iskrabronstein
18th April 2010, 02:17
There is a Specter Haunting America: Huey Long and the Birth of American Fascism
The world crisis of capitalism that began in 1929 was unprecedented in both scale and severity. Bereft of social safety nets and effective regulation of capital institutions, the people of the industrialized world watched in horror as the economic system whose insatiable lust for resources and productivity had lifted millions of people from abject poverty began, inevitably, to devour itself. The collapse of the economic institutions that had hitherto upheld tenuous social stability in many nations provoked exaggerated, desperate political responses. The socialist fatherland of the U.S.S.R. plunged headlong into the suicidal maelstrom of Stalin’s Five Year Plans; European fascism, alive in Italy and nascent in Germany, radicalized even further and began to develop distinct socio-economic policies of its own. And in the United States, capitalism as usual was soon to be transformed by the policies of the New Deal. Yet by 1934, despite a resounding Democratic victory in the midterm elections, the efficacy of Roosevelt’s approach was being challenged by opponents from across the political spectrum. Business interests and conservatives howled angrily about increased federal regulation of production and distribution; progressives and leftists of every stripe screamed that Roosevelt was selling out popular interests to maintain capitalist support. The radicals in America were spoiling for a fight – and one man would anoint himself as their savior, to lead them into battle.
The career of Huey Long is an object lesson to outsiders of every stripe in American politics. Beginning as a crusading anti-big business populist in Louisiana state politics, throughout his career in politics Long designed a political program based upon two founding principles – centralize power, decentralize wealth – and a powerful political machine to enforce them. It is difficult, upon cursory examination, to place Long within the standard political terminology of the day. Like all great politicians, Long was attacked by enemies from across the political spectrum in richly varying terms; conservatives lambasted him as a Communist and Bolshevik sympathizer, socialists decried him as a fascist, and the fascists viewed him with mixed admiration and fear. This confusion is easily explained – Long’s policies, when viewed in the standard political terms of the day, defy classical categorization. He was simultaneously the supporter of populist principles and the destroyer of local autonomy; the opponent of big business but the builder of big government. Yet despite their apparent incongruity, the substance of Long’s programs, both of social reformation and political centralization, fit a single mold. Huey Long defied classification because he was, quite simply, in a new class of his own.
Despite the thorough inadequacy of “Great Man” historical analysis in explaining either the processes or the nature of political transition, in the particular case of Huey Long it is impossible to separate the character of his political organization from the character of the man himself – for the Long machine exhibited all the strengths and weaknesses of its leader, all the traits that drove man and machine inevitably toward both triumph and destruction. Any analysis of the Long machine as a political structure necessitates a concomitant analysis of the personality that created and led it forth.
Huey Pierce Long Jr. was born on August 30, 1893, in Winnfield, Louisiana. He sprang from deep roots in the area, his grandfather John P. Long having settled in Winnfield before the Civil War. Long was remembered by contemporaries as a strange boy, filled to the brim with an inexhaustible energy and possessed of a powerful and inquisitive mind. He manifested a consuming interest in politics from an early age – his mother recalls the young Huey’s obsessive interest in a biography of Napoleon (Williams). As he matured, Long’s fascination with power politics only increased in scope and depth. Yet two stages of his life prepared him beyond anything else for a career in politics: his days as a salesman, and his time as an attorney. Long’s time as a salesman enabled him to travel over vast portions of the state and gave him the opportunity to see firsthand the issues and problems affecting Louisiana – problems that he resolved to alleviate. Yet it also allowed him to make many personal contacts with small businessmen and community leaders throughout the state, whose support would prove indispensable in forging the Long machine.
