Marcuse

[Buffalo Souljah]

I have just picked up a dusty copy of One-Dimensional Man and have spent the afternoon outside on the veranda (sounds fancier than 'porch') marking up the first few chapters with my own notes. I would love to bring in some of his (and perhaps, by extension, Benjamin's Deborg's, Adorno's etc etc) ideas for discussion.

I particularly enjoy his notion that any revolutionary class consciousness (he does not use the word) must arise "from outside", and is not to be expected 'naturally or 'inevitably', something he shares with an older generation of Marxists, led by, among others, Rosa Luxembourg and Georg Lukacs (cf. "imputed consciousness"):

Indeed, society must first create the material prerequisites of freedom for all its members before it can be a free society; it must first create the wealth before being able to distribute it according to the freely developing needs of the individual; it must first enable its slaves to learn and see and think before they know what is going on and what they themselves can do to change it. And, to the degree to which the slaves have been preconditioned to exist as slaves and be content in that role, their liberation necessarily appears to come from without and from above. They must be "forced to be free," to "see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear," they must be shown the "good road" they are in search of. (40)
If the individuals are satisfied to the point of happiness with the goods and services handed down to them by the administration...and if the individuals are pre-conditioned so that the satisfying goods also include thoughts, feelings, aspirations, why should they wish to think, feel and imagine for themselves[2]? (50)Marxism tends very quickly into revisionism the greater its distance from real practice becomes. However, this does not preclude meaningful and influencial structural observations from being made about a particular social context. And Marcuse certainly is no idiot: in the first two chapters, he quotes Rousseau, Marx, C. Wright Mills and a slew of 'scientific' sociologists to boot. He knows his Freud and Sartre, both of whom he uses to his advantage. His analysis of "Reason" is cogent. That's all I'll say for now. Sometimes, the less said the more.

[which doctor]

This is similar to Lenin's point about class consciousness. You can have a trade union consciousness that develops naturally from the proletariat, but a revolutionary class conscious must come from without, from intellectuals, and does not develop spontaneously from the ontological position of the proletariat.

[black magick hustla]

I think the issue here is not from "without", but from revolutionary minorities. the working class breeds its own worker-intellectuals.

[Buffalo Souljah]

This is similar to Lenin's point about class consciousness. You can have a trade union consciousness that develops naturally from the proletariat, but a revolutionary class conscious must come from without, from intellectuals, and does not develop spontaneously from the ontological position of the proletariat.Yes, but I find this problem more directly engaged by Lukacs:


[C]lass consciousness is identical with neither the psychological consciousness of individual members of the proletariat, nor with the (mass-psychological) consciousness of the proletariat as a whole; but it is, on the contrary, the sense, become conscious, of the historical role of the class. This sense will objectify itself in particular interests of the moment and it may only be ignored at the price of allowing the proletarian class struggle to slip back into the most primitive Utopianism. Every momentary interest may have either of two functions: either it will be a step towards the ultimate goal or else it will conceal it. Which of the two it will be depends entirely upon the class consciousness of the proletariat and not on victory or defeat in isolated skirmishes. Marx drew attention very early on [41] to this danger, which is particularly acute on the economic ‘trade-union’ front: “At the same time the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate consequence s of these struggles. They ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects. . . , that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady. They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in these unavoidable guerilla fights . . . instead of simultaneously trying to cure it, instead of using their organised forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the wages system." (History & Class Consciousness, "Class Consciousness" (http://marxists.org/archive/lukacs/index.htm))
The relation with concrete totality and the dialectical determinants arising from it transcend pure description and yield the category of objective possibility. By relating consciousness to the whole of society it becomes possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular situation if they were able to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of society... it would be possible to infer the thoughts and feelings appropriate to their objective situation...Now class consciousness consists in fact of the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ [zugerechnet] to a particular typical position in the process of production.[11] This consciousness is, therefore, neither the sum nor the average of what is thought or felt by the single individuals who make up the class. And yet the historically significant actions of the class as a whole are determined in the last resort by this consciousness and not by the thought of the individual – and these actions can be understood only by reference to this consciousness.(ibid)
But also, it appears that every method is necessarily implicated in the existence of the relevant class. For the bourgeoisie, method arises directly from its social existence and this means that mere immediacy adheres to its thought, constituting its outermost barrier, one that can not be crossed. In contrast to this the proletariat is confronted by the need to break through this barrier, to overcome it inwardly from the very start by adopting its own point of view. And as it is the nature of the dialectical method constantly to produce and reproduce its own essential aspects, as its very being constitutes the denial of any smooth, linear development of ideas, the proletariat finds itself repeatedly confronted with the problem of its own point of departure both in its efforts to increase its theoretical grasp of reality and to initiate practical historical measures. For the proletariat the barrier imposed by immediacy has become an inward barrier. With this the problem becomes clear; by putting the problem in this way the road to a possible answer is opened up. [22] (http://marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/hcc07_1.htm#22) (ibid, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, III)I think Marcuse would respond that the conditions enabling this type of organic development are significantly curtailed in modern inustrial society, where even thoughts, emotions and especially ideas are handed down by "experts" (and any number of others "in the know"), to be gobbled up by the 'lesser-minded' people--the rest of us. And furthermore, he would state, why would someone for whom every convenience and leisure was provided argue or contest the ideals of a system that offers these conveniences to him/her, even if it is based on oppression and control and loss of individual freedom? And this is, by all means, a formidable puzzle. I refer you to chapter two of Marcuse, which I have quoted above.


