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ChrisK

18th June 2010, 23:56

I just turned this in. Its my final paper for my Philosophy of Religion class. I wrote it on the question of being. Due to being allowed only five double spaced pages, the paper contains some vast oversimplifications of the argument itself. Even so I think its a good summary of the argument that the paper attempts to present. Thanks to Rosa for recommending the book by Kahn and for pointing out a few arguments.

The philosophy of religion is a subject that hinges upon the answering of questions of human existence; answering the questions of ontology. Central to ontology, and, thus, the philosophy of religion, is the question of being. Charles Kahn put it best when he wrote

the systematic development of the concept of Being in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle, and then in a more mechanical way from the Stoics to Plotinus, relies on the pre-existing disposition of the language to make a very general and diversified use of the verb είμί. Furthermore, insofar as the notions expressed by ον, είναι , and ούσία in Greek underlie the doctrines of Being, substance, essence, and existence, in Latin and Arabic, and in modern philosophy from Descartes to Heidegger and perhaps to Quine, we may say that the usage of the Greek verb be studies here forms the historical basis for the ontological tradition of the West, as the very term "ontology" suggests. (Kahn, 1)
By being, the philosopher means the innate state in which one exists, their personal character. If the question of being were to be shown as a nonsensical question, then ontology and the philosophy of religion will become based on nonsense.

In fact, the question of being can be shown to be nonsense, based on the fact that it is a distortion of the verb to be. This is, of course, contingent on the idea that ordinary language is the proper framework for understanding language as used in philosophy. Additionally, it has to be shown how the verb to be was distorted into the noun being.

Ordinary language is indeed the way to look at language as used by philosophers. This is due to how a word gains its meaning. A word obtains its meaning through its use in a social interaction. Words cannot obtain their meaning through some a priori knowledge of the words, for it that were true then words meanings would not change over time. Rather, by existing through human interaction, words meanings can begin to change over time. Further, people assimilate words through social interaction. How else does a child learn to speak? It can only be through hearing the words and seeing the context in which they are spoken. As one learns more of the language, then words can be used to describe the meaning of other words.

Considering this to be the case, ordinary language is the basis for all other forms of language. Specialized languages, like those used in the sciences, expand ordinary language to suit their specialized needs. This is most often done by creating new words through Greek or Latin roots. It is also done by expanding an old concept to a modern form, as was done with the word “atom.” Atom originally was just the small thing that made up everything else and the word was then used, by physicists, to describe the tiny building blocks of all material things so far observed.

Other than ordinary and specialized languages, there is a third type of language used; philosophical. Philosophical language is a language created through the nominalization of verbs and then, as nouns, giving them a life of their own. By changing the verb to a noun, the philosopher can change the meaning of a word and give it a new meaning. This can be demonstrated through a simple analysis of the words themselves.

Concerning the question of being, the distortion through nominalization occurred in Ancient Greece. From the Greek word on, or ον using the Greek alphabet, one can see how being stopped being an action and became its own topic. When looking at ον, "it is in nominalized form, as articular participle and abstract noun, that the verb be serves not only to express but also to thematize the concept of Being as a distinct topic for philosophical reflection." (Kahn, 453) Thus, we must look at its nominalized forms in order to understand in what way it has been changed.

The first nominalized form of ον is όντα, which is its articular participle. In this form, “the denotation of the participle is highly ambiguous, as Aristotle observed. In the first place τά όντα or “what is” means what is the case, facts or events that actually occur or will occur… In the second place, τά όντα means what is in the locative-existential use of είμί, things which exist, things which are present, or which are to be found somewhere.” (Kahn 457) Here it can be seen that by exploiting the ambiguity of όντα, philosophers are able to take the existential use of the word and treat it like it has a life of its own. This will be discussed in depth later, for now it is sufficient to see what part of the word is distorted.