Long’s tenure as a practicing attorney yielded similar fruits for his future political career. The vast majority of Long’s cases were workman’s compensation, and while he made relatively small commissions in most cases (the amount of compensation was limited by Louisiana law), the cases gained him great publicity – he cast himself as the advocate of the poor and working man, the scourge of corrupt corporate and government interests. (Williams) However, one important case demonstrated Long’s pragmatic approach to strategy and gave him the necessary capital supply to begin campaigning for office. This was a series of lawsuits in which Long represented Ernest R. Bernstein, and defended him against charges of fraud and misuse of bank funds. Not content to simply defend, however, Long went on the offensive – countersuing the bank for libel, on the grounds that the charges were only alleged, not proven, and that by publicizing the matter across the state the bank had injured Bernstein’s reputation as a businessman. The bank’s attorneys immediately attempted to get the suit thrown out on a technicality, realizing implicitly that if the bank were convicted of libel it would weaken the cases of their other suits. The case was sent to an appeals court, and remanded back to the district court, which found for Bernstein and ordered an undisclosed, but probably large sum. Long also obtained the dismissal of the other two suits. Harry Williams estimates that Long’s fee from these cases was around forty thousand dollars – a substantial sum at the time, one that he used to purchase a new house and fund the next stepping stone in his career – election to the Railroad Commission in 1918.
Long’s tenure on the Railroad Commission is perhaps the most fundamentally important point in his political career – his performance as a member of the Commission demonstrates the personal qualities that would determine the nature of both his political career and political machine; and the support that would provide the foundation for his nascent party. Long used his post as a bastion from which to harass and attack the large economic interests of Louisiana – suing railroad companies to force them to extend service to rural areas, attacking oil companies in a bid to open their private pipelines to common carriership. Long was initially successful in many suits, and made sure to publicize these successes widely; he made equally sure that his failures were cast as the victory of corrupt officials and corporate interests over the people’s champion. His effective self-promotion and effort on behalf of the rural poor yielded tangible benefits – “around the state, the common people could not begin to tell you about Huey Long or his policies, but they knew implicitly that he was their ally” (Williams). Yet opposition to his activities developed within the Commission – and rather than change his policies, Long arranged with a newly elected Commission member to depose the current chairman. Long was promptly nominated to replace him, and renewed his attacks on corporate interests in Louisiana with unfettered vigor.
This process is characteristic of both Long personally, and the political party that developed in his wake. Where it was expedient, Long and his followers were willing to work within the system – yet when they encountered entrenched opposition, they scrapped rules of order and law to drive their foes from power. Long’s time as governor of Louisiana, from 1924 to 1932, was simply an exercise of the same political mechanism on a larger scale, and backed by the powers of the state. Long used his position to engage in large scale economic and infrastructural development within Louisiana, modernizing road systems and economic infrastructures – yet while he engaged in this large scale development, he was simultaneously cementing his organization’s control over the political apparati and rewards systems of the state. The nature of American politics and the concrete social conditions of American life were the factors that shaped Long’s political program on the national level. Long could not only appeal to the rural poor to support him against entrenched business interests – he could also enlist support from leftists and progressives of every stripe to support a wealth redistribution plan entitled Share Our Wealth.
Essentially a program of increased direct federal spending to create jobs, and a punitive income tax that would be redistributed in the form of social services and infrastructural development, Share Our Wealth would in practice have simply implemented on a national level the Long machine’s control of Louisiana’s state economy and political infrastructure. Critics who focus on the economic problems within the plan miss entirely the driving political goal: the centralization of power in the hands of the Long machine was the end – bread and books for the poor of the country were only the means.
Consequently, although Long’s political support stemmed mostly from the petit-bourgeoisie, he also enjoyed healthy support from union leaders and labor organizations. Long was not committed to a genuine popular revolution – in principle, as well as practice, he moved toward the complete reformation of the government apparatus from the inside-out: a palace revolution. This approach accomplished two goals, synthesized by Long’s popular appeal – Long could point to the enormous economic development and social benefit brought by his programs to shore up mass support, and cast political foes within the state apparatus as corrupt enemies of the people’s interests.
