=13106) (1988 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8888_Uprising) and 2007 (http://aw2w.blogspot.com/2007/09/china-fears-burma-uprising.html)), Kyrgyzstan (http://leninology.blogspot.com/2010/04/revolution-in-kyrgyzstan-nothing-to-do.html) (April 2010 (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1714462&postcount=1)) and Bangkok (April 2010 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8612783.stm)) -- to name but a few.

Furthermore, the dire political consequences of the idea that socialism could be built in one country can be seen in the subsequent use to which dialectics was put to defend and rationalise this counter-revolutionary idea, and to try to limit (or deny) the catastrophic damage it inevitably inflicted on the international workers' movement and on Marxism in general.

And this is where DM comes into its own: short-term, opportunistic policies sold to party cadres (world-wide) by the use of this theory -- a 'method' that 'permits' the justification of anything whatsoever and its opposite, sometimes in the same breath. Similar ideas are still being peddled to us on the same basis. Trotskyists, of course, argue for the exact opposite conclusion using equally sound 'dialectical' arguments to show how and why the revolution decayed, and how the former USSR was still a workers' state (albeit, 'degenerated'). [On this, see below (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Trotskyism).]

Dialectics can thus be used to defend and rationalise anything the party chooses as the political circumstances require.

Indeed, Stalinism and Trotskyism (rightly or wrongly) parted company largely over of their differing views on internationalism and party democracy. Of course, this rift wasn't just about ideas! Hard-headed decisions were taken for political reasons, but in order to rationalise these, and sell them to the international communist movement, they were liberally coated with dialectical jargon.

Those who know the history of Bolshevism will also know of the incalculable damage this deep rift has inflicted on Marxism world-wide ever since.

Later on, 'Materialist Dialectics' was used to justify/rationalise the catastrophic and reckless class-collaborationist tactics imposed on both the Chinese (http://www.marxists.de/china/hore/01-1949.htm) and Spanish (http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj84/durgan.htm) revolutions, just as it was employed to rationalise/justify the ultra-left, "social fascist (http://gfdl.marxists.org.uk/archive/hallas/works/1951/xx/stalparty.htm)" post-1929 about-turn (by the communist movement). This helped cripple the fight against the Nazis by suicidally splitting the left in Germany, pitting communist against socialist, while Hitler laughed all the way to the Reichstag (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichstag_building).45a (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note 45a)

This 'theory' then helped 'excuse' the rotation of the Communist Party through another 180 degrees in its next, class-collaborationist phase, the "Popular Front (http://gfdl.marxists.org.uk/archive/hallas/works/1985/comintern/ch7.htm)" --, and then through another 180 (in order to 'justify' the unforgivable Hitler-Stalin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov-Ribbentrop_Pact) pact) as part of the newly re-discovered 'revolutionary defeatist' stage --, and through yet another 180 two years later in the shape of 'The Great Patriotic War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Patriotic_War)', following upon Hitler's predictable invasion of the "Mother Land" -- "Holy Russia".46 (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note 46)

In attempting to justify these overnight about-turns, and specifically the criminal Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939, all that Ragani Palme Dutt (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rajani_Palme_Dutt), for example, could say was:

"We are told that the Soviet-German pact has also strengthened Nazi Germany. The process is of course dialectical, but fundamentally Nazi Germany has been weakened by the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and is more weakened every day as this [dialectical -- RL] process is continuing and is beginning to become clearer to more and more people." [King and Mathews (1990), p.75. Bold emphasis added.]

Once more, it seems that to strengthen the Nazis dialectically is to weaken them! We can see how accurate that analysis was by the fact that the dialectically "weakened" Wehremacht (http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005137) was able to conquer most of Europe within two years, and large sections of the former USSR in six months! It was only Hitler's incompetent generalship that saved the USSR from annihilation.

More 'dialectical contradictions' --, more dead workers.

Post-1945, one more dialectical flip saw the invention of "peace-loving" nations versus the evil US Empire. History was now the struggle of "progressive, peace-loving" peoples against reactionary regimes, the class war lost in all the dust kicked up by so much dialectical spinning.

[Indeed, and by now, Marx would be doing much more than 180 degree flips in his grave!]

Every single one of these 'somersaults' had a catastrophic impact on the international workers' movement. Collectively, they have cast a long shadow across the C (http://gfdl.marxists.org.uk/archive/hallas/works/1985/comintern/index.htm)ommunist Party (http://gfdl.marxists.org.uk/archive/hallas/works/1985/comintern/index.htm) worldwide, reducing it to the sad, reformist excuse that we see among us today.

However, but far, far worse: these 'contradictory' about-turns helped pave the way for fascist aggression and the Third Reich. In that case, this 'theory' has played its own small, shameful, but indirect part in the deaths of millions of workers and countless millions of Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Slavs -- alongside the many hundreds of thousands of mentally-ill and handicapped victims surrendered to the Nazi death machine.46a0 (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note-46a0)

Because of their continual, dialectically-inspired twists and turns, STD (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2001.htm#Abbreviations)s in effect all but invited the Nazi tiger to rip European humanity to shreds.

And, it was only too happy to oblige.

The negative effect of all this on the reputation of Marxism among the great mass of workers cannot be over-estimated, howsoever hard one tries.

Talk to anyone about Marxism (and not just Communism), and you will be regaled with much of the above. Thus, these days, everyone 'knows' it "does not work", and stands for heartless oppression.

We can only put all this down to "capitalist propaganda" if we want to see yet more of the same.

Of course, none of this is the sole fault of this mystical theory; but it is undeniable that it was a major factor in helping to rationalise the above political gyrations (for whatever other political reasons they were in fact taken), and in helping to sell them to party cadres. Over the years, this has had an inevitable and seriously demoralising effect.

Moreover, no other theory (save perhaps Zen Buddhism!) so easily excused the continual, and almost overnight, changes in strategy and tactics --, or rationalised so effectively the pathetic reasons that were given for the criminally unacceptable political about-turns imposed on the Communist Party internationally by post-1925 Stalinism.

Nor, indeed, could any other theory have so effortlessly licensed the grinding to dust of the core and periphery of the old Bolshevik Party in the 1930s, as scores of leading (and thousands of ordinary) comrades were put on 'trail' on trumped-up charges, and then executed -- or just summarily shot.

And you will still find communists (http://www.stalinsociety.org.uk/) defending the execution of these "wreckers" and "fascist" spies (the core of the party leadership!), along equally crazy, dialectical lines!

Millions dead, Bolshevism in tatters and Marxism a foul stench in the nostrils of workers everywhere.

'Materialist Dialectics', tested in practice? A resounding success?

Indeed, yes -- but only for the ruling-class!

[2] Maoism

Anyone who knows anything about Maoism will also know that MISTs (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2001.htm#Abbreviations) are serious Materialist Dialectic-oholics, and will brook no compromise. [An excellent recent example of this can be found here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/mao-zedong-t121784/index3.html) and here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/maos-theory-change-t130879/index.html).]

[This might have something to do with the fact that Daoism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taoism) shares much with Maoism. More on this in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Fourteen_Part_One.htm)).]

Nevertheless, deep dialectical devotion like this has meant that the anti-democratic and class collaborationist tactics adopted by the CPSU (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_the_Soviet_Union) were copied by the CCP (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_China) under Mao (http://www.marxists.de/china/harris/index.htm) (even if for locally different reasons). For example, the use of "principal" and "secondary" contradictions to justify the suicidal alliances with the G (http://www.marxists.de/china/hore/01-1949.htm)uomindang (http://www.marxists.de/china/hore/01-1949.htm), the use of UO (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2001.htm#Abbreviations)s to rationalise one-party, autocratic rule, and the reference to "leaps" to excuse the lunatic and murderous "Great Leap Forward (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forward)".

Maoists are among the most fanatical anti-Revisionists, but have they given Mao a hard time for revising Hegel, Marx, Engels and Lenin (who knew nothing of such 'contradictions')?

Once more: are you kidding?

Consider the first two of these: class collaboration and centralisation. Dialectical arguments favouring class-collaboration and the centralisation ("concentration") of power were not confined to CPSU theorists. In the mid-1930s, the abrupt change from out-right opposition to the Guomindang, to a policy of forming a united front with them was justified by, among other things, yet another dose of contradictory DM-concepts.

The whole sorry affair is well documented in Werner Meissner's detailed study; the reader is directed there for more details. However, a few choice examples will illustrate the influence of dialectical mayhem on the minds of CCP theorists. Consider the argument of CCP-theorist Ai Ssu-ch'i (whose work was highly influential on Mao):46a (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note 46a)

"The law of identity is a rule of the abstract, absolute unity; it sees in identical things only the aspect of absolute identity, recognising this aspect alone and disregarding its own contradictory and antagonistic aspects. Since an object can only be absolutely identical to itself, it therefore cannot be identical to another aspect. One expresses this with the formula: A is not Not-A, or A is B (sic) and simultaneously it cannot be Not-B.... For example, 'retreat is not attack' (A is Not-A (sic)), concentration is limitation of democracy (A is B), one cannot in this case develop democracy (simultaneously 'not is Not-B' (sic)). In this definition, an object (concept, thing, etc.) is confronted absolutely with another object, which lies beyond the actual object, a consequence of which is that an object (A) and the others (Not-A) have no relations at all with each other.... The law of identity thus only recognises abstract identity, and the law of contradiction only recognises an absolute opposite." [Ai Ssu-ch'i, 'Formal Logic And Dialectic', quoted in Meissner (1990), p.107. Bold emphasis added.]

We have already (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm#Practically) had occasion to note the sloppy syntax (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm#Several detailed) found throughout the writings of these 'superior' dialectical logicians, but here is yet another example. For instance, the "A" above at one point is "retreat" while "Not-A" is "not attack"!

[In addition, it has already (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm) been shown that the above 'conclusions' only seem to follow because everything has been turned into an object of some sort.]

Despite this, Ai Ssu-ch'i continues in the same fantastical vein:

"The law of the excluded third specifies: either there is an absolute identity (A is B) or an absolute opposition (A is not B); an object cannot be simultaneously identical and at the same time be antagonistic. For example 'concentration' is either limited democracy or unlimited democracy; it cannot at the same time be limited and a developed democracy. A government in which the people participate is either a democratic organ or it is not a democratic organ. It cannot be simultaneously democratic and insufficiently democratic. Therefore the law of the excluded third only recognises opposition or unity, and struggles against the 'unity of opposites'. This meant that it ['formal logic'] and the dialectic are diametrically opposed." [Ibid. Bold emphases added.]

Meissner summarises Ai Ssu-ch'i main points as follows:

"1. What is the meaning of 'Retreat is not attack'? As we will see in more detail below, this formulation referred to the strategic principles of the long-protracted war....

"For Mao Tse-Tung...the defence of Wuhan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wuhan) had no special meaning. Instead he advocated surrendering the city and building up the resistance in the countryside. Ai Ssu-ch'i thus defended Mao's tactics, in that he dismissed the phrase 'Retreat is not attack' as 'formal logically'. To consider the 'retreat' from Wuhan solely as a retreat or non-attack corresponded, according to Ai, to the first law of 'formal logic' and was in no way seen as 'dialectical'. On the other hand, Ai wanted to show that the retreat was at one and the same time both a retreat and not a retreat.... The retreat thus contained an attack.

"2. The explanations of 'democratisation' and 'concentration' were also a criticism of Wang Ming's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Ming) concepts of setting back 'democratisation' in favour of the 'concentration' of all political and military forces, and of attempting to commit the CCP exclusively to the support of the national government. Behind this was hidden the consideration that a possible 'democratisation' of Kuomintang control could lead to an impairment of the military effectiveness of the United Front. Ai criticised this view a 'formal logically', because 'democratisation' and 'concentration' were seen as mutually exclusive contradictions....

"3. However, Ai Ssu-ch'i' made a further observation concerning the relationship between the CCP and the Kuomintang by speaking of the 'unification of several objects identical to themselves' and by characterising them as a 'formal-logical' combination of independent, mutually unrelated objects, which thus represented a state of rest. The 'formal-logical identity' served him as an example of how the relationship between the two parties should not be constituted....