I think the issue here is not from "without", but from revolutionary minorities. the working class breeds its own worker-intellectuals. Yes, but (Marcuse would argue), what are the thoughts and ideas of an impoverished and scattered minority in the face of such fantastic architecture of control and repression? (see above, as well as the epilogue to Benjamin's Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, which I will post here momentarily.)

[Buffalo Souljah]

Epilogue

The growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of masses are two aspects of the same process. Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses without affecting the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves. The masses have a right to change property relations; Fascism seeks to give them an expression while preserving property. The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. The violation of the masses, whom Fascism, with its Führer cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values.
All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and war only can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system. This is the political formula for the situation. The technological formula may be stated as follows: Only war makes it possible to mobilize all of today's technical resources while maintaining the property system. It goes without saying that the Fascist apotheosis of war does not employ such arguments. Still, Marinetti says in his manifesto on the Ethiopian colonial war:
For twenty-seven years we Futurists (http://www.jahsonic.com/Futurism.html) have rebelled against the branding of war as anti-aesthetic... Accordingly we state:... War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metallization of the human body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning villages, and many others... Poets and artists of Futurism!... remember these principles of an aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art... may be illumined by them! This manifesto has the virtue of clarity. Its formulations deserve to be accepted by dialecticians. To the latter, the aesthetics of today's war appears as follows: If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war. The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of society. The horrible features of imperialistic warfare are attributable to the discrepancy between the tremendous means of production and their inadequate utilization in the process of production - in other words, to unemployment and the lack of markets. Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which collects, in the form of 'human material,' the claims to which society has denied its natural material. Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new way.
'Fiat ars - pereat mundus,' says Fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of 'l'art pour l'art.' Mankind, which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.
the full essay can be found here (http://www.jahsonic.com/WAAMR.html)

[which doctor]

Lukacs may have said it better, but Lenin said it first:


We have said that there could not have been Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc.[2] The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. In the period under discussion, the middle nineties, this doctrine not only represented the completely formulated programme of the Emancipation of Labour group, but had already won over to its side the majority of the revolutionary youth in Russia.

Lenin asked this question in the context of what organizational approach to take. Lukacs is dealing with the exact same problem Lenin was, but placed it in a philosophical context. I too think Lukacs was able to put it more succinctly, which comes from his firm command of the dialectic, which Lenin lacked. You have echoes of these sentiments from Marx-Engels, but as far as I know, they ever dealed with them as concretely as Lenin and Lukacs did. For instance, Engels once commented somewhere that the workers movement was the heir of German Idealism. I think they point here is that Marxism takes its cue from bourgeois science, and this isn't anything we need to be ashamed about.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ignore what Marcuse has to say about Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy. Here is why:


An equally inept attempt to come to grips with Wittgenstein's work (and with Ordinary Language Philosophy {OLP} in general) can be found in Chapter Seven of Marcuse's One Dimensional Man. [Marcuse (1968).] Marcuse failed to tell his readers that he derived many of his criticisms from Ernest Gellner's notorious Words and Things -- except that, tucked away in note 2 page 141, he acknowledges that similar ideas appeared in Gellner's work --, but it is quite plain that he has. [Gellner's diatribe will not be examined in this Essay. On that egregious book, see Uschanov (2002). See also Dummett (1960).]

