Does objective truth exist? Materialism and Existentialism

[A.R.Amistad]

So I finished reading through Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Overall, I agreed with it and saw no contradiction between what was presented in the book and my existential philosophy of the individual. Lenin does present some determinism in the chapter "Freedom and Necessity," but I am a compatibilist (weak-determinist) and I don't agree with the mystical level of Free Will that was presented by Sartre ("we are 'condemned' to be free.") I hold that existence precedes essence, but I understand that in order for the mind to create any sort of essence, it has to satisfy its material needs. For some reason existentialists seem to reject materialism as 'determinist,' but I don't see why they have to be contradictory, or even why weak-determinism can't have a place in existentialism. From my own perspective, reality does, and has always, existed outside of our senses, and our senses can correctly interpret the objective world outside of our consciousness.

I actually find the level of free will advocated by Sartre and co. against materialism as inauthentic because it rejects the facticity we live in and fils to correctly explain our existence. This is why I advocate an existential weak-determinism. Our existence can precede our essence, but we can only create our essence with a basic correct interpretation of our physical needs. One cannot even choose suicide without first having reached a level of consciouness that requires some material sustanence that can't be a product of free will. So again, no real contradictions could be found, by me at least, between existentialism and Leninist materialism because, in fact, Lenin presents himself as a weak-determinist like myself in the last section of Chapter Three: "necessity of nature is primary (determinism on human existence) and human will and the mind secondary (freedom is dependent on the level of free will we have from determined factors in nature)" In other words, free will does and can exist, but it cannot exist without some deterministic external forces.

But the chapter that really disturbed me (if I understood it correctly) was the one entitled "does objective truth exist?" I don't deny that gravity exists, and that Newton's Law's accuretly describe how gravity functions, but how is this an objective truth? Sure, there is objective reality, there is a reality outside of our conciousness. And the scientific laws that we attribute to that objective reality can be correct or incorrect, but how is this "objective truth?" Isn't there even a level of subjectivity to science? Implying that objective truth exists seems like saying that a divine force was here before man that labeled things as "gravity," "apple," "whale," "limestone." Maybe I mistunderstood the chapter, but the idea seems highly flawed that there is "objective truth." Maybe "objective reality" would have been more acceptable than truth.

So, does objective truth exist?

[mikelepore]

There is no objective truth in Newton's or anyone else's description of gravity. The objective truth is in the behavior of gravity itself that the descriptions are meant to refer to but do so imperfectly. The description moves around the truth and keeps missing it. The magnitude of error can be reduced but it's always there.

"When someone points at the moon, don't look at the finger." -- ancient Buddhist proverb

[Buffalo Souljah]

But the chapter that really disturbed me (if I understood it correctly) was the one entitled "does objective truth exist?" I don't deny that gravity exists, and that Newton's Law's accuretly describe how gravity functions, but how is this an objective truth? Sure, there is objective reality, there is a reality outside of our conciousness. And the scientific laws that we attribute to that objective reality can be correct or incorrect, but how is this "objective truth?" Isn't there even a level of subjectivity to science? Implying that objective truth exists seems like saying that a divine force was here before man that labeled things as "gravity," "apple," "whale," "limestone." Maybe I mistunderstood the chapter, but the idea seems highly flawed that there is "objective truth." Maybe "objective reality" would have been more acceptable than truth. The difference is probably semantic. If you're more comfortable with "objective reality", then use that instead of "truth." Remember, all the works you read of Lenin are translations from the Russian, and you have to take into account the different semantical and syntactical operators in the two languages.

A thread (http://www.revleft.com/vb/diference-between-marxist-t109802/index.html?t=109802&highlight=pragmatic+marxist+epistemology)in which Rosa and I swapped views on this subject (ie. truth, not semantics).

[A.R.Amistad]

So, lets get a second opinion on here. I'm posting a link to the chapter in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in case somebody hasn't read it. In this chapter, do you think that Lenin is arguing for objective truth existing, or would objective reality be a more appropriate term?

http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/two4.htm

[gilhyle]

He is arguing that we should not adopt any philosophical stance which depends on truthfulness as a general characteristic of human understanding, considered as a category, resting on anything else other than the descriptive success (or otherwise) of that understanding in referencing a really existing material world. He is not making a claim about what exists or about the conditions of justified affirmation or assent.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


He is arguing that we should not adopt any philosophical stance which depends on truthfulness as a general characteristic of human understanding, considered as a category, resting on anything else other than the descriptive success (or otherwise) of that understanding in referencing a really existing material world. He is not making a claim about what exists or about the conditions of justified affirmation or assent

The question now is: Is what Lenin says true? If it is, then his ideas self-destruct (in that they manifestly rely on his "truthfulness"). If not, we can ignore him.

Either way, we can ignore what Lenin had to say about this pseudo-question -- see my next post.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

A R Amistad:


So, does objective truth exist?

A far better question to ask: Are there any true propositions/indicative sentences?

If the answer to that is "No there aren't", then that sentence, if true, is false!

Moreover, the word 'objective' adds nothing to the use of 'true', so it's wise to drop it.

