Dialectics made easy

[red cat]

In this thread, dialectics will be explained to those who are willing to learn, by very easy examples. All relevant questions will be answered one by one in a stepwise manner. Contribution by other pro-dialectics elements is strongly encouraged.

No spamming please.

EDIT: Learners are requested to ask questions relevant only to what has been discussed so far, and stick to one question at a time.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Why isn't this in Philosophy? Or in the Dialectical Materialism group?

Anyway, I look forward to trashing this mystical 'theory wherever it raises its ugly head.:)

[red cat]

My earlier discussion with ChristoferKoch can be found in the threads "Trotskyism" (http://www.revleft.com/vb/trotskyism-t131193/index8.html) and "anti dialectics made easy" (http://www.revleft.com/vb/nti-dialectics-made-t103349/index23.html) .

In this thread we continue understanding dialectics. The main posts of mine which explained dialectics in the above mentioned threads, and the points to which Chris too agreed are:


I just wanted you to know. :)



I appreciate your sense of humour. :)

So, it is evident that fascists and communists are opposites in the specific aspects that you mention, right ? In other very negligible aspects, they might have common characteristics. For example, both are human beings. Very naive example though, but do you agree?

See ? You are assuming things again. I just asked you whether you understood up to that part or not. Answer my questions to the point. Sometimes a simple yes or no will suffice.

The point that I wanted to make is that when we talk of opposites, we only talk of them opposing each other in certain aspects. Is this much clear ?
Correct !

After you have sealed the lid and kept the jar for a few days, you will observe that the water level has gone down slightly.

In the jar, countless water molecules always collide with each other. There is a certain force of attraction between any two water molecules, but sometimes due to these collisions, a molecule gains so much momentum that it shoots out into the air above. Similarly, the water molecules in the air too hit the water surface very hard and enter the water mass sometimes. After a while the number of water molecules leaving the water mass per unit time equals the number of water molecules entering it, which is why only a certain amount of water will evaporate in the jar. This is called a state of equilibrium. Thus, even in a system(the jar of water) that seems so static, there is transformation.

Now, when you take off the lid of the jar, some of the air in it escapes into the open, and is replaced by air from outside, with less water content. This means that less water molecules will enter the water mass every unit time, and more will enter the air. So the water level will decrease even more before equilibrium is reached.

Thus, in even such a system which seems stagnant, change is always taking place.

Till now, no system in the real world has been observed, which truly remains static. Change is there everywhere. No matter what the conditions of a given system(in the real world) be, some change will always take place there.

Is everything so far clear?

A certain amount of motion is required to break through the water surface. But since the liquid state of water implies motion of its constituent molecules, a non-zero probability of accumulation of enough momentum on a single molecule remains, which can make it leave the water mass and enter the air. Since this property is displayed in room temperature itself, no external factor in the form of heat is required.

Change in position is good enough. But since you want to know, protons can change into neutrons.

Clear ?

The notion that every real system changes is fundamental to dialectics. Even if we ignore the more complex situations of protons changing, and go for some simpler example of "change" in protons, change in their position with respect to other particles is good enough; change in the number of protons in the nucleus of an element transforms the element itself.

Till now we have not observed any real system that does not change.

Clear ?

When we consider a jar in room temperature, it is effectively almost a closed system with respect to heat. Therefore heat should not be considered as an outer factor in this case at least.
In case you haven't noticed, all of what you quoted makes sense when like while studying about any other laws of science, we assume that these are true because no counter-example has been observed so far. This is what our recent discussion was all about.

Sure.

But first tell me whether you are okay with change being unconditional or not. I repeat; all this is based on our observation so far.
Good.

I think that in our future debates, we should avoid talking about subatomic particles and other cases which defy our natural conceptions. It is not very unusual that you find it hard to believe that protons decay. There are many other things, for example the dual nature of matter or the constant value of C, that you will find hard to believe. Whole branches of physics are devoted to all these things and it is impossible to realize without rigorously studying them, as to why they are true.

I hope you had no difficulty in visualizing the example of the water jar that I gave. Henceforth let us limit our discussion to what we encounter in our daily lives, and systems related to social processes, as those are primarily what dialecticians deal with. I don't want to bring sub- atomic particles or celestial bodies or the velocity of light into our discussion. Are you okay with that ?
Good.

Now I claim that both external and internal conditions affect the development of a system or object. For example, if an egg is incubated, it will hatch into a chicken. But if it is not incubated, no internal quality of the egg can make it hatch.

My second claim is that the internal conditions of a system determine how it will react to a given external factor. For example, no amount of incubation can make a stone hatch. An egg hatches because its internal qualities enable it to respond to incubation that way.

Clear ?

[Dave B]

I presume we all have;

Frederick Engels
Dialectics of Nature 1883

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/index.htm (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/index.htm)


...

[ChrisK]

My earlier discussion with ChristoferKoch can be found in the threads "Trotskyism" (http://www.revleft.com/vb/trotskyism-t131193/index8.html) and "anti dialectics made easy" (http://www.revleft.com/vb/nti-dialectics-made-t103349/index23.html) .

In this thread we continue understanding dialectics. The main posts of mine which explained dialectics in the above mentioned threads, and the points to which Chris too agreed are:

Clear. Next point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dave B:


I presume we all have;

Frederick Engels
Dialectics of Nature 1883

The main ideas in these notebooks have been refuted here at RevLeft many times; you can find a list of the threads where this has been done, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Now I claim that both external and internal conditions affect the development of a system or object. For example, if an egg is incubated, it will hatch into a chicken. But if it is not incubated, no internal quality of the egg can make it hatch.

My second claim is that the internal conditions of a system determine how it will react to a given external factor. For example, no amount of incubation can make a stone hatch. An egg hatches because its internal qualities enable it to respond to incubation that way.

You have already been asked what the 'internal contradictions' are in an egg that make it develop.

Now, you seem to prefer 'internal conditions', but this either means that you disagree with Lenin and Mao that all development is the result of 'internal contradctions', or you have abandoned dialectical materialism.

[red cat]

Clear. Next point.

Next, consider the incubation, hatching and further development of what is now the egg. The physical and chemical changes inside the egg change its state every moment. For convenience, while studying the development of the egg, we will take into account only very few states, because it is neither practical nor possible to study the zillions of states that constitute the development of the egg.

Some observations:

Suppose the egg hatches into a chicken. It will grow into an adult bird. The adult chicken is also a stage. But it is not reachable if the egg does not first transform into the state of a hatchling.

There are many states that are reachable from the original state, when we don't know whether the egg will undergo incubation or something else. The egg can rot, become an omelette or a hatchling. However, once it is incubated and becomes a hatchling, the omelette stage becomes unreachable.

Suppose the egg is being incubated. You take the egg away and place it in a freezer. After a few days, you place it in the incubation chamber again, it will not hatch despite displaying a high temperature . This means, that even if it seems from the outside that the egg is in a state similar to the earlier one, some change has taken place inside it that has actually made the earlier stage of incubation unreachable now, so that the egg never hatches.

Clear ?

[vyborg]

I presume we all have;

Frederick Engels
Dialectics of Nature 1883

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/index.htm (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/index.htm)


...

This is not a book but a series of articles. Some of them is marvelous (for instance "the part played by the labour in the humanization of apes" is fantastic) other are less interesting.

I think the most important point of dialectic is that in a process something can becomes its opposite. This is fundamental to understand if you want to intervene in the real world. I will make an example.

In the upswing part of a business cycle, the role of he credit is to expand the cycle beyond its normal lenght and deepness. The credit is like an accelerator of the economic growth. But when the cycle turns, the credit becomes a burden, something that instead of helping economy is an enormous fetter on it ("credit crunch").

Now how is it possibile that the very same process is two and opposite things? Dialectics helps us to analyse these phenomenons.

However, Marx also explained that you should not speak about dialectic in a science before grasping it. On the contrary you must study it untill the dialectic nature of the processes in this science comes out for themselves. There is a comment that Marx made to Engels about Lassalle exactly on this point.

[syndicat]

All change does not proceed by things becoming "their opposites". A kind of change takes place along a particular dimension where the properties in that dimension are contraries that exclude each other. For example, you paint a fence dark blue but over time the blue fades to a lighter shade. Or to take another example, a cat finds a patron who feeds it regularly, and it gains weight. Now it weighs 11 pounds instead of 8 pounds. But 11 pounds is not "the opposite" of 8 pounds. There is a continous range of weights, and any given weight logically excludes having a different weight at that moment. Similarly there is a continuous series of color shades and any one shade excludes all others.

This was how Aristotle analyzed change over 2,000 years ago.

Now, complex physical systems may have developmental tendencies. Organisms do. And they may also have tendencies that conflict. Aging and homeostasis are conflicting tendencies in an animal organism. Homeostasis are tendencies to maintain a certain state needed for life to continue such as the tendency to maintain a constant temperature in human bodies. Aging occurs through small degradations in cell replacement for example. So over time changes accrue that eventually undermine homeostasis to the point that it can't continue, and the animal dies.

But there is never any "contradiction" that exists in the life of the animal. Aging and homeostasis aren't "contradictories". The states they tend to engender over time are opposites...life versus death.

Marx thought modes of production were sort of analogous to organisms in having developmental tendencies and also a process through which they would die. But I don't think there is any tendency in capitalism that will ensure that it is replaced by authentic socialism. That depends on human self-activity and the development of the working class into a force that can create an authentic socialism. And that is not an outcome "determined" by the developmental tendencies of capitalism. Capitalism might die and be replaced by something even worse, maybe statist eco-fascism.

According to the way Aristotle understood the term "dialectic", a dialectic is a back-and-forth process of debate between interlocutors. One side gives reasons, asks questions, makes assertions and so on. The other side replies and so on. We can then talk about the "dialectical strenth" of A's position, that is, how cogent a case A has made.

Hegel, as part of his generally confused way of thinking, introduced the idea of "dialectic in nature", as part of his idealism. 19th century idealism was a tendency to reduce reality to ideational processes. So, if we think of an Aristotelian dialectic, one person "contradicts" what another person is saying. So it makes sense to talk of them having "opposite" views, and so on. So if you now suppose that reality itself somehow has a kind of internal dialectic with itself, this leads to the idea of reality itself somehow containing "contradictory views." But this notion doesn't make any sense, if you think about it. If two debaters are taking opposed views, and A contradicts, that is, denies, what B says, then only one of them can be correct about the way things are. But if you now suppose that both "contradictory views" are somehow contained in nature, what you end up with is incoherence.

[vyborg]

But I don't think there is any tendency in capitalism that will ensure that it is replaced by authentic socialism. That depends on human self-activity and the development of the working class into a force that can create an authentic socialism. And that is not an outcome "determined" by the developmental tendencies of capitalism.

This is the only part of the post I agree with. The crisis of capitalism are only the demonstration of the need of socialism but the new society can only arise with a social revolution, that is with the active and conscious intervention of the masses in history. The idea that the development of productive forces alone brings about socialism is the worst kind of reformism.

[S.Artesian]

All change does not proceed by things becoming "their opposites". A kind of change takes place along a particular dimension where the properties in that dimension are contraries that exclude each other. For example, you paint a fence dark blue but over time the blue fades to a lighter shade. Or to take another example, a cat finds a patron who feeds it regularly, and it gains weight. Now it weighs 11 pounds instead of 8 pounds. But 11 pounds is not "the opposite" of 8 pounds. There is a continous range of weights, and any given weight logically excludes having a different weight at that moment. Similarly there is a continuous series of color shades and any one shade excludes all others.

This was how Aristotle analyzed change over 2,000 years ago.

Now, complex physical systems may have developmental tendencies. Organisms do. And they may also have tendencies that conflict. Aging and homeostasis are conflicting tendencies in an animal organism. Homeostasis are tendencies to maintain a certain state needed for life to continue such as the tendency to maintain a constant temperature in human bodies. Aging occurs through small degradations in cell replacement for example. So over time changes accrue that eventually undermine homeostasis to the point that it can't continue, and the animal dies.

But there is never any "contradiction" that exists in the life of the animal. Aging and homeostasis aren't "contradictories". The states they tend to engender over time are opposites...life versus death.

Marx thought modes of production were sort of analogous to organisms in having developmental tendencies and also a process through which they would die. But I don't think there is any tendency in capitalism that will ensure that it is replaced by authentic socialism. That depends on human self-activity and the development of the working class into a force that can create an authentic socialism. And that is not an outcome "determined" by the developmental tendencies of capitalism. Capitalism might die and be replaced by something even worse, maybe statist eco-fascism.

According to the way Aristotle understood the term "dialectic", a dialectic is a back-and-forth process of debate between interlocutors. One side gives reasons, asks questions, makes assertions and so on. The other side replies and so on. We can then talk about the "dialectical strenth" of A's position, that is, how cogent a case A has made.

Hegel, as part of his generally confused way of thinking, introduced the idea of "dialectic in nature", as part of his idealism. 19th century idealism was a tendency to reduce reality to ideational processes. So, if we think of an Aristotelian dialectic, one person "contradicts" what another person is saying. So it makes sense to talk of them having "opposite" views, and so on. So if you now suppose that reality itself somehow has a kind of internal dialectic with itself, this leads to the idea of reality itself somehow containing "contradictory views." But this notion doesn't make any sense, if you think about it. If two debaters are taking opposed views, and A contradicts, that is, denies, what B says, then only one of them can be correct about the way things are. But if you now suppose that both "contradictory views" are somehow contained in nature, what you end up with is incoherence.

OK with that when it comes to nature, science, fences, frogs, and cats, but how about this:

The very mechanism, the very organization of property, that quickens, stimulates the accumulation of capital becomes the inhibition to, obstacle to, immanent barrier to further accumulation of capital.

Is that a contradiction or not?

Or this: The development of productive power is therefore only important in so far as it increases the surplus labour time of the workers, not in so far ast it reduces labour time for material production in general.

Contradiction or not?

Or this: A reduction in the rate of profit can only be enforced by a growth of capital, by a growth in the absolute amount of profit, as long as the rate of profit does not fall in the same proportion as the capital grows.

Contradiction or not?

[syndicat]

OK with that when it comes to nature, science, fences, frogs, and cats, but how about this:

The very mechanism, the very organization of property, that quickens, stimulates the accumulation of capital becomes the inhibition to, obstacle to, immanent barrier to further accumulation of capital.

Is that a contradiction or not?

Nope. Notice the word "becomes". So the system has a property F at one time ("stimulates the accumulation of capital") and then has G later ("an inhibition to further accumulation of capital"). So in other words, there is a period when profits are advancing and growth is taking place, and then there is a later period of stagnation, when profits have diminished and little growth is taking place. So the relevant dimension of change is "rate of profit". This varies from time to time. If the average rate of growth is 6% at one time and then 1% later, these properties are contraries. That is, it isn't possible for the growth rate in profit one year to be both 1% and 6%. But it is possible for the system to have a growth rate of 1% one year and a growth rate of 6% another year.



Or this: The development of productive power is therefore only important in so far as it increases the surplus labour time of the workers, not in so far ast it reduces labour time for material production in general.

Contradiction or not?

This is saying that, within capitalism, productive capacity is developed only insofar as it contributes to making profit. Of course, increases in productive capacity *could* be used to reduce required hours of labor. So "increasing profits" and "reducing hours of labor", in a particular situation, are incompatible, that is, they are contraries. But notice that they both do not take place at the same moment. Hence no contradiction.

If we say the wall is red but could be blue (if we paint it), we're not expressing a contradiction.



Or this: A reduction in the rate of profit can only be enforced by a growth of capital, by a growth in the absolute amount of profit, as long as the rate of profit does not fall in the same proportion as the capital grows.

Contradiction or not?

This is merely a statement, in a rather confused way, of the alleged tendency of the rate of profict to fall, due supposedly to the accumulation of capital. This principle was refuted in the early 20th century, and there is a mathematical proof that there is no such tendency in capitalism by the Japanese economist Okishio. However, the issue here isn't whether the statement is true or not but whether it is a contradiction. There is in fact no contradiction. That's because it is a claim to the effect that there is a certain tendency in the capitalist accumulation process. There either is such a tendency or not. But either way that is not a contradiction.

Maybe you think it is for the following reason. Capitalism is organized as a system of competing capitals. Each capitalist entity is forced by competition to seek always to maximize its profit. But sometimes the overall effect of them all doing this is to undermine profitability. Again, there is no contradiction. Here are the relevant statements:

1. Each capitalist seeks to gain as much profit as possible.
2. The effect of every capitalist doing this sometimes leads to a fall in profits.

1 and 2 are not contradictories. From the fact that a capitalist *seeks* to maximize profit, it doesn't follow they are always successful in doing so. If that were so, there'd never be banktruptcies.

[black magick hustla]

change is what people mean with that word at a particular context. philosophers did not create the word

[syndicat]

change is what people mean with that word at a particular context. philosophers did not create the word

what word are you talking about? "people" don't in fact mean "change" by "contradiction". the talk of "contradictions" in reality is a practice of a narrow radical minority who have borrowed this practice from certain radical writers, going back to people like Marx, Engels, Bakunin and others in the 19th century. The three men I just named had all been influenced by Left Hegelianism when they were students, but this is no reason for us to continue this usage. Idealist modes of speech were common among intellectuals in the 19th century due to the influence of idealist philosophy in that era. But idealist philosophy was pretty much annihilated by the mid-20th century. Nowadays continuing in this talk of "internal contradictions" in social systems or social reality makes us look like some weird religius cult.

the original reference for the word "contradiction" was influenced by the use of this word in the logical tradition, which goes back over 2,000 years in the west, since the beginning of logic as an organized discipline. and in this logical tradition a "contradiction" is a pair of statements, a statment P and its denial Not-P. the Law of Non-contradiction -- a deeply entrenched hypothesis -- says that contradictory statements can't both be true at the same time.

[S.Artesian]

Nope. Notice the word "becomes". So the system has a property F at one time ("stimulates the accumulation of capital") and then has G later ("an inhibition to further accumulation of capital"). So in other words, there is a period when profits are advancing and growth is taking place, and then there is a later period of stagnation, when profits have diminished and little growth is taking place. So the relevant dimension of change is "rate of profit". This varies from time to time. If the average rate of growth is 6% at one time and then 1% later, these properties are contraries. That is, it isn't possible for the growth rate in profit one year to be both 1% and 6%. But it is possible for the system to have a growth rate of 1% one year and a growth rate of 6% another year.

Indeed I do, as Marx did, recognize the critical role of the word "becomes" since becoming is exactly that category of movement, of development, by which social forces become their opposite. To become, to transform into its opposite requires several things, not the least of which, is the latent identity of the contradiction within the very formation of the social force, thus Marx always traces back the self-impairment of capital to its very origin as capital.

The example I provided is taken directly from Marx and is identified by him as a contradiction of capital, of its existence as the "self-expansion of value."

Thus for Marx, capital is born in contradiction-- he says exactly that in his manuscripts-- the contradiction between labor and the conditions of labor, and the latency of the contradiction is made manifest precisely through capital's "becoming," its development.

More on the other 2 later..

[ChrisK]

Next, consider the incubation, hatching and further development of what is now the egg. The physical and chemical changes inside the egg change its state every moment. For convenience, while studying the development of the egg, we will take into account only very few states, because it is neither practical nor possible to study the zillions of states that constitute the development of the egg.

Some observations:

Suppose the egg hatches into a chicken. It will grow into an adult bird. The adult chicken is also a stage. But it is not reachable if the egg does not first transform into the state of a hatchling.

There are many states that are reachable from the original state, when we don't know whether the egg will undergo incubation or something else. The egg can rot, become an omelette or a hatchling. However, once it is incubated and becomes a hatchling, the omelette stage becomes unreachable.

Suppose the egg is being incubated. You take the egg away and place it in a freezer. After a few days, you place it in the incubation chamber again, it will not hatch despite displaying a high temperature . This means, that even if it seems from the outside that the egg is in a state similar to the earlier one, some change has taken place inside it that has actually made the earlier stage of incubation unreachable now, so that the egg never hatches.

Clear ?

Yes

[syndicat]

Indeed I do, as Marx did, recognize the critical role of the word "becomes" since becoming is exactly that category of movement, of development, by which social forces become their opposite. To become, to transform into its opposite requires several things, not the least of which, is the latent identity of the contradiction within the very formation of the social force, thus Marx always traces back the self-impairment of capital to its very origin as capital.



the "latency of the contradiction within the very formation of the social force" isn't clear. first of all, if by the "self-impairment of capital" you're referring to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, I'd again point out this has been refuted.

moreover what does it mean to say a "contradiction" is latent in something? This suggests that a contradiction then comes into existence. But in fact no contradiction actually exists. When change takes place, what happens is that one property is replaced by one of its contraries. So if the profit rate falls from 4% to 1%, one property replaces another. There is never any existing "contradiction".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


I think the most important point of dialectic is that in a process something can becomes its opposite. This is fundamental to understand if you want to intervene in the real world. I will make an example.

But, this can't work. As Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin argued (along with many others):

1) Every object and process in the entire universe changes because of a 'struggle of opposites', and

2) They change into those opposites.

3) Let us assume that there is an object or process, "P".

4) So, according to the dialectical classicists, P can only change because it struggles with its opposite.

5) Call that opposite "P*".

6) Hence, P and P* change because they struggle with each other.

7) But, we are also told that P and P* change into each other.

8) But, that is not possible, since P* already exists!

9) If P* didn't already exist, P could not struggle with it, and thus could not change.

10) Hence, if dialectical materialism were true, change would be impossible.

Consider a more concrete example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? But, this must be so if the Dialectical Classics are to be believed.

Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!

In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!

So, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it, we shall call it "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into "S1". But, if the DM-Worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 can't struggle with it! But, if that is so, where does S1 disappear to if W1 changes into it?

In fact, according to the Dialectical Classics, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1 at the same time as W1 is turning into S1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this 'superscientific theory', steam must be condensing back into the water you are boiling, and it must be doing so at the same rate!

One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.

This must be so otherwise when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists, or W1 could not struggle with it -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be only one! [Matter created from nowhere?]

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other alleged examples of DM-change).

It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas; so the dialectical classicists are correct. However, if we take them at their word, then that gas must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change. But that gas does not yet exist since water has not yet turned into it! In which case, dialectical water would never boil if this 'theory' were true.

But even if it did, it is heat that causes the change not the gas! However we try and slice it, this 'theory' is totally useless -- that is, what little sense can be made of it.

This, of course, does not deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.

Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

Now, for nearly six months, in Philosophy, and here in Theory, Red Cat has been trying to show where this argument goes wrong (but, to tell the truth, he/she has all but given up the fight over the last two months, content merely to distract attention from her/his plight), and has failed miserably.

Anyone else care to try?

Incidentally, anyone who doubts that the Dialectical Classicists say such ridiculous and unworkable things about change, I have posted over twenty quotations from the classics, and from more recent dialecticians, to this effect, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

[S.Artesian]

Okishio's work itself has been refuted by others.

And the tendency of the rate of profit to declined has been verified by Andrew Kliman's work, among others.

The change from valorisation to devaluation, from accumulation to inability to accumulate is not the result of some external force acting upon capital but is the result of valorisation itself, of accumulation itself; it is the result of labor organized as wage-labor for the extraction of surplus value-- surplus value that is then utilized to reproduce the opposition of labor to the conditions of labor.

The second section I cited is also directly from Marx and he concludes it by saying. "It is therefore embedded in a contradiction."

I don't know how you understand "contradiction," but it is quite clear how Marx understands it-- a social organization based on creating its opposite, i.e. capital and wage-labor where each is embedded in the identity and as the contradiction to the other-- that is wage-labor represents social labor but is expropriated and reproduced as private property.

Within this contradiction, the social organization reproduces, as it reproduces itself, the conditions for its own abolition. Capital doesn't just experience an "impairment," an inability to accumulate, it becomes that impairment as its development of the productivity of labor undermines its ability, its necessity to expand value.

We have opposition, fused, integrated, born of the same identical social relationship. We have "becoming," transformation. We have negation based on the very same social relationship. We have abolition and overcoming of the limitations of that social relationship based on the reproduction of the original embedded opposition.

That's Marx. If your claim is that Marx, while using dialectic and contradiction is following a mistaken path-- that's an argument that requires some sort of alternative explanation for actual historical events-- like the development of capitalism, for example; like the "long deflation" of 1873-1898; like the Russian Revolution, its ascendancy and collapse; etc.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


I don't know how you understand "contradiction," but it is quite clear how Marx understands it-- a social organization based on creating its opposite, i.e. capital and wage-labor where each is embedded in the identity and as the contradiction to the other-- that is wage-labor represents social labor but is expropriated and reproduced as private property.

But, how can 'contradictory' opposites turn into one another? Do the relations of production turn into the forces of production? Does the proletariat turn into the capitalist class? None of this makes sense, even in 'dialectical' terms.

[die antwoord]

I could say the world runs in 2s, 3s, 4s and that opposition cannot have '2' opposite ends, or that we are all holons, or that communism is the only 'correct' way, but that would be very closed minded of me. To think that my perception can accurately be reduced to irrefutable ideas is rather silly.

[syndicat]

I don't know how you understand "contradiction," but it is quite clear how Marx understands it-- a social organization based on creating its opposite, i.e. capital and wage-labor where each is embedded in the identity and as the contradiction to the other-- that is wage-labor represents social labor but is expropriated and reproduced as private property.

There is no "opposite" to capitalism because there are in fact a variety of different possible modes of production. For example, in the USSR there was a bureaucratic mode of production, not a worker-managed socialism. So capitalism can't be "based on" "creating its opposite". capital and wage-labor are not "contradictories" because they're not statements. Both can co-exist, as indeed they must for capitalism to exist. They are opposed social forces in the sense that social activities (strikes, organization) that increase the social power of the working class diminish the prospects for capital. but to talk of opposed or contending social forces as a "contradiction" is confused thinking.

Workers within capitalism are "social labor" in two senses, they are brought together and work cooperatively, and what they produce is for others. There is no contradiction in saying that, within capitalism, their work generates profit for the capitalist.



Within this contradiction, the social organization reproduces, as it reproduces itself, the conditions for its own abolition.

Capitalism has a *tendency* to reproduce itself...it must or it wouldn't continue to survive. It does not automatically create "the conditions for its own abolition."



Capital doesn't just experience an "impairment," an inability to accumulate, it becomes that impairment as its development of the productivity of labor undermines its ability, its necessity to expand value.



Now what you say is nonsense. An impairment is a condition. Capitalism is a social arrangement, a mode of production, not a condition. Rising labor productivity does not automatically lead to any impairment of its ability to make a profit, and thus expand value. That is a mere unproven assertion. But even if it were true, it does not show that there is any contradiction.


That's Marx. If your claim is that Marx, while using dialectic and contradiction is following a mistaken path-- that's an argument that requires some sort of alternative explanation for actual historical events-- like the development of capitalism, for example; like the "long deflation" of 1873-1898; like the Russian Revolution, its ascendancy and collapse; etc.

Marx's theory can be restated without the lingo of dialectics and contradictions. See GA Cohen. And it's hard to see how talk of "identity of opposites" and "fused contradictories" and what not helps us one iota to provide explanations for the phenomena you refer to.

