Why Rothbardites will never see their Utopia

[anticap]

1. Rothbardites, like most if us, have their ideal society; but they can't get there immediately, so they'll have to settle for a less than ideal society in the interim. But even before they can reach that lesser ideal, they'll have to settle for a still lesser one, and so on. Because their ideal is so far removed from the present reality, these stages may be innumerable; but they can't be criticized for being less than ideal, since each stage is a means to the ideal end. So far this could apply to any of us.

2. But wait! The Rothbardite non-aggression principle (NAP) tolerates no violation of an individual's inherent, inalienable, Natural Rights (remember: these are objective, not subjective!). Any such violation is incompatible with Rothbardite principles. The NAP is either upheld, or it is not; it's a black or white issue, with no gray area (a consistent Rothbardite would never settle for a partially-upheld NAP -- that is to say, a partially-aggressive form of non-aggression -- even if such a thing were logically possible).

3. Obviously, the ideal Rothbardite society would be one that complied in every respect with the NAP. Equally obvious is that each stage would fall short of this ideal -- each stage, therefore, must be incompatible with Rothbardite principles! Moreover, Rothbardites cannot draw distinctions between these interim stages; they cannot value some (i.e., the closer ones) more than others: these stages all violate the NAP, and are thus all white (let's make black = good, just because we know they're all closet racists).

4. Given the implication of #3, a Rothbardite can't even advocate for reforms that might move him toward his ideal! By doing so, he would be openly advocating the violation of his core principles! He has rendered himself impotent and frozen in time! He can spend eternity grumbling about the status quo, but he can do nothing to change it, lest he violate his own principles and the objective Natural Rights of others!

5. Even supposing our Rothbardite threw logic out the window and somehow convinced himself that the logical impossibility from #2 were somehow possible, and supposing he therefore decided to rank each potential stage on the path to his ideal society according to how aggressive its non-aggression principle would be (are you still with me?), he would be effectively asserting that Natural Rights were subjective; that is to say, he would have decided that his Natural Right to not be aggressed against is now open to interpretation, and that he is willing to accept a degree of violation of that Natural Right -- that he is now willing to accept a less-than-ideal society!

And there we must leave our poor little Rothbardite, stuck between a rock and a hard place, forced to decide whether to abide by his principles and never arrive at Utopia, or to violate them and never arrive there. That decision will depend on another: will he keep his head in the clouds, believing in the nonsense of Natural Rights; or will he come down to Earth. If he joins the rest of us down here, there may be hope for him yet -- all we have to do is convince him that there are achievable Utopias, which don't depend on anything mystical but are instead grounded in material reality.

[Dimentio]

Oh no!

Not yet another thread on Misean libertarianism! I notice that about two thirds of these threads are started by non-restricted members. Why this bizarre obsession with Mises?

[RED DAVE]

Given the fact that there are fantasies floating around for a Left-Right coalition, and that the Right Wing component is largely young Libertarians and Paulistas, a critique of Rothbard is appropriate. Besides, Rothbard was such an asshole that's it's fun to kick his corpse around.

There's a lot of dead ideologies that are staggering around these like zombies pretending to be real. After a half-decade or so of quiet, Ayn Rand's corpses is trying to break out of her coffin, etc. And there are others.

RED DAVE

[Cal Engime]

1. Rothbardites, like most if us, have their ideal society; but they can't get there immediately, so they'll have to settle for a less than ideal society in the interim. But even before they can reach that lesser ideal, they'll have to settle for a still lesser one, and so on. Because their ideal is so far removed from the present reality, these stages may be innumerable; but they can't be criticized for being less than ideal, since each stage is a means to the ideal end. So far this could apply to any of us.Won't a true Rothbardite refuse to compromise? Cf. Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pp. 299–300

[Dimentio]

Rothbardites and Randians don't really want to accomplish their ideal societies, but rather prevent progressive movements from arising and at the same time trying to move the current society towards a less restricted capitalist economic system.

[anticap]

Won't a true Rothbardite refuse to compromise? Cf. Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pp. 299–300

Won't a true forumite read entire posts before leaping to respond to a perceived flaw at the beginning?

Were you such a forumite, you'd have realized that #1 was merely the set up, pointing out the obvious (that you can't get from A to Z without traversing the rest of the alphabet).

The rest of the post explicitly addresses your question, and goes on to draw logical conclusions from its answer.

[Cal Engime]

A false premise to a deductive argument does in fact invalidate the conclusion of the argument.

[anticap]

A false premise to a deductive argument does in fact invalidate the conclusion of the argument.

You're not getting it. There is no false premise in #1. As I've already explained, #1 merely establishes the obvious: that Rothbardites have an ideal, and that they can't get there by clicking their heels together three times. The outline of Rothbardite theory begins with #2, and the logical conclusions of that theory then follow.

I won't repeat myself again.

[Dimentio]

You're not getting it. There is no false premise in #1. As I've already explained, #1 merely establishes the obvious: that Rothbardites have an ideal, and that they can't get there by clicking their heels together three times. The outline of Rothbardite theory begins with #2, and the logical conclusions of that theory then follow.

I won't repeat myself again.

I think of all attacks on rothbardianism, attacking their logic is probably the worst idea. It is good if you want to demotivate them, but it won't convert to anything else than another current of libertarianism or conservatism. Moreover, most people do not care about logics since the logical consistency of a political movement is the last thing people usually are thinking of (*cough* TZM *cough*).

[anticap]

I think of all attacks on rothbardianism, attacking their logic is probably the worst idea. ... Moreover, most people do not care about logics since the logical consistency of a political movement is the last thing people usually are thinking of....

Are you even faintly aware of right-"libertarianism"? Your statements that I've quoted above are the polar opposite of reality when it comes to right-"libertarians," who hold logical consistency to be at least as important as any other facet of their ideology.

You may be right, however, about it being unwise to attack them there; but I didn't start this thread to convert anyone (despite the speculative comment at the end, which came to me on-the-spot). It's just something that was rattling around in my head for a few days and had finally coalesced into something I thought might be worth posting. So far it seems that my intuition was right, since there hasn't been a (coherent) rebuttal yet.

[LeftSideDown]

1. Rothbardites, like most if us, have their ideal society; but they can't get there immediately, so they'll have to settle for a less than ideal society in the interim. But even before they can reach that lesser ideal, they'll have to settle for a still lesser one, and so on. Because their ideal is so far removed from the present reality, these stages may be innumerable; but they can't be criticized for being less than ideal, since each stage is a means to the ideal end. So far this could apply to any of us.

Why can't it be reached through a glorious revolution?


2. But wait! The Rothbardite non-aggression principle (NAP) tolerates no violation of an individual's inherent, inalienable, Natural Rights (remember: these are objective, not subjective!). Any such violation is incompatible with Rothbardite principles. The NAP is either upheld, or it is not; it's a black or white issue, with no gray area (a consistent Rothbardite would never settle for a partially-upheld NAP -- that is to say, a partially-aggressive form of non-aggression -- even if such a thing were logically possible).

The state is seen as violating this principle therefore they forfeit any protection they had because of it. Rebellion is still possible.


3. Obviously, the ideal Rothbardite society would be one that complied in every respect with the NAP. Equally obvious is that each stage would fall short of this ideal -- each stage, therefore, must be incompatible with Rothbardite principles! Moreover, Rothbardites cannot draw distinctions between these interim stages; they cannot value some (i.e., the closer ones) more than others: these stages all violate the NAP, and are thus all white (let's make black = good, just because we know they're all closet racists).

Your first and second assertion (premises) have been debunked. So this is wrong. Btw, nice ad hominem at the end there, really got me shaking in my boots.


4. Given the implication of #3, a Rothbardite can't even advocate for reforms that might move him toward his ideal! By doing so, he would be openly advocating the violation of his core principles! He has rendered himself impotent and frozen in time! He can spend eternity grumbling about the status quo, but he can do nothing to change it, lest he violate his own principles and the objective Natural Rights of others!

There is an essay where Walter Block talks about how, if the world was libertarian and everyone followed the NAP, what would happen if aliens came down and said they would kill everyone unless Bob was killed. Well, what would happen is this: Bill would kill Bob, be paraded through the streets, and then hung for his crime. Why cannot something like this happen to insure the success of society?


5. Even supposing our Rothbardite threw logic out the window and somehow convinced himself that the logical impossibility from #2 were somehow possible, and supposing he therefore decided to rank each potential stage on the path to his ideal society according to how aggressive its non-aggression principle would be (are you still with me?), he would be effectively asserting that Natural Rights were subjective; that is to say, he would have decided that his Natural Right to not be aggressed against is now open to interpretation, and that he is willing to accept a degree of violation of that Natural Right -- that he is now willing to accept a less-than-ideal society!

Or he could say "I am violating the NAP by killing people to insure the libertarian revolution and I will be killed because of this."


And there we must leave our poor little Rothbardite, stuck between a rock and a hard place, forced to decide whether to abide by his principles and never arrive at Utopia, or to violate them and never arrive there. That decision will depend on another: will he keep his head in the clouds, believing in the nonsense of Natural Rights; or will he come down to Earth. If he joins the rest of us down here, there may be hope for him yet -- all we have to do is convince him that there are achievable Utopias, which don't depend on anything mystical but are instead grounded in material reality.

So, you're solution is to give up a good ideal (non violence/NAP) because your logic says we should? So I suppose that Communism can come about because you guys can murder anyone you want without a care in the world, right? Honestly: "Join the pigs because they are animals too". Worst. Logic. Ever.

[Nolan]

What's up with putting "ite" on the end of everything?

[LeftSideDown]

What's up with putting "ite" on the end of everything?

Makes him look legitimate? Gives his tone a more sneer and snotty inflection?

[MMIKEYJ]

One day when we find Rothbard's button we're gonna press that damned thing!! :D

[Publius]

Oh no!

Not yet another thread on Misean libertarianism! I notice that about two thirds of these threads are started by non-restricted members. Why this bizarre obsession with Mises?

To be totally blunt: because people who adhere to one fanciful, pie-in-the-sky utopian social theory (Marxian Communism) have an obsession with people who proclaim opposing fanciful, pie-in-the-sky utopian theories because all proponents of such theories have, essentially, zero effect upon the world.


Therefore all they can do is argue in futility with each other on internet forums.

We're no closer to establishing a workers state than we are to establishing a minarchist state, or electing me supreme emperor of the earth (my preferred social arrangement).

[Left-Reasoning]

4. Given the implication of #3, a Rothbardite can't even advocate for reforms that might move him toward his ideal! By doing so, he would be openly advocating the violation of his core principles! He has rendered himself impotent and frozen in time!

"The libertarian, then, should be a person who would push the button, if it existed, for the instantaneous abolition of all invasions of liberty. Of course, he knows, too, that such a magic button does not exist, but his fundamental preference colors and shapes his entire strategic perspective.

Such an "abolitionist" perspective does not mean, again, that the libertarian has an unrealistic assessment of how rapidly his goal will, in fact, be achieved. Thus, the libertarian abolitionist of slavery, William Lloyd Garrison, was not being "unrealistic" when in the 1830s he first raised the glorious standard of immediate emancipation of the slaves. His goal was the morally proper one, and his strategic realism came in the fact that he did not expect his goal to be quickly reached. We have seen in chapter 1 that Garrison himself distinguished: "Urge immediate abolition as earnestly as we may, it will, alas! be gradual abolition in the end. We have never said that slavery would be overthrown by a single blow; that it ought to be, we shall always contend." Otherwise, as Garrison trenchantly warned, "Gradualism in theory is perpetuity in practice."" - Murray Rothbard

[Dermezel]

Even their concept of Natural Rights is flawed because it only includes negative freedom. http://www.marxists.org/archive/caudwell/1938/liberty.htm



Liberty
A study in bourgeois illusion

Source: “Studies in a Dying Culture,” first published 1938.
Republished 1977 in “The Concept of Freedom,” Lawrence & Wishart, London.
Transcribed: by Dominic Tweedie;
Proofed and corrected: by Guy Colvin, November 2005.

