Compatibilism: the consistent Marxist approach to the Free Will question

[A.R.Amistad]

So, the question of free will has been coming up and I thought that it is time we discussed the proletarian Marxist view of free will. Generally, Marxist philosophy holds that both extreme determinism and extreme philosophical libertarianism are bourgeois philosophical notions that end up supporting the capitalist establishment. Often times, Marxists are called historical determinists, or even free-will Utopians by the less knowledgeable. The way Marx, Engels and Lenin presented the question, freedom exists, but necessity precedes freedom. Quantum physics has come to support compatibility conclusions, what with the actual existence of "randomness" in the universe. For those of you who have followed my Existentialist threads, the only thing needed to "smooth over" the reconciliation between the two is to accept the Marxist (and scientifically correct) definition of free will, that is, the compatiblist or weak-determinist view. Existence precedes essence and necessity precedes free will. For a great argument on the scientific basis for compatibilism, read Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves. I have just started reading the book and it is amazing. It presents the idea of the compatibility of the existence of free will and determinist factors in a logical and very scientific way, and it is free of any mysticism. Still, it manages to be an engaging philosophical read. Not only that, but while not explicit, the book presents what is the Marxist view of the free will question, and I suggest everyone read this wonderful piece of work:

http://www.amazon.com/Freedom-Evolves-Daniel-C-Dennett/dp/0670031860


Synopsis

As in Consciousness Explained, Dennett advertises the controversial nature of his views extensively in advance. He expects hostility from those who fear that a skeptical analysis of freedom will undermine people's belief in the reality of moral considerations; he likens himself to an interfering crow who insists on telling Dumbo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dumbo) he doesn't really need the feather he believes is allowing him to fly.
[edit (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Freedom_Evolves&action=edit&section=2)] Free will and altruism

Dennett's stance on free will (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will) is compatibilism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism) with an evolutionary twist – the view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions are pre-determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved. Free will, seen this way, is about freedom to make decisions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_%28philosophy%29) without duress, as opposed to an impossible and unnecessary freedom from causality itself. To clarify this distinction, he coins the term 'evitability' as the opposite of 'inevitability', defining it as the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones. Evitability is entirely compatible with, and actually requires, human action being deterministic. Dennett moves on to altruism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altruism), denying that it requires acting to the benefit of others without gaining any benefit yourself. He argues that it should be understood in terms of helping yourself by helping others, expanding the self to be more inclusive as opposed to being selfless. To show this blend, he calls such actions 'benselfish', and finds the roots of our capacity for this in the evolutionary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution) pressures that produced kin selection (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kin_selection). In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. This strategy comes down to dissolving problems, instead of solving them. Rather than try to answer certain flawed questions, he questions the assumptions of the questions themselves and undermines them.
[edit (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Freedom_Evolves&action=edit&section=3)] Beneficial mutual arrangements

Dennett also suggests that adherence to high ethical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical) standards might pay off for the individual, because if others know your behaviour is restricted in these ways, the scope for certain beneficial mutual arrangements is enhanced. This is related to game theoretical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory) considerations: in the famous Prisoner's Dilemma (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_Dilemma), 'moral' agents who cooperate will be more successful than 'non-moral' agents who do not cooperate. Cooperation wouldn't seem to naturally arise since agents are tempted to 'defect' and restore a Nash equilibrium (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium), which is often not the best possible solution for all involved. Dennett concludes by contemplating the possibility that people might be able to opt in or out of moral responsibility: surely, he suggests, given the benefits, they would choose to opt in, especially given that opting out includes such things as being imprisoned or institutionalized.

[Zanthorus]

There is no "proletarian marxist" view of anything philosophical. "Philosophy" in fact has absolutely nothing to do with the class struggle.

The best way to determine the answer to the "can we have free will" question would to just look at the ways we can use the term "free will". Most of the confusion in this debate seems to rest on the fact that no-one defines "free will". You can read articles by philosophical libertarians and determinists that although they argue convincingly for/against free will as they define it eventually solve nothing because they all mean different things by "free will" and in the end it almost comes down to your own preferences of wether you like a universe with free will or a deterministic one better.

[blackwave]

Let's just say that one cannot defy causation, and leave it at that.

[ZeroNowhere]

There is no "proletarian marxist" view of anything philosophical. "Philosophy" in fact has absolutely nothing to do with the class struggle.