[S.Artesian]

There is no "opposite" to capitalism because there are in fact a variety of different possible modes of production. For example, in the USSR there was a bureaucratic mode of production, not a worker-managed socialism. So capitalism can't be "based on" "creating its opposite". capital and wage-labor are not "contradictories" because they're not statements. Both can co-exist, as indeed they must for capitalism to exist. They are opposed social forces in the sense that social activities (strikes, organization) that increase the social power of the working class diminish the prospects for capital. but to talk of opposed or contending social forces as a "contradiction" is confused thinking.

But that's exactly not what Marx says. He state that for capital to exist, the laborer and the conditions of labor must be opposed to each. Marx argues that the fundamental condition is that the capitalist encounter labor "free" of any use, any value, save its value in exchange for the means of subsistence.

Indeed both capital and wage-labor coexist, more than coexist each is organized in the organization of the other. What is capital? Accumulated surplus-value. Ownership of the means of production for the purpose of expanding value. How is that purpose realized? By dispossessing labor from the direct self-reproduction, from its self-maintenance through control of the terms, conditions of its use.

Can different manifestations of this relationship that is essential to the production exist? Of course [although I do not agree that the fSU was "state-capitalist] variations exist. Capital doesn't spring from anyone's forehead, full blown. It development is historical, shaped by the pre-existing conditions surrounding its own emergence.

Is there a limit to capitalist reproduction? If so what is the limit? What creates the limit? What are the conditions that lead up to that limit? Can the limit be overcome? If so how is it overcome?

Does capital in its very augmentation of the productivity of labor undermine its own profitability?

These are the questions Marx is investigating and it is his claim that these are contradictions in that the capital contains a self-negation. That it contains such a negation, that it in fact creates the potential for its own abolition is part of the necessity of capitalist development. It does not mean that such abolition will occur, just that the necessity for its abolition is created in and by its very reproduction of accumulation.


Workers within capitalism are "social labor" in two senses, they are brought together and work cooperatively, and what they produce is for others. There is no contradiction in saying that, within capitalism, their work generates profit for the capitalist.

Of course there is a contradiction within capitalism that the workers' social labor produces a profit for the capitalist as the production of that profit increases capital's control over the means of production, and the conditions of labor; as the expanding productivity of labor leads to diminished profits for capitalism; as the expanding productivity leads to economic contraction[which is what impaired accumulation is], leading to unemployment, reduction in living standards, etc.


Now what you say is nonsense. An impairment is a condition. Capitalism is a social arrangement, a mode of production, not a condition. Rising labor productivity does not automatically lead to any impairment of its ability to make a profit, and thus expand value. That is a mere unproven assertion. But even if it were true, it does not show that there is any contradiction.

Of course capital creates conditions; it creates the conditions for its own expansion and its own contraction. Rising labor productivity does not immediately lead to declines in profit. As a matter of fact, rising labor productivity initially is the source of increased profit. However, as capital accumulates, this very productivity will lead to declining profit. It will lead to overproduction. And as Marx points out in vol.3, all overproduction is the overproduction of capital.

If you doubt that rising productivity leads to decreased profit, I think you should look at the US economy in the post-war period to 1969/1970, when the rate of profit peaked and began a slide that led to the end of Bretton-Woods; OPEC; marked reduction in growth rates etc.

You can also look at the 1993-2000 period in the US, where real increases in capital expenditures pushed labor productivity up and unit labor costs down, particularly in transportation in the US... only to have the rate of profit stumble in 1997, recover and then in 2001 drop the US right into the 2001-2003 recession. You can also look at the 2004-2007 recovery, and look at rates of return and capital spending.



Marx's theory can be restated without the lingo of dialectics and contradictions. See GA Cohen. And it's hard to see how talk of "identity of opposites" and "fused contradictories" and what not helps us one iota to provide explanations for the phenomena you refer to.

I don't think it's necessary to talk about unity of opposites and negations either when actually analyzing capitalism. I think it is very important to understanding capitalism to demonstrate that the theoretical constructs of Marx, his dialectic, is evidenced in the actual social relations, in the actual movements of capital, in the actual expansion and contraction of accumulation.

[S.Artesian]

But, how can 'contradictory' opposites turn into one another? Do the relations of production turn into the forces of production? Does the proletariat turn into the capitalist class? None of this makes sense, even in 'dialectical' terms.

First, in my post I did not say that turn into each other. I said they create each other, and reproduce each other. I said they are embedded in each other's existence. Capital cannot exist without wage-labor. Wage-labor is the very basis for the accumulation of capital. The accumulation of capital recreates wage-labor as it expands value.

The very dynamic, the very necessity of capitalism to aggrandize surplus value, to augment the productivity of labor, to develop the means of production becomes the very dynamic that inhibits the development of the means of production; becomes the reason accumulation slows down, becomes the source of its devaluation.

Do the relations of production become the forces of production, you ask? As a matter of fact yes, that is exactly what Marx is stating when he states capital is dead labor, capital is the accumulation of expropriated surplus value-- that very relation of production becomes the forces of production [materialization of surplus value in machinery to aggrandize more surplus value] as well as the force behind production-- accumulation. That is exactly what happens, and why Marx reiterates in several different writings that the means and relations of production contradict each other; and that contradiction inaugurates the era of social revolution.

Do the proletariat and capitalist become each other? No, because the social relation that defines each, the shared social relation, means that the aggrandizement of surplus value, of wage labor, that process that converts the relation of production into the forces of production, reproduces the same social relation, the same aggrandizement, and the same classes as opposing classes.

[syndicat]

me:

There is no "opposite" to capitalism because there are in fact a variety of different possible modes of production. For example, in the USSR there was a bureaucratic mode of production, not a worker-managed socialism. So capitalism can't be "based on" "creating its opposite". capital and wage-labor are not "contradictories" because they're not statements. Both can co-exist, as indeed they must for capitalism to exist. They are opposed social forces in the sense that social activities (strikes, organization) that increase the social power of the working class diminish the prospects for capital. but to talk of opposed or contending social forces as a "contradiction" is confused thinking.

you:

But that's exactly not what Marx says.
Marx may not have been aware that there could be another mode of production after capitalism other than one based on the "emancipation of the working class" but that's irrelevant since the Soviet Union proved that in fact there can be.


He state that for capital to exist, the laborer and the conditions of labor
must be opposed to each.
Your language isn't clear. How are the laborer and the conditions of labor "opposed"? Also, note that when A and B are "opposed," it doesn't follow they are "opposites." Jack may be opposed to his brother's love of alochol, but it doesn't follow that he and his brother are "opposites." His opposition may be based on his love and close concern for his brother. In fact it would have no clear meaning to say that they are "opposites."

Now, maybe you mean that laborers fight to improve or change the conditions of labor they find themselves in within capitalism. They are, in that sense, "opposed" to those conditions of labor. From this it does not follow that the laborer and the conditions of labor she finds herself in are "opposites." To say that is gibberish.


Marx argues that the fundamental condition is that the capitalist encounter labor "free" of any use, any value, save its value in exchange for the means of subsistence.
Fundamental condition for what? Let me suggest a translation: For capitalism to exist, laborers have to generally not be bonded laborers nor coerced to work for a particular employer but enter into "voluntary" contracts with the employer. Their relationship to the capitalist is that they rent their capacities for work to the capitalist employer and get a wage that enables them to buy their consumption."

But it's not clear that Marx held that wages must be reduced to "subsistence." That thesis is called the iron law of wages. Engels did seem to advocate that view in his essay on housing, but Marx says things that can be interepreted either for or against that thesis.

But this "encounter" in the labor market between employer and worker is not a "contradiction".


Indeed both capital and wage-labor coexist, more than coexist each is organized in the organization of the other.
You really like these confused modes of speech. Does it give you a feeling of being profound? But it's just confusion. Maybe what you mean here is that capital/wage-labor is a relationship, a relationship between the possessor of capital and the laborers. And it's a relationship in which social production is organized, a form of organization imposed by capital on labor.


What is capital? Accumulated surplus-value. Ownership of the means of production for the purpose of expanding value. How is that purpose realized? By dispossessing labor from the direct self-reproduction, from its self-maintenance through control of the terms, conditions of its use.
Translation: Workers don't control the system of social production. They are dispossessed of means of production and thus become subject to the power of capital over social production. Capital gains control over the conditions of labor power's use in social production.

There are no contradictions here.


Can different manifestations of this relationship that is essential to the production exist? Of course [although I do not agree that the fSU was "state-capitalist] variations exist. Capital doesn't spring from anyone's forehead, full blown. It development is historical, shaped by the pre-existing conditions surrounding its own emergence.

Capitalism is "shaped" by more than the conditios that gave rise to it initially (the "pre-existing conditions").

Anyway, no contradictions here.


Is there a limit to capitalist reproduction? If so what is the limit? What creates the limit? What are the conditions that lead up to that limit? Can the limit be overcome? If so how is it overcome?

I don't think anyone knows the answer to this question.


Does capital in its very augmentation of the productivity of labor undermine its own profitability?

This is equivalent to the falling rate of profit thesis...disproved by Okishio.


These are the questions Marx is investigating and it is his claim that these are contradictions in that the capital contains a self-negation.

Only statements can be negated or denied. Capitalism is not a statement but a socio-economic order.

Anyway, you've not shown any "contradictions".


That it contains such a negation, that it in fact creates the potential for its own abolition is part of the necessity of capitalist development. It does not mean that such abolition will occur, just that the necessity for its abolition is created in and by its very reproduction of accumulation.

I'm willing to agree that capitalism creates a potentiality for it to be replaced. But you've not explained what this "negation" of capitalism is or that there are any "contradictions" in it.


Of course there is a contradiction within capitalism that the workers' social labor produces a profit for the capitalist as the production of that profit increases capital's control over the means of production, and the conditions of labor; as the expanding productivity of labor leads to diminished profits for capitalism; as the expanding productivity leads to economic contraction[which is what impaired accumulation is],
leading to unemployment, reduction in living standards, etc.


You've not shown any "contradiction" in the above. Even assuming the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, that would not show the existence of any "contradiction". I've already explained this above:


Capitalism is organized as a system of competing capitals. Each capitalist entity is forced by competition to seek always to maximize its profit. But sometimes the overall effect of them all doing this is to undermine profitability. Again, there is no contradiction. Here are the relevant statements:
1. Each capitalist seeks to gain as much profit as possible.
2. The effect of every capitalist doing this sometimes leads to a fall in profits.
1 and 2 are not contradictories. From the fact that a capitalist *seeks* to maximize profit, it doesn't follow they are always successful in doing so. If that were so, there'd never be banktruptcies.

[S.Artesian]

As pointed out earlier, Okishio has been refuted, and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall has been verified in works by other Marxists.

If I follow you, only statements can be negated, which means that only statements can be contradicted, i.e I say capitalism creates the conditions for its own overthrow.
You say know it doesn't. That's a contradiction.

I say the fact that the immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation is the accumulation of capital itself, and that's a contradiction within the system, social relation of capital. You say, capitalism is the immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation, but that's no contradiction to capitalism.

Do I have this right?



Labor and capital are opposed, in that the latter aggrandizes the former, expropriates the labor-power of the laborer and the product of that appropriation, accumulation, increases the power of capital, and the capitalist over the workers. The product of labor diminishes, proportionately, the power of the laborer over the conditions of production, and the use of that labor.

Rather than repeat ourselves-- "this is a contradiction," "no it's not because I can express it this way," let's see if we can bring some focus with a single issue:

Is Marx's assertion that the barrier to capitalist accumulation is capital itself 1.accurate and 2. a contradiction?

[red cat]

Yes

The different states of the egg are mutually exclusive, and the transformation of the egg from one stage to another has some properties that we observed.

Note that these properties can be generalized to any system.

Keeping this in mind, we will now focus on the physical and chemical changes inside the egg. These include particles coming from different directions colliding, charges interacting, chemical bonds being formed and broken etc. All these changes are due to interactions between particles, groups of particles, or more complex subsystems of the egg displaying mutually exclusive states, that is, states that differ with respect to position, velocity, charge or otherwise. Due to these interactions, the systems that interact, acquire each others' characteristics (those that constitute the mutually exclusive states) partially or wholly and change into different states.

Moreover, the overall change of state of the egg is equivalent to the sum-total of all these changes, as they, in the given conditions(such as incubation), uniquely determine the change of the egg from one state to another. For convenience we will ignore the more minor interactions of the egg with its surroundings, due to the much greater complexity of the changes within. We also ignore the possibility that the egg gets smashed accidentally and similar stuff, because it would require expanding the system under observation.

Clear ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian (who 'claimed' he had put me on his ignore list -- some hope!):


First, in my post I did not say that turn into each other. I said they create each other, and reproduce each other. I said they are embedded in each other's existence. Capital cannot exist without wage-labor. Wage-labor is the very basis for the accumulation of capital. The accumulation of capital recreates wage-labor as it expands value.

Maybe you didn't, but Hegel did, and so did Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Mao and a host other more recent dialectical mystics. You can find the relevant quotations here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

Of course, if you now want to disagree with the above Dialectical Magi, then that is up to you, but you will find that few of your fellow mystics here will continue to regard you as an ally, and might even call you a 'Revisionist'.

Moreover, the above Dialectical Prophets were not idiots, nor was Hegel. Hegel had invented his 'theory' (partly) to provide an answer to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation. Hume had argued that there is no logical or conceptual connection between cause and effect. This struck right at the heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume was radically mistaken. Kant had attempted to provide a reply, but his solution banished causation into the Noumena, about which we can know nothing. This was totally unacceptable to Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect. He found it in Spinoza's claim that every determination is also a negation (which neither theorist even attempted to justify), and in his argument that the law of identity, stated negatively, implied a contradiction (which it does not).

Based on this, he was 'able' to argue that for any concept A, determinate negation implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A (yes, this is the sordid origin of the 'negation of the negation'!) -- details of this odd argument can be found at my site, link at the end.

Now this 'allowed' Hegel to argue that every concept has development in it, as A transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A, and this provided him with the logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. But it led him to postulate that for every concept A, there must also be its paired 'other' (as he called it), not-A. From this the unity of opposites was born. So, the link between cause and effect was now given by this unity of opposites.

Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Dialectical Mystics) appropriated these ideas and tried to give them a materialist make-over. But they also relied on Hegel's defective logic. Hegel had claimed that every proposition/judgement was proof of this unity of opposites (details at my site), as Engels and Lenin point out:


"The fact that identity contains difference within itself is expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red, where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not covered by the predicate or the subject…. That from the outset identity with itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident." [Engels (1954), pp.214-15.]


"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.359-60. Emphases in the original.]

This 'allowed' Lenin then to transform Hegel's idealist theory into a materialist theory, in the following way:


"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Emphasis added.]


"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….[Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58, 359-60. Bold emphases added.]

And we also find Lenin endorsing Hegel's rationalist theory (albeit in an allegedly materialist context), using Hegel's word "other" to indicate this:


"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

So, this Hegelian theory (albeit 'inverted') is integral to classical dialectical materialism, since it provided Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.

Now, I do not want to enter into a criticism of the 'arguments' one finds in the above (that can be found at my site), the only point I wish to make here is that if you edit this Hegelian theory (upside down, or the 'right way up') out of dialectical materialism, then the conceptual link Lenin called the work of "genius", a "law of cognition", and which he claimed was integral to understanding Das Kapital, is destroyed:


"This aspect of dialectics…usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum total of examples…and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin (1961), p.357.]

In short, it would undermine this 'law of cognition', leaving dialectical materialism open to Humean attack.

So, Hegel's theory at least was a theory of causation, and the above dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into dialectical materialism, since it allowed them to argue, among other things, that capitalism must give was to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to nothing else. Hume's criticisms (which feature in much of modern economic theory, and thus in criticisms of Marx's economics and politics) are a direct threat to this, since we cannot predict this if Hume is right.

So, if you are right that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction, you too need Hegel's theory (upside down, or 'the right way up'), that things/processes turn into their opposites.

The problem is that Hegel's theory sort of works if one is an idealist (the details of which I will not enter into here), but they cannot work in Historical Materialism.

Now, I have posted several abstract and concrete arguments in Philosophy and here in Theory that show why this is so, demonstrating that if dialectical materialism is true, change would be impossible.

In this particular case, if the relations of production and the forces of production, the proletariat and the capitalist class, are indeed linked as 'contradictory opposites' in this Hegelian manner (upside down or 'the right way up', which they will have to be, or Hume's criticisms, or a more modern version of them, have their place, meaning, of course, that you dialecticians will now have no viable theory of change -- as a 'law of cognition'), then my earlier comments must apply: the forces of production must change into the relations of production, and the proletariat must change into the capitalist class.

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

With a brief summary of Hegel's logical blunders here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

Now, I'm not saying Hume is correct, indeed, I can show he isn't; but the radically defective conceptual tools bequeathed to you lot by Hegel leave you open to his attack -- or more modern versions of it.

[vyborg]

I made an example on how something can become its opposite. No one answered my argument. Instead the discussion turned to very general and abstract points. I will continue to stay on my level, so to speak. that's because, the general filosofical arguments about dialectics have been already answered for 2 centuries and they are more than enough to me. So I think it's more fruitful to go on with concrete examples.

In the meantime, the enemies of dialectics can ask themselves why any theoretician that wanted to distance himself from scientific socialism always started with dialectics. It started with Bernstein and went on untill Burnham and afterwards. The reactionary thinkers always knew dialectics must be put aside to emasculate marxism. and they are right.
This means you cannot have marxism without dialectics.

But back to the example I gave. in the business cycle, the very same laws applies in any stage. So how is that the very same process can be one and the very opposite thing? How is it possible that credit, for instance, is a foundamental leverage in a stage but all of a sudden, bang!, it becomes something that make the cycle collapse and everything goes into reverse?

And how it happens? gradually? no, with a bang, a collapse, the process is not calm, smooth, but is convulsed, made of sudden breaks. In a word the process of economic growth is dialectic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


The different states of the egg are mutually exclusive, and the transformation of the egg from one stage to another has some properties that we observed.

Note that these properties can be generalized to any system.

Keeping this in mind, we will now focus on the physical and chemical changes inside the egg. These include particles coming from different directions colliding, charges interacting, chemical bonds being formed and broken etc. All these changes are due to interactions between particles, groups of particles, or more complex subsystems of the egg displaying mutually exclusive states, that is, states that differ with respect to position, velocity, charge or otherwise.

Moreover, the overall change of state of the egg is equivalent to the sum-total of all these changes, as they, in the given conditions(such as incubation), uniquely determine the change of the egg from one state to another. For convenience we will ignore the more minor interactions of the egg with its surroundings, due to the much greater complexity of the changes within. We also ignore the possibility that the egg gets smashed accidentally and similar stuff, because it would require expanding the system under observation.

And yet, as I have shown, dialectical materialism implies eggs cannot develop.

According to the dialectical classics, everything in the entire universe changes because of a 'struggle of opposites', and they also change into those opposites. Over twenty quotations (from Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Mao, and many others) to that effect can be found here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

So, consider egg, E. Call any of the stages in its development E(k), so that the development goes through these stages: E(1), E(2), E(3),..., E(k-1), E(k), E(k+1),..., E(n), all following on from one another (with E(n) being the stage where the egg hatches).

Now, according to the dialectical classics, for E(1) to change into E(2), for example, they must 'struggle' with one another, and they must change onto one another.

But, this is impossible, since E(2) does not yet exist (it is, after all what E(1) turns into!).

On the other hand, if E(2) already exists, E(1) cannot change into it, since E(2) is already there!

However, if E(2) does not already exist, E(1) cannot struggle with it, and cannot change.

Either way, dialectical eggs cannot develop!:(

It's high time we ditched this useless 'theory'...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


I made an example on how something can become its opposite. No one answered my argument. Instead the discussion turned to very general and abstract points. I will continue to stay on my level, so to speak. that's because, the general filosofical arguments about dialectics have been already answered for 2 centuries and they are more than enough to me. So I think it's more fruitful to go on with concrete examples.

Well, in fact, I pointed out that even if you are right (that things can turn into their opposites) dialectics would imply that this can't happen.

You can find a particular example of this proof above, in my last post.

A more general demonstration can be found here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


If I follow you, only statements can be negated, which means that only statements can be contradicted, i.e I say capitalism creates the conditions for its own overthrow.
You say know it doesn't. That's a contradiction.

Indeed, but these are confined to what you say, that is to statements -- as no doubt Syndicat would be the first to point out. You have yet to show what these say (if, per impossible, both are true at the same time) can exist in the world at the same time.


Is Marx's assertion that the barrier to capitalist accumulation is capital itself 1.accurate and 2. a contradiction?

1) Yes, 2) No.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Incidentally, in my argument about non-developmental 'dialectical eggs', the 'stages' I mention can be replaced by processes at work in an egg. The result will be the same.

If anyone wants to see the details, you only have to ask...:)

[vyborg]

Vyborg:



Well, in fact, I pointed out that even if you are right (that things can turn into their opposites) dialectics would imply that this can't happen.

You can find a particular example of this proof above, in my last post.

A more general demonstration can be found here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77

I read the topic and was absolutely not convinced by it, it is logic for dummies. On the contrary Marxism, that is historical and dialectic materialism together, is the only theory that can explain something that a non dialectic theory must refute as impossible.

Thats' why, back to my example, the burgeois theory (that is anti-dialectic theories) states that money and credit are irrelevant to economic growth (money as a veil etc) or that credit is only good (efficiency market theories). No one can explain the different and opposite role played by credit, or by technology, to give another example, in the economic development.

[S.Artesian]

Thats' why, back to my example, the burgeois theory (that is anti-dialectic theories) states that money and credit are irrelevant to economic growth (money as a veil etc) or that credit is only good (efficiency market theories). No one can explain the different and opposite role played by credit, or by technology, to give another example, in the economic development.

That's not exactly the case; the bourgeoisie are more than happy, when push comes to shove, to blame excessive speculation, "loose" credit for leading to the crash of the bourgeois economy. And in this, as in most things about the nature of capital, the bourgeoisie are wrong.

The bourgeoisie have a theory of "speculative excess," they have Greenspan-- that putty-faced bureaucrat and hack whose very visage is the living picture of Dorian Gray of advanced capitalism-- and his "warnings" of irrational exuberance," they have the idiot-sophist Friedman who argues that all history is the history of money supply and that the depression was extended, intensified by the actions of the FRB during the 1930s-- in particular a premature tightening of the money supply-- and let's not forget Keynes and his "general theory."

The bourgeoisie have no shortage of theories and theoreticians regarding the roles of credit "good" and "bad." The theories of course all share a common incomprehension, that is to say that the "good" or the "bad" are all voluntary actions, mistakes, errors, adjustments,[sometimes accurate one, like the blind pig finding the acorn].

What the bourgeoisie do not have, and cannot have, the source, the cause for both "good" and "bad."

[vyborg]

That's not exactly the case; the bourgeoisie are more than happy, when push comes to shove, to blame excessive speculation, "loose" credit for leading to the crash of the bourgeois economy. And in this, as in most things about the nature of capital, the bourgeoisie are wrong.

The bourgeoisie have a theory of "speculative excess," they have Greenspan-- that putty-faced bureaucrat and hack whose very visage is the living picture of Dorian Gray of advanced capitalism-- and his "warnings" of irrational exuberance," they have the idiot-sophist Friedman who argues that all history is the history of money supply and that the depression was extended, intensified by the actions of the FRB during the 1930s-- in particular a premature tightening of the money supply-- and let's not forget Keynes and his "general theory."

The bourgeoisie have no shortage of theories and theoreticians regarding the roles of credit "good" and "bad." The theories of course all share a common incomprehension, that is to say that the "good" or the "bad" are all voluntary actions, mistakes, errors, adjustments,[sometimes accurate one, like the blind pig finding the acorn].

What the bourgeoisie do not have, and cannot have, the source, the cause for both "good" and "bad."

Yes the explanations are there but with the exception of Minsky's (that comes, basically, from a Marxist milieu) are not worth the paper where are written. at the end of the day "speculation" is bad if you loose and good if you win. This is the profound explanation they give. And this "explanation" is not linked in any sense with the general development of the economy as a whole. I would also add that the burgeois economists always confuse how capitalism works for the single capitalist and the general results. This is also another clear lack of dialectics.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


I read the topic and was absolutely not convinced by it, it is logic for dummies.

In what way is it 'logic for dummies'?

Would you accept a rejection of Das Kapital, advanced by a supporter of capitalism, who simply said "I'm not convinced, and anyway it's economics for dummies", and refuses to say any more.

No, you wouldn't.

Same here; so you are going to have to do far better than post a flat rejection if you want to defend this 'theory' of yours.


On the contrary Marxism, that is historical and dialectic materialism together, is the only theory that can explain something that a non dialectic theory must refute as impossible.

However, as my demolition of the dialectical 'theory' of change shows, it would make change impossible.



Thats' why, back to my example, the burgeois theory (that is anti-dialectic theories) states that money and credit are irrelevant to economic growth (money as a veil etc) or that credit is only good (efficiency market theories). No one can explain the different and opposite role played by credit, or by technology, to give another example, in the economic development.

Where have I denied this? But, this is an explanation in Historical Materialsm. As soon as you incorporate the mystical stuff Engels imported from Hegel, it ceases to work.

[S.Artesian]

And... as Rosa is on my ignore list, if she answered, as I expect she did, that 1. Yes, the barrier to capitalist accumulation is capital itself 2. No, that is not a contradiction.. can she or anyone explain how capital, which is organized, reproduced as the expansion of value, as the accumulation of value, can become an obstacle to accumulation of value based on precisely that same self-organization, self-reproduction without being in contradiction to itself, without being in opposition to itself, without becoming its opposite?

[S.Artesian]

Yes the explanations are there but with the exception of Minsky's (that comes, basically, from a Marxist milieu) are not worth the paper where are written. at the end of the day "speculation" is bad if you loose and good if you win. This is the profound explanation they give. And this "explanation" is not linked in any sense with the general development of the economy as a whole. I would also add that the burgeois economists always confuse how capitalism works for the single capitalist and the general results. This is also another clear lack of dialectics.


Agree.

[vyborg]

For dummies means that if you buy a 1 dollar book about logic (static as well as dialectic) it is explained why these arguments are not enough. And I will wait untill you will win the Nobel Prize in something before considering your replies better than that of Bernstein's or Burnham's or Bohk Bawerk.

So a sudden change can happen. something can become its opposite. and this is not dialectic it is historical materialism. good. you can call it as you like, Mickie Mouse is perfect to me. The important point is that we agree on how reality works. Gradual changes that all of a sudden provokes an explosion and something completely different.

[S.Artesian]

The important point is that we agree on how reality works. Gradual changes that all of a sudden provokes an explosion and something completely different.

Not that I would ever want to speak for our Lady Gaga-- that is to say a cheaper imitation of a cheap imitation [Madonna] --of the anti-dialectic but I don't think she agrees that gradual changes provoke an explosion of something completely different.

That would be agreeing with Hegel's notion of the transformation of quantity into quality, no?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


And... as Rosa is on my ignore list, if she answered, as I expect she did, that 1. Yes, the barrier to capitalist accumulation is capital itself 2. No, that is not a contradiction.. can she or anyone explain how capital, which is organized, reproduced as the expansion of value, as the accumulation of value, can become an obstacle to accumulation of value based on precisely that same self-organization, self-reproduction without being in contradiction to itself, without being in opposition to itself, without becoming its opposite?