Many will have heard a broadcast by H. G. Wells in which (commenting on the Soviet Union) he described it as a “great experiment which has but half fulfilled its promise,” it is still a “land without mental freedom.” There are also many essays of Bertrand Russell in which this philosopher explains the importance of liberty, how the enjoyment of liberty is the highest and most important goal of man. Fisher claims that the history of Europe during the last two or three centuries is simply the struggle for liberty. Continually and variously by artists, scientists, and philosophers alike, liberty is thus praised and man’s right to enjoy it imperiously asserted.
I agree with this. Liberty does seem to me the most important of all generalised goods – such as justice, beauty, truth – that come so easily to our lips. And yet when freedom is discussed a strange thing is to be noticed. These men – artists, careful of words, scientists, investigators of the entities denoted by words, philosophers scrupulous about the relations between words and entities – never define precisely what they mean by freedom. They seem to assume that it is quite a clear concept, whose definition every one would agree about.
Yet who does not know that liberty is a concept about whose nature men have quarrelled perhaps more than any other? The historic disputes concerning predestination, Karma, Free-Will, Moira, salvation by faith or works, determinism, Fate, Kismet, the categorical imperative, sufficient grace, occasionalism, Divine Providence, punishment and responsibility, have all been about the nature of man’s freedom of will and action. The Greeks, the Romans, the Buddhists, the Mahomedans, the Catholics, the Jansenists, and the Calvinists, have each had different ideas of liberty. Why, then, do all these bourgeois intellectuals assume that liberty is a clear concept, understood in the same way by all their hearers, and therefore needing no definition? Russell, for example, has spent his life finding a really satisfactory definition of number and even now it is disputed whether he has been successful. I can find in his writings no clear definition of what he means by liberty. Yet most people would have supposed that men are far more in agreement as to what is meant by a number, than what is meant by liberty.
The indefinite use of the word can only mean either that they believe the meaning of the word invariant in history or that they use it in the contemporary bourgeois sense. If they believe the meaning invariant, it is strange that men have disputed so often about freedom. These intellectuals must surely be incapable of such a blunder. They must mean liberty as men in their situation experience it. That is, they must mean by liberty to have no more restrictions imposed upon them than they endure at that time. They do not – these Oxford dons or successful writers – want, for example, the restrictions of Fascism, that is quite clear. That would not be liberty. But at present, thank God, they are reasonably free.
Now this conception of liberty is superficial, for not all their countrymen are in the same situation. A, an intellectual, with a good education, in possession of a modest income, with not too uncongenial friends, unable to afford a yacht, which he would like, but at least able to go to the winter sports, considers this (more or less) freedom. He would like that yacht, but still – he can write against Communism or Fascism or the existing system. Let us for the moment grant that A is free. I propose to analyse this statement more deeply in a moment, and show that it is partial. But let us for the moment grant that A enjoys liberty.
Is B free? B is a sweated non-union shop-assistant of Houndsditch, working seven days of the week. He knows nothing of art, science, or philosophy. He has no culture except a few absurd prejudices, his elementary school education saw to that. He believes in the superiority of the English race, the King’s wisdom and loving-kindness to his subjects, the real existence of God, the Devil, Hell, and Sin, and the wickedness of sexual intercourse unless palliated by marriage. His knowledge of world events is derived from the News of the World, on other days he has no time to read the papers. He believes that when he dies he will (with luck) enter into eternal bliss. At present, however, his greatest dread is that by displeasing his employer in some trifle, he may become unemployed.
B’s trouble is plainly lack of leisure in which to cultivate freedom. C does not suffer from this. He is an unemployed middle-aged man. He is free for 24 hours a day. He is free to go anywhere – in the streets and parks, and in the museums. He is allowed to think of anything – the Einstein theory, the Frege definition of classes, or the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Regrettably enough he does none of these things. He quarrels with his wife, who calls him a good-for-nothing waster, and with his children, who because of the means test have to pay his rent, and with his former friends, because they can enjoy pleasures he cannot afford. Fortunately he is free to remove himself from existence, and this one afternoon, when his wife is out and there is plenty of money in the gas-meter, he will do.
A is free. Are B and C? I assume that A will reply that B and C are not free. If A asserts that B and C do enjoy real liberty, most of us, without further definition, will know what to think of A’s idea of liberty. But a Wells, a Forster, or a Russell would doubtless agree, as vehemently as us, that this is not liberty, but a degrading slavery to environment. He will say that to free B and C we must raise them to A’s level, the level, let us say, of the Oxford don. Like the Oxford don, B and C must have leisure and a modest income with which to enjoy the good things and the good ideas of the world.
But how is this to be brought about? Bourgeois social relations are what we have now. No one denies that the dynamic motive of such relations is private profit. Here bourgeois economists and Marxists are agreed. Moreover, if causality has any meaning, and unless we are to throw all scientific method overboard, current economic relations and the unfreedom of B and C must be causally inter-related.
We have, then, bourgeois social relations on the one hand, and these varying degrees of unfreedom – A, B, and C – on the other hand, interconnected as cause and effect. So far, either might be the cause, for we have not decided whether mental states arise from social relations, or vice versa. But as soon as we ask how action is to solve the problem, we see which is primary. It is useless to give B, by means of lectures and picture galleries, opportunity for understanding philosophy or viewing masterpieces of art. He has no time to acquire, before starting work, the taste for them or after starting work the time to gratify it. Nor is C free to enjoy the riches of bourgeois culture as long as his whole existence is clouded by his economic position. It is circumstances that are imprisoning consciousness, not vice versa. It is not because B and C are unenlightened that they are members of the working class, but because they are members of the working class, they are unenlightened. And Russell, who writes In Praise of Idleness, praises rightly, for he is clever because he is idle and bourgeois, not idle and bourgeois because he is clever.
We now see the cause and effect of the situation. We see that it is not this freedom and unfreedom which produces bourgeois social relations, but that bourgeois social relations alike give rise to these two extremes, the freedom of the idle bourgeois, and the unfreedom of the proletarian worker. It is plain that this effect, if undesirable, can only be changed by changing the cause.
Thus the intellectual is faced with another problem, like that when he had to define more precisely who enjoyed the liberty he regarded as contemporary. Does he wish that there should exist for ever these two states of captivity and freedom, of misery and happiness? Can he enjoy a freedom which is sustained by the same cause as the workers’ unfreedom? For if not, he must advance further and say, “bourgeois social relations must be changed.” Change they will, precisely because of this unfreedom they increasingly generate; but to-day the intellectual must decide whether his will be part of the social forces making for change, or vainly pitted against them.
But how are bourgeois social relations to be changed? Not by a mere effort of the will, for we saw that the mind was made by social relations, not vice versa. It is matter, the quantitative foundation of qualitative ideology, that must be changed. It is not enough to argue and convince. Work must be done. The environment must be altered.
Science shows us how. We achieve our wants always, not by the will alone, not by merely wishing them into being, but with action aided by cognition, by utilising the physical laws of reality. We move mountains, not by the mere movement of desire, but because we understand the rigidly determined laws of kinetics, hydraulics, and electrical engineering and can guide our actions by them. We attain freedom – that is, the fulfilment of our will – by obedience to the laws of reality. Observance of these laws is simple; it is the discovery of them that is the difficulty, and this is the task of science.
Thus, the task of defining liberty becomes still harder. It is not so easy after all to establish even a contemporary definition of liberty. Not only has the intellectual already had to decide to change bourgeois social relations, but he must now find out the laws of motion of society, and fit social relations into a causal scheme. It is not enough to want to be free; it is also necessary to know.
Only one scientific analysis of the law of motion of social relations exists, that of Marxism. For the understanding of how, physically, at the material level of social being, quantitative movements of capital, of matter, of stuff, provide the causal predictive basis of society, and pass via social relations into the qualitative changes of mind, will, and ideology, it is necessary to refer the bourgeois intellectual to Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Bukharin. Let us suppose that he has now done this and returns again to the difficult pursuit of liberty.
His causal conception of society will now enable him to realise that the task of making social relations produce liberty is as rigidly conditioned by reality as the task of making matter fulfil his desire in the form of machines. All matter – machinery, capital, men – and the relations which they exhibit in society – can only move in accordance with causal laws. This involves first that the old relations must be broken down, just as a house must be pulled down if we would entirely rebuild it, and the transition, putting up and pulling down, must follow certain laws. We cannot pull the foundation first, or build the roof before the walls.
This transitional stage involves the alteration of all the adherences between humans and the capital, machinery and materials, which mediate social relations. These must no longer adhere to individual persons – the bourgeois class – but to all members of society. This change is not a mere change of ownership, for it also involves that no individuals can derive profit from ownership without working. The goods are not destined to go the rounds of the market – the profit movement – but directly into use – the use movement. Moreover, this involves that all the visible institutions depending on private profit relations – laws, church, bureaucracy, judiciary, army, police, education – must be pulled down and rebuilt. The bourgeoisie cannot do this, for it is by means of these very institutions – private property (the modest income), law, university, civil service, privileged position, etc., – that they attain their freedom. To expect them to destroy these relations on which, as we saw, their freedom and the workers’ unfreedom, depend, is to ask them to go in quest of captivity, which, since liberty is what all men seek, they will not do. But the opposite is the case with the unfree, with the proletariat. The day they go in search of liberty, they revolt. The bourgeois, fighting for his liberty, must necessarily find himself in antagonism to the non-bourgeois, also fighting for liberty. The eventual issue of this struggle is due to the fact that capitalist economy, as it develops, makes ever narrower the class which really owns liberty until the day comes when the intellectual, the doctor, the petty bourgeois, the clerk, and the peasant, realise that they too are not after all free. And they see that the fight of the proletariat is their fight.
What, to the proletarian, is liberty – the extermination of those bourgeois institutions and relations which hold them in captivity – is necessarily compulsion and restraint to the bourgeois, just as the old bourgeois liberty generated non-liberty for the worker. The two notions of liberty are irreconcilable. Once the proletariat is in power, all attempts to re-establish bourgeois social relations will be attacks on proletarian liberty, and will therefore be repulsed as fiercely as men repulse all attacks on their liberty. This is the meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and why with it there is censorship, ideological acerbity, and all the other devices developed by the bourgeois in the evolution of the coercive State which secures his freedom.
There is, however, one vital difference. Bourgeois social relations, generating the liberty of the bourgeois and the non-liberty of the proletarian, depend on the existence of both freedom and unfreedom for their continuance. The bourgeois would not enjoy his idleness without the labour of the worker, nor the worker remain in a bourgeois relationship without the coercive guidance and leadership of the bourgeois. Thus the liberty of the few is, in bourgeois social relations, built on the unfreedom of the many. The two notions dwell in perpetual antagonism. But after the dispossession of the bourgeoisie, the antagonism between the expropriated and therefore unfree bourgeois, and the inheriting and therefore free proletariat, is only temporary. For the owners of the means of production, being also the workers of that means, do not need the existence of an expropriated class. When therefore, the transition is complete, and the bourgeois class is either absorbed or has died out, there is no longer an unfree compelled class. That is what is meant by the “withering away” of the State into a classless society, after the transitional period such as is now taking place in Russia.
This, stated in its simplest terms, is the causal process whereby bourgeois social relations can change into new social relations not generating a mass of unfreedom as the opposite pole to a little freedom. We have purposely made it simple. A fuller discussion, such as Marx gives, would make clearer the fluid interpenetrating nature of the process; how it is brought about causally by capitalist economy itself, which cannot stand still, but clumps continually into greater centralisation, giving rise to imperialistic wars, which man will not forever tolerate, and to viler and viler cash relations, filling men with hate, which will one day become hate for the system. And as capitalism perpetrates these enormities, the cause of revolt, it gives the proletariat the means of revolt, by making them unite, become more conscious and organised, so that, when the time of revolt comes, they have both the solidarity and the executive ability needed to take over the administration of the bourgeois property. At the same time bourgeois social relations reveal that even their freedom is not real freedom, that bourgeois freedom is almost as imprisoning to its enjoyers as the worker’s unfreedom. And thus the bourgeoisie does not find itself as a solid class, arrayed against the proletariat, but there are divisions in its own ranks, a few at first, and then more and more. The revolution takes place as soon as the proletariat are sufficiently organised by their fight against bourgeois social relations to co-operate, sufficiently harried by their growing unfreedom to demand a new world at all costs; and when, on the other side, as a result of the developing contradictions of capitalism, the bourgeois themselves have lost their grip.
Let us, therefore, go deeper, and examine more closely the true nature of bourgeois freedom. Are H. G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, E. M. Forster, you, reader and I, really free? Do we enjoy even mental freedom? For if we do not enjoy that, we certainly do not enjoy physical freedom.
Bertrand Russell is a philosopher and a mathematician. He takes the method of science seriously, and applies it to various fields of thought. He believes that thoughts are simply special arrangements of matter, even though he calls matter mind-stuff. He agrees that to every psychism corresponds a neurism, that life is a special chemical phenomenon, just as thought is a special biological phenomenon. He is not taken in by the nonsense of entelechies and pure memory.
Why then does he refrain from applying these categories used everywhere else, to the concept of liberty? In what sense can he believe man to be ever completely free? What meaning can he attach to the word freedom? He rightly detects the idealistic hocus-pocus of smuggling God into science as the Life-Force, entelechy, or the first cause, for the sleight of hand it is. But his liberty is a kind of God; something which he accepts on faith, somehow intervening in the affairs of the universe, and unconnected with causality, Russell’s liberty and his philosophy live in different worlds. He has made theology meet science, and seen that theology is a barbarous relic. But he has not performed the last act of integration; he has not asked science’s opinion of this belief that the graduate of one of the better universities, with a moderate income, considerable intelligence, and some leisure, is really free.
It is not a question of whether man has in some mysterious fashion free will. For if that were the problem, all men would either would or would not have liberty. If freedom consists in having free will, and men have free will, we can will as freely under a Fascist, or proletarian, as under a bourgeois government. But everyone admits that there are degrees of liberty. In what therefore does this difference in liberty consist?