The best way to determine the answer to the "can we have free will" question would to just look at the ways we can use the term "free will". Most of the confusion in this debate seems to rest on the fact that no-one defines "free will". You can read articles by philosophical libertarians and determinists that although they argue convincingly for/against free will as they define it eventually solve nothing because they all mean different things by "free will" and in the end it almost comes down to your own preferences of wether you like a universe with free will or a deterministic one better.
I agree with this; though the last sentence is rather vague, I had read it as indicating that the two are, beneath the epistemic claims about 'natural laws' and such, generally just attitudes, which can hardly have more validity than other attitudes; I believe that Wittgenstein had compared them to when he loses his key, and comments that if there were a god, he must be quite amused due to W looking for the key when the god can see all. Otherwise, as you said, the word 'free will' is generally not given any sense, and therefore it wouldn't be entirely clear what 'living in a universe with free will' meant.

As to compatibilism, I don't think that one can answer a question by simply defining the terms, unless it is a question about the definition of the term, which the 'Free Will question' is not. That would be like answering the question 'If an ideal gas has an increase in pressure while the temperature is constant, what will happen to the volume?' by redefining volume to mean pressure, and therefore saying that it would increase. The only difference being that 'volume' has sense in the above question, and that it is not a pseudo-question.

[Zanthorus]

I agree with this; though the last sentence is rather vague, I had read it as indicating that the two are, beneath the epistemic claims about 'natural laws' and such, generally just attitudes, which can hardly have more validity than other attitudes;

That was basically what I was trying to get across :)

[Meridian]

Marxism is a political theory with corresponding political movements, not a philosophy in the traditional meaning of the term. There are no 'ontological' or 'epistemological' (metaphysical) ideas directly attributable to marxism as a political theory. Additionally, nor should or could (successfully) any such ideas be attempted derived from marxism, because marxism is fundamentally an a-philosophical political theory.

And we should be very, very grateful for that.

[A.R.Amistad]

Marxism is a political theory with corresponding political movements, not a philosophy in the traditional meaning of the term. There are no 'ontological' or 'epistemological' (metaphysical) ideas directly attributable to marxism as a political theory. Additionally, nor should or could (successfully) any such ideas be attempted derived from marxism, because marxism is fundamentally an a-philosophical political theory.

And we should be very, very grateful for that.

I like the way you put that. So many people complain that Marxism doesn't "address the individual" or "address people's emotions," etc. etc. etc. insert idealist babble here. Well, no it doesn't. Marxism isn't a pretentious ideology like orthodox Freudianism that tries to impose a formula on all individuals. Marxism restricts itself to society and the history of society. As Marx said "capitalism is a social, not an individual force."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Since the 'free will question' is a pseudo-problem, then the answer to your question is "No". There can be no solution to such conundrums, any more than there can be a solution to the 'problem' whether the King and Queen in chess are really married.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1

[A.R.Amistad]

Since the 'free will question' is a pseudo-problem, then the answer to your question is "No". There can be no solution to such conundrums, any more than there can be a solution to the 'problem' whether the King and Queen in chess are really married.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1

That doesn't attack or disprove my argument, nor does it support it. According to Deckett, it seems that freedom is something that is a product of the evolution of our brains. Its an evolutionary trait, not an abstract subjective idea.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, it does, since I have shown that the way this problem has been framed over the last two thousand years depends on an anthropomorphisation of nature. If so, there is no 'problem' of 'free will' to solve, and hence 'free will' can't have evolved.

[anticap]

Anyone who believes in free will is a raving loon (and, incidentally, probably a closeted right-wing conservative, since it forms the bedrock of nearly all such ideologies).

Dennet's "solution" to the problem is to simply redefine a bunch of terms. I remember him being interviewed by a right-"libertarian" rag on this issue, and that was my immediate reaction: "You've simply redefined everything, you ass!"

I'll never understand the desperate need that some people seem to have to save this nonsense from the philosophical dustbin.

[A.R.Amistad]

Anyone who believes in free will is a raving loon (and, incidentally, probably a closeted right-wing conservative, since it forms the bedrock of nearly all such ideologies).

Dennet's "solution" to the problem is to simply redefine a bunch of terms. I remember him being interviewed by a right-"libertarian" rag on this issue, and that was my immediate reaction: "You've simply redefined everything, you ass!"

I'll never understand the desperate need that some people seem to have to save this nonsense from the philosophical dustbin.

OK, so, since everything is so predetermined, I take it socialism will never happen and we're really just shooting the shit about this "dustbin."

[lulks]

Dennet's "solution" to the problem is to simply redefine a bunch of terms. I remember him being interviewed by a right-"libertarian" rag on this issue, and that was my immediate reaction: "You've simply redefined everything, you ass!"can you give examples of where he redefines the terms? it is true he does not believe humans can defy causality, and he does not believe in libertarianism (metaphysical libertarianism, not political). he believes in free will in the sense that he is opposed to the belief that no one can be responsible for anything they do, like in galen strawson's "basic argument":

In its simplest form, the Basic Argument runs thus:

You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
So in order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.