No need to, Marx did this for us, and he did so without using the word "contradiction" (seriously) in Das Kapital -- he merely 'coquetted' with it.

But, even if you are right, you have yet to tell us why this is a 'contradiction', let alone a dialectical 'contradiction'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


of the anti-dialectic but I don't think she agrees that gradual changes provoke an explosion of something completely different.

Where have I said that? The point is that this alleged 'law' is not a law to begin with -- it is far too vague and imprecise to be one, and many things in nature and society 'disobey' it. More on that here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

[S.Artesian]

I see Rosa has posted a reply:

Let me guess, based on all her previous replies, what her answer is:

1. I [Rosa] have no need to do this because somebody else [probably Marx] already did it.

2. Even if he [Marx] didn't, the self-opposition of capital to its own terms of existence, are not a "contradiction" because-- and this is my representation of Rosa's cop logic-- because since the opposition in capital actually exists, it cannot be in contradiction to capital which means capital cannot exist.

As for my responses:

To (1): cop [appropriately] out. Please identify those parts in Marx's work where he describes this self-opposition to capital as not being a contradiction, embedded in contradiction?

To (2): No further discussion is possible or necessary. The sophist's tricks are just that, sophist's tricks, worthy of the Mad Hatter, Milton Friedman, David Stockman, George Gilder.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


For dummies means that if you buy a 1 dollar book about logic (static as well as dialectic) it is explained why these arguments are not enough. And I will wait untill you will win the Nobel Prize in something before considering your replies better than that of Bernstein's or Burnham's or Bohk Bawerk.

But, I do not use any logic -- not that you'd know anyway. And the dailecticians I quote do not either.

You might reply that they use 'dialectical logic', but even if that were so, it's pretty simple logic, and as I have shown, it implies change is impossible.

But, let's suppose you are right. If my logic is all that simple, then you'll find it easy to show where I go wrong.

So, where do I go wrong?

You have yet to say.


And I will wait untill you will win the Nobel Prize in something before considering your replies better than that of Bernstein's or Burnham's or Bohk Bawerk.

On that basis, you'd be right to ignore Hegel, Marx, Engles, Plekhanov, Lenin and Trotsky.:lol:

But what is the winning of a capitalist prize (founded by a ruling-class war-monger) doing in a reply from a Marxist?!?


So a sudden change can happen. something can become its opposite. and this is not dialectic it is historical materialism. good. you can call it as you like, Mickie Mouse is perfect to me. The important point is that we agree on how reality works. Gradual changes that all of a sudden provokes an explosion and something completely different.

Where have I denied that some things can change into their opposites? The point is that if dialectical materialsm were true, change would be impossible.

Once more, you have yet to show why this conclusion is false.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian (still both ignoring and not ignoring me; how 'dialectical'!):


I see Rosa has posted a reply:

Let me guess, based on all her previous replies, what her answer is:

1. I [Rosa] have no need to do this because somebody else [probably Marx] already did it.

Ah, the mystic finally sees the light.:)


2. Even if he [Marx] didn't, the self-opposition of capital to its own terms of existence, are not a "contradiction" because-- and this is my representation of Rosa's cop logic-- because since the opposition in capital actually exists, it cannot be in contradiction to capital which means capital cannot exist.

Not my argument, but one you simply made up.


As for my responses:

To (1): cop [appropriately] out. Please identify those parts in Marx's work where he describes this self-opposition to capital as not being a contradiction, embedded in contradiction?

As you know, since I have told you, Marx was merely 'coquetting' with this word.

And even if he weren't, you have yet to tell us why these are 'contradictions' to begin with.


To (2): No further discussion is possible or necessary. The sophist's tricks are just that, sophist's tricks, worthy of the Mad Hatter, Milton Friedman, David Stockman, George Gilder.

Stop posting them, then.:lol:

[syndicat]

As pointed out earlier, Okishio has been refuted, and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall has been verified in works by other Marxists.

But not by non-marxists. Robin Hahnel is a radical economist, a professor who is an expert on mathematical economics. He says he teaches Okishio's proof to his students. I'll take his word over someone who advocates dopey dialectics.



If I follow you, only statements can be negated, which means that only statements can be contradicted, i.e I say capitalism creates the conditions for its own overthrow.
You say know it doesn't. That's a contradiction.

1. I say capitalism creates the conditions for its overthrow.
2. You say it doesn't.

1 and 2 are not contradictories. The relevant contradictories would be:

1. Capitalism creates the conditions for its overthrow.
2. Capitalism does not create the conditions for its overthrow.

It's not capitalism along that creates the conditions for its overthrow because class formation is a process in the working class. In the development of self-activity and self-organization and revolutionary consciousness, the working class develops a counter-power to capital. It's not capital that creates this counter-power. You're collapsing all agency into capital.



I say the fact that the immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation is the accumulation of capital itself, and that's a contradiction within the system, social relation of capital. You say, capitalism is the immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation, but that's no contradiction to capitalism.

Do I have this right?[/quote[

No. "capitalism creates an immanent barrier to capital accumulation" is just a pontificator's rendition of the thesis of declining rate of profit. since I don't agree with it. I don't agree that "capitalism is the immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation." But, yes, "capitalism is an immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation" is not a contradictory of capitalism because capitalism is not a statement but a social formation.

[quote]
Labor and capital are opposed, in that the latter aggrandizes the former, expropriates the labor-power of the laborer and the product of that appropriation, accumulation, increases the power of capital, and the capitalist over the workers. The product of labor diminishes, proportionately, the power of the laborer over the conditions of production, and the use of that labor.

Labor and capital are opposed forces, that is correct. What does it mean to say capital "expropriates" labor-power? Capitaliism isn't a system of chattel slavery. but there is no contradiction in your statement.



Rather than repeat ourselves-- "this is a contradiction," "no it's not because I can express it this way," let's see if we can bring some focus with a single issue:

Is Marx's assertion that the barrier to capitalist accumulation is capital itself 1.accurate and 2. a contradiction?


It's neither accurate nor a contradiction.

[vyborg]

Well if we all agree about how reality works (gradual accumulation that provokes a complete change a revolution) and, therefore, how to intervene in it, that's the important point. if someone states that it cannot happen with dialectics I would say it is exactly the opposite, but, at the end of the day, these are minor points

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


Well if we all agree about how reality works (gradual accumulation that provokes a complete change a revolution) and, therefore, how to intervene in it, that's the important point. if someone states that it cannot happen with dialectics I would say it is exactly the opposite, but, at the end of the day, these are minor points

But we don't agree.

And even if we did, and even if we needed a theory to account for change, dialectical materialism would not make the bottom of the reserve list of viable candidates, since it is far too vague and confused for anyone to be able to say whether it is true or not.

[S.Artesian]

But not by non-marxists. Robin Hahnel is a radical economist, a professor who is an expert on mathematical economics. He says he teaches Okishio's proof to his students. I'll take his word over someone who advocates dopey dialectics.

Really? Have you read Kliman's latest analysis of rates of profits? Lots of "radical" economists have proven lots of things contra Marx like it is state interference with free markets, and the actions of unions that inhibit growth and bring about recession. Then there's Laffler & co., remember those "radicals"? who "proved" that reduced taxes would reduce the US deficit and create larger growth rates. Didn't work out that way in the Reagan area, but the "proof" is still there. Didn't work out that way in the Clinton era either, as increased taxes preceded accelerated growth, profit margin increases, reduction of deficits, and damn near retired the US debt... until that accelerated growth reduced those profit margins and brought Bush 2 to office, so that deficits, reduced taxes, and war could all join hands in the great here and now.

You pay your money and you pick your proof. It's the market at work.

And I guess Marx is the foremost dope of those dopey dialecticians, no?


The relevant contradictories would be:

1. Capitalism creates the conditions for its overthrow.
2. Capitalism does not create the conditions for its overthrow.

It's not capitalism along that creates the conditions for its overthrow because class formation is a process in the working class. In the development of self-activity and self-organization and revolutionary consciousness, the working class develops a counter-power to capital. It's not capital that creates this counter-power. You're collapsing all agency into capital.[quote]

How is the self-activity and self-organization of the working class created if not in response to, in opposition to, capital? Revolutionary consciousness develops as a "counter-power" to capital. Does speaking in such mystical terms-- revolutionary consciousness as a "counter-power"-- make you feel more profound, more opposed to capitalism than those dopey dialecticians? Where has there ever been a self-organization of the working class as a "counter power" to capitalism that did not spring forth due to conflicts in capitalist expanded reproduction? Where did such mystical consciousness come from if not from the struggle in opposition to capital, due to the working class's position in capitalist reproduction; due to the appropriation, not theft, but appropriation, aggrandizement of surplus value?

If there ever was mystical, meaningless, pontification being drummed into analysis of revolutionary struggles, a language that can accommodate any all sorts of conflicted actions, strategies, notions; language that allows for everything and means nothing, it is precisely this language of "revolutionary consciousness" developing as a "counter-power" to capitalism.



[QUOTE=syndicat;1711678]No. "capitalism creates an immanent barrier to capital accumulation" is just a pontificator's rendition of the thesis of declining rate of profit. since I don't agree with it. I don't agree that "capitalism is the immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation." But, yes, "capitalism is an immanent barrier to capitalist accumulation" is not a contradictory of capitalism because capitalism is not a statement but a social formation.

Marx, the dopey dialectician and the pontificator, those after all are his words, and words he uses several times in different iterations throughout his works.

I appreciate your answer, though, that such a condition-- a self-barrier-- cannot be a contradiction because capitalism is not a statement but a social form. OK, contradictions can only apply to statements, and not to anything that actually occurs in the world independent of our statements about it.

Kind of where discussion of this aspect has to end, no? At least I think it is where we come to the end, which is at the beginning.

[ChrisK]

The different states of the egg are mutually exclusive, and the transformation of the egg from one stage to another has some properties that we observed.

Note that these properties can be generalized to any system.

Keeping this in mind, we will now focus on the physical and chemical changes inside the egg. These include particles coming from different directions colliding, charges interacting, chemical bonds being formed and broken etc. All these changes are due to interactions between particles, groups of particles, or more complex subsystems of the egg displaying mutually exclusive states, that is, states that differ with respect to position, velocity, charge or otherwise. Due to these interactions, the systems that interact, acquire each others' characteristics (those that constitute the mutually exclusive states) partially or wholly and change into different states.

Moreover, the overall change of state of the egg is equivalent to the sum-total of all these changes, as they, in the given conditions(such as incubation), uniquely determine the change of the egg from one state to another. For convenience we will ignore the more minor interactions of the egg with its surroundings, due to the much greater complexity of the changes within. We also ignore the possibility that the egg gets smashed accidentally and similar stuff, because it would require expanding the system under observation.

Clear ?

Sure, we're getting repetitive here. Things change and interact with each other and two of the same process stages are mutually exclusive. This has been already covered.

[syndicat]

Really? Have you read Kliman's latest analysis of rates of profits? Lots of "radical" economists have proven lots of things contra Marx like it is state interference with free markets, and the actions of unions that inhibit growth and bring about recession. Then there's Laffler & co., remember those "radicals"? who "proved" that reduced taxes would reduce the US deficit and create larger growth rates. Didn't work out that way in the Reagan area, but the "proof" is still there. Didn't work out that way in the Clinton era either, as increased taxes preceded accelerated growth, profit margin increases, reduction of deficits, and damn near retired the US debt... until that accelerated growth reduced those profit margins and brought Bush 2 to office, so that deficits, reduced taxes, and war could all join hands in the great here and now.


well, Hahnel is a libertarian socialist, an anti-capitalist. That's what I meant by "radical".

but stick to your obscurantist 19th century religion if you like.


If there ever was mystical, meaningless, pontification being drummed into analysis of revolutionary struggles, a language that can accommodate any all sorts of conflicted actions, strategies, notions; language that allows for everything and means nothing, it is precisely this language of "revolutionary consciousness" developing as a "counter-power" to capitalism.


In other words, you don't want to look at working class self-activity at all and how the working class changes so as to be able to pose the possibility of a revolution where iit liberates itself and creates an authentic socialism (not the bureaucratic class systems of USSR, Cuba, China et al).

You'd prefer to hum your metaphysical religion.

[red cat]

Sure, we're getting repetitive here. Things change and interact with each other and two of the same process stages are mutually exclusive. This has been already covered.

Okay. :)

Now look at systems of much higher complexities, the society for example. Even here things can be broken down into elementary physical and chemical changes. But that is neither practical nor actually possible to achieve at present. So we look for subsystems of higher complexities, which roughly preserve the properties that we observed.

It turns out that the main kind of internal changes that transform the society are interactions between different classes. These classes too acquire each others' properties partially during the course of change, and this transforms the society as a whole.

For example, in a special kind of interaction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the proletariat acquires the property of the bourgeoisie of being the ruling class, and the bourgeoisie becomes the ruled class in turn. This changes a capitalist society into a socialist one. The change from capitalism to socialism is the sum total of many changes, but the interactions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat almost completely and uniquely determine it. Since we are viewing systems of very high complexities, we can ignore the other changes and consider the particular change in these to classes to be equivalent to the change of the society from capitalism to socialism.

The other properties that we earlier observed, such as some states becoming unreachable are also preserved; capitalism becomes unreachable once the society turns communist. But as we earlier observed, change is unconditional and the society will transform into a different state. But it will be some form that we cannot predict right now, and the main conditions determining that change will also be very different from class interactions, as classes will disappear then.

Clear ?

[ChrisK]

Okay. :)

Now look at systems of much higher complexities, the society for example. Even here things can be broken down into elementary physical and chemical changes. But that is neither practical nor actually possible to achieve at present. So we look for subsystems of higher complexities, which roughly preserve the properties that we observed.

It turns out that the main kind of internal changes that transform the society are interactions between different classes. These classes too acquire each others' properties partially during the course of change, and this transforms the society as a whole.

For example, in a special kind of interaction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the proletariat acquires the property of the bourgeoisie of being the ruling class, and the bourgeoisie becomes the ruled class in turn. This changes a capitalist society into a socialist one. The change from capitalism to socialism is the sum total of many changes, but the interactions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat almost completely and uniquely determine it. Since we are viewing systems of very high complexities, we can ignore the other changes and consider the particular change in these to classes to be equivalent to the change of the society from capitalism to socialism.

The other properties that we earlier observed, such as some states becoming unreachable are also preserved; capitalism becomes unreachable once the society turns communist. But as we earlier observed, change is unconditional and the society will transform into a different state. But it will be some form that we cannot predict right now, and the main conditions determining that change will also be very different from class interactions, as classes will disappear then.

Clear ?

Yes

[S.Artesian]

In other words, you don't want to look at working class self-activity at all and how the working class changes so as to be able to pose the possibility of a revolution where iit liberates itself and creates an authentic socialism (not the bureaucratic class systems of USSR, Cuba, China et al).


On the contrary, that's exactly what I want to do, but talking about developing consciousness as a "counter-power" can be and is used to explain, justify, beat the drum for everything from Zapatista "liberated zones" to cooperatives to actual factory committees.

Actually, I would suggest that revolutionary class consciousness is not measured, produces, or is produced in this notion of "counter-power" to capitalism, but rather in the recognition that capitalism is the power, that capitalism is the agency of social power, and the necessary task, is the overtaking of that class power; seizing of power over all of society through specific organizations -- that would be soviets, councils, committees such as were developed in El Alto in the struggle against privatization of the water utility, against Goni.

That's dual power, is that what you had in mind? If so, those dual power organizations are themselves not exempt from the power, the agency of capital, but manifest all the conflicts, contradictions, hesitations, unevenness, combination, confusion coursing through the society. Moreover, such organizations of dual power grow, expand, become in fact dual powerful under precise conditions. Those conditions are exactly when capitalism has run up the inside of the cage of its own making; when capital has become the immanent barrier to capitalist reproduction; when, in fact, the relations and means of production undermine the expansion of each other and are in contradiction to each other.

[syndicat]

"dual power" is a development out of worker social power. but worker social power always exists to some extent within capitalism. when workers resist by forming a worker committee or union, and take collective actions to oppose management, they are thus creating a form of social power...they are using their force of numbers to bend the will of the firm's management. this is a form of counter-power because it arises independently of capital, outside its logic, and acts counter to the will of the bosses. to say that workers develop through self-activity and self-organizatoin a counter-power to capital is not something you should be aghast at or have any problem with since you agree, I would suppose, that labor and capital are opposed forces in capitalist society.

but it doesn't reach the point of "dual power" til worker self-organization poses a fundamental, revolutionary challenge to capitalist control of society.

[red cat]

Yes

What I described in my earlier posts is essentially dialectics.

Now just a bit about the language part. In our daily lives we refer to several things as opposites. We say that a body at rest is the opposite of a body in motion. Again, bodies moving in two opposite directions are opposites of each other. A slow moving body is the opposite of a fast moving body. When we talk of dialectics, we generalize this notion to that of systems displaying mutually exclusive states. Indeed, all things that we normally refer to as opposites fall under this category.

Now look at the "special" type of class interaction that we talked about. It is a full-fledged struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Look at the biosphere in general. Species develop due to evolution which is determined by struggle between individuals, species, and life and environment. Again, in dialectics, we generalize the notion of struggle to interaction between opposites. Same as earlier, what we generally refer to as struggle in our daily lives is a subset of this. Note that for systems like capitalism and socialism, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat can actually be viewed as a struggle between socialism and capitalism, since the former uniquely determines the latter.

These are the fundamentals of dialectics and this is what we mean by struggle between opposites. Thus the terms like contradiction, antagonization etc. also arise. I hope all this makes things clear for you. Do you have any more questions ?

[S.Artesian]

"dual power" is a development out of worker social power. but worker social power always exists to some extent within capitalism. when workers resist by forming a worker committee or union, and take collective actions to oppose management, they are thus creating a form of social power...they are using their force of numbers to bend the will of the firm's management. this is a form of counter-power because it arises independently of capital, outside its logic, and acts counter to the will of the bosses. to say that workers develop through self-activity and self-organizatoin a counter-power to capital is not something you should be aghast at or have any problem with since you agree, I would suppose, that labor and capital are opposed forces in capitalist society.

but it doesn't reach the point of "dual power" til worker self-organization poses a fundamental, revolutionary challenge to capitalist control of society.


But the very fact that it "always exists" says its mere existence is part of the very capitalist agency that creates the class itself, that agency being wage-labor.

What you've given us is a form without any substance, any real content,"it always exists," arises "independently," "outside the logic of capitalism." That's just baloney. Unions don't arise independently of capitalism; they are not "outside" the logic of capitalism.

Soviets did not arise in 1905 outside the "logic of capitalism," it was the very logic of capitalism, of its uneven and combined development that produced the soviets.


And workers' actions are not immediately nor always "bending management to their will."

When in 1906 (? I think that was the year), US train dispatchers working in Mexico on railways in Mexico that were owned by the US, struck because they did not want Mexican workers to be qualified as train dispatchers, Mexican workers to receive the same salary, and did not want Spanish to be used in the transmission of train orders, bulletins orders, and other instructions to train crews, was that an exercise in counter-power?

Are we honestly to think that the CIO in the US developed independently of the bourgeoisie, outside the logic of capitalism? The workers' movements, strikes, opposition arose directly from inside the logic of capitalism, but the conversion of that opposition into the formal organization of the CIO was aided by, and in turn aided, significant and powerful sectors of the bourgeoisie.

Does anyone think John L. Lewis existed "outside" the logic of capitalism? That his efforts in the CIO were not aided by sections of the bourgeoisie?

That's what I mean when you give us a mystical term, one that can be filled with any content anyone desires at anytime-- counter-power always exists. Then its existence is meaningless, or only has meaning rather, to the degree that it accommodates, and capitulates to capital.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Now just a bit about the language part. In our daily lives we refer to several things as opposites. We say that a body at rest is the opposite of a body in motion. Again, bodies moving in two opposite directions are opposites of each other. A slow moving body is the opposite of a fast moving body. When we talk of dialectics, we generalize this notion to that of systems displaying mutually exclusive states. Indeed, all things that we normally refer to as opposites fall under this category.

Let's take a body B at rest. Later it's in motion; call it B*.

And yet, according to the dialectical classicists, this can only happen if B and B* have been engaged in struggle.

But this is rather odd, since that must mean that, in order to move, B has to struggle with its future self!

In turn, that means that dialectical objects will never move.:confused:

And yet, I thought dialectical materialism was the theory/philosophy of movement and change?

Looks like it isn't...:(

[vyborg]

Rosa stated that we dont agree on how changes come about in society. I thought we did. And I also think how dialectical materialism explains them is so easy to understand...

So I will go back o the example. Credit helps the business cycvle to overcome its limitations. Gradually this expansion (quantitative modification) reaches a plateau (overproduction, tendency of the profit rate to go down, disproportions among sectores and any other trend linked to the anarchy of production). Hence, all of a sudden, the growth collapse, some banks go bust, we experience a strong credit crunch, then a slump...the quantitative accumulation turns into a qualitative new status of things.

I think this is an example on how capitalism really works. Someone can reply he doesnt agree with the theory and that's ok; others will tell us they agree but this is not dialectical materialism or something like this.

The first kind of critic is consistent: you refuse marxism and dialectic altogether. You are left with no explanation of reality but this is another matter.
The second kind of critic is only linguistic to me. If we agree about the way the things are, we will find a common way to define them quite easily.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


Rosa stated that we dont agree on how changes come about in society. I thought we did. And I also think how dialectical materialism explains them is so easy to understand...

We do if we stick to Historical Materialism, but not if you introduce the mystical ideas Engels pinched from Hegel.


So I will go back o the example. Credit helps the business cycle to overcome its limitations. Gradually this expansion (quantitative modification) reaches a plateau (overproduction, tendency of the profit rate to go down, disproportions among sectors and any other trend linked to the anarchy of production). Hence, all of a sudden, the growth collapse, some banks go bust, we experience a strong credit crunch, then a slump...the quantitative accumulation turns into a qualitative new status of things

And yet, the affectation at the end ruins everything. Why throw it in? It adds nothing, and makes the whole theory look amateurish and non-scientific.


I think this is an example on how capitalism really works. Someone can reply he doesn't agree with the theory and that's ok; others will tell us they agree but this is not dialectical materialism or something like this.

It ceased to be a scientific theory when you decided to adulterate it with all that Hegelian guff at the end.


The first kind of critic is consistent: you refuse marxism and dialectic altogether. You are left with no explanation of reality but this is another matter.

Well, you have said this several times, but repetition does not equal truth. To reject 'the dialectic', as you understand it, is not to reject Marxism --, since Marx also rejected 'the dialectic' as you see it -- as I have established in the 'anti-dialectics made easy' thread two, in Philosophy.


The second kind of critic is only linguistic to me. If we agree about the way the things are, we will find a common way to define them quite easily.

You'll be telling us next that Marx's distinction between the relative and the equivalent form of value is just 'linguistic' next.:lol:

Careful use of language is integral to science, economics and political theory.

[vyborg]

The "affectations at the end" is what happens in the real world. A gradual accumulation and then a complete break. This "historical" materialism is also dialectic. Marx based his theory on it.

The words are very important but ideas are more important.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


The "affectations at the end" is what happens in the real world. A gradual accumulation and then a complete break. This "historical" materialism is also dialectic. Marx based his theory on it.

And there are many changes (in natiure and society) that are gradual, and involve no 'leaps', so this can't be a law.

Anyway, as I noted, it can't be a law: it's far too vague and confused to be one.


The words are very important but ideas are more important.

In that case, give me an example of an idea that you have -- but do not use any words to tell me about it.

[ZeroNowhere]

Robin Hahnel is a radical economist, a professor who is an expert on mathematical economics. He says he teaches Okishio's proof to his students. I'll take his word over someone who advocates dopey dialectics.
How about a radical economist who is a professor who has a Ph.D. in Economics? Which is, y'know, what Kliman is.

Tbh, perhaps we should leave this thread to RC and CK?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Zero:


How about a radical economist who is a professor who has a Ph.D. in Economics? Which is, y'know, what Kliman is.

Well, I had a recent debate with him about 'dialectical contradictions', and he was totally incapable of saying what they are, just like the dialectical mopes here:

http://marxisthumanistinitiative.org/2009/05/05/brief-comments-on-the-relationship-between-marxism-and-the-hegelian-dialectic/


Tbh, perhaps we should leave this thread to RC and CK?

In fact, CK is just playing RC.

[075]

dialects are hard, i tried learning one and it was hard, u need to visit the country. :)

[red cat]

In fact, CK is just playing RC.

Interesting.

[S.Artesian]

This "historical" materialism is also dialectic. Marx based his theory on it.

That is exactly the point. There is no antagonism between Marx's concrete analysis of history, in its specific "moments," i.e. The 18th Brumaire, and in its "general outlines," i.e. The Grundrisse.

[REVLEFT'S BIEGGST MATSER TROL]

I have a question,

Was wondering wheter there was any evidence for this "dialectics" shit actually happening?

And if so, why do we need dialectics to explain it, and not ordinary science, which seems perfectly capable of explaining why some things change fast and dramatically, and others methodically and slowly?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


That is exactly the point. There is no antagonism between Marx's concrete analysis of history, in its specific "moments," i.e. The 18th Brumaire, and in its "general outlines," i.e. The Grundrisse.

But, he chose not to publish the Grundrisse.

And no wonder -- by the time he came to write Das Kapital, he had waved all this Hegelian stuff 'goodbye'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gangsterio:


Was wondering wheter there was any evidence for this "dialectics" shit actually happening??

None at all.


And if so, why do we need dialectics to explain it, and not ordinary science, which seems perfectly capable of explaining why some things change fast and dramatically, and others methodically and slowly?

Quite right; in fact, as I have shown, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1594418&postcount=90

[vyborg]

'Comrade' Artesian:



But, he chose not to publish the Grundrisse.

And no wonder -- by the time he came to write Das Kapital, he had waved all this Hegelian stuff 'goodbye'.

The Grundrisse are fundamental to understand Das Kapital. Marx wrote the 3 volumes of Das Kapital (with the fourth and Grundrisse also) before publishing the I volume (Rosdolsky explains it very well). So there is nothing in Das Kapital against Grundrisse. They were not intended to publication at least not all but if we think to the most "methodological" part of the Grundrisse (the '57 introduction), does Marx repudiated it theoretically? Not at all, Marx only states (in the '59 introduction) that he think it is not useful to present something that concludes a problem instead of presenting the problem itself. and he showed this way his method once again: dialectic must come out from reality, not be remembered...as Lassalle did

[vyborg]

Vyborg:
And there are many changes (in natiure and society) that are gradual, and involve no 'leaps', so this can't be a law.

Anyway, as I noted, it can't be a law: it's far too vague and confused to be one.

In that case, give me an example of an idea that you have -- but do not use any words to tell me about it.

We are talking about society, so confusion and vagueness of a theory must be understood. to me, the gradual accumulation of contradiction in the business cycle that becomes a slump, that is a qualitative change, is perfectly cleare, precise and perfect to explain reality.

If you pretend an equation, this is not the case. social laws are only general tendency because people are not atoms. but they are law nontheless and we can study them (as, for instance, the law of decrease of the profit rate or the law of increase in the technical composition of capital etc)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


The Grundrisse are fundamental to understand Das Kapital.

Maybe so, but he nevertheless chose not to publish it. But he did publish (in the Afterword to the second edition of Das Kapital) a summary of 'his method', 'the dialectic method' in which there is no trace of Hegel:


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will no doubt notice that, in the dialectic method that Marx (not me) endorses, there is not one single Hegelian concept to be found -- no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality" --, and yet Marx calls this the "dialectic method", and says of it that it is "my method".

So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two here and there with which he merely "coquetted". In that case once more, Marx's "dialectic method" more closely resembles that of Aristotle, Kant, Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Smith and Stewart (the Scottish Historical Materialists). This is, of course, the version of Historical Materialism I have been advocating all along.


Marx wrote the 3 volumes of Das Kapital (with the fourth and Grundrisse also) before publishing the I volume (Rosdolsky explains it very well). So there is nothing in Das Kapital against Grundrisse.

Except, Marx has now dropped all that the Hegelian guff.


They were not intended to publication at least not all but if we think to the most "methodological" part of the Grundrisse (the '57 introduction), does Marx repudiated it theoretically? Not at all, Marx only states (in the '59 introduction) that he think it is not useful to present something that concludes a problem instead of presenting the problem itself. and he showed this way his method once again: dialectic must come out from reality, not be remembered...as Lassalle did

But, as we now know, since Marx told us, his 'dialectic method' has no Hegel in it at all (upside down or the 'right way up').

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


We are talking about society, so confusion and vagueness of a theory must be understood. to me, the gradual accumulation of contradiction in the business cycle that becomes a slump, that is a qualitative change, is perfectly cleare, precise and perfect to explain reality.

1) This is just an excuse for sloppy thinking.

2) These aren't contradictions, and I defy you to show otherwise.


If you pretend an equation, this is not the case. social laws are only general tendency because people are not atoms. but they are law nontheless and we can study them (as, for instance, the law of decrease of the profit rate or the law of increase in the technical composition of capital etc)

That would be like someone saying "Whenever the Sun rises, I get out of bed. So, this must be a law...."

So, it can't be a 'law', since most things 'disobey' it.

[vyborg]

I wrote about the contradiction at least 5 or 6 time. But I will sum up it again.
During the business cycle, what helps the growth, also explain the fall. this is a complete contradiction. How can be the credit, for instance, be foundamental in a stage to grow and the very same thing being the main cause of collapse?

Is it a law? Yes, every business cycle happens in the same general way. But if someone pretends any business cycle to be exactly the same this is not science but science fiction.

look at the medicine. when a person arrives at the emergency room of a hospital do the MD use science to cure him or her? Of course they do. Do they apply the same law to this person? Of course but does it mean any person reacts the same way to any medicine or any cure? Of course not.

The economic laws are scientific and dialectic, as Marx explained, but they remain tendencies because men can react to them to a certain extent.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


I wrote about the contradiction at least 5 or 6 time. But I will sum up it again.
During the business cycle, what helps the growth, also explain the fall. this is a complete contradiction. How can be the credit, for instance, be fundamental in a stage to grow and the very same thing being the main cause of collapse?

This would be a contradiction: "Credit helps growth and credit does not help growth", but the example you gave is not a contradiction.

Of course, you may be using "contradiction" in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense, but what is it?


Is it a law? Yes, every business cycle happens in the same general way. But if someone pretends any business cycle to be exactly the same this is not science but science fiction.

I do not doubt it, but the part where you referred to "business cycle that becomes a slump, that is a qualitative change", in your previous post, isn't a 'law' -- it's far to vague and imprecise, and far too many things disobey it.


look at the medicine. when a person arrives at the emergency room of a hospital do the MD use science to cure him or her? Of course they do. Do they apply the same law to this person? Of course but does it mean any person reacts the same way to any medicine or any cure? Of course not.

Again, I do not doubt it, but doctors are pretty clear what constitutes a disease, a medicine, its effects and what are the symptoms they are looking for. None of this is true with respect to the Hegelian use of "quality"; we have yet to be told (clearly) what one of these is, and we have yet to be told what the length of a Hegelian "node" (or "leap") is supposed to be.

Here is what I have written on this in one of my essays (in connection with Trotsky's example of peasant woman adding salt to meal, but it also applies to the other examples Engels gives -- boiling water, etc.); DM = Dialectical Materialism:


Qualities, as characterised by dialecticians -- or, rather, by those that bother to say what they mean by this word -- are those properties of bodies/processes that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body/process into something else:


"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity and measure.

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975) Logic, p.124, §85.]

As the Glossary at the Marx Internet Archive notes:


"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.

"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'.

"In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here. You can find the link in the original essay, link at the end.]

This is an Aristotelian notion.

Cornforth tries gamely to tell us what a 'dialectical quality' is:


"For instance, if a piece of iron is painted black and instead we paint it red, that is merely and external alteration..., but it is not a qualitative change in the sense we are here defining. On the other hand, if the iron is heated to melting point, then this is such a qualitative change. And it comes about precisely as a change in the attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a qualitative change." [Cornforth (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method, p.99.]

And yet, as we have seen, no new substance emerges as a result; liquid iron, gold and aluminium is still gold, iron and aluminium. [Worse, metals melt slowly, not nodally!]

Kuusinen's book is one of the few other DM-texts that seems to make any note of this difficulty:


"The totality of essential features that make a particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguishes it from others, is called its quality.... It is...[a] concept that denotes the inseparable distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a phenomenon and without which it cease to be what it is." [Kuusinen (1961) Fundamentals Of Marxism-Leninism, pp.83-84.]

But, it is not at all clear that someone's liking/not liking soup defines them as a person -- or as a being of a particular sort. While scientists might decide to classify certain aspects of nature (placing them in whatever categories they see fit), none, as far as I am aware, has so far identified two different sorts of human beings: "soup-likers for n milligrams of salt per m litres of soup versus soup-dislikers for the same or different n or m". And even if they were to do this, that would save this part of DM by mere re-definition, since it is reasonably clear that these two different sorts of human beings do not actually exist -- , or, at least, they didn't until I just invented them. Once again, that would make this part of DM eminently subjective, since it indicates that changes in quality are now relative to a choice of descriptive framework. Plainly, this introduces a fundamental element of arbitrariness into what dialecticians claim is a scientific law.

So, water, as ice, liquid or steam is still H2O. No new "quality", in the above Aristotelian sense, comes into being. In which case, this 'law' does not apply to the most widely used and hackneyed example of it that dialecticians appeal to!

Here is what I have also said (in the same essay) about the loose way that "node" is used:


To this end, DM-theorists could specify a minimum time interval during which a phase or state of matter transition must take place for it to be counted as "nodal". In the case of boiling water, say, they could decide that if the transition from water to steam (or vice versa) takes place in an interval lasting less than or equal to k seconds/minutes (for some k), then it is indeed "nodal". Thus, by dint of such a stipulation, their 'Law' could be made to work (at least in this respect). But, there is nothing in nature that forces any of this on us -- the reverse is, if anything, the case. Phase/state of matter changes, and changes in general take different amounts of time; moreover, under differing circumstances even these alter, too. If so, as noted above, this 'Law' would become 'valid' only because of yet another stipulation or imposition, which would make it eminently 'subjective'.

However, given the strife-riven and sectarian nature of dialectical politics, any attempt to define DM-"nodes" could lead to yet more factions. Thus, we are sure to see emerge the rightist "Nanosecond Tendency" -- sworn enemies of the "Picosecond Left Opposition" -- who will both take up swords with the 'eclectic' wing: the "it depends on the circumstances" 'clique' at the 'centrist' "Femtosecond League".


Now, with respect to the length of "nodal" points, Kuusinen had this to say (Kuusinen does not use the word "node", but it is plain that his "leaps" are "nodes"):


"The transition of a thing, through the accumulation of quantitative modifications, from one qualitative state to a different, new state, is a leap in development. This leap is a break in the gradualness of the quantitative change of a thing. It is the transition to a new quality and signalises (sic) a sharp turn, a radical change in development." [Kuusinen (1961), p.88. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphasis added.]

This seems pretty clear: all "leaps" are "sharp" turns, "radical" breaks in qualitative change. Kuusinen clearly defines "nodes"/"leaps" just as Hegel and Engels did. How then does he handle the slow qualitative changes we met earlier?


"Leaps, transitions from one quality to another are relatively rapid.... The leaps are rapid in comparison with the preceding periods of gradual accumulation of quantitative modifications. This rapidity varies, depending upon the nature of the object and the conditions in which the leap occurs.

"Some substances pass at once from the solid to the liquid state on reaching a certain critical temperature.... Other substances -- plastics, resins, glass -- do not have an exact melting point. On heating, the first soften and then pass into the liquid state. We might say that in their case the qualitative change, i.e., the leap, occurs gradually. But it is still relatively rapid."

This is all very confusing; "leaps" are rapid except where they aren't! Now, this is about as scientifically useful as defining acids (a là Brønsted-Lowry) as "substances which donate a hydrogen ion, except where they don't". Would genuine scientists be allowed to get away with cop-outs like this? Would anyone take a Physicist seriously who said that a half-life was the time taken for a radioactive compound to decay to half its original mass, except where it isn't?

Apparently, in this branch of Mickey Mouse Science, this is fine.

However, this sits rather awkwardly with Engels own take on the matter:


"We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0oC from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100oC from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water. [Engels (1976) [I]Anti-Duhring, p.160.]

Engels seems to know nothing of Kuusinen's protracted "nodes".

Now, Kuusinen tries to get round this with the usual "relatively-speaking" get-out clause tacked on at the end. But the transition from liquid water to steam (at 100oC) is genuinely rapid no matter how quickly or slowly the water is heated up in the build-up to that. And the melting of say, plastic can be long and drawn out (lasting weeks, if necessary) if the temperature rise is regulated accordingly.

And we might ask: "Relative to what?" With what may we 'objectively' compare the time it takes for plastic objects to melt so that we might truly say that it was "relatively sudden"?

But, what about the opposite, where qualitative changes that are very slow in cases where the build-up is rapid? Consider the larval stage of moths. The larva/grub will build a cocoon rapidly, but the radical qualitative changes inside that cocoon (from larva to adult moth), in its pupal stage, are painfully slow (relative to the previous stage, and to the lifetime of most moths and butterflies) -- ranging from a few weeks to many months. To be sure, when the moth breaks out, that change is rapid; but the unseen qualitative changes that have already happened before this event takes place, are slow. By no stretch of the imagination is this unseen development, these radical qualitative changes, a "leap".

And the same comments apply to the development of reptiles, birds, fish and other animals that grow inside egg sacks. Even a human baby takes nine months to "leap" from fertilised egg to fully-developed foetus before it is born --; as is well-known, fertilisation is pretty rapid in comparison. So, the "relative" clause is not just vague, it fails to apply in many cases itself.

All this, of course, is independent of the earlier comments made about the subjective implications of this "relatively-speaking" get-out clause.

In short, Kuusinen's amateurish attempt to spell-out the length of these dialectical "nodes"/"leaps" is no more impressive than the other things he and other Mickey Mouse Dialectical Scientists try to sell us.


When confronted with examples like these, dialecticians largely ignore them, but the few who don't often tell us that these aren't objections to this law, since Engels (and other DM-theorists) did not mean it to be interpreted this way. But, how they know this they have so far kept to themselves.

Now, it turns out that this Law is so vaguely worded that dialecticians can use it in whatever way they please. If this is difficult to believe then ask the very next dialectician you meet precisely how long a "nodal point" is supposed to last. You will receive no answer. But, if no one knows, then anything from a Geological Age to an instantaneous quantum leap could be "nodal"!

And, it really isn't good enough for dialecticians to dismiss this as mere pedantry. Can you imagine a genuine scientist refusing to say how long a crucially important interval in her theory is supposed to be, and accusing you of "pedantry" for even thinking to ask?

In relation to 'Mickey Mouse Science':


In general, however, the examples usually given by DM-fans to illustrate this 'Law' are almost without exception either anecdotal or impressionistic. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal purporting to establish the veracity of a new law with the same level of vagueness, imprecision, triteness, lack of detail and/or mathematics, compounded by such theoretical naivety, it would be rejected out-of-hand at the first stage. Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any attempt to establish, say, either the truth of classical economic theory or the falsity of Marx's own work with an evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as this --, to say nothing of the contempt they would show for such theoretical wooliness. In circumstances like this, those who might be quick to cry "pedantry" at the issues raised in this and other Essays published at this site would become devoted pedants themselves, and nit-pick with the best at such inferior anti-Marxist work.

[Indeed, they already do this to my work; in one breath they complain about my alleged "pedantry", in the next they home in on what they assume are minor errors. Here is just the latest example; concentrate on the comments of one "Gilhyle" at RevLeft. Here is another. The use of "here" here indicates a link in the original essay. Link at he end.]

Now, anyone who has studied or practiced real science will know this to be true. It is only in books on DM (and internet discussion boards) that Mickey Mouse material of this sort seems acceptable.

At this point we might wonder where Engels's predilection for Mickey Mouse Science came from. After all, he was familiar with the careful and detailed work of contemporary scientists (like Darwin). Why then was he prepared to assert that his 'Laws' were indeed laws on the basis of very little primary data (or none at all), but rely on secondary or tertiary (but nonetheless selective) evidence and sloppy analysis instead? Well, we need look no further than Hegel for a clue here, for Hegel was the original Mickey Mouse Scientist (making Engels merely the Sorcerer's Apprentice -- this is a reference to a cartoon character Mickey once assumed), since he derived this law' from just such Mickey Mouse evidence. Added: comrades can access the quotation from Hegel in the original essay, link at the end; I have omitted it from this summary..

So, as you can see, Hegel/Engels's 'law' is in tatters.

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm


The economic laws are scientific and dialectic, as Marx explained, but they remain tendencies because men can react to them to a certain extent.

And yet, as I demonstrated in my last post but one, Marx's "dialectic method" (in Das Kapital) does not appeal to this 'law'.

[S.Artesian]

I wrote about the contradiction at least 5 or 6 time. But I will sum up it again.
During the business cycle, what helps the growth, also explain the fall. this is a complete contradiction. How can be the credit, for instance, be foundamental in a stage to grow and the very same thing being the main cause of collapse?



Actually comrade, since credit is not the source of profits, the example you offer is not the actual structure of the contradiction.

A more accurate formulation:

When and where sufficient profitability can be achieved and sustained, credit will help growth; where insufficient profitability exists, credit will not help growth.

Example: Recent and current condition of economies in US, EU, and Japan.


And even that is not a contradiction, but an observation.

The contradiction is: the increased productivity of labor strengthens profitability; the increased productivity of labor weakens profitability.

[vyborg]

Ok, now the problem seems gravitate around the problem of precision. How much something must be precise to be dialectic.

First of all the problem is that in the formal logic, a process cannot be something and its contrary. So if credit means growth cannot means slump. In the real world that's exactly what happens after the process reach a certain level. This is exactly what happened in 2007-2009 in the world financial system. Is it "vague"? I dont think so.

As for the precision. Can we expect to predict how much a gradual accumulation of contradictions will bring us to an explosion? No we cant. Take the example I made.
Credit helped the growth in 2000-2008. Anyone could see the bubble inflating in the last years. But the explosion of it was linked to a number of casual factors: the election period in a country, the stance of a central bank, the collapse of a big bank, and so on.

Do all this kind of secundary factors invalidate the fundamental pattern? I think not. Does the way we depict the fundamental pattern helps us to intervene in the everyday life? I think this is the case.

This is was I "pretend" from marxist method and marxist theory.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


Ok, now the problem seems gravitate around the problem of precision. How much something must be precise to be dialectic.

Correction: precision is a fundamental aspect of science; so if these 'dialectical laws' are imprecise, and do not work in the majority of cases, they can't be scientific laws.


First of all the problem is that in the formal logic, a process cannot be something and its contrary. So if credit means growth cannot means slump. In the real world that's exactly what happens after the process reach a certain level. This is exactly what happened in 2007-2009 in the world financial system. Is it "vague"? I dont think so.

Even Aristotle allowed for this: "a process can be something and its contrary". You have clearly been reading far too many books and articles on dialectics that tell you the opposite of this, and whose authors merely copy this odd idea from one another without checking a single logic text (other than that badly misnamed work Hegel inflicted on humanity 200 years ago).


Is it "vague"? I dont think so.

Maybe not, but as I have shown in my last post, Engels's 'law' is, so it can't be a law.

You keep ignoring this, as I predicted you would (in my last post).


As for the precision. Can we expect to predict how much a gradual accumulation of contradictions will bring us to an explosion? No we cant. Take the example I made.
Credit helped the growth in 2000-2008. Anyone could see the bubble inflating in the last years. But the explosion of it was linked to a number of casual factors: the election period in a country, the stance of a central bank, the collapse of a big bank, and so on.

Once more, you keep helping yourself to the word "contradiction", when it is plain that the examples you give aren't contradictions to begin with.

Unless, of course, you are using this word in a new, and as-yet-unexplained sense. If so, what is it?


Do all this kind of secondary factors invalidate the fundamental pattern? I think not. Does the way we depict the fundamental pattern helps us to intervene in the everyday life? I think this is the case.

This is was I "pretend" from marxist method and marxist theory.

But, in what way is this an answer to my last post -- 99% of which you have just ignored?

[vyborg]

My aim here is not to show someone is wrong but to work out the best way to look at reality so to change it. I think there is no workable alternative to the marxist method (that is historical and dialectical method he exposes in his works).

Having said that, let's go back to the main point. If I state that the in a natural or a social process the factor is a basic element for the process to expand and, at the same time, a basic element for the process to collapse, this means it is A and on A. We can state that, in my example, credit is and is not an element needed for the business cycle to procede? My opinion is that it is the case. Is it this process contradictory? Well, it is.

A non contradictory process would be for credit to be an engine for growth always, and always the same way, something like Y(t):a+bC(t), where Y is the growth at time t, a is the non studied automatical growth, b is the elasticity of growth to credit and C is credit at time t. Always the same, always linear, clear, direct.

In reality what happens? That credit is more and more important for growth (as the "real" increase of productive forces ended already) but after a while (can we predicted this "while"? no we cant, it is bad but this is reality) credit collapses. even if our C is not going backward already, its role is pushing Y downwards.

Our factor that pushed growth up, provoked it to go down. How you can call this process if not contradictory? Plain? Linear? I think is not. Anyway, as I said, words are not an issue to me. Call this process "weird" too, it is fine to me.

This means economy moves in weird spirals...

[S.Artesian]

Ok, now the problem seems gravitate around the problem of precision. How much something must be precise to be dialectic.

First of all the problem is that in the formal logic, a process cannot be something and its contrary. So if credit means growth cannot means slump. In the real world that's exactly what happens after the process reach a certain level. This is exactly what happened in 2007-2009 in the world financial system. Is it "vague"? I dont think so.

As for the precision. Can we expect to predict how much a gradual accumulation of contradictions will bring us to an explosion? No we cant. Take the example I made.
Credit helped the growth in 2000-2008. Anyone could see the bubble inflating in the last years. But the explosion of it was linked to a number of casual factors: the election period in a country, the stance of a central bank, the collapse of a big bank, and so on.

Do all this kind of secundary factors invalidate the fundamental pattern? I think not. Does the way we depict the fundamental pattern helps us to intervene in the everyday life? I think this is the case.

This is was I "pretend" from marxist method and marxist theory.

Well not to belabor the point that needs belaboring, the point is that credit, in and of itself, means nothing. The expansion or contraction of credit is derivative of value, not causal.

Credit, leverage, speculation did not cause the contraction beginning in 2007, but was a reflection of the underlying decline in profitability.

And as a point of fact, there was no unbroken period of growth in the world economy 2000-2008; there was a recession in 2001-2003. Credit may have continued to expand, but that only proves that its expansion is not the basis for either profitability or the decline in profitability.

So again, the contradiction is:

Increased productivity of labor increases profitability.
Increased productivity of labor decreases profitability.

Precision is essential in analyzing and determining cause.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


My aim here is not to show someone is wrong but to work out the best way to look at reality so to change it. I think there is no workable alternative to the marxist method (that is historical and dialectical method he exposes in his works).

There is a workable alternative; it's called Historical Materialism (minus the Hegelian guff).


If I state that the in a natural or a social process the factor is a basic element for the process to expand and, at the same time, a basic element for the process to collapse, this means it is A and on A. We can state that, in my example, credit is and is not an element needed for the business cycle to proceed? My opinion is that it is the case. Is it this process contradictory? Well, it is.

I think you mean "A and not-A" here.

But this can't be so. Your "A" appears to be something like "Process P has a factor F that makes it expand"

In that case "not-A" will be:

"It is not the case that process P has a factor F that makes it expand".

Or more colloquially:

"Process P does not have a factor F that makes it expand."

But, your "not-A" isn't this, it's something like: "Process P has a factor F that makes it contract".

So your "A and not A" is really "A and B", which isn't a contradiction.

Unless, of course, you are using "contradiction" in a new, and as-yet-unexplained sense. Once more, what is it?


A non contradictory process would be for credit to be an engine for growth always, and always the same way, something like Y(t):a+bC(t), where Y is the growth at time t, a is the non studied automatical growth, b is the elasticity of growth to credit and C is credit at time t. Always the same, always linear, clear, direct

Maybe so, but the process you described earlier (in the previous paragraph you posted) isn't even a contradiction, so I do not know how showing me a process that isn't contradictory helps.

That would be like you trying to identify George W Bush by pointing to someone who wasn't George W Bush, and then it later turned out that you had thought Tony Blair was George W Bush in the first place!

No help at all...


In reality what happens? That credit is more and more important for growth (as the "real" increase of productive forces ended already) but after a while (can we predicted this "while"? no we cant, it is bad but this is reality) credit collapses. even if our C is not going backward already, its role is pushing Y downwards.

I agree, but it's not a contradiction. And you are only saying it is because of tradition.

And this is where that tradition came from:

Your his use of "contradiction" has been borrowed from Hegel, who in turn 'obtained' it from his unwise attempt to state the so-called 'Law of Identity' [LOI] negatively. From A = A he 'derived' what he thought was also the 'Law of non-contradiction' [LOC]: "A cannot be A and at the same time not A" -- which isn't even, of course, a contradiction!

[This is because we do not yet know what these "A"s are. If they are phrase or name variables, then this can't be a contradiction. So this can't be a contradiction until those variables have been interpreted.]

But, even if it were, the LOI concerns the alleged identity of an object with itself, whereas the LOC concerns the logical connection between a proposition and its negation. The LOC is not about objects (let alone their identity), and the LOI is not about propositions. Indeed, if a proposition were an object, it could say nothing at all, and if it wasn't self-identical, it wouldn't be a proposition to begin with, and so could say nothing determinate, either.

So, it is from this very basic error that Hegel's claim that everything is 'contradictory' derives, not from a scientific analysis of reality. That, and tradition are the only reasons comrades use this word today in the way you do.

This is not to deny that capitalism is unstable, but it is to deny that we can learn anything at all about it from that Christian mystic, Hegel -- upside down or even 'the right way up'.

You can find more details about this here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm


Our factor that pushed growth up, provoked it to go down. How you can call this process if not contradictory? Plain? Linear? I think is not. Anyway, as I said, words are not an issue to me. Call this process "weird" too, it is fine to me.

We have many other words to describe it: unstable, self-limiting, crisis-prone, self-defeating, self-stultifying, negative feedback... We do not need the mystical jargon Hegel invented to fix something that wasn't broken, and which word doesn't fit anyway.


This means economy moves in weird spirals...

What 'spirals'?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


So again, the contradiction is:

Increased productivity of labor increases profitability.
Increased productivity of labor decreases profitability.

Precision is essential in analyzing and determining cause.

Looks like you mystics can't even agree what the alleged 'contradiction is! :lol:

The only contradiction here in fact would be:

(A) Increased productivity of labor increases profitability, and

(B) Increased productivity of labor does not increase profitability.

Or perhaps:

(C) Increased productivity of labor decreases profitability, and

(D) Increased productivity of labor does not decrease profitability.

Then we have to find out if these ((A) and (B), or (C) and (D)) are, or can both be true at the same time and in the same respect.

You do not even attempt to show this.


Precision is essential in analyzing and determining cause.

Great "precision"! You do not seem to know what a contradiction is! :lol:

No wonder Marx said he was merely "coquetting" with this word in Das Kapital...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

So, after nearly ninety posts, let's sum this thread up so far:

1) Even those who believe in this mystical 'theory' can't decide among themselves what the alleged 'contradictions' in Das Kapital are!:lol:

2) The examples they keep giving aren't even contradictions! http://www.freesmileys.org/smileys/smiley-laughing013.gif

3) They can't tell us what the "qualities" they keep banging on about are -- or in a way that does not ruin some of their best examples (like boiling water). http://www.freesmileys.org/smileys/smiley-laughing025.gif

4) They can't even tell us how long a "leap" is. http://www.freesmileys.org/smileys/smiley-laughing014.gif

5) The alleged 'struggle of opposites', which is supposed to explain change, in fact makes change impossible. As we saw, 'dialectical eggs' will never hatch. http://www.freesmileys.org/smileys/smiley-laughing021.gif

So, is anyone clearer about this joke of a 'theory'? Has this thread made things 'easy'?

No wonder then that this 'theory' has presided over decade after decade of failure... :(

[vyborg]

Credit, leverage, speculation did not cause the contraction beginning in 2007, but was a reflection of the underlying decline in profitability.

This is bit mechanic. I agree that in the last analysis is only a reflection, but how credit and finance work can change considerably the business cycle.


And as a point of fact, there was no unbroken period of growth in the world economy 2000-2008; there was a recession in 2001-2003. Credit may have continued to expand, but that only proves that its expansion is not the basis for either profitability or the decline in profitability.

Borrowing allowed the recession to be irrelevant that is to end soon and with minor consequences. The problem is you cannot have a financial leverage always growing with no effects.


So again, the contradiction is:

Increased productivity of labor increases profitability.
Increased productivity of labor decreases profitability.

Precision is essential in analyzing and determining cause.

I agree that the core of capitalism is to find ways to extract more profits from workers. I think we all agree on it. I also agree that the way capitalists do it (ie technological innovation) is higly contradictory because the final results is directly the oppoiste of what they attempted in the first place. Anyway the role of credit is nont irrelevant

[vyborg]

I think the law of identity is quite important to understand reality and dialectics allow us to assess the limits of this law, not to deny it straight away.

Anyway, if we set aside the hate for Hegel, and we substitute dialectic with historical materialism, it seems to me we dont have found yet something we dont agree on how capitalism really work. this is positive, after all

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


I think the law of identity is quite important to understand reality and dialectics allow us to assess the limits of this law, not to deny it straight away.

And yet there is precious little evidence that dialecticians know anything about this 'law'.


Anyway, if we set aside the hate for Hegel, and we substitute dialectic with historical materialism, it seems to me we dont have found yet something we dont agree on how capitalism really work. this is positive, after all

I'm sorry, this sentence does not seem to make much sense.

[vyborg]

I think I understand what dialectic is and I dont hink any "historical" materialism can exist without dialectic. Anyway, if we call with 2 names one and the same thing, this is the same thing.