Marcuse begins with this hackneyed criticism of OLP and Wittgenstein:


"Austin's contemptuous treatment of the alternatives to the common usage of words, and his defamation of what we 'think up in our armchairs of an afternoon'; Wittgenstein's assurance that philosophy 'leaves everything as it is' -- such statements exhibit, to my mind, academic sado-masochism, self-humiliation, and self-denunciation of the intellectual whose labour does not issue in scientific, technical or like achievements. These affirmations of modesty and dependence seem to recapture Hume's mood of righteous contentment with the limitations of reason which, once recognized and accepted, protect man from useless mental adventures but leave him perfectly capable of orienting himself in the given environment. However, when Hume debunked substances, he fought a powerful ideology, while his successors today provide an intellectual justification for that which society has long since accomplished-namely, the defamation of alternative modes of thought which contradict the established universe of discourse."

Added in a footnote:


"The proposition that philosophy leaves everything as it is may be true in the context of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach (where it is at the same time denied), or as self-characterization of neo-positivism, but as a general proposition on philosophic thought it is incorrect." [Marcuse (1968), pp.141-42. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at my site. Spelling corrected to conform to UK English. I have used the on-line text here, and have corrected any typographical errors I managed to spot. The same is true of the other quotations from this book used below.]

I will not try to defend John Austin in this Essay, but Marcuse clearly failed to note that Wittgenstein is here speaking of philosophy as he practiced it, not as it has traditionally been carried out. Moreover, in view of the fact that traditional Philosophy is little more than self-important hot air (on this, see Essay Twelve Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm)), except negatively, it cannot change anything, anyway.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein is not advocating "conformism", as Marcuse alleges. It is no more philosophy's goal to challenge the status quo than it is the role of basket weaving to do this. Alongside Marx, Wittgenstein would have argued that the point is in fact to change the world, not build empty/non-sensical theories about it. Change is the central concern of political action, science and technology, not Philosophy. Moreover, one only has to read the many conversations that took place between Wittgenstein and those he gathered around him to see that he was not a political quietist. [On that, see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Wittgenstein.htm).]

In fact, Marcuse, along with the vast majority of Wittgenstein's critics, misquotes him in this regard. This is what Wittgenstein actually said:


"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can advance it." [Wittgenstein (1958), §124, page 49e.]

From this it is clear that the word "everything" refers to language. This is plain from the fact that he then goes on to mention mathematics ("It also leaves mathematics as it is"), which he would not have added if "everything" were unqualified.

Now, in conformity with the traditional contempt shown by theorists toward the vernacular and the thought of ordinary workers, Marcuse argues:


"Throughout the work of the linguistic analysts, there is this familiarity with the chap on the street whose talk plays such a leading role in linguistic philosophy. The chumminess of speech is essential inasmuch as it excludes from the beginning the high-brow vocabulary of 'metaphysics;' it militates against intelligent non-conformity; it ridicules the egghead. The language of John Doe and Richard Roe is the language which the man on the street actually speaks; it is the language which expresses his behaviour; it is therefore the token of concreteness. However, it is also the token of a false concreteness. The language which provides most of the material for the analysis is a purged language, purged not only of its 'unorthodox' vocabulary, but also of the means for expressing any other contents than those furnished to the individuals by their society. The linguistic analyst finds this purged language an accomplished fact, and he takes the impoverished language as he finds it, insulating it from that which is not expressed in it although it enters the established universe of discourse as element and factor of meaning.

"Paying respect to the prevailing variety of meanings and usages, to the power and common sense of ordinary speech, while blocking (as extraneous material) analysis of what this speech says about the society that speaks it, linguistic philosophy suppresses once more what is continually suppressed in this universe of discourse and behaviour. The authority of philosophy gives its blessing to the forces which make this universe. Linguistic analysis abstracts from what ordinary language reveals in speaking as it does-the mutilation of man and nature." [Ibid., pp.142-43.]

From this, it is quite plain that Marcuse prefers the obscure and impenetrable jargon of ruling-class hacks to the language of ordinary workers, and it is not hard to see why. Indeed, as was alleged above, Marcuse all but concedes here that it is impossible to derive the empty theses of traditional Philosophy if theorists confine themselves to the vernacular. [On this, see Essay Twelve Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm).] And that is why he complains that the language used by Wittgenstein and others has been "purged" of the jargon upon which traditionalists like Marcuse dote, a move that would prevent them from even attempting to practice their verbal tricks.