OK, so, since everything is so predetermined, I take it socialism will never happen and we're really just shooting the shit about this "dustbin." he never said everything was predetermined, and even if it was, that doesn't mean socialism will never happen.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I see you lot are determined (no pun intended) to continue bashing your heads against this pseudo-problem.:(

[lulks]

why is it a pseudoproblem?

[Tribune]

why is it a pseudoproblem?

Do you need a theory of will to join a fighting union? Do you need a theory of will, to take a step down a flight of stairs? Do you need a belief about free will, or determined will, to take a bite out of an apple? Protest a war?

[lulks]

Do you need a theory of will to join a fighting union? Do you need a theory of will, to take a step down a flight of stairs? Do you need a belief about free will, or determined will, to take a bite out of an apple? Protest a war?
no. why does that make it a pseudproblem?

[Tribune]

no. why does that make it a pseudproblem?

Assume two people, Barry and Louise. Assume a guitar.

For the next four years, Barry will study all of the theories of music, musicology, music history and musical philosophy he can fit into the time period. He will read biographies of the great musicians in every available tradition. He will study countless doctrinal theses about sound, the human ear and the history of music.

For the same period of time, Louise will study the guitar. She will practice playing it, tuning it, caring for it, cleaning it. She will study music for the guitar, and music which she can play in accompaniment with others, on the guitar. She will play the guitar.

At the end of the four years, which one of them can give a concert with a guitar and which one of them will talk about people giving concerts with guitars?

[lulks]

Assume two people, Barry and Louise. Assume a guitar.

For the next four years, Barry will study all of the theories of music, musicology, music history and musical philosophy he can fit into the time period. He will read biographies of the great musicians in every available tradition. He will study countless doctrinal theses about sound, the human ear and the history of music.

For the same period of time, Louise will study the guitar. She will practice playing it, tuning it, caring for it, cleaning it. She will study music for the guitar, and music which she can play in accompaniment with others, on the guitar. She will play the guitar.

At the end of the four years, which one of them can give a concert with a guitar and which one of them can talk about people giving concerts with guitars?
i'm not saying there is any practical benefit of having any opinion about free will, but that doesn't mean it is a pseudoproblem. solving problems in advanced mathematics usually has no practical benefit, but that doesn't mean they are pseudoproblems.

[Tribune]

no. why does that make it a pseudproblem?

Putting all that another way - it's a metaphysical use of language, which has no bearing on every day life. "Solving" the problem of free will or determinism won't address human choice. It won't make the experience of choice any different. It will address only beliefs about human choice, because the question is formulated to address problems which present only in the use (and misuse) of language.

For example - "Why does God cause human suffering?" No answer to the pseudo-problem presented in the question arises from a demonstrable experience of God, so that the question and any "solutions" are contained entirely in words about words, or the misuse of language.

[Tribune]

i'm not saying there is any practical benefit of having any opinion about free will, but that doesn't mean it is a pseudoproblem. solving problems in advanced mathematics usually has no practical benefit, but that doesn't mean they are pseudoproblems.

I suspect that Rosa's assertion comes from a reading of Wittgenstein, and I have to leave her response to her.

For my own part - any presumed knowledge about will has no relationship to the experience of choice, and sets up free will and determinism as problems only by misusing language. It has no context outside of its own terms. It is (in short) metaphysics, stripped of God.

[Tribune]

lulks,

In fairness, I ought make my bias very clear: I don't see any evidence for a thing, called will. It is treated, in common usage, as an inhabitant of the body, a compelling force which (according to various theoretical interpretations) either possesses some quality of self-direction, and is therefore partially causa sui, or is entirely shaped by the totality of the universe, and past events, and experiences itself only as an epiphenomenon.

In other words, "the will" is just an updated version of "the soul," and we are back to discussing, but now with the imprimatur of Revolutionary Marxism™, whether or not the soul is free to choose its salvation (understood as a revolutionary, just society) or is pre-ordained by God (reconfigured as History).

[lulks]

Putting all that another way - it's a metaphysical use of language, which has no bearing on every day life. "Solving" the problem of free will or determinism won't address human choice. It won't make the experience of choice any different. It will address only beliefs about human choice, because the question is formulated to address problems which present only in the use (and misuse) of language.

For example - "Why does God cause human suffering?" No answer to the pseudo-problem presented in the question arises from a demonstrable experience of God, so that the question and any "solutions" are contained entirely in words about words, or the misuse of language.
actually, i just thought of one practical effect of free will - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no free will, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake.

but i am still interested in why you think all issues that have no practical effect are pseudoproblems. why is it a misuse of language?

[Tribune]

actually, i just thought of one practical effect of free will - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no free will, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake.

but i am still interested in why you think all issues that have no practical effect are pseudoproblems. why is it a misuse of language?