Why is so important to assess if we agree on reality more than on words? Because theory, as Lenin said, are guide to action. So if this guides take us to the same action that's the main point. We dont risk to be on different sides of the struggle...

[S.Artesian]

Hey, here's a thought, why don't we all, individually provide our comrade who initiated this thread with a definition of contradiction.

And... ladies first, goddam the male-chauvinist in me, so Rosa, care to provide our inquiring comrade with your definition?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vyborg:


I think I understand what dialectic is and I dont hink any "historical" materialism can exist without dialectic. Anyway, if we call with 2 names one and the same thing, this is the same thing.

Looks like you believe in the 'law of identity'

Historical Materialism [HM] = Dialectical Materialism [DM].:lol:

But, I'd like to see you try to show HM needs DM, especially since I have shown that if DM is true, change would be impossible!


Why is so important to assess if we agree on reality more than on words? Because theory, as Lenin said, are guide to action. So if this guides take us to the same action that's the main point. We dont risk to be on different sides of the struggle...

In that case, if theory is a guide to action, and Dialectical Marxism is a long-term and abject failure, that must mean your theory is defective.

No wonder then that I have been able to show it is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian (who is still both ignoring me and not ignoring me, just like a confused dialectician should!):


Hey, here's a thought, why don't we all, individually provide our comrade who initiated this thread with a definition of contradiction.

You have been asked to do this (or rather to explain, and not define this term) for over a month. Indeed, you have also been asked to explain what one of these obscure 'dialectical contradictions' is, and you have signally failed to do so.


And... ladies first, goddam the male-chauvinist in me, so Rosa, care to provide our inquiring comrade with your definition?

In ordinary language, as the word suggests, to contradict what someone has said is to the gain-say them.

In logic, there are many different sorts of contradiction. Here is what I have written in Essay Five at my site:


Now, as far as FL is concerned, two propositions are contradictory just in case they cannot both be true and cannot both be false at once. [The latter condition is almost invariably ignored by DM-critics of FL. Many deny there is a distinction here, even when it is pointed out to them! They call this distinction "pedantic". However, its importance will emerge later.] Naturally, this characterisation represents the simplest form of FL-contradiction.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on context; FL = Formal Logic; MFL = Modern Formal Logic; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; PB = Principle of Bivalence.]

Examples of more complex contradictions would include one or both of the following:

C1: ~[(P→Q)v(P→R)↔(P→(QvR))]

C2: ~[~(Ex)(Fx&~Gx)↔(x)(Fx→Gx)]

[In the above, "(E...)" is the existential quantifier; "↔" is a biconditional sign; "(x)" is the universal quantifier; "&" stands for "and"; "v" is the inclusive "or"; "~" stands for negation; "→" is the conditional sign; "P", "Q", and "R" are propositional variables; "F" and "G" are one-place, first-level predicate letters; and "x" is a second-level predicate-binding variable. More details here, and here.]

These, of course, are just two of the potentially infinite number of logical contradictions which can be generated in MFL. DM-theorists would be hard-pressed to find space -- even in their quirky universe -- for contradictions such as these (once they have been interpreted).

Moreover, dialecticians often confuse the LEM, the PB -- and particularly the LOC -- with one another, and all of them with opposites, inconsistencies, contraries, paradoxes, oddities, irrationalities, struggles, oppositional processes, forces, events which go contrary to expectations, and a host of other oddities. In fact, they are so ready to see contradictions everywhere, they find they have to alter the meaning of that word so that (for them) it becomes synonymous with "struggle", "conflict" and "opposition".

More details and links to sites where the above technical expressions are explained, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2005.htm

[S.Artesian]

I see that Rosa has posted something. Let me view that post, and then I'll respond.

[S.Artesian]

Preliminary inquiry for Rosa:

Am I understanding the definition of contradiction that you provide correctly in saying:

a contradiction occurs between two propositions when they cannot both be true and both cannot be false at the same time.

So if I say: increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism; increased productivity of labor does not strengthen capitalism—that is a contradiction as both cannot be true and false at the same time. If I say increased productivity of labor weakens capitalism and increased productivity of labor does not weaken capitalism, that is a contradiction as both cannot be true and both cannot be false at the same time?


Is this a correct understanding of contradiction as you intended it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Artesian:


a contradiction occurs between two propositions when they cannot both be true and both cannot be false at the same time.

No, the way you put it suggests this is an a posteriori matter. The definition of a contradiction in logic tells us that concerning a proposition and its negation, only one of them can be true and only one of them can be false together.

[Just to make things even more complicated, in mathematical logic, all contradictions are false; this is not the case in many branches of Formal Logic. For example, in Wittgenstein's logic, all contradictions are sensless, that is they are neither true nor false.]

It's not as if we discover this after looking at the world; this definition tells us what is allowable in an interpretation if it is to count as a contradiction.

Logic does not tell us what exists or does not exist, it just tells us that if something is to count as a contradiction, then the above constaints apply. It's up to us to decide what to do with this.

Now, we may want to criticise this definition (as the dialetheic logicians do), but if that definition is altered then we are no longer speaking about contradictions, but about 'contradictions'. That's Ok too, so long as we are clear that the two uses of this word are distinct. The dialetheic logicians fail to notice this.


So if I say: increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism; increased productivity of labor does not strengthen capitalism—that is a contradiction as both cannot be true and false at the same time. If I say increased productivity of labor weakens capitalism and increased productivity of labor does not weaken capitalism, that is a contradiction as both cannot be true and both cannot be false at the same time?

Well, you are now using what we call an 'interpretation' in logic, that is, you are trying to express a contradiction in ordinary language, not in logic as such. Alas, the conventions of ordinary langauge are far less precise.

So, your example would count as an ordinary contradiction, but not one in logic (unless a formal translation had been effected -- example below).

A much more precise and less colloquial contradiction, using your example, would be:

Let "P" = "Increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism" --, using "¬" as the negation sign, and "&" as the sign for conjunction (the logical equivalent of "and"):

The contradiction "P & ¬P" would then be (semi-coloquially):

"Increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism and it is not the case that increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism."

The colloquial use of "does not" obscures things somewhat.

[S.Artesian]

Thanks. I think I understand this, at least the example you give:""Increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism and it is not the case that increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism" clarifies the issue.

[S.Artesian]

Let me respond to a question Rosa posed awhile ago, where, in discussing historical materialism, I stated that I did not classify historical materialism as a science. Rosa asked why I did not regard it as a science.


First answer: science investigates, explores, describes, and derives the operation of “nature,” of the laws of the natural universe, and those laws, it seems to me, manifest themselves consistently and without distortion whatever the surrounding circumstances. Not so with capitalism. It is at its very core, uneven and combined; distorted, misshapen, in a state of constant dynamic disequilibrium. It’s all capitalism, but the expression of that capitalism is quite affected by all surrounding circumstances.



The Mexican Revolution, for example, is no less an expression of the conflict [NB Rosa, I am not using the word contradiction in this example as we have not established to our mutual satisfaction a single definition of contradiction] between the means and relations of production within capitalism than was the Russian Revolution, or even the non-revolutionary period of the “long deflation,” 1873-1898. However, the actual course of the Mexican revolution gives quite a different expression, manifestation, and resolution to that conflict than the expression, manifestation, resolution provided by the Russian Revolution, or that of the “long deflation” [one of the results of which was an incredibly powerful consolidation and centralization of capital. In the US between 1895 and 1904, approximately 1800 manufacturing enterprises consolidated into 157 corporations].


Second answer: while I know a lot about history, and what determines the validity of historical analysis, I know very little [other than what I recall from an old “philosophy of science” course] about the actual requirements and methodology for scientific exploration as practiced in the “hard science.”


I don’t consider myself a “dialectical materialist,” and I don’t consider Marx’s work to be in any way shape or form concerned with establishing a “dialectical materialism” about all things big and small in the universe. Maybe there’s a “dialectic” at work in the universe, maybe there isn’t. I’ll leave that to the scientists. I do know that unified field theory, big bangs, sub-atomic particles, and double helixes were not Marx’s objects of inquiry.


And I do know that attempting to “force” a conformity to “dialectical materialism” in physics, chemistry, genetics is the best way to insure that real knowledge of physics, chemistry, genetics is obscured, or worse, suppressed.



To proclaim a “dialectical materialism” as the universal method/platform for investigation is to give dialectical materialism a status not unlike that of money in industrial commodity production—a universal equivalent, a store of value, a means of circulation, and all of that power coming from the alienation of the producer from the product; the conflict between labor and the conditions of labor—money is the measure of all things, money is all things, and money is nothing. On Wall Street, this takes the form of the cycle that goes from “Cash is Trash” to “Cash is King” and back to “Cash is Trash.” “Dialectical Materialism” becomes capable of explaining all things, meaning all things to all people at all times—in essence, and I do mean essence, capable of being nothing in itself, but just the mirror which tells whoever is holding it: “No doubt about it, sweetie, you’re the fairest one of them all. Forget what I told that slug who was holding me just a minute ago.”


Actually, when I first started discussing this with Rosa, I thought we had some serious agreements based on a rejection of “dialectical materialism” as the “philosophy” of Marxism, and a shared acceptance of historical materialism as being the real core to Marxism. Funny how these things work out, isn’t it?


And after saying all that, do I still think Marx maintained a connection to Hegel? That there is validity, a “rational kernel” to Hegel’s dialectic? That Marx is serious [even when flirting] with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel? Yep. Being able to tolerate ambivalence is a signature characteristic of the human being.


Marx’s inquiry was the content of history. For Marx, economics is nothing but concentrated history, and history is the history of the social organization of labor. One of the keys to that grasp of the social organization of labor, is in its mediations, the property forms, that determine how that organization, how that labor is expressed, is made material in the material world. Those mediations, those property forms, fashioned by the appropriation of labor, simultaneously represent the record of humankind’s interaction with the material world, with nature, and with itself, humankind. Hegel, in his alienated language, is, as I interpret Marx’s interpretation of Hegel, providing an analysis of that alienated interaction with the material world, an alienated representation of alienated labor so to speak, and if that’s not alienated enough for you, let me just add that Hegel’s analysis where “spirit” “consciousness” develops is an analysis of how “spirit,” and “consciousness” make themselves “at home” in the world—how they appropriate the conditions of existence. This is particularly clear, or unclear, [we are talking, after all, about Hegel], in the Phenomenology.


Now we get to contradiction.
Rosa’s example is the clear: “"Increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism and it is not the case that increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism"


Now several questions follow from this. And—full disclosure, I have no extensive background, university training other than a freshman intro to philosophy course, in formal logic [I can hear Rosa chortling—“As if that weren’t painfully clear”].
1. Can both phrases, the affirmation and its negation be “true”—that is to say, exist?
2. Can both conditions described in the affirmation and in the negation, exist at the same instant?
3. Is the existence of either the affirmation or the negation, the permanent exclusion of the other?
4. If in fact both the affirmation and its negation can exist, are they then truly contradictions?
5.And that get’s me to this, given the requirements of formal logic for contradiction, can contradictions even exist in the material world?
6. But…. And here’s where I think Marx connects with and breaks with Hegel, “ extracts the rational kernel” so to speak,: can the source in the material world, in the social organization of labor that produces the affirmation be or become the source for the negation?
If the answer to this last question is “yes,” then IMO we’ve established the ongoing connection between Marx and Hegel, and the basis for contradiction existing in the mediation of the labor process.

My answers to the questions are:
1. yes
2. no/yes—one is made manifest and its manifestation contains the basis for the manifestation of its negation. Think overproduction, tendency of rate of profit to decline.
3. no
4. I can’t answer that.
5. That’s my question to Rosa
6. Yes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


First answer: science investigates, explores, describes, and derives the operation of “nature,” of the laws of the natural universe, and those laws, it seems to me, manifest themselves consistently and without distortion whatever the surrounding circumstances. Not so with capitalism. It is at its very core, uneven and combined; distorted, misshapen, in a state of constant dynamic disequilibrium. It’s all capitalism, but the expression of that capitalism is quite affected by all surrounding circumstances.

I do not see why this means that HM isn't a science. Are human beings part of nature? Yes. So HM is a science.

Complexity can't be the reason. Have you seen how complicated, say, quantum mechanics is? Or, geology?


The Mexican Revolution, for example, is no less an expression of the conflict [NB Rosa, I am not using the word contradiction in this example as we have not established to our mutual satisfaction a single definition of contradiction] between the means and relations of production within capitalism than was the Russian Revolution, or even the non-revolutionary period of the “long deflation,” 1873-1898. However, the actual course of the Mexican revolution gives quite a different expression, manifestation, and resolution to that conflict than the expression, manifestation, resolution provided by the Russian Revolution, or that of the “long deflation” [one of the results of which was an incredibly powerful consolidation and centralization of capital. In the US between 1895 and 1904, approximately 1800 manufacturing enterprises consolidated into 157 corporations].

Maybe so, but I'm not sure how this is relevant.


Second answer: while I know a lot about history, and what determines the validity of historical analysis, I know very little [other than what I recall from an old “philosophy of science” course] about the actual requirements and methodology for scientific exploration as practiced in the “hard science.”

Once more, with all due respect, I'm not sure how this shows HM is not a science.


I don’t consider myself a “dialectical materialist,” and I don’t consider Marx’s work to be in any way shape or form concerned with establishing a “dialectical materialism” about all things big and small in the universe. Maybe there’s a “dialectic” at work in the universe, maybe there isn’t. I’ll leave that to the scientists. I do know that unified field theory, big bangs, sub-atomic particles, and double helixes were not Marx’s objects of inquiry.

Again, I fail to see how this shows that HM is not a science. Forgive me, but you seem to be operating with a very narrow view of science.


And I do know that attempting to “force” a conformity to “dialectical materialism” in physics, chemistry, genetics is the best way to insure that real knowledge of physics, chemistry, genetics is obscured, or worse, suppressed.

To proclaim a “dialectical materialism” as the universal method/platform for investigation is to give dialectical materialism a status not unlike that of money in industrial commodity production—a universal equivalent, a store of value, a means of circulation, and all of that power coming from the alienation of the producer from the product; the conflict between labor and the conditions of labor—money is the measure of all things, money is all things, and money is nothing. On Wall Street, this takes the form of the cycle that goes from “Cash is Trash” to “Cash is King” and back to “Cash is Trash.” “Dialectical Materialism” becomes capable of explaining all things, meaning all things to all people at all times—in essence, and I do mean essence, capable of being nothing in itself, but just the mirror which tells whoever is holding it: “No doubt about it, sweetie, you’re the fairest one of them all. Forget what I told that slug who was holding me just a minute ago.”

Ok, but once more, and I have tried to see this, I can't for the life of me discern the relevance of all this.


And after saying all that, do I still think Marx maintained a connection to Hegel? That there is validity, a “rational kernel” to Hegel’s dialectic? That Marx is serious [even when flirting] with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel? Yep. Being able to tolerate ambivalence is a signature characteristic of the human being.

Well, you know what I think about this, so we are just going to have to disagree about this.


Marx’s inquiry was the content of history. For Marx, economics is nothing but concentrated history, and history is the history of the social organization of labor. One of the keys to that grasp of the social organization of labor, is in its mediations, the property forms, that determine how that organization, how that labor is expressed, is made material in the material world. Those mediations, those property forms, fashioned by the appropriation of labor, simultaneously represent the record of humankind’s interaction with the material world, with nature, and with itself, humankind. Hegel, in his alienated language, is, as I interpret Marx’s interpretation of Hegel, providing an analysis of that alienated interaction with the material world, an alienated representation of alienated labor so to speak, and if that’s not alienated enough for you, let me just add that Hegel’s analysis where “spirit” “consciousness” develops is an analysis of how “spirit,” and “consciousness” make themselves “at home” in the world—how they appropriate the conditions of existence. This is particularly clear, or unclear, [we are talking, after all, about Hegel], in the Phenomenology.

I tend to agree with the first half of this, but, with all due respect, what you say is ruined by the second part, which contains far too many meaningless Hegelian terms.


Now we get to contradiction.
Rosa’s example is the clear: “"Increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism and it is not the case that increased productivity of labor strengthens capitalism"

Well, this was my attempt to interpret your example. If I were to choose a contradiction, it wouldn't be this.


Now several questions follow from this. And—full disclosure, I have no extensive background, university training other than a freshman intro to philosophy course, in formal logic [I can hear Rosa chortling—“As if that weren’t painfully clear”].
1. Can both phrases, the affirmation and its negation be “true”—that is to say, exist?

You might have missed the comment I made in my last post that logic has nothing to do with what exists. It is concerned solely with inference and the factors in language that affect this. This allows us to make inferences about things that do not exist, and which could never exist, or about things whose existence we have no knowledge.

And, I specifically left out pragmatic terms like "affirmation" and "denial". The latter are what we do with propositions. Negation is anterior to this. So a proposition can be negated or not independently of whether we have affirmed or denied it, or not. This allows us to reason hypothetically, about things we might not want to affirm or deny, but just entertain --, or before we choose to affirm or deny them. Mathematicians and scientists do this all the time.



Aristotelian logic did not allow for this (Aristotle's logic was [I]categorical, not hypothetical), and this was partly what led to the confusion of psychological and pragmatic issues with logic. Hegel was trained in this ancient logic. This then led him into accepting the confused idea that logic was a categorical science, and then for conflating it with philosophical psychology (as 'laws' of thought'), both of which were central to his Idealism.

Dialectical classicists inherited this defective categorical logic, and that is why you find all these obscure concepts cropping up in Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, and all the rest since. The importation of this ancient view of logic has completely distorted HM.

Again, and with all due respect, it surfaces too in your confusion of logic with what exists, and in your use of pragmatic terms.


2. Can both conditions described in the affirmation and in the negation, exist at the same instant?

It is not a question of existence, but one of truth. If someone thinks both can be true, then there must be an undischarged ambiguity in one or both of these propositions.

Here is how I have explained this in Essay Five:

]


Now, the principles that underlie FL merely commit us to the view that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true and cannot both be false at the same time. Hence, on that basis, any claim that two allegedly contradictory propositions are both true at once (or are both false at once -- as noted above, dialecticians do not appear to be aware of that particular caveat) would automatically be regarded as mistaken in some way.

[FL = Formal Logic; LIE = Linguistic Idealism; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist depending on context.]

Indeed, that fact alone could provide sufficient grounds for questioning whether one or both of the allegedly true contradictory propositions were in fact propositions to begin with. To be sure, if it is unclear what is being proposed, any sentence in which that is supposedly being attempted cannot be proposing anything -- that is, this side of its disambiguation. [Examples of the latter process are given below.]

Several factors might contribute to this state of affairs: (1) the said 'propositions' could contain typographically similar words that have different denotations; (2) they could harbour ambiguous, vague, or figurative expressions; (3) they might have been drawn from different areas of discourse, and so on. From such a perspective, the presumption would always be that both 'halves' of an alleged contradiction could only be held true by someone in the grip of some sort of linguistic or interpretative confusion. 'Contradictions' that had been generated in this way would not normally be regarded as capable of revealing fundamental truths about the nature of reality; they would perhaps convey more about the linguistic naivety of anyone so easily taken in.

In that case, one would expect that the disambiguation or clarification of these alleged 'contradictions' would eliminate the problem. Only an exceedingly naive person (or worse, [I]a mad dog Idealist -- like Hegel) would conclude that just because certain words and/or sentences appeared to be contradictory, nature must be so too.

Indeed, this austere approach should recommend itself to materialists; not only was the alternative view (that there are contradictions in reality) invented by card-carrying mystics, it 'implies' that the natural world/social forces possess properties that are only rightly attributable to human beings -- i.e., the ability to converse and to disagree (i.e., to contradict).

In addition, and to its credit, this austere approach helps undermine the influence of the traditional doctrine that fundamental aspects of reality may be inferred solely from the logical properties of language (which is what I call 'Linguistic Idealism' -- on that, see Essay Three) -- or, rather, in this particular case, from a series of simple errors concerning the nature of contradictions outlined a few paragraphs back.

Naturally, DM-apologists will view claims like these with some suspicion; indeed, they might even appear to them to be dogmatic and aprioristic. Moreover, it could be argued that this obsession with the fine detail of linguistic usage must itself collapse into LIE, since it presumes to offer a linguistic solution to what is in fact a philosophical, scientific or practical problem.

However, the opposite of this is in fact the case; the approach adopted here seeks to undermine the traditional metaphysical belief (which dialecticians themselves have also appropriated) that truths about reality may be inferred from contingent -- or even from logical -- features of language. Manifestly, it is the world that makes what we say true or false; it is not what we say that determines the nature of reality....

Nevertheless, it is important to be able to recognise when the descriptive capacities of language begin to break down. This is highly relevant with respect to DM-theses since they break down alarmingly easily; indeed, they invariably turn out to be confused, ambiguous or non-sensical when examined closely -- as several Essays posted at this site demonstrate.

Moreover, it is equally important to be able to distinguish spurious pictures (or, indeed, non-pictures) of reality from the genuine article. DM-theorists themselves do this when they highlight the confused and/or self-contradictory nature of rival theories and advocate their rejection on that basis. [This allegation is substantiated in Essay Eleven Part One.]

On the other hand, DM-theorists believe that their analysis begins with reality (albeit mediated by the conceptual/practical resources human beings have to hand); they then require that our linguistic habits adapt accordingly. On this view, if nature and/or society is contradictory, and ordinary language and FL cannot accommodate that fact, then both must be judged limited and/or defective in some way, and thus in need of supplementation with concepts drawn from 'Materialist Dialectics'.

It is not easy for a response to this to appear un-dogmatic. Language has been moulded throughout history by an evolving set of social norms and conventions, which have themselves been refined by countless factors at work across diverse Modes of Production. Because of this it might seem possible to argue that when faced with situations that appeared to be 'contradictory', human beings not only could, they actually did develop dialectical categories. [However, the factual basis for this supposition will be undermined in Essay Fourteen Part One.]

Even so, given other conventions that were in fact adopted -- in practice; no one supposes that overt decisions were taken, here --, this is far more than highly unlikely.

As the word itself suggests, to contradict someone is to gain-say or deny what they say is true (or false, as the case may be). This facility in language (which apparently goes back as far as records last, and as far back, one supposes, as human beings have been able to argue) means that our ancestors clearly failed to take the DM-route. And it is not difficult to see why. In fact, given the concepts we now have (and the social practices from which they have arisen), we can make no sense of the claim that a contradiction could be true. Indeed, we would fail to comprehend anyone who claimed that in a dispute (where someone gain-said what someone else had asserted) both sides could be speaking the literal truth -- ambiguous examples excepted.

In cases where disputants might appear to be doing this, the most likely response (then as now) would be to try to disambiguate their words in order to resolve the serious problems that 'true contradictions' would create in everyday life.

And this can be asserted with some confidence because, as noted above, the conventions we now have prevent us from understanding how a contradiction could be true. Not only that, these conventions prevent us from understanding anyone who might think otherwise. Worse still, they also prevent us from understanding how humanity could ever have developed alternative conventions, or how we could make sense of anyone who supposed that they could have done so.

This is one intellectual river we cannot now step back into even once -- to paraphrase Cratylus.



These claims are as bold as they are controversial, [I]so I shall defend each in turn.

Take the first -- which was that we should fail to understand anyone who believed a contradiction could be true, and that we would seek to disambiguate it (or them) in order to make sense of what it or (they) said. Consider the following example:

B1: John Rees wrote and did not write The Algebra of Revolution.

B1a: John Rees wrote The Algebra of Revolution.

B1b: John Rees did not write The Algebra of Revolution.

Let us suppose someone asserted that B1 was true -- or that both B1a and B1b were true. Faced with this, we would find it difficult to take that person or what they said either literally or seriously; this is because both halves of B1 could not be true, nor could they both be false.

[Some might think that these are not the type of contradictions that are of interest to dialecticians; that objection will be fielded later on in this Essay.]

However, if B1a and B1b were still held true, then we could only make sense of the contradiction they seem to express by noting the ambiguous use of the word "write". In one sense of that term it could imply that John Rees was the author of the said work; in another quite ordinary sense it might suggest that the book was not hand-written, but was perhaps word-processed. In that case, B1 would be expressing the fact that although John Rees authored the said book he did not hand-write it. Hence, it would then be clear that B1 only appeared to be contradictory because of this elementary equivocation. We would not automatically think that there were real material forces at work behind the struggle to produce Rees's book, no matter how well-confirmed each half of B1 happened to be.

[Naturally, this indicates that an empirical check in such cases is not relevant to what is in fact a logical or conceptual issue.]

Again, someone might object, arguing that the above line of attack reveals the LIE implicit in the logical caveats this Essay lays down, for it seems to restrict the options available to reality by appealing to a controversial logical/linguistic pre-condition.

But, this would be to mistake the approach adopted here for its opposite. The strategy employed here seeks to undermine the idea that substantive truths about reality can be derived from logical, conceptual or contingent features of language. In this case, it does this by basing itself on what we would now try to do (prior to, and independently of any theory) to interpret/understand contradictions as and when they might arise. In that case, this Essay appeals to rules (i.e., normed social practices) we already use, and not to truths that can be inferred from a misconception of the nature of such rules.

Hence, no truths are being inferred (by me) from the above logical observations, merely a denial that anyone can derive any truths at all from a misconstrued set of puzzling words.

Indeed, it is the opposite (dialectical) view that collapses into LIE, for it confuses linguistic/logical rules with empirical -- or Superempirical -- truths. In DM, this is done, for example, when dialecticians treat the LOC as a truth which they think could be (and often is) false. This leads them to argue that contradictions themselves could be true (since the 'law' that supposedly 'banishes contradictions' -- the LOC -- is false when it is applied to the real world and to change, etc.). But, if the LOC is in fact a rule, or if it merely formalises a rule we ordinarily use, it cannot be either true or false -- any more than orders or questions can be true or false.

[LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]

[Further ruminations on this theme will be resumed in Essay Twelve Part One, where it will be demonstrated in detail why the aforementioned confusion of rules with substantive truths about the world is a characteristic feature of ruling-class thought. This is because it implies that there is world anterior to experience that is accessible to thought alone, thus undermining and devaluing communally constituted aspects of ordinary language, and thus the experience of working people. It is from such ideologically-motivated confusion that Metaphysics (and now dialectics) originally arose.]

Admittedly, the example quoted above (in B1) is glaringly trite, but it was deliberately chosen so that the strategy of disambiguation would be clear to all.

Nevertheless, and against this, it could be objected that DM-theorists are more concerned with the analysis of real material forces operating inside the Capitalist system, so that they can assist in its demise. In that case, simplistic examples like B1 are not even remotely relevant. Nor are they even dialectical contradictions.

In order to counter this response, the types of contradictions to which DM-theorists regularly refer will be analysed elsewhere on this site in unprecedented detail -- for example, here, here and here. There, it will be shown that many of the favourite examples used by dialecticians to illustrate "real material contradictions" turn out not to be contradictions (in any sense of the word; on that see here, here and here) -- and they cannot be turned into them howsoever they are interpreted, or 'surgically enhanced'.