"Through the example of the 'law of identity', Ai also grappled with the question of how far the CCP should acquiesce in the Kuomintang's demand to base itself on the 'Three principles of the people', without endangering the independence of the CCP....

'Since the law of identity only recognises the absolute aspect of identity, one can maintain in the United Front that all parties and factions have now already given up their independence and have only one goal; consequently, many people say that the CP has given up Marxism. Since, on the other hand, the law of contradiction only recognises the absolute opposite, some people advocate the view that every party and faction must retain its own independent programme and organisation'. [Ibid.]

"Ai characterised the adherents of the first view as 'right deviationists' and those of the second as 'left deviationists'.... Both groups...are, according to Ai, 'formal-logical' in their thought; they consider one aspect of the whole and make it absolute.... 'Formal logic' recognises only attack and/or retreat, only concentration and/or democracy, only the 'three principles of the people' and/or communism. However, it is not capable of comprehending the existing relationships between those respective pairs of objects....

"Thus, in concrete terms, 'dialectical logic' can be explained thus: the United Front is accepted and at the same time rejected, in that the struggle against the Kuomintang is to be continued within the United Front." [Meissner (1990), pp.107-110. Bold emphases added.]

Anyone interested in this sort of material can read page after page of this lame-brained 'logic' (and not all of it from the writings of Ai Ssu-ch'i), summarised for us in Meissner's book. In these writings alone we can see how dialectics 'allowed' its acolytes to see the world any which way they liked, and how it insulated their thought from material reality at the same time.

Consider next the second of these examples: the 'contradiction' between centralised state power and greater social and democratic accountability. Dialectical dodges similar to those employed by Stalin were used by Mao and his acolytes to rationalise this "paradox" by an appeal to the alleged 'contradictory' nature of 'socialist' democracy. [Indeed, we saw some of this 'logic' in Ai Ssu-ch'i's 'reasoning' above.]

Mao himself tried to justify class-collaboration as well as the contradictory combination of autocracy with proletarian democracy (the latter along the same lines as Stalin):

"The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another.)

"That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion.

"This being so, there is an utter lack of identity or unity. How then can one speak of identity or unity?

"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below'.... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'how opposites can be ... identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.

"But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.

"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?

"The Kuomintang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counter-revolutionary party after 1927 because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions); but it has been compelled to agree to resist Japan because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies a definite identity....

"To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the people is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing this dictatorship and advancing to the higher stage when all state systems are eliminated. To establish and build the Communist Party is in fact to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the Communist Party and all political parties. To build a revolutionary army under the leadership of the Communist Party and to carry on revolutionary war is in fact to prepare the conditions for the permanent elimination of war. These opposites are at the same time complementary....

"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another'." [Mao (1961) (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm), pp.337-40. Bold emphases added.]47 (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note 47)

Hence, for Mao, as it was for Stalin, less democracy meant more democracy!

[As we have seen (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm#The Interpenetration Of Opposites), the idea in the passage above that things "struggle" with and then turn into their opposites (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm#Note_10b1) can't work. This means that dialectics cannot (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm#UO-objection) in fact account for change! On this, see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Primaryconfusions), too.]

Now, such wacky ideas have been shown up for what they are in other Essays posted at this site, but those recorded above were included to demonstrate how Maoist versions of 'Materialist Dialectics' helped corrupt not only Mao's thought processes, but also the strategy and tactics of the CCP.

DM: tested in practice?

Once again: indeed so! And we can see the results today in that model 'socialist state': China.

Of course, at the very least, this means that approximately 20% of the population of this planet cannot now (and might not in the foreseeable future ever) be won over to any credible form of Marxism, since the vast majority have been inured to it, having seen the dire consequences of this contradictory theory, which preaches 'proletarian democracy', but won't actually trust them with any of it, alongside the "mass-line", while practicing mass oppression --, these dialectical 'contradictions' rationalised along sound Stalinist lines.

Chinese workers and peasants do not need anyone to inform them of the results of "practice"; the vast majority can see for themselves the political and social consequences of this 'theory'.

And now 'Materialist Dialectics (http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=15&art_id=12899&sid=6814740&con_type=1&d_str=20060227&sear_year=2006)' is being used to justify the existence (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JD18Cb02.html) of 'socialist' billionaires (http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/nov2007/chin-n14.shtml)!

But, it's no use you complaining that this is a contradiction in terms. You clearly do not "understand" dialectics!

Once more, anyone who thinks the above is prejudicial to Mao, need only reflect on the fact that, since Maoism has been ditched, China has turned into one of the most successful economies on earth. A rather fitting unity of opposites...

[Recall an earlier assertion: Anyone can justify any conclusion they like, and its opposite, using 'Materialist Dialectics'. So, if the above looks contradictory or misguided to you, dear reader, you just do not "understand" anti-dialectics...]

[3] Trotskyism

Trotskyism has similarly been cursed by the Dialectical Deity; its founder succeeded in super-gluing his followers to the crazy dialectical doctrine that the 'socialist' regime in the former USSR was contradictory. In that case, it made perfectly good dialectical-sense to suppose that the ruling-class (i.e., the proletariat) exercised no power at all, and were systematically oppressed for their pains, even while they were still the ruling class! [This is the Trotskyist equivalent of the "Retreat is attack" claim of Ai Ssu-ch'i (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Ai-Ssu-chi), we met earlier.]

"The bourgeois norms of distribution, by hastening the growth of material power, ought to serve socialist aims -- but only in the last analysis. The state assumes directly and from the very beginning a dual character: socialistic, insofar as it defends social property in the means of production; bourgeois, insofar as the distribution of life's goods is carried out with a capitalistic measure of value and all the consequences ensuing therefrom. Such a contradictory characterization may horrify the dogmatists and scholastics; we can only offer them our condolences." [Trotsky (1977), p.54 (http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch03.htm). Bold emphasis added.]

Hence, because 'Materialist Dialectics' appeared to demand it, all good Trotskyists were required to defend the USSR as a workers' state --, albeit "degenerated". As Trotsky argued at length [in Trotsky (1971)], only those who failed to "understand" dialectics would disagree:

"Is it possible after the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact to consider the USSR a workers' state? The future of the Soviet state has again and again aroused discussion in our midst. Small wonder; we have before us the first experiment in the workers' state in history. Never before and nowhere else has this phenomenon been available for analysis. In the question of the social character of the USSR, mistakes commonly flow, as we have previously stated, from replacing the historical fact with the programmatic norm. Concrete fact departs from the norm. This does not signify, however, that it has overthrown the norm; on the contrary, it has reaffirmed it, from the negative side. The degeneration of the first workers' state, ascertained and explained by us, has only the more graphically shown what the workers' state should be, what it could and would be under certain historical conditions. The contradiction between the concrete fact and the norm constrains us not to reject the norm but, on the contrary, to fight for it by means of the revolutionary road.... (p.3)

"The events did not catch us unawares. It is necessary only to interpret them correctly. It is necessary to understand clearly that sharp contradictions are contained in the character of the USSR and in her international position. It is impossible to free oneself from those contradictions with the help of terminological sleight-of-hand ('workers' state' -- 'not workers' state'). We must take the facts as they are. We must build our policy by taking as our starting point the real relations and contradictions.... (p.24)

"The present political discussion in the party has confirmed my apprehensions and warning in an incomparably sharper form than I could have expected, or, more correctly, feared.... The attitude of [Shachtman (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Shachtman) and Burnham (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Burnham)] toward the nature of the Soviet state reproduces point for point their attitude toward the dialectic.... (pp.60-61)

"...Burnham and Shachtman themselves demonstrated that their attitude toward such an 'abstraction' as dialectical materialism found its precise manifestation in their attitude toward the Soviet state.... (pp.61-62)

"Last year I was visited by a young British professor of political economy, a sympathizer of the Fourth International. During our conversation on the ways and means of realizing socialism, he suddenly expressed the tendencies of British utilitarianism in the spirit of Keynes and others: 'It is necessary to determine a clear economic end, to choose the most reasonable means for its realization,'. I remarked: 'I see that you are an adversary of dialectics.' He replied, somewhat astonished: 'Yes, I don't see any use in it.' 'However,' I replied to him, 'the dialectic enabled me on the basis of a few of your observations upon economic problems to determine what category of philosophical thought you belong to -- this alone shows that there is an appreciable value in the dialectic.' Although I have received no word about my visitor since then, I have no doubt that this anti-dialectic professor maintains the opinion that the USSR is not a workers' state, that unconditional defense of the USSR is an 'out-moded' opinion.... If it is possible to place a given person's general type of thought on the basis of his relation to concrete practical problems, it is also possible to predict approximately, knowing his general type of thought, how a given individual will approach one or another practical question. That is the incomparable educational value of the dialectical method of thought.... (pp.62-63)

"The definition of the USSR given by comrade Burnham, 'not a workers' and 'not a bourgeois state,' is purely negative, wrenched from the chain of historical development, left dangling in mid-air, void of a single particle of sociology and represents simply a theoretical capitulation of pragmatism before a contradictory historical phenomenon.

"If Burnham were a dialectical materialist, he would have probed the following three questions: (1) What is the historical origin of the USSR? (2) What changes has this state suffered during its existence? (3) Did these changes pass from the quantitative stage to the qualitative? That is, did they create a historically necessary domination by a new exploiting class? Answering these questions would have forced Burnham to draw the only possible conclusion -- the USSR is still a degenerated workers' state.... (p.68)

"It is not surprising that the theoreticians of the opposition who reject dialectic thought capitulate lamentably before the contradictory nature of the USSR. However the contradiction between the social basis laid down by the revolution, and the character of the caste which arose out of the degeneration of the revolution is not only an irrefutable historical fact but also a motor force. In our struggle for the overthrow of the bureaucracy we base ourselves on this contradiction.... (p.69)

"...Dialectic training of the mind, as necessary to a revolutionary fighter as finger exercises to a pianist, demands approaching all problems as processes and not as motionless categories. Whereas vulgar evolutionists, who limit themselves generally to recognizing evolution in only certain spheres, content themselves in all other questions with the banalities of 'common sense.'

"A vulgar petty-bourgeois radical is similar to a liberal 'progressive' in that he takes the USSR as a whole, failing to understand its internal contradictions and dynamics. When Stalin concluded an alliance with Hitler, invaded Poland, and now Finland, the vulgar radicals triumphed; the identity of the methods of Stalinism and fascism was proved. They found themselves in difficulties however when the new authorities invited the population to expropriate the landowners and capitalists-they had not foreseen this possibility at all! Meanwhile the social revolutionary measures, carried out via bureaucratic military means, not only did not disturb our, dialectic, definition of the USSR as a degenerated workers' state, but gave it the most incontrovertible corroboration. Instead of utilizing this triumph of Marxian analysis for persevering agitation, the petty-bourgeois oppositionists began to shout with criminal light-mindedness that the events have refuted our prognosis, that our old formulas are no longer applicable.... (pp.70-71)

"Tomorrow the Stalinists will strangle the Finnish workers. But now they are giving -- they are compelled to give -- a tremendous impulse to the class struggle in its sharpest form. The leaders of the opposition construct their policy not upon the 'concrete' process that is taking place in Finland, but upon democratic abstractions and noble sentiments.... (p.74)

"Anyone acquainted with the history of the struggles of tendencies within workers' parties knows that desertions to the camp of opportunism and even to the camp of bourgeois reaction began not infrequently with rejection of the dialectic. Petty-bourgeois intellectuals consider the dialectic the most vulnerable point in Marxism and at the same time they take advantage of the fact that it is much more difficult for workers to verify differences on the philosophical than on the political plane. This long known fact is backed by all the evidence of experience.... (p.94)

"The opposition circles consider it possible to assert that the question of dialectic materialism was introduced by me only because I lacked an answer to the 'concrete' questions of Finland, Latvia, India, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and so on. This argument, void of all merit in itself, is of interest however in that it characterizes the level of certain individuals in the opposition, their attitude toward theory and toward elementary ideological loyalty. It would not be amiss, therefore, to refer to the fact that my first serious conversation with comrades Shachtman and Warde, in the train immediately after my arrival in Mexico in January 1937, was devoted to the necessity of persistently propagating dialectic materialism. After our American section split from the Socialist Party I insisted most strongly on the earliest possible publication of a theoretical organ, having again in mind the need to educate the party, first and foremost its new members, in the spirit of dialectic materialism. In the United States, I wrote at that time, where the bourgeoisie systematically in stills (sic) vulgar empiricism in the workers, more than anywhere else is it necessary to speed the elevation of the movement to a proper theoretical level.... (p.142)

"This impulse in the direction of socialist revolution was possible only because the bureaucracy of the USSR straddles and has its roots in the economy of a workers' state. The revolutionary utilization of this 'impulse' by the Ukrainian Byelo-Russians was possible only through the class struggle in the occupied territories and through the power of the example of the October Revolution. Finally, the swift strangulation or semi-strangulation of this revolutionary mass movement was made possible through the isolation of this movement and the might of the Moscow bureaucracy. Whoever failed to understand the dialectic interaction of these three factors: the workers' state, the oppressed masses and the Bonapartist bureaucracy, had best restrain himself from idle talk about events in Poland.... (p.163) [Trotsky (1971). Bold emphases added.]47a (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note-47a)

All this helped cripple the politics of the Fourth International (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_International) in the run-up to WW2 (and this has remained so since) -- whose cadres, even while they were advocating a principled anti-imperialist stance, were quite happy to defend Stalinist imperialism.