I'm going to alter your text with a single replacement, to see how it reads:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of the soul - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no soul, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

(bolded word is the alteration)

"but i am still interested in why you think all issues that have no practical effect are pseudoproblems. why is it a misuse of language?"

See alteration above.

[lulks]

I don't see any evidence for a thing, called will. It is treated, in common usage, as an inhabitant of the body, a compelling force which (according to various theoretical interpretations) either possesses some quality of self-direction, and is therefore partially causa sui, or is entirely shaped by the totality of the universe, and past events, and experiences itself only as an epiphenomenon.

In other words, "the will" is just an updated version of "the soul," and we are back to discussing, but now with the imprimatur of Revolutionary Marxism™, whether or not the soul is free to choose its salvation (understood as a revolutionary, just society) or is pre-ordained by God (reconfigured as History). i don't believe in that kind of free will. i don't believe in dualism, i believe humans are just matter. all i believe is that what happens in the future is not inevitable even if determinism is true, and that people can be held responsible for what they do.

[Tribune]

i don't believe in that kind of free will. i don't believe in dualism, i believe humans are just matter. all i believe is that what happens in the future is not inevitable even if determinism is true, and that people can be held responsible for what they do.

Okay. But you are still using the term "free will" as if it were an equivalent of an inhabiting soul.

I'm not suggesting a moral failure on your part, in noting this, lulks. Consider how often the word "consciousness" is used in exactly the same way - as a thing, either free or determined, which inhabits the body.

In my experience, "free will" and "consciousness" are simply restatements of the soul, denuded of the overtly theological language of God, but with a firm entrenchment still in a kind of teleology.

[lulks]

Okay. But you are still using the term "free will" as if it were an equivalent of an inhabiting soul. how am i using the term like that? is it because i say i believe free will exists? just because i use "free will" like a name of a thing doesn't mean i actually believe there is a nonphysical substance that i am calling free will. just like when i use the word "software", it doesn't mean i believe there is a nonphysical substance in the computer.

[Tribune]

how am i using the term like that? is it because i say i believe free will exists? just because i use "free will" like a name of a thing doesn't mean i actually believe there is a nonphysical substance that i am calling free will. just like when i use the word "software", it doesn't mean i believe there is a nonphysical substance in the computer.

If "free will" is a name, it is the name of a thing which exists, and you are treating it not as a descriptor of events and choices (seen after the fact) but as an entity.

Whether or not you believe in the will as a substance, you are nonetheless using it as an entity, and a substance, in your argument.

That was the point of the exchange of terms, in your actual argument. To show - whatever your stated beliefs - the consequences of your usage.

And I think that disconnect between your statement of non-belief in the will as an entity, and your usage of it as a thing in your argument, explains part of the pseudo-problem to which Rosa first alluded.

It is in the language of the argument itself that the problem arises.

[Tribune]

(snip)

but i am still interested in why you think all issues that have no practical effect are pseudoproblems. why is it a misuse of language?

And just for the sake of clarity, I don't think all problems which have "no practical effect" are pseudo problems.

I used the example of the guitar as an analog, an illustration.

[lulks]

If "free will" is a name, it is the name of a thing which exists, and you are treating it not as a descriptor of events and choices (seen after the fact) but as an entity."free will" is not a name, as i use it. i just use it similar to a name (i use it as a noun). if someone uses the word "software" does that mean they believe in a substance? if someone uses the word "possibility" does that mean they believe in a substance that they are calling "possibility"? the usage of nouns is more complex than just to be a label.

[Tribune]

"free will" is not a name, as i use it. i just use it similar to a name (i use it as a noun). if someone uses the word "software" does that mean they believe in a substance? if someone uses the word "possibility" does that mean they believe in a substance that they are calling "possibility"? the usage of nouns is more complex than just to be a label.

For this statement to work, you treat "free will" as a substance, an entity:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of free will - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no free will, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

Insert any substitute noun, as a word naming a thing, and the grammar works, whether or not the statement describes observable phenomena.

For example:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of ice cream - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no ice cream, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

Or:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of love - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no love, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

Or:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of the Resurrection - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no Resurrection, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

Now substitute another part of speech, say an adjective, and the grammar starts to break down:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of salty - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no salty, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

See also:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of broken - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no broken, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

Or:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of hairy - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no hairy, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

Or:

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of fair - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no fair, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."

Now try that with an adverb, a conjunction or even a non-gerund verb. It becomes non-sense.

You are treating with "free will" as a thing.

You are using precisely as Scholastic Theologians used the word, "soul."

I understand that you don't believe free will is a thing, but the argument you are making depends upon you treating it as such.

[lulks]

"actually, i just thought of one practical effect of love - the issue of moral responsibility. if there is no love, no one should be held responsible for anything they do. so there is a practical effect, sorry about making that mistake."
so do you believe that when people talk about love, they are talking nonsense because there is no substance inside people called love?