Long and his followers have also been accused of much corruption throughout his tenure as governor – this is not strictly untrue, but it has been mostly misunderstood. Long understood more clearly than his contemporaries the dialectical role of corruption within any political power structure. Corruption is simultaneously a solidifying and a destabilizing force for a power structure; it can bind members of the organization to the cause materially, provide motivation for new recruits, and centralize power within a state structure – but it can also unite political and public opposition against an organization. Long’s policy synthesized the two extremes, tolerating localized, limited corruption in order to solidify his movement’s control over the state – but he strictly punished embezzlement of public funds, except when those funds were misplaced into his campaign chest. Maintenance of power in progressive hands justified unscrupulous means – for Long to reject the weapons of his enemies was to lay himself open to their blows. Long viewed open corruption as irresponsible and inefficient, and condemned it along those lines, but was not above instituting his own rewards policies when they suited his interests – and extended his power. By the time Long entered national politics as a Senator in 1932, he had the entire state apparatus of Louisiana bending to his whim – his party controlled the legislature, appointed justices, determined patronage and contracts for public works. Nothing like Long’s machine had ever been seen before in American politics; but in Europe two parties were accomplishing the same ends, using nearly identical means. Fascism was on the march.
Fascism, like any political movement, is subject to the social conditions that produce it. In purely political terms, fascism is a mass movement centered politically around a single leader, who embodies both the political and ideological aspirations of his followers. Fascist movements typically unite people from across the political spectrum in a strong, nationalist ideology and mythos. In class terms, the following of a fascist movement is typically working and lower middle class: the economic policies of the movement – limiting of corporate power and profit, and intensive economic development along autarchic lines utilizing deficit spending - follow naturally from the social makeup of its support. Fascist movements are reactions against entrenched power and authority, attempting not to overthrow the institutions of authority, but rather to purge and appropriate them. This is evidenced by the economic and political platforms of Fascist movements when and where they have taken power – in Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, as well as Pilsudski’s Poland, the fascist rise to power was facilitated by large capitalist and conservative interests, ranging from industrialists to financiers to large and small landholders, who sought to use fascism as a bludgeon to ward off a Communist coup d’état. (Gregg)
Yet despite the importance of this political support, when it came to governance the actions of fascist states were determined by the political beliefs of its true support base, the petit-bourgeoisie. Under fascism, capitalism survived mostly intact – but it was kept on a short leash, and corporate profit was subordinated to national interest; the Italian or German Blackshirt or Brownshirt was an enemy to both organized, radical labor and big business. Having crushed the threat of socialism at the barricades, fascism sought not to destroy the interests within the nation that upheld capitalism, but rather to intimidate and co-opt them. As such, fascism must be seen first and foremost not as a revolutionary movement seeking to abolish and replace the current state, but rather as a movement of national regeneration – an assertion of conservative national values against a supposedly corrupt and weak liberal parliamentary state unable to face the threat of social revolution.
European fascism in its infancy was characterized primarily by a militant opposition to the established social-democratic and Communist parties. Having established their claim to political authority by attacking proletarian labor organizations, European fascists could not readily adopt their political and social platform. American fascism, because of the lack of any kind of militant left-wing opposition, was able to create a much broader tent for political mobilization by adopting many policies that the political bases of Hitler or Mussolini would have rebelled against. This is why Long’s movement, despite retaining the political characteristics of fascism – personal authority, political centralization into a single machine – was so vastly different from contemporaneous fascist movements in its social and political program. In Europe, fascism was a reaction against the threat of socialist revolution; in America, fascism was a reaction against the failure of capitalism, and its political and economic program reflects these conditions. Long’s movement exhibited progressive tendencies because its path to power was not blocked by powerful political organizations already laying claim to progressive ideology. Similarly, Long’s rhetoric reflects the social makeup of his support – unlike Hitler and Mussolini, who appealed to national, cultural, and racial identity, Long framed his policies in Biblical terms. This can be accounted for by noting that, while his support base was heterogeneous in racial makeup, in economic positions and religious sentiment they were mostly congruent. (Arthur M. Schlesinger) Long utilized religious rhetoric because it was effective for his political ends, just as Hitler and Mussolini adapted their platforms and ideology to maintain control over the varying interests comprising their parties. (Gregg)
Long’s entry into national politics was coincidental with Franklin Roosevelt’s. Sensing earlier than his fellow Democrats which way the wind was blowing, Long swung large portions of Southern primary votes toward the candidate from New York – in a characteristic exchange, Long shouted down a conservative Democrat who was planning to vote in dissent with the words: “If you break the unit rule, you sonofa*****, I’ll go into Mississippi and break you!” (Flynn, quoted from Williams) ; Long would later imply that he was responsible for Roosevelt’s election, but realistically Roosevelt’s support at the 1932 Convention would have been sufficient to secure nomination even had some Southern states voted against him. (Williams) Yet Long quickly realized that Roosevelt was no pawn to be moved or manipulated into adopting populist policies and submitting to Long’s authority: here was a man with vision and determination not unlike his own. Long confided to a bodyguard after the Democratic Convention: “I have met a man as smart as myself for the first time; and I do not know how long we can walk together.” (Williams) And so, having just helped nominate a Democratic President and the elections of progressive Democratic congressmen from Arkansas and Mississippi, Long threw himself into the Senate, leading opposition to Roosevelt’s policies from the left.