Although liberty does not then depend on free will, it will help us to understand liberty if we consider what is the freedom of the will. Free will consists in this, that man is conscious of the motive that dictates his action. Without this consciousness of antecedent motive, there is no free will. I raise my hand to ward off a blow. The blow dictated my action; none the less, I was conscious that I wanted to ward off the blow; I willed to do so. My will was free; it was an act of my will. There was a cause; but I was conscious of a free volition. And I was conscious of the cause, of the blow.
In sleep a tickling of the soles of the feet actuates the plantar reflex. Such an action we call involuntary. Just as the warding movement was elicited by an outside stimulus, so was the bending of the leg. None the less, we regard the second as unfree, involuntary. It was not preceded by a conscious motive. Nor were we conscious of the cause of our action. We thus see that free will exists in so far as we are conscious of the antecedent motive in our mind, regarded as the immediate cause of action. If this motive, or act of will, is itself free, and not forced, we must also be in turn conscious of the antecedent motive that produced it. Free will is not therefore the opposite of causality, it is the consciousness of causality. That is why man naturally fits all happenings outside him in a causal frame; because he is conscious of causality in himself. Otherwise it would be a mystery if man, experiencing only uncausality in free will, should assume, as he does, that all other things are linked by causality. If, however, he is only assuming that other objects obey the same laws as he does, both the genesis and success of causality as a cognitive framework for reality are explicable.
Causality and freedom are thus aspects of each other. Freedom is the consciousness of necessity. The universe as a whole is completely free, because that which is not free is determined by something else outside it. But all things are, by definition, contained in the universe, therefore the universe is determined by nothing but itself. But every individual thing in the universe is determined by other things, because the universe is material. This material is not “given” in the definition of the universe, but is exactly what science establishes when it explains the world actively and positively.
Thus the only absolute freedom, like the only absolute truth, is the universe itself. But parts of the universe have varying degrees of freedom, according to their degrees of self-determination. In self-determination, the causes are within the thing itself; thus, in the sensation of free will, the antecedent cause of an action is the conscious thought of an individual, and since the action is also that of the individual, we talk of freedom, because there is self-determination.
The freedom of free will can only be relative. It is characteristic of the more recently evolved categories that they contain more freedom. The matter of which man is composed is in spatio-temporal relation with all other matter in the universe, and its position in space and time is only to a small degree self-determined. Man’s perception, however, is to a less degree in relation to the rest of the universe; it is a more exclusive kind of perception that sees little not in the immediate vicinity of man, or in which it is not interested, and it is largely moulded by memory, that is, by internal causes. Hence it is freer, more self-determined, than the spatio-temporal relations of dead matter. Man’s consciousness is still more self-determined, particularly in its later developments, such as conscious volition.
Man constantly supposes that he is freer than he is. Freudian research has recently shown that events at the level of being – i.e. unconscious psychological events – may give rise to disturbances which usurp conscious functions. In such circumstances a man may not be conscious of the motives of his actions, although he believes he is. He is therefore unfree, for his will’s determination arise from events outside consciousness. An example is the neurotic. The neurotic is unfree. He attains freedom by attaining self-determination, that is, by making conscious motives which before were unconscious. Thus he becomes captain of his soul. I am not now discussing the validity of the various methods by which this knowledge is obtained, or what neurological meaning we are to give to Freudian symbolism. I agree with this basic assumption of Freudian therapy, that man always obtains more freedom, more self-determination, by a widening of consciousness or, in other words, by an increase of knowledge. In the case of his own mind, man, by obtaining a knowledge of its causality, obtains more freedom. Here too freedom is seen to be a special form of determinism, namely, the consciousness of it.
But man cannot simply sit and contemplate his own mind in order to grasp its causality. His body, and likewise his mind, is in constant metabolic relation with the rest of the universe. As a result, when we want to trace any causal mental sequence, in order to be conscious of it, we find it inextricably commingled with events in the outer world. At an early stage we find we must seek freedom in the outer as well as the inner world. We must be conscious not only of our own laws, but of those of outer reality. Man has always realised that whatever free will may mean, it is not will alone, but action also which is involved in liberty. For example, I am immersed in a plaster cast so that I cannot blink an eyelid. None the less, my will is completely free. Am I therefore completely free? Only extremely idealistic philosophers would suggest that I am. A free will is therefore not enough to secure liberty, but our actions also must be unconstrained. Now everyone realises that the outer environment continually constrains our freedom, and that free will is no freedom unless it can act what it wills. It follows that to be really free we must also be able to do what we freely will to do.
But this freedom, too, leads us back to determinism. For we find, and here no philosopher has ever disputed it, that the environment is completely deterministic. That is to say, whatever motion or phenomenon we see, there is always a cause for it, which is itself caused, and so on. And the same causes, in the same circumstances, always secure the same effects. Now an understanding of this iron determinism brings freedom. For the more we understand the causality of the universe, the more we are able to do what we freely will. Our knowledge of the causality of water enables us to build ships and cross the seas; our knowledge of the laws of air enables us to fly; our knowledge of the necessary movements of the planets enables us to construct calendars so that we sow, embark on voyages, and set out to meet each other at the times most conducive to achieving what we will to do. Thus, in the outer world too, determinism is seen to produce freedom, freedom is understood to be a special form of necessity, the consciousness of necessity. We see that we attain freedom by our consciousness of the causality of subjective mental phenomena together with our consciousness of the causality of external phenomena. And we are not surprised that the characteristic of the behaviour of objects – causality – is also a characteristic of consciousness, for consciousness itself is only an aspect of an object – the body. The more we gain of this double understanding, the more free we become, possessing both free will and free action. These are not two mutually exclusive things, free will versus determinism – but on the contrary they play into each other’s hands.
From this it follows that the animals are less free than men. Creatures of impulse, acting they know not why, subject to all the chances of nature, of other animals, of geographical accidents and climatic change, they are at the mercy of necessity, precisely because they are unconscious of it.
That is not to say they have no freedom, for they possess a degree of freedom. They have some knowledge of the causality of their environment, as is shown by their manipulations of time and space and material – the bird’s flight, the hare’s leap, the ant’s nest. They have some inner self-determination, as is shown by their behaviour. But compared to man, they are unfree.
Implicit in the conception of thinkers like Russell and Forster, that all social relations are restraints on spontaneous liberty, is the assumption that the animal is the only completely free creature. No one constrains the solitary carnivore to do anything. This is of course an ancient fallacy. Rousseau is the famous exponent. Man is born free but is everywhere in chains. Always in the bourgeois mind is this legend of the golden age, of a perfectly good man corrupted by institutions. Unfortunately not only is man not good without institutions, he is not evil either. He is no man at all; he is neither good nor evil; he is an unconscious brute.
Russell’s idea of liberty is the unphilosophical idea of bestiality. Narkover School is not such a bad illustration of Russell’s liberty after all. The man alone, unconstrained, answerable only to his instincts, is Russell’s free man. Thus all man’s painful progress from the beasts is held to be useless. All men’s work and sweat and revolutions have been away from freedom. If this is true, and if a man believes, as most of us do, as Russell does, that freedom is the essential goal of human effort, then civilisation should be abandoned and we should return to the woods. I am a Communist because I believe in freedom. I criticise Russell, and Wells, and Forster, because I believe they are the champions of unfreedom.
But this is going too far, it will be said. How can these men, who have defended freedom of thought, action, and morality, be champions of unfreedom? Let us proceed with our analysis and we shall see why.
Society is a creation by which man attains a fuller measure of freedom than the beasts. It is society, and society alone, that differentiates man qualitatively from the beasts. The essential feature of society is economic production. Man, the individual, cannot do what he wants alone. He is unfree alone. Therefore he attains freedom by co-operation with his fellows. Science, by which he becomes conscious of outer reality, is social. Art, by which he becomes conscious of his feelings, is social. Economic production, by which he makes outer reality conform to his feeling, is social, and generates in its interstices science and art. It is economic production then that gives man freedom. It is because of economic production that man is free, and beasts are not. This is clear from the fact that economic production is the manipulation, by means of agriculture, horse-taming, road-building, car-construction, light, heating, and other engineering, of the environment, conformably to man’s will. It enables man to do what he wills; and he can only do what he wills with the help of others. Without roads, food supplies, machines, houses, and clothes, he would be like the man in a plaster cast, who can will what he likes, and yet is not a free man but a captive. But even his free will depends on it. For consciousness develops by the evolution of language, science, and art, and these are all born of economic production. Thus the freedom of man’s actions depends on his material level, on his economic production. The more advanced the economic production, the freer the civilisation.
But, it will be argued, economic production is just what entails all the ‘constraints’ of society. Daily work, division of labour under superintendents, all the laws of contract and capital, all the regulations of society, arise out of this work of economic production. Precisely, for, as we saw, freedom is the consciousness of causality. And by economic production, which makes it possible for man to achieve in action his will, man becomes conscious of the means necessary to achieve it. That a lever must be of a certain length to move the stone man wills to move is one consequence; the other is that a certain number of men must co-operate in a certain way to wield the lever. From this it is only a matter of development to the complicated machinery of modern life, with all its elaborate social relations.
Thus all the ‘constraints’, ‘obligations’, ‘inhibitions’, and ‘duties’ of society are the very means by which freedom is obtained by men. Liberty is thus the social consciousness of necessity. Liberty is not just necessity, for all reality is united by necessity. Liberty is the consciousness of necessity – in outer reality, in myself, and in the social relations which mediate between outer reality and human selves. The beast is a victim of mere necessity, man is in society conscious and self-determined. Not of course absolutely so, but more so than the beast.
Thus freedom of action, freedom to do what we will, the vital part of liberty, is seen to be secured by the social consciousness of necessity, and to be generated in the process of economic production. The price of liberty is not eternal vigilance, but eternal work.
But what is the relation of society to the other part of liberty, freedom to will? Economic production makes man free to do what he wills, but is he free to will what he will?
We saw that he was only free to do what he willed by attaining the consciousness of outer necessity. It is equally true that he is only free to will what he will by attaining the consciousness of inner necessity. Moreover, these two are not antagonistic, but, as we shall now find, they are one. Consciousness is the result of a specific and highly important form of economic production.
Suppose someone had performed the regrettable experiment of turning Bertrand Russell, at the age of nine months, over to a goat foster-mother, and leaving him to her care, in some remote spot, unvisited by human beings, to grow to manhood. When, say forty years later, men first visited Bertrand Russell, would they find him with the manuscripts of the Analysis of Mind and the Analysis of Matter in his hands? Would they even find him in possession of his definition of number, as the class of all classes? No. In contradiction to his present state, his behaviour would be both illogical and impolite.
It looks, therefore, as if Russell, as we know and value him, is primarily a social product. Russell is a philosopher and not an animal because he was taught not only manners, but language, and so given access to the social wisdom of ages of effort. Language filled his head with ideas, showed him what to observe, taught him logic, put all other men’s wisdom at his disposal, and awoke in him affectively the elementary decencies of society – morality, justice, and liberty. Russell’s consciousness, like that of all useful social objects, was a creation. It is Russell’s consciousness that is distinctively him, that is what we value in him, as compared to an anthropoid ape. Society made him, just as it makes a hat.
It goes without saying that Russell’s ‘natural gifts’ (or, as we say more strictly, his genotype) were of importance to the outcome. But that is only to say that the material conditions the finished product. Society is well aware that it cannot make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear or, except in special circumstances, a don out of a cretin. But it is also aware that out of iron ore you can make rocks, bridges, ships, or micrometers and, out of that plastic material, man’s genotype, you can make Aztecs, ancient Egyptians, Athenians, Prussians, proletarians, parsons, or public schoolboys.
It also goes almost without saying that a man is not a hat. He is a unique social product, the original of Butler’s fantasy of machines that gave birth to machines. He himself is one of those machines. The essential truth about man, as compared with hats, is that he is not a hat, but the man who wears it. And the essential truth about this fashioning process of man by society, is that the fashioning is primarily of his consciousness, a process that does not take place with anything else. Now it is precisely because society elaborates his consciousness, that man, although a social product like a hat, is capable of free will, whereas a hat, being unconscious, is not capable of free will. The coming-to-be of a man, his ‘growing up’, is society fashioning itself, a group of consciousnesses, themselves made by previous consciousnesses, making another. So the torch of liberty is handed on, and burns still brighter. But it is in living that man’s consciousness takes its distinctive stamp, and living is simply entering into social relations.
But, it will be urged, man – the individual – sees the world for himself alone – mountains, sky, and sea. Alone in his study he reflects on fate and death. True. But mountains and sea have a meaning to him, precisely because he is articulate-speaking because he has a socially-moulded consciousness. Death, fate, and sea are highly-evolved social concepts. Each individual contributes a little to altering and elaborating them, but how small a contribution compared to the immense pressure of the past! Language, science, and art are all simply the results of man’s uniting with his fellows socially to learn about himself and outer reality, in order to impose his desires upon it. Both knowledge and effort are only possible in co-operation, and both are made necessary by man’s struggles to be freer.
Thus man’s inner freedom, the conscious will, acting towards conscious ends, is a product of society; it is an economic product. It is the most refined of the products society achieves in its search for freedom. Social consciousness flowers out of social effort. We give vent in effort to our instinctive desires. Learning how to accomplish them we learn something about the nature of reality and how to master it. This wisdom modifies the nature of our desires, which become more conscious, more full of accurate images of reality. So enriched, the desires become subtler, and, in working to achieve profounder goals, in more elaborate economic production, gain still deeper insight into reality, and, as consequence, themselves become yet more enriched. Thus, in dialectic process, social being generates social mind, and this interplay between deepening inner and outer reality is conserved and passed on by culture. Man, as society advances, has a consciousness composed less and less of unmodified instinct, more and more of socially-fashioned knowledge and emotion. Man understands more and more clearly the necessities of his own being and of outer reality. He becomes increasingly more free.
The illusion that our minds are free to the extent that, like the beasts, we are unconscious of the causality of our mental states, is just what secures our unfreedom. Bourgeois society to-day clearly exhibits in practice this truth, which we have established by analysis in theory. The bourgeois believes that liberty consists in absence of social organisation; that liberty is a negative quality, a deprivation of existing obstacles to it; and not a positive quality, the reward of endeavour and wisdom. This belief is itself the outcome of bourgeois social relations. As a result of it, the bourgeois intellectual is unconscious of the causality that makes his consciousness what it is. Like the neurotic who refuses to believe that his compulsion is the result of a certain unconscious complex, the bourgeois refuses to believe that his conception of liberty as a mere deprivation of social restraints arises from bourgeois social relations themselves, and that it is just this illusion which is constraining him on every side. He refuses to see that his own limited liberty, the captivity of the worker, and all the contradictions of developing bourgeois relations – pacifism, Fascism, war, hate, cruelty, disease – are bound in one net of causality, that each is influenced by each, and that therefore it is fallacious to suppose a simple effort of the will of the free man, without knowledge of the causes will banish Fascism, war, and slumps. Because of his basic fallacy, this type of intellectual always tries to cure positive social evils, such as wars, by negative individual actions, such as non-co-operation, passive resistance or conscientious objection. This is because he cannot rid himself of the assumption that the individual is free. But we have shown that the individual is never free. He can only attain freedom by social co-operation. He can only do what he wants by using social forces. If, therefore, he wishes to stop poverty, war, and misery, he must do it, not by passive resistance, but by using social relations. But in order to use social relations he must understand them. He must become conscious of the laws of society, just as, if he wants to lever up a stone, he must know the laws of levers.
Once the bourgeois intellectual can see that society is the only instrument of freedom, he has advanced a step farther along the road to freedom. But until then he is unfree. True he is a logician, he understands the causality of nature, Einstein’s theories, all the splendid apparatus of social discovery, but he still believes in a magic world of social relations divorced from these theories, in which only the god of bourgeois liberty rules. This is proved, not only in his theory, in the way his doctrine of liberty is accepted like a theological dogma, and never made to square with all his philosophic and scientific knowledge; but it is also proved in action, when the bourgeois intellectual is powerless to stop the development of increasing unfreedom in bourgeois society. All the compulsions of militancy, Fascism, and economic distress harry contemporary society, and all he can oppose to them is individualistic action, conscientious objection and passive resistance. This is bound to be the case if he is unfree. Like a man who believes he can walk upon the water and drowns in it, the bourgeois intellectual asserts a measure of freedom that does not in fact exist, and is therefore unfree mentally and physically. Who cannot see iron compulsion stalking through the bourgeois world today? We are free when we can do what we will. Society is an instrument of freedom in so far as it secures what men want. The members of bourgeois society, all of them, worker, capitalist, and capitalist-intellectual, want an increase in material wealth, happiness, freedom from strife, from danger of death, security. But bourgeois society to-day produces a decrease in material wealth and also creates unemployment, unhappiness, strife, insecurity, constant war. Therefore all who live in bourgeois society – democratic, Fascist or Rooseveltian – are unfree, for bourgeois society is not giving them what they desire. The fact that they have, or have not, votes or ‘freedom of speech’ does not alter, in any way, their unfreedom.
Why does not bourgeois society fulfil the wants of its members? Because it does not understand the laws of economic production – it is unorganised and unplanned. It is unconscious of the necessities of economic production, and, because of that, cannot make economic production fulfil its desires. Why is it unconscious of the necessities of economic production? Because, for historical reasons, it believes that economic production is best when each man is left free to produce for himself what seems to him most profitable to produce. In other words, it believes that freedom is secured by the lack of social organisation of the individual in the function of society, economic production. As we saw, this individual freedom through unconsciousness is a delusion. Unconscious, deluded bourgeois society is therefore unfree. Even Russell is unfree; and in the next war, as in the last, will be put in gaol.
This very unfreedom – expressed as individualism – in the basic function of society, ultimately generates every form of external constraint. The bourgeois revolutionary asserted a fallacious liberty – that man was born good and was everywhere in chains, that institutions made him bad. It turned out that this liberty he claimed was individualism in private production. This revealed its fallacious nature as a freedom by appearing at once as a restraint. For it could only be secured, itwas only a name, for unrestricted right to own the means of production, which is in itself a restriction on those who are thus alienated from their livelihood. Obviously, what I own absolutely my neighbour is restricted from touching.
All social relations based on duty and privilege were changed by the bourgeois revolution into exclusive and forcible rights to ownership of cash. I produce for my individual self, for profit. Necessarily, therefore, I produce for the market, not for use. I work for cash, not from duty to my lord or retainer. My duties to the State could all now be compounded for cash. All my obligations of contract, whether of marriage or social organisation, could be compounded for cash. Cash appeared as the only obligation between men and men, who were otherwise apparently completely free – free master, free labourer, free producer, free consumer, free markets, free trade, free entrepreneur, the free flow of capital from hand to hand and land to land. And even man’s obligations to cash appeared an obligation of cash to him, to be absolutely owned by him.
This dissolution of social obligations could be justified if man was free in himself, and if, doing what seemed best for him, for his own good and profit, he would in fact get what he desired, and so secure freedom. It was a return to the apparent liberty of the jungle, where each beast struggles only for himself, and owes no obligations to anyone. But this liberty, as we saw, is an illusion. The beast is less free than man. The desires of the jungle cancel each other, and no one gets exactly what he wants. No beast is free.
This fallacy at once revealed itself a fallacy in the following way. Complete freedom to own property meant that society found itself divided into haves and have-nots, like the beasts in the jungle. The have-nots, each trying to do what was best for him in the given circumstances, according to the bourgeois doctrine of liberty, would have forcibly seized the property from the haves. But this would have been complete anarchy, and though anarchy, according to bourgeois theory, is complete liberty, in practice the bourgeois speedily sees that to live in the jungle is not to be free. Property is the basis of his mode of living. In such circumstances social production could not be carried on, and society would dissolve, man return to savagery, and freedom altogether perish. Thus the bourgeois contradicted his theory in practice from the start. The State took its distinctive modern form as the enforcement of bourgeois rights by coercion. Police, standing army and laws were all brought into being to protect the haves from the ‘free’ desires of the have-nots. Bourgeois liberty at once gives rise to bourgeois coercion, to prisons, armies, contracts, to all the sticky and restraining apparatus of the law, to all the ideology and education centred round the sanctity of private property, to all the bourgeois commandments. Thus bourgeois liberty was built on a lie, bound to reveal in time its contradictions.
Among the have-nots, bourgeois freedom gave rise to fresh coercions. The free labourer, owning nothing, was free to sell his labour in any market. But this became a form of slavery worse, in its unrestricted form, than chattel slavery, a horror that Government Blue Books describing pre-Factory Act conditions make vivid for all their arid phraseology. They show how unrestricted factory industrialisation made beasts of men, women, and children, how they died of old age in their thirties, how they rose early in the morning exhausted to work and knocked off late at night only to sink exhausted to sleep, how the children were aged by work before they had ceased to be infants. Made worse than a slave – for he was still free to be unemployed – the labourer fought for freedom by enforcing social restraints on his employers. Banding with others in trade unions, he began the long fight that gave rise to the various Factory Acts, wage agreements, and all the elaborate social legislation which to-day coerces the bourgeois employer.
And, after all this, even the bourgeois himself is not free. The unrestricted following of his illusion of liberty enslaves him. His creed demands unrestricted competition, and this, because it is unrestricted, works as wildly and blindly as the weather. It makes him as unfree, as much at the mercy of a not understood chance, as a cork bobbing on the waves. So he too seeks freedom in restraint – industry is increasingly sheltered by amalgamations, rings, tariffs, price agreements, ‘unfair competition’ clauses, subsidies, and Government protection for the exploitation of colonial areas. Bourgeois liberty makes overt its self-contradictions by becoming monopoly.
Here is the secret paradox of bourgeois development and decline. The bourgeois abandoned feudal relations in the name of a liberty which he visualised as freedom from social restraints. Such a liberty would have led to savagery. But in fact the liberty he claimed – ‘unrestricted’ private property – really involved restraint, that is, it gave rise to complex forms of social organisation, which were more many-sided, more incessant, and more all-pervading, than feudal restraints. Thus the cash relation, which he conceived as putting an end to all social restraints, and thus giving him liberty, did give him a larger measure of liberty than in feudalism, but in the opposite way to his expectations, by imposing far more complex organisations than those of feudal civilisation. All the elaborate forms of bourgeois contracts, market organisation, industrial structure, national States, trade unions, tariffs, imperialism and bureaucratic democratic government, the iron pressure of the consumer and the labour market, the dole, subsidy, bounties – all these multifarious forms of social organisation – were brought into being by a class that demanded the dissolution of social organisation. And the fact that bourgeois civilisation obtained a greater measure of control over its environment than feudal – and was that much freer – is precisely because all these complex social organisations were brought into being – but brought blindly.
Blindly brought into being; that is the source of the ultimate unfreedom of bourgeois civilisation. Because it is not conscious of the fact that private ownership of the means of production, unrestricted competition, and the cash nexus, of their natures involve various forms of restraint – alienation from property, captivity to slump and war, unemployment and misery – bourgeois society is unable to control itself. The various forms of social organisation it has blindly erected, as an animal tunnelling for gold might throw up great mounds of earth, are all haphazard and not understood. It believes that to become conscious of them fully, to manipulate them consciously for the ends of the will is to be an advocate of determinism, to kill liberty, to bring into birth the bee-hive state. For still, in spite of all the havoc the bourgeois sees around him, he believes that only the beast is free, and that to be subject to all the winds of chance, at the mercy of wars and slumps and social strife, is to be free.
Any definition of liberty is humbug that does not mean this: liberty to do what one wants. A people is free whose members have liberty to do what they want – to get the goods they desire and avoid the ills they hate. What do men want? They want to be happy, and not to be starved or despised or deprived of the decencies of life. They want to be secure, and friendly with their fellows, and not conscripted to slaughter and be slaughtered. They want to marry, and beget children, and help, not oppress each other. Who is free who cannot do these things, even if he has a vote, and free speech? Who then is free in bourgeois society, for not a few men but millions are forced by circumstances to be unemployed, and miserable, and despised, and unable to enjoy the decencies of life? Millions are forced to go out and be slaughtered, or to kill, and to oppress each other. Millions are forced to strive with their fellows for a few glittering prizes, and to be deprived of marriage, and a home, and children, because society cannot afford them these things. Millions and millions of men are not free. These are the elements of liberty, and it is insane – until these are achieved – for a limited class to believe it can secure the subtleties of liberty. Only when these necessities are achieved, can man rise higher and, by the practice of art and science, learn more clearly what he wants, and what he can get; having only then passed from the sphere of necessity to that of freedom.
Each step to higher consciousness is made actively with struggle and difficulty. It is man’s natural but fatal error to suppose that the path of liberty is easy, that liberty is a mere negative, a relaxation, the elimination of an obstacle in his path. But it is more than that. True freedom must be created as strenuously as we make the instruments of freedom, tools and machines. It must be wrested out of the heart of reality, including the inner reality of man’s minds.
That is why all lovers of liberty, who have understood the nature of freedom, and escaped from the ignorant categories of bourgeois thought, turn to Communism. For that is simply what Communism is, the attainment of more liberty than bourgeois society can reach. Communism has as its basis the understanding of the causality of society, so that all the unfreedom involved in bourgeois society, the enslavement of the have-nots by the haves, and the slavery of both haves and have-nots to wars, slumps, depression and superstition, may be ended. To be conscious of the laws of dead matter: that is something; but it is not enough. Communism seizes hold of a higher degree of self-determination, to rescue man from war, starvation, hate, and coercion, by becoming conscious of the causality of society. It is Communism that makes free will real to man, by making society conscious of itself. To change reality we must understand its laws. If we wish to move a stone, we must apply the leverage in the proper place. If we wish to change bourgeois social relations into communist, we must follow a certain path. The have-nots, the proletariat, must take over the means of production from the haves, the bourgeoisie, and since, as we saw, these two freedoms are incompatible, restraint, in the form of the coercive State, must remain in being as long as the bourgeoisie try to get back their former property. But unlike the former situation, this stage is only temporary. This stage is what is known as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the necessary step from the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie – which is what the bourgeois State is – to the classless State, which is what Communism is. And as Russia shows, even in the dictatorship of the proletariat, before the classless State has come into being, man is already freer. He can avoid unemployment, and competition with his fellows, and poverty. He can marry and beget children, and achieve the decencies of life. He is not asked to oppress his fellows.
To the worker, subject to unemployment, starved in the midst of plenty, this path eventually becomes plain. Despite the assurances of the bourgeoisie that in a democratic or national State he is completely free, he revolts. And who, in those days, will stand by his side? Will the bourgeoisie, themselves pinched and disfranchised by the growing concentration of capital, discouraged, pessimistic, harried into war and oppression by ‘forces beyond control’, and yet still demanding liberty? On the answer to that question, which each individual bourgeois must make, sooner or later, will depend whether he strives in those days to make men free or to keep them in chains. And this too depends on whether he has understood the nature of liberty. The class to whom capitalism means liberty steadily contracts, but those once of that class who are now enslaved to war, and imperialism and poverty, still cling to that bourgeois interpretation of liberty that has abundantly proved its falsehood. They can only escape and become free by understanding the active nature of liberty, and by becoming conscious of the path they must follow to attain it. Their will is not free as long as they will liberty but produce unfreedom. It is only free when they will Communism and produce liberty.
This good, liberty, contains all good. Not only at the simple level of current material wants, but where all men’s aspirations bud, freedom is the same goal, pursued in the same way. Science is the means by which man learns what he can do, and therefore it explores the necessity of outer reality. Art is the means by which man learns what he wants to do, and therefore it explores the essence of the human heart. And bourgeoisdom, shutting its eyes to beauty, turning its back on science, only follows its stupidity to the end. It crucifies liberty upon a cross of gold, and if you ask in whose name it does this, it replies, ‘In the name of personal freedom’.
What about freedom to have enough to eat, a safe place to sleep, some basic opportunities, or enough knowledge and data to make an informed vote? Are those not "Natural Rights"?

