Sociolinguistics, Applied Linguistics, Generative Grammar

[Buffalo Souljah]

I know very littel about these fields, but what I have read from Wikipedia so far has been very confusing, to say the least.

Take this, from the Sociolinguistics article:

In Chomskian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chomskian) linguistics, a distinction is drawn between I-language (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I-language) (internal language) and E-language (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=E-language&action=edit&redlink=1) (external language). In this context, internal language applies to the study of syntax and semantics in language on the abstract level; as mentally represented knowledge in a native speaker. External language applies to language in social contexts, i.e. behavioral habits shared by a community. Internal language analyses operate on the assumption that all native speakers of a language are quite homogeneous in how they process and perceive language.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] External language fields, such as sociolinguistics, attempt to explain why this is in fact not the case. Many sociolinguists reject the distinction between I- and E-language on the grounds that it is based on a mentalist view of language. On this view, grammar is first and foremost an interactional (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactional_linguistics) (social) phenomenon (e.g. Elinor Ochs, Emanuel Schegloff (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emanuel_Schegloff), Sandra Thompson).

Are these valid distinctions-- Internal/external language? This seems to me to be the classic argument between idealism and skepticism, which always responds to the former with something along the lines of infinite regress or the problem of induction. Does this degrade the quality of linguistics' claim to be a "true" science (and not a "social" science)?

I have other questions, but I feel we should let the bull out of his pen so as to avoid suspense.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, this is an empty distinction, since it is based on an odd use of 'internal' and an empty use of 'representation'.

Here's a neat refutation:


"If a speaker's competence in a language consists in having knowledge-that of its rules, then assuming RTM [The Representational Theory of Mind -- RL], she must represent those rules. That representation must itself be in a language. What is it to be competent in that more basic language? If we suppose that the more basic language is the same as the original language then we are caught in a vicious circle. If we suppose that it is some other language ('Mentalese' perhaps), then its rules also have to be represented. This requires a still more basic language. And so on. The only way to avoid a vicious circle or an infinite regress is to allow that we can be competent in at least one language directly, without representing its rules. Why not then allow this of the original language, the one spoken?" [Devitt (2006), p.92.]

Devitt, M. (2006), Ignorance Of Language (Oxford University Press).

And since the above distinction is also often based on the computational model of the 'mind', here is another:


"Reasoning (on the computational model) is the manipulation of meaningful symbols according to rational rules (in an integrated system). Hence, there must be some sort of manipulator to carry out those manipulations. There seem to be two basic possibilities: either the manipulator pays attention to what the symbols and rules mean or it doesn't. If it does pay attention to the meanings, then it can't be entirely mechanical -- because meanings (whatever exactly they are) don't exert physical forces. On the other hand, if the manipulator does not pay attention to the meanings, then the manipulations can't be instances of reasoning -- because what's reasonable or not depends crucially on what the symbols mean.

"In a word, if a process or system is mechanical, it can't reason; if it reasons, it can't be mechanical. " [Haugeland (1985), p.39.]

Haugeland, J. (1985), Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (MIT Press).

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm