Wittgenstein's Religion

[Buffalo Souljah]

An interesting debate may ensue out of this: I didn't know so much was written on this subject. This is part of a much larger article:


Was Wittgenstein a Christian? In some sense yes, and therefore also in some sense no. Which one [someone] will emphasize, the yes or the no, seems to me to depend on which one wants [wishes] Wittgenstein to have been.
It was Albert Schweitzer's view (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit47.html) that one could be a Christian without sharing Jesus's [eschatological, mythological] world-picture of the supernatural kingdom of God. But Wittgenstein's view of the Christian religion was very different. Wittgenstein wrote that he did not believe that Jesus would come to judge him [Second Coming, Last Judgment], although about Jesus's Resurrection he felt inclined to believe (CV p. 33). -- But by 'belief' here Wittgenstein meant 'religious belief', which is not belief that an hypothesis is more or less probable; it concerns the foundations of our life -- i.e. the pictures that are "at the root of all our thinking" (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/manner.html#Parak-Note-3). I think that he identified holding fast to certain [particular] pictures to be essential to whether or not one was a Christian.
Do you believe there is such a thing as religious belief? Does such a thing exist? What kind of thing would it be? Can we imagine it? I have many other questions, but I will stop with those, for the moment.

More:

How did Wittgenstein read Charles Dickens, who certainly believed that education was the only difference between a "gentleman" and a workingman (cf. Great Expectations e.g.)? Maybe not as we read him. We should not as a matter of course expect Wittgenstein, who was born long before World War One and the social changes [revolution in the status of the common man] that followed it, to have perceived the mass of humanity the way we do. Perhaps he believed that there really is a natural aristocracy (that king and peasant are conditions of nature, not only of society). Wittgenstein's beliefs often appear to have been irrational. For example, he believed in the existence of a "Jewish race" to which he belonged and which was the source (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit32.html#Rhees-Wittgenstein-Jewish-view) of what he said was his "non-Western" point of view.

Like Drury, at least as he was at the time, I do not understand what Wittgenstein was talking about in this story from 1951, not long before Wittgenstein died. Drury had said that there were Old Testament [Wittgenstein's relation to Judaism (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit27.html#Footnote-14M) (CV p. 35 [MS 162b 16v: 1939-1940])] stories that he found offensive, e.g. the story of God sending bears out of the forest to punish children. Wittgenstein: "[very sternly] You mustn't pick and choose just what you want in that way. (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit26.html#Footnote-6M)... Just remember what the Old Testament meant to a man like Kierkegaard. After all, children have been killed by bears." And when Drury then referred to the story about the Tower of Siloam in the New Testament where it says that such tragedies were not a punishment from God, Wittgenstein answered:
That has nothing to do with what I am talking about. You don't understand, you are quite out of your depth. (Recollections p. 170)

If we talk about Wittgenstein's own religion, we must not forget that religion is not entirely discursive: it is not entirely "what can be put into words" nor what must be put into words (as is the case in philosophy). A man who was emotionally dry might have no use for religion, art, love; -- such a man might be barely recognizable as human. A man's inner life isn't just language. Engelmann (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/englmann.html): "feeling, intuition, the irrational, etc." should be excluded only where their inclusion is inappropriate, and when we move from the philosophy of religion to religion itself, we must remember that in the latter they are appropriate; and that to talk about Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion is not the same thing as to talk about Wittgenstein's own religion.
Fr Fechín O'Doherty, who attended Wittgenstein's lectures in Cambridge, recalls his saying that the could think best in the dark and that in the West of Ireland he had found one of the last "pools of darkness" in Europe.
Drury remembered Wittgenstein saying to him as they walked in a Dublin park in 1949: "When I was a prisoner of war in Italy, I was very glad when we were compelled to attend Mass. Now why don't you see if starting the day by going to Mass each morning doesn't help you to begin the day in a good frame of mind?" Wittgenstein was advising Drury to experiment with religion. "To find out, by trying, what helps one and what doesn't."
Drury and Wittgenstein talked about the "ancient liturgies, particularly the collects of the Latin Mass", and Drury asked whether it wasn't important "that there should be ordained priests to carry on this tradition? That was my idea in wanting to be ordained [an Anglican priest after leaving Cambridge University]." Wittgenstein replied: "At first sight it would seem a wonderful idea that there should be in every village someone who stood for these things. But it hasn't worked out that way."I'm honestly surprised to see a man so renowned for his commitment to logic and science to hold such a reverence for religious expression. I don't know what this says of the 'character' of Wittgenstein. He seems to have had an abiding sense that the portions of human existence that arose 'between language' had a content. Certainly not uninteresting


Am I looking for an explanation where I ought instead to be saying: this game is played; -- not this language-game, because the specific language used in the case of religion is secondary (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/religion-language-games.html); and because nonsense is nonsense for everyone if sense and nonsense are objective, as they are in Wittgenstein's logic of language. (That is, religious behavior may be compared to games -- i.e. activities done according to rules -- and we might speak of the "religious game", but the comparison of religious behavior to primitive language-games (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt3.html#Parts-of-Speech-and-Printed-Words) would need to be defined, because it has no obvious meaning -- i.e. there is no natural extension of a concept -- here.)
'Proto-phenomenon' means: there is no basis for this; it is bedrock: it is the basis of other things. What you must remember about a language-game:
it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there -- like our life. Nothing comes before this: "In the beginning ..." There is no bedrock beneath the bedrock.

[spiltteeth]

I'm told there is alot of similarity between Thomas Aquinus and O'l Witti.

He has had a great influence on theology and how we speak of God.

In his biography of Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein said that he sometimes had a certain experience which could best be described by saying that
"when I have it, I wonder at the existence of the world. I am then inclined to use such phrases as 'How extraordinary that anything should exist!'"

Reminds me of Leibniz :

"The first question which should rightly be asked, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"

This question often unites philosophers and religious thinkers. I've been told by suspect sources that Witti was a believer. I don't know the truth. Perhaps he had religious impulses, but could find no way to philosophically justify himself in speaking about them.

[Hit The North]

In his biography of Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein said that he sometimes had a certain experience which could best be described by saying that

"when I have it, I wonder at the existence of the world. I am then inclined to use such phrases as 'How extraordinary that anything should exist!'"



So what? I get that. I call it phenomenological ecstasy. Existence is extraordinary. But these feelings do not have to lead to religious belief. In fact, the notion that existence is a teleological game played by some cosmic egotist with a grey beard and a penchant for floods, plague and pestilence, only detracts from the wondrousness of the universe. The discourses on nature provided by the natural sciences invite more wonder than the guilt-ridden fantasies of Christianity.

If Wittgenstein had religious belief, it only demonstrates that he was unable to rise above the superstitions of his age.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Wittgenstein had some sort of 'religious' experience on the Italian Front in WW1, and he added certain 'mytsical' comments to the last few sections of the Tractatus (his first book) as a result. Nothing like this had appeared in his work earlier (his Notebooks are free of this stuff), and it bears no relation to the thrust of the Tractatus.

He certainly was a 'religious' man for the rest of his life, but the 'mystical' element was dropped, and never re-surfaces. He converted to Roman Catholicism on his death bed.

Having said this, from at least the late 1920s onward, his ideas drifted far to the left, to such an extent that he expressed sympathy toward the gains of the Russian revolution and with what Lenin had tried to do. He even wanted to go and live and teach in Russia, and was offered the chair of Philosophy at the University of Kazan (Lenin's old University).

I have assembled all the evidence that strongly suggests that Wittgenstein was the most left wing of all the major philosophers since Marx -- and thus arguably, to this day --, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Wittgenstein.htm

It has to be said: Wittgenstein's remarks on religion are almost totally worthless.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


If Wittgenstein had religious belief, it only demonstrates that he was unable to rise above the superstitions of his age.

That's quite amusing coming from a fan of the 'dialectic'.

[ZeroNowhere]

While I would have to read more of his work on the subject in order to determine this, and probably won't get to that for quite a while, there's an interesting work on the subject here (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/james_still/w_why.html). It would seem that he shared Hegel's revulsion for the idea of god as some separate being, "It is a dogma of the Roman Church that the existence of God can be proved by natural reason. Now this dogma would make it impossible for me to be a Roman Catholic. If I thought of God as another being like myself, outside myself, only infinitely more powerful, then I would regard it as my duty to defy him."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I think his concept of 'god' was more like that of Kierkegaard, than that of Hegel.

[ZeroNowhere]

It's quite possible, though I don't know enough on Kierkegaard to comment too much. Hegel is just the first thing that came to mind when reading that quote, though of course Wittgenstein differed from Hegel quite a bit on the subject (considering that a large part of Hegel's philosophy involves his views on god, this is pretty much inevitable). In fact, Wittgenstein's reasoning in the quote itself is quite different from Hegel's reasoning in rejecting the same concept.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

It's more than possible. We know Wittgenstein had studied Kierkegaard's work, but we do not know if he had read much Hegel, or any at all.

[JoyDivision]

I know most disciples of Wittgenstein generally just disregard his mystical/metaphysical comments, but I am no disciple, I have no vested interested in whether W. conforms to what I want him to.


We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course then there is no question left, and just this is the answer.(6.52)

There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical (6.522)

What can be shown, cannot be said.(4.1212)


Clearly he is suggesting in Tractatus that what is of ultimate philosophic importance is beyond scientific knowledge.

The odd thing is that none of the people that sort of follow in his footsteps, the postivists ect. even try to explain why these statement occur in the Tractatus, or interpret them in terms of the antimetaphysical trust of most of his work. They are just outright ignored, along with the metaphysics of logical atomism that underlies the first part of the book.

WTF history of philosophy, your politics has forsaken me yet again

[spiltteeth]

So what? I get that. I call it phenomenological ecstasy. Existence is extraordinary. But these feelings do not have to lead to religious belief. In fact, the notion that existence is a teleological game played by some cosmic egotist with a grey beard and a penchant for floods, plague and pestilence, only detracts from the wondrousness of the universe. The discourses on nature provided by the natural sciences invite more wonder than the guilt-ridden fantasies of Christianity.

If Wittgenstein had religious belief, it only demonstrates that he was unable to rise above the superstitions of his age.

OOOOK. My point is that such an experience of 'How extraordinary that anything should exist!'" often naturally leads to Leibitzs comment, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and to the limits of philosophy, to places where religion and philosophy often intersect etc

I've noticed yr posts are riddled with superstitions and unjustified presuppositions...

Even in this last post :


the notion that existence is a teleological game

Who has this notion?


played by some cosmic egotist with a grey beard and a penchant for floods,

Who believes in this? What "gray beard"?


only detracts from the wondrousness of the universe.

In fact, it provides the dround to make sense of it all (the uniformity of nature, laws of logic, moral statments etc)


The discourses on nature provided by the natural sciences invite more wonder than the guilt-ridden fantasies of Christianity.

I'll simply ask you to prove its a "fantasy".
Where does this fantasy reside? In the brain? Do you think we have "minds" that hold "fantasies"?
Where do beliefs reside? In the soul? How can beliefs exist? What are they made of?
So many superstitions....

It sounds as if yr fighting some fantasies of yr own Bob....

[Buffalo Souljah]

I'm told there is alot of similarity between Thomas Aquinus and O'l Witti.There is certainly the same committment to clarity and logical consistency in both men. This is not to be questioned. However, I have read there are actually more similarities between W and Augustine, whom he quoted in the beginning of PI, and about whose work, Confessions, he was known to have said 'it was the most serious book ever written.' Here is an article (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit33.html#Augustine-contrasting-views) on the relations between the two men.

Regardless of his own religious inclinations (which I would argue would only be demonstrable by the events of his own biography), W's beliefs on the philosophy of religion seem to uphold a firm commitment to 'clarifying' the 'meaning' of the language used in religious language-games. Whether or not they are 'true' is for him not a matter of consequence; they merely 'are.' The idea that is so different (and what might at first glance appear Hegelian) is his belief that religion represents 'non-verbal' facets of human existence which could be interpreted as an allegation of the Absolute, that it somehow relies on foundational 'images' in relation to which any 'meaning' might derive. In that sense, religion seems more often than not to ask 'questions without answers' (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit12.html#a-god-who-sees-what-we-cannot-see) in W's sense. I think, though, what was meant more than transcendental notions of anything was an understanding that, whatever 'religion' was, it could not be rationalized the same way a scientific proposition or a mathematical formula could

I think, rather, W's main intention in these and other 'ramblings' (for they have been largely excluded from what is being studied today of him) constitute an attempt to come to terms with the ultimate dichotomy between 'appearance' and 'reality', the same problem that faced Nietzsche a half century earlier. W believes that language involves certain liberties on the part of the imagination, including the use of the connotative 'standing for' function of words which in referring to objects and processes in reality never ultimately and finally 'constitute' those objects and processes but are limited by the rules of language and individual interpretation, as well as the context in which they are used. This is IMO best represented by the 'cricket in the box' game, where each individual 'has' a 'vision' of 'reality', but is not able to 'speak' or express that vision to anyone else, nor 'understand' any one else's interpretation on the same basis.


"What men mean when they say, The world is there, lies close to my heart" says alot about W's beliefs about the role of religion in the world. It is certainly not 'rational'. (We can even see inklings of Rudolf Otto's notion of the mysterium tremendum here.) I'm not sure what religion then becomes, but I'm sure it's not something we can identify and distinguish from other types of human expression: art, music, literature.

Perhaps what W says about language can just as easily be applied to religion:
Our language gets its meaning from the use we as a community make of it as we live our life; when it is removed from that way of life, it becomes nonsense (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit7a.html#we-learned-language).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


The odd thing is that none of the people that sort of follow in his footsteps, the postivists ect. even try to explain why these statement occur in the Tractatus, or interpret them in terms of the antimetaphysical trust of most of his work. They are just outright ignored, along with the metaphysics of logical atomism that underlies the first part of the book.

That is not true, there are plenty of commentators who analyse this aspect of the Tractatus.

However, as I pointed out above, these mystical passages were a late addition, and bear no deep relation to the anti-metaphysical and logical thrust of the book.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


Perhaps what W says about language can just as easily be applied to religion:

Indeed, and that is partly why his comments about religion are worthless.

[JoyDivision]

JD:That is not true, there are plenty of commentators who analyse this aspect of the Tractatus.

However, as I pointed out above, these mystical passages were a late addition, and bear no deep relation to the anti-metaphysical and logical thrust of the book.


I had in mind more like the logical positivists, not random guy in the wasteland of second order philosophers. Anywa, this was a statement about history of philosophy, not secondary literature.

I don't know exactly what "deep relation" means here. If you mean they are rather contrary to much of the book, then yeah, which to me would beg that they need to be analyzed even more. Other than that, you'll have to clarify.

[Meridian]

However, I have read there are actually more similarities between W and Augustine, whom he quoted in the beginning of PI,
Unless I am completely mistaken, Wittgenstein there quotes Augustine in the effort of giving an example of what he intends to argue against later in the same work.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


I don't know exactly what "deep relation" means here. If you mean they are rather contrary to much of the book, then yeah, which to me would beg that they need to be analyzed even more. Other than that, you'll have to clarify.

Well, as I noted, Wittgenstein added the 'mystical' passages after the main part of the Tractatus had been written, and because he had already made the 'saying/showing' distinction in relation to the formal properties of language/logic, he imagined he could do the same with the mystical.

But, the two argument structures are completely different. In relation to the formal properties of language, we can try to say what we mean, but we end up producing non-sense when we do. In relation to the mystical, on the other hand, we can't even begin to say anything. That's why he enjoins slience in the last sentene of the book.

So, the links between the two parts are superficial.

The main thrust of the Tractatus is totally unaffected if the 'mystical' sections are left out.

Finally, apologies for misunderstanding your other point.:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


However, I have read there are actually more similarities between W and Augustine, whom he quoted in the beginning of PI,

He quotes him and then proceeds to pull his ideas apart.

[ZeroNowhere]

[/I]Unless I am completely mistaken, Wittgenstein there quotes Augustine in the effort of giving an example of what he intends to argue against later in the same work.
Perhaps the point being made by the poster was that the quote indicates that Wittgenstein probably had read Augustine, and may have agreed with him on other matters?

[Buffalo Souljah]

^^indeed.


Wittgenstein told Norman Malcolm (Memoir of Wittgenstein, 2nd ed. (1984), p.59-60) that he had chosen to quote St. Augustine at the beginning of his Investigations, not because Augustine's view [picture] of language was unique (It might be found in many writers), but out of his deep respect for Augustine. (Robert Wesley Angelo, WIttgenstein's Logic of Language, 33 (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit33.html))

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Indeed, Wittgenstein had deep respect for certain philosophers (such as Aristotle) and theologians (like Augustine), but that did not mean he held back from criticising them.

[black magick hustla]

I think wittgenisten's religious take on is really interesting because it is basically an implementation of his philosophy of the "unspeakable" to his life. He never tried to prove the existence of god. or used ultra-rationalistic argument to prove its necessity. Rather, religion is nonsensical, in the same way ethics and aesthetics are.

To wittgenstein, maybe god resolves his so called "problem of life".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I think you are right, but that just shows how worthless his comments are. For example, it is not at all clear how that about which we can say nothing can resolve anything, let alone the 'problem of life'.

It is also worth recalling that Wittgenstein uses the word 'nonsense' in a rather special way (which is not related to its ordinary use, or to the use to which it was put by the Logical Positivists).

In that case, I always highlight this difference by re-writing it thus: "non-sense".

I have explained more here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1680732&postcount=38

[Buffalo Souljah]

He never tried to prove the existence of god. or used ultra-rationalistic argument to prove its necessity. Rather, religion is nonsensical, in the same way ethics and aesthetics are.