Long’s break with Roosevelt is not particularly well documented, but what records survive testify to a fundamental disagreement over the focus of economic policy, which made a political break inevitable. Yet on a personal level, the reaction is characteristic of Long. He was an immensely brilliant, charismatic man – and knowing his own quality, he could tolerate neither superior nor equal. Roosevelt also recounted his fear of Long’s potential – “It’s all very well for us to laugh over Huey. But actually we have to remember all the time that he is really one of the two most dangerous men in the country.” (Williams) Having met an opponent capable of countering his power, Long exhibited the political mechanism that characterized his career, his machine, and his kindred movements across the Atlantic – he sought to overthrow Roosevelt’s organization from the ground up and replace it within the political structure, using personal and political intervention in elections nationwide to build support for a 1936 Presidential bid. Long planned to unite the progressives and radicals into a third party, which even if unsuccessful in electing Long as President, would create a nationwide vehicle to extend his political influence for future campaigns. Shortly before his assassination in 1935, by the son-in-law of a political enemy, Long delivered an ultimatum to the Roosevelt administration: “If this present state of affairs continues unaltered, there will soon be a revolution in this country” (Arthur M. Schlesinger). It was both a warning, and a statement of intent.
In its mechanisms of operation, accumulation of power, and appeal to mass support without supporting mass democracy, the political machine of Huey Long was a direct model of contemporaneous Fascist movements manifesting in Europe. Long’s machine was authoritarian in structure and means of governance – power was centralized in a single political machine, which attacked large economic interests in order to subordinate them to the development of the national or state economy. Where his policies differed in focus and framing, these divergences can be attributed to the adaptation of a broad political phenomenon to the specific national conditions of American society, just as fascism in Italy developed different policies and foci than its National Socialist cousin in Germany. Both Long as a political personality, and the machine he created to ensure his advancement in power, were unprecedented in American politics – and no similar movement has threatened to overthrow the bipartisan system from the radical wing in such a comprehensive, national manner. Huey Long truly was in a class of his own, and his shadow has haunted the American psyche for generations – tempting the populace in times of desperation with that most dangerous of promises: revolution without responsibility.
“To hell with the ridicule of the wise street-corner politician! Pay no attention to any newspaper that has sold its columns to perpetuate this crime against the people of America! Save this country! Save mankind! Who can be wrong in such a work, and who cares what consequences may come in following the mandates of the Lord, of the Pilgrims, of Jefferson, Webster, and Lincoln? He who falls in this fight falls in the radiance of the future. Better to make this fight and lose than to be a party to a system that strangles humanity!
- Huey Long, May 23, 1935
Bibliography
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1969.
Gregg, A. James. Interpretations of Fascism. Morristown: General Learning Press, 1974.
Shachtman, Max, et al. As We Saw The Thirties. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967.
The Great Depression: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1994.