The second nominalized form of ον is ούσία, the abstract noun. This form has a much clearer change made to it by philosophers, due to being able to trace the history of the words actual distortion. “ούσία occurs in Herodotus and is common in Attic prose but only in the sense of ‘property’… There is no direct connection between this idiomatic use of ούσία (reflecting on the possessive construction of είμί with the dative) and the more technical sense of ούσία which [one] find[s] in Plato and Aristotle.” (Kahn, 458) If there is no direct connection between the two uses of the word, then one would have to have been made up. In fact, ούσία had been distorted by Plato in order to answer “what is” sort of questions. As it is understood, Plato’s use of ούσία can only be used for his Forms or Aristotle’s Essences. (Kahn 461) Plato changed ούσία from being a word that reflects possession to being an actual quality of human possession, such as possessing a soul. This is a new use of a word that was abstracted by philosophers.

Of course, just claiming that the words are abstracted from the ordinary words is not damning evidence. What is more important is the process behind the actual abstracting of the words. “This they do by re-writing predicative sentences as propositions expressing identity, and it this which transforms the general terms they contain into the names of abstract particulars.” (Lichtenstein) Philosophers do this because, as Plato and all philosophers have since argued, the only words that have any meaning are names and for a sentence to make sense, all words must be names. Then, through a use of philosophical nominalism, they argue that the word or concept must exist independent of the word itself. For what is a name without a subject? Ergo, philosophers have argued that words such as ον must exist independent of the word itself. There are multiple flaws with this line of reasoning.

If all words are names, then what are sentences? A sentence would then be a list of names with no actual content. Its lack of content would have to do with lists of names having an inability to express particulars. Take this list of proper names: Wittgenstein, George Bush, Barack Obama, Tina Fey, Bill Hicks, Venus, Paris. Who do these names refer too? No one can say as they are just names, not particulars. Tina Fey could have been a coffee shop girl or a comedian that appears on television and movies. If all words are names then this list should be a sentence: Indicative, Paris, Fresh, Fudge. However, it is clearly not a sentence. A sentence requires words that are not names and, therefore, do not exist independent of the word. (Lichtenstein)

Further, the nominalist position is untenable. The line of reasoning for the nominalist framework is that ον is a name because names are the only words that mean anything. Therefore, ούσία is describing a real possession of ον (or being). Now ούσία can be used to answer question like “what is a chair” and giving the chair some metaphysical quality or, as Plato put it, form. This is then used to support the idea that words have some form or essence independent of the word itself. The argument is circular. One begins by claiming that words are names and therefore exist independent of the word itself and then proves the argument by using a word. This clearly cannot be the case, as one cannot use a word as a name to prove that words true form is that of the name.

Finally, as has already been argued, words gain their meaning through their use in a social context. Believing that words only gain a meaning by referring to a thing falls into the problem of changing words. If words all names for something in particular, then that particular must be what the word already refers to. Yet it is well known that if one were to look at words from two hundred years ago, some have changed in meaning. Dictatorship in the 1850’s often meant a direct democracy (Draper, 58). Now dictatorship means despotic rule of the minority. This change would not have occurred if dictatorship was a name referring to a proper form of dictatorship. Thus, words cannot exist outside of themselves and they cannot all be names.

Having taken apart the nominalist position, it becomes clear that the Greek verb ον was abstracted to be an existential quality inherent to humans. As this is the case, then the question of Being falls apart. There is no question of Being, because there is no such thing as Being. Thus the question is pseudo question based on nonsense. By abstracting the word in its nominalized forms, philosophers have created a quality that does not exist in reality. With no question of Being, there is no need for a god to have created Being.

By looking at the word ον and how it has been abstracted, one can see how philosophers have distorted the word and created something that does not exist. By dissolving the word into its ordinary usage, the question of Being simply goes away as being a non-question. In exposing the question of Being as being a nonsense question, the foundations of the philosophy of religion, nay ontology itself have been ripped out from beneath them.

Bibliography

Draper, Hal. Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution Volume III: The "Dictatorship of the Proletariat". 1st. III. New York City, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1986. Print.

Kahn, Charles. The Verb "be" in Ancient Greek. Reprint. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 2003. 1-261. Print.