Wittgenstein clearly is not saying that religion is 'nonsense':
Nonsense is produced by trying to apply to a sign a grammar that is not its own (PP iii, p. 312). E.g. with an apparent question like 'What color is the number 3?' which tries to treat the number-word '3' as if it were a name-of-object word. The rule 'Numbers are no color' belongs to the grammar of number-words. [Note 13 (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt3.html#Footnote-13)]
I think the really noteworthy thing about W's philosophy of religion (and this is to contest Rosa's argument that his views are 'worthless', which I disagree with) is that, instead of outrightly dismissing it as an irrational volition, as 'nonsense', he attempts, instead of applying arbitrary logical parameters to it and rationalize it until it's been all whittled away, to interpret religion impartially, as yet another variation of language-games-- structures with their own rules and 'grammar' (W has his own distinct notion of grammar (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt1.html)). He does not label religion as 'right' or 'wrong': for him it simply 'is', and to speak of it, one must take it at its own terms, and udnerstand that its images/symbols/'rules' derive out of and refer to a specific social context, outside of which it bears no ultimate 'meaning', outside of which it would be nonsense.


I think wittgenisten's religious take on is really interesting because it is basically an implementation of his philosophy of the "unspeakable" to his life.

W views religion as constituting not just 'the unspeakable' (though that does play a role in his interpretation); for him it is also normative, moral, subjective and amorphous (and I could find quotes to back this assertion up, if you like), qualities/forms/'images' which each are all elements of our irrational (though not necessarily non-verbal) instincts. For him, the less we say about religion, the more it is able to 'work', the more we are able to 'live' it. Perhaps this is artistic (read: philosophic) license on my part, but I believe what's left behind of his writings would verify this interpretation:


We talk about ghosts, angels, elves, and say, "No one can prove that they don't exist!" No, no one can ... but that only means that the word 'prove' is defined by stating a method of proof (verification-falsification). But it belongs to the grammar (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt1.html) of words like 'elf' and 'spirit' that we do not allow any such method. That is a rule of this "game" -- i.e. a rule belonging to the family of language-games (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt3.html#language-games-as-parts-of-speech) called 'fairy tales'. And therefore to demand a method of verification here would be to misunderstand the logic of this language, to misunderstand this particular form of human life (http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt5.html#forms-of-life).

Instead of telling a clock to read shapes and colors, we should understand the 'game' of the clock consists in a relation between numbers. The same can be said of his views on religion. I hope this clears things up.

[JoyDivision]

But, the two argument structures are completely different. In relation to the formal properties of language, we can try to say what we mean, but we end up producing non-sense when we do. In relation to the mystical, on the other hand, we can't even begin to say anything. That's why he enjoins slience in the last sentene of the book.On the other hand they are similar because the problems of philosophy are deeply rooted in us and hold high amounts of significance, but are nonsensical when elucidated. Philosophic questions have the character of depth, but when posed by language, are ultimately unintelligible.

Likewise, as per mystical, science cannot touch the problems of life.


The distinction qua language picks out problems of deep significance that cannot be touched by philosophic elucidation, and the recognition of these problems grounds his mysticism. It functions to delimit showing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


Wittgenstein clearly is not saying that religion is 'nonsense':

And yet it follows other things he says.


I think the really noteworthy thing about W's philosophy of religion (and this is to contest Rosa's argument that his views are 'worthless', which I disagree with) is that, instead of outrightly dismissing it as an irrational volition, as 'nonsense', he attempts, instead of applying arbitrary logical parameters to it and rationalize it until it's been all whittled away, to interpret religion impartially, as yet another variation of language-games -- structures with their own rules and 'grammar' (W has his own distinct notion of grammar). He does not label religion as 'right' or 'wrong': for him it simply 'is', and to speak of it, one must take it at its own terms, and understand that its images/symbols/'rules' derive out of and refer to a specific social context, outside of which it bears no ultimate 'meaning', outside of which it would be nonsense.

Well, the language game metaphor was introduced by Wittgenstein to act as a method of comparison, not as way of advancing philosophical theses about things like religion.

The problem with the metaphor, if pushed too far, is that all games share certain things in common.

For example; (1) They have rules, and the rules have to be applied with some sort of consistency. [Otherwise there would be no such thing as cheating.]

(2) All games are constrained by the physical limitations social and natural life impose on us all. For example, it's no use trying to play rugby (or American football) with an invisible ball, or swim in molten lead, or play baseball with a bat made of ice, or play a game of poker for 1000 years, under water.

(3) All games use words taken from ordinary language, and require the application of practical skills acquired in communal life. For example, a ball in tennis is a sphere (obviously!), and so is a ball in snooker, and in soccer (and many other games). But who would argue that the use of the word "ball" in these games is hermetically sealed off from its use in ordinary life, or in other games? And kicking is the same in soccer as it is in kick-boxing and in rugby (American football). These activities are the same as they are in ordinary life, and do not have their own 'logic'. Same with lying. If you lie in soccer its the same as lying in tennis (telling a falsehood with the intent to deceive). And so on.

There are many other crossovers, but these will do for now.

So, the language game analogy was one of Wittgenstein's worst ideas. It has limited application at best, and it certainly does not apply to religion. Believers do not consider themselves engaged in a hermetically-sealed 'language game'. Their ideas, they hold, apply to everything in existence, and apply in every other sphere of life. So, their use of language is imperialistic; it seeks to invade every aspect of human existence.

Wittgenstein's approach to religious belief was revisionary, which makes it totally out-of-keeping with the general thrust of his work: Philosophy has no business revising stuff.

Now, I have been using Wittgenstein's other (and much more defensible) core ideas to show that religious belief is non-sensical -- in a debate I was having with Spiltteeth, over in Religion.

You can find my arguments here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/history-christianity-t115173/index4.html

It begins at the foot of the page.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


On the other hand they are similar because the problems of philosophy are deeply rooted in us and hold high amounts of significance, but are nonsensical when elucidated. Philosophic questions have the character of depth, but when posed by language, are ultimately unintelligible.

Well, I don't think they are; they are rooted in a misuse of language, and are thus easy to rectify.


Likewise, as per mystical, science cannot touch the problems of life.

It can touch many of them. Such as dying of small pox, or all your children dying before they reach three. These, and many others like them, were certainly 'problems of life' in the past; many still are. Science has largely solved these.


The distinction qua language picks out problems of deep significance that cannot be touched by philosophic elucidation, and the recognition of these problems grounds his mysticism. It functions to delimit showing.

But, as soon as you try to say what they show, you end up with non-sense. In other words, there is nothing there to address.

[black magick hustla]

I think you are right, but that just shows how worthless his comments are. For example, it is not at all clear how that about which we can say nothing can resolve anything, let alone the 'problem of life'.

It is also worth recalling that Wittgenstein uses the word 'nonsense' in a rather special way (which is not related to its ordinary use, or to the use to which it was put by the Logical Positivists).


I think his point of the unspeakable is not so much you say nothing, but that what you say is nonsense. But as you say nonsense is not related to its ordinary use, so some nonsense can be really important to someboddy but it has nothing to do with its sense. For example, poetry, songs, a love letter, religion, etcetera. I think his point on the problem of life is actually one of the most important ones.

[black magick hustla]

JD:



It can touch many of them. Such as dying of small pox, or all your children dying before they reach three. These, and many others like them, were certainly 'problems of life' in the past; many still are. Science has largely solved these.




I don't think this is what he means by problem of life though. I think he means with issues about the "meaning of life", "what is good", "god", existential angst etcetera. Things that by wittgensteinian virtue are nonhsensical but at the same time important to people.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

maldoror:


I think his point of the unspeakable is not so much you say nothing, but that what you say is nonsense. But as you say nonsense is not related to its ordinary use, so some nonsense can be really important to someboddy but it has nothing to do with its sense. For example, poetry, songs, a love letter, religion, etcetera. I think his point on the problem of life is actually one of the most important ones.

Well, it can be, just like a teddy bear can be important, but who wants to make a religion out of that?

[075]

Me!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

maldoror:


I don't think this is what he means by problem of life though. I think he means with issues about the "meaning of life", "what is good", "god", existential angst etcetera. Things that by wittgensteinian virtue are nonhsensical but at the same time important to people.

Well, I was specifically using a Wittgensteinian technique: when someone wants to make a metaphysical statement, we point out that 1) they are using ordinary words in an odd way, and 2) we bring that use back to the ordinary employment of langauge.

So, I was (a) deliberately using 'problems of life' in an ordinary sense in order to underline (b) that the religious use of such words is odd, and has no content at all.

One might just as well say "BuBuBu" (to use another of Wittgenstein's words).

As I noted, if one applies Wittgenstein's method, religious belief falls apart, not so much as non-sense, but as incomprehensible non-sense.

This is the line of attack I took with Spiltteth in the thread I mentioned in an earlier post.

[JoyDivision]

Well, I don't think they are; they are rooted in a misuse of language, and are thus easy to rectify.All that is being said is that the great problems of philosophy hold a particular significance in human life. If you don't feel it, then all I can do is report to you that I do, regardless of weather W. is right about them being nonsensical.



But, as soon as you try to say what they show, you end up with non-sense. In other words, there is nothing there to address. Isn't that just what showing is defined to be. There is nothing there for language to address.