[Left-Reasoning]

Even their concept of Natural Rights is flawed because it only includes negative freedom.

Positive "freedom" is the negation of freedom.

"Society must be so converted as to preserve the SOVEREIGNTY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL inviolate. That it must avoid all combinations and connections of persons and interests, and all other arrangements which will not leave every individual at all times at liberty to dispose of his or her person, and time, and property in any manner in which his or her feelings or judgment may dictate. WITHOUT INVOLVING THE PERSONS OR INTERESTS OF OTHERS" - Josiah Warren (Capitalization by Benjamin Tucker)

[Dermezel]

Positive "freedom" is the negation of freedom.

"Society must be so converted as to preserve the SOVEREIGNTY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL inviolate. That it must avoid all combinations and connections of persons and interests, and all other arrangements which will not leave every individual at all times at liberty to dispose of his or her person, and time, and property in any manner in which his or her feelings or judgment may dictate. WITHOUT INVOLVING THE PERSONS OR INTERESTS OF OTHERS" - Josiah Warren (Capitalization by Benjamin Tucker)

You do know any positive freedom could be rephrased to make it negative right? The right to food could be rephrased to be "the right not to starve".

In any case, any meaningful freedom is based on the ability to do what you want. If you can't move or think, say you are a vegetable, you aren't really free even if the government is making sure nobody interferes with you.

That being the case positive freedom is just as essential as negative as it is necessary for most people being able to do what they want.

[Left-Reasoning]

You do know any positive freedom could be rephrased to make it negative right? The right to food could be rephrased to be "the right not to starve".

"The concept of negative liberty refers to freedom from interference by other people." - Wikipedia

The right not to starve is not a freedom from interference by other people.

The right not to have others prevent you from obtaining food, is a negative liberty, however.


In any case, any meaningful freedom is based on the ability to do what you want. If you can't move or think, say you are a vegetable, you aren't really free even if the government is making sure nobody interferes with you.

Agreed.


That being the case positive freedom is just as essential as negative as it is necessary for most people being able to do what they want.

Agreed. If I am stuck at the bottom of a well, in what respect am I free?

[Dermezel]

Positive "freedom" is the negation of freedom.

"Society must be so converted as to preserve the SOVEREIGNTY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL inviolate."

That is a backwards conception of freedom because it is saying some guy alone on an island is more free then a person who is living in a Utopia where anything he or she desires is given on demand.

According to that reasoning a guy who is "free" to work by himself, all day, securing the basic necessities of food and water and only able to be a hunter-gatherer is more free then someone in a modern society who can choose to be a doctor, or physicist or artist. Basically your idea of freedom implies that man should strive to be like a wild beast, an animal who has to struggle all day and night by himself to secure the most basics because any sort of "interference" would violate his "freedom".

[Dermezel]

"The concept of negative liberty refers to freedom from interference by other people." - Wikipedia

The right not to starve is not a freedom from interference by other people.

Again you can just reinterpret "interference" i.e. not allowing me to get the food on the shelves is "interfering". Property laws by their very nature entail interference from a State authority.

And like I said, this concept of freedom is backwards because it supposed that everyone should just move into the woods and dirt farm for berries.


The right not to have others prevent you from obtaining food, is a negative liberty, however.

That conception of freedom is overly narrow. Physical limitations are likewise an impediment of freedom, and people live under de facto interference.

Again, the problem is this notion of negative freedom can actually make people less free. Living in a society with vast Social Programs, high technology and income redistribution I am free to play video games, watch anime, debate online, watch one of many countless movies, see a State prostitute, light a joint.

Whereas a society based exclusively on negative freedom, I am free to well dirt farm for basic necessities, and that's about it, because anything else would involve social "interference" to my pure Natural State of isolation.

[Left-Reasoning]

That is a backwards conception of freedom because it is saying some guy alone on an island is more free then a person who is living in a Utopia where anything he or she desires is given on demand.

The man toiling all day just to receive enough sustenance to keep him alive another day is indeed in worse straights than the man basking in the glories of utopia.

But we are not addressing well-being. We are addressing rights, and a positive right is the right to use force against another man and thereby deprive him of his freedom. Such a conception is therefore contradictory.

This is not my conception of freedom, it is the conception of Warren and of Tucker.

[Dermezel]

But we are not addressing well-being. We are addressing rights,

If your rights don't lead to well being they are worthless.


and a positive right is the right to use force against another man and thereby deprive him of his freedom.

You have to use force to accomplish anything. If you wish to harness resources you must apply force to nature.

As for applying it to human beings, what do you think property laws are? Are property laws not backed by force?

[Left-Reasoning]

Again you can just reinterpret "interference" i.e. not allowing me to get the food on the shelves is "interfering". Property laws by their very nature entail interference from a State authority.

This is correct.


And like I said, this concept of freedom is backwards because it supposed that everyone should just move into the woods and dirt farm for berries.

It has never been said by myself or by the great anarchists that one should abandon everything that is good in order to live a life free from coercion. That is a strawman.


That conception of freedom is overly narrow. Physical limitations are likewise an impediment of freedom

Correct.


Again, the problem is this notion of negative freedom can actually make people less free. Living in a society with vast Social Programs, high technology and income redistribution I am free to play video games, watch anime, debate online, watch one of many countless movies, see a State prostitute, light a joint.

Whereas a society based exclusively on negative freedom, I am free to well dirt farm for basic necessities, and that's about it, because anything else would involve social "interference" to my pure Natural State of isolation.

Why do you equate freedom with isolation? Is not the anarchist cause that of the community of freemen?

[Left-Reasoning]

If your rights don't lead to well being they are worthless.

I am better off that no one else has the right to my labor. That I am not a slave, which is what all conceptions of positive "freedom" boil down to.

There is a moral and an immoral way to achieve societal good. Institutionalized violence is an immoral way.


You have to use force to accomplish anything. If you wish to harness resources you must apply force to nature.

That is a different kind of force, Comrade.


As for applying it to human beings, what do you think property laws are? Are property laws not backed by force?

Indeed they are.

[Dermezel]

I am better off that no one else has the right to my labor.


Okay does a child have a right to a parent's labor?

[Left-Reasoning]

Okay does a child have a right to a parent's labor?

Should a parent provide for his child? Yes. In fact, anyone should provide for anyone else that is in need.

Does the child, or an agent acting in his/her name, have the right to employ violence to force the parent to serve the child? No. That would be slavery and thus authoritarian.

[Dermezel]

Should a parent provide for his child? Yes. In fact, anyone should provide for anyone else that is in need.

Does the child, or an agent acting in his/her name, have the right to employ violence to force the parent to serve the child? No. That would be slavery and thus authoritarian.

Sometimes, people have the right to other's labor. That's the entire basis of inheritance, and almost all our wealth and technology is inherited.

Arguing "no one has a right to another's labor" is like saying every generation we should smash our tools and burn down our buildings and start from scratch, because that was built by someone else's labor. Almost all technology and infrastructure is dead labor. And the dead have no say in it, it is just expropriated.

Also disabled people? Sick people? Yeah. People who need police/military protection? Yeah. That's part of living in a society.

[Left-Reasoning]

Arguing "no one has a right to another's labor" is like saying every generation we should smash our tools and burn down our buildings and start from scratch, because that was built by someone else's labor. Almost all technology and infrastructure is dead labor. And the dead have no say in it, it is just expropriated.

Agreed.


Also disabled people? Sick people? Yeah. People who need police/military protection? Yeah. That's part of living in a society.

Yeah, what?

[RED DAVE]

Does the child, or an agent acting in his/her name, have the right to employ violence to force the parent to serve the child? No. That would be slavery and thus authoritarian.In other words, there should be no force employed to require parents to take care of their children.

You are one stupid bastard.

But at least you agree with Rothbard, only he was more consistent. He believed that while a parent had no right to use violence against a child, a parent should be allowed to starve a child to death.

RED DAVE

[Left-Reasoning]

In other words, there should be no force employed to require parents to take care of their children.

If it is known that the parent doesn't take care of their child than the child should be removed from that person's home and should be cared for by someone that will.

To advocate the use of violence in these instances, however, is to be anti-leftist. As leftism is unequivocally opposed to slavery.

[RED DAVE]

In other words, there should be no force employed to require parents to take care of their children.
If it is known that the parent doesn't take care of their child than the child should be removed from that person's home and should be cared for by someone that will.And that process of removal could easily involve violence.


To advocate the use of violence in these instances, however, is to be anti-leftist. As leftism is unequivocally opposed to slaverySo, according to your bizarre system, parenting equals slavery?

RED DAVE

[Agnapostate]

Their reference to themselves is most often as Misesians and Rothbardians, with there being distinction (but significant overlap), between advocacy of Austrian economic philosophy and "anarcho"-capitalist political philosophy (though we here are cognizant of the arbitrary nature of any division between economics and politics).

Of all his asinine statements and commentaries, one gem particularly stands out in Rothbard's literature: "It is no crime to be ignorant of economics, which is, after all, a specialized discipline and one that most people consider to be a 'dismal science.' But it is totally irresponsible to have a loud and vociferous opinion on economic subjects while remaining in this state of ignorance."

I emphatically agree. The Austrian school provides to the field of economics what creationism provides to the field of evolutionary biology; a fanciful, utopian, and dogmatic mythology with no basis in logical reasoning or empirical evidence, but characterized by blind faith among the uninformed lay population vastly disproportionate to its rational support among experts in the know. As creationism is pseudo science, Austrian ideology is pseudo economics.

Internet Austro-propertarians are generally smug, snobbish, pompous elitists without the economic knowledge that might partially justify those attributes.

[LeftSideDown]

Their reference to themselves is most often as Misesians and Rothbardians, with there being distinction (but significant overlap), between advocacy of Austrian economic philosophy and "anarcho"-capitalist political philosophy (though we here are cognizant of the arbitrary nature of any division between economics and politics).

Of all his asinine statements and commentaries, one gem particularly stands out in Rothbard's literature: "It is no crime to be ignorant of economics, which is, after all, a specialized discipline and one that most people consider to be a 'dismal science.' But it is totally irresponsible to have a loud and vociferous opinion on economic subjects while remaining in this state of ignorance."

I emphatically agree. The Austrian school provides to the field of economics what creationism provides to the field of evolutionary biology; a fanciful, utopian, and dogmatic mythology with no basis in logical reasoning or empirical evidence, but characterized by blind faith among the uninformed lay population vastly disproportionate to its rational support among experts in the know. As creationism is pseudo science, Austrian ideology is pseudo economics.

Internet Austro-propertarians are generally smug, snobbish, pompous elitists without the economic knowledge that might partially justify those attributes.

Most sciences use deduction. They don't gather a bunch of data and stare at it until suddenly a theory magically appears.

[Left-Reasoning]

And that process of removal could easily involve violence.

If the parent is keeping their child captive, then yes, it may.


So, according to your bizarre system, parenting equals slavery?

I dislike the term parenting as it seems to be used in a hierarchical manner.

[Left-Reasoning]

I emphatically agree. The Austrian school provides to the field of economics what creationism provides to the field of evolutionary biology; a fanciful, utopian, and dogmatic mythology with no basis in logical reasoning or empirical evidence, but characterized by blind faith among the uninformed lay population vastly disproportionate to its rational support among experts in the know. As creationism is pseudo science, Austrian ideology is pseudo economics.

Nothing of the sort.


Internet Austro-propertarians are generally smug, snobbish, pompous elitists without the economic knowledge that might partially justify those attributes.

This is true.

[Agnapostate]

I might have gone too far. While I'm always relatively polite to political opponents that I meet in person, my reaction to Austro-propertarians that I'm disconnected from is somewhat dependent on their level of civility, which is a mistake, when I think about it. My tone should change, perhaps, but not the content of my actual statements.

But when I read Rothbard's idiotic assertion that he is an anarchist while legitimate anarchists are not, I tend to laugh and scorn any sort of thought associated with him.


Professor Chomsky reveals that he is not really an “anarchist” at all, indeed that he prefers statism to an anarcho-capitalist world. That of course is his prerogative, and scarcely unusual, but what is illegitimate is for this distinguished linguist to call himself an “anarchist”. And I very much fear that the same can be said for the other varieties of left-anarchists: communal, syndical, or whatever. Beneath a thin veneer of libertarian rhetoric there lies the same compulsory and coercive collectivist that we have encountered all too often in the last two centuries. Scratch a left-wing “anarchist” and you will find a coercive egalitarian despot who makes the true lover of freedom yearn even for Richard Nixon (Arghhl) in contrast.

It's in those moments that I tend to sympathize with Iain McKay's sharply critical attacks on these fraudulent fools in An Anarchist FAQ, so audaciously stupid as to assert that left is right and right is left. It's in those moments that I applaud his statement that, "While anarcho'-capitalists obviously try to associate themselves with the anarchist tradition by using the word 'anarcho' or by calling themselves 'anarchists' their ideas are distinctly at odds with those associated with anarchism. As a result, any claims that their ideas are anarchist or that they are part of the anarchist tradition or movement are false." I tend to wish that he used stronger language still, that he engaged in a Bob Black style rant against "anarcho"-capitalists.