Lichtenstein, Rosa. "Essay Three Part One: Abstractionism -- The Heart Of The Beast." Anti Dialectics. Rosa Lichtenstein, 15 Aug 2009. Web. 18 Jun 2010. <http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm#DM-Epistemology>.

Comments, questions, critiques?

Proletarian Ultra

19th June 2010, 00:07

Citing Rosa in an academic paper = extra points for ballsiness.

syndicat

19th June 2010, 00:57

If the question of being were to be shown as a nonsensical question, then ontology and the philosophy of religion will become based on nonsense.

This is a nonsequitur. Refuting one particular weird conception of "the question of being" doesn't show that ontology is "nonsense" as you are falsely assuming there aren't other ways to understand ontology.

Then, through a use of philosophical nominalism, they argue that the word or concept must exist independent of the word itself.

You've misused the word "nominalism". This has been used to refer to the view that words don't stand for anything or stand not for anything in the external world but only for concepts. Nominalism is the opposite of realism, whereas you seem to be arguing against some form of realism.

If all words are names, then what are sentences? A sentence would then be a list of names with no actual content. Its lack of content would have to do with lists of names having an inability to express particulars.

Again, a crude misconstrual. If a philosopher supposes that a predicate such as "is black" refers to or tracks a color, it doesn't follow they are holding that "is black" is a name. Predicates and singular terms have different functions in a sentence. From the point of view of a philosopher who holds that "is black" refers to or tracks a color, the predicate "is black" is used to attribute this feature to the subject term of the sentence as in:

(1) Chuckles is black

Names, definite descriptions and predicates all have different social communicative functions, just as questions, commands, and descriptive sentences also have different functions.

In order to be able to attribute a feature to this particular cat, it's necessary to refer to the cat and also pick out a particular feature that is being attributed. If "is black" corresponds to no feature, what is (1) saying about Chuckles? To say that both "Chuckles" and "is black" refer to or track entities in the world, it doesn't follow one is supposed that "is black" is a name. Again, that's a non-sequitur.

As to why philosophers think there are properties or features, there are in fact a wide variety of reasons, and not just to have something that a predicate tracks to in the world. You might start by checking out Chris Swoyer's article on properties at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/

JazzRemington

19th June 2010, 01:03

Meridian

19th June 2010, 02:30

Citing Rosa in an academic paper = extra points for ballsiness.
If you mean that it's courageous, I agree. I think it is deserving, hopefully there's no problem with it.

I liked the paper, but felt it was sort of agressive in approach (not an agressive tone). Of course, I agree with the general message so I thought it was fine. I'm hoping for ChristoferKoch's sake that whoever judges this feels the same way. In the university I attend there are several interesting old women and men who I doubt would be pleased with the prospect of ontology and traditional philosophy being based on nonsense, so I tend to write like a bit of a coward.

Proletarian Ultra

19th June 2010, 02:49

If you mean that it's courageous, I agree. I think it is deserving, hopefully there's no problem with it.

I liked the paper, but felt it was sort of agressive in approach (not an agressive tone). Of course, I agree with the general message so I thought it was fine. I'm hoping for ChristoferKoch's sake that whoever judges this feels the same way. In the university I attend there are several interesting old women and men who I doubt would be pleased with the prospect of ontology and traditional philosophy being based on nonsense, so I tend to write like a bit of a coward.

The university where I was an undergrad was full of analytical types who would eat this up if it was better argued.

If I was still teaching university (my subject was not philosophy FWIW) I would not give this a high mark. At the very least I would expect 'nominalism' to be defined. I would also expect a good-faith counterargument to be considered.

ChrisK

19th June 2010, 03:42

This is a nonsequitur. Refuting one particular weird conception of "the question of being" doesn't show that ontology is "nonsense" as you are falsely assuming there aren't other ways to understand ontology.

You've misused the word "nominalism". This has been used to refer to the view that words don't stand for anything or stand not for anything in the external world but only for concepts. Nominalism is the opposite of realism, whereas you seem to be arguing against some form of realism.