And, as if to compound this monumental error, Trotsky used dialectics to justify the murderous Stalinist invasion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winter_War) of Finland!

All so contradictory, all so dialectical!48 (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Note 48)

Post-WW2, devotion to this 'theory' has prompted them to argue that red army tanks were capable of bringing socialism (http://www.marxists.org/archive/hallas/works/1973/xx/fidecline.htm) to Eastern Europe in the absence of a worker's revolution (a line that was in fact in agreement with the analysis concocted by the Stalinists!). Substitutionism justified by another dose of dialectical double-dealing.

More dialectically-'justified' practice, more dead workers, more ordure heaped on Marxism.

Do you begin to see a pattern here?

After Trotsky was murdered by a Stalinist agent, the application of 'scientific dialectics' to the contradictory nature of the USSR (and its satellites in Eastern Europe) split the Fourth International (http://gfdl.marxists.org.uk/archive/hallas/works/1973/xx/fidecline.htm) into countless warring sects (http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/Sectariana/Pub.html), who have continued to fragment to this day.

Indeed, this is the only aspect of practical dialectics that Trotskyists have managed to perfect as their movement continues to splinter under its own 'internal contradictions'.

Unfortunately, Trotsky's heirs could not quite agree which was the more important principle: loyalty to their founder's 'dialectical method', or to Marx's belief that the emancipation of the working (http://www.marxists.org/history/international/iwma/documents/1867/rules.htm) class must be the act of the working class itself. However, if the latter is indeed the case, the emancipation of the working class cannot be an act of the Red Army (in Finland, Eastern Europe or even North Korea), of 'Third World' guerrillas (in China, Cuba, Nepal, Peru, etc.), of nationalist/'progressive' dictators, or even of radicalised students, to name but a few of the groups that have been 'dialectically substituted' for the working class by assorted Trotskyists over the last sixty years or so. Indeed, if it were possible to create workers' states in this way (deformed/degenerated or not), then Stalinism is indeed "progressive", and Pablo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Pablo) was right.

And it is little use complaining that this contradicts Trotsky's belief that Stalinism is inherently counter-revolutionary (as these (http://www.bolshevik.org/history/pabloism/gop.html) comrades try to do, again on sound 'dialectical' lines), for, if everything is contradictory, then on equally sound 'dialectical' lines, so is Stalinism. On such a basis, the former USSR is both counter-revolutionary and 'progressive' all rolled into one -- as we saw yet again when its forces invaded Afghanistan (http://www.lrp-cofi.org/PR/AfghanistanSV9.html). [This link leads to an article which is plainly the Spartacist (http://www.spartacist.org/english/icldop/index.html) equivalent of the "Retreat is attack" claim of Ai Ssu-ch'i (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Ai-Ssu-chi), we met earlier.]

Dialectics has been used, and is still being used, to justify every conceivable form of substitutionism (http://www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1960/xx/trotsub.htm). To take one more example: dialectical dissembling allowed Ted Grant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Grant) to invent yet another contradictory idea (http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~socappeal/russia/part11.html) -- "Proletarian Bonapartism (http://www.marxists.de/trotism/callinicos/3-2_orthodox.htm)" -- in order to account for the fact that the Stalinist regime in the former USSR, and the Maoist clique in China, was actually oppressing the supposed ruling-class: i.e., workers! [The ghost of Ai Ssu-ch'i (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm#Ai-Ssu-chi) lives on!]

All this dialectical wavering has fatally wounded Trotskyism. It might never recover. At present the signs are not good. The difficulties (http://liammacuaid.wordpress.com/2007/10/30/open-letter-from-socialist-worker-new-zealand-to-the-british-swp) recently experienced in UK-Respect are just another indication of this long-term malaise.

Here are two paragraphs taken from a recent letter written by the CC of the SWP in New Zealand to the UK-SWP:

"'The critics of the [UK] SWP's position have organised themselves under the slogan 'firm in principles, flexible in tactics'. But separating principles and tactics in this way is completely un-Marxist. Tactics derive from principles. Indeed the only way that principles can become effective is if they are embodied in day-to-day tactics.' [This is a quote from the UK-SWP.]

"In contrast, Socialist Worker -- New Zealand sees Respect -- and other 'broad left' formations, such as Die Linke (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left_Party_(Germany)) in Germany, the Left Bloc in Portugal, the PSUV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Socialist_Party_of_Venezuela) in Venezuela and RAM (http://www.ram-auckland.net/wordpress/index.php) in New Zealand -- as transitional formations, in the sense that Trotsky would have understood. In programme and organization, they must 'meet the class half-way' -- to provide a dialectical unity between revolutionary principle and reformist mass consciousness. If they have an electoral orientation, we must face the fact that this cannot be avoided at this historical point. Lenin said in 'Left-Wing' Communism that parliamentary politics are not yet obsolete as far as the mass of the class are concerned -- this is not less true in 2007 than it was in 1921. The question is not whether Respect should go in a 'socialist' or 'electoralist' direction, but in how Respect's electoral programme and strategy can embody a set of transitional demands which intersect with the existing electoralist consciousness of the working class." [Quoted from here (http://unityaotearoa.blogspot.com/2007/10/crisis-in-respect-letter-to-british-swp.html). Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Tactics from principles, or flexible tactics from inflexible principles? WTF does this mean? From which stone tablets have these verities been lifted?

Internal Bulletins/Documents are full of empty, but radical-sounding rallying calls like this (one (ex-member of the UK-SWP, John Rees) recently sought to defend the "united front of special kind" entered into by the UK-SWP, as a "unity of opposites (http://splinteredsunrise.wordpress.com/2009/11/28/madness-to-the-method)" -- on that basis, as we saw above with Mao, any sort of class-collaboration can be 'justified'!) which are then used to berate whoever has fallen foul of the CC member who has just invented them (or who has just dredged them up from the last faction fight) -- this frame of mind aggravated by far too many years of "dialectical training" than is good for any human being to have to endure. [Several more examples of this sort of thing are given in Essay Ten Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm#UK-SWP).]

So, even in the Trotskyist 'tradition', dialectics is still rearing its ugly head. Clearly, comrades just do not learn.

Conclusion

If truth is tested in practice (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm), the clear message of history is:

Please, comrades -- no more Dialectical practice!!

The whole essay can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm).

One can further look at the Black Panther Party who used dialectics to create crazy theories like intercommunlism, etc. There are plenty of examples if one just looks.

S.Artesian

26th September 2010, 01:01

Idealist horseshit, you should pardon the vulgarity. "Stalinism" did not originate in the "Hegelian mystification" of Marx's analysis of capital.

Here's the task-- trace the material development of the fSU after 1917 to the lingering, residual "Hegelian mysticism" that Marx employs in his analysis of the labor process and the valorisation process.

Show us not how Stalin or Mao converts dialectic, Hegel, Marx etc. into an ideology to justify x... y...z..., but how Marx's analysis, pre vol 1 is mystified, and the subsequent development of the class struggle is determined by the specific mystified elements in the "earlier Marx."

Show us how Hegelian mystification is responsible for NEP, for the defeat of the struggle in Germany 1919, 1921, and even 1923. Show us the Hegelian mysticism in the early Marx that leads to the "popular front," or the third period.

Rosa can't do that, and neither can you.

Rosa's "arguments" are no different than those that claim "Stalinist totalitarianism" originates in Marx's communism because Marx speaks of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Rosa's argument is predicated on an ignorance of Marx, of materialism, of history, that is to say class struggle.

ChrisK

26th September 2010, 21:59

Idealist horseshit, you should pardon the vulgarity. "Stalinism" did not originate in the "Hegelian mystification" of Marx's analysis of capital.

Ummm, she didn't write that, nor do any of us believe that. What is being pointed out is that it was a helpful tool in legitimizing Stalin and Mao's anti-workers democracy position. This is further evidenced by the section on Trotsky, where he agreed with Stalin.

Here's the task-- trace the material development of the fSU after 1917 to the lingering, residual "Hegelian mysticism" that Marx employs in his analysis of the labor process and the valorisation process.

Show us not how Stalin or Mao converts dialectic, Hegel, Marx etc. into an ideology to justify x... y...z..., but how Marx's analysis, pre vol 1 is mystified, and the subsequent development of the class struggle is determined by the specific mystified elements in the "earlier Marx."

Show us how Hegelian mystification is responsible for NEP, for the defeat of the struggle in Germany 1919, 1921, and even 1923. Show us the Hegelian mysticism in the early Marx that leads to the "popular front," or the third period.

Rosa can't do that, and neither can you.

This is quite a simple matter actually. By using the residual mysticism, people can easily make the leap from coquetted Hegelian terminology to Engel's dialectical materialism. From there, other revolutionaries use dialectical materialism in their arguments when all hope seems lost.

Within the Soviet Union, this can be seen by dialectical materialism not playing a key role in arguments until all hope has been lost after the loss of the German Revolution. From here Stalin begins to take over and uses diamat to legitimize his dictatorship.

Simple.

Rosa's "arguments" are no different than those that claim "Stalinist totalitarianism" originates in Marx's communism because Marx speaks of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Rosa's argument is predicated on an ignorance of Marx, of materialism, of history, that is to say class struggle.

No, her argument is that dialectical reasoning is one facet as to why Marxism has been failing and why it is so ineffectual today.

S.Artesian

26th September 2010, 23:00

Ummm, she didn't write that, nor do any of us believe that. What is being pointed out is that it was a helpful tool in legitimizing Stalin and Mao's anti-workers democracy position. This is further evidenced by the section on Trotsky, where he agreed with Stalin.

Again, idealist nonsense, the same sort of nonsense that says "Marxism can be used to justify Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, Bordiga, Goerter, Levi,-- look how all the Marxists say they are the real Marxists. Obviously, Marxism is the source, the useful tool, for legitimizing the defeats of the proletarian revolution."

To answer that, we don't go and argue about the quality of Stalin's, Mao's, etc. understanding of Marxism. We provide a materialist analysis, the arrangement of classes, the relations of classes, and the actual history of struggle.

We don't say Trotsky's argument for the militarization of labor finds a "useful tool" in "Hegelian mystification," we point out how fundamentally anti-productive, backward, materially destructive the militarization of labor is.

Stalin, Trotsky, Mao, Bordiga, etc etc all talk about the labor theory of value -- does that mean the LTV is a useful tool for x...y...z...?

This is quite a simple matter actually. By using the residual mysticism, people can easily make the leap from coquetted Hegelian terminology to Engel's dialectical materialism. From there, other revolutionaries use dialectical materialism in their arguments when all hope seems lost.

Making a leap? Why, how Hegelian of you. So.. the sequence is Marx says, just kidding around, "contradiction" "abstraction" in the chapters on value, Engels then leaps to "quantity into quality," Plekhanov gets us DM, and Kautsky gets us to.... what? abstention on war credits instead of internationalist opposition to WW1?

WTF happened to the actual transformations of capitalism in this process, the actual process of accumulation, and class struggle?