As for "problems of life", again it's just a phrase to denote certain problems that are significant to individuals, but language cannot handle. You can apply the method all you want and think you've done something, but it has already been said that such things are a matter of showing, so it achieves nothing. The point has already been assumed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


All that is being said is that the great problems of philosophy hold a particular significance in human life. If you don't feel it, then all I can do is report to you that I do, regardless of weather W. is right about them being nonsensical.

They do for a tiny minority. Even more hold that Hitler's birthday has great significance, but does that make it so?

And when you attempt to tell us what this 'significance' is, all we are likely to get are empty phrases.


Isn't that just what showing is defined to be. There is nothing there for language to address.

Not so with formal concepts in the Tractatus. It is possible to say something non-sensical. With the mystical, it is impossible to say anything at all comprehensible. So, as far as the rest of us can determine, there is nothing there at all.

Indeed, mystics might just as well utter "BuBuBu" for all the good it does.

[JoyDivision]

They do for a tiny minority. Even more hold that Hitler's birthday has great significance, but does that make it so?

Here's where the discussion ends. You are considering the connection I and most other people feel to certain problems philosophy has traditionally tried to elucidate, and you compare it to Hitler's birthday. Delightfully preposterous, but a closed frame of mind in a discussion that requires it not to be. This is your problem, and is of no philosophic concern.



With the mystical, it is impossible to say anything at all comprehensible. So, as far as the rest of us can determine, there is nothing there at all.

If that's how you want to frame it I really don't care, but the "rest of us" refers to no one but extremely rigid analytical individuals with an agenda. You can lie to yourself about these things, but the rest of us know what's up.

Hmm, good job, this discussion lasted longer than I thought it would. You're making progress.

I'm outtie.

[spiltteeth]

Well, I don't know the truth, but I've been told that W and Aquinas had similarities in their idea's of religious language - Aquinas apparently thought of religious language as analogous?
I've been recommended books on this topic - "the language of revelation" "The coherence of theism" "The grammar of grace"
I haven't yet read them though.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


Here's where the discussion ends. You are considering the connection I and most other people feel to certain problems philosophy has traditionally tried to elucidate, and you compare it to Hitler's birthday. Delightfully preposterous, but a closed frame of mind in a discussion that requires it not to be. This is your problem, and is of no philosophic concern.

Considering that traditional philosophy is little other than ruling-class ideology, the distance between these two is less than one might think.


If that's how you want to frame it I really don't care, but the "rest of us" refers to no one but extremely rigid analytical individuals with an agenda. You can lie to yourself about these things, but the rest of us know what's up.

And what exactly is 'up'?


Hmm, good job, this discussion lasted longer than I thought it would. You're making progress.

You aren't.


I'm outtie.

I reluctantly accept your capitulation.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Spiltteeth:


Well, I don't know the truth, but I've been told that W and Aquinas had similarities in their idea's of religious language - Aquinas apparently thought of religious language as analogous?

Following Aristotle, Aquinas (and other medieval and modern theologians) did indeed think that the signification of religious language could be explained by the use of analogy. But, since the logic of analogy has not advanced much since Aristotle's day (with minor advances being made by Aquinas and Suarez) we still have no idea what these theologians were attempting to say.

After studying Wittgenstein intensively for over 30 years, I know of no place in his writings (published and unpublished) where he even so much as mentions Aquinas and his doctrine of analogy -- and no wonder, he'd have regarded it as non-sensical metaphysics. His notion of 'god' was more closely allied to that of Kierkegaard.

[JoyDivision]

All you do is repeatedly assert the conclusions of highly entrenched philosophic positions. There's no room for investigation, give and take, or really even the sharing of ideas. It simply isn't an interesting way to do philosophy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


All you do is repeatedly assert the conclusions of highly entrenched philosophic positions. There's no room for investigation, give and take, or really even the sharing of ideas. It simply isn't an interesting way to do philosophy.

1) And you keep saying you are done, but it turns out that you were merely joshing.

2) I have no 'philosophical position' and do not want one. I reject philosophy as so much ruling class-hot air. Small wonder then that philosophy hasn't solved a single problem in 2500 years, and is no closer to doing so than was Plato.

[JoyDivision]

That is really, well, stupid. Both that you don't think you have a philosophic position when quite clearly everything you say assumes some sort of naturalized scientiism, and that philosophy is ruling class ideology when philosophers come from all walks of life and represent some of humanities greatest rebels. Philosophers have been disabusing us from bullshit whimsical type folk psychology and religious doctrine for 300 hundred years. You have no idea what you are talking about, absolutely no idea.


And if you think philosophy's success is defined by how many problems it "solves" then you both don't know what philosophy is, and are unfamiliar with how many of the greatest philosophers themselves viewed philosophy.


Like I said, a highly entrenched philosophy, that is employed as established "fact" at all times. Well, I suppose it's more like taking a well established philosophy and turning it into an ideology. Just not interesting in the slightest.

[black magick hustla]

JD:



They do for a tiny minority. Even more hold that Hitler's birthday has great significance, but does that make it so?

And when you attempt to tell us what this 'significance' is, all we are likely to get are empty phrases.
.

you get empty phrases but there is a psychological element associated with it. nonsense can say something about someone's psychological state, like poetry. so it doesnt matter if he is saying bubububu or not, the problem is there.

[JoyDivision]

^^Here comes something completely unrelated about "ruling-class ideology". I'm on the edge of my seat.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

JoyDivision, I feel your frustration as I have been there. I can't be sure whether my frustrations are due to a lack of understanding or a legitimate disagreement. I do, however, know I'm partially to blame for my failure to take the time to properly investigate Wittgenstein. I've done some reading, but whenever I'm doing academic philosophy, it tends to diminish my enjoyment of reading philosophy for leisure. I think I read more difficult philosophy out of class than in it.

Anyway, I think the idea is that philosophy is trying to use a methodology to solve problems that is inefficient. It draws on available evidence and laws concerning the universe. It then makes a conclusion.

However, that's the better of philosophy. Much of it gets a conclusion, then uses that conclusion in another argument, ad infinitum. Then Descartes tries to prove things by sitting in a chair. Modal Logicians are an interesting bunch that have gave the philosophy engine some more fuel. However, Quine critiqued the field, and those who agree with his critique also tend to be Wittgenstein fans.

They all have their little groups. The issue is that presuming a negative is far easier. Philosophy has to decide when something is true. It hasn't because it argues about that. Science has a system that determines truth.

Philosophy utilizes complex systems that can trick people into believing false things or maintaining ruling class ideas. For instance, there is a large amount of what philosophers consider "pseudo-philosophy" that defends religious belief sets that are clearly outdated. They create elaborate theories and jump through hoops to defend a particular idea.

Ultimately, the ideas that are going to be defended are those the writer favors, and the writer may favor what exists in their particular cultural context. That being said, I don't fall into the anti-philosophical camp. I have been gradually convinced to be more sympathetic to some of the views. Though what I consider philosophy done "properly" might not even be how Wittgenstein's "team" would define the subject.

I think the key to philosophical usefulness is a recognition of its pragmatic nature. Have people agree on the science. Utilizes the science to promote the values and ideas shown to be beneficial.

Consider philosophy the art of turning quasi-fictional interpretations of reality into "reality." Then again, I'm a strange sort. I believe that if "thinking the sun revolves around the sun benefits all sentient creatures, the sun "does" revolve around the earth." At the same time, it doesn't, and these beliefs are in no way contradictory towards one another.

The issue is many scientists want to trample over alternative methodologies of explaining reality. Science should concern itself with utilities. If the methodologies are shown to be minimizing utility, then you can criticize them. For much of philosophy, this would be a valid critique, I suspect, but I am a bit sleepy and starting to ramble.

Try not to go too crazy on the Internet. I say believe everything anyone tells you as long as it isn't dangerous. See where that takes you for a hours of thought. If you don't get any use out of it, feel free to do as you wish.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


That is really, well, stupid. (1) Both that you don't think you have a philosophic position when quite clearly everything you say assumes some sort of (2) naturalized scientism, and that philosophy is ruling class ideology when (3) philosophers come from all walks of life and represent some of humanities greatest rebels. (4) Philosophers have been disabusing us from bullshit whimsical type folk psychology and religious doctrine for 300 hundred years. (5) You have no idea what you are talking about, absolutely no idea.

Numbers added.

Taking each in turn:

1) You merely assert I have a 'philosophical position', but neglected to prove it. So, let's see you put your evidence where your over-sized gob is.

2) Where have I even so much as suggested this? Again, no evidence.

3) Sure, but so what? As Marx said, the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, and traditional philosophers have endeavoured to derive fundamental a priori theses about reality, true for all of space and time, from thought/words alone. Here is how I have outlined this in an Introductory Essay as my site:


In the 'West' since Ancient Greek times traditional thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature. In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated into traditional thought so deeply that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them. Or, rather, they fail to see its significance.

Now, if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or, rather, a significant section of "opinion formers", minor officials and administrators) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and thus cannot be fought. As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies.