Again, a crude misconstrual. If a philosopher supposes that a predicate such as "is black" refers to or tracks a color, it doesn't follow they are holding that "is black" is a name. Predicates and singular terms have different functions in a sentence. From the point of view of a philosopher who holds that "is black" refers to or tracks a color, the predicate "is black" is used to attribute this feature to the subject term of the sentence as in:

(1) Chuckles is black

Names, definite descriptions and predicates all have different social communicative functions, just as questions, commands, and descriptive sentences also have different functions.

In order to be able to attribute a feature to this particular cat, it's necessary to refer to the cat and also pick out a particular feature that is being attributed. If "is black" corresponds to no feature, what is (1) saying about Chuckles? To say that both "Chuckles" and "is black" refer to or track entities in the world, it doesn't follow one is supposed that "is black" is a name. Again, that's a non-sequitur.

As to why philosophers think there are properties or features, there are in fact a wide variety of reasons, and not just to have something that a predicate tracks to in the world. You might start by checking out Chris Swoyer's article on properties at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/

Thank you for the criticism. I can't believe I used nomialism instead of realism (I mean, half of it is criticizing Platonic realism). My bad. Thank you also for the article, it is quite good (though I haven't finished it yet).

ChrisK

19th June 2010, 03:48

If you mean that it's courageous, I agree. I think it is deserving, hopefully there's no problem with it.

I liked the paper, but felt it was sort of agressive in approach (not an agressive tone). Of course, I agree with the general message so I thought it was fine. I'm hoping for ChristoferKoch's sake that whoever judges this feels the same way. In the university I attend there are several interesting old women and men who I doubt would be pleased with the prospect of ontology and traditional philosophy being based on nonsense, so I tend to write like a bit of a coward.

I should be fine. My teacher is very nice and was unreasonably excited about my paper. She is no Wittgensteinian, but she is very fair and judges based on the merits of the arguments, not how she feels about the subject.

And I think she'd like my internet source.

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd June 2010, 12:46

Syndicat:

This is a nonsequitur. Refuting one particular weird conception of "the question of being" doesn't show that ontology is "nonsense" as you are falsely assuming there aren't other ways to understand ontology.

Of course, not. Ontology is non-sensical for reasons explained in detail here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

Again, a crude misconstrual. If a philosopher supposes that a predicate such as "is black" refers to or tracks a color, it doesn't follow they are holding that "is black" is a name. Predicates and singular terms have different functions in a sentence. From the point of view of a philosopher who holds that "is black" refers to or tracks a color, the predicate "is black" is used to attribute this feature to the subject term of the sentence as in

In that case, you need to tell us in what way such terms differ from names.

(1) Chuckles is black

Names, definite descriptions and predicates all have different social communicative functions, just as questions, commands, and descriptive sentences also have different functions.

Agreed, but then such linguistic expressions perform descriptive (/attributive) roles; so why treat them as referring expressions?

In order to be able to attribute a feature to this particular cat, it's necessary to refer to the cat and also pick out a particular feature that is being attributed. If "is black" corresponds to no feature, what is (1) saying about Chuckles? To say that both "Chuckles" and "is black" refer to or track entities in the world, it doesn't follow one is supposed that "is black" is a name. Again, that's a non-sequitur.

We've already been over this, where it turned out that this was a dead end:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantum-vs-materialism-t124540/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/wittgenstein-t123066/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/possible-worlds-t129293/index.html

But, more specifically, in the middle pages of this thread:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-made-easy-t132387/index.html

As to why philosophers think there are properties or features, there are in fact a wide variety of reasons, and not just to have something that a predicate tracks to in the world. You might start by checking out Chris Swoyer's article on properties at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

But this is just more of the same, traditional approach to philosophy.