It is also worth pointing out that, also in line with many others, Marcuse has confused ordinary language with "common sense". As we saw here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm), these two are not at all the same. [On this, see also Hallett (2008), pp.91-99.] Moreover, he is wrong in what he says about "boffins" -- in fact, in all my years of studying OLP, I have yet to encounter anything that remotely suggests this reading. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Marcuse does not quote a single passage in support of this allegation.

What of this, though?


"Moreover, all too often it is not even the ordinary language which guides the analysis, but rather blown-up atoms of language, silly scraps of speech that sound like baby talk such as 'This looks to me now like a man eating poppies,' 'He saw a robin', 'I had a hat.' Wittgenstein devotes much acumen and spare to the analysis of 'My broom is in the corner.'" [Ibid., p.143.]

But, does Marcuse take Hegel or Engels to task for their use of "The rose is red", or Lenin for his employment of "John is a man"? Not a bit of it. In fact, Marcuse misses the point of using such simple language -- if we can't get this right, we stand no chance with more complex propositions. And, as we have seen (for example, here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm)), dialecticians cannot even get "John is a man" right! Which rather makes the point, one feels.

Except, Marcuse has an answer to this:


"To take another illustration: sentences such as 'my broom is in the corner' might also occur in Hegel's [I]Logic, but there they would be revealed as inappropriate or even false examples. They would only be rejects, to be surpassed by a discourse which, in its concepts, style, and syntax, is of a different order -- a discourse for which it is by no means 'clear that every sentence in our language "is in order as it is,"' Rather the exact opposite is the case-namely, that every sentence is as little in order as the world is which this language communicates." [Ibid., p.144.]

But, if that were indeed so, then the ordinary words Marcuse himself uses are not "in order", either, and we cannot take what he says at face value. [But is there any other, deeper significance to his words?] We have already seen (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm) that attempts to argue that ordinary language is in some way (or in any way) defective back-fire on those making such rash allegations. And now we witness the same here, for if Marcuse's words are not "in order", what can they possibly mean? As Marcuse notes on the same page:


"Thus the analysis does not terminate in the universe of ordinary discourse, it goes beyond it and opens a qualitatively different universe, the terms of which may even contradict the ordinary one." [Ibid., p.144.]

Except that here the tables are turned on Marcuse, for if we analyse his words, we can see that if he is correct, then his words in fact say the opposite of what he intended: if they are in the "right order", we can understand him after all. And yet, as soon as we understand what he is telling us, we immediately see that his words too are not in the "right order" (for he tells us that none are!), and thus they make no sense. [Yet another ironic dialectical inversion here, one feels.]

And then we encounter this hackney, traditionalists' lament; Marcuse (quoting Wittgenstein):


"The almost masochistic reduction of speech to the humble and common is made into a program: 'if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", door."' We must 'stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties...' -- as if this were the only alternative, and as if the 'extreme subtleties' were not the suitable term for Wittgenstein's language games rather than for Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Thinking (or at least its expression) is not only pressed into the straitjacket of common usage, but also enjoined not to ask and seek solutions beyond those that are already there. 'The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.'

"The self-styled poverty of philosophy, committed with all its concepts to the given state of affairs, distrusts the possibility of a new experience. Subjection to the rule of the established fact is total -- only linguistic facts, to be sure, but the society speaks in its language, and we are told to obey. The prohibitions are severe and authoritarian: 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language.' 'And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.'

"One might ask what remains of philosophy? What remains of thinking, intelligence, without anything hypothetical, without any explanation? However, what is at stake is not the definition or the dignity of philosophy. It is rather the chance of preserving and protecting the fight, the need to think and speak in terms other than those of common usage -- terms which are meaningful, rational, and valid precisely because they are other terms. What is involved is the spread of a new ideology which undertakes to describe what is happening (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of understanding what is happening (and meant)." [Ibid., pp.144-45.]

Marcuse has worked himself up into a right old lather here, all the while missing the point. Wittgenstein was speaking here of his new approach to philosophy, which, if correct, would mean that traditional forms-of-thought, beloved of characters like Marcuse, are simply "houses of cards". Wittgenstein is certainly not arguing against "anything hypothetical", or against "explanation" in other areas of theory (for example, in science -- indeed, in this area, he developed a novel account of what it is to reason hypothetically). Once more, in his haste to malign Wittgenstein, Marcuse has simply punched empty space.