All of these were imposed on reality by those who invented them -- plainly, since they cannot be read from it.

Indeed, this is how Marx depicted things:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, pp.64-65.]

As Marx notes, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system as 'rational', 'natural', or 'god-ordained' -- that underlying appearances, there is a hidden world which is more real than the material world around us

In Ancient Greece, with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old myths and Theogonies were no longer relevant. So, in the newly emerging republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC, far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were needed.

Enter Philosophy.

From its inception, philosophers constructed increasingly baroque and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which their inventors then happily imposed on nature.

Again, as Marx also pointed out:


"...The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Ibid., p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Philosophers felt they could read their doctrines into nature, since, for them, nature was Mind (or, indeed, the product of Mind). In that case, the human mind could safely project its thoughts onto a world created by Mind. True thoughts were a "reflection" of underlying reality, anyway. "As above, so below", went the old Hermetic saying. The microcosm of the mind "reflected" the macrocosm of the universe. The doctrine of Correspondences thus came to dominate all ancient and modern theories of knowledge -- on this view, 'philosophical' truth corresponded with hidden 'essences' which supposedly underpinned the world of 'appearances'. These 'essences' were impossible to detect by any material means, hence they were accessible by thought alone. As Novack pointed out, this made all such theories Idealist.

Again, as Marx noted, these systems were based on the idea that language somehow contained a secret code that 'enabled' traditional theorists to represent to themselves the rational order underlying "appearances", the hidden "secrets of nature", and in any cases the "Mind of God".

Language was thus viewed primarily as a means of representation and not as a means of communication -- as Marx and Engels had claimed.

This ancient theoretical tradition has changed many times throughout history as different Modes of Production rose and fell, but its main features have remained basically the same: the dogmatic promulgation of abstract theories that were supposed to reveal the underlying rational structure of reality, conveniently hidden from the disconfirming gaze of ordinary working people (which is why such dogmas were and still are inexpressible in ordinary language --, again, as Marx pointed out).

So, like Theology, but in this case in a far more abstract and increasingly secularised form, subsequent philosophies came to reflect the 'essential' structure of reality that supposedly underpinned and rationalised alienated class society, mystified now by the use of increasingly obscure terminology and technical jargon. [How this is connected with attempts to legitimate class power is outlined below.]

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

4) Perhaps so, but they have been equally happy to formulate a priori theories of their own, continuing in the traditional way outlined above, but now overlain with ideas steeped in bourgeois individualism.

5) And you are long on assertion, short on proof.


And if you think philosophy's success is defined by how many problems it "solves" then you both don't know what philosophy is, and are unfamiliar with how many of the greatest philosophers themselves viewed philosophy.

In fact, I have been reading and studying philosophy since the early 1970s, and I have yet to come across a single philosophical 'problem' that we are any nearer to solving than was Plato. Perhaps you know differently, but you unwisely kept that to yourself.

And now you say that philosophy's success is not defined by how many problems it has solved, and you are wise to take that view, since it hasn't solved a single one.

But, it's lack of success is perhaps clearer to see from the additional fact that we are no nearer to a solution to a single one than was Plato. Indeed, in that philosophy is now vastly more complex than it was 2500 years ago, we are arguably further away from a single solution than was Plato.

So, not so much 'progress' then than retrogression. You are welcome to this total waste of human energy.


Like I said, a highly entrenched philosophy, that is employed as established "fact" at all times. Well, I suppose it's more like taking a well established philosophy and turning it into an ideology. Just not interesting in the slightest.

Then stop posting such dreary stuff...

Oh, and by the way, we are still waiting for a clear explanation of "unchangeable".:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

maldoror:


you get empty phrases but there is a psychological element associated with it. nonsense can say something about someone's psychological state, like poetry. so it doesnt matter if he is saying bubububu or not, the problem is there.

Once more, one can get a 'psychological element' from a teddy bear. Perhaps then we should worship Paddington the Bear (http://www.paddingtonbear.com/)?

And, what 'problem'?

[black magick hustla]

maldoror:


Once more, one can get a 'psychological element' from a teddy bear. Perhaps then we should worship Paddington the Bear (http://www.paddingtonbear.com/)?



yes. it is possible someone replaces an empty aspect of their lives with a teddy bear. does not remove the issue.


And, what 'problem'?

the problem of life.

[black magick hustla]

maldoror:

And, what 'problem'?

I don't know if addressing as a problem is correct, but since the beginning of civilization people have tried to address questions like how much a life is worth, the meaning of life, what is good, etcetera and they build religions around it. All these questions are the "problem of life" and wittgenstein's solution is the "dissolution of the problem". I dont think he just meant that this feelings are not real, simply that, the "solution" is a matter of "showing", not speaking. I.e. you are not going to argue your way through it. I don't think it is just as simple as say they do not exist, or they are empty, because to most people these issues are very real. Simply, that the ordinary way of adressing them is worthless (i.e. philosophizing about it).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

maldoror:


I don't know if addressing as a problem is correct, but since the beginning of civilization people have tried to address questions like how much a life is worth, the meaning of life, what is good, etcetera and they build religions around it. All these questions are the "problem of life" and wittgenstein's solution is the "dissolution of the problem". I dont think he just meant that this feelings are not real, simply that, the "solution" is a matter of "showing", not speaking. I.e. you are not going to argue your way through it. I don't think it is just as simple as say they do not exist, or they are empty, because to most people these issues are very real. Simply, that the ordinary way of adressing them is worthless (i.e. philosophizing about it).

And Marx explained why they did this:


"The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man -- state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.

"Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.

"The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo." [Marx (1975) A Contribution To The Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy Of Right, p.244.]

And I agree that most people think these issues are real, but then that is just part of alienation.

[black magick hustla]

And I agree that most people think these issues are real, but then that is just part of alienation.

Yes. This does not address how do people solve how to behave, or why Marx should to try to save humanity rather than get a normal bourgeois education and live a nice life, like probably most of his friends and classmates did. Or why shouldn't I treat women like raw peaces of meat like a lot of my friends do. Marx just adresses the how, but he does not tell us why we should "ought".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Maldoror:


Yes. (1)This does not address how do people solve how to behave, or (2) why Marx thought it was a good idea to try to save humanity rather than get a normal bourgeois education and live a nice life, like probably most of his friends and classmates did. Or why (3) shouldn't I treat women like raw peaces of meat like a lot of my friends do. (4) Marx just adresses the how, but he does not tell us why we should "ought".

Numbers added.

Taking each in turn:

1) Sure, but then he wasn't concerned with this. And the alleged 'solutions' are also part of the problem (since they treat the symptons not the casue). Or do you imagine that, for example, eternal life is a solution?

2) Marx did not decide to 'save humanity'. Had he never lived, the class war would still have gone its way. But, I think you mean, why did Marx decide to do what he did rather than just waste his life on wine and song? But, alienation itself produces rebels, and that is what Marx was. So, the conditions that make some look to religion, make others look to revolution.

3) Presumably because you are a socialist.

4) That we have to supply ourselves.

[black magick hustla]

Maldoror:



Numbers added.

Taking each in turn:

1) Sure, but then he wasn't concerned with this. And the alleged 'solutions' are also part of the problem (since they treat the symptons not the casue). Or do you imagine that, for example, eternal life is a solution?

2) Marx did not decide to 'save humanity'. Had he never lived, the class war would still have gone its way. But, I think you mean, why did Marx decide to do what he did rather than just waste his life on wine and song? But, alienation itself produces rebels, and that is what Marx was. So, the conditions that make some look to religion, make others look to revolution.

3) Presumably because you are a socialist.

4) That we have to supply ourselves.

1) Yes, there is no "solution", at least not one you can express in words because the problem itself is nonsensical. The issue here is that it is something very real, so much that someone as smart as Wittgenstein adressed it with his "silent" religion. I suspect it had very little to do with the deadweight of tradition because his family was jewish, not christian.

2) I was being facetious when I said "save humanity". What I mean is that he did what he thought was correct even if it meant to live in bitter poverty.

3) Yes, but you cannot reason your way through that solution. it is something that is "shown" rather than said.

4) Yes, of course. But the point is that we supply axioms that we take for granted, we dont really philosophize about them. Of course, because ehtical propositions are generally nonsensical, they cannot be true or false. However, they are very important, and they are issues we adress, although not necessarily by arguing about them to find "truth".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'm sorry but I just can't summon up the will to continue this aimless debate.

[JoyDivision]

1) You merely assert I have a 'philosophical position', but neglected to prove it. If you want to make preposterous claims, then I'm going to point them out, but I'm not going to get sucked into a debate. Especially about weather someone has a philosophic position when that person constantly discusses philosophy through the perspective of a highly entrenched analytic position. It's just a bizarrely pointless and stupid claim to make, that's that.

2. reference one


Sure, but so what? As Marx said, the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, and traditional philosophers have endeavoured to derive fundamental a priori theses about reality, true for all of space and time, from thought/words alone. Here is how I have outlined this in an Introductory Essay as my site:Oh holy Jesus, another, "look what I did" post.


In the 'West' since Ancient Greek times traditional thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature. In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated into traditional thought so deeply that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them. Or, rather, they fail to see its significance.
This is silly, that's what humans do when they think, they try to create narratives about how nature works and things come to be, and that is more or less what you are doing now - Generating a narrative about how philosophers have behaved. I don't know what version of history says that common folk are these enlightened scientists that have been manipulated by philosophers into adopting metaphysical narratives, but it's stupid from beginning to end. Philosophy has been at odds with ruling class ideas since it's beginning, Socrates made sure of that when he drank the hemlock after espousing ideas that threatened the legitimacy of Athens elite. Philosophy is revolt.

That is why the historically great philosophers are considered the historically great philosophers, they are the iconoclasts of their time. THey advance us out of the shackles of the dominant metaphysics of the time and in it's wake build more scientific and less restraining narratives. There are a few roadbumps, but i can think of no single celebrated philosopher that took the dominant and popular beleif system of the time and said "you know what, this just isn't restrictive enough, this just doesn't have enough religion and mechanisms of control, allow me to remedy that."

Take, for example, the Enlightenment. Philosophers In terms of both philosophy and government they made massive steps forward. They overthrew the dominant ass backwards religious dogma of the time, secured empirical investigation as legitimate, laid the foundations for government to be based on things other than divine right, and among other things, secured positive rights for mankind. All of these things represent a counter-thrust to the ruling class of the time. Yes, they set up an imperfect system in it's place, and that system is repressive, but that doesn't change the fact that they represent a significant move foward for mankind, including workers.



How about this, just give us a few historical examples where a new philosophy functioned to emoldened the ruling class under which it was written, or represents a step backwards in terms of repressive ways of thinking and behaving.

[Meridian]

Socrates made sure of that when he drank the hemlock after espousing ideas that threatened the legitimacy of Athens elite.
Or perhaps he had it coming to him, what with all the bizarre ideas of higher knowledge, a world "beneath the surfaces" that only philosophers could perceive, etc.

I think philosophy shows little but disdain for working people in general, and especially the materialist/social use of language. And this coming from a philosophy student...

[JoyDivision]

Or perhaps he had it coming to him, what with all the bizarre ideas of higher knowledge, a world "beneath the surfaces" that only philosophers could perceive, etc.

I think philosophy shows little but disdain for working people in general, and especially the materialist/social use of language. And this coming from a philosophy student...

Dude, we're talking 2400 years ago. Consider what was being replaced when he was talking about higher knowledge and forms. It's just a hobbled together network of superstitions and man-gods that had social stratification built into it, and saw nature as unfolding like a book. I don't think anyone can say with a straight face that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle represent anything but a step forward. In terms of both them being in opposition to the power elite, and in giving an emancipatory way of thinking compared to what they're overthrowing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


If you want to make preposterous claims, then I'm going to point them out, but I'm not going to get sucked into a debate. Especially about weather someone has a philosophic position when that person constantly discusses philosophy through the perspective of a highly entrenched analytic position. It's just a bizarrely pointless and stupid claim to make, that's that.

Kop out.


This is silly, that's what humans do when they think, they try to create narratives about how nature works and things come to be, and that is more or less what you are doing now - Generating a narrative about how philosophers have behaved. I don't know what version of history says that common folk are these enlightened scientists that have been manipulated by philosophers into adopting metaphysical narratives, but it's stupid from beginning to end. Philosophy has been at odds with ruling class ideas since it's beginning, Socrates made sure of that when he drank the hemlock after espousing ideas that threatened the legitimacy of Athens elite. Philosophy is revolt.

Mine is an a posteriori scientific hypothesis (made true of false by the way the world is), which does not seek to derive truths about the world from thought alone. Traditional philosophers, in contrast, sought to do precisely that (whose theories are 'true'independently of the way the world is).


This is silly

Alas, you seem to be far better at abuse than effective argument.


That is why the historically great philosophers are considered the historically great philosophers, they are the iconoclasts of their time. THey advance us out of the shackles of the dominant metaphysics of the time and in it's wake build more scientific and less restraining narratives. There are a few roadbumps, but i can think of no single celebrated philosopher that took the dominant and popular beleif system of the time and said "you know what, this just isn't restrictive enough, this just doesn't have enough religion and mechanisms of control, allow me to remedy that."

You can't call Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Hegel, Bradley, Heidegger..., among many others, "iconoclasts" when it came to the traditional approach to philosophy: the promulgation of fundamental truths about reality, derived from language/thought alone, valid for all of space and time -- since they aped this method.


Take, for example, the Enlightenment. Philosophers In terms of both philosophy and government they made massive steps forward. They overthrew the dominant ass backwards religious dogma of the time, secured empirical investigation as legitimate, laid the foundations for government to be based on things other than divine right, and among other things, secured positive rights for mankind. All of these things represent a counter-thrust to the ruling class of the time. Yes, they set up an imperfect system in it's place, and that system is repressive, but that doesn't change the fact that they represent a significant move foward for mankind, including workers

What has this got to do with whether or not they challenged the traditional approach to philosophy? Nothing. They all copied it.


How about this, just give us a few historical examples where a new philosophy functioned to emolden[ed] the ruling class under which it was written, or represents a step backwards in terms of repressive ways of thinking and behaving.

Where did I allege they had to be this?

But the following will do: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Augustine, Boethius, Anslem, Aquinas, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel...

There are many others.

[JoyDivision]

Rosa, the issue of weather philosophers prop up the ruling class ideology is not resolved by picking out a "traditional approach to philosophy". It is resolved by whether they actually propped up the power elite at the time or not. The answer, ofcourse, is that they did not.

The fact that they were incapable of adopting current methods of empirical investigation does not mean they are ruling class, it means they cannot transcend their circumstances or their technological level. Philosophers are not timeless, they are historically contingent, and it is silly and pointless to criticize them for not being modern. They either progressed their age or they did not, and that is the only reasonable measure of their relation to ruling-class ideology.

[JoyDivision]

Mine is an a posteriori scientific hypothesis (made true of false by the way the world is), which does not seek to derive truths about the world from thought alone.No, you are considering history from a particular perspective and applying profoundly broad brush strokes. It is a narrative that can be neither strictly true nor strictly false, as no two time periods and no two philosophers are the same. It is a possible way of thinking about a whole bunch of individual which makes them cohere into one understandable narrative. Your narrative lives or dies by how powerful it's explanatory coherence is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


Rosa, the issue of weather philosophers prop up the ruling class ideology is not resolved by picking out a "traditional approach to philosophy". It is resolved by whether they actually propped up the power elite at the time or not. The answer, of course, is that they did not.

I have nowhere argued that philosophers 'propped up' the ruling-class. You need to learn to read more carefully.


The fact that they were incapable of adopting current methods of empirical investigation does not mean they are ruling class, it means they cannot transcend their circumstances or their technological level. Philosophers are not timeless, they are historically contingent, and it is silly and pointless to criticize them for not being modern. They either progressed their age or they did not, and that is the only reasonable measure of their relation to ruling-class ideology.

Bold added.

Where did I allege that philosophers were the ruling-class or were even part of it?

Are you on something?


No, you are considering history from a particular perspective and applying profoundly broad brush strokes. It is a narrative that can be neither strictly true nor strictly false, as no two time periods and no two philosophers are the same. It is a possible way of thinking about a whole bunch of individual which makes them cohere into one understandable narrative. Your narrative lives or dies by how powerful it's explanatory coherence is.

And that is precisely what an a posteriori hypothesis in history is.

Sure they are broad brush strokes, but that is what I warned readers about on the opening page of my site:


(7) These Essays represent work in progress; hence they do not necessarily reflect my final views.

I am only publishing this material on the Internet because several comrades whose opinions I respect urged me to do so, even though the work you see before you is less than half complete. Many of my ideas are still in the formative stage and need considerable attention and time devoted to them to mature.

I estimate this project will take another ten years to complete before it is fit to publish either here in its final version or in book form.

All of these Essays will have radically changed by then.

This work will be updated regularly -- edited and re-edited constantly --, its arguments clarified and progressively strengthened as my research continues (and particularly as my 'understanding' of Hegel develops).

So, visitors are encouraged to check back often.

Up to the middle of April 2010, I have posted Essays and other material totalling in excess of 1.8 million words. This is approximately 85% of all the material I have. Far more will be added as my researches continue.

However, much of the later half of this work exists only in note form, so the second set of Essays will appear here far more slowly than the first.

Now, when I fill in the fine detail, that will be in an essay over 150,000 words long. The material I posted above was merely a very basic introduction to my ideas that several here requested of me back in 2006.

In the meantime, I'm happy merely to agree with Marx:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an "eternal law." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, pp.64-65.]


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Ibid., p.118.]

Now, this forms the basis of my argument. It's possible you might disagree with Marx, but I do not, and neither do most of the comrades who post here.