Now try that with an adverb, a conjunction or even a non-gerund verb. It becomes non-sense.it is true that only nouns are used as names for objects, but not all nouns are used that way. there are many examples in ordinary language of this. for example, when someone talks about software, they don't have any metaphysical theory of a substance inside the computer. since you like wittgenstein, i think you should agree with me on this. one of his main ideas was that to find the meaning of a word you should look to its use, not to an object it is naming.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

lulks:


why is it a pseudoproblem?

Well, the contrast between 'free will' and 'determinism' is based on a radical misuse of language, and on the anthropomorphisation of nature. I have explained more fully in the link I added to an earlier post:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1

If after reading that you are still not sure, let me know and I'll try to expalin it more clearly.

[A.R.Amistad]

What I don't understand about the Wittgenstein-ites out there is that they must believe that every single human emotion and individual is total bunk. So, despair doesn't exist? Love doesn't exist? Individual emotions don't exist? We get to a point where basically everything falls into some sort of nihilism because you simply can't explain why people's emotions are so unpredictable. If free will doesn't exist at all then what do you counter pose it with besides hard-determinist mysticism?

[Tribune]

so do you believe that when people talk about love, they are talking nonsense because there is no substance inside people called love?

No. Nor did I state anything remotely resembling that assertion. I exist. I feel what I call love. I feel it for the woman foolish enough to live with me, and for our children.

Do I think it ought to be treated as a thing I possess, containing it within myself? No.

But, not treating a feeling, or set of feelings, as possessions (in language) has nothing to do with your use of "free will" as a stand in for "soul."


it is true that only nouns are used as names for objects, but not all nouns are used that way. there are many examples in ordinary language of this. for example, when someone talks about software, they don't have any metaphysical theory of a substance inside the computer. since you like wittgenstein, i think you should agree with me on this. one of his main ideas was that to find the meaning of a word you should look to its use, not to an object it is naming.I made no point about Wittgenstein, except that I believed Rosa was restating a position, from his argument - but not being sure, I would leave it to Rosa to explain.

*

All that stated, I see no evidence for a thing, "Will," which needs to be philosophized.

[JazzRemington]

What I don't understand about the Wittgenstein-ites out there is that they must believe that every single human emotion and individual is total bunk.

Who said this? Wittgensteinians only talk about what makes and does not make sense. It doesn't make sense to say that you have a particular feeling that you, and only you can know or understand. Saying something like "I'm filled with dread" doesn't make sense without qualification (e.g. "I'm filled with dread over whether or not I'm going to fall this exam" or "I dread whenever I have to give a public speech").

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

A R Amistad:


What I don't understand about the Wittgenstein-ites out there is that they must believe that every single human emotion and individual is total bunk. So, despair doesn't exist? Love doesn't exist? Individual emotions don't exist?

How do you work this out? Our use of such words in ordinary discourse does not depend on a philosophical theory of any sort. In contrast, the philosophical use of the phrase 'free will' does.

Of course, if, in every day life, someone says something like "I did it of my own free will", then no problem, since this is just shorthand for the fact this person decided to do whatever it was, and he/she wasn't coerced. But no theory is involved here.


We get to a point where basically everything falls into some sort of nihilism because you simply can't explain why people's emotions are so unpredictable. If free will doesn't exist at all then what do you counter pose it with besides hard-determinist mysticism?

Not at all, since determinism is also based on the systemtaic misuse of language too.

Look, here is how I explained this last year:


Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on 'determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.



This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.

For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, can apply, or can bring about.

As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., 'determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.

To use an analogy, would we take seriously anyone who wondered when the King and Queen in chess got married, and then wanted to know who conducted the ceremony? Or, whether planning permission had been sought for that castle over in the corner? Such empty questions, of course, have no answer.

To be sure, this is more difficult to see in relation to the traditional question at hand, but it is nonetheless the result of similar confusions. So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language. [More on this below.]

When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.

So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature. [But, note the qualification I introduce here, below. There were ideological reasons why these words were in fact used.]

If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.

Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

As I noted earlier, this whole way of looking at 'the will' inverts things. [I]We are denied a will (except formally) and nature is granted one. As many might now be able to see, this is yet another aspect of the alienating nature of traditional thought, where words are fetishised and we are dehumanised.

And this should not surprise us since such questions were originally posed theologically (and thus ideologically), where theorists were quite happy to alienate to 'god' such control over nature and our supposedly 'free' actions'. Hence, we too find that we have to appropriate such distorted terminology if we follow traditional patterns of thought in this area.

No wonder Marx argued:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118.]

And:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.' [Ibid., pp.64-65.]
These concepts "rule" us too if we are suitably uncritical.