But there are times when I read statements from a fairly reasonable person on *their* side, and admit that undue aggression tends to alienate those who might otherwise be sympathetic. For example, I read a statement of Austrian economist Peter Boettke that criticized the elitist tendencies of some Austro-propertarians, and felt more sympathetic myself:


Austrians have an unusually large, for an economic doctrine, lay audience, even though it’s an obscure school of thought. Why people often get interested is that they found Rothbard was such a powerful writer for libertarianism [sic] that they became converted to libertarianism [sic] through Rothbard. And he tried to demonstrate a causal connection with Austrian economics, and they buy into that. Rand also recommended the works of Mises over other advocates of capitalism. She didn’t say go read Smith, she said go read Mises…The lay audiences don’t always understand the questions that give rise to the Austrian economics philosophy. They now it says don’t use math, and laymen are happy because they don’t understand complicated math either…people start to think Austrian economics is easy, which it’s not. They think they can read a body of work in four months and have a deep appreciation of what Austrians are up to, which I don’t think is right. And they also think that Austrian economics is political, which isn’t accurate either. They think it’s easy, and political, and that there’s a giant conspiracy keeping it out of the mainstream. Therefore, you get involved in it and you’re like in the X-Files of academics. You think "I can be part of this non-conspirational approach against these silly academic pigs."

The problem is, it builds into the idea that the world is divided into stupid people, evil people, and people who agree with me. The first thing you have to learn is that there are lots of brilliant, kind-heated people who just disagree with you.

It's in those moments that I'm more sympathetic to the "alliance of left-libertarians" that attempts to synthesize Austrian and socialist thought, and is characterized by figures such as market socialist Kevin Carson and "free market" capitalism supporter Roderick Long, and an "anarchy without adjectives" perspective. I also nod to socialist theorist Theodore Burczak's statement that "Marxists need to understand the theoretical and practical importance of the Austrian theory of the market process in order to retain their relevance in the post-Soviet world."

But of course, my opinions shouldn't vary according to petty whims and my feelings towards specific people and their tones. I objectively believe that anarchism and capitalism are incompatible and that "anarchist" capitalism is oxymoronic as a result, and that Austrian theory has contributed virtually nothing to modern economics. I also objectively believe that Hayekian knowledge theory is important and significant, and that it must be considered in any advocacy of a socialist economy. I'm also sympathetic towards the Austrian focus on political economy rather than mathematics, and the resistance towards orthodoxy that characterizes any heterodox school.

[Dermezel]

If it is known that the parent doesn't take care of their child than the child should be removed from that person's home and should be cared for by someone that will.

To advocate the use of violence in these instances, however, is to be anti-leftist. As leftism is unequivocally opposed to slavery.

That would require force and taxes.

[Dermezel]

I dislike the term parenting as it seems to be used in a hierarchical manner.

Please explain.

[Left-Reasoning]

That would require force and taxes.

What would?

[gorillafuck]

What would?
Relocating the child from the home, I think.

[Skooma Addict]

I emphatically agree. The Austrian school provides to the field of economics what creationism provides to the field of evolutionary biology; a fanciful, utopian, and dogmatic mythology with no basis in logical reasoning or empirical evidence, but characterized by blind faith among the uninformed lay population vastly disproportionate to its rational support among experts in the know. As creationism is pseudo science, Austrian ideology is pseudo economics.Whether or not creationism is pseudo-science depends on the methodology and justifications creationists use to defend their beliefs. AE is not pseudo economics either.

If you want to see a dogmatic mythology look at utilitarianism and objective ethics. I also noticed that Fredrick Copleston (someone who knows more about religion than anyone here) claimed that marxism became a faith in volume 7 of his History of Philosophy series.

[RED DAVE]

I dislike the term parenting as it seems to be used in a hierarchical manner.Too bad for you that it's the term that most of people use..

RED DAVE

[RED DAVE]

Whether or not creationism is pseudo-science depends on the methodology and justifications creationists use to defend their beliefs. AE is not pseudo economics either.No, creationism is pseuco-science. I wonderwhy you fail to realize this? Are you, per chance, a creationist?


If you want to see a dogmatic mythology look at utilitarianism and objective ethics. I also noticed that Fredrick Copleston (someone who knows more about religion than anyone here) claimed that marxism became a faith in volume 7 of his History of Philosophy series.Yeah, he was such a great philosopher and believer in the truth that he believed that an invisible spook ruled the universe and one of the best ways to the spook was never to fuck.

RED DAVE

[Skooma Addict]

No, creationism is pseuco-science. I wonderwhy you fail to realize this? Are you, per chance, a creationist?


I could use arguments which are incorrect but not pseudo-scientific to support creationism. Creationism is not inherently pseudo-scientific. I am not a creationist. I also reject the folk psychology that many atheists still cling to after rejecting creationism.


Yeah, he was such a great philosopher and believer in the truth that he believed that an invisible spook ruled the universe and one of the best ways to the spook was never to fuck.

RED DAVE


He was excellent when it came to the history of Philosophy, as most philosophers would tell you. His series is pretty much the series to read on the history of philosophy.

[Dean]

Most sciences use deduction. They don't gather a bunch of data and stare at it until suddenly a theory magically appears.

I could use arguments which are incorrect but not pseudo-scientific to support creationism. Creationism is not inherently pseudo-scientific. I am not a creationist. I also reject the folk psychology that many atheists still cling to after rejecting creationism.

It would be much better to point out that Austrian economics is primarily an idealist and ideologists form of economic theory - since "pseudo-science" is a weighted term with differing qualifiers, many of which lead us to conclude that a "pseudo-science" is either false or useless when neither may be the case.

The reason Austrian economics should be marginalized is because its purpose is almost exclusively in the furtherance of extant for-profit entities (Koch Industries, one of the largest private companies in the US supports it, for instance) or right wing economic ideology. These two go hand-in-hand, of course, since the ideology serves either to justify or deepen the centralization of economic control endemic to capitalist systems.

I have almost never seen it used in other context, except as an anecdotal point, rarely serving a meaningful application or analyses besides its own, novel character.

[Dermezel]

Whether or not creationism is pseudo-science depends on the methodology and justifications creationists use to defend their beliefs. AE is not pseudo economics either.


Give me an example of a good, scientific creationism.

[Cal Engime]

The Austrian school provides to the field of economics what creationism provides to the field of evolutionary biology; a fanciful, utopian, and dogmatic mythology with no basis in logical reasoning or empirical evidence, but characterized by blind faith among the uninformed lay population vastly disproportionate to its rational support among experts in the know. As creationism is pseudo science, Austrian ideology is pseudo economics.Which claims of the modern Austrians are illogical? What fallacies do they employ?

[Dermezel]

I could use arguments which are incorrect but not pseudo-scientific to support creationism. Creationism is not inherently pseudo-scientific.

That is such a weak argument. Yes, they can make arguments that are dumber then scientific ones. Good point.

As for Marginal Utility, on which the AE rests:


Marginal utility, let us be frank, is hardly a scientific concept: unobservable, unmeasurable and untestable, marginal utility is a notion with very dubious scientific standing. As Stigler notes, "Had specific tests been made of the implications of theories, the unfruitfulness of the ruling utility theory as a source of hypotheses in demand would soon have become apparent" (G.J. Stigler (http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//profiles/stigler.htm), 1950).

http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//essays/margrev/phases.htm

[qupte]A Critique of the Austrian School of Economics:

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/2clorbar.JPG

Perhaps the defining difference between mainstream and Austrian economists lies in their opposing philosophies towards learning truth.

Mainstream scientists use a well-developed process called the scientific method. This method employs both data and theory. "Data" includes facts, evidence and statistics. "Theory" is the attempt to describe general laws, principles and causes and effects found in the data. Both form a cycle, as data goes into the formulation of theory, whose conclusions then engender more data collection in an attempt to confirm, refute or develop yet more theories. The accuracy of this process is verified by experimentation or prediction. Scientists believe they are on the right path when both theory and data agree; when they disagree, they know something is wrong. It could be the theory is wrong, or the data is badly collected or interpreted.

Austrians accept this method in principle, but argue that it is more appropriate for hard sciences like physics or chemistry, not soft sciences like sociology or economics. The problem is that humans, unlike electrons, have freedom of choice. They are therefore vastly more unpredictable, even if placed in the same situation twice. Within economics, Austrians favor a method called "apriorism." A priori knowledge is logic, or knowledge that exists in a person's mind prior to, and independent of, outer world experience. For example, the statement "two plus two equals four" is true whether or not a person goes out into his garden and verifies this by counting two pairs of tomatoes. What this means is that Austrians reject the attempt to learn economic laws through experiment or real world observation. The only true economic laws are those based on first principles, namely, logic.

As Hayek wrote, economic theories can "never be verified or falsified by reference to facts. All that we can and must verify is the presence of our assumptions in the particular case." (1)

So the mainstream approach is inductive, and the Austrian approach is deductive. The first draws generalizations from the data, the second applies preconceived generalizations to the data. A completely deductive approach is pre-scientific, however, which is why Austrians cannot legitimately claim to use a scientific method. Deduction does occur in science, but the generalizations are primarily based on other data, not a priori assumptions.

This is not to say that Austrians do not refer to real-world events and data in their writings. They just don't do it in the usual scientific way. Here is Austrian economist Ken Gaillot, Jr., describing their use of data:
"The Austrian economist sees his task as deducing the implications of human choice under conditions observed in the real world. The assumptions of economic theory are the point at which the theory is empirically verifiable. This approach allows qualitative prediction of economic events, explanation of observed patterns, and evaluation of government policy." (2)

In other words, Austrians get to critique the real world, but the real world is prevented from informing their theories. Even their predictions are "qualitative," not "quantitative" -- meaning they are free to call the government "bad," without being held down to the statistics that would verify this claim.

The Austrian approach to philosophy is a very old one: Rationalism. You have to go back to the 17th and 18th centuries to find when it was last considered a serious philosophical movement. It was widely abandoned after its inadequacies were laid bare by other schools of philosophy: Empiricism, Positivism, and most famously by Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy has progressed tremendously since Rationalism; the Austrian approach is a relic of history.

The problem with rationalism is that it makes the search for truth a game without rules. Rationalists are free to theorize anything they want, without such irritating constrictions as facts, statistics, data, history or experimental confirmation. Their only guide is logic. But this is no different from what religions do when they assert the logical existence of God (or Buddha or Mohammed or Gaia). Theories ungrounded in facts and data are easily spun into any belief a person wants. Starting assumptions and trains of logic may contain inaccuracies so small as to be undetectable, yet will yield entirely different conclusions.

In fact, if we accepted all the tenets of the Austrian School, we would have a second reason why it fails to qualify as science. To be a science, a school must produce theories that are falsifiable -- that is, verifiable. If a theory's correctness or falseness cannot be verified, then it is not science. Perhaps it's religion, or metaphysics, or an unsupported claim. Austrian economists make claims about the market (such as markets know better than governments), but then deny us the tools for verifying those claims (such as statistics). One might ask: how do they know?

Austrians claim to know these things by logic. But although their literature frequently evokes "a priori" knowledge, this term appears to be misused. Humans are not born knowing that "two plus two equals four." It is something they must learn from their environment, namely, school. Forging this learned knowledge into axioms comes later, and then through a process of trial and error. So in this sense, "a priori" knowledge doesn't even exist, unless one refers to a very basic level of knowledge capability, such as the physical construction of the human brain or animal instincts.

Austrians may be using the term "a priori" to mean logical proofs or axioms, such as "If A=B, and B=C, then A=C." But if Austrians were creating economic axioms that were true by logical force, then the Austrian School would become world famous overnight, whether mainstream economists liked it or not. In truth, Austrian journals are not filled with these kinds of axioms. Their arguments are really no more than theories that are guided or tested by logical proofs. Again, that's no different from what religions do. The fact that we have thousands of different religions in the world is remarkable evidence of the fallibility of this method.[/quote]