Williams, T. Harry. Huey Long. New York: Random House, Inc., 1969.
The world crisis of capitalism that began in 1929 was unprecedented in both scale and severity. Bereft of social safety nets and effective regulation of capital institutions, the people of the industrialized world watched in horror as the economic system whose insatiable lust for resources and productivity had lifted millions of people from abject poverty began, inevitably, to devour itself. The collapse of the economic institutions that had hitherto upheld tenuous social stability in many nations provoked exaggerated, desperate political responses. The socialist fatherland of the U.S.S.R. plunged headlong into the suicidal maelstrom of Stalin’s Five Year Plans; European fascism, alive in Italy and nascent in Germany, radicalized even further and began to develop distinct socio-economic policies of its own. And in the United States, capitalism as usual was soon to be transformed by the policies of the New Deal. Yet by 1934, despite a resounding Democratic victory in the midterm elections, the efficacy of Roosevelt’s approach was being challenged by opponents from across the political spectrum. Business interests and conservatives howled angrily about increased federal regulation of production and distribution; progressives and leftists of every stripe screamed that Roosevelt was selling out popular interests to maintain capitalist support. The radicals in America were spoiling for a fight – and one man would anoint himself as their savior, to lead them into battle.
The career of Huey Long is an object lesson to outsiders of every stripe in American politics. Beginning as a crusading anti-big business populist in Louisiana state politics, throughout his career in politics Long designed a political program based upon two founding principles – centralize power, decentralize wealth – and a powerful political machine to enforce them. It is difficult, upon cursory examination, to place Long within the standard political terminology of the day. Like all great politicians, Long was attacked by enemies from across the political spectrum in richly varying terms; conservatives lambasted him as a Communist and Bolshevik sympathizer, socialists decried him as a fascist, and the fascists viewed him with mixed admiration and fear. This confusion is easily explained – Long’s policies, when viewed in the standard political terms of the day, defy classical categorization. He was simultaneously the supporter of populist principles and the destroyer of local autonomy; the opponent of big business but the builder of big government. Yet despite their apparent incongruity, the substance of Long’s programs, both of social reformation and political centralization, fit a single mold. Huey Long defied classification because he was, quite simply, in a new class of his own.
Despite the thorough inadequacy of “Great Man” historical analysis in explaining either the processes or the nature of political transition, in the particular case of Huey Long it is impossible to separate the character of his political organization from the character of the man himself – for the Long machine exhibited all the strengths and weaknesses of its leader, all the traits that drove man and machine inevitably toward both triumph and destruction. Any analysis of the Long machine as a political structure necessitates a concomitant analysis of the personality that created and led it forth.
Huey Pierce Long Jr. was born on August 30, 1893, in Winnfield, Louisiana. He sprang from deep roots in the area, his grandfather John P. Long having settled in Winnfield before the Civil War. Long was remembered by contemporaries as a strange boy, filled to the brim with an inexhaustible energy and possessed of a powerful and inquisitive mind. He manifested a consuming interest in politics from an early age – his mother recalls the young Huey’s obsessive interest in a biography of Napoleon (Williams). As he matured, Long’s fascination with power politics only increased in scope and depth. Yet two stages of his life prepared him beyond anything else for a career in politics: his days as a salesman, and his time as an attorney. Long’s time as a salesman enabled him to travel over vast portions of the state and gave him the opportunity to see firsthand the issues and problems affecting Louisiana – problems that he resolved to alleviate. Yet it also allowed him to make many personal contacts with small businessmen and community leaders throughout the state, whose support would prove indispensable in forging the Long machine.
Long’s tenure as a practicing attorney yielded similar fruits for his future political career. The vast majority of Long’s cases were workman’s compensation, and while he made relatively small commissions in most cases (the amount of compensation was limited by Louisiana law), the cases gained him great publicity – he cast himself as the advocate of the poor and working man, the scourge of corrupt corporate and government interests. (Williams) However, one important case demonstrated Long’s pragmatic approach to strategy and gave him the necessary capital supply to begin campaigning for office. This was a series of lawsuits in which Long represented Ernest R. Bernstein, and defended him against charges of fraud and misuse of bank funds. Not content to simply defend, however, Long went on the offensive – countersuing the bank for libel, on the grounds that the charges were only alleged, not proven, and that by publicizing the matter across the state the bank had injured Bernstein’s reputation as a businessman. The bank’s attorneys immediately attempted to get the suit thrown out on a technicality, realizing implicitly that if the bank were convicted of libel it would weaken the cases of their other suits. The case was sent to an appeals court, and remanded back to the district court, which found for Bernstein and ordered an undisclosed, but probably large sum. Long also obtained the dismissal of the other two suits. Harry Williams estimates that Long’s fee from these cases was around forty thousand dollars – a substantial sum at the time, one that he used to purchase a new house and fund the next stepping stone in his career – election to the Railroad Commission in 1918.
Long’s tenure on the Railroad Commission is perhaps the most fundamentally important point in his political career – his performance as a member of the Commission demonstrates the personal qualities that would determine the nature of both his political career and political machine; and the support that would provide the foundation for his nascent party. Long used his post as a bastion from which to harass and attack the large economic interests of Louisiana – suing railroad companies to force them to extend service to rural areas, attacking oil companies in a bid to open their private pipelines to common carriership. Long was initially successful in many suits, and made sure to publicize these successes widely; he made equally sure that his failures were cast as the victory of corrupt officials and corporate interests over the people’s champion. His effective self-promotion and effort on behalf of the rural poor yielded tangible benefits – “around the state, the common people could not begin to tell you about Huey Long or his policies, but they knew implicitly that he was their ally” (Williams). Yet opposition to his activities developed within the Commission – and rather than change his policies, Long arranged with a newly elected Commission member to depose the current chairman. Long was promptly nominated to replace him, and renewed his attacks on corporate interests in Louisiana with unfettered vigor.
This process is characteristic of both Long personally, and the political party that developed in his wake. Where it was expedient, Long and his followers were willing to work within the system – yet when they encountered entrenched opposition, they scrapped rules of order and law to drive their foes from power. Long’s time as governor of Louisiana, from 1924 to 1932, was simply an exercise of the same political mechanism on a larger scale, and backed by the powers of the state. Long used his position to engage in large scale economic and infrastructural development within Louisiana, modernizing road systems and economic infrastructures – yet while he engaged in this large scale development, he was simultaneously cementing his organization’s control over the political apparati and rewards systems of the state. The nature of American politics and the concrete social conditions of American life were the factors that shaped Long’s political program on the national level. Long could not only appeal to the rural poor to support him against entrenched business interests – he could also enlist support from leftists and progressives of every stripe to support a wealth redistribution plan entitled Share Our Wealth.
Essentially a program of increased direct federal spending to create jobs, and a punitive income tax that would be redistributed in the form of social services and infrastructural development, Share Our Wealth would in practice have simply implemented on a national level the Long machine’s control of Louisiana’s state economy and political infrastructure. Critics who focus on the economic problems within the plan miss entirely the driving political goal: the centralization of power in the hands of the Long machine was the end – bread and books for the poor of the country were only the means.
Consequently, although Long’s political support stemmed mostly from the petit-bourgeoisie, he also enjoyed healthy support from union leaders and labor organizations. Long was not committed to a genuine popular revolution – in principle, as well as practice, he moved toward the complete reformation of the government apparatus from the inside-out: a palace revolution. This approach accomplished two goals, synthesized by Long’s popular appeal – Long could point to the enormous economic development and social benefit brought by his programs to shore up mass support, and cast political foes within the state apparatus as corrupt enemies of the people’s interests.