Fortunately, I do not simply rely on naive faith in Marx; I think I can support my thesis both from what he says, and the historical record. If what I have posted above is not sufficient for you, then all I can say is wait until I have published the relevant essay, and/or read my next post.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is a summary of a very long and involved argument at my site in which I try to show how what I allege is ruling class ideology seems to gain a grip (apologies for the slight repetition below; this is because I used different versions of parts of the same argument to establish two different conclusions):



Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived.

Contrast this with a typical empirical proposition:

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, to the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative mood.

[Sometimes, the latter is beefed-up with subjunctive and/or modal qualifying terms (such as 'must', 'necessary', etc.) -- which, incidentally, helps create even more of a false impression.]

Now, this apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

As noted above, expressions like these look as if they reveal deep truths about reality since they certainly resemble empirical propositions (i.e., propositions about matters of fact). In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again an ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative (but nonetheless typical metaphysical) sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

In order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or not.

However, the comprehension of T2 and T3 goes hand-in-hand with knowing either or both are true (or, conversely, knowing either or both are false). The truth of T2 and T3 thus follows from the meaning of certain words (or from certain definitions -- i.e., from yet more words).



This now intimately links the truth status of T2 and T3 with [I]meaning, but not with material confirmation/facts, and hence not with a confrontation with reality. Their truth-status is independent of and anterior to the evidence (even if there were any!).

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent its confirmation or refutation -- indeed, it would be impossible to do either if T1 had not already been understood. However, the truth/falsehood of T1-type propostions follows from the way the world is, not solely from meaning.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth/falsehood on their faces, as it were.

So here, we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different 'relation' to 'reality'.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

In the second (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or on those in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true.

Indeed, metaphysical theses (like T2 and T3) are deliberately constructed to transcend the limitations of the material world, which tactic is excused on the grounds that it allows the aspiring metaphysician to uncover "underlying essences", revealing nature's "hidden secrets". Theses like these are "necessarily true" (or "necessarily false"), and are thus held to express genuine knowledge of fundamental aspects of reality, unlike contingent/empirical propositions whose actual truth-status can alter with the wind. Traditionally, this meant that empirical propositions like T1 were considered to be incapable of revealing authentic knowledge. Indeed, "philosophical knowledge" (underlying absolute certainty) has always been held to be of the sort delivered by T2 or T3-type sentences: necessary, a priori, non-contingent, and generated by thought alone.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound super-empirical truths which cannot fail to be true (or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be). They do this by aping the indicative mood --, but they go way beyond this. Thus, what they say does not just happen to be this way or that, as with ordinary empirical truths -- these propositions cannot be otherwise. The world must conform to whatever they say. Indeed, this accounts for the use of modal terms (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") if and when their status is questioned --, or, of course, whenever their content is being sold to us -- as in "I must exist if I can think", or "Existence can't be a predicate".

Conversely, if anyone were to question the truth of T1, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of Das Kapital" would be highly inappropriate -- unless, perhaps, T1 itself were the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one", or it was based on a direct observation statement. But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

In the latter case, with empirical propositions, reality is dictating to us whether what we say is true or false. We would not be dictating to reality what it must contain, or what it must be like, as metaphysicial theses have always done.

Hence, with respect to T2 and T3, things are radically different; the second option above applies, for their truth-values (true or false) can be determined independently and in advance of the way the world happens to be. Here, the essential nature of reality can be ascertained from words/thought alone. Such Super-Truths (or Super-Falsehoods) can be derived solely from the alleged meaning of the words sentences like T2 and T3 contain (or from the 'concepts' they somehow express). In that case, once understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or their own falsehood. They are thus true a priori.

So, to understand a metaphysical thesis is to know it is true or to know it is false. That is why, to their inventors, metaphysical propositions appear to be so certain and self-evident. Questioning them seems to run against the grain of our understanding, not of our experience. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their truth-status; they provide their own evidence, and testify on their own behalf. Their veracity follows from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, guarantee their own truth (or falsehood).

Unfortunately, this divorces such theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or false on conceptual grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one.

This might seem to be a somewhat dogmatic statement to make, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality (and on one whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test), which collapses into incoherence when examined closely.

The paradoxical nature metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic principles on which it is based -- those which, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such a fuss.

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth-status; it is not possible to verify/falsify an alleged proposition if no one understands it.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, or when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such linguistic/structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded by those who propose them as truths, or Super-truths, about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appears to go hand in hand with knowing their 'truth' (or their 'falsehood'): they are based on features of thought/language, not on the material world. This means that they can't be related to the material world or anything in it, and hence they can't be used to help change it.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture. But this is not so with such 'reflected' theses.

On the other hand, if their truth-status can be ascertained from such propositions/'thoughts' alone (i.e., if they are "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture. Naturally, this just means that such 'thoughts'/propositions cannot be reflections of the world, whatever else they are.

Another odd feature of metaphysical theses is worth underlining: since the truth-values of defective sentences like these are plainly not determined by the world, they have to be given a truth-value by fiat. That is, they have to be declared "necessarily true" or "necessarily false", and this is plainly because their truth-status cannot be derived from the world, with which they cannot now be compared.

Or, more grandiloquently, their opposites have to be pronounced "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- a Philosopher of some sort.

Metaphysical decrees like this are as common as dirt in traditional thought.

Isolated theses like these have necessary truth or falsehood bestowed on them as a gift. Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, they are derived solely from or compared only with other related theses (or to be more honest, they are merely compared with yet more obscure jargon) as part of a terminological gesture at 'verification'. Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal and 100% bogus.

The normal cannons that determine when something is true or false (i.e., a comparison with reality) have to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- or, if it is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a sort of 'thought experiment', or perhaps as part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.

As far as traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what happened as the subject developed; philosophers simply invented more and more jargonised words, juggled with such bogus terminology, and thereby derived countless 'truths' from thought/language alone.

But, none of these 'truths' can be given a sense, no matter what is done with them; in that case, they are all non-sensical.

These ideas are worked out in extensive detail, and defended in depth here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

This, of course, illustrates why Marx said:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels, (1970) The German Ideology, p.118.]

Now, there is a reason why traditional theorists attempted to derive 'truths' from thought alone. I have already summarised this reason; here it is again:


This traditional way of seeing reality taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who have always viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for each ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

And this is why all of traditional philosophy is dogmatic, and thus non-sensical.

Now the reason why this traditional approach to 'philosophical truth' has dominated 'western' (and 'eastern') thought for 2500 years was outlined by Marx, too:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65.]

And:



You:

So “I must finally conclude that the proposition, ‘I am,’ ‘I exist,’ is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind”

This is a classic example of the sort of 'proposition', which has no truth conditions (that is, it's alleged 'truth' follows from the supposed meaning of the words it contains, not from the way the world happens to be, which I exposed as non-sensical in this reply I gave you recently):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

So, this thesis of Descartes derives from thought alone.

The phrase 'necessarily true' is a dead give-away.

Here is why (this is an excerpt from Essay Twelve Part One, and uses a metaphysical claim of Lenin's -- about motion and matter -- to illustrate the point, but it is easily adaptable to cover what Descartes opined):


An empirical proposition derives its sense from the truth possibilities it appears to hold open (which options will later be decided upon one way or the other by a confrontation with the material world). That is why the actual truth-value of, say, T1 (or its contradictory, T2) does not need to be known before it is understood, but it is also why evidence is relevant to establishing that truth-value.

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

T2: Tony Blair does not own a copy of Das Kapital.

All that is required here is some grasp of the possibilities that both of these hold open. T1 and T2 both have the same content, and are both made true or false by the same situation obtaining or not.

It is also why it is easy to imagine T1 as true even when it is false, or false when it is true. In general, comprehension of empirical propositions involves an understanding of the conditions under which they would/could be true or false; as is well-known, these are otherwise called their truth-conditions. That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm their actual truth status by comparison with the world, since they would in that case know what to look for/expect.

As we saw earlier, these non-negotiable facts about language underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social -- and hence the communal and communicational -- nature of discourse, but they fly in the face of metaphysical/representational theories, which emphasise the opposite: that to understand a proposition goes hand-in-hand with knowing it is true (or knowing it is false) -- by-passing the confirmation/disconfirmation stage (thus reducing the usual 'truth-conditions' to only one option).

However, there are other serious problems this approach to language faces over and above the fact it would make knowledge un-communicable.

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth-status, as we have seen.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or syntactic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded (by those who propose them) as truths (or Supertruths) about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of a metaphysical proposition appears to go hand in hand with knowing its 'truth' (or its 'falsehood') -- it is based on features of thought/language alone, and not on the material world.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world, which might seem (to some) to nullify the above comments.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture.

And yet, on the other hand if its truth could be ascertained from that proposition/'thought' itself (i.e., if it were "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture, which just means that that 'thought'/proposition cannot be a reflection of the world, whatever else it is.

Furthermore, and worse, if a proposition is purported to be empirical, but which can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, T3, below, according to Lenin) then, as we will see, paradox must ensue.