With respect to the other assertion made above -- that we would fail to understand alternative conventions, given the ones we already have --, the key point is that as social beings we may only succeed in understanding something when, plainly, it is presented to us in a language and a form with which we are familiar --, and typically, but not exclusively, this takes place in ordinary language. And this, too, can be asserted with some confidence since the word "understand" is (patently) in ordinary language already. But, discourse is not a free-floating phenomenon; its invention and evolution were and are functions of our social and material development. In addition, our use of language is subject to constraints we have inherited from previous generations, which we clearly had no hand in shaping. Indeed, all of us had to be socialised (by parents, siblings, carers, teachers and peers) into using language within, and with regard to, these constraints. We manifestly did not socialise ourselves.

Moreover, we demonstrate our mastery of this complex socio-linguistic medium when we begin to communicate and interact with others. While we can form thoughts as we please, we cannot do so under logico-linguistic/social conditions of our own choosing (to paraphrase Marx).

Now, it is tempting to think that such limitations are physical -- or at least that they represent merely contingent constraints on the use of language --, but that would be a serious mistake. There are physical and contingent boundaries to language, but these are not the limitations alluded to above.

[A clue to the nature of these limitations can ascertained by anyone who reads the Essays posted at this site, where it has been demonstrated time and again how quickly DM-theses fall apart, and how they cannot be repaired no matter what is done to them. That sort of limitation is not physical; it is conceptual. Another example can be found here....]

B1: John Rees wrote and did not write The Algebra of Revolution.

Fortunately, however, the negative points made in this Essay do not depend on the validity of this latest batch of seemingly dogmatic claims. Doubters need only think about how they would interpret B1 (or indeed B2, below), and this point should become a little clearer.

Of course, we can translate other languages (ancient or modern) into our own, but we may do so only if we act within the constraints currently operating on us -- unless we want to restrict ourselves merely to simple transliteration. This means that because we cannot make sense of contradictory speech now, we cannot comprehend the supposition that contradictions could ever have been held true by anyone in the past. Indeed, we are equally incapable of translating any language (ancient or modern) into our own in comprehensible terms while attempting to depict its users using contradictory speech, holding contradictions to be true in any form we could now understand. We may be able to record the fact that certain people spoke in paradoxical ways in the past (or whenever), but given what we now mean by the words we use, we would not be able to make sense of what these ancient 'paradoxes' could have presented to their alleged 'believers', or, indeed, determine whether or not they presented anything at all....

Some may take exception to the above, claiming that they certainly can imagine speakers holding certain contradictions true (or representing real material forces), namely themselves! Dialecticians, it seems, are living disproof of the above sweeping allegations.

However, this Essay aims to show that Hegel's and Engels's claim that motion is 'contradictory' is far too confused for it to be assessed for its truth or falsehood (and hence that this alleged 'contradiction' isn't one to begin with). Other examples of dialectical 'contradictions' will similarly be dealt with in Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three, as well as Essay Eleven Part One. In addition, the dialectical thesis that reality is suffused with UOs will be consigned to the mystical trash can of history, where it belongs, in Essay Seven Part One.

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

In which case, because it is not possible to make sense of any of the examples DM-theorists give of 'dialectical contradictions', the above "sweeping allegations" have everything going for them. Indeed, since dialecticians have shown they are incapable of explaining their mysterious 'contradictions' to a living soul, this failure can serve as further confirmation. [On that, see here.] Indeed, on internet discussion boards, both academic Marxists and activists, who have been asked to explain what 'dialectical contradictions' are, have signally failed to do so. [Links to many of these can be found here.]

To be sure, there have been, and still are religious believers who assent to all manner of apparently contradictory ideas -- but this does not refute the above. Their talk is non-propositional, and wall-to-wall non-sense, as will be demonstrated in a later Essay. The same comment applies to Buddhists (or, more pointedly, Zen Buddhists), who seem to glory in paradox.

However, in relation to the claim that we would not be able to understand past generations who held contradictions true, consider this example:

B2: This four thousand year old inscription says that its author wrote and did not write it.

Now, despite the fact that dialecticians assure us that reality is contradictory, not even they would attempt to understand B2 literally. This is not because it would be especially difficult for them to do so, but because any claim to the contrary would undermine the meaning of the word "literally".

But, even supposing a few die-hard dialecticians could be found who attempted to do this, they would find it impossible to explain to anyone else in literal terms what sense they made of B2 (other than by trying to disambiguate it in ways similar to those outlined above, for instance).

As noted earlier, trite examples like these have been deliberately chosen to illustrate a point that is all too easily missed: when faced with the paradoxical things people sometimes say, we automatically try to disambiguate their words and their actions; we adopt what Donald Davidson once called the "principle of charity" when attempting to grasp their meaning. [Davidson (2001).]

Hence, when confronted with someone who asserted an apparent contradiction we would normally employ this policy (trivial examples excepted, of course). This does not mean that the result of this exercise will necessarily be a distortion of what is said; it is rather that we would not be able to understand such individuals if we did not do this, and we would be unable to make sense of anyone who did not do this -- or who rejected this principle in practice.

In any case, DM-rejectionists would be hard-pressed to explain to anyone else what they themselves took the sense of a true contradiction to be..., as the rest of this site aims to show. [And that comment applies to any 'dialectically-motivated' responses of those who think to question the above assertions.]

Clearly, this does not mean that we shouldn't exercise some degree of sensitivity toward other belief systems (past or present), but we may only do so in terms of current linguistic protocols. If confronted with what appeared to be weird and/or paradoxical beliefs, we would not be able to translate or interpret them literally and claim we understood them. And, if anyone claimed that they [I]could do this, it would automatically throw into doubt the validity of their translation (unless the meaning of the word "translate" itself had changed) -- always supposing, of course, that they hadn't merely transliterated the relevant inscriptions/writings instead.

However, if what had been translated were still held to be literally true, but paradoxical, then whatever else we could make of the translated passage, we would have to abandon all talk of its literal truth. Either that, or, once again, we would have to understand the word "literal" non-literally!

Hence, we led to conclude that 'dialectical contradictions' do not depict reality in any meaningful sense.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that this is not being asserted because I personally think that reality contains no contradictions, or because I have concluded that the world either is or is not as these allegedly 'true contradictions' might seem to depict it -- or even because contradictions are always false (which is the classical view). To argue along these lines would be to fall into the same trap that ensnares DM-theorists, and would amount to the derivation of an opposite a priori thesis about reality from an alternative linguistic convention, which I might have found more acceptable.

On the contrary, contradictions fail to depict the world not because they are false, but because they are not depictions to begin with. They represent the disintegration of description, since they violate materially-grounded linguistic rules we already have for picturing reality. [On this, see Essay Twelve Part One.]

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2005.htm

I'll deal with the rest of your post in my next reply.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


4. If in fact both the affirmation and its negation can exist, are they then truly contradictions?
5.And that get’s me to this, given the requirements of formal logic for contradiction, can contradictions even exist in the material world?
6. But…. And here’s where I think Marx connects with and breaks with Hegel, “ extracts the rational kernel” so to speak,: can the source in the material world, in the social organization of labor that produces the affirmation be or become the source for the negation?
If the answer to this last question is “yes,” then IMO we’ve established the ongoing connection between Marx and Hegel, and the basis for contradiction existing in the mediation of the labor process.

But, we have yet to see what your 'true contradictions' are. Up to now all we have seen are sentences which aren't true together, or which aren't even sentences to begin with.


My answers to the questions are:
1. yes
2. no/yes—one is made manifest and its manifestation contains the basis for the manifestation of its negation. Think overproduction, tendency of rate of profit to decline.
3. no
4. I can’t answer that.
5. That’s my question to Rosa
6. Yes.

Well, in answer to (5), as I have argued, logic does not deal with what exists.

[syndicat]

rtosa writes:
Logic does not tell us what exists or does not exist, it just tells us that if something is to count as a contradiction, then the above constaints apply. It's up to us to decide what to do with this.


but this suggests that logic is only about the definition of "contradiction." if someone is just stipulating a definition why should we care? Why should we accept their definition? the word "contradiction" was understood by logicians long before modern first order propositional calculus was cooked up in the 19th century. why is the definition important?

If logic doesn't deal with what exists, it has no application to reality. A sentence such as

1. productivity has risen since last year

is made true by a course of events in reality. If 1 is true than 2 is false:

2. productivity is lower than last year

Productivity going up is a situation which would verify sentence 1. Productivity going down is a situation that would verify 2. These two situations can't both obtain, that is, they can't both exist. they can't both exist because going up and going down are contraries...properties that exclude each other.

similarly if Mingo weighs 8 pounds then Mingo does not weigh 12 pounds. 8 pounds and 12 pounds are weights (properties that a cat might have) that exclude each other.

So the Law of Non-Contradiction does have implications for what exists. If A and B are contraries, then if "X has A" is true, this imiplies "X does not have B". Thus if "X has A" and "X has B" were both true this would imply a contradiction.

So we can take LNC to be based on a generalization to the effect that properties in any given dimension are arranged in contraries that exclude each other, and where this is so things don't ever have two properties at the same time that are contraries. Animals don't have two weights at the same time, surface areas don't have throughout one color and also another, and so on.

To put this another way if someone says:

3. Mingo doesn't weigh 8 pounds anymore.

What is it that makes this true? I think what makes this true is that Mingo (if he still exists) now has a positive weight that is other than 8 pounds. That is, one of the other contraries of 8 pounds among the infinite number of possible weights. "not" itself doesn't really refer to anything in reality.

Thus in fact I think LNC has an empirical basis. I see it as really a very deeply entrenched hypothesis about properties...one so deeply entrenched we're probably hard wired to think along those lines and this is reflected also in language practices.

This is no absolute guarantee of LNC tho. Our brains appear to be hard wired to make geometric judgments that are Euclidian, and given that geometry in our actual terrestrial environment is consistent with it, that is no surprise as other geometries are more complex. But Euclidean geometry is nonetheless false of the physical universe.

anyway, a different point of view...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


but this suggests that logic is only about the definition of "contradiction."

I do not know how you managed to conclude that from what I said. Recall, I'm just responding to Artesian's attempt to understand this word.


if someone is just stipulating a definition why should we care? Why should we accept their definition? the word "contradiction" was understood by logicians long before modern first order propositional calculus was cooked up in the 19th century. why is the definition important?

If that was all they were doing, then fine, let them get on with it. But, dialecticians also go on to use this word (in its logical sense) to rationalise all manner of counter-revisionary and reactionary ideas. Consider, for example, how Stalin used this word:


"It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added.]

Greater democracy from less democracy; all eminently contradictory, all quintessentially 'dialectical'.

Because of this equivocal use of 'contradiction', the Stalinists were able to rationalise overnight about-turns and sell-outs. Sure, these were taken for hard-headed political reasons, but they would have found these difficult to sell to their cadres around the world without this theory. No other theory (with this word at its centre), other than perhaps Zen Buddhism, allows for its adepts to argue for anything they like, and then its opposite in the next breath. Maoists and Trotskyists do similar things with this theory and this word.

And that's part of the reason I oppose their use of this word.


If logic doesn't deal with what exists, it has no application to reality. A sentence such as

1. productivity has risen since last year

is made true by a course of events in reality. If 1 is true than 2 is false:

2. productivity is lower than last year

But, this is informal logic! I've no problem with informal logic, but it's hardly the sort of logic I was referring to.


Productivity going up is a situation which would verify sentence 1. Productivity going down is a situation that would verify 2. These two situations can't both obtain, that is, they can't both exist. they can't both exist because going up and going down are contraries...properties that exclude each other.

Well you are using 'exist' in a rather odd way. What you mean is that these statements can't both be true and they can't both be false. Logic does not deal with 'situations', but with propositions/statements.


similarly if Mingo weighs 8 pounds then Mingo does not weigh 12 pounds. 8 pounds and 12 pounds are weights (properties that a cat might have) that exclude each other.

Again, you seem to be operating, too, with an odd idea of properties, which suggests that they are agents in some way, that they can 'exclude' one another. How do they manage to pull that trick off? By threats? Intimidation? Brute force?


So we can take LNC to be based on a generalization to the effect that properties in any given dimension are arranged in contraries that exclude each other, and where this is so things don't ever have two properties at the same time that are contraries. Animals don't have two weights at the same time, surface areas don't have throughout one color and also another, and so on.

I think you have this the wrong way round, since your version fetishises properties, and attributes them with rather mysterious powers (as I noted above).

The problem is that you make it a matter of discovery that the properties you mention can't exist at the same time. But how do you know that this universally true? Or that it is true at all? In fact, you are using the LNC to legislate here; that is you are using it as a rule of language to set the truth values of the propositions/indicative sentences in your examples. That is what gives you the confidence to legislate about what properties can or cannot do.

I cut all this metaphysics out, and just regard the LNC as a rule of language.

And this confirms my estimation of your argument:


To put this another way if someone says:

3. Mingo doesn't weigh 8 pounds anymore.

What is it that makes this true? I think what makes this true is that Mingo (if he still exists) now has a positive weight that is other than 8 pounds. That is, one of the other contraries of 8 pounds among the infinite number of possible weights. "not" itself doesn't really refer to anything in reality.

Thus in fact I think LNC has an empirical basis. I see it as really a very deeply entrenched hypothesis about properties...one so deeply entrenched we're probably hard wired to think along those lines and this is reflected also in language practices.

And yet, if that is so, then you might be prepared to give it up. But, what could possibly prompt you to do that?


Thus in fact I think LNC has an empirical basis.

But, you have just plucked this out of thin air -- or, rather, out of Quine's work. You haven't justified it at all. And, as I noted above, if you attempt to justify it along the lines your post suggests you might, then you are going to have to attribute to properties human characteristics, the power to 'exclude' one another, fetishising them. This dehumanises our use of language, and humanises nature.


This is no absolute guarantee of LNC tho. Our brains appear to be hard wired to make geometric judgments that are Euclidian, and given that geometry in our actual terrestrial environment is consistent with it, that is no surprise as other geometries are more complex. But Euclidean geometry is nonetheless false of the physical universe.

However, you have to use the LNC to show this. But, what could possibly show the LNC is as you say it is.


anyway, a different point of view...

Sure, and it's preferable to the view put forward by the dialectal mystics, but it is nonetheless defective for all that.

[syndicat]

well, you can't have it both ways.

"True" and "false" apply to sentences of natural languages. What makes them true or false? Why bother with sentences? What are we doing? Why do humans have the biological capacity to produce sentences? I don't think we can explain these things unless we take seriously the tremendous value to us, to the survival of our species, of being able to describe or report stituaions in the world, to coordinate behavior and develop divisions of labor, and so on. And I think it makes sense in terms of evolutionary biology to suggest that the function of descriptive sentences is to represent a situation in the world.

I think one has to suppose that we use descriptive sentences to describe situations in the world, and if things are as we describe, it's true, false otherwise.

If truth and falsity pertains to sentences stated in natural languages, then so does the law of Non-Contradiction. Formal logic existed long before symbolic logic was invented. Restricting "formal logic" only to symbolic arrays is idiosyncratic on your part. I used to teach formal logic. And I would start by explaining various principles of inference using examples in plain English. The formulas such as "P -> Q" have no meaning except as part of a process of abbreviation, that is, abbreviation from English. In this case we can use letters "P" and "Q" as shorthand for a sentence.

Moreover, the way logicians work is that they use sentences in natural language as the "data" and then they develop their theories to capture the inferences that they think are valid in virtue of certain formal structures that are present in the natural language. For example "or", "not", "if" occur in the natural languages. And there are inferences that will be valid because of the "logic" of these words. They introduce symbols in order to remove extraneous information that would obscure the forms, and because words can be ambiguous and they try to "rivet" on a particular meaning.

me:

Productivity going up is a situation which would verify sentence 1. Productivity going down is a situation that would verify 2. These two situations can't both obtain, that is, they can't both exist. they can't both exist because going up and going down are contraries...properties that exclude each other.

you:

Well you are using 'exist' in a rather odd way. What you mean is that these statements can't both be true and they can't both be false. Logic does not deal with 'situations', but with propositions/statements.


Nope. Logic has to have a semantics for its expressions to be interpreted. This has to do with what we take the various words to be referring to. "Truth" is a semantical word. It has to do with the word-to-world relationship. Now I take it that descriptive sentences are true when they represent a situation that is an actual situation, false otherwise. If I see the cat sitting on top of the wall, then I can say "The cat is sitting on top of the wall." My sentence in this case represents this situation that I see, a situation that is actual.

As to the Law of Non-Contradiction having an empirical basis, I've not "plucked it out of Quine's work" but Millikan.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


well, you can't have it both ways.

And what suggests I want it 'both ways'?


"True" and "false" apply to sentences of natural languages. What makes them true or false? Why bother with sentences? What are we doing? Why do humans have the biological capacity to produce sentences? I don't think we can explain these things unless we take seriously the tremendous value to us, to the survival of our species, of being able to describe or report situations in the world, to coordinate behavior and develop divisions of labor, and so on. And I think it makes sense in terms of evolutionary biology to suggest that the function of descriptive sentences is to represent a situation in the world.

Well, I think you over egg the evolutionary aspect here, but even if you haven't, how does this affect anything I have said?

Except perhaps this:


And I think it makes sense in terms of evolutionary biology to suggest that the function of descriptive sentences is to represent a situation in the world

Indeed, but what has his to do with logic?

But then you argue:


I think one has to suppose that we use descriptive sentences to describe situations in the world, and if things are as we describe, it's true, false otherwise.

If truth and falsity pertains to sentences stated in natural languages, then so does the law of Non-Contradiction.

Well, who says the alleged 'law of non-contradiction' applies to natural languages? In fact, I deny there is such a 'law'. Who promulgated it, 'god'?


I used to teach formal logic. And I would start by explaining various principles of inference using examples in plain English. The formulas such as "P -> Q" have no meaning except as part of a process of abbreviation, that is, abbreviation from English. In this case we can use letters "P" and "Q" as shorthand for a sentence

Yes, and I used to teach it, too. So what? Your biography has no logical significance, interesting though it is.


Formal logic existed long before symbolic logic was invented. Restricting "formal logic" only to symbolic arrays is idiosyncratic on your part.

Are you suggesting that Aristotle did not use variables?


In this case we can use letters "P" and "Q" as shorthand for a sentence

They are no more shorthand than "x" is a shorthand in x^2+3x-1 = 0.

What sort of 'logic' did you teach?!


Moreover, the way logicians work is that they use sentences in natural language as the "data" and then they develop their theories to capture the inferences that they think are valid in virtue of certain formal structures that are present in the natural language. For example "or", "not", "if" occur in the natural languages. And there are inferences that will be valid because of the "logic" of these words. They introduce symbols in order to remove extraneous information that would obscure the forms, and because words can be ambiguous and they try to "rivet" on a particular meaning.

Sure, this is one part of providing interpretations in a natural language, but it is not what logic itself is about.


Nope. Logic has to have a semantics for its expressions to be interpreted. This has to do with what we take the various words to be referring to. "Truth" is a semantical word. It has to do with the word-to-world relationship. Now I take it that descriptive sentences are true when they represent a situation that is an actual situation, false otherwise. If I see the cat sitting on top of the wall, then I can say "The cat is sitting on top of the wall." My sentence in this case represents this situation that I see, a situation that is actual.

Again, you are imposing a limited (Quinean) interpretation now on 'truth'.

I partially agree with much of the above, but I fail to see why you need to use the word 'actual', or your earlier word 'exist'.

If that were so, the truth of a proposition/indicative sentence would depend on the truth of another, and then you'd have an infinite regress.


As to the Law of Non-Contradiction having an empirical basis, I've not "plucked it out of Quine's work" but Millikan

But you must know that the locus classicus of this defective view is Quine.

[syndicat]

Your view that there are no contradictions expressable in natural languages would be regarded by logicians as highly idiosyncratic, to say the least. That's because a logic is intended to account for a range of arguments as stated in natural languages. Logicians aren't interested in merely concocting uninterpreted syntactic schemes. If there are contradictions that can be expressed in a symbolic setup, they can be expressed in natural language, and this must be so, because the symblic formulation of an argument is supposed to be a mere abbreviation of its natural language counterpart. That's why, the proof of the symbolic argument, is said to show the validity of the natural language argument that was represented in it.

All natural languages are such that the sentences can be denied or negated. That makes it obviously possible to formulate "contradictories".

Such contradictories would be held to be always false...that's the Law of Non-contradiction. It's a generalization, backed by a huge amount of experience, and, as I suggested, linked in with our understanding that properties come in ranges of contraries that exclude each other.

me:

Formal logic existed long before symbolic logic was invented. Restricting "formal logic" only to symbolic arrays is idiosyncratic on your part.
you:

Are you suggesting that Aristotle did not use variables?

But within natural language sentences. Replacing content with placeholders was done to eliminate the irrelevant verbiage and illustrate patterns. Formal logic is about forms. It's based on the assumption that certain forms will guarantee the deductive validity of arguments that use those forms. But you can't apply it if there are no natural language arguments that illustrate those patterns.

When we apply the logic, we use the letters as abbreviations for elements of ordinary language. For example if we represent

The cat is on the fence

as

O(c,f)

We are abbreviating "...is on..." with O(...,...) and abbreviating "the cat" with "c" and "the fence" with "f".

When the inference rules are stated, such as

from

P => Q

and P

you may infer Q

the letters here (often Greek letters are used to do this) function as placeholders, not variables.


I partially agree with much of the above, but I fail to see why you need to use the word 'actual', or your earlier word 'exist'.

If that were so, the truth of a proposition/indicative sentence would depend on the truth of another, and then you'd have an infinite regress.


What is it that makes sentences of a natural language true? Let's say that the situation

S: the cat's sitting on the fence

makes true:

1. The cat is sitting on the fence.

Now I suppose that your point is that, if this is true, then the following sentence would be true:

2. 1 is true because S is actual

And this would be made true by some situation that has to do with the way the elements of 1 refer and so on. so what? Some regresses are harmless, such as the regress of the natural numbers.

but, hey, this should probably be under philosophy, and, in any case, i'm merely indicating here that there are other views about what logic is about.

[Meridian]

What is it that makes sentences of a natural language true? Let's say that the situation

S: the cat's sitting on the fence

makes true:

1. The cat is sitting on the fence.
I'm no 'pro logician', but I think perhaps the problem with this is that you're essentially saying that one sentence is true because another sentence (which you call a "situation") is true. Now, for this to be correct wouldn't it necessitate some connection between what is fundamentally "outside" language and its use, and our actual language? It seems to rely on what you call a "situation" (but which is, critically, expressed with a sentence) to have direct access to reality. Sorry if I'm way off here.

[syndicat]

I'm no 'pro logician', but I think perhaps the problem with this is that you're essentially saying that one sentence is true because another sentence (which you call a "situation") is true. Now, for this to be correct wouldn't it necessitate some connection between what is fundamentally "outside" language and its use, and our actual language? It seems to rely on what you call a "situation" (but which is, critically, expressed with a sentence) to have direct access to reality. Sorry if I'm way off here.

Nope. "the cat's sitting on the fence" is not a sentence. It's a name. "Direct access to reality" is not required. I've been sort of basing myself on Millikan's theory and she doesn't think there is such a thing as "direct access to reality" and neither do I. that's because even in sense perception there are no perceptions that are not interpreted.

Let's imagine a situation tens of thousands of years ago in the early beginnings of our species. A hunter comes back to the tribe and says: "There is bison over that hill." We can see right away that it's very useful to the survival of the tribe that they have a way of referring to this situation. The situation is there being bison over the hill. If that is the real situation, that makes the hunter's sentence true.

To put this another way, what explains why the hunter uses the sentence? What explains why we produce sentences to each other? Why would this practice have continued to be proliferated down through tens of thousands of years?

So I suggest that the biological function of producing sentences is to refer to, or describe, situations. A sentence is serving its biological function when it refers to a real situation. If it fails to do that, it's defective in some way, and we call sentences that are defective that way "false."

Thus "true" is like the word "health." Tissues and organs have biological functions. But sometimes they are not able to do this. The function of eyes is to provide sight but sometimes something has happened...either at birth or later...and the person is blind. Analogously, a false sentence fails to perform its function of conveying a reference or description of a real situation.

Now, what is my reason for thinking that sentences refer to situations? My reason is this: Making this assumption helps us to explain why humans have the biological capacity for sentence production. Only real situations can explain this because only real situations have causal effects in the world. If the situation described by the hunter is real...if there is bison over the hill...his tribe's hunters can go and kill some and the tribe will eat...and live another day.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


Your view that there are no contradictions expressible in natural languages would be regarded by logicians as highly idiosyncratic, to say the least.

I see you have resumed your old tactic of making stuff up about my beliefs.

Where have I asserted this?


That's because a logic is intended to account for a range of arguments as stated in natural languages. Logicians aren't interested in merely concocting uninterpreted syntactic schemes. If there are contradictions that can be expressed in a symbolic setup, they can be expressed in natural language, and this must be so, because the symbolic formulation of an argument is supposed to be a mere abbreviation of its natural language counterpart. That's why, the proof of the symbolic argument, is said to show the validity of the natural language argument that was represented in it.

Again, you seem to think that there is a set of logicians out there all of whom are doing exactly the same thing: interpreting their schemas.

And you keep saying that these schemas are 'abbreviations'. As I pointed out, they are no more 'abbreviations' than the formulae and rules in mathematics are.


All natural languages are such that the sentences can be denied or negated. That makes it obviously possible to formulate "contradictories".

Apart from your equation of denial and negation, I agree with you here -- so, why are you telling me this?


Such contradictories would be held to be always false...that's the Law of Non-contradiction. It's a generalization, backed by a huge amount of experience, and, as I suggested, linked in with our understanding that properties come in ranges of contraries that exclude each other.

The can't be 'always' false, since then it would be possible to say what could make them true, and nothing could make them true.

And what experience is this based on? Has anyone produced a scientific paper on this 'experience'.

In fact, it can't be based on experience, for if it were, it would be possible to say under what conditions it could be refuted. But, refutation is dependent on this 'law', so your appeal to experience must already presuppose this 'law' is valid.


But within natural language sentences. Replacing content with placeholders was done to eliminate the irrelevant verbiage and illustrate patterns. Formal logic is about forms. It's based on the assumption that certain forms will guarantee the deductive validity of arguments that use those forms. But you can't apply it if there are no natural language arguments that illustrate those patterns.

When we apply the logic, we use the letters as abbreviations for elements of ordinary language. For example if we represent

And that is what Formal Logic deals in: the use of variables -- so that its theorems are perfectly general. They could not be that if this were an abbreviating device, or if it were conducted in a natural language.


the letters here (often Greek letters are used to do this) function as placeholders, not variables

Then you can't introduce the quantifiers, or make generalisations from these alleged place-holder schemas.



What is it that makes sentences of a natural language true? Let's say that the situation

S: the cat's sitting on the fence

makes true:

1. The cat is sitting on the fence.

Now I suppose that your point is that, if this is true, then the following sentence would be true:

2. 1 is true because S is actual

And this would be made true by some situation that has to do with the way the elements of 1 refer and so on. so what? Some regresses are harmless, such as the regress of the natural numbers.

but, hey, this should probably be under philosophy, and, in any case, i'm merely indicating here that there are other views about what logic is about

But "the cat sitting on the fence" is tenseless so it also makes true "The cat was sitting on the fence" and "The cat will be sitting on the fence" and "My cat will be sitting on the fence" and a potentially infinite set of other propositions/indicative sentences.