And, far from this being true:


"It is rather the chance of preserving and protecting the fight, the need to think and speak in terms other than those of common usage -- terms which are meaningful, rational, and valid precisely because they are other terms. What is involved is the spread of a new ideology which undertakes to describe what is happening (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of understanding what is happening (and meant)" [Ibid.]

the opposite is in fact the case. The obscure terminology found in traditional thought, and particularly the impenetrable jargon Hegel inflicted on humanity, actually prevents us understanding the world. As I pointed out in Essay Twelve Part One (link above), the influence of traditional Philosophy must be destroyed in order to facilitate the advance of scientific knowledge in general, and Marxism in particular. [Here, I am very loosely paraphrasing Kant.]

Marcuse's failure to get the point is further underlined by this blindingly irrelevant comment:


"To begin with, an irreducible difference exists between the universe of everyday thinking and language on the one side, and that of philosophic thinking and language on the other. In normal circumstances, ordinary language is indeed behavioural -- a practical instrument. When somebody actually says 'My broom is in the corner,' he probably intends that somebody else who had actually asked about the broom is going to take it or leave it there, is going to be satisfied, or angry. In any case, the sentence has fulfilled its function by causing a behavioural reaction: 'the effect devours the cause; the end absorbs the means.'" [Ibid., pp.145-46.]

Marcuse clearly did not know, perhaps because of his characteristically sloppy research, that when Wittgenstein used the sentence "My broom is in the corner" [Wittgenstein (1958), §60, p.29e] he was in fact criticising a view he had adopted in the Tractatus -- about (1) the nature of logically simple names, (2) the idea that a fact is a complex, and (3) that analysis can reveal hidden logical form, etc. [Wittgenstein (1972), 2-3.263, pp.7-25, and 5.5423, p.111; on the background to this, see White (1974, 2006). On Investigations §37-61 (the relevant sections), see Baker and Hacker (2005b), pp.112-42, Hallett (1977), pp.112-39, Hallett (2008), pp.33-41]. So, Wittgenstein is here advancing a profound criticism of his earlier way of seeing things, and whether or not one agrees with Wittgenstein (before or after his change of mind -- or even at all!), the issues he raises are not of the everyday "behavioural" sort that Marcuse seems to think; they concern the logical nature of propositions and how they can represent the world (that is, if they can). [These issues are considered in more detail in Essay Twelve Part One (link above), and in subsequent Parts of that Essay.]

And there is more:


"In contrast, if, in a philosophic text or discourse, the ward 'substance,' 'idea,' 'man,' 'alienation' becomes the subject of a proposition, no such transformation of meaning into a behavioural reaction takes place or is intended to take place. The word remains, as it were, unfulfilled -- except in thought, where it may give rise to other thoughts. And through a long series of mediations within a historical continuum, the proposition may help to form and guide a practice. But the proposition remains unfulfilled even then -- only the hubris of absolute idealism asserts the thesis of a final identity between thought and its object. The words with which philosophy is concerned can therefore never have a use 'as humble ... as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door"'.

"Thus, exactness and clarity in philosophy cannot be attained within the universe of ordinary discourse. The philosophic concepts aim at a dimension of fact and meaning which elucidates the atomized phrases or words of ordinary discourse 'from without' by showing this 'without' as essential to the understanding of ordinary discourse. Or, if the universe of ordinary discourse itself becomes the object of philosophic analysis, the language of philosophy becomes a 'meta-language.' Even where it moves in the humble terms of ordinary discourse, it remains antagonistic. It dissolves the established experiential context of meaning into that of its reality; it abstracts from the immediate concreteness in order to attain true concreteness." [Ibid., p.146.]

Once more, as we have seen, it is in fact the use of the obscure jargon found in traditional Philosophy that undermines clarity of thought. In which case, it is no surprise to discover that, far from constituting a "guide" to practice, dialectics has been refuted by it. [On this, see Essay Ten Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm).]

Moreover, as far as 'abstraction' is concerned, Marcuse just helps himself to this word without any attempt to explain the obscure process that is alleged to lie behind it, or show how it is even possible to 'abstract' anything at all. [On this, see Essay Three Parts One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm) and Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_02.htm).]


"Ordinary language in its 'humble use' may indeed be of vital concern to critical philosophic thought, but in the medium of this thought words lose their plain humility and reveal that 'hidden' something which is of no interest to Wittgenstein. Consider the analysis of the 'here' and 'now' in Hegel's Phenomenology, or...Lenin's suggestion on how to analyze adequately 'this glass of water' on the table. Such an analysis uncovers the history in every-day speech as a hidden dimension of meaning -- the rule of society over its language. And this discovery shatters the natural and reified form in which the given universe of discourse first appeals. The words reveal themselves as genuine terms not only in a grammatical and formal-logical but also material sense; namely, as the limits which define the meaning and its development -- the terms which society imposes on discourse, and on behaviour. This historical dimension of meaning can no longer be elucidated by examples such as 'my broom is in the corner' or 'there is cheese on the table.' To be sure, such statements can reveal many ambiguities, puzzles, oddities, but they are an in the same re language games and academic boredom." [Ibid., pp.147-48.]