http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/L-aussm.htm



The Austrian school of economics is very popular in libertarian and anarchist circles today. Part of that school is its methodology which favors building up theories based on axioms of human action. The Austrian school says that these axioms need no empirical verification. I believe any methodology that rejects empirical testing of theories is flawed. Once the scientific revolution reaches the social sciences, any school of thought that denies the empirical method will have to be abandoned just as happened in the physical and biological sciences. If libertarianism and anarchism are bundled together with Austrian economics, our politics will be disgraced along with Austrian economics and we'll receive the same respect as creationism or flat earth geography. Apparently there are economists who call themselves Austrians but are not orthodox in that they accept some empirical testing of their theories. I believe any economic theory must be tested however, not just some peripheral theories, and I will argue for this general rule.
When we study economics, we are dealing with observables. The prices of products, exchange rates of different national currencies, and the employment rate are all things we can observe. If we have a theory about how such things work, we can test that theory's predictions with what we observe and tell how good the theory is based on how close our predictions came to reality. A theory about economics will either make predictions about reality that can be observed or it will not. If it does not make any predictions that we can check, it is a useless theory and cannot tell us anything about our world. If this theory does make predictions, it is meaningful because its claims about the world can be found to be true or false. If this theory continuously succeeds at making correct predictions, we say this is a good theory, at least in the situations that we've tested it in. If there are parts of our theory that can be discarded while still retaining all of our theory's predictive power, those parts should be discarded.
Of course advocates of the Austrian school have objections to these arguments and insist that the empirical method is not a good one for economics. I emailed one of them following an article of his I saw at mises.org which rejected the empirical method. He replied to what I wrote with these things, which are pretty standard arguments from the Austrians.
He started by saying that some things, like the law of demand, are set in stone and that if it wasn't true, then we'd have to throw out all our textbooks because we wouldn't know if the law of demand would be true the next day. But this is bad reasoning because if all our textbooks are wrong, we are best off admitting it frankly and starting anew instead of lying to ourselves to make things easier. Also, if an economic law has passed numerous tests and made many true predictions it is very reasonable to believe it will continue to do so, the very reason we empirically test a theory is to find out how reliable it is.
He stated that one of the central tenets of Austrian economics is that the laws of human action are not falsifiable. But falsifiability is an absolute requirement of a scientific theory. If a theory makes predictions about reality, it can be falsified. All we'd have to do is find what predictions it makes, then test if those predictions are true. If a theory makes predictions that turn out to be false, we know our theory is wrong. Our Austrians seem to be saying that if we observe one thing and our theory tells us something else, we should ignore what we just saw and continue believing in our theory. Our theory won't be falsifiable only if it makes no predictions, and if it makes no predictions, it's useless for anything.
He later said that the premises for human action come from the long-term observations of human behavior and don't need to be continually tested to see if they're true. So he's saying here that situations have been observed where some law appears to hold, in fact numerous situations have backed up the validity of the law. What's odd then is that he seems to be saying that if some other situation comes up that contradicts this law, we should ignore this because the law has held up in so many situations before this happened. But of course this new situation isn't any less valid than any of the others, it happened and if we're interested in the truth, we can't ignore it. Part of scientific reasoning is that we try to prove our theories wrong instead of right. We put them to all sorts of tests to see if they always make correct predictions, and if they continuously pass our tests, we call them good theories and depend on them, though of course they're always up for more testing in other situations and to be tested more accurately. If we have a theory that passes all of our tests for a long time, but then we find a new situation where the theory fails, we don't throw out the theory altogether. Instead we say that the old theory is valid under the circumstances where it was successfully tested before and invalid under the new situations. We'd study these new situations and come up with new theories that explained economic behavior there. Finally, we would, if possible, find one theory that could give correct predictions under the new and old situations without any artificial separation between the two.
He also says that the laws of economics are true because of a certain understanding of how human beings act. The problem with this is that the theory that is built up is nothing more than an idealization of what human beings are. It is how a certain person believes that human beings act, but it's a fairly informal way of trying to figure things out and really isn't something we can depend on. So once we have this economic system built up from our understanding of how humans act, we have to scientifically test it to find if it is true.
These arguments are typical of the Austrians. I hope I've convinced you of how unreasonable they are and why any theory of economics must be scientifically tested. For a long time, the social sciences acted like they were immune from scientific testing. Fortunately the tide is turning as we can see from the latest Nobel prize awards. In the future, hopefully every theory will be empirically tested before being accepted as true.

http://anti-state.com/article.php?article_id=381

The Austrian School admits it is peddling pseudoscience.

[Cal Engime]

The Austrian approach to philosophy is a very old one: Rationalism. You have to go back to the 17th and 18th centuries to find when it was last considered a serious philosophical movement. It was widely abandoned after its inadequacies were laid bare by other schools of philosophy: Empiricism, Positivism, and most famously by Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy has progressed tremendously since Rationalism; the Austrian approach is a relic of history.This is Whig history and a worthless appeal to authority. Incidentally, he cites Kant; was Kangas a transcendental idealist?
The problem with rationalism is that it makes the search for truth a game without rules. Rationalists are free to theorize anything they want, without such irritating constrictions as facts, statistics, data, history or experimental confirmation. Their only guide is logic. But this is no different from what religions do when they assert the logical existence of God (or Buddha or Mohammed or Gaia). Theories ungrounded in facts and data are easily spun into any belief a person wants. Starting assumptions and trains of logic may contain inaccuracies so small as to be undetectable, yet will yield entirely different conclusions.Here, Kangas simply reminds us that errors can be made.
In fact, if we accepted all the tenets of the Austrian School, we would have a second reason why it fails to qualify as science. To be a science, a school must produce theories that are falsifiable -- that is, verifiable. If a theory's correctness or falseness cannot be verified, then it is not science. Perhaps it's religion, or metaphysics, or an unsupported claim. Austrian economists make claims about the market (such as markets know better than governments), but then deny us the tools for verifying those claims (such as statistics). One might ask: how do they know?

Austrians claim to know these things by logic. But although their literature frequently evokes "a priori" knowledge, this term appears to be misused. Humans are not born knowing that "two plus two equals four." It is something they must learn from their environment, namely, school. Forging this learned knowledge into axioms comes later, and then through a process of trial and error. So in this sense, "a priori" knowledge doesn't even exist, unless one refers to a very basic level of knowledge capability, such as the physical construction of the human brain or animal instincts.At this point, I begin to think that Kangas did not know much about epistemology. One who knows, a priori, that all bachelors are unmarried need not have experienced the unmarried status of all (or any) bachelors to justify this proposition.
Austrians may be using the term "a priori" to mean logical proofs or axioms, such as "If A=B, and B=C, then A=C." But if Austrians were creating economic axioms that were true by logical force, then the Austrian School would become world famous overnight, whether mainstream economists liked it or not. In truth, Austrian journals are not filled with these kinds of axioms. Their arguments are really no more than theories that are guided or tested by logical proofs. Again, that's no different from what religions do. The fact that we have thousands of different religions in the world is remarkable evidence of the fallibility of this method.All religions are based on logic, and logic is fundamentally flawed? I have no idea what point Kangas tries to make with this conclusion.

[Dermezel]

This is Whig history and a worthless appeal to authority. Incidentally, he cites Kant; was Kangas a transcendental idealist?Here, Kangas simply reminds us that errors can be made.At this point, I begin to think that Kangas did not know much about epistemology. One who knows, a priori, that all bachelors are unmarried need not have experienced the unmarried status of all (or any) bachelors to justify this proposition.All religions are based on logic, and logic is fundamentally flawed? I have no idea what point Kangas tries to make with this conclusion.

Kangas point is that you can't use a priori methods for empirical phenomenon. Don't believe me? Then tell me the weather based on your deductions from metaphysical axioms.

I'll just look out the window.

[Cal Engime]

Kangas point is that you can't use a priori methods for empirical phenomenon. Don't believe me? Then tell me the weather based on your deductions from metaphysical axioms.

I'll just look out the window.No Austrian claims that apriorism is the only source of knowledge, or that it is a useful approach for physics or meteorology. Obviously, if I claim "it is raining," empirical evidence would be necessary to justify that proposition, but that has nothing to do with the field in which Austrians believe a priori knowledge is useful: economics (or rather, praxeology).

My question, again, was which claims of the Austrians have no basis in logical reasoning, but this seems to have become an epistemological debate. You, then, are an empiricist?

[Dermezel]

No Austrian claims that apriorism is the only source of knowledge, or that it is a useful approach for physics or meteorology. Obviously, if I claim "it is raining," empirical evidence would be necessary to justify that proposition, but that has nothing to do with the field in which Austrians believe a priori knowledge is useful: economics (or rather, praxeology).

Okay, that ignores the whole argument for the scientific revolution. Francis Bacon didn't argue that you can't use a priori knowledge, but that it was way less efficient then empirical.


My question, again, was which claims of the Austrians have no basis in logical reasoning, but this seems to have become an epistemological debate. You, then, are an empiricist?

Okay, when you are dealing with real world phenomenon, you need empirical data. Otherwise you are just making stuff up.

[LeftSideDown]

Okay, when you are dealing with real world phenomenon, you need empirical data. Otherwise you are just making stuff up.

Lets throw loaded die (each loaded differently) in a room with random weather patterns, gather all the data and stare at it and draw conclusions about nature.

[Dermezel]

Lets throw loaded die

Yeah. If I'm betting money I play with loaded die.

[Dean]

Lets throw loaded die (each loaded differently) in a room with random weather patterns, gather all the data and stare at it and draw conclusions about nature.

That's basically what you're doing with Austrian economics - only the dice are loaded to represent the interests of capital-holders.

[Cal Engime]

Okay, that ignores the whole argument for the scientific revolution. Francis Bacon didn't argue that you can't use a priori knowledge, but that it was way less efficient then empirical.So you accept the validity of a priori reasoning? What does it mean for logic to be inefficient?

[Skooma Addict]

Give me an example of a good, scientific creationism.

I am not a creationist. So I cannot give you an example of a good scientific argument for creationism.


That is such a weak argument. Yes, they can make arguments that are dumber then scientific ones. Good point.


Well don't expect me to give strong arguments for creationism. But they can make arguments which are not pseudo-scientific. They are just wrong. There is a difference.


As for Marginal Utility, on which the AE rests:

Not just AE. Pretty much all of modern economics. Also, Marginal Utility is observable.

[LeftSideDown]

That's basically what you're doing with Austrian economics - only the dice are loaded to represent the interests of capital-holders.

No, what Austrians do is recognize that dice are being thrown and that they follow some fundamental axioms (like after they have been thrown, they will land on one side, but are predisposed to land in a way in which they are loaded) and then deduce from these axioms things that must be true (something like in order for the dice to be thrown, they must be thrown by something).

[Agnapostate]

Whether or not creationism is pseudo-science depends on the methodology and justifications creationists use to defend their beliefs. AE is not pseudo economics either.

I removed that section from the document I'm writing about Austrian Internet culture, as I thought it contained excessively strong language. It is true, of course, that the Austrian school was for a time on the margins of economics, though neo-Austrian thought has contributed nothing to the modern field. Here's a little draft I have:


Says Brian Doherty: "Boettke’s evolution from Sennholz-inspired hard-core libertarian to a more nuanced, scientific perspective isn’t uncommon among young Austrians going through their professional evolution. Other of Boettke’s mid-1980s George Mason colleagues, such as Tyler Cowen and Daniel Klein, have gone through similar evolutions, and there are many young professional economists who consider themselves ex-Austrians. Boettke says he can detect the smell of Austrianism even in the work of many who have officially abandoned it. ‘The typical young IHS turk in the 1980s believed in the three A’s: anarchism [sic], Austrianism, and atheism.’ But as they age, go through the grad school grind, and learn more about different perspectives, many find themselves broadening out from that filter."

There is a hierarchy of knowledge and respectability in Austrian thought similar to that in creationist thought, with there certainly being some overlap between them and some difficulty determining which group those on the cusp between two groups belong to.

The laypeople in the X-Files crowd are analogous to Internet advocates of young-earth creationism, who know almost nothing about biology but believe that they know almost everything. This group primarily regurgitates the talking points created by more elevated hierarchies, styling themselves “economists” due to their belief that academic credential standards are some form of statist conspiracy. While not necessarily unintelligent or stupid, the majority of this faction are ignorant of economics, all the while emphatically believing that they are economic geniuses unfairly excluded from mainstream consideration because of the “academic pigs” that Boettke mentioned. As with an indoctrinated young-earth creationist, members of this group will usually be able to defeat other laypersons in economics debates, but cannot contend in a written exchange with informed experts.

The X-Files contingency finds its greatest base on the Internet, where the standards of literary publication do not filter the massive flow of uninformed opinions and comments. Internet Austro-propertarians, most strongly gathered around sites like mises.org, provide an unusually accurate example of Rothbard’s critical description; they are generally smug, snobbish, pompous elitists without the economic knowledge that might partially justify those attributes. https://mises.org/Community/forums/p/11308/259994.aspx


The unintended consequences are a bunch of leeches who refuse to work for themselves and instead enjoy living off of others. Even more harmful would be a loss of incentives for African governments to reform and embrace capitalism.

A better solution would be to cut off all aid to Africa and instead allow free trade, investment, and hard work bring prosperity to Africans.

This is made all the more depressing by the fact that mises.org is the hub of Austro-propertarian Internet activity, and its forum the central location for the “best and brightest” of the lay advocates to assemble.

The intermediate group is composed of those generally still unwaveringly loyal to raw propertarian ideology, but somewhat more informed than their junior counterparts, perhaps being economics students themselves (some of them with undergraduate degrees), and primarily writing on the blogs and other somewhat filtered sections of Austro-propertarian websites such as mises.org. The “IHS turks” are on this intermediate level of the Austrian hierarchy.

The highest and smallest group consists of the academics, the professional economists that advocate Austrian theory. They are akin to the "intelligent design scientists" such as biochemist Michael Behe and mathematician William Dembski. While certainly more knowledgeable about economics than lower groups on the pyramid (particularly the lowest order), this group may still have a tendency to place ideology before neutral economic reasoning, though it also contains the highest percentage of moderates willing to adopt the “more nuanced, scientific perspective” that Doherty mentioned.

The weaknesses of Austrian theory still mean that even the Austrian professionals have not ever produced any substantial theoretical work or figures to modern economics, with the exception of Nobel prize winner Friedrich von Hayek, himself a moderate who drew the ire of more rigid peers for advocating state-provided welfare for those unable to work, marking him apart from Misesian economic purism, and the later tradition of Rothbardian political purism.

In Rothbard's words, “The problem is that [they] originated nothing that was true, and that whatever [they] originated was wrong.”

Ah, welll...


If you want to see a dogmatic mythology look at utilitarianism and objective ethics. I also noticed that Fredrick Copleston (someone who knows more about religion than anyone here) claimed that marxism became a faith in volume 7 of his History of Philosophy series.

I'm not interested in your fallacious appeals to authority, especially not from someone that can so quickly conclude that, "This is one of the reasons why it is better to use economic and consequentialist arguments for private propery." :thumbup1:


Which claims of the modern Austrians are illogical? What fallacies do they employ?

Consult Robert Vienneau's Some Fallacies of Austrian Economics (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921183) (I don't recall if he posts on here), and Bryan Caplan's critique (if you haven't read it already), as well as the fact that the Austrian school has no coherent understanding of labor economics and no theory of the firm, and lost the socialist calculation debate.