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd June 2010, 13:45

Great essay Chris. You might like to add this quotation to it (if it hasn't already been handed in!):

"What is the problem of predication? In a nutshell, it is this. Consider any simple subject-predicate sentence, such as..., 'Theaetetus sits'. How are we to understand the different roles of the subject and the predicate in this sentence, 'Theaetetus' and 'sits' respectively? The role of 'Theaetetus' seems straightforward enough: it serves to name, and thereby to refer to or stand for, a certain particular human being. But what about 'sits'? Many philosophers have been tempted to say that this also refers to or stands for something, namely, a property or universal that Theaetetus possesses or exemplifies: the property of sitting. This is said to be a universal, rather than a particular, because it can be possessed by many different individuals.

"But now we have a problem, for this view of the matter seems to turn the sentence 'Theaetetus sits' into a mere list of (two) names, each naming something different, one a particular and one a universal: 'Theaetetus, sits.' But a list of names is not a sentence because it is not the sort of thing that can be said to be true or false, in the way that 'Theaetetus sits' clearly can. The temptation now is to say that reference to something else must be involved in addition to Theaetetus and the property of sitting, namely, the relation of possessing that Theaetetus has to that property. But it should be evident that this way of proceeding will simply generate the same problem, for now we have just turned the original sentence into a list of three names, 'Theaetetus, possessing, sits.'

"Indeed, we are now setting out on a vicious infinite regress, which is commonly known as 'Bradley's regress', in recognition of its modern discoverer, the British idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley. Bradley used the regress to argue in favour of absolute idealism...." [Lowe (2006).]

Lowe, E. (2006), 'Take A Seat And The Consider This Simple Sentence', Times Higher Education Supplement, 07/04/06.

Quoted in Note 22a0 in Essay Three Part One:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

ChrisK

22nd June 2010, 19:05

I would but the paper was turned in! And I already went over the page limit :(. It was a very short final. But good news; I recieved a 4.0!

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd June 2010, 20:28

I'm not familiar with that marking system. Is that an A, B, C...?

ChrisK

22nd June 2010, 21:29

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd June 2010, 21:43

Well done, then!!:thumbup1:

syndicat

23rd June 2010, 05:15

Agreed, but then such linguistic expressions perform descriptive (/attributive) roles; so why treat them as referring expressions?

you can't attribute a property to something without thereby referring to it, picking it out among all the properties there are.

from

Chuckles is black
Lucy is black

i can infer

There is a trait Chuckles and Lucy both have.

Quantifying over traits is done all the time....in the sciences and in everyday life.

But you can stick to your idiosyncratic view if you like.

Rosa Lichtenstein

23rd June 2010, 11:48

Syndicat:

you can't attribute a property to something without thereby referring to it, picking it out among all the properties there are.

Yes you can, that's why we call it 'describing'/'alluding'/'ascribing', etc., not referring.

Chuckles is black
Lucy is black

i can infer

There is a trait Chuckles and Lucy both have.

Quantifying over traits is done all the time....in the sciences and in everyday life.

But you can stick to your idiosyncratic view if you like.

And here you have a predicate expression "...is a trait C and L both have", which is still not a referring expression.

Quantifying over traits is done all the time....in the sciences and in everyday life.

And we can quantify over non-existent and imaginary objects, too -- so what?

But you can stick to your idiosyncratic view if you like.

It's only 'idiosyncratic' in so far as it runs against a traditon in ruling-class thought dating back at least to Plato. In that case, I'm rather surprised you have swallowed it.

syndicat

24th June 2010, 18:41

as i said:

Chuckles is black
Lucy is black

i can infer

There is a trait Chuckles and Lucy both have.

Quantifying over traits is done all the time....in the sciences and in everyday life.

And here you have a predicate expression "...is a trait C and L both have", which is still not a referring expression.

But note that this inference implies that "is black" is a referring expression. It's not valid to grab onto something with the particular quantifier if there is no such thing. For example, from

Chuckles is black
Chuckles is a cat

we can infer

Some cat is black

This wouldn't be valid if "Chuckles" didn't refer to anything.

Analogously, the first argument won't be valid if "is black" doesn't refer to anything. Quantifiers have to range over existing items when we're talking about real things such as real cats.