And Lenin is the very last person to who you should go for advice (in philosophy).

After all, if he were right, then Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy must exist:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/did-lenin-believe-t70368/index.html

[Tribune]

I think it helps to understand the evolution of the word truth, and the meaning shift through which it has passed, in usage.

Originally, "troth" meant only a pledge to abide, to remain faithful. It was an OE/ME equivalent of the Latin, "fides/fidelis."

We see the remainder of this archaic meaning in "by my troth" and "betrothal."

The expansion of the meaning "fidelity" to include "constancy" really picked up after the Enlightenment, especially following Bacon, who is the first really widespread scribbler to treat with truth as if it were more an example of constancy, of patterns repeated over time, than of the narrower fidelity of a pledge to bind word and action.

But, even in modern usage, "truth" still retains it's archaic core, modified as it is by the expansive, abstracted elevation to a category.

For example, if a woman shouts to a man, "Tell me the truth,' she is not only asking him to conform his speech to verifiable events, to remain faithful in his accounting, but to confirm that the thing he says can remain so over long periods of time, can be constant.

This is how we now, generally, treat with the word "truth." As a thing which is independent of the speaker, to which the speaker must be faithful, since the thing itself remains constant, even if the speaker's words do not.

But, as a category, it's really not all that useful. Precisely because it contains the older, more specific core of fidelity, and the moral component so preserved.

Looking at it another way:

Assume Rosalind and James.

Rosalind describes the observable properties of a specific tree by detailing characteristics. She speaks of the color and shape of leaves, the extent of the root system, the striations in the bark, the distribution of tree limbs, and all the other myriad properties of the specific organism.

James announces that trees exist, that they grow in many climates, that they vary across regions and that they've grown in some shape or another for millions of years.

Rosalind observes and records data. James deals in truths. For Rosalind's project, no assertions about constancy are necessary. She observes a set of phenomena in real circumstances, contingent on her presence in an exact space during an exact period of time. For James' annunciation, what matters are not the specific, observable attributes of a tree, or a series of trees. None of his assertions require the demonstration of observable data, even if he makes reference to them, obliquely. What matters to James are assertions of constancy over time.

Changes in conditions - large and small, immediately noticeable and discovered only after extended observation - do not alter Rosalind's approach to data.

Changes in conditions do alter James' announcements of truth.

Looking at in from another way, let's assume that Rosalind has observed certain characteristics apparently common to all frogs and James has announced that frogs exist.

If today there are frogs on the planet, and tomorrow there are not, James announcement no longer contains the character of constancy, and ceases to function as a truth. What was true yesterday cannot now be true today. But, Rosalind's observations about frogs are not changed by their disappearance, because her record of characteristics does not depend upon assertions about their constancy.

This, I think, is the problem with many (but not all, especially in logic and mathematics) assertions of truth. They are propositions which depend upon an adherence, a fidelity, to assumed constancy.

Or, I could just be really, really wrong...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thank you for those perceptive comments, but there are several other uses of this word that have to be regarded as somewhat different. For example, the use of 'true' in 'that-forming' clauses:

1) It is true that Paris is in France in 2010.

This is true/false independently of the 'fidelity' of the one saying it. And it stays true even if France disappears under the waves, or Paris is demolished.

2) It's true that today is Monday.

This is true on one day out of seven, false otherwise.

3) It's true that I have changed my mind.

This has nothing to do with constancy.

We can personalise the above, too, by adding a pre-fix:

4) Jane said is was true she had changed her mind.

[Tribune]

Thank you for those perceptive comments, but there are several other uses of this word that have to be regarded as somewhat different. For example, the use of 'true' in 'that-forming' clauses:

1) It is true that Paris is in France in 2010.

This is true/false independently of the 'fidelity' of the one saying it. And it stays true even if France disappears under the waves, or Paris is demolished.

2) It's true that today is Monday.

This is true on one day out of seven, false otherwise.

3) It's true that I have changed my mind.

This has nothing to do with constancy.

We can personalise the above, too, by adding a pre-fix:

4) Jane said is was true she had changed her mind.

I'm in complete agreement, Rosa. I took pains to note, below, that not all truth assertions present the outlined problem.

Perhaps the problem with paring down my argument to a (relatively) brief and communicable form was losing sight of the exceptions.

I think the category problem is most pronounced in the philosophical, economic and moral "search for truth," since in these cases the word is used often enough as a stand-in for "situation/belief which will last, to which I can remain faithful and upon which I can rely."

[ZeroNowhere]

That depends on how one is using the term 'objective truth'. For example, the OP seems to consider things 'subjective truths' because they are expressed in language, although this does not correspond with the way these words are used ordinarily. However, it is possible that they may give this some sense, in which case a discussion would be possible.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

And yet, I 'd like to see an explanation of 'subjective truth' that does not imply it's not really true.

[A.R.Amistad]

I still find the chapter to be quite confusing, and to dodge the question of subjectivity versus objectivity, at least in the traditional sense.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The question is: why are you bothering with this lamentably poor book of Lenin's?

On this particular topic, you'd find more sense in the collected works of Enid Blyton (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showgroups.php).