Many of these ideas are not original to me (but the Marxist application of them is). They first appeared, as far as I am aware, in Bertrand Russell's essay:

Russell, B. (1917a), 'On The Notion Of A Cause', in Russell (1917b), pp.132-51.

--------, (1917b), Mysticism And Logic (George, Allen and Unwin).

These ideas can be found explicitly stated in the following (but not from a Marxist angle):

Gallop, D. (1962), 'On Being Determined', Mind 71, pp.181-96.

I have also followed this analysis of 'law':

Swartz, N. (1985), The Concept Of A Physical Law (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (2006), 'Laws Of Nature', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

A PDF of the former can be downloaded here:

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/

The latter is found here:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/

Influential Wittgensteinian criticisms of modern scientistic philosophies of 'mind' can be found here:

Bennett, M., and Hacker, P. (2003), Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience (Blackwell).

--------, (2008), History Of Cognitive Neuroscience (Blackwell).

Those who think an appeal to ordinary language is inappropriate here should re-read what Marx said above, consult the first half of following, and then think again:

Button, G., Coulter, J., Lee, J., and Sharrock, W. (1995), Computers, Minds And Conduct (Polity Press).

The bottom line is that Marxists have been too quick to appropriate concepts and forms-of-thought from traditional (alienated ruling-class) philosophy without subjecting them to close enough scrutiny. Unfortunately, this means that while our politics seems radical enough, our theory (both here and in relation to dialectics, for example) is thoroughly traditional -- and, if I may say so, disconcertingly conservative.

I explain why I say this in the first few sections of the following:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm

Finally, I'd try to get this material published in Marxist journals, etc., but I am generally treated as a pariah, and face emotive and irrational hostility wherever I try to present such ideas.

Seems "ruling ideas" rule comrades who are editors, too.

RL

Of course, the above does not imply I believe in something called 'The Freedom of the Will'.

More about this here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

[Hit The North]

Assume two people, Barry and Louise. Assume a guitar.

For the next four years, Barry will study all of the theories of music, musicology, music history and musical philosophy he can fit into the time period. He will read biographies of the great musicians in every available tradition. He will study countless doctrinal theses about sound, the human ear and the history of music.

For the same period of time, Louise will study the guitar. She will practice playing it, tuning it, caring for it, cleaning it. She will study music for the guitar, and music which she can play in accompaniment with others, on the guitar. She will play the guitar.

At the end of the four years, which one of them can give a concert with a guitar and which one of them will talk about people giving concerts with guitars?

It is true: we should only engage in the narrow skill set required to mechanically perform whatever function is prescribed to us. We should not concern ourselves with the wider context in which we do things.

Does a bricklayer need to understand the labour theory of value in order to build a wall for a capitalist? Of course not! :rolleyes:

I wonder how much "Tribune" is being paid by the capitalists to propagate slavishness to narrow instrumentalism amongst the working class :lol:

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I think determinism and free will are conceptual models that attempt to explain the world. We see something in nature, and we make up a way of describing it. Evolution describes a phenomenon. It's verifiability makes the description stronger. Perhaps it could be described accurately in other ways, such as in terms of fairies casting spells to evolve creatures. Not much use to believing that, though.

My view is that determinism is true in a certain context because it's a highly valuable explanatory model that is far superior to others. My view is that free will is true in certain cases because it's either intuitively true or psychologically beneficial to assume it's true. I believe determinism is false by default in other circumstances because quantum physics is doing weird stuff these days.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


I think determinism and free will are conceptual models that attempt to explain the world. We see something in nature, and we make up a way of describing it. Evolution describes a phenomenon. It's verifiability makes the description stronger. Perhaps it could be described accurately in other ways, such as in terms of fairies casting spells to evolve creatures. Not much use to believing that, though.

But, as I have pointed out to you many times, they are both based on the systematic misuse of language, and so cannot explain anything.


My view is that determinism is true in a certain context because it's a highly valuable explanatory model that is far superior to others. My view is that free will is true in certain cases because it's either intuitively true or psychologically beneficial to assume it's true. I believe determinism is false by default in other circumstances because quantum physics is doing weird stuff these days.

Well, you need to show where my demolition of this 'theory' goes wrong.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Dooga:

But, as I have pointed out to you many times, they are both based on the systematic misuse of language, and so cannot explain anything.

Well, you need to show where my demolition of this 'theory' goes wrong.

When something X occurs, there is always something Y before it that had Y been absent, X would not have occurred.

This is essentially the argument determinism suggests when reconsidered within a Humean framework.

I also don't see why a theory needs to satisfy a "proper use of language" to be valid? And what is a "proper use?" It seems like certain ideas can be conceptually recognized as true without being linguistically expressible within a modern context.