Long and his followers have also been accused of much corruption throughout his tenure as governor – this is not strictly untrue, but it has been mostly misunderstood. Long understood more clearly than his contemporaries the dialectical role of corruption within any political power structure. Corruption is simultaneously a solidifying and a destabilizing force for a power structure; it can bind members of the organization to the cause materially, provide motivation for new recruits, and centralize power within a state structure – but it can also unite political and public opposition against an organization. Long’s policy synthesized the two extremes, tolerating localized, limited corruption in order to solidify his movement’s control over the state – but he strictly punished embezzlement of public funds, except when those funds were misplaced into his campaign chest. Maintenance of power in progressive hands justified unscrupulous means – for Long to reject the weapons of his enemies was to lay himself open to their blows. Long viewed open corruption as irresponsible and inefficient, and condemned it along those lines, but was not above instituting his own rewards policies when they suited his interests – and extended his power. By the time Long entered national politics as a Senator in 1932, he had the entire state apparatus of Louisiana bending to his whim – his party controlled the legislature, appointed justices, determined patronage and contracts for public works. Nothing like Long’s machine had ever been seen before in American politics; but in Europe two parties were accomplishing the same ends, using nearly identical means. Fascism was on the march.
Fascism, like any political movement, is subject to the social conditions that produce it. In purely political terms, fascism is a mass movement centered politically around a single leader, who embodies both the political and ideological aspirations of his followers. Fascist movements typically unite people from across the political spectrum in a strong, nationalist ideology and mythos. In class terms, the following of a fascist movement is typically working and lower middle class: the economic policies of the movement – limiting of corporate power and profit, and intensive economic development along autarchic lines utilizing deficit spending - follow naturally from the social makeup of its support. Fascist movements are reactions against entrenched power and authority, attempting not to overthrow the institutions of authority, but rather to purge and appropriate them. This is evidenced by the economic and political platforms of Fascist movements when and where they have taken power – in Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, as well as Pilsudski’s Poland, the fascist rise to power was facilitated by large capitalist and conservative interests, ranging from industrialists to financiers to large and small landholders, who sought to use fascism as a bludgeon to ward off a Communist coup d’état. (Gregg)
Yet despite the importance of this political support, when it came to governance the actions of fascist states were determined by the political beliefs of its true support base, the petit-bourgeoisie. Under fascism, capitalism survived mostly intact – but it was kept on a short leash, and corporate profit was subordinated to national interest; the Italian or German Blackshirt or Brownshirt was an enemy to both organized, radical labor and big business. Having crushed the threat of socialism at the barricades, fascism sought not to destroy the interests within the nation that upheld capitalism, but rather to intimidate and co-opt them. As such, fascism must be seen first and foremost not as a revolutionary movement seeking to abolish and replace the current state, but rather as a movement of national regeneration – an assertion of conservative national values against a supposedly corrupt and weak liberal parliamentary state unable to face the threat of social revolution.
European fascism in its infancy was characterized primarily by a militant opposition to the established social-democratic and Communist parties. Having established their claim to political authority by attacking proletarian labor organizations, European fascists could not readily adopt their political and social platform. American fascism, because of the lack of any kind of militant left-wing opposition, was able to create a much broader tent for political mobilization by adopting many policies that the political bases of Hitler or Mussolini would have rebelled against. This is why Long’s movement, despite retaining the political characteristics of fascism – personal authority, political centralization into a single machine – was so vastly different from contemporaneous fascist movements in its social and political program. In Europe, fascism was a reaction against the threat of socialist revolution; in America, fascism was a reaction against the failure of capitalism, and its political and economic program reflects these conditions. Long’s movement exhibited progressive tendencies because its path to power was not blocked by powerful political organizations already laying claim to progressive ideology. Similarly, Long’s rhetoric reflects the social makeup of his support – unlike Hitler and Mussolini, who appealed to national, cultural, and racial identity, Long framed his policies in Biblical terms. This can be accounted for by noting that, while his support base was heterogeneous in racial makeup, in economic positions and religious sentiment they were mostly congruent. (Arthur M. Schlesinger) Long utilized religious rhetoric because it was effective for his political ends, just as Hitler and Mussolini adapted their platforms and ideology to maintain control over the varying interests comprising their parties. (Gregg)
Long’s entry into national politics was coincidental with Franklin Roosevelt’s. Sensing earlier than his fellow Democrats which way the wind was blowing, Long swung large portions of Southern primary votes toward the candidate from New York – in a characteristic exchange, Long shouted down a conservative Democrat who was planning to vote in dissent with the words: “If you break the unit rule, you sonofa*****, I’ll go into Mississippi and break you!” (Flynn, quoted from Williams) ; Long would later imply that he was responsible for Roosevelt’s election, but realistically Roosevelt’s support at the 1932 Convention would have been sufficient to secure nomination even had some Southern states voted against him. (Williams) Yet Long quickly realized that Roosevelt was no pawn to be moved or manipulated into adopting populist policies and submitting to Long’s authority: here was a man with vision and determination not unlike his own. Long confided to a bodyguard after the Democratic Convention: “I have met a man as smart as myself for the first time; and I do not know how long we can walk together.” (Williams) And so, having just helped nominate a Democratic President and the elections of progressive Democratic congressmen from Arkansas and Mississippi, Long threw himself into the Senate, leading opposition to Roosevelt’s policies from the left.