As we will see in Essay Twelve, Hegel's crass analysis of the spatial and temporal indexicals (i.e., "here" and "now") isn't a reassuring advertisement for the 'superiority' of 'Dialectical Logic', after all. And we have already seen what a mess Lenin got himself into with his 'analysis' of glass tumblers (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm). In which case, the alleged banalities of ordinary language are much to be preferred over the irredeemable confusion that has for two centuries flowed out of Hegel's Hermetic House of Horrors, clogging the minds of far too many comrades. Indeed, science has about as much to learn from this backwater of Neo-Platonic mysticism as it has from dowsing or crystal gazing.

It is also revealing that Marcuse shows an unhealthy interest in what is "hidden", since we have already seen that this is a cornerstone of ruling-class ideology: that there is a "hidden" world behind "appearances", which is accessible to thought alone. Here, Marcuse reveals that even though he pretends to be a radical, he is nonetheless a philosophical conservative, happy to ape the thought forms of the last two-and-a-half thousand years of boss-class theory. [On that, see the opening comments in Essay Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm).]

It would be tedious indeed to detail the many other confusions and errors that this chapter of One Dimensional Man alone contains, so I will end with just two more examples (one taken from the next chapter, and one from earlier in the book):


"The 'whole' that here comes to view must be cleared from all misunderstanding in terms of an independent entity, of a 'Gestalt,' and the like. The concept somehow expresses the difference and tension between potentiality and actuality -- identity in this difference. It appears in the relation between the qualities (white, hard; but also beautiful, free, just) and the corresponding concepts (whiteness, hardness, beauty, freedom, justice). The abstract character of the latter seems to designate the more concrete qualities as part-realizations, aspects, manifestations of a more universal and more 'excellent' quality, which is experienced in the concrete.

"And by virtue of this relation, the concrete quality seems to represent a negation as well as realization of the universal. Snow is white but not 'whiteness;' a girl may be beautiful, even a beauty, but not 'beauty;' a country may be free (in comparison with others) because its people have certain liberties, but it is not the very embodiment of freedom. Moreover, the concepts are meaningful only in experienced contrast with their opposites: white with not white, beautiful with not beautiful. Negative statements can sometimes be translated into positive ones: 'black' or 'grey' for 'not white,' 'ugly' for 'not beautiful.'

"These formulations do not alter the relation between the abstract concept and its concrete realizations: the universal concept denotes that which the particular entity is, and is not. The translation can eliminate the hidden negation by reformulating the meaning in a non-contradictory proposition, but the untranslated statement suggests a real want. There is more in the abstract noun (beauty, freedom) than in the qualities ('beautiful,' 'free') attributed to the particular person, thing or condition. The substantive universal intends qualities which surpass all particular experience, but persist in the mind, not as a figment of imagination nor as more logical possibilities but as the 'stuff' of which our world consists. No snow is pure white, nor is any cruel beast or man an the cruelty man knows -- knows as an almost inexhaustible force in history and imagination." [Ibid., pp.168-69.]

This is in fact a faint echo of Hegel's reference to Spinoza's Greedy Principle [SGP] (so-called in Essay Eleven Part Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011%2002.htm)) -- i.e., "All determination is also negation". But this is an unreliable principle (even if sense can be made of it), not least because it confuses what we do with words with the means by which we do it. Of course, that is about as brainless as confusing, say, a holiday with the aeroplane we travel on in order get there, or a map with a trek in the hills! [The other serious weaknesses of the SGP are outlined in Essay Eight Part Three (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm).]

Ignoring, too, the fact that Marcuse confuses concepts with words, it is not even true that:


"the concepts are meaningful only in experienced contrast with their opposites: white with not white, beautiful with not beautiful. Negative statements can sometimes be translated into positive ones: 'black' or 'grey' for 'not white,' 'ugly' for 'not beautiful.'" [Ibid.]