I guess I really don't know what classifies as a proper use of language and what determinism needs to "prove" to be valid. If I had a better idea of those variables, I'd be in a better position to provide a defense. I'm not entirely convinced the misuse of language is negative if it manages to communicate a conceptually understandable idea that would otherwise been incapable of expression.

For instance, if we had no terms for running, we could see running and associate it with something. Determinism as a phenomenon is, in my view, something most people can conceptually understand. We are trying to explain it mechanistically like we would running. It's more difficult than impossible.

I also don't understand how the anthropomorphizing nature is significant. Arguably, the mistake goes in the other direction. We shouldn't have distinguished between people and mechanistic systems. When someone does something the laws do "control" what they do.

The weight of a tree controls why I can't pull it up by its roots with my hand. The verb "control" is used to imply we made a choice+performed an action. Of course, but determinism can also be arguing that the choice is a misconceived idea that is in actually a combination of actions. So human-specific language is really reducible to phrases like "the mechanistic processes" made me release tears rather than "the pain."

***

I may be getting a clearer picture. It almost seems like this is an objection to determinism on the grounds that it is, by definition, incompatible with a Humean conception? That it requires the universe to literally "determine" in the sense of having agency.

If that's the critique, it's easier to understand. Still, I'm not sure why humans can determine and the universe can't, given that the theory proposes both are mechanistic in nature.

It is somewhat circular, but that's why it's partially an explanatory model rather than an analytic claim.

[Tribune]

It is true: we should only engage in the narrow skill set required to mechanically perform whatever function is prescribed to us. We should not concern ourselves with the wider context in which we do things.

Do you folks terminally misread out of ignorance, or willfully? I didn't suggest that one should not study music theory. I used the example to show that some inquiry and study will lead to a skill set, and some will leading to talking about others' skill sets.

I made no moral judgment as to preference, nor did I ever state or imply that a person ought to study only one thing, and that because it was assigned.


Does a bricklayer need to understand the labour theory of value in order to build a wall for a capitalist? Of course not! :rolleyes:

Now you're just going straight for obtuse.


I wonder how much "Tribune" is being paid by the capitalists to propagate slavishness to narrow instrumentalism amongst the working class :lol:

Conspiracism is for sectarians. I serve no capitalists. I just don't hedge my mind on silly philosophizing, when the real work of opposition requires only ordinary language.

[lulks]

Do I think it ought to be treated as a thing I possess, containing it within myself? No.

But, not treating a feeling, or set of feelings, as possessions (in language) has nothing to do with your use of "free will" as a stand in for "soul."I don't think free will ought to be treated as something within myself either. why must free will be a stand in for soul. i'm just using it as shorthand, like this:

Of course, if, in every day life, someone says something like "I did it of my own free will", then no problem, since this is just shorthand for the fact this person decided to do whatever it was, and he/she wasn't coerced. But no theory is involved here.





Well, the contrast between 'free will' and 'determinism' is based on a radical misuse of language, and on the anthropomorphisation of nature. I have explained more fully in the link I added to an earlier post:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...16&postcount=1 (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1)

If after reading that you are still not sure, let me know and I'll try to expalin it more clearly.
so your problem with determinism is that nature is anthropomorphized? determinism could also be expressed like this: if i knew the position and velocity of all particles in the universe, i could predict the exact position and velocity of all the particles in the universe at any time in the future. determinism might be false because of quantum physics, but i believe it is compatible with free will.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


When something X occurs, there is always something Y before it that had Y been absent, X would not have occurred.

This is essentially the argument determinism suggests when reconsidered within a Humean framework.

But that isn't determinism. Otherwise why use that word? What determinism adds to mere regularity is that if Y always follows X, then this could not have been otherwise (that that Z could not have happened instead), and when it is asked why not, the reply is that X determines Y or Y necessarily follows X, or X controls Y, or Y must happen,. etc.). And there you have the use of anthropomorphic terms to explain the course of events in nature.


I guess I really don't know what classifies as a proper use of language and what determinism needs to "prove" to be valid. If I had a better idea of those variables, I'd be in a better position to provide a defense. I'm not entirely convinced the misuse of language is negative if it manages to communicate a conceptually understandable idea that would otherwise been incapable of expression.

Well, I did not use the phrase "proper use of language", I merely adverted to its misuse. Now, you already know what is meant when the word 'determine' is used in ordinary contexts, such as:

1) I am determined to go on that march.

2) I determine the time of the next train from the time-table.

3) The rules of chess determine when the King is in check.

Here, the ordinary use of this word relates to what human beings do, can do, or bring about or can infer.

Now, if this is transferred into other contexts -- such as theories that attempt to explain the course of events in nature -- this word either takes on a new and as-yet-unexplained sense, or it carries with it its anthropomorphic connotations.