That's more than leaping, that's leaps, bounds, somersaults, back flips, cartwheels, and headstanding.

And how to explain that in this so-called dialectical materialism, the DMs manage to ignore the actual revolutionary components of Marx's analysis, which he himself always explores..... [I]dialectically?

Here you are assuming what you must first prove: residual mysticism. Where is the residual mysticism in Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1864? Where is there residual mysticism in his proposed 6th chapter of Capital, on the direct results of the production process? Where is the residual mysticism in the Grundrisse-- which BTW the DMs didn't even know about, nor did they know about the Economic Manuscripts. So where is this residual mysticism in Marx? In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844? Nope, and the DM's didn't know about those either. In the Poverty of Philosophy? In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy? In volumes 2, 3 of Capital?

I'm waiting for someone to show me this residual mysticism in Marx's work, exactly how the concepts of wage-labor, capital, private property, social production, use value, value, surplus value, etc etc are mystified by Marx anywhere, and how he corrects that in volume 1.... and I'll add a new wrinkle, how the DM's takes on these critical categories refers to that residual mysticism that, because it must reside somewhere, resides in Marx's work?

Within the Soviet Union, this can be seen by dialectical materialism not playing a key role in arguments until all hope has been lost after the loss of the German Revolution. From here Stalin begins to take over and uses diamat to legitimize his dictatorship.

Please, that's simply ignorant. The ideological pretension at DM is not the method, the power, the social basis through which Stalin "legitimizes his dictatorship."

There are real material forces, real economic, social conflicts, that generate the disruption of the revolutionary process, that lead to the inversion of revolutionary relations between party and class, that destroy the mediations for those relations-- the soviets. Saying "Stalin begins to take over and use diamat to legitimize his dictatorship" simply does not square up with what actually happened, why it happened or how it happened.

You're being taken in by the advertising.

No, her argument is that dialectical reasoning is one facet as to why Marxism has been failing and why it is so ineffectual today.

Think about that. Doesn't that strike you as a bit "unMarxist" in its formulation? "Dialectical reasoning is one facet as to why Marxism has been failing"? I mean I can make you a better argument to use simply by saying "All this pretense at dialectic is simply an excuse not to deal with the fact that Marxism has been failing."

So how has Marxism been failing?

The absurdity is in "thinking," literally in the thinking that thinking is part of the reason, one facet of Marxism's failure, when [I]there has been no failure of Marxism. Does Marx's analysis correctly analyze the origin, organization, reproduction, accumulation of capital? Does Marx's analysis correctly analyze the barriers, limits, integuments to that organization, reproduction, accumulation of capital? Does Marx's analysis correctly establish that the barriers, integuments, limitations to accumulation, reproduction, organization of capital are immanent to the very organization, accumulation and reproduction of capital? Does Marx's analysis correctly locate a necessity for the abolition of capital in capital's very rendering of the labor process as the valorisation process, in what Marx repeatedly identifies as the opposition of labor and the conditions of labor?

Now I answer yes to all 4. For Marxism to be a failure, you have to answer "no" somewhere along that line, and then show us the "no."

And that's all I want someone to do. Show me where there is no inherent, immanent need for the abolition of capital based on the very terms, the necessary logic, the determinants, the grounding of its own expansion and accumulation.

If you want to argue that the reason the proletarian revolution has failed to advance, that the legacy of October 1917 has been defeated, and that that defeated can be attributed to, in part, to residual mysticism of dialectic, then we're back at the beginning-- where you have to show that residual mysticism, and how not simply conscious decisions were made based on that mysticism, but that the entire class struggle was pinned to that residual mysticism.

You have to show NOT where somebody says "The Popular Front is the living embodiment of dialectical materialism," but how the origin of the popular front is NOT in conditions of class struggle under capitalism but in the residually mystified analysis of capitalism produced prior to volume 1 of Capital.

Thirsty Crow

27th September 2010, 20:04

I have an honest question for those of you who defend "dialectics": why is it so important to understand the "law of negation of the negation" in order that "mutual connections" between labour and capital (which may be reproduced in text, narrative or speech as "paradoxical") may be understood? Moreover, what does it mean to understand dialectics in the form of its "laws"? How could one understand a law (a natural law? a law of...what?) but by understanding its effects?
Seriously, these are honest questions.

S.Artesian

27th September 2010, 22:51

I don't think the formal understanding of any dialectical law, separate and apart from its significance for analyzing capitalism, and acting upon that analysis is important.

What I think is important is the critical comprehension of capital that makes wage-labor its identity and its opposition, its determinant and its negation; that makes class struggle along class lines the only direction for effecting a transformation, so that effective action can be taken against the bourgeoisie and for revolution.

That's the only way we can explain, appropriate, and mobilize against, why and what capital does. Without that, we cannot develop a revolutionary program, one that aims for the actual abolition of capitalism.

We can get lots of reformism, we can get popular fronts, we can get all sorts of mish-mash theories about the "3rd world," about the peasantry, but we won't be able to develop any means of overthrowing capital.

Doesn't mean we go out and preach "dialectics" to the working class. Does mean we recognize the logic of capital, and of Capital, in that the accumulation of capital entails the necessity, on its own terms, on the basis of an immanent critique for its overthrown, and that overthrow can only be accomplished by a class that exists in opposition to the conditions of its own labor.

Which is why, since the anti-dialecticians don't have a single concrete contribution to make on questions, understanding of value, of the valorisation process, of the limits to that process as Marx describes it, I don't think they have a single contribution to make period.

ChrisK

28th September 2010, 21:02

Again, idealist nonsense, the same sort of nonsense that says "Marxism can be used to justify Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, Bordiga, Goerter, Levi,-- look how all the Marxists say they are the real Marxists. Obviously, Marxism is the source, the useful tool, for legitimizing the defeats of the proletarian revolution."

Thats not idealist. Idealist would be saying that the world is not material and is entirely made up of thought. That is in no way implied in claiming that an idea was used to legitimize a role. We've been through this.

Except that I don't claim to throw out Marx's method (the one shared with Kant). I want to clean it up, not a total rejection of it. Further, I would want to clean up any misinterpretation of Marx as these contribute to Marxisms continued failures.

Making a leap? Why, how Hegelian of you.

So Hegel came up with, and has ownership of, a turn of phrase? My how capitalist of you.

So.. the sequence is Marx says, just kidding around, "contradiction" "abstraction" in the chapters on value, Engels then leaps to "quantity into quality," Plekhanov gets us DM, and Kautsky gets us to.... what? abstention on war credits instead of internationalist opposition to WW1?

Actually, yes in a way. Oh, and not kidding around, teasing with.

[Refering to the Second International] Socialism would come intevitably, as a result of the contradictions of capitalism, it was constantly stressed.

Bracketed mine.

So we have DM being used by the second international to claim that revolution shouldn't be striven for because Socialism is inevitable. This is a perfectly valid argument using DM (opposites transforming into one another).

WTF happened to the actual transformations of capitalism in this process, the actual process of accumulation, and class struggle?

That's more than leaping, that's leaps, bounds, somersaults, back flips, cartwheels, and headstanding.

I don't need accumulation theories to explain how ideas are misrepresented.

And how to explain that in this so-called dialectical materialism, the DMs manage to ignore the actual revolutionary components of Marx's analysis, which he himself always explores..... [I]dialectically?

The second international succeeded in doing it.

Here you are assuming what you must first prove: residual mysticism. Where is the residual mysticism in Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1864? Where is there residual mysticism in his proposed 6th chapter of Capital, on the direct results of the production process? Where is the residual mysticism in the Grundrisse-- which BTW the DMs didn't even know about, nor did they know about the Economic Manuscripts. So where is this residual mysticism in Marx? In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844? Nope, and the DM's didn't know about those either. In the Poverty of Philosophy? In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy? In volumes 2, 3 of Capital?

I'm waiting for someone to show me this residual mysticism in Marx's work, exactly how the concepts of wage-labor, capital, private property, social production, use value, value, surplus value, etc etc are mystified by Marx anywhere, and how he corrects that in volume 1.... and I'll add a new wrinkle, how the DM's takes on these critical categories refers to that residual mysticism that, because it must reside somewhere, resides in Marx's work?

We've been over this. The residual is in his use of Hegelian terms.

Please, that's simply ignorant. The ideological pretension at DM is not the method, the power, the social basis through which Stalin "legitimizes his dictatorship."

Please, if you don't believe ideas and ideologies are used to help prop up systems, then you are being blind.

There are real material forces, real economic, social conflicts, that generate the disruption of the revolutionary process, that lead to the inversion of revolutionary relations between party and class, that destroy the mediations for those relations-- the soviets. Saying "Stalin begins to take over and use diamat to legitimize his dictatorship" simply does not square up with what actually happened, why it happened or how it happened.

I never excluded any of that. Nor will I ever. I will, however, continue to consider DM a part of what Stalin used to hold power.

Think about that. Doesn't that strike you as a bit "unMarxist" in its formulation? "Dialectical reasoning is one facet as to why Marxism has been failing"? I mean I can make you a better argument to use simply by saying "All this pretense at dialectic is simply an excuse not to deal with the fact that Marxism has been failing."

Its more like holding onto religion in order to feel less of the pain, but yeah.

So how has Marxism been failing?

Russia, Germany, China, many other nations, gaining popular support, etc. Tell me, how has Marxism been successful?

The absurdity is in "thinking," literally in the thinking that thinking is part of the reason, one facet of Marxism's failure, when [I]there has been no failure of Marxism. Does Marx's analysis correctly analyze the origin, organization, reproduction, accumulation of capital? Does Marx's analysis correctly analyze the barriers, limits, integuments to that organization, reproduction, accumulation of capital? Does Marx's analysis correctly establish that the barriers, integuments, limitations to accumulation, reproduction, organization of capital are immanent to the very organization, accumulation and reproduction of capital? Does Marx's analysis correctly locate a necessity for the abolition of capital in capital's very rendering of the labor process as the valorisation process, in what Marx repeatedly identifies as the opposition of labor and the conditions of labor?

Now I answer yes to all 4. For Marxism to be a failure, you have to answer "no" somewhere along that line, and then show us the "no."

If Marxism is simply analysis then it is without revolutionary goals. Its revolutionary goals have not been met ever and not for lack of trying.

If you want to argue that the reason the proletarian revolution has failed to advance, that the legacy of October 1917 has been defeated, and that that defeated can be attributed to, in part, to residual mysticism of dialectic, then we're back at the beginning-- where you have to show that residual mysticism, and how not simply conscious decisions were made based on that mysticism, but that the entire class struggle was pinned to that residual mysticism.

You have to show NOT where somebody says "The Popular Front is the living embodiment of dialectical materialism," but how the origin of the popular front is NOT in conditions of class struggle under capitalism but in the residually mystified analysis of capitalism produced prior to volume 1 of Capital.

I need not do that as I believe that the popular front was simply Stalin showing that he was a State Capitalist and in line with the other capitalists. That does not disprove that DM has been used to legitimize democracy, anti-revolutionary tendencies and as a crutch to avoid looking at the fact that Marxism has not been a success.

Hit The North

28th September 2010, 22:07

Except that I don't claim to throw out Marx's method (the one shared with Kant). I want to clean it up, not a total rejection of it. Further, I would want to clean up any misinterpretation of Marx as these contribute to Marxisms continued failures.

Kant's method! This needs some elaboration on your part. Where does Marx, in any of his reflective commentary, claim to be using a method indebted to Kant?

Actually, yes in a way. Oh, and not kidding around, teasing with.
What POSSIBLE REASON would Marx have for mysteriously teasing with his readers in his magnum opus? And then waiting several years after publication before alerting his readers to this in the Preface to the 2nd German edition? This is the claim of an idiot! Moreover, an idiot who has not read Capital. Hegelianism wasn't even fashionable, it appealed to no contemporaneous audience - certainly not the readership Marx was after. The fact is that Marx employed terms like contradiction because the concept did work for him as Artesian has taken considerable pains to illustrate. If you have disagreements with this, your disagreement is with Marx.

So we have DM being used by the second international to claim that revolution shouldn't be striven for because Socialism is inevitable. This is a perfectly valid argument using DM (opposites transforming into one another).Actually, it was a teleological verson of historical materialism which was mostly appealed to in order to justify this fatalism. And why? Because the ideologues of the 2nd International ignored the dialectic between agency and structure in Marx's view:

Men make history, but not in the circumstances of their own choosing.

In fact, the main ideologues of the 2nd International were considerably less Hegelian than the ideologues of the Comintern.

Tell me, how has Marxism been successful?

It provides the best explanation of why capitalism behaves like it does and why the problems it presents to humanity can only be overcome through its overthrow. It is the best approach to understanding the connections between the political, the cultural, the ideological, and the material aspects of social life. It is the most coherent account of human history in its generality. It provides the best rebuttals to reformism. It succeeds on all these levels of critique. The one level it cannot succeed on is that it cannot summon up a revolution at will. Marxists can intervene in the class struggle but they can't pull it out their asses like magicians with monkeys. If you think some bogus mission of restoring the Kantian method to Marxism will alter that, you're crazy.

I need not do that as I believe that the popular front was simply Stalin showing that he was a State Capitalist and in line with the other capitalists. That does not disprove that DM has been used to legitimize democracy, anti-revolutionary tendencies and as a crutch to avoid looking at the fact that Marxism has not been a success.But a dialectical explanation would demand that we examine the material as well as the ideological determinations. You just focus on the ideological and therefore present a partial and one-sided view.

S.Artesian

28th September 2010, 22:12

Of course, Marxism has a revolutionary goal, but it is not a "utopian," a moral advocacy of that goal. It, Marxism, finds the reason, the necessity, the material basis for that revolution in the capital's own organization, its own "immanent critique," its own expanded reproduction and accumulation which amount to the basis for its own abolition.

This is what Marx, taking over and overtaking from Hegel, called contradiction, called the opposition of labor to the conditions of labor, called the conflict between the means and relations of production, called the negation of each in and by the existence of the other in his manuscripts.

Now if there's no internal logic, no necessity for the overthrow of capital based on its own terms of reproduction; if we're saying that the accumulation of capital does not, at a critical point, negate the accumulation of capital; if we're saying that at a certain point the expansion of the means of production does not contradict, contra-indicate, the realization of profit, and through that the expansion of the means of production; that there is no opposition within capital's reproduction of itself to capital's reproduction process.... then who's ever saying that needs to provide another analysis of the historical accumulation of capital. Whoever is saying that needs to give us another analysis of the conversion of particular concrete labor into social, abstract labor. Whoever is saying that has to give us another explanation for the necessity of the conversion of surplus-value into the means of production. Whoever is saying that has to give us some reason for the breakdown in the valorisation process that is external to the capitalist appropriation of labor-power.

So have at it-- take the residual "mysticism" out of Marx's Economic Manuscripts from 1857-1864. But don't just change the words "contradiction" and "negation." You need to do much more than that. You need to change the description and analysis of the reproduction of capital which Marx provides with a different analysis that abjures the notions of necessity, self-contradiction in accumulation,self-negation of value in the reproduction of value... and tell us where that leaves your Marxism as a "revolutionary activity."

ZeroNowhere

29th September 2010, 10:55

Kant's method! This needs some elaboration on your part. Where does Marx, in any of his reflective commentary, claim to be using a method indebted to Kant? Technically, Kant was certainly influential enough to have influenced Feuerbach and such, whose influence Marx was definitely quite conscious of.

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 12:14

Technically, if you check Marx's actual writings, published and unpublished, you will see how little importance Marx attached to Kant's theories.

I have to say, I particularly love this twist of our anti-dialecticians. What Marx writes and demonstrates of his critique/connection to Hegel, of the importance of Hegel to his, Marx's, dialectic, is transformed into its opposite-- a supposed extirpation of Hegel. What Marx doesn't write, demonstrate, acknowledge about Kant becomes evidence of Kant's supposed great influence.

We're not dealing with those who hold a different interpretation of Marx when we're dealing with our anti-dialecticians. We're dealing with those who disavow history and make things up.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 16:12

Smarty Pants:

Your repetition compulsion, and distortion of Marx's afterward, have been refuted, numerous times.

You have certainly rejected it many times (so you seem to be afflicted with a compuslion to repeat yourself), but we are still waiting for this much vaunted 'refutation.

Hermetic poison, huh? Please provide us with the results, the influence of such hermetic poison on the actual content and practice of Marxist analysis.

Done it at my site; but, as we know, you prefer to remain ignorant.:(

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 16:15

Smarty Pants:

We're dealing with those who...make things up.

Alas, as hard as we try, we still can't invent as much as you mystics do.

Fopr example, you seem to think Marx did not 'coquette' with Hegel's impenetrable jargon in Das Kapital, despite Marx telling us he did.:lol:

For instance, in this example of Hermetic gobbledygook:

So have at it-- take the residual "mysticism" out of Marx's Economic Manuscripts from 1857-1864. But don't just change the words "contradiction" and "negation." You need to do much more than that. You need to change the description and analysis of the reproduction of capital which Marx provides with a different analysis that abjures the notions of necessity, self-contradiction in accumulation,self-negation of value in the reproduction of value... and tell us where that leaves your Marxism as a "revolutionary activity."

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 16:28

No, I think Marx coquetted with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel in his, Marx's, explanation of value. And this is because it is in the identity of value, in its existence as a specific historical relation of social production and private property, that contains in "genetic," concentrated form, all the antagonisms, oppositions, of capital-- which is exactly what Marx called the dialectic of capital and labor.

So that in volume 1, explicitly organized to be an introductory volume, employing language that would not deter the lay-reader, Marx could only make the conflicts and interpenetrations of the value form intelligible by using language that might in fact deter the lay-reader. He assumed that any serious-minded person would be willing to make the effort, to struggle through this, and actually learn something new.

He was right, as you yourself prove in the negative.

But you just stay steady there Rosa. Keep on making stuff up about the importance of Kant, and how Marx was actually following the dialectical tradition of the English school of political economy, thereby showing how little you know about that school, about Marx, and of course, about value.

Your lack of understanding of Marx's method, and content, his transformation and overcoming of the categories of speculative philosophy is enormous, as evidenced by your inability to grasp what Marx intends and demonstrates with his use of abstraction.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 16:33

Smarty Pants:

"Stalinism" did not originate in the "Hegelian mystification" of Marx's analysis of capital.

Where does that passage from one of my essays say it did?

The point is that Stalinists, Maoists, Trotskyists and other assorted Dialectical Marxists use this 'theory' to 'justify' anything they like and its opposite. And they use it to 'prove' all the rest 'do not understand dialectics' and are in the grip of a 'ready made' formula, etc.

Here's the task-- trace the material development of the fSU after 1917 to the lingering, residual "Hegelian mysticism" that Marx employs in his analysis of the labor process and the valorisation process.

And why would we want to do that if Marx waved all this gobbledygook 'goodbye' in Das Kapital?

Show us not how Stalin or Mao converts dialectic, Hegel, Marx etc. into an ideology to justify x... y...z..., but how Marx's analysis, pre vol 1 is mystified, and the subsequent development of the class struggle is determined by the specific mystified elements in the "earlier Marx."

Done it. Check out my site.:)

Oh, sorry, you prefer Hermetic ignorance...

Show us how Hegelian mystification is responsible for NEP, for the defeat of the struggle in Germany 1919, 1921, and even 1923. Show us the Hegelian mysticism in the early Marx that leads to the "popular front," or the third period.

Where have I claimed it did this? In fact, I claim that these and other moves were taken for hard-headed political reasons.

It's just that dialectics (in that it glories in 'contradiction') was used to sell these contradictory about-turns to the party cadres.

You need to read far more carefully; all this was covered above.

Rosa can't do that, and neither can you.

Again we'd not want to since we haven't claimed this, as you'd know if you had a personality transplant and began to look at what I actually say as opposed to what you think you can make me say.

Rosa's "arguments" are no different than those that claim "Stalinist totalitarianism" originates in Marx's communism because Marx speaks of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Not at all; I defy you to substantiate this slander.

Oh sorry, you don't do proof...:lol:

Rosa's argument is predicated on an ignorance of Marx, of materialism, of history, that is to say class struggle.

So you keep saying, but when we look at what you post, much of what you allege is based on figments of your own class-compromised imagination, not on anything I have argued.

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 16:58

Where exactly have you shown that Marx's analysis of the origin, reproduction, accumulation of capital is mystified prior to volume 1?

Where and what is the mystification in the analysis of estranged labor, dispossession of the laborer from the means of labor, surplus value, valorisation, relative and absolute surplus value, cost price, market price, cost of production, price of production, in Marx's work prior to volume 1?

Where and what is the mystification of the conflict between labor and capital, which Marx describes as a dialectic, where each creates the other in its negation, prior to volume 1?

And where in, or subsequent to, volume 1 does he change the analysis of those categories, of those relations to "demystify" them?

All you talk about is that Marx said he "coquetted" with terms that Hegel used, but the issue is the content of the analysis that makes use of the terms. If the terms mystify the content, then show us the change, the demystification in that content.

You cannot and do not do that with the actual content of Marx's analysis anywhere. You never show how Marx's "Hegelianism" mystifies his discussion of the direct results of the production process in the proposed 6th chapter of Capital. You never show how Marx's use of Hegelian terms mystifies his discussion of the conversion of surplus value into capital in his economic manuscripts. You never show how his discussion of estranged labor where he explicitly refers to the dialectical relation between labor and capital in the manuscripts mystifies that relationship.

And we know why you don't do that. Because you can't.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 17:06

Smarty Pants:

Again, idealist nonsense, the same sort of nonsense that says "Marxism can be used to justify Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, Bordiga, Goerter, Levi,-- look how all the Marxists say they are the real Marxists. Obviously, Marxism is the source, the useful tool, for legitimizing the defeats of the proletarian revolution."

Not so, since Marx waved the serious use of 'contradiction' goodbye -- as he told us when he said he was merely 'coquetting' with this word.

Unless, of course, you can find a passage published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, in which Marx tells us he has stopped 'coquetting'...

Oh wait, you can't.

And, are you seriously denying that Stalin and Mao used dialectics to 'justify' anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary policies?

To answer that, we don't go and argue about the quality of Stalin's, Mao's, etc. understanding of Marxism. We provide a materialist analysis, the arrangement of classes, the relations of classes, and the actual history of struggle.

Except, you missed out their use of dialectics to sell their ideas to the party.

We don't say Trotsky's argument for the militarization of labor finds a "useful tool" in "Hegelian mystification," we point out how fundamentally anti-productive, backward, materially destructive the militarization of labor is.

Where have we said he did?

Stalin, Trotsky, Mao, Bordiga, etc etc all talk about the labor theory of value -- does that mean the LTV is a useful tool for x...y...z...?

The LTV does not assert that everything is contradictory; dialectical materialism does.

And how to explain that in this so-called dialectical materialism, the DMs manage to ignore the actual revolutionary components of Marx's analysis, which he himself always explores.....[I'm going to use that word] dialectically?

As you should know, other Dialectical Mystics use this theory to show that everyone else (and that includes you) does this too. You can find plenty of quotations to this effect in the footnotes to that essay at my site. There are plenty more I could have added.

Please, that's simply ignorant. The ideological pretension at DM is not the method, the power, the social basis through which Stalin "legitimizes his dictatorship."

There are real material forces, real economic, social conflicts, that generate the disruption of the revolutionary process, that lead to the inversion of revolutionary relations between party and class, that destroy the mediations for those relations-- the soviets. Saying "Stalin begins to take over and use diamat to legitimize his dictatorship" simply does not square up with what actually happened, why it happened or how it happened.

You're being taken in by the advertising.

Again, you have deliberately mis-read what I argued, for I make this very point. In order to sell these anti-Marxist moves, they had an almost infinitely plastic theory to which they could appeal: dialectics and its use of 'contradiction'. The cadres were (and still are) only too happy to accept the adverts, and go along with this. Ask any Trotskyist to justify his/her belief in Trotsky's analysis of the fSU, and you'll get a lecture on the 'contradictory' nature of the state. Trotsky himself used this theory to justify Stalin's invasion of Finland. Trotskyists today still use it retroactively to do the same. Ask a Maoist to justify Mao's class collaboration with the Guomindang, and you will be berated with 'principle' and 'secondary contradictions'.