We can talk about imaginery or hallucinated objects but in those cases we're actually talking about the properties referred to in the story or as an ostensible object of perception or belief. And these properties are real. we can't refer to any particulars or properties that aren't real. So in any such discussion, there is a preface: "In the story it says..." or "In John's hallucination there is..."

It's only 'idiosyncratic' in so far as it runs against a traditon in ruling-class thought dating back at least to Plato. In that case, I'm rather surprised you have swallowed it.

calling an idea names isn't a refutation of it.

Rosa Lichtenstein

24th June 2010, 21:02

Syndicat:

But note that this inference implies that "is black" is a referring expression. It's not valid to grab onto something with the particular quantifier if there is no such thing. For example, from

Chuckles is black

Chuckles is a cat

we can infer

Some cat is black

This wouldn't be valid if "Chuckles" didn't refer to anything.

Compare your argument with this:

Chuckles is grue.

Chuckles is a cat.

Ergo: Some cat is grue.

But "grue" isn't a referring expression (what does it refer to?).

Analogously, the first argument won't be valid if "is black" doesn't refer to anything. Quantifiers have to range over existing items when we're talking about real things such as real cats.

Quantifiers range over whatever they range over. But this is not relevant anyway, even if you are right. Ordinary language is not governed by the alleged protocols of logic.

But even if it were, the inference would be valid even if the predicate " is black" did not refer. All we need is for the argument to preserve truth, and for that, all we'd need in turn is a name or some other singular expression to be mapped by " is black" onto True (if the premisses are true, False otherwise). And that can happen even if " is black" does not refer -- which it doesn't, anyway, since it's not a referring expression.

So, not only does logic not need predicates to be referring expressions to preserve validity, ordinary language does not treat them as referring expressions.

We can talk about imaginary or hallucinated objects but in those cases we're actually talking about the properties referred to in the story or as an ostensible object of perception or belief. And these properties are real. we can't refer to any particulars or properties that aren't real. So in any such discussion, there is a preface: "In the story it says..." or "In John's hallucination there is..."

My example 'grue" shows this is not so.

Despite this, in your previous post you said this:

Quantifying over traits is done all the time....in the sciences and in everyday life.

Once more, we can quantify over non-existent "traits", for example "Anyone who can swim the Atlantic in less than three seconds needn't bother to book a seat on a plane".

And if you do not like this rather fanciful trait, try these for size:

"Anyone who shows Golbach's conjecture is unprovable (or false) is sure to win the Shields Medal (sic)."

Or:

"Anyone who has translated the Voynich Manuscript (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voynich_manuscript) into Swahili deserves the Nobel prize for Translation (sic)".

calling an idea names isn't a refutation of it.

Where did I say it did?

On the other hand, your adherence to this ruling-class nostrum only serves to further confirm what Marx said:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.

You are welcome to them...

syndicat

25th June 2010, 03:22

Chuckles is grue.

Chuckles is a cat.

Ergo: Some cat is grue.

But "grue" isn't a referring expression (what does it refer to?).

it's not a sound inference because nothing is grue. So the first premise is false.

Ordinary language is not governed by the alleged protocols of logic.

well, that would be news to logicians. and here they thought they were developing a theory to capture or explain fragements of valid inference. oh well, i suppose you know better than logicians....

Once more, we can quantify over non-existent "traits", for example "Anyone who can swim the Atlantic in less than three seconds needn't bother to book a seat on a plane".

clever except that in such a case there are traits here referred to...swimming, less than three seconds, and so on.

in other words, we can take expressions that do refer to things and then combine them to describe non-actual and even impossible situations.

to take a simple example, if i say "That wall is solidly red and solidly green all over" then what i've said is false. there is no such property as the one I attribute to the wall. but what i say makes sense because the property of being solidly red does exist and similarly with the property of being solidly green.

similarly with swimming across the Atlantic in three seconds. the relevant predicate makes sense because the various properties here do exist, just not in this combination.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th June 2010, 11:10

Syndicat:

it's not a sound inference because nothing is grue. So the first premise is false.