But you reply:


2. 1 is true because S is actual

But what does "S is actual mean"? No less than "The cat is sitting on the fence"!

So, your 'explanation' goes round in a circle.


Some regresses are harmless, such as the regress of the natural numbers.

But this is not the same, since for each of your sentences, for it to be true, another has to be true. We thus never end up with a sentence that is determinately true.


but, hey, this should probably be under philosophy, and, in any case, i'm merely indicating here that there are other views about what logic is about.

Of course, there are other views about logic, and I much prefer your view to that of the mystics here. But that doesn't mean I do not have serious worries about the way you characterise things.

[Meridian]

Well, Syndicat, I agree with some of the things you say here, but I am honestly less sure about other things.


Nope. "the cat's sitting on the fence" is not a sentence. It's a name. "Direct access to reality" is not required.
I think "the cat's sitting on the fence" looks a lot like a sentence, to be quite honest. Maybe you are using it in a different manner, for sure, but I think most people would agree that it looks awfully lot like a sentence.


I've been sort of basing myself on Millikan's theory and she doesn't think there is such a thing as "direct access to reality" and neither do I. that's because even in sense perception there are no perceptions that are not interpretedI am not sure what you mean by "interpreted" or "sense perception" here, but I know that I do not always think about things that I nevertheless seem to perceive. Personally, I think interpreting involves thinking, so therefore I must disagree here.

On the other hand, though, I agree that everyone can perceive differently. As a musician (not a professional one, don't worry) I can hear, for example, whether a pitch changes half a tone or a whole tone. Countless similar examples can be made, with taste, colors, geometrical forms, etc. I think this is related to cultural/social differences, and, most basically, how we use our language.



Let's imagine a situation tens of thousands of years ago in the early beginnings of our species. A hunter comes back to the tribe and says: "There is bison over that hill." We can see right away that it's very useful to the survival of the tribe that they have a way of referring to this situation. The situation is there being bison over the hill. If that is the real situation, that makes the hunter's sentence true.
This is assuming the people of that time even had terms for "there is", "bison", "over", "hill", etc. We do see that it could be useful for them to have such terms, but that is merely speaking relative to our own use of language. Most likely they would employ completely different uses of language. But the point here is that the different use of language also changes how they'd consider the situation, and even, if they'd consider it a 'situation' at all.



Now, what is my reason for thinking that sentences refer to situations? My reason is this: Making this assumption helps us to explain why humans have the biological capacity for sentence production. Only real situations can explain this because only real situations have causal effects in the world. If the situation described by the hunter is real...if there is bison over the hill...his tribe's hunters can go and kill some and the tribe will eat...and live another day.
And my point was that situations will change as long as our language changes. That is because, to describe a situation we need to employ language. So, it is fine to say a sentence is true and base it off another sentence (which is a description of things, a 'situation'), but it is not correct to say that the noted description of things refers to the "true reality". Thus, language functions and develops because of our interaction with the world, but I do not think it correct that usage of language can transcend its function as a tool in this regard and refer directly to reality (by predicating truth about the "actual world").

So, basically, I think your use of "situation" is a-historical, and refer to things which 'just are so'. I do not believe in that. On the other hand, I am still learning and I may be wrong here.

[syndicat]

me:
Your view that there are no contradictions expressible in natural languages would be regarded by logicians as highly idiosyncratic, to say the least.

Where have I asserted this?

Maybe I misunderstood you. You seem to be drawing a kind of differentiation between formal logic and natural languages that seems to me to be implausible...and one that many logicians would disagree with.

me:

Such contradictories would be held to be always false...that's the Law of Non-contradiction. It's a generalization, backed by a huge amount of experience, and, as I suggested, linked in with our understanding that properties come in ranges of contraries that exclude each other.
you:

The can't be 'always' false, since then it would be possible to say what could make them true, and nothing could make them true.


If I say

1. This wall surface is both green and red all over

we know this can't be true. But we also know what would have to happen for it to be true. 1 is a subject-predicate sentence in which two features are predicated of the wall, green and red. The wall surface would have to have green throughout and also red throughout. Call this situation W.

It's just that those properties are contraries and exclude each other. So it isn't physically possible for the situation W to be real.

The components of W are all real things -- the wall, the color red, the color green. but W isn't real.


In fact, it can't be based on experience, for if it were, it would be possible to say under what conditions it could be refuted.

So, then, people 2000 years ago, when asserting the principles of Euclid's geometry would have to know exactly what sort of situation could refute the axiom of parallels? Why? To find out that it was false of this world people had to have the capacities needed to find this out...and eventually people did develop the necessary skills to do so.

according to some historians, Euclid's geometry was developed as a generalization from the experiences and rules of thumb of Egyptian land surveyors. But human brains have developed here on earth where Euclid's principles are not falsified in our experience. Hence Euclidean geometry "seemed obvious" and was taken to be apriori for 2000 years. But they were wrong about that. It was in fact an empirical generalization. I think it's plausible to think of the law of non-contradiction this way.


But, refutation is dependent on this 'law',

but a refutation of the LNC might be limited to certain special kinds of cases, and in that case people might then develop a restricted or modified form of LNC. at one time some people thought quantum mechanics provided a possible counter-example to LNC. in that case it seemed that a single thing could have contraries....being a wave and being a particle being thought to be contraries.


And that is what Formal Logic deals in: the use of variables -- so that its theorems are perfectly general. They could not be that if this were an abbreviating device, or if it were conducted in a natural language.


As I pointed out, when rules of inference are formulated, placeholders are used, not variables. the idea is to exhibit the forms. variables are one kind of device for doing that but not the only one.


But "the cat sitting on the fence" is tenseless so it also makes true "The cat was sitting on the fence" and "The cat will be sitting on the fence" and "My cat will be sitting on the fence" and a potentially infinite set of other propositions/indicative sentences.


but makes true at different times. In other words, if S (the cat sitting on the fence) obtained yesterday afternoon but not now, then "the cat was sitting on the fence" is true. but if the cat dies now, then "the cat will be sitting on the fence" won't be made true by S.


But what does "S is actual mean"? No less than "The cat is sitting on the fence"!


S consists in the cat sitting on the fence. So, S is real when and only when the cat exhibits the property of sitting on the fence. In other words, just as sentences have a subject/predicate structure, they do so because we use noun-phrases to track various items, and we use predicate-phrases to track to properties we may wish to attribute or deny of items, in this case, sitting on the fence.

Again, as with sentences having the function of designating or describing real situations (if used as descriptive devices), we can break up the subjects and predicates as tracking elements in those situations. The way in which one's language group uses a noun or verb to track various items in the world acts as a restraint for you and others, limiting variation from the current practice, because people want to be understood, they are using language to communicate. And we pick up these practices as a kind of social copying process, just as children pick up words when very young by copying what people around them do.

How do know which item is being tracked? We can use an abductive reasoning here, that is, what hypothesis about the term's reference best explains the data of observation?

If language can't "refer directly to reality" then what are we talking about"?: Ideas in our heads? Your view here leads straight to linguistic idealism. But I thought you rejected idealism?

as you know the early Wittgenstein's view of truth is that a true sentence "pictures" a fact (a real situation). but the problem he ran into is that he couldn't coherently explain this idea of "picturing". Millikan agrees with the early Wittgenstein that true sentences represent facts but she offers a worked out theory of what "representing" is, which also ends up being a materialist account of what "intentionality" is.

Listen, Rosa, I know that you and I disagree, but isn't it okay that different perspectives on these questions be expressed here? As I think you would agree, you and I seem to be on the same side on a number of questions.

[syndicat]

I think "the cat's sitting on the fence" looks a lot like a sentence, to be quite honest. Maybe you are using it in a different manner, for sure, but I think most people would agree that it looks awfully lot like a sentence.


"the cat's sitting on the fence" is called a "nominalization", that is, we can take a sentence and convert it to a name of the situation described by that sentence by nominalizing it. This consists in converting the verb to a gerundive which designates the property the verb phrase predicates, in this case, sitting on the wall.

we use nominalizations in situations where we want to talk about some situation, such as what caused it or that we perceived it. so for example:

I saw the cat sitting on the fence.

Lucy's stealing the bicycle got her arrested.


I am not sure what you mean by "interpreted" or "sense perception" here, but I know that I do not always think about things that I nevertheless seem to perceive. Personally, I think interpreting involves thinking, so therefore I must disagree here.


I'm not saying you consciously engage in thinking or judging when you pick up information about the world by seeing what is happening. What I mean is that you bring to your experience a huge mass of cognitive habits and dispositions and expectations about the world that you've developed in the course of your life. These habits and expectations shape how things are perceived by you.

I'll give an example. A European was out in the bush in southern Africa with a guide. The guide says, Look there's a lion. The European just can't see it. "Where?" he asks. Then suddenly what he took as a bush moved and then he saw the lion. The guide, having lived there all his life, was able to "see" things the European couldn't.

This is why people will often disagree about some event, such as a fight or what happened in some event such as a strike or something.


This is assuming the people of that time even had terms for "there is", "bison", "over", "hill", etc. We do see that it could be useful for them to have such terms, but that is merely speaking relative to our own use of language. Most likely they would employ completely different uses of language. But the point here is that the different use of language also changes how they'd consider the situation, and even, if they'd consider it a 'situation' at all.


uses of language definitely change. but you're missing the point. I'm talking about our production of sentences. the sentences are made up of terms to designate or track various things and these will change over time, and depend on our interest and circumstances. but sentence production is a universal biological capacity of humans, an innate capacity. all human natural languages are based on an internal differentiation in sentences into subjects and predicates and all allow for negation of sentences. thus humans have a very articulated communication system where we have sentences that have elements corresponding to elements in the situations we describe, and I don't think you can explain why we have this biological capacity without considering why it was extremely advantageious to our ancestors. well, what was advantageous? It was advantageous being able to convey information about the world, describe situations, ascribe properties to things in those situations, and discuss also activities and situations we might wish to bring about through action.

the fact that the world is made up of situations that occur is a very abstract feature of our world. it's not something that changes through history any more than the laws of physics change. and human languages have always been about producing sentences.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


You seem to be drawing a kind of differentiation between formal logic and natural languages that seems to me to be implausible...and one that many logicians would disagree with.

And there are many who think like me.


If I say

1. This wall surface is both green and red all over

we know this can't be true. But we also know what would have to happen for it to be true. 1 is a subject-predicate sentence in which two features are predicated of the wall, green and red. The wall surface would have to have green throughout and also red throughout. Call this situation W.

It's just that those properties are contraries and exclude each other. So it isn't physically possible for the situation W to be real.

The components of W are all real things -- the wall, the color red, the color green. but W isn't real.

Bold added.

And how can properties 'exclude' one another? I asked this before, and you have just re-asserted it. Do they have squatters' rights? Legal tenure? Do they push each other out of the way? Are they self-directed agents (a la Leibniz)?

As I also noted, as soon as you try to tell us how they 'exclude' one another, you are forced to attribute human capacities to them.

Now, you might not want to tell us how they do this, but then you have no good reason to say they 'exclude' one another.

The problem is that you are reading into nature the logical principles we use to try to make sense of it -- as Wittgenstein noted.


So, then, people 2000 years ago, when asserting the principles of Euclid's geometry would have to know exactly what sort of situation could refute the axiom of parallels? Why? To find out that it was false of this world people had to have the capacities needed to find this out...and eventually people did develop the necessary skills to do so.

Not so; it's just that in the 19th century, Euclid's axioms were given a new sense, which manifestly did not follow from experience.


according to some historians, Euclid's geometry was developed as a generalization from the experiences and rules of thumb of Egyptian land surveyors. But human brains have developed here on earth where Euclid's principles are not falsified in our experience. Hence Euclidean geometry "seemed obvious" and was taken to be apriori for 2000 years. But they were wrong about that. It was in fact an empirical generalization. I think it's plausible to think of the law of non-contradiction this way.

And yet, as I noted, the refutation of Euclid's parallel axiom required the use of the LNC. What could possibly refute the LNC except another application of the LNC, undermining that very 'refutation'.

But you have a reply:


but a refutation of the LNC might be limited to certain special kinds of cases, and in that case people might then develop a restricted or modified form of LNC. at one time some people thought quantum mechanics provided a possible counter-example to LNC. in that case it seemed that a single thing could have contraries....being a wave and being a particle being thought to be contraries.

Once more, even a restricted refutation would have to depend in a use of the 'law'. Or do you imagine that such a refutation will allow a proposition/indicative sentence and its negation to be true? Surely not, or it would not count as a refutation.

Let 'RLNC' stand for 'restricted LNC'. Suppose someone manages to show that RLNC is false (i.e., ¬RLNC is true). This refutation must mean that RLNC and ¬RLNC cannot both be true. But that is just another use of the LNC! So this 'refutation' simply confirms the LNC!


As I pointed out, when rules of inference are formulated, placeholders are used, not variables. the idea is to exhibit the forms. variables are one kind of device for doing that but not the only one.

Then as I noted, these rules can't be general.


but makes true at different times. In other words, if S (the cat sitting on the fence) obtained yesterday afternoon but not now, then "the cat was sitting on the fence" is true. but if the cat dies now, then "the cat will be sitting on the fence" won't be made true by S.

S consists in the cat sitting on the fence. So, S is real when and only when the cat exhibits the property of sitting on the fence. In other words, just as sentences have a subject/predicate structure, they do so because we use noun-phrases to track various items, and we use predicate-phrases to track to properties we may wish to attribute or deny of items, in this case, sitting on the fence.

Again, as with sentences having the function of designating or describing real situations (if used as descriptive devices), we can break up the subjects and predicates as tracking elements in those situations. The way in which one's language group uses a noun or verb to track various items in the world acts as a restraint for you and others, limiting variation from the current practice, because people want to be understood, they are using language to communicate. And we pick up these practices as a kind of social copying process, just as children pick up words when very young by copying what people around them do.

But, the phrase is not tensed, while the indicative sentence/proposition is. So, they can't be related to each other in the way you say.

Moreover, the 'situation' "S" makes the following true:

1) There are less than two cats sitting on the fence.

2) There are less than three cats sitting on the fence.

3 )There are less than four cats sitting on the fence.

...

n+1) There are less than n cats sitting on the fence.

And:

5) The are more than zero cats sitting on the fence.

As well as:

6) Either a cat or a dog is sitting on the fence.

7) Either a cat or two dogs are sitting on the fence.

8) Either a cat or three dogs are sitting on the fence.

and so on.

And:

9) Either a cat is sitting on the fence or there are wombats on the moon.

10) There is a cat sitting on the fence or Tony Blair is your uncle.

And so on...

The problem is, as Wittgenstein noted in the Tractatus, for your theory to be true, there would have to be some sort on internal connection between a true proposition/indicative sentence and the alleged 'situation' (state of affairs) that supposedly makes it true, so that nothing else could intrude, as it were, in the above manner. But, your connection is external, as it were, hence it allows in all manner of what appear to be irrelevances. You can only exclude these by quoting the original proposition/indicative sentence, but then that would make your theory circular.

Which is just a long-winded way of saying that there can be no theory of truth.


How do know which item is being tracked? We can use an abductive reasoning here, that is, what hypothesis about the term's reference best explains the data of observation?

Well, do we use abductive reasoning here? We certainly use it in everyday situations, but I question whether we use in working out the truth conditions of mundane sentences like this. I certainly do not, and I rather think you are in a minority if you do. And you'd be wise to desist, for the above reasons. The theory is defective.


If language can't "refer directly to reality" then what are we talking about"?: Ideas in our heads? Your view here leads straight to linguistic idealism. But I thought you rejected idealism?

In fact, what we do is use referring expressions (names, definite descriptions, etc.) and descriptive clauses. So, in "Fred is tall", "Fred" refers to Fred and "...is tall" describes him.


as you know the early Wittgenstein's view of truth is that a true sentence "pictures" a fact (a real situation). but the problem he ran into is that he couldn't coherently explain this idea of "picturing". Millikan agrees with the early Wittgenstein that true sentences represent facts but she offers a worked out theory of what "representing" is, which also ends up being a materialist account of what "intentionality" is.

I happen to think that Wittgenstein's picture 'theory' is far better than you suggest. It failed because it could not cope with infinities (as part of 'the general form of a proposition') and it ignored what he later called the 'anthropological' view of language. He also came to see that language is not too good at representing, since it's a means of communication.


Listen, Rosa, I know that you and I disagree, but isn't it okay that different perspectives on these questions be expressed here? As I think you would agree, you and I seem to be on the same side on a number of questions.

Indeed, we are; in fact, in many areas it's hard to slip a party card between us.:)

As far as 'different perspectives' is concerned; sure, but one always has to argue one's corner, which is what we are both doing.

[syndicat]

In regard to S

S: the cat's sitting on the fence

verifying a number of different sentences. This is true. You seem to be arguing against a view that holds there is a one-to-one relationship between sentences and states of affairs. That would be an implausible view since language is a human construct.

Consider sentence P:

P: the wall is not blue

There are many situations that could verify this:

The wall's being black all over
The wall's being a green and yellow checkerboard
The wall's being chartreuse on the top half and purple on the lower half
etc

There is no entity in reality that "not" refers to.

More generally, a particular situation can be described using different modes of speech or phrasing and thus you have different sentences.

Consider also Q:

Q: Some cat is sitting on the fence

This can be verified by an unlimited number of different concrete situations:

Tweedledee's sitting on the fence
Django's sitting on the fence
Sparky's sitting on the fence
etc

More generally if we have a sentence that would be appropriately abbreviated to:
Ex Fx
this is made true by any substitution instance
Fa
being true.

Now, in regard to contraries excluding each other. Exclusion is a modal term.

Modality enters the picture when we consider physical capacities, tendencies, susceptibilities, etc.

When we make hypotheses about the properties that will be exhibited under certain conditions, we attribute tendencies or capacities to things.

Ohm's Law doesn't allow that a circuit's voltage could change without resistance or amperage changing. It's not expressing an accidental correlation. So, if we increase the voltage, the other properties must change.

when we talk about a property being replaced by one of its contraries through change, we're talking about how a capacity for change is realized or exercized.

in our understanding or theory of the world we have various ranges of properties in contraries where there are principles of change just as there is Ohm's Law in the case of circuits.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


In regard to S

S: the cat's sitting on the fence

verifying a number of different sentences. This is true. You seem to be arguing against a view that holds there is a one-to-one relationship between sentences and states of affairs. That would be an implausible view since language is a human construct.

No, that is not what I am saying. What I am saying is that for any given 'state of affairs' there is a potentially infinite number of propositions/indicative sentences that it allegedly makes true.


Consider sentence P:

P: the wall is not blue

There are many situations that could verify this:

The wall's being black all over
The wall's being a green and yellow checkerboard
The wall's being chartreuse on the top half and purple on the lower half
etc

There is no entity in reality that "not" refers to.

More generally, a particular situation can be described using different modes of speech or phrasing and thus you have different sentences.

Consider also Q:

Q: Some cat is sitting on the fence

This can be verified by an unlimited number of different concrete situations:

Tweedledee's sitting on the fence
Django's sitting on the fence
Sparky's sitting on the fence
etc

More generally if we have a sentence that would be appropriately abbreviated to:
Ex Fx
this is made true by any substitution instance
Fa
being true.

Now, in regard to contraries excluding each other. Exclusion is a modal term.

Modality enters the picture when we consider physical capacities, tendencies, susceptibilities, etc.

But, this does not count against any theory I have propounded, since I have propounded none at all (nor will I).

But this does reveal the bankruptcy of introducing 'states of affairs'.


When we make hypotheses about the properties that will be exhibited under certain conditions, we attribute tendencies or capacities to things.

Maybe so, but when we try to fill in the details we end up attributing to nature human capacities, as I pointed out above -- we end up fetishising nature.


Ohm's Law doesn't allow that a circuit's voltage could change without resistance or amperage changing. It's not expressing an accidental correlation. So, if we increase the voltage, the other properties must change.

I agree, except the modal term you use will imply just such a fetishisation if you try to give it content.


when we talk about a property being replaced by one of its contraries through change, we're talking about how a capacity for change is realized or exercized.

in our understanding or theory of the world we have various ranges of properties in contraries where there are principles of change just as there is Ohm's Law in the case of circuits.

Well, yes, but as I noted, if you try to spell out how this is so, you end up fetishising nature.

You did this in an earlier post when you talked about one property 'excluding' another.

[syndicat]

But this does reveal the bankruptcy of introducing 'states of affairs'.

I don't see why. I've explained the truth conditions, I think.

You have a predicative phrase, such as "is scratching." This tracks a certain property. We have a name for this cat here, "Lucy." when we formulate the sentence "Lucy is scratching", we know what the truth conditions are. If Lucy has the property "is straching" tracks, it's true, otherwise not. Now, there might be other ways of predicating that property of an animal, that is, other modes of speaking. Doesn't matter because there are things being tracked by the various subject and predicate phrases. And if we use a subject phrase to denote A and we use a predicate phrase to ascribe property F, then we know that A's exhibiting F is what will make that sentence true.

And this also gives us truth conditions for particular and universal generalizations, Something is F, everything is F.

And, again, linguistic variations will not necessarily imply a different state of affairs as truth-maker.

A cat is sitting on the fence
Some cat is sitting on the fence
The fence has a cat sitting on it
At least one cat is sitting up there on the fence

same state of affairs would verify these.

So we know what the truth conditions are for basic affirmative subject predicate sentences and generalizations. And we also know something about the truth conditions are for compound sentences formed using "and" and "or" and "not".

With a disjunction you just need one of the disjuncts to be true to verify it. So S1:

S1: Django's sitting on the fence


can verify an infinite series of sentences:

Django is sitting on the fence or there is a lizard in the basement
Django is sitting on the fence or there are 2 lizards in the basement
Django is sitting on the fence or there are 3 lizards in the basement
Django is sitting on the fence or there are 4 lizards in the basement
and so on.

so your infinite reqresses are entirely harmless. they hardly show the "bankruptcy" of states of affairs.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


I don't see why. I've explained the truth conditions, I think.

But, as I showed, they aren't unique.


You have a predicative phrase, such as "is scratching." This tracks a certain property. We have a name for this cat here, "Lucy." when we formulate the sentence "Lucy is scratching", we know what the truth conditions are. If Lucy has the property "is scratching" tracks, it's true, otherwise not. Now, there might be other ways of predicating that property of an animal, that is, other modes of speaking. Doesn't matter because there are things being tracked by the various subject and predicate phrases. And if we use a subject phrase to denote A and we use a predicate phrase to ascribe property F, then we know that A's exhibiting F is what will make that sentence true.

I largely agree with this, but I'd put it differently, and I'd drop any attempt to explain the truth conditions of your example, for instance, since that would end up as a circular 'explanation', as I explained in an earlier post.


And this also gives us truth conditions for particular and universal generalizations, Something is F, everything is F.

And, again, linguistic variations will not necessarily imply a different state of affairs as truth-maker.

A cat is sitting on the fence
Some cat is sitting on the fence
The fence has a cat sitting on it
At least one cat is sitting up there on the fence

same state of affairs would verify these.

And the same 'state of affairs' would 'verify' a potentially infinite set of non-equivalent propositions/indicative sentences, as I also pointed out above. So, this theory is useless.


So we know what the truth conditions are for basic affirmative subject predicate sentences and generalizations. And we also know something about the truth conditions are for compound sentences formed using "and" and "or" and "not".

With a disjunction you just need one of the disjuncts to be true to verify it. So S1:

S1: Django's sitting on the fence

can verify an infinite series of sentences:

Django is sitting on the fence or there is a lizard in the basement
Django is sitting on the fence or there are 2 lizards in the basement
Django is sitting on the fence or there are 3 lizards in the basement
Django is sitting on the fence or there are 4 lizards in the basement
and so on.

so your infinite reqresses are entirely harmless. they hardly show the "bankruptcy" of states of affairs

However, this is not an infinite regress, since the truth of any one of your propositions does not depend on the truth of the one that came before it.

But, you must know this isn't an infinite regress, so I can only think you made a hasty error here.

And, whatever it is, it isn't harmless, since if the same state of affairs can verify a potentially infinite set of propositions/indicative sentences, your choice of any one specific sentence is entirely arbitrary.

[CartCollector]

What can be proven or disproven with dialectics that can't be with regular logic?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Good point, except dialectics is far too confused to prove anything.

[Nolan]

At first I read this thread as "Dialectics made sexy" :blink:

I'm tired.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You must be!:lol:

[syndicat]

And the same 'state of affairs' would 'verify' a potentially infinite set of non-equivalent propositions/indicative sentences, as I also pointed out above. So, this theory is useless.


conclusion doesn't follow from the premise.

when we specify truth conditions, it doesn't matter that there is not a one-to-one relationship between sentence tokens and states of affairs. for some odd reason you seem to think it should matter. what would be unacceptable would be if the conditions we specified were not consistent.

I believe I've explained how a sentence token is linked to a state of affairs. Because we have various modes of speech for describing the same thing it should hardly surprise you that there is no one-to-one correlation between sentences and states of affairs.

also, "infinite regress" traditionally has not been used to mean only "vicious infinite regress". There can also be a virtuous infinite regress. A recursion such as that which generates the natural number series is generating a virtuous infinite regress.

A vicious infinite regress occurs where you can't understand what the first element is without having progressed through the infiinite series...There is no vicious infinite regress in what I've been saying. i can start with the basis subject predicate sentences, and the subject and predicate phrases that make them up, and the various items these are linked to, and then build up the states of affairs and the more complex types of sentences from that, in the way that is familiar to logicians.

also, words should be differentiated by their copying lineage. so this means there are different words that look and sound the same. a copying lineage means, Why is a person using this word? What practice is this person copying in doing that? for example, the word "black" can be used to refer to a color of a surface or it can be used to refer to persons of African ancestry. These are different lineages of tokens. Each token is a copy in that it copies previous usages that track to something in reality.

so, which copying lineage a token of "black" falls into will determine a different property.

[CartCollector]

In reference to my earlier question (what dialectics can do that formal logic can't), I read the part of Rosa's site (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm#Academic) where she argues that formal logic has produced countless scientific and mathematical advancements while dialectical materialism has nothing to show for itself after 150 years since its invention. There is the argument that formal logic can't handle changing quantities, but a cursory glance shows that this isn't true. For instance, what is calculus except the study of changes over time? Certainly the derivative represents a changing quantity? Also, in physics, there's velocity, which is change in position, and acceleration, which is change in velocity, and these were found without any use of dialectical reasoning. Unless you want to argue that Issac Newton was a dialectician.

[GX.]

Shouldn't this thread be in Philosophy?

[S.Artesian]

In reference to my earlier question (what dialectics can do that formal logic can't), I read the part of Rosa's site (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm#Academic) where she argues that formal logic has produced countless scientific and mathematical advancements while dialectical materialism has nothing to show for itself after 150 years since its invention. There is the argument that formal logic can't handle changing quantities, but a cursory glance shows that this isn't true. For instance, what is calculus except the study of changes over time? Certainly the derivative represents a changing quantity? Also, in physics, there's velocity, which is change in position, and acceleration, which is change in velocity, and these were found without any use of dialectical reasoning. Unless you want to argue that Issac Newton was a dialectician.