The list goes on and on.

No other theory in the entire history of humanity (other than perhaps certain forms of Buddhism) can be used to prove anything you like and its opposite in the same breath.

So how has [Dialectical] Marxism been failing?

Check this out:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm

But, perhaps you can tell us where Dialectical Marxism a success?

The absurdity is in "thinking," literally in the thinking that thinking is part of the reason, one facet of Marxism's failure, when there has been no failure of Marxism.

Perhaps you imagine that Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Trotsky did not think, then? That they were robots, perhaps, and what they argued had no effect on the class struggle? :lol:

Now I answer yes to all 4. For Marxism to be a failure, you have to answer "no" somewhere along that line, and then show us the "no."

And that's all I want someone to do. Show me where there is no inherent, immanent need for the abolition of capital based on the very terms, the necessary logic, the determinants, the grounding of its own expansion and accumulation.

1. Perhaps you failed to notice that I am careful to argue that Dialectical Marxism has been a long-term failure. I have nowhere said that Marxism has been. It's just that you mystics have dominated our movement for over 100 years, and can do little other than screw up.

To suggest that your core theory has nothing to do with this is, frankly, ludicrous.

2. There is no 'necessary logic' to capitalism since it is not an argument.

You appear to be in the grip of an odd delusion.

I blame Hegel...:lol:

If you want to argue that the reason the proletarian revolution has failed to advance, that the legacy of October 1917 has been defeated, and that that defeated can be attributed to, in part, to residual mysticism of dialectic, then we're back at the beginning-- where you have to show that residual mysticism, and how not simply conscious decisions were made based on that mysticism, but that the entire class struggle was pinned to that residual mysticism.

You have to show NOT where somebody says "The Popular Front is the living embodiment of dialectical materialism," but how the origin of the popular front is NOT in conditions of class struggle under capitalism but in the residually mystified analysis of capitalism produced prior to volume 1 of Capital.

Where have we claimed otherwise?

The point is, once more, that this theory was used to sell such about-turns to the party cadres.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 17:17

Smarty Pants:

No, I think Marx coquetted with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel in his, Marx's, explanation of value. And this is because it is in the identity of value, in its existence as a specific historical relation of social production and private property, that contains in "genetic," concentrated form, all the antagonisms, oppositions, of capital-- which is exactly what Marx called the dialectic of capital and labor.

So that in volume 1, explicitly organized to be an introductory volume, employing language that would not deter the lay-reader, Marx could only make the conflicts and interpenetrations of the value form intelligible by using language that might in fact deter the lay-reader. He assumed that any serious-minded person would be willing to make the effort, to struggle through this, and actually learn something new.

Well, in that case, it will be easy for you to quote a passage published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your attempt to 'de-coquette' Marx.

Oh wait, you can't...

So, my interpretation conforms to what Marx actually published -- yours does not.:(

But you just stay steady there Rosa. Keep on making stuff up about the importance of Kant, and how Marx was actually following the dialectical tradition of the English school of political economy, thereby showing how little you know about that school, about Marx, and of course, about value.

But, it's you who ignores the evidence, not me.

Your lack of understanding of Marx's method, and content, his transformation and overcoming of the categories of speculative philosophy is enormous, as evidenced by your inability to grasp what Marx intends and demonstrates with his use of abstraction.

Except, you have yet to explain this mysterious process -- and no wonder, no one has been able to do this since Greek mystics inflicted it on humanity 2400 years ago.:lol:

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 17:23

Rosa, what you failed to notice, in your incredible self-aggrandizing narcissistic manner, is that I wasn't addressing you, I was address Chris Koch.

Mere technicality.

Your argument in this matter is that because anyone can claim that "dialectics" justifies any number of contradictory positions, or that dialectics can be used to justify anti-revolutionary actions/theories, claims that Marx utilized dialectic, maintained a dialectic to capital and labor, must be rejected.

The very same thing can, and has been, said about Marxism, by Marxists, about other Marxists. Marx can be used to justify anything. So what? What counts is the actual content, the substance, the materiality of the actions and analysis, not the claims to pedigree.

Mao, Stalin etc. did not consolidate power by making the masses "believe" in "dialectical materialism." Their consolidation of power was a social process, based on the material reproduction of economic, class, forces. The conversion, or substitution, of dialectical materialism as an ideology for Marxist analysis and practice follows the consolidation.

You want to claim "dialectical materialism" expresses and reinforces that "degeneration" of Marxism? I couldn't agree more with that, but that no more makes dialectic "reactionary," than it does Marx's work itself.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 17:24

Smarty Pants:

Where exactly have you shown that Marx's analysis of the origin, reproduction, accumulation of capital is mystified prior to volume 1?

Where and what is the mystification in the analysis of estranged labor, dispossession of the laborer from the means of labor, surplus value, valorisation, relative and absolute surplus value, cost price, market price, cost of production, price of production, in Marx's work prior to volume 1?

Where and what is the mystification of the conflict between labor and capital, which Marx describes as a dialectic, where each creates the other in its negation, prior to volume 1?

And where in, or subsequent to, volume 1 does he change the analysis of those categories, of those relations to "demystify" them?

I'll be happy to answer your questions when you answer the many I have asked which you just ignore.

All you talk about is that Marx said he "coquetted" with terms that Hegel used, but the issue is the content of the analysis that makes use of the terms. If the terms mystify the content, then show us the change, the demystification in that content.

Once more, you argue as if you think I have access to a time machine, and nipped back into the 1870s and smuggled this word into the Postface to the second edition of Das Kapital!:lol:

You cannot and do not do that with the actual content of Marx's analysis anywhere. You never show how Marx's "Hegelianism" mystifies his discussion of the direct results of the production process in the proposed 6th chapter of Capital. You never show how Marx's use of Hegelian terms mystifies his discussion of the conversion of surplus value into capital in his economic manuscripts. You never show how his discussion of estranged labor where he explicitly refers to the dialectical relation between labor and capital in the manuscripts mystifies that relationship.

I have never claimed this, so why should I even try to do what you say?

Once more, you prefer lies to evidence.

And we know why you don't do that. Because you can't.

Of course I can't show something is as yuo say if I never claimed it to begin with.

Or, has Hegel's loopy 'logic' addled your brain into thinking the opposite -- dialectically, as it were?:lol:

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 17:34

Smarty Pants:

Rosa, what you failed to notice, in your incredible self-aggrandizing narcissistic manner, is that I wasn't addressing you, I was address Chris Koch.

Mere technicality.

Except you posted things like this:

Rosa can't do that, and neither can you.

Rosa's "arguments" are no different than those that claim "Stalinist totalitarianism" originates in Marx's communism because Marx speaks of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Rosa's argument is predicated on an ignorance of Marx, of materialism, of history, that is to say class struggle.

So, it looks like you not only lie about what I have posted, you lie about your own posts!:lol:

Your argument in this matter is that because anyone can claim that "dialectics" justifies any number of contradictory positions, or that dialectics can be used to justify anti-revolutionary actions/theories, claims that Marx utilized dialectic, maintained a dialectic to capital and labor, must be rejected.

Are you denying it has been used in this way?

If it has been it manifestly can be used in this way.

The very same thing can, and has been, said about Marxism, by Marxists, about other Marxists. Marx can be used to justify anything. So what? What counts is the actual content, the substance, the materiality of the actions and analysis, not the claims to pedigree.

And they can do that because they were addressing Dialectical Marxism, not Marxism as such.

But, I have been over this -- once more, you need to read more carefully.

Ha! Some hope! :lol:

The very same thing can, and has been, said about Marxism, by Marxists, about other Marxists. Marx can be used to justify anything. So what? What counts is the actual content, the substance, the materiality of the actions and analysis, not the claims to pedigree.

And where did I say they did?

Yet more lies...

You want to claim "dialectical materialism" expresses and reinforces that "degeneration" of Marxism? I couldn't agree more with that, but that no more makes dialectic "reactionary," than it does Marx's work itself.

And yet, Marx abandoned this crazy theory when he came to write Das Kapital...:)

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 17:44

Smarty Pants:

Well, in that case, it will be easy for you to quote a passage published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your attempt to 'de-coquette' Marx.

Oh wait, you can't...

But of course I can... in volume 1 itself. As I have repeatedly offered, anytime your ready to actually consider the substance of the discussion of value in volume 1, of money, of the commodity, where Marx demonstrates both the form and the content, the method and the outcome of his material dialectic, his dialectic of the conflict between the labor process and the valorisation process, I'm ready to assist you.

Furthermore, if you look through the footnotes in volume 1, where Marx repeatedly cites Hegel, and treats him with great respect, it is evident that Marx in no way shape or form considers Hegel to be "incompetent" or any of the other terms you use to describe Hegel.

Except, you have yet to explain this mysterious process -- and no wonder, no one has been able to do this since Greek mystics inflicted it on humanity 2400 years ago.:lol:

Here's where I get to flip the script on you and throw something back. I don't need to explain this process, because Marx already did so. Or perhaps you weren't aware.

Look at what Marx writes about the speculative, post-Hegel Hegelians, and philosophers and their notion of abstraction. The abstraction exists separate and apart from the materiality of the object. Abstraction exists as an act of spirit, of mind.

Marx, throughout his works, and particularly in the first 3 chapters of volume 1, establishes abstraction as a shared materiality. For example, apples, oranges, limes, pears aren't all fruit because the mind identifies their "fruitiness" as something separate from their existence as apples, oranges etc. Their abstraction, all as fruit, is based on the materiality of the actual conditions of their existence; on their common relations to process of reproduction of their specific trees.

Marx's process of material abstraction in examining value follows this very same process. He identifies the historical origin in the commonality, the shared relations of the specific commodities that allows them to exchange one for the other, one for all. And this is what allows one "ultimate commodity" to act as the "ultimate abstraction"-- which is to represent in its specific existence the substance [which is actually the social relation] at the core of all-- estranged labor; general, distilled, homogenized, social labor; labor-time. Labor in the abstract devoid of all particular characteristics save the characteristic that makes it particularly human-- the organization of time.

That you don't understand that is just one more expression of your inability to understand Marx's analysis of the commodity, his analysis of value.

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 17:59

You miss the point again Rosa, I was responding to Chris's claim that Marxism was failing. But please, don't let reality stand in the way your narcissism.

As for this:

For instance, in this example of Hermetic gobbledygook:

:
So have at it-- take the residual "mysticism" out of Marx's Economic Manuscripts from 1857-1864. But don't just change the words "contradiction" and "negation." You need to do much more than that. You need to change the description and analysis of the reproduction of capital which Marx provides with a different analysis that abjures the notions of necessity, self-contradiction in accumulation,self-negation of value in the reproduction of value... and tell us where that leaves your Marxism as a "revolutionary activity."

Tell us Rosa, does capitalist accumulation become the obstacle to capitalist accumulation? Does the very source of profit, in the amplification of labor productivity, become the restriction on profit? Does the extraction of value, the expropriation of surplus-value lead to, create, actually contain in its own process, the actual devaluation of commodities?

Are these processes intrinsic to capital, based on its very identity as capital, or are they external, extrinsic?

We know you won't answer because you can't.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 18:07

Smarty Pants:

But of course I can... in volume 1 itself. As I have repeatedly offered, anytime your ready to actually consider the substance of the discussion of value in volume 1, of money, of the commodity, where Marx demonstrates both the form and the content, the method and the outcome of his material dialectic, his dialectic of the conflict between the labor process and the valorisation process, I'm ready to assist you.

Except we already know, because Marx (not me) told us he was merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon.

What you need to produce is a passage published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that tells us he is no longer 'coquetting'.

Oh wait, you can't....

Furthermore, if you look through the footnotes in volume 1, where Marx repeatedly cites Hegel, and treats him with great respect, it is evident that Marx in no way shape or form considers Hegel to be "incompetent" or any of the other terms you use to describe Hegel.

In fact Hegel gets only eight mentions (and only in passing), while Aristotle, Smith, Stewart, Hume and Ferguson get 67.

Here's where I get to flip the script on you and throw something back. I don't need to explain this process, because Marx already did so. Or perhaps you weren't aware.