Colour concepts are meaningful, among other things, because of the colour octahedron [there is a link to a PDF in the original essay, at this point] not because we have met in experience "not-white" (or whatever). If someone has no understanding of colour words, they can swim in "not-white" all day long for all the good it will do them. This alone shows that the SGP is useless.

But, the above errors are connected with much deeper logical issues. This brings us to the final passage from One Dimensional Man that I propose to discuss here:


"In the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are; consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence -- potentiality.

"But the essential potentiality is not like the many possibilities which are contained in the given universe of discourse and action; the essential potentiality is of a very different order. Its realisation involves subversion of the established order, for thinking in accordance with truth is the commitment to exist in accordance with truth. (In Plato, the extreme concepts which illustrate this subversion are: death as the beginning of the philosopher's life, and the violent liberation from the Cave.) Thus, the subversive character of truth inflicts upon thought an imperative quality. Logic centres on judgments which are, as demonstrative propositions, imperatives, -- the predicative 'is' implies an 'ought'.

"This contradictory, two-dimensional style of thought is the inner form not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grips with reality. The propositions which define reality affirm as true something that is not (immediately) the case; thus they contradict that which is the case, and they deny its truth. The affirmative judgment contains a negation which disappears in the propositional form (S is p). For example, 'virtue is knowledge'; 'justice is that state in which everyone performs the function for which his nature is best suited'; 'the perfectly real is the perfectly knowable'...; 'man is free'; 'the State is the reality of Reason.'

"If these propositions are to be true, then the copula 'is' states an 'ought,' a desideratum. It judges conditions in which virtue is not knowledge, in which men do not perform the function for which their nature best suits them, in which they are not free, etc. Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the proposition involves a process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is. The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the eyes of God, by nature, etc." [Ibid., pp.110-11.]

We have already seen (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm) that dialecticians have bought into a defective theory of predication, so it is no surprise to see Marcuse follow suite. His claim that the traditional logic of subject (S) and predicate (P) "conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality" may or may not be true --, but if it isn't, then this is all to the good since "reality" has neither a "negative" nor a positive "character". In fact, it's only because Marcuse has considered a very narrow range of examples that his assertions here might seem (to some) to be reliable. As was noted in Essay Three Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm):


For example, how would the following be classified?

H1: Every sailor loves a girl who reminds him of anyone other than his mother.

H2: Anyone who knows Marx's work will also know that he is second to none in his analysis of all the economic forces operating in Capitalism, and most of those constitutive of other Modes of Production.

H3: Any prime factor of an even number between two and one hundred is less than a composite number not equal to but greater than fifty.

H4: Some who admire most of those who do not despise themselves often avoid sitting opposite any who criticise those who claim membership of the minority break-away faction of the Socrates Appreciation Society.

H5: Today, Blair met some of those who think his policy in Iraq is a betrayal of his few remaining socialist principles.

Are these universal, particular, negative, or positive? Are they judgements or propositions? But these are the sort of propositions (and worse!) that appear in mathematics and the sciences all the time (to say nothing of everyday speech). Indeed, the serious limitations of the restrictive old logic, with its incapacity to handle complex sentences in mathematics, inspired Frege to recast the entire discipline in its modern form. [On this, see Essay Four (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm).]

Some might argue that these are not the sort of "judgements" traditional' logic concerned itself with, but that is the point. It is only because Marcuse, along with other dialecticians, has relied on a bowdlerised form of Aristotelian logic that his argument seems to gain a slender toe-hold.

However, let us assume that Marcuse's analysis was impeccable. Even then what Marcuse alleges is still incorrect:


"In the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are; consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence -- potentiality.

"...Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the proposition involves a process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is. The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the eyes of God, by nature, etc." [Marcuse, ibid.]

But, this depends on "men and things" having an essence, which Marcuse simply takes for granted. Of course, to mystics like Hegel and Aristotle, it seemed clear that "men and things" did indeed have an "essence", but that was just another example of ruling-class ideology dominating their thought. But, even if this allegation were itself incorrect, what is Marcuse going to say about propositions like these?

M1: Man is mortal.

M2: Tables and chairs are material.

Do these "oppose" the "truth of reality"? Are we to assume that "men" are "really" immortal, and that they "oughtn't" be like this? Or that ordinary objects are in "reality" non-material, and that there is an "imperative" here which means that we should struggle to make them material? If not, then Marcuse analysis cannot be relied on to reveal the truth consistently, which fact should not surprise us in view of the preceding paragraphs -- that is, in view of the defective logic by means of which Marcuse arrived at most of his conclusions.

It is time to leave this sad victim of ruling-class confusion, and turn to others who have similarly drifted off into deep water.

References and more details can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm

[Buffalo Souljah]

Wittgenstein is certainly not arguing against "anything hypothetical", or against "explanation" in other areas of theory (for example, in science -- indeed, in this area, he developed a novel account of what it is to reason hypothetically).Would you mind pointing me in the direction of where W makes such observations?


As I pointed out in Essay Twelve Part One (link above), the influence of traditional Philosophy must be destroyed in order to facilitate the advance of scientific knowledge in general, and Marxism in particular. [Here, I am very loosely paraphrasing Kant.]No, I think we should go back to feudalism! It was far the simpler way of life. :P In all seriousness, I will read the essay-- however, I don't understand how to reconcile what you said in its relation to Kant: are you speaking here of the _Refutation of Idealism_, per chance?




Or, if the universe of ordinary discourse itself becomes the object of philosophic analysis, the language of philosophy becomes a 'meta-language.' Even where it moves in the humble terms of ordinary discourse, it remains antagonistic. It dissolves the established experiential context of meaning into that of its reality; it abstracts from the immediate concreteness in order to attain true concreteness." [Ibid., p.146.]Once more, as we have seen, it is in fact the use of the obscure jargon found in traditional Philosophy that undermines clarity of thought. In which case, it is no surprise to discover that, far from constituting a "guide" to practice, dialectics has been refuted by it. [On this, see Essay Ten Part One.]

Moreover, as far as 'abstraction' is concerned, Marcuse just helps himself to this word without any attempt to explain the obscure process that is alleged to lie behind it, or show how it is even possible to 'abstract' anything at all. [On this, see Essay Three Parts One and Two.]When you place it in the context of everything else you have pulled from his text, it does seem that Marcuse is resorting to some form of Platonism: in order to understand what he means by
[Philosophy] dissolves the established experiential context of meaning into that of its reality, we first have to come to know what he means by "dissolves" and "reality" (not taking into account he proposes a theory of meaning which is not based out of any correlation to anything in the world: meaning for him simply becomes "Meaning"), and we can not even begin to ask in what context or in reference to what this "meaning"/"Meaning" may arise. Immediate concreteness? "True" concreteness? It seems the emperor wears no clothes!

And here I was expecting succinct theoretical observations based out of and applicable to practice, in the manner of Benjamin's Passagen-Werk and perhaps, by implication, the theater of Berthold Brecht and the stories of Franz Kafka, in all of which I find just such a 'synthesis' (small 's'), sans all the above insanity.

As I stated in the OP:
Marxism tends very quickly into revisionism the greater its distance from real practice becomes. However, this does not preclude meaningful and influencial structural observations from being made about a particular social context. And Marcuse certainly is no idiot Perhaps I was wrong about the last part (which still doesn't prohibit him from making accurate assessments of some of the major 'features' of contemporary 'Culture'), but this still leaves the door open to those wishing to make theoretical observations grounded in--and applicable to--practice, perhaps in the manner of the aforementioned individuals.

[The above quotations make me think of the pretensious dribble of someone like Baudrillard... now there's a REAL stinker..! Trying to understand him at times is like trying to cut your own hair wwith your eyes closed: it ends up a clumsy mess!]

[Buffalo Souljah]

From another thread on the same subject:
Marcuse and the Frankfurt school, like Leninism and Stalinism, Maoism, etc... are all developments and critiques/reinventions of Marxism.

As revolutionaries living in the imperialist stages of capitalism, we need to synthesize these theories. No one theory is entirely correct, and no one thinker is entirely incorrect. They all provide adequate analysis in certain respects.

Regarding Marcuse, I think it's important to understand that the artists and philosophers too are working class individuals. They are workers in the ever-widening service sector in that they provide intellectual and culturally creative services: books, lectures, papers, stories, music, etc... If we suffer the blindness of viewing the working class as solely industrial/agricultural laborers, we not only ignore the developments of capitalism (which have greatly diminished these sectors) but also the realities of a Marxist perspective - namely, that the working class assumes many roles, many faces, in many places yet is always defined by a relationship to the means of production.

It is our responsibility to approach Marcuse and others with as open a mind as possible, and reject what seems inadequate and irrational, while accepting what appears apt and logical. I believe that Marcuse focused on an aspect of contemporary society which was not addressed in Marx, for whatever reason, and while it is certainly not the foremost aspect of the revolutionary struggle, it is an aspect worthy of consideration.

- August