Now, when pressed, determinists explain their use of this words in ways that suggest that these anthropomorphic connotations have been carried over, as I pointed out above.

Of course, if this is being unfair to determinists, then it's up to them to tell us what they do mean by the use of this word (without using other terms that also carry with them no such anthropomorphic connotations). As far as I can tell, they have so far failed to do this, and the same seems to me to be the case with you.


I'm not entirely convinced the misuse of language is negative if it manages to communicate a conceptually understandable idea that would otherwise been incapable of expression

But, you have yet to tell us what this 'understanding' is without the use of anthropomorphic terms in the attempt to do so.

And this is not the least surprising, since this theory was invented by ancient mystics for whom 'god' (and an anthropomorphic 'god' at that) determined all that happened in nature. The were quite open about this, and weren't phased by such implications.

Modern theorists just dropped 'god' but retained the anthropomorphism -- now projected (implicitly or explicitly) onto nature as a 'cosmic will' of some sort, as Bertrand Russell pointed out.


For instance, if we had no terms for running, we could see running and associate it with something. Determinism as a phenomenon is, in my view, something most people can conceptually understand. We are trying to explain it mechanistically like we would running. It's more difficult than impossible.

If it is so readily 'understood' then you will find it easy to tell us what you mean by the use of such language without having to employ anthropomorphic terminology. The question is: can you? I remain sceptical.


I also don't understand how the anthropomorphizing nature is significant. Arguably, the mistake goes in the other direction. We shouldn't have distinguished between people and mechanistic systems. When someone does something the laws do "control" what they do.

It's significant since it suggests that there is a mind or a cosmic will at work in nature. It's also significant since it gets things completely the wrong way round: nature is the agent and we the patient. This is all part of the ancient ruling-class ploy to promote alienating theories that attribute to nature/'god' what are properly human capacities (Feuerbach was the first to spot this, and it forms a central core of Marx's work in this area, as I am sure you know). This theory is indeed part of the 'ruling ideas' that have dominated human thought for over two thousand years.

So, this is only of no significance to those who aren't revolutionaries.


The weight of a tree controls why I can't pull it up by its roots with my hand. The verb "control" is used to imply we made a choice+performed an action. Of course, but determinism can also be arguing that the choice is a misconceived idea that is in actually a combination of actions. So human-specific language is really reducible to phrases like "the mechanistic processes" made me release tears rather than "the pain."

Exactly, it gets things the wrong way round, as I noted above. We have no control, it is all down to nature. Nature controls us.

Except, in order to explain how nature 'controls' anything, we have to attribute it with a will or with some form of intelligence.


I may be getting a clearer picture. It almost seems like this is an objection to determinism on the grounds that it is, by definition, incompatible with a Humean conception? That it requires the universe to literally "determine" in the sense of having agency

Well, my objections have little or nothing to do with Hume.


Still, I'm not sure why humans can determine and the universe can't, given that the theory proposes both are mechanistic in nature.

Again, the universe can determine things if it is Mind or is controlled by some sort of cosmic will.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

lulks:


so your problem with determinism is that nature is anthropomorphized? determinism could also be expressed like this: if i knew the position and velocity of all particles in the universe, i could predict the exact position and velocity of all the particles in the universe at any time in the future. determinism might be false because of quantum physics, but i believe it is compatible with free will.

Well, my problem with determinism is that it makes no sense since it's based on a radical misuse of language -- see my reply to Dooga, above.

And if it makes no sense, it can't be false -- or true.

About prediction: I have no problem with that, but we have no reason to believe that we will ever be in a position to make such predictions.

But, even supposing we will, or could, be in such a position, predictions like this will be analogous to those we make from, say, timetables (we determine from them what we expect to happen with the arrival and departure of buses and trains) -- they would represent our way of trying to make sense of nature. But when it comes to explaining such regularities (or such predictions) we will inevitably hit the same brick wall -- unless we attribute to nature a will or an intelligence of some sort, there can be no explanation (other than, 'that's just how things are').

[blackwave]

I prefer to use the term 'conditionalism' to determinism. In my understanding, everything is ultimately the result of the conditions from which it arose, including human personality. Humans are, of course, capable of reason, but if they do not use it that is because the conditions of their life and person did not lead them to using it.

[A.R.Amistad]

I prefer to use the term 'conditionalism' to determinism. In my understanding, everything is ultimately the result of the conditions from which it arose, including human personality. Humans are, of course, capable of reason, but if they do not use it that is because the conditions of their life and person did not lead them to using it.

I prefer the Marxist idea that necessity precedes freedom, since I could be raised as a right wing nut as a child and reject my upbringing and become a revolutionary socialist in my adulthood (the true-life story of my Dad, and the beginning of my path to communism.)

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch09.htm