Well, as i have pointed out to you before, what we actually see on then page is Marx using certain words in new ways; we never get to see, nor does Marx detail, the mental processes that are alleged to underlie this mythical process.

And no wonder, there is no such thing as the 'process of abstraction'.

Of course, if you think otherwise, you will no doubt be able to provide the psychological/neurological data that show how and where it takes place.

Expressed, for example, in this piece of hokum:

Look at what Marx writes about the speculative, post-Hegel Hegelians, and philosophers and their notion of abstraction. The abstraction exists separate and apart from the materiality of the object. Abstraction exists as an act of spirit, of mind.

Where is the evidence that this takes place 'in the mind'?

Marx, throughout his works, and particularly in the first 3 chapters of volume 1, establishes abstraction as a shared materiality. For example, apples, oranges, limes, pears aren't all fruit because the mind identifies their "fruitiness" as something separate from their existence as apples, oranges etc. Their abstraction, all as fruit, is based on the materiality of the actual conditions of their existence; on their common relations to process of reproduction of their specific trees.

Marx's process of material abstraction in examining value follows this very same process. He identifies the historical origin in the commonality, the shared relations of the specific commodities that allows them to exchange one for the other, one for all. And this is what allows one "ultimate commodity" to act as the "ultimate abstraction"-- which is to represent in its specific existence the substance [which is actually the social relation] at the core of all-- estranged labor; general, distilled, homogenized, social labor; labor-time. Labor in the abstract devoid of all particular characteristics save the characteristic that makes it particularly human-- the organization of time.

And yet, what we actually see, what you see, is Marx using words (there on then page, or screen) in new ways. He does not once refer to the contents of his 'mind'.

That you don't understand that is just one more expression of your inability to understand Marx's analysis of the commodity, his analysis of value.

Maybe so, maybe not -- but at least I do not try to re-mystify his work, like you.:cool:

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th September 2010, 18:14

Smarty Pants:

You miss the point again Rosa, I was responding to Chris's claim that Marxism was failing. But please, don't let reality stand in the way your narcissism.

Except, and once more, you posted these:

Rosa can't do that, and neither can you.

Rosa's "arguments" are no different than those that claim "Stalinist totalitarianism" originates in Marx's communism because Marx speaks of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Rosa's argument is predicated on an ignorance of Marx, of materialism, of history, that is to say class struggle.

And Chris was summarising my argument.

So, it is you, my confused Hermetic friend, who is 'missing' a few points.

Tell us Rosa, does capitalist accumulation become the obstacle to capitalist accumulation? Does the very source of profit, in the amplification of labor productivity, become the restriction on profit? Does the extraction of value, the expropriation of surplus-value lead to, create, actually contain in its own process, the actual devaluation of commodities?

Are these processes intrinsic to capital, based on its very identity as capital, or are they external, extrinsic?

Once more, I'll be happy to answer your questions (which do not seem to be related to the topic of this thread) just as soon as you answer the many I have asked you which you just ignore -- several of which you have been asked today.

We know you won't answer because you can't.

Maybe so, maybe not, but we know for certain you can't answer mine.:lol:

graymouser

29th September 2010, 19:09

Except we already know, because Marx (not me) told us he was merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon.
Rosa has told us a thousand times (and to be honest, I do not believe I'm exaggerating here; it seems likely that she has typed this a thousand times on RevLeft) that Marx admits to "coquetting" with Hegel's mode of expression in the chapter on value in Capital. There are two documents that it's necessary to read in order to understand what Marx is talking about here:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/commodity.htm
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/appendix.htm

The problem with the afterword to the second German edition of Capital is that Marx was talking in it about the first German edition of the book, where he had written a chapter (the first link above) that was much denser in its Hegelian jargon than the final product. Marx was so concerned about the heavy and un-popular form of presentation of this chapter that he first wrote an appendix to his masterwork (available in the second link) which would render these ideas comprehensible to workers with no philosophical training.

Now, we must remember that in this Afterword, Marx was dealing with reviews of the first German edition, not the second. His "coquetting," therefore, was actually done in the first edition's Chapter I - not in the revised form which has been part of every english edition of Capital ever since. Here is some of the actual "coquetting":

It is only the ‘concept’ in Hegel’s sense that manages to objectify itself without external material.

Time cannot be related to the coat as value or incarnated human labour, without being related to tailoring-labour as the immediate manifestation-form of human labour.

The linen, after all, relates itself to the coat as the sensually existing materialization of human labour in abstracto and hence as present value-body. It is this only because and insofar as the linen relates itself to the coat in this specific manner. Its status as an Equivalent is (so to speak) only a reflection-determination of linen. But the situation seems just the reverse.
When Marx says he was "coquetting" with "the modes of expression peculiar to" Hegel, he is not talking about words like contradiction and so forth, which were used in their proper and quite serious sense, but about overly complicated words like "reflection-determination" and "manifestation-form" and "value-body."

Oh, and just in case there was any doubt as to what the Marx who had written Capital thought of dialectics, this extract from a letter to Engels (quoted in the second link above) should help.

As to the development of the value-form I have and have not followed your advice, in order to behave dialectically in this respect as well; i.e. I have: 1. written an appendix in which I present the same thing as simply and pedagogically as possible, and 2. followed your advice and divided each step in the development into §§, etc. with separate headings. In the preface I then tell the ‘non-dialectical’ reader that he should skip pages x-y and read the appendix instead. Here not merely philistines are concerned but youth eager for knowledge, etc. Besides, the matter is too decisive for the whole book.

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 21:31

This by Rosa sums it up

2. There is no 'necessary logic' to capitalism since it is not an argument.

Plenty of things contain a logic, an internal organization of specific and repeated response to specific and inputs. Railroad signal systems have a core logic of "if [X,Y,Z..], then X', Y', Z']. This, of course, gets easily translated in the digital logic of "1s" and "0s" that forms the core of what we call vital logic processing in interlockings, which prevents two trains from receiving authorization to occupy the same, or conflicting routes.

For example: On=1, On=1= track occupancy= not O=no other 1s, no other occupancy permitted. Off=0=no occupancy= not 1= occupancy permitted.

The logic of capital is the need of capital for its expansion and accumulation. It is its determination, its grounding, its reason. Does capital have such a need, a need based in its very identity, organization as capital? If so, how does capital manifest this need? What must capital do? And in doing what it must do as capital to maintain itself as capital, to expand itself as capital, does capital create the terms of its own inability to maintain accumulation, expanded reproduction?

Or if capitalism establishes occupancy, i.e. accumulates, does its very occupancy, accumulation, obstruct its ability to expand occupancy, expand accumulation?

I don't need any answer from our lady of the anti-dialectic. The fact that she has nothing to say about the substance of Marx's work, about the organization, the identity of value, surplus value, accumulation, valorisation process, the labor process speaks louder than all her thousands of words on various websites.

The fact that she identifies not a single substantive error in Marx's analysis of capital when he is utilizing in all earnestness terms of "Hegelian mystification," shows how irrelevant, how basically stupid, her distinction of the "pre-volume 1 Marx" from the "vol 1. Marx" really is.

S.Artesian

29th September 2010, 21:51

When I write:
Look at what Marx writes about the speculative, post-Hegel Hegelians, and philosophers and their notion of abstraction. The abstraction exists separate and apart from the materiality of the object. Abstraction exists as an act of spirit, of mind.

Rosa responds with this:
Where is the evidence that this takes place 'in the mind'? .

Here is the complete passage from The Holy Family, where Marx is happily engaged in demystifying speculative philosophy, and demystifying the further mystification of the mystified side of Hegel's dialectic:

If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea "Fruit”, if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea "Fruit”, derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then in the language of speculative philosophy — I am declaring that "Fruit” is the "Substance” of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be a pear is not essential to the pear, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea — "Fruit”. I therefore declare apples, pears, almonds, etc., to be mere forms of existence, modi, of "Fruit” My finite understanding supported by my senses does of course distinguish an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but my speculative reason declares these sensuous differences inessential and irrelevant. It sees in the apple the same as in the pear, and in the pear the same as in the almond, namely "Fruit”. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is "the substance" — "Fruit”.

By this method one attains no particular wealth of definition. The mineralogist whose whole science was limited to the statement that all minerals are really "the Mineral" would be a mineralogist only in his imagination. For every mineral the speculative mineralogist Says "the Mineral", and his science is reduced to repeating this word as many times as there are real minerals.

Having reduced the different real fruits to the one "fruit" of abstraction — "the Fruit", speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from "the Fruit", from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea "the Fruit" as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction.

The speculative philosopher therefore relinquishes the abstraction "the Fruit", but in a speculative, mystical fashion — with the appearance of not relinquishing it. Thus it is really only in appearance that he rises above his abstraction.

He argues somewhat as follows:

If apples, pears, almonds and strawberries are really nothing but "the Substance", "the Fruit", the question arises: Why does "the Fruit" manifest itself to me sometimes as an apple, sometimes as a pear, sometimes as an almond? Why this semblance of diversity which so obviously contradicts my speculative conception of Unity, "the Substance", "the Fruit"?

This, answers the speculative philosopher, is because "the Fruit" is not dead, undifferentiated, motionless, but a living, self-differentiating, moving essence. The diversity of the ordinary fruits is significant not only for my sensuous understanding, but also for "the Fruit" itself and for speculative reason. The different ordinary fruits are different manifestations of the life of the "one Fruit"; they are crystallisations of "the Fruit" itself. Thus in the apple "the Fruit" gives itself an apple-like existence, in the pear a pear-like existence. We must therefore no longer say, as one might from the standpoint of the Substance: a pear is "the Fruit", an apple is "the Fruit", an almond is "the Fruit", but rather "the Fruit" presents itself as a pear, "the Fruit" presents itself as an apple, "the Fruit" presents itself as an almond; and the differences which distinguish apples, pears and almonds from one another are the self-differentiations of "the Fruit" and,.make the particular fiuits different members of the life-process of "the Fruit". Thus "the Fruit" is no longer an empty undifferentiated unity; it is oneness as allness, as "totality” of fruits, which constitute an "organically linked series of members”. In every member of that series "the Fruit" gives itself a more developed, more explicit existence, until finally, as the "summary” of all fruits, it is at the same time the living unity which contains all those fruits dissolved in itself just as it produces them from within itself, just as, for instance, all the limbs of the body are constantly dissolved in and constantly produced out of the blood.

We see that if the Christian religion knows only one Incarnation of God, speculative philosophy has as many incarnations as there are things, just as it has here in every fruit an incarnation of the Substance, of the Absolute Fruit. The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of "the Fruit", this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind. Hence what is delightful in this speculation is to rediscover all the real fruits there, but as fruits which have a higher mystical significance, which have grown out of the ether of your brain and not out of the material earth, which are incarnations of "the Fruit", of the Absolute Subject. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, "the Fruit", to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of "the Fruit" in all the manifestations of its life — the apple, the pear, the almond — that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each one of them "the Fruit" realises itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of "the Absolute Fruit"

The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind "the Fruit", i.e., by creating those fruits out of his own abstract reason, which he considers as an Absolute Subject outside himself, represented here as "the Fruit". And in regard to every object the existence of which he expresses, he accomplishes an act of creation.

It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, "the Fruit"
In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method.

These preliminary remarks were necessary to make Herr Szeliga intelligible. Only now, after dissolving real relations, e.g., law and civilisation, in the category of mystery and thereby making "Mystery”(das Geheimnis) into Substance, does he rise to the true speculative, Hegelian height and transforms "Mystery” into a self-existing Subject incarnating itself in real situations and persons so that the manifestations of its life are countesses, marquises, grisettes, porters, notaries, charlatans, and love intrigues, balls, wooden doors, etc. Having produced the category "Mystery” out of the real world, he produces the real world out of this category.

The mysteries of speculative construction in Herr Szeliga's presentation will be all the more visibly disclosed as he has an indisputable double advantage over Hegel. On the one hand, Hegel with masterly sophistry is able to present as a process of the imagined creation of the mind itself, of the Absolute Subject, the process by which the philosopher through sensory perception and imagination passes from one subject to another. On the other hand, however, Hegel very often gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself, within the speculative presentation. This real development within the speculative development misleads the reader into considering the speculative development as real and the real as speculative.