Long’s break with Roosevelt is not particularly well documented, but what records survive testify to a fundamental disagreement over the focus of economic policy, which made a political break inevitable. Yet on a personal level, the reaction is characteristic of Long. He was an immensely brilliant, charismatic man – and knowing his own quality, he could tolerate neither superior nor equal. Roosevelt also recounted his fear of Long’s potential – “It’s all very well for us to laugh over Huey. But actually we have to remember all the time that he is really one of the two most dangerous men in the country.” (Williams) Having met an opponent capable of countering his power, Long exhibited the political mechanism that characterized his career, his machine, and his kindred movements across the Atlantic – he sought to overthrow Roosevelt’s organization from the ground up and replace it within the political structure, using personal and political intervention in elections nationwide to build support for a 1936 Presidential bid. Long planned to unite the progressives and radicals into a third party, which even if unsuccessful in electing Long as President, would create a nationwide vehicle to extend his political influence for future campaigns. Shortly before his assassination in 1935, by the son-in-law of a political enemy, Long delivered an ultimatum to the Roosevelt administration: “If this present state of affairs continues unaltered, there will soon be a revolution in this country” (Arthur M. Schlesinger). It was both a warning, and a statement of intent.
In its mechanisms of operation, accumulation of power, and appeal to mass support without supporting mass democracy, the political machine of Huey Long was a direct model of contemporaneous Fascist movements manifesting in Europe. Long’s machine was authoritarian in structure and means of governance – power was centralized in a single political machine, which attacked large economic interests in order to subordinate them to the development of the national or state economy. Where his policies differed in focus and framing, these divergences can be attributed to the adaptation of a broad political phenomenon to the specific national conditions of American society, just as fascism in Italy developed different policies and foci than its National Socialist cousin in Germany. Both Long as a political personality, and the machine he created to ensure his advancement in power, were unprecedented in American politics – and no similar movement has threatened to overthrow the bipartisan system from the radical wing in such a comprehensive, national manner. Huey Long truly was in a class of his own, and his shadow has haunted the American psyche for generations – tempting the populace in times of desperation with that most dangerous of promises: revolution without responsibility.
“To hell with the ridicule of the wise street-corner politician! Pay no attention to any newspaper that has sold its columns to perpetuate this crime against the people of America! Save this country! Save mankind! Who can be wrong in such a work, and who cares what consequences may come in following the mandates of the Lord, of the Pilgrims, of Jefferson, Webster, and Lincoln? He who falls in this fight falls in the radiance of the future. Better to make this fight and lose than to be a party to a system that strangles humanity!
- Huey Long, May 23, 1935
Bibliography
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1969.
Gregg, A. James. Interpretations of Fascism. Morristown: General Learning Press, 1974.
Shachtman, Max, et al. As We Saw The Thirties. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967.
The Great Depression: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1994.
Williams, T. Harry. Huey Long. New York: Random House, Inc., 1969.