Consider the following sentences, the first of which Lenin would presumably have declared necessarily false (if not "unthinkable"):

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare T3 necessarily (and always) false, the possibility of its truth must first be entertained (as we saw). Thus, if the truth of T3 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as necessarily false, then whatever would make it true has to be ruled out conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what T3 rules in so that he/she could comprehend what it is that is being disqualified by its rejection as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done if what T3 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic/conceptual grounds.

Consequently, if a proposition like T3 is necessarily false this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say (or to think) what could count as making T3 true. Indeed, Lenin himself had to declare it "unthinkable" (in T4).

However, because the truth of the original proposition (T4) cannot even be conceived, Lenin was thus in no position to say what was excluded by its rejection.

Unfortunately, this prevents any account being given of what would make T3 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, paradoxically, T3 would now be necessarily false if and only if it was not capable of being thought of as necessarily false!

That is: T3 could be thought of as necessarily false if and only if what would make it true could at least be entertained just in order to rule it out as necessarily false. But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make T3 true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. And, if the truth of T3 -- or the conditions under which it would be true -- cannot be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we would then not know what was being ruled out.

In that case, the negation of T3 can neither be accepted nor rejected by anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that it could be either countenanced or repudiated. Hence, T3 would lose any sense it had, since it could not under any circumstances be either true or false.

This is in fact just another consequence of saying that an empirical proposition and its negation have the same content. It is also connected with the non-sensicality of all metaphysical 'propositions', for their negations do not have the same content. Indeed, because their negations do not picture anything that could be the case in any possible world, they have no content at all. That, of course, evacuates the content of the original non-negated proposition.

As we can now see, the radical misuse of language governing the formation of what look like empirical propositions (such as T3, or T4):

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T5: Motion never occurs without matter.

involves an implicit reference to the sorts of conditions that that underlie their normal employment/reception. Hence, when such sentences are entertained, a pretence (often genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they are capable of being understood. This is done even if certain restrictions are later placed on their further processing, as in T4. In that case, a pretence has to be that we understand what might make such propositions true, and their 'negations' false, so that those like T30 can be declared 'necessarily' false or "unthinkable".

But, this entire exercise is an empty charade, for no content can be given to propositions like T3 (and thus to T4, nor in fact to any metaphysical 'proposition').

With respect to motionless matter, even Lenin had to admit that!

Indeed, he it was who told us this 'idea' was "unthinkable".

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

Finally, as Hume pointed out, 'necessay propositions' cannot follow from contingent propositions, so they cannot be cobbled together from scientific knowledge.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

The same argument applies to other allegedly 'necessary truths'.

Since allegedly 'necessary truhs' are in fact misconstrued rules of language, if the are deemed 'false', then the meaning of the terms involved must change, and when that happens the proposition involved is no longer the saem as it used to be.

So, since 'necessary propositions' cannot be false, they cannot be true either.

And, as I pointed out, this is no surprise: 'necessary propositions' are misconstrued rules for the use of certain words, and rules can be neither true nor false, only obeyed or otherwise, practical or otherwise...

[JoyDivision]

I have nowhere argued that philosophers 'propped up' the ruling-class.

Really, you're going to resort to just denying what you have previously said once again. The problem with that, of course, is that you just typed it, and it's still there.

As Marx said, the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, and traditional philosophers have endeavoured to derive fundamental a priori theses about reality, true for all of space and time, from thought/words alone.


In the 'West' since Ancient Greek times traditional thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature. In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated into traditional thought so deeply that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them..........As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies.
As Marx notes, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system as 'rational', 'natural', or 'god-ordained' -- that underlying appearances, there is a hidden world which is more real than the material world around us...... ..........Enter Philosophy. From its inception, philosophers constructed increasingly baroque and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which their inventors then happily imposed on nature.


the dogmatic promulgation of abstract theories that were supposed to reveal the underlying rational structure of reality, conveniently hidden from the disconfirming gaze of ordinary working people

Just two posts ago you not only tried to argue that philosophy is ruling-class ideology, you tried to explain how it worked. My god you are a waste of time, and worthless to boot.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Where in there have I said that philosophers 'propped-up' the ruling-class?


Just two posts ago you not only tried to argue that philosophy is ruling-class ideology, you tried to explain how it worked. My god you are a waste of time, and worthless to boot.

And you don't seem to be able follow a simple argument.

You also seem to throw tantrums rather too quickly.:(

[JoyDivision]

As Marx said, the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, and traditional philosophers have endeavoured to derive fundamental a priori theses about reality, true for all of space and time, from thought/words alone.


In the 'West' since Ancient Greek times traditional thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature. In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated into traditional thought so deeply that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them..........As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies.
As Marx notes, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system as 'rational', 'natural', or 'god-ordained' -- that underlying appearances, there is a hidden world which is more real than the material world around us...... ..........Enter Philosophy. From its inception, philosophers constructed increasingly baroque and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which their inventors then happily imposed on nature.


the dogmatic promulgation of abstract theories that were supposed to reveal the underlying rational structure of reality, conveniently hidden from the disconfirming gaze of ordinary working people

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

So, and once more: where in there do I say that philosophers 'prop-up' the ruling-class?

[JoyDivision]

As Marx said, the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, and traditional philosophers have endeavoured to derive fundamental a priori theses about reality, true for all of space and time, from thought/words alone.


In the 'West' since Ancient Greek times traditional thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature. In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated into traditional thought so deeply that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them..........As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies.
As Marx notes, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system as 'rational', 'natural', or 'god-ordained' -- that underlying appearances, there is a hidden world which is more real than the material world around us...... ..........Enter Philosophy. From its inception, philosophers constructed increasingly baroque and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which their inventors then happily imposed on nature.


the dogmatic promulgation of abstract theories that were supposed to reveal the underlying rational structure of reality, conveniently hidden from the disconfirming gaze of ordinary working people

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I think you are risk being warned about spamming if you continue.

But, if you think that I have said that philosophers do indeed 'prop-up' the ruling-class, perhaps when you next post the above, you can highlight where those words actually occur.

[JoyDivision]

Here is a summary of a very long and involved argument at my site in which I try to show how what I allege is ruling class ideology seems to gain a grip
Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical thesis:.......Is that what you're doing, claiming you didn't say the specific words, as if what is at issue is the specific phrase............LOL, so pathetic. How is this the behavior of an actual person.


As Marx said, the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, and traditional philosophers have endeavoured to derive fundamental a priori theses about reality, true for all of space and time, from thought/words alone.


In the 'West' since Ancient Greek times traditional thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature. In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated into traditional thought so deeply that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them..........As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies.
As Marx notes, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system as 'rational', 'natural', or 'god-ordained' -- that underlying appearances, there is a hidden world which is more real than the material world around us...... ..........Enter Philosophy. From its inception, philosophers constructed increasingly baroque and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which their inventors then happily imposed on nature.


the dogmatic promulgation of abstract theories that were supposed to reveal the underlying rational structure of reality, conveniently hidden from the disconfirming gaze of ordinary working people

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


Is that what you're doing, claiming you didn't say the specific words

In other words, you lied.

And nothing I have said implies this, either.


............LOL, so pathetic.

Stop being so hard on yourself.:(

[JoyDivision]

Maybe if I misquoted you could say that, but i didn't quote you, I wasn't even really paraphrasing you. I was summing up an issue in the shortest way possible.

You're probably just a bad person.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


Maybe if I misquoted you could say that, but i didn't quote you, I wasn't even really paraphrasing you. I was summing up an issue in the shortest way possible.

But the passage you keep quoting does not even remotely say what you allege of it. If you think otherwise, highlight the allegedly incriminating parts.


You're probably just a bad person.

I have become so since I began to model myself on you.:(

[JoyDivision]

Enough of this, the passage I quoted clearly says it. It's time to just let your epic failure speak for itself.

Show's over folks, move along.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


Enough of this, the passage I quoted clearly says it. It's time to just let your epic failure speak for itself.

And yet, despite being asked several times, you still can't show where I alleged that philosophers 'propped up' the ruling-class, or even so much as implied it.


Show's over folks, move along.

In fact, they are still waiting for you to explain "unchangeable".:(

[JoyDivision]

Considering that traditional philosophy is little other than ruling-class ideology

laugh

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD:


laugh

So, you have no argument.

Why does that not surprise me?

[A.R.Amistad]

An idea of the type of character Wiggenstein was...


"the people making speeches against producing the (atomic) bomb are undoubtedly the scum of the intellectuals, although even this does not prove beyond question that what they abominate is to be welcomed"-Wiggenstein

[black magick hustla]

Yes. and Marx called Lasalle a nigger and us mexicans lazy. Do you realize nobody reads wittgenstein because of his politics? Its like reading Newton for his religion.

The ad-hominem attacks against Wit are dumb.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AR Amistad:


"the people making speeches against producing the (atomic) bomb are undoubtedly the scum of the intellectuals, although even this does not prove beyond question that what they abominate is to be welcomed"-Wittgenstein

He was in fact referring to their hypocrisy -- supporting conventional war (that had just killed 50 million) while rejecting nuclear weaponry.

You will note also he appears to oppose nuclear weapons.