With Herr Szeliga both these difficulties vanish. His dialectics have no hypocrisy or dissimulation. He performs his tricks with the most laudable honesty and the most ingenuous straightforwardness. But then he nowhere develops any real content, so that his speculative construction is free from all disturbing accessories, from all ambiguous disguises, and appeals to the eye in its naked beauty. In Herr Szeliga we also see a brilliant illustration of how speculation on the one hand apparently freely creates its object a priori out of itself and, on the other hand, precisely because it wishes to get rid by sophistry of the rational and natural dependence on the object, falls into the most irrational and unnatural bondage to the object, whose most accidental and most individual attributes it is obliged to construe as absolutely necessary and general.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th September 2010, 02:49

GM (who, not a few days ago, declared 'he' was done arguing with me, now rats on that empty promise and weighs in, keen to show 'himself' up in public once again):

Rosa has told us a thousand times (and to be honest, I do not believe I'm exaggerating here; it seems likely that she has typed this a thousand times on RevLeft) that Marx admits to "coquetting" with Hegel's mode of expression in the chapter on value in Capital. There are two documents that it's necessary to read in order to understand what Marx is talking about here:

You argue as if you think it was I who nipped into my time machine, whisked myself off to the 1870s and smuggled that word in myself while Marx wasn't looking!:lol:

And thanks for those links, but I fail to see how they help you in your endeavour to re-mystify Marx's work.

But you have an answer:

The problem with the afterword to the second German edition of Capital is that Marx was talking in it about the first German edition of the book, where he had written a chapter (the first link above) that was much denser in its Hegelian jargon than the final product. Marx was so concerned about the heavy and un-popular form of presentation of this chapter that he first wrote an appendix to his masterwork (available in the second link) which would render these ideas comprehensible to workers with no philosophical training.

In fact, we have been over this many times. Fortunately, Marx put an end to all your speculation by adding a summary pf 'the dialectic method' which contained no Hegel at all.

And what little of it that was left -- he tells us he was merely 'coquetting' with it.

But you have another reply:

Now, we must remember that in this Afterword, Marx was dealing with reviews of the first German edition, not the second. His "coquetting," therefore, was actually done in the first edition's Chapter I - not in the revised form which has been part of every english edition of Capital ever since. Here is some of the actual "coquetting":

It is only the ‘concept’ in Hegel’s sense that manages to objectify itself without external material.

Time cannot be related to the coat as value or incarnated human labour, without being related to tailoring-labour as the immediate manifestation-form of human labour.

The linen, after all, relates itself to the coat as the sensually existing materialization of human labour in abstracto and hence as present value-body. It is this only because and insofar as the linen relates itself to the coat in this specific manner. Its status as an Equivalent is (so to speak) only a reflection-determination of linen. But the situation seems just the reverse.

Perhaps then you can find a passage, published by Marx that was contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your contention that he had stopped 'coquetting'?

Oh wait -- you can't.

When Marx says he was "coquetting" with "the modes of expression peculiar to" Hegel, he is not talking about words like contradiction and so forth, which were used in their proper and quite serious sense, but about overly complicated words like "reflection-determination" and "manifestation-form" and "value-body."

Are you suggesting that Marx did not derive his use of 'contradiction' from Hegel? Especially since the things Marx says are 'contradictions' aren't contradictions to begin with, and do not even look like them.

Oh, and just in case there was any doubt as to what the Marx who had written Capital thought of dialectics, this extract from a letter to Engels (quoted in the second link above) should help.

Thanks for that, but others have tried this ploy before -- and had to be reminded that no unpublished source can countermand a published source.

Of course, if you can find a passage, published by Marx that was contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your attempt to ignore what he had actually published...

Oh wait -- you can't.

However, when we look at the letter you quoted:

As to the development of the value-form I have and have not followed your advice, in order to behave dialectically in this respect as well; i.e. I have: 1. written an appendix in which I present the same thing as simply and pedagogically as possible, and 2. followed your advice and divided each step in the development into §§, etc. with separate headings. In the preface I then tell the ‘non-dialectical’ reader that he should skip pages x-y and read the appendix instead. Here not merely philistines are concerned but youth eager for knowledge, etc. Besides, the matter is too decisive for the whole book.

we find no indication that he was talking about the Hegelian dialectic (upside down or 'the right way up'), especially when Marx published a summary of that method that contained no Hegel at all.

Once more: nice try -- only it wasn't.:(

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th September 2010, 02:55

Smarty Pants:

Plenty of things contain a logic, an internal organization of specific and repeated response to specific and inputs. Railroad signal systems have a core logic of "if [X,Y,Z..], then X', Y', Z']. This, of course, gets easily translated in the digital logic of "1s" and "0s" that forms the core of what we call vital logic processing in interlockings, which prevents two trains from receiving authorization to occupy the same, or conflicting routes.

For example: On=1, On=1= track occupancy= not O=no other 1s, no other occupancy permitted. Off=0=no occupancy= not 1= occupancy permitted.

The logic of capital is the need of capital for its expansion and accumulation. It is its determination, its grounding, its reason. Does capital have such a need, a need based in its very identity, organization as capital? If so, how does capital manifest this need? What must capital do? And in doing what it must do as capital to maintain itself as capital, to expand itself as capital, does capital create the terms of its own inability to maintain accumulation, expanded reproduction?

Or if capitalism establishes occupancy, i.e. accumulates, does its very occupancy, accumulation, obstruct its ability to expand occupancy, expand accumulation?

This merely shows there is a sort of logic in Marx's analysis, or your attempt to summarise it, but not that there is a logic in capital -- which isn't an argument, so there can't be.

I don't need any answer from our lady of the anti-dialectic. The fact that she has nothing to say about the substance of Marx's work, about the organization, the identity of value, surplus value, accumulation, valorisation process, the labor process speaks louder than all her thousands of words on various websites.

So you keep saying, but we have yet to see the proof.

The fact that she identifies not a single substantive error in Marx's analysis of capital when he is utilizing in all earnestness terms of "Hegelian mystification," shows how irrelevant, how basically stupid, her distinction of the "pre-volume 1 Marx" from the "vol 1. Marx" really is.

Once more, where did I say Marx committed any errors?

Yet more lies...:lol:

And thanks for the quotation from The Holy Family, but I fail to see how it helps your case.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th September 2010, 03:00

Smarty Pants, quoting me:

Where is the evidence that this takes place 'in the mind'?

We're still waiting for the evidence...:)

S.Artesian

30th September 2010, 03:58

As previously stated, the published passages are in volume 1 itself, in the Marx's analysis of value where he demonstrates his dialectic. Of course to grasp that you actually have to deal with the social relation, and the historical origin, of value in the opposition of labor to the conditions of labor, so there is absolutely no danger of Rosa pursuing this line of inquiry.

A talking irrelevancy that RL.

S.Artesian

30th September 2010, 04:01

Smarty Pants:

This merely shows there is a sort of logic in Marx's analysis, or your attempt to summarise it, but not that there is a logic in capital -- which isn't an argument, so there can't be.

You are an idiot.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th September 2010, 10:09

Smarty Pants:

As previously stated, the published passages are in volume 1 itself, in the Marx's analysis of value where he demonstrates his dialectic. Of course to grasp that you actually have to deal with the social relation, and the historical origin, of value in the opposition of labor to the conditions of labor, so there is absolutely no danger of Rosa pursuing this line of inquiry.

Except, we already know that by 'the dialectic method', Marx meant something different from you and the rest of the mystical tradition (within which you operate), since the summary of that method which he endorsed contained no trace of Hegel at all (upside down or the 'right way up').

Moreover, we also know, since Marx told us, that he was merely 'coquetting' with what few obscure Hegelian terms can be found in Das Kapital.

A talking irrelevancy that RL.

As you have pointed out to you several times already: not even you believe that or you'd not have stalked me here, posting literally hundreds of (and by now well over a thousand) comments.:lol:

You are an idiot.

Now that you have resorted to abuse, I take it you have no effective answer to my point.:lol::lol:

And, we're still waiting for that evidence...

graymouser

30th September 2010, 11:18

Perhaps then you can find a passage, published by Marx that was contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your contention that he had stopped 'coquetting'?
No, what I have demonstrated is what Marx actually meant when he said he was "coquetting" with "the mode of expression peculiar" to Hegel. He was not referring to the rather straightforward dialectical presentation in the revised chapter I (which would be irrelevant to the Kaufman review of the first German edition) but to the original chapter I:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/commodity.htm

Anyone who actually reads this chapter, with its dense terminology and development on Hegelian lines, will understand that it is what Marx meant by "coquetting" with the "mode of expression peculiar" to Hegel. This chapter is something that worried Marx to the point where he wrote a simplified appendix to explain it, directing readers who weren't familiar with Hegel to skip the chapter and read the appendix, and when he had the chance to revise the book he rewrote the entire thing. The concern is well documented, both in his exchange with Engels and in the excuse he made for it in the afterword to the second German edition (the "coquetted" molehill out of which you construct a false anti-dialectical mountain). It is clear from context that he stopped "coquetting" when he rewrote the chapter to remove the reliance on terms like "reflection-determination" and other overly dense Hegelian terms. The fact that he didn't remove the straightforwardly dialectical terms in the revision demolishes your case that he had "waved goodbye" to Hegel.

Unfortunately, you aren't going to actually respond to any of the substantive points above and will repeat your childish demand for a place where he "stopped 'coquetting'" - even though it is clear that, like everything else in this afterword, you have completely misunderstood where Marx was going with this.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th September 2010, 13:23

GM:

No, what I have demonstrated is what Marx actually meant when he said he was "coquetting" with "the mode of expression peculiar" to Hegel. He was not referring to the rather straightforward dialectical presentation in the revised chapter I (which would be irrelevant to the Kaufman review of the first German edition) but to the original chapter I:

I beg to differ; I do not think you have shown this.

In addition, and as I have pointed out to those who have tried this dodge before, you face the not inconsiderable problem of trying to explain why he 'coquetted' in the most important chapter of the book, but stopped doing it in the rest of the first edition of Das Kapital.

Moreover, even if you are right, you would need to show that he had stopped 'coquetting'.

But you have an answer to this:

Unfortunately, you aren't going to actually respond to any of the substantive points above and will repeat your childish demand for a place where he "stopped 'coquetting'" - even though it is clear that, like everything else in this afterword, you have completely misunderstood where Marx was going with this.

I see, you classify anyone who has the temerity to disagree with you as 'childish'. How convenient! It allows you to assume what you had to prove.

Can anyone do this? Can I?

However, I rather think that this petulant attitude of yours is considerably more 'childish' than anything I can manage, no matter how hard I try.

Perhaps then I'm not as 'childish' as you, since I still think one has to substantiate allegations made about Marx, and you have yet to substantiate your implied allegation that Marx had stopped 'coquetting'.

In which case, you still need a passage published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your belief that Marx had stopped 'coquetting'.

Oh dear, there isn't one...

You:

The concern is well documented, both in his exchange with Engels and in the excuse he made for it in the afterword to the second German edition (the "coquetted" molehill out of which you construct a false anti-dialectical mountain). It is clear from context that he stopped "coquetting" when he rewrote the chapter to remove the reliance on terms like "reflection-determination" and other overly dense Hegelian terms. The fact that he didn't remove the straightforwardly dialectical terms in the revision demolishes your case that he had "waved goodbye" to Hegel.

Not so; the 'coquetting' comment is a but a tiny part of my case.

You forget that Marx put an end to all speculation that he had waved 'goodbye' to that sub-logical incompetent, Hegel, when he added a summary of 'the dialectic method' which contained no trace of Hegel at all.

It is clear from context that he stopped "coquetting" when he rewrote the chapter to remove the reliance on terms like "reflection-determination" and other overly dense Hegelian terms. The fact that he didn't remove the straightforwardly dialectical terms in the revision demolishes your case that he had "waved goodbye" to Hegel

In which case, you either think that when Marx used Hegelian terms (such as 'contradiction', 'negation', 'negation of the negation', 'unity of opposites', 'quantity and quality') he had resumed 'coquetting', or that these aren't Hegelian terms at all, and Marx had forgotten that fact.

So, it seems that it is you who is ignoring such 'substantive' points, after all.