But I'm not interested in a long exchange with you. I tried playing that game on mises.org, and unsurprisingly, I was banned when some of the regulars were too economically ignorant to know about the role of monopsony in labor markets. I've tried playing that game with Oaf here, and his style of exchange is regurgitating previously rebutted points, a practice that I quickly grew sick of. You'll probably be ever so disappointed if I abandon you after I grow tired of whatever fallacies you engage in, so don't even bother starting anything.

[Skooma Addict]

I removed that section from the document I'm writing about Austrian Internet culture, as I thought it contained excessively strong language. It is true, of course, that the Austrian school was for a time on the margins of economics, though neo-Austrian thought has contributed nothing to the modern field.


AE was also pretty mainstream for a while as well. Also, aspects of AE have been incorporated with modern economics. In fact sometimes it is pretty difficult to draw the line when it comes to seperating AE from neoclassical econ.


Here's a little draft I have:

I actually agree with a lot of this but this is not unique to AE at all. This is true with practically everything, including socialism.

I am just wondering out of curoisity, where would you place me in this?


I'm not interested in your fallacious appeals to authority, especially not from someone that can so quickly conclude that, "This is one of the reasons why it is better to use economic and consequentialist arguments for private propery." :thumbup1:

I merely made an observation. But when someone like Copleston claims that Marxism became a faith, it is not something I would just dismiss. Also, I did not quickly conclude anything. My thoughts on that matter have developed over quite some time. I used to strongly believe in the moral aspect of private property and gave less concern to the economic aspect.


I've tried playing that game with Oaf here, and his style of exchange is regurgitating previously rebutted points, a practice that I quickly grew sick of.

That would make sense if you actually rebutted the talking points. Not my fault if you ignore the well known advantages of large and hierarchical firms. Also your entire defense of utilitarianism was regurgitated talking points.

[Dean]

No, what Austrians do is recognize that dice are being thrown and that they follow some fundamental axioms (like after they have been thrown, they will land on one side, but are predisposed to land in a way in which they are loaded) and then deduce from these axioms things that must be true (something like in order for the dice to be thrown, they must be thrown by something).
"Recognize axioms" instead of "restrict economic analysis by assumptions."

The bottom line is that Austrians have one theory, and that is that "better outcomes" will transpire if the state (and labor unions and other worker interests) are removed from the decision-making processes of economic control. It's nonsense meant to further the interests of a specific clique, and it has only gained prevalence because that clique is currently empowered - this has been the case since at least the 80s (this is an incredibly conservative estimate).

[Dermezel]

So you accept the validity of a priori reasoning? What does it mean for logic to be inefficient?

Yes, that's the problem with a priori reasoning. It's all valid no matter how fictional or imaginary. Validity, in logic just means consistent.

According to that nonsense, "freed" as it is from empirical testing, any economic theory or biological theory or physical is equally as true as any other so long as the person remains consistent to initial premises.

I could argue that the Bible is true as so:

Premise: The Bible is the Word of God

Premise: God's Word supersedes observation

Premise: The Bible says the Earth is 6,000 years old.

Conclusion: The Earth is 6,000 years old.

All perfectly valid, but completely at odds with reality.

[Dermezel]

Also, Marginal Utility is observable.

Oh that's rich. Tell me what observations confirm it?

[LeftSideDown]

"Recognize axioms" instead of "restrict economic analysis by assumptions."

Its a restriction to say that the dice will land on one side, and has a higher chance of landing on the loaded side? I don't see how, just seems to be self evident.


The bottom line is that Austrians have one theory, and that is that "better outcomes" will transpire if the state (and labor unions and other worker interests) are removed from the decision-making processes of economic control. It's nonsense meant to further the interests of a specific clique, and it has only gained prevalence because that clique is currently empowered - this has been the case since at least the 80s (this is an incredibly conservative estimate).

Its not nonsense, its has been proven again and again and again. Everytime the government gets involved there is a depression/recession later (dot.com crash, housing bubble) or if it gets involved after the fact it suffers slow growth and unsustainable levels of debt and expenditure (Great Depression, Japan's Lost Decade). Labor unions are fine so long as they are not protected or discriminated against by the state. Voluntary contracts and group gatherings are perfectly legitimate, and if one believes that one is entitled to higher wages hes free to pursue this course. If the factory owner does not agree than he should be free to hire anyone who offers his labor.

[RED DAVE]

Labor unions are fine so long as they are not protected or discriminated against by the state. Voluntary contracts and group gatherings are perfectly legitimate, and if one believes that one is entitled to higher wages hes free to pursue this course. If the factory owner does not agree than he should be free to hire anyone who offers his labor.I think that lays out your position with regard to the working class.

May your kids join a union someday and picket your reactionary ass.

RED DAVE

[LeftSideDown]

I think that lays out your position with regard to the working class.

May your kids join a union someday and picket your reactionary ass.

RED DAVE

If A is bargaining with B over the sale of his house, and if A were given the privileges of a modern labor union, he would be able (1) to conspire with all other owners of houses not to make any alternative offer to B, using violence or the threat of violence if necessary to prevent them, (2) to deprive B himself of access to any alternative offers, (3) to surround the house of B and cut off all deliveries, including food (except by parcel post), (4) to stop all movement from B's house, so that if he were for instance a doctor he could not sell his services and make a living, and (5) to institute a boycott of B's business. All of these privileges, if he were capable of carrying them out, would no doubt strengthen A's position. But they would not be regarded by anyone as part of "bargaining" – unless A were a labor union.

[RED DAVE]

If A is bargaining with B over the sale of his house, and if A were given the privileges of a modern labor union, he would be able (1) to conspire with all other owners of houses not to make any alternative offer to B, using violence or the threat of violence if necessary to prevent them, (2) to deprive B himself of access to any alternative offers, (3) to surround the house of B and cut off all deliveries, including food (except by parcel post), (4) to stop all movement from B's house, so that if he were for instance a doctor he could not sell his services and make a living, and (5) to institute a boycott of B's business. All of these privileges, if he were capable of carrying them out, would no doubt strengthen A's position. But they would not be regarded by anyone as part of "bargaining" – unless A were a labor union.I think, dude, that you're going to stay here in Other Ideologies for a very long time.

RED DAVE

[Cal Engime]

You'll probably be ever so disappointed if I abandon you after I grow tired of whatever fallacies you engage in, so don't even bother starting anything.Okay then, I'll just ignore your post if that's what you want.
Yes, that's the problem with a priori reasoning. It's all valid no matter how fictional or imaginary. Validity, in logic just means consistent.

According to that nonsense, "freed" as it is from empirical testing, any economic theory or biological theory or physical is equally as true as any other so long as the person remains consistent to initial premises.

I could argue that the Bible is true as so:

Premise: The Bible is the Word of God

Premise: God's Word supersedes observation

Premise: The Bible says the Earth is 6,000 years old.

Conclusion: The Earth is 6,000 years old.

All perfectly valid, but completely at odds with reality.So where do Austrians assume that the Bible is the Word of God? Which of their premises are not self-evidently true?

You never criticise Austrians' assumptions, you just repeat that they could make false assumptions.

[LeftSideDown]

I think, dude, that you're going to stay here in Other Ideologies for a very long time.

RED DAVE

I think, dude, that that is a very strong argument against the present state of unions.

[LeftSideDown]

Premise: The Bible is the Word of God

Is it self evident that the Bible is the word of God?

[RED DAVE]

I think, dude, that that is a very strong argument against the present state of unions.Maybe when you learn to debate historically, instead of axiomatically, it might be worth the time, but since you have no idea of capitalism as a dynamic or historic phenomenon, it hardly seems worth it.

But, just for fun, how do you account for the persistence of racism as an ongoing political tool of capitalism?

RED DAVE

[LeftSideDown]

Maybe when you learn to debate historically, instead of axiomatically, it might be worth the time, but since you have no idea of capitalism as a dynamic or historic phenomenon, it hardly seems worth it.

But, just for fun, how do you account for the persistence of racism as an ongoing political tool of capitalism?

RED DAVE

Its easy to account for that. People themselves are racist. If they do not want to hire/serve people who could bring them money thats their own fault, and its a pretty stupid one at that.

[Agnapostate]

Honestly, as for the OP, I'm really not sure why the Rothbardian couldn't simply compromise. The institutions that they despise so much are here to stay anyway, so wouldn't it be better to have less than more...?

[LeftSideDown]

Honestly, as for the OP, I'm really not sure why the Rothbardian couldn't simply compromise. The institutions that they despise so much are here to stay anyway, so wouldn't it be better to have less than more...?

No because if you compromise once you always compromise forever! The logic is sound!

[Dean]

Its a restriction to say that the dice will land on one side, and has a higher chance of landing on the loaded side? I don't see how, just seems to be self evident.
These are not axioms if they only claim that "something is more likely to happen." Axioms are by definition logical assumptions, not statistical expectations.


Its not nonsense, its has been proven again and again and again. Everytime the government gets involved there is a depression/recession later (dot.com crash, housing bubble) or if it gets involved after the fact it suffers slow growth and unsustainable levels of debt and expenditure (Great Depression, Japan's Lost Decade). Labor unions are fine so long as they are not protected or discriminated against by the state. Voluntary contracts and group gatherings are perfectly legitimate, and if one believes that one is entitled to higher wages hes free to pursue this course. If the factory owner does not agree than he should be free to hire anyone who offers his labor.
Correlation is not proof. Its just as reasonable to claim that activity exclusively born of the market systems primarily free of state intervention is to be blamed for all depressions and "slow growth, unsustainable debt and expenditure." After all, dominant economic actors nearly always respond to market failures, so its completely to be expected that states would intervene when the market appears to be suffering. Its a survival tactic for capitalism, and dominant firms rely on what is nothing more than the valuable service an entity serving to maintain and perpetuate dominant economic relations. These relations serve for-profit entities, so I don't see why you would look at them as externalities to the free market system.

They're the manifestation of rational self interest on the part of capitalist firms. Why wouldn't capitalists want the same kind of service, which they often pay a lot for, in the context of an unfettered market?

[RED DAVE]

Maybe when you learn to debate historically, instead of axiomatically, it might be worth the time, but since you have no idea of capitalism as a dynamic or historic phenomenon, it hardly seems worth it.

But, just for fun, how do you account for the persistence of racism as an ongoing political tool of capitalism?
Its easy to account for that. People themselves are racist.So racism exists because people are racist.

Q - Tell us, Mr. Harvey, how does blood circulate in the human body?

A - It circulates because it goes around.


If they do not want to hire/serve people who could bring them money thats their own fault, and its a pretty stupid one at that.Do you support the right of people to be racist with regard to hiring?

RED DAVE

[Left-Reasoning]

The Austrian School admits it is peddling pseudoscience.

Scientismatic.

[Cal Engime]

Do you support the right of people to be racist with regard to hiring?Who wants to work for a racist anyway?

[Ryke]

Who wants to work for a racist anyway?

Not only is a racist employer rarely open enough for people to make that choice, but if accepting a job, any job, were a completely free choice, you wouldn't have any grumpy workers in the first place.

[LeftSideDown]

So racism exists because people are racist.

Q - Tell us, Mr. Harvey, how does blood circulate in the human body?

A - It circulates because it goes around.

Yes, if people were not racist there would be no racism. The reasons for racism vary from person to person, I'm not going to sit here and try and list all of them. Some had racist parents, others may have had bad experiences, some people probably listen to Rush Limbaugh, and other's probably are just scared of things that aren't white and middle class.


Do you support the right of people to be racist with regard to hiring?

RED DAVE

Yes of course. They can be sexist too. Is it discriminatory to hire men for work that requires lots of heavy lifting? Or to hire a woman at Hooters? I am not myself a racist, but the employer harms his business by this practice and in the long run it will either bankrupt him or he will change his hiring policies.

Do you think it is okay for someone to only want to marry within their race? I think if you say yes to this question then you cannot say "no" to the question you asked; both have to do with property and how the owner wishes to dispose of it.

[LeftSideDown]

Not only is a racist employer rarely open enough for people to make that choice, but if accepting a job, any job, were a completely free choice, you wouldn't have any grumpy workers in the first place.

If you're saying that because we live in conditions of scarcity we aren't free then no one is free because resources are scarce no matter how rich you are.

[Westward-Individualism]

This thread is about Rothbardianism not Misesean Logic.

Rothbard was a student of Mises; but the Mises Institute nor Rothbard follow Mises.

Mises argued for Zero Owner's Rights and Zero Worker's Rights
---He was in favor of Consumer-Sovereignty
---He thought we needed to get there by way of a Consumer-Minarchism.

Rothbard disagreed and was in favor of an Owner's Rights Society
---A Proto-Founding-Father's
---Paleo-Propertarianism

Rothbard thought of himself as a "type" of Anarchist; which is absurd.

You cannot have Property Rights and have Anarchism
---Anarchy is Voluntarism
---Anarchy means "No Authority" or "No Ruler"
---You can't have rights without "voting" and "lobbying"
---Voting and Lobbying is an abdication of self-rule and an attempt to purchase voting blocks -- it is corrupt!

Rothbard
---Owner's Rule

Mises
---Consumers Rule

They argued extensively over this. Since Anarchy is Individualism -- Deciding on who the individual is in a free-society is very very crucial.

Rothbard says the individual is sovereign owing to self-ownership

Mises said the individual is the consumer (because everyone is a consumer)

The protection of property (by court, gov't, or by military) is a "guarantee" against failure and thus does not allow perfect innovation in the realm of "self-defense" -- it monopolizes defense over at least one market; ownership.

A "free-society" would be one where there are no barriers and no monopolies
---Especially in the areas of Self-Health, Self-Rule, Self-Defense
----->Thus no universal health care
----->No voting or lobbying
----->Zero protection in all markets