What it, formal logic, can't do, and what Marx's dialectic does, is analyze capitalism. Formal logic does not explain the historical specificity of capital in a social relation of labor to the conditions of labor. Formal logic does not explain the necessity for expanded reproduction, for capital to accumulate as capital, and that the same necessity for expanded reproduction, that the very same accumulation is the limit to capitalist development, and more than the limit, contains the potential for the negation of capitalist accumulation.

[syndicat]

Formal logic is a formal discipline, like mathematics. It blends in with methodology and mathematics. It's not a particular empirical science such as political economy or sociology. But any science will necessarily use reasoning techniques and methods that are studied in logic just as sciences also use various mathematical techniques. Marx's various explanatory ideas fit in political economy and historical sociology. But "dialectics" has no relevant role to play. It's way too confused.

[S.Artesian]

Formal logic is a formal discipline, like mathematics. It blends in with methodology and mathematics. It's not a particular empirical science such as political economy or sociology. But any science will necessarily use reasoning techniques and methods that are studied in logic just as sciences also use various mathematical techniques. Marx's various explanatory ideas fit in political economy and historical sociology. But "dialectics" has no relevant role to play. It's way too confused.

I recommend you go back and read Marx a bit more closely since his work does not "fit in political economy," but rather demolishes political economy. The entire point of Marx's work is to show the necessity generated in the accumulation of capital for the abolition of capitalism.

As for historical sociology... that's even further off the mark, if getting any further is even possible.

Other than that, I think you got Marx down pat.

[syndicat]

I recommend you go back and read Marx a bit more closely since his work does not "fit in political economy," but rather demolishes political economy. The entire point of Marx's work is to show the necessity generated in the accumulation of capital for the abolition of capitalism.


wrong. he "demolished", that is, criticized the prevailing ideas of political economy in his day. but his own views are a particular theory or set of ideas in political economy. That's why there is such a thing as "marxist economics."

any science is defined by the subject matter, that is, what is it that is being explained? if one is talking about the dynamics and "laws of motion" of the capitalist mode of production, then you're talking about political economy. if you're talking about how and why whole social formations are replaced by others (Marx's theory of history) and if you're talking about the relationship between social production and other aspects of society, these are social science endeavors. That is, the relevant science is the science of society. as I said, sciences are defined by their subject matter. biology is about living things, zoology is about animals, geology is about the earth etc.

[S.Artesian]

wrong. he "demolished", that is, criticized the prevailing ideas of political economy in his day. but his own views are a particular theory or set of ideas in political economy. That's why there is such a thing as "marxist economics."

any science is defined by the subject matter, that is, what is it that is being explained? if one is talking about the dynamics and "laws of motion" of the capitalist mode of production, then you're talking about political economy. if you're talking about how and why whole social formations are replaced by others (Marx's theory of history) and if you're talking about the relationship between social production and other aspects of society, these are social science endeavors. That is, the relevant science is the science of society. as I said, sciences are defined by their subject matter. biology is about living things, zoology is about animals, geology is about the earth etc.


Correct there is no Marxist economics. Incorrect, there is no Marxist political economy. Political economy is the bourgeoisie's attempt to explain their own mode of production without acknowledging its, or their, historical limitation. Political economy becomes the ideological justification of capital, and Marx's critique exposes the immanent tendencies of capital toward self-negation. And exposing that political economy is not political economy itself, but a weapon in its practical overthrow.

Like I said, those are the things formal logic can't do, and can't even understand.

[syndicat]

Correct there is no Marxist economics. Incorrect, there is no Marxist political economy. Political economy is the bourgeoisie's attempt to explain their own mode of production without acknowledging its, or their, historical limitation. Political economy becomes the ideological justification of capital, and Marx's critique exposes the immanent tendencies of capital toward self-negation. And exposing that political economy is not political economy itself, but a weapon in its practical overthrow.


What is a science? What relationship does Marxism have to the knowledege that we develop and build up about our society, about health, about the world around us? Like I said, I don't think you know what a science is.

Of course it's true that ideas about the world can be applied, can form a practical body of knowledge for our use in oppositional activity. But if you read around in this literature, you'll find that writers in the marxist tradition do not ignore developments in human knowledge.

part of what we do is we try to persuade people -- the people who we are working with and organizing with -- to pursue strategies and pursue changes we advocate for, to link to their grievances and experience of oppression some ideas to help them "theorize" their experience.

now, in doing this, we have to contend with other ideas and other proposed explanations and ideologies. in the course of doing this having the best available information is helpful. this is why it makes no sense to simply ignore the sciences. for example, one of the most important crises of capitalism is the global warming crisis...and its cause is capitalism itself. how are you going to profitably discuss this without knowing anything about, or paying no attention, to what climate scientists say?

[syndicat]

formal logic has produced countless scientific and mathematical advancements

she's right. digital electronics and the semi-conductor industry is based on the work to construct clear formal logic systems, with the work of Frege in the 19th century and then on through the '30s. this work enabled finite math to be reduced to the symbolic logic of "and" "or" and "not". the semi-conductor industry produces elements on microchips that are electronic analogues of these three logical functions. microchips are vast arrays of logical functions. because finite math can be reduced to these three logical operations, this is how calculators were possible. computer languages are all built on a formal logic framework as the underlying digital electronic hardware is as well.

[S.Artesian]

What is a science? What relationship does Marxism have to the knowledege that we develop and build up about our society, about health, about the world around us? Like I said, I don't think you know what a science is.

Of course it's true that ideas about the world can be applied, can form a practical body of knowledge for our use in oppositional activity. But if you read around in this literature, you'll find that writers in the marxist tradition do not ignore developments in human knowledge.

part of what we do is we try to persuade people -- the people who we are working with and organizing with -- to pursue strategies and pursue changes we advocate for, to link to their grievances and experience of oppression some ideas to help them "theorize" their experience.

now, in doing this, we have to contend with other ideas and other proposed explanations and ideologies. in the course of doing this having the best available information is helpful. this is why it makes no sense to simply ignore the sciences. for example, one of the most important crises of capitalism is the global warming crisis...and its cause is capitalism itself. how are you going to profitably discuss this without knowing anything about, or paying no attention, to what climate scientists say?


I didn't say anything about ignoring sciences-- although I don't think political economy qualifies as a science.

I said Marx's work does not fit in political science or historical sociology-- both of which have large ideological components designed to comfort the bourgeoisie in their times of trouble.

Formal logic cannot explain the inherent limits to capital accumulation; and formal logic cannot explain the historical origin or the development of the social relation of production behind capitalist accumulation.

Marx's work is not supposed to "fit in." It breaks out of the "there is no alternative" faux-rationality of political economy.

It's not a question of whether I know "what science is." It's the answer to "what Marxism is" that is of critical importance. That's the answer you don't have.

[syndicat]

I didn't say anything about ignoring sciences-- although I don't think political economy qualifies as a science.

there are different things you could mean by that. you might be talking about the community of researchers called "economists". I'd agree that mostly their function is to provide a supportive ideology for the capitalists.

however there are some people who pursue the subject in an independent manner and often these people are influenced by radical ideas such as the ideas about political economy developed by marxist writers. when they write about economic matters, what is their discipline or area of study called? in the radical tradition we call it "political economy"...to differeniate it from bourgeois economics.



I said Marx's work does not fit in political science or historical sociology-- both of which have large ideological components designed to comfort the bourgeoisie in their times of trouble.

when you talk about "ideological components designed to comfort the bourgoisie" you're talking about a certain fraction of the academics or researchers who work in these areas. and that's true. but their ideologies don't define what the science is. the science is defined by the subject. and there are radicals including marxists who work in these fields.



Formal logic cannot explain the inherent limits to capital accumulation; and formal logic cannot explain the historical origin or the development of the social relation of production behind capitalist accumulation.

when you're talking about capital accumulation and historical origin of development of capitalist social relations, you're talking about subjects in political economy and historical sociology. that's the subject matter.

in the course of pursuing this subject you make various inferences. you attempt to use data and then make inferences from it. you have to see whether your ideas fit in with the facts, and so on. now, when you make inferences you're engaged in reasoning and this is where logic comes into play, because logic is the study of the patterns of reasoning that are good or bad. for example, one way to test a supposed idea about the world H is to see if we can deduce some fact F which we know from research is false. If so, that would tend to cast doubt on H. so in this case we're using logic, because we're making inferences in the course of seeing if our explanatory ideas match what has actually happened.

of course formal logic isn't going to provide explanations about the course of history...logic is a separate subject from historical sociology and political economy.

Oh I know what Marxism is. but more important than what marxism is, is it true? And how would we find that out?

[S.Artesian]

however there are some people who pursue the subject in an independent manner and often these people are influenced by radical ideas such as the ideas about political economy developed by marxist writers. when they write about economic matters, what is their discipline or area of study called? in the radical tradition we call it "political economy"...to differeniate it from bourgeois economics.

You can call it that. And that is wrong. Exactly what is the "radical tradition" in "political economy"? And who is in that tradition? Dean Baker and the CEPR crowd? The Union of Radical Political Economists? Fine and dandy-- but look at their work and tell me where you see the necessity for the abolition of capital, and by necessity I mean the self-generating limit to capital that propels class struggle?

It's a bit like those academic philosophers who, when reviewing Lukacs History and Class Consciousness, declared Lukacs to be the "finest Marxist philosopher since Marx himself." All you want to do is laugh in their faces and point out that they, the academics, are the perfect ones to make such an award, since Lukacs, like them, didn't have a clue to what Marxism really was about.

The point I'm trying to make is not that political economy doesn't exist, no more than I would make the point that after Marx philosophy doesn't exist. Rather the points are that Marxism is not a political economy, as its beginning is in the criticism of political economy and its ending with the overthrow of bourgeois society.






when you're talking about capital accumulation and historical origin of development of capitalist social relations, you're talking about subjects in political economy and historical sociology. that's the subject matter.

When we are discussing capital accumulation we are precisely talking about the social relation of production. When political economists are talking, they are not talking at all about the social relation of production



Oh I know what Marxism is. but more important than what marxism is, is it true? And how would we find that out?

What do you mean "is it true?" Is it an accurate analysis of the social relation of production that allows, generates the accumulation of capital? Is its analysis of the role of overproduction accurate? Is its assertion that at a certain point the means of production come into conflict with the relations of production, with the property form, accurate? Is the analysis that says the property forms change from being the stimuli to the development of the means of production to being fetters upon that development accurate?

We find out its truth in analyzing and opposing capitalism.

[syndicat]

You can call it that. And that is wrong. Exactly what is the "radical tradition" in "political economy"? And who is in that tradition? Dean Baker and the CEPR crowd? The Union of Radical Political Economists? Fine and dandy-- but look at their work and tell me where you see the necessity for the abolition of capital, and by necessity I mean the self-generating limit to capital that propels class struggle?


Baker is merely a liberal economist, a Keynesian.


When we are discussing capital accumulation we are precisely talking about the social relation of production. When political economists are talking, they are not talking at all about the social relation of production


well, then, you've not read, say, Braverman "Labor & Monopoly Capital", Michael Yates "Naming the System" or for that matter "ABCs of Political Economy" by Hahnel. what they are talking about is the social relations of production.


What do you mean "is it true?" Is it an accurate analysis of the social relation of production that allows, generates the accumulation of capital? Is its analysis of the role of overproduction accurate? Is its assertion that at a certain point the means of production come into conflict with the relations of production, with the property form, accurate? Is the analysis that says the property forms change from being the stimuli to the development of the means of production to being fetters upon that development accurate?

yes.



We find out its truth in analyzing and opposing capitalism.

"Analyzing". What, navel gazing? No data or research enters the picture? What was Marx doing those years at the British Museum?

And how do we assess the accuracy of something without reasoning about it? for example, the Japanese economist Okishio has a proof that capitalism does not require a tendency to falling rate of profit. To assess this proof you'd have to look at the argument, to see if it's valid or not. In doing that you're applying logic.

[S.Artesian]

Baker is merely a liberal economist, a Keynesian.

well, then, you've not read, say, Braverman "Labor & Monopoly Capital", Michael Yates "Naming the System" or for that matter "ABCs of Political Economy" by Hahnel. what they are talking about is the social relations of production.

Read them both. Actually know Yates. He's not a political economist by any stretch. But I don't consider the "Monopoly Capital" school to be Marxist analysis.


"Analyzing". What, navel gazing? No data or research enters the picture? What was Marx doing those years at the British Museum?

That's a hard one. Not navel gazing. Exactly by looking at the data. Would you like a list of sources?


And how do we assess the accuracy of something without reasoning about it? for example, the Japanese economist Okishio has a proof that capitalism does not require a tendency to falling rate of profit. To assess this proof you'd have to look at the argument, to see if it's valid or not. In doing that you're applying logic.

We've been through this about Okishio before. I did not say formal logic was not necessary in analyzing the empirical data regarding capitalist accumulation, no more than I said Marx's dialectic was a substitute for such concrete analysis. What I did say is that formal logic will not explain why the data changes, what causes rates of return to rise and fall; why the price of oil goes from less than $10 barrel in 1998 to $30 dollars then back to $20 in 2002 and why that "rotation" made it a dead cinch lock that Bush would invade Iraq.

Formal logic will not explain overproduction-- but as is most often the case misrepresent it as underconsumption, or some issue of "effective demand."

[syndicat]

What I did say is that formal logic will not explain why the data changes, what causes rates of return to rise and fall; why the price of oil goes from less than $10 barrel in 1998 to $30 dollars then back to $20 in 2002 and why that "rotation" made it a dead cinch lock that Bush would invade Iraq.


of course not. formal logic is not an empirical theory about society or any other particular concrete subject matter. but any attempt to analyze any of these things can be evaluated as to its soundness using tools of formal logic. logic is more akin to mathematics in being a tool for evaluating and developing ideas about the various aspects of society and our world.

"dialectics" is a confused and obfuscatory set of ideas that are of no use at all.

[S.Artesian]

of course not. formal logic is not an empirical theory about society or any other particular concrete subject matter. but any attempt to analyze any of these things can be evaluated as to its soundness using tools of formal logic. logic is more akin to mathematics in being a tool for evaluating and developing ideas about the various aspects of society and our world.

"dialectics" is a confused and obfuscatory set of ideas that are of no use at all.


So you would like everyone to think. Certainly not obfuscatory in Marx's hands.

Political economy, on the other hand, becomes nothing but obfuscatory in its formalism.

Let's try this, empirical analysis, conforming and restricted to the framework of formal logic, cannot accurately account for the historical development of capitalism, of the development of conflicts between the means and relations of production, etc. etc. etc.

[ChrisK]

Sorry this took so long. I've been quite busy.


What I described in my earlier posts is essentially dialectics.

Really? I didn't see any of the dialectical laws.


Now just a bit about the language part. In our daily lives we refer to several things as opposites. We say that a body at rest is the opposite of a body in motion. Again, bodies moving in two opposite directions are opposites of each other. A slow moving body is the opposite of a fast moving body. When we talk of dialectics, we generalize this notion to that of systems displaying mutually exclusive states. Indeed, all things that we normally refer to as opposites fall under this category.

Systems displaying mutually exclusive states would imply that these states cannot exist together. Lets just keep that in mind.


Now look at the "special" type of class interaction that we talked about. It is a full-fledged struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Look at the biosphere in general. Species develop due to evolution which is determined by struggle between individuals, species, and life and environment. Again, in dialectics, we generalize the notion of struggle to interaction between opposites. Same as earlier, what we generally refer to as struggle in our daily lives is a subset of this. Note that for systems like capitalism and socialism, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat can actually be viewed as a struggle between socialism and capitalism, since the former uniquely determines the latter.

Why? Does this mean that socialism, the opposite of capitalism, already exists?

Also, how are these opposites? It would seem to be that they have different interests, but that doesn't make them opposites.


These are the fundamentals of dialectics and this is what we mean by struggle between opposites. Thus the terms like contradiction, antagonization etc. also arise. I hope all this makes things clear for you. Do you have any more questions ?

How are these opposites? You have to demonstrate these are indeed contradictions, or opposites.

[red cat]

Sorry this took so long. I've been quite busy.



Really? I didn't see any of the dialectical laws.

We did not proceed that far yet.



Systems displaying mutually exclusive states would imply that these states cannot exist together. Lets just keep that in mind.
Not always. The bourgeoisie and proletariat co-exist under capitalism.

The same system can of course not display mutually exclusive state at the same time. But different systems or objects displaying mutually exclusive states can co-exist, as in the example above.



Why? Does this mean that socialism, the opposite of capitalism, already exists?No, but notice the equivalence of the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and proletariat to that between capitalism and socialism.

Also, how are these opposites? It would seem to be that they have different interests, but that doesn't make them opposites.

How are these opposites? You have to demonstrate these are indeed contradictions, or opposites.This is how:


Now just a bit about the language part. In our daily lives we refer to several things as opposites. We say that a body at rest is the opposite of a body in motion. Again, bodies moving in two opposite directions are opposites of each other. A slow moving body is the opposite of a fast moving body. When we talk of dialectics, we generalize this notion to that of systems displaying mutually exclusive states. Indeed, all things that we normally refer to as opposites fall under this category.I know this will be a bit difficult in the beginning, but it happens with all subjects. In mathematics, when we are introduced to numbers beyond rationals or reals, we don't ask how they are "numbers" according to our previous understanding; we expand our notion of numbers of which rationals or reals are a subset.

[JazzRemington]

Not always. The bourgeoisie and proletariat co-exist under capitalism.

If the proletariat and bourgeoisie co-exist, then they aren't mutually-exclusive, unless you're using the term differently than the way it's normally used.


The same system can of course not display mutually exclusive state at the same time. But different systems or objects displaying mutually exclusive states can co-exist, as in the example above.

That depends upon what you mean by "co-exist" and "mutually exclusive" because those terms sort-of cancel each other out.


No, but notice the equivalence of the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and proletariat to that between capitalism and socialism.

How do you mean, "equivalence of the contradiction"?


Now just a bit about the language part. In our daily lives we refer to several things as opposites. We say that a body at rest is the opposite of a body in motion. Again, bodies moving in two opposite directions are opposites of each other. A slow moving body is the opposite of a fast moving body. When we talk of dialectics, we generalize this notion to that of systems displaying mutually exclusive states. Indeed, all things that we normally refer to as opposites fall under this category.

All this seems to rely on confusing an action with the thing doing the action. Those are two very different things. Two cars moving in the opposite direction from one another doesn't mean that one car is the opposite of one car. The ACTIONS may be the opposite of one another but not the objects themselves. But two mutually exclusive states doesn't mean that the two are opposites. I can't have my right hand on my computer mouse and on the keyboard at the same time, but it doesn't follow that "left hand on my computer mouse" and "left hand on the keyboard" are opposites.

[red cat]

If the proletariat and bourgeoisie co-exist, then they aren't mutually-exclusive, unless you're using the term differently than the way it's normally used.

Please go through my earlier posts for a better understanding.

In short, identify moving east and moving west as two opposite or mutually exclusive states. Object A can move east and co-exist with object B that moves west. But object A moving east cannot coexist with itself moving west. That is why these two states are mutually exclusive.




That depends upon what you mean by "co-exist" and "mutually exclusive" because those terms sort-of cancel each other out.

How do you mean, "equivalence of the contradiction"?Already described here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1711443&postcount=28).



All this seems to rely on confusing an action with the thing doing the action. Those are two very different things. Two cars moving in the opposite direction from one another doesn't mean that one car is the opposite of one car. The ACTIONS may be the opposite of one another but not the objects themselves. But two mutually exclusive states doesn't mean that the two are opposites. I can't have my right hand on my computer mouse and on the keyboard at the same time, but it doesn't follow that "left hand on my computer mouse" and "left hand on the keyboard" are opposites.When we consider objects or systems, we take into account all of their properties; all actions included.

[JazzRemington]

In short, identify moving east and moving west as two opposite or mutually exclusive states. Object A can move east and co-exist with object B that moves west. But object A moving east cannot coexist with itself moving west. That is why these two states are mutually exclusive.

But that doesn't have anything to do with the proletariat and bourgeoisie. These are two different groups of people, whereas "object A moving east" is a state of affairs, or at least a description of an action. "Proletariat" is neither of these.


When we consider objects or systems, we take into account all of their properties; all actions included.

This doesn't change the fact that there's a difference between an action and the thing that does the action. Taking a system in its totality doesn't make the system and its actions one and the same. I should know, I'm a library and information science major and this is part of what we study.

Also, in your linked post you seem to show this confusion. You say that an egg cannot be in multiple stages of development at once, but only one at a time. You're talking about an action. The proletariat and bourgeoisie are not actions, but groups (or entities in a system, as it were). If they were mutually exclusive, only one would exist, going by how you appear to use the term in your description of an egg's development.

[red cat]

But that doesn't have anything to do with the proletariat and bourgeoisie. These are two different groups of people, whereas "object A moving east" is a state of affairs, or at least a description of an action. "Proletariat" is neither of these.

They are groups of people displaying mutually exclusive states.



This doesn't change the fact that there's a difference between an action and the thing that does the action. Taking a system in its totality doesn't make the system and its actions one and the same. I should know, I'm a library and information science major and this is part of what we study.

Also, in your linked post you seem to show this confusion. You say that an egg cannot be in multiple stages of development at once, but only one at a time. You're talking about an action. The proletariat and bourgeoisie are not actions, but groups.

Can we really separate objects from actions in that manner ? Does an egg remain the same object in its many developmental stages ?

[JazzRemington]

They are groups of people displaying mutually exclusive states.

But an egg itself goes through multiple stages of development, which ARE mutually exclusive from one another. How does this apply to the bourgeoisie and proletariat? If they both display mutually exclusive states, then by default they aren't mutually exclusive. If they were, only one would be displaying a state at any one time. Clearly this is not the case because both groups exist together.


Can we really separate objects from actions in that manner ? Does an egg remain the same object in its many developmental stages ?

For analytical purposes, yes. System designers do this all the time: they break up a system into its components and actions involved in said system. They design maps that chart the relationships between entities that lack any mention of actions. Otherwise you're saying that an object and its action are the same thing, which is false. A runner is not the same thing as running. A runner is "doing" running, but is not the same thing as running.

[red cat]

But an egg itself goes through multiple stages of development, which ARE mutually exclusive from one another. How does this apply to the bourgeoisie and proletariat? If they both display mutually exclusive states, then by default they aren't mutually exclusive. If they were, only one would be displaying a state at any one time. Clearly this is not the case because both groups exist together. Mutually exclusive in the sense that a single person or social class cannot be both bourgeois and proletarian at the same time.




For analytical purposes, yes. System designers do this all the time: they break up a system into its components and actions involved in said system. They design maps that chart the relationships between entities that lack any mention of actions. Otherwise you're saying that an object and its action are the same thing, which is false. A runner is not the same thing as running. A runner is "doing" running, but is not the same thing as running.

We can look into other examples later. My question is simple; does an egg remain the same object throughout its developmental stages or not ?

[JazzRemington]

Mutually exclusive in the sense that a single person or social class cannot be both bourgeois and proletarian at the same time.

That goes without saying. But it would be more precise to state that membership in social classes is mutually exclusive, rather than the classes themselves are mutually exclusive or what the classes state is mutually exclusive. That just leads to the confusion we've seen above.


We can look into other examples later. My question is simple; does an egg remain the same object throughout its developmental stages or not ?

I was merely using the term "system" the way system designers use it. You asked how one can separate an object from its action, and I showed you how, according to the people who design/analyze systems. If you don't want to use the term the way its used in its proper context, then don't use it.

Also, I'll answer your question about eggs if you can explain to me what this has to do with what we're talking about. You're not trying to claim I deny change happens, are you?

[red cat]

That goes without saying. But it would be more precise to state that membership in social classes is mutually exclusive, rather than the classes themselves are mutually exclusive or what the classes state is mutually exclusive. That just leads to the confusion we've seen above.

Yes, that might be a better way of stating it.



I was merely using the term "system" the way system designers use it. You asked how one can separate an object from its action, and I showed you how, according to the people who design/analyze systems. If you don't want to use the term the way its used in its proper context, then don't use it.

I don't understand this "system designing" stuff. So it will be convenient for me if we go by simpler examples.


Also, I'll answer your question about eggs if you can explain to me what this has to do with what we're talking about. You're not trying to claim I deny change happens, are you?

I am just trying to show that we cannot necessarily separate an object from actions.

[JazzRemington]

I don't understand this "system designing" stuff. So it will be convenient for me if we go by simpler examples.

Your use of "system" (by referencing entities and inter-relations between such) suggested the field of system design. If you aren't using "system" in this way, then how are you using it?


I am just trying to show that we cannot necessarily separate an object from actions.

Again, for analytical, as well as grammatical, purposes, you can. When you say that two cars going in opposite directions are opposites of each other, you're conflating actions and objects (that's like saying a verb is the same thing as a noun). It doesn't necessarily follow that contradicting actions must come from contradicting objects. If I were arguing with someone and stated the opposite of what he said, I am not the other's opposite. Hell, the word "opposite", when it;s used in ordinary language, isn't usually even applied to objects themselves.

[REVLEFT'S BIEGGST MATSER TROL]

I'm not trolling here, could someone answer my question?


Has there been any rigorous scientific proof of dialectics, as opposed to examples of water boiling and so on?

And what does dialetics tell us that we cannot already find out though normal reasoning? Why is it even nessacary to invoke dialetics to explain rapid/dynamic change, when we can already do so without that theory.

As an example;

Water boils when it reaches 100c and quickly turns from liquid into gas having remained mostly as water for all the lower temperatures.

I mean, why do we need this theory when it just seems to provide an explanation for everything that may be right in some cases (assuming dialeticians can agree on what the theory predicts) and may be totally wrong in others?

[Hit The North]

That goes without saying. But it would be more precise to state that membership in social classes is mutually exclusive, rather than the classes themselves are mutually exclusive or what the classes state is mutually exclusive. That just leads to the confusion we've seen above.


The relationship between the bourgeoisie and proletatriat is an interesting one, isn't it? They are mutually exclusive in that the identity of one excludes the other. But at the same time the existence of one is absolutely dependent on the existence of the other. So on one level they are in opposition to each other but, on another level, find their origin within the same relation.

[S.Artesian]

The relationship between the bourgeoisie and proletatriat is an interesting one, isn't it? They are mutually exclusive in that the identity of one excludes the other. But at the same time the existence of one is absolutely dependent on the existence of the other. So on one level they are in opposition to each other but, on another level, find their origin within the same relation.

That's called a dialectic.

[red cat]

Your use of "system" (by referencing entities and inter-relations between such) suggested the field of system design. If you aren't using "system" in this way, then how are you using it?


Yes, that is what I mean by a system, but I have no idea of what system designing is.



Again, for analytical, as well as grammatical, purposes, you can. When you say that two cars going in opposite directions are opposites of each other, you're conflating actions and objects (that's like saying a verb is the same thing as a noun). It doesn't necessarily follow that contradicting actions must come from contradicting objects. If I were arguing with someone and stated the opposite of what he said, I am not the other's opposite. Hell, the word "opposite", when it;s used in ordinary language, isn't usually even applied to objects themselves.

Well, it might be convenient to do so for analytical or grammatical purposes, but it might not be possible always.

What do you mean by contradicting objects ?

[red cat]

I'm not trolling here, could someone answer my question?


Has there been any rigorous scientific proof of dialectics, as opposed to examples of