You seem to be in the grip of an odd theory of validity that restricts inferences that only deal with true premisses. Science would be crippled if it adopted your approach.

well, that would be news to logicians. and here they thought they were developing a theory to capture or explain fragments of valid inference. oh well, i suppose you know better than logicians....

Not news at all; this has been a hot topic in the philosophy of logic at least since Peter Strawson published his 'Introduction to Logical Theory' in 1952. Informal logicians will also find this unsurprising, too. You may be unaware of this, but we can't be held back by your ignorance, can we?

clever except that in such a case there are traits here referred to...swimming, less than three seconds, and so on.

The point is, there is no such 'trait', so there can be no reference here.

But you have a reply:

in other words, we can take expressions that do refer to things and then combine them to describe non-actual and even impossible situations.

So, 'traits' have parts do they, while the whole 'trait'-term might still fail to refer.

to take a simple example, if i say "That wall is solidly red and solidly green all over" then what i've said is false. there is no such property as the one I attribute to the wall. but what i say makes sense because the property of being solidly red does exist and similarly with the property of being solidly green.

Not my example, so this is irrelevant.

similarly with swimming across the Atlantic in three seconds. the relevant predicate makes sense because the various properties here do exist, just not in this combination.

But the 'trait' still doesn't exist, and so the predicate cannot refer.

Finally, all this assumes that predicates are referring expressions, which you have failed to show is the case.

syndicat

26th June 2010, 00:10

me:

it's not a sound inference because nothing is grue. So the first premise is false.
you:

You seem to be in the grip of an odd theory of validity that restricts inferences that only deal with true premisses. Science would be crippled if it adopted your approach.

notice: I said it wasn't "sound". i didn't say anything about its validity.
me:

in other words, we can take expressions that do refer to things and then combine them to describe non-actual and even impossible situations.
you:

Informal logicians will also find this unsurprising, too. You may be unaware of this, but we can't be held back by your ignorance, can we?

I taught informal logic. I didn't assume that a "theory" of valid inferences is purely about formal structures. This can't be so because the same "form" can correspond to valid and at other times invalid inferences.

me:

clever except that in such a case there are traits here referred to...swimming, less than three seconds, and so on.
you:

The point is, there is no such 'trait', so there can be no reference here.

You miss the point. The point is this: just because we put together predicates that do track features in some way doesn't show there is somehow some combined trait that the more complex predicate tracks.

Thus, in the example you gave, "swims the Atlantic in less than three seconds" is a complex predicate. Having a duraction of less than three seconds is a trait of events. It is true of some events. I can say "The light was on for less than three seconds." Swimming across a body of liquid is a particular relation, one that a swimmer stand in to some body of liquid.

So, 'traits' have parts do they, while the whole 'trait'-term might still fail to refer.

again, it is the predicative expressions that have "parts". And these parts can track properties even if the complex expression doesn't.

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th September 2010, 19:20

Syndicat:

I said it wasn't "sound". i didn't say anything about its validity.

Indeed, but my point still stands:

Science would be crippled if it adopted your approach.

You:

I taught informal logic.

I know you did. You never tire of telling us. So did I.

You seem to have forgotten much that you taught, though.

I didn't assume that a "theory" of valid inferences is purely about formal structures. This can't be so because the same "form" can correspond to valid and at other times invalid inferences.

Depends on how you define 'valid'.

You miss the point. The point is this: just because we put together predicates that do track features in some way doesn't show there is somehow some combined trait that the more complex predicate tracks.

Well, this makes little sense, and I fail to see how it is a relevant reply to my point, which was that many predicates, even on your view, fail to 'refer'.

Thus, in the example you gave, "swims the Atlantic in less than three seconds" is a complex predicate. Having a duraction of less than three seconds is a trait of events. It is true of some events. I can say "The light was on for less than three seconds." Swimming across a body of liquid is a particular relation, one that a swimmer stand in to some body of liquid.

Maybe so, but this fails to show why these comments of mine are incorrect:

The point is, there is no such 'trait', so there can be no reference here.

So, 'traits' have parts do they, while the whole 'trait'-term might still fail to refer.

But you have another reply:

again, it is the predicative expressions that have "parts". And these parts can track properties even if the complex expression doesn't.

But, you have now substituted 'designate' (or 'refer') with 'track', an even vaguer term.

You might as well try to explain, say, Hegel, with the 'language' contained in the Voynich Manuscript.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voynich_manuscript

This is not help at all. I might 'track' a wild goose, but that does not imply it exists. If it did, Big Foot and the Loch Ness Monster must exist too!

norwegian commie

5th September 2010, 21:55

I love these analytical marxists who envoke their standard critique of all continental philosophy again and again and again - never realizing their own limitations. For example, discussing dialectics in purely logical terms and thus proving it to be logically incoherent. Well, that is the dialecticians point...

JazzRemington

5th September 2010, 22:09

Rosa Lichtenstein

6th September 2010, 00:05

Norwegian Commie:

I love these analytical marxists

Who precisely is an 'analytic Marxist' here?

who envoke their standard critique of all continental philosophy again and again and again

Because it constitutes a capitulation to the systematic distortion and misuse of language, as Marx indicated:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118.Bold emphasis added.

Like Marx, us genuine materialists prefer ordinary language.

- never realizing their own limitations. For example, discussing dialectics in purely logical terms and thus proving it to be logically incoherent.

It's not just logically incoherent, it is incoherent tout court. Unless, of course, you can show otherwise.

And good luck with that one; we have only been waiting for nigh on 200 years.

Well, that is the dialecticians point...

They don't have a point. Or, at least, not a coherent point.

norwegian commie

6th September 2010, 09:32

Problem is, for dialecticians logic and dialectics co-exist in an internal contradiction. Epistemologically, we understand the already known - and rest - by logic. Flux is understood by dialectics. However, this is not quite right. One cannot understand rest wothout flux, and vice versa.

LOL wut? The dialecticians' point is that dialectics is incoherent? Also, you're using "logical" in a vague way.

Yes, logical is used - deliberatly - in a vauge way. What is logics, is quite the discussion. And certain logicians would define logics in a way that is all-embracing, hence including dialectical thought. So i leave that discussion alone by using the word in a vauge manner.

The dialecticians point isnt that its task is to be logically incoherent, but that logic cannon account for everything. Problem with Rosas argument, where she proves that certain concepts is contradictory in a logical sense, is that she cannot do this by mear appeal to logics. In other words: You cant falsify a system of thought that claims logics isnt adequate in order to comprehend the world - by a simple logical inquiery.

Rosa Lichtenstein

6th September 2010, 09:43

Norwegian Commie:

Problem is, for dialecticians logic and dialectics co-exist in an internal contradiction. Epistemologically, we understand the already known - and rest - by logic. Flux is understood by dialectics. However, this is not quite right. One cannot understand rest wothout flux, and vice versa.

Well, dialectical 'logic' is based on several serious logical gaffs Hegel committed, so there is no clash between dialectical 'logic' and genuine logic, anymore than there is between, say, Alice in Wonderland and Physics.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

Epistemology has nothing to do with logic, and dialectical 'logic', if true, would make change impossible. Here is why:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31

And certain logicians would define logics in a way that is all-embracing, hence including dialectical thought. So i leave that discussion alone by using the word in a vauge manner.

Sure, and some individuals would lump together Astrology and Astronomy, but that doesn't make their classification correct. Same with genuine logic and dialectical 'logic'.

The dialecticians point isnt that its task is to be logically incoherent, but that logic cannon account for everything.

Logic doesn't account for anything; it is merely the systematic study of inference.

Problem with Rosas argument, where she proves that certain concepts is contradictory in a logical sense, is that she cannot do this by mear appeal to logics. In other words: You cant falsify a system of thought that claims logics isnt adequate in order to comprehend the world - by a simple logical inquiery.

Well, I 'd like to see you show me where I do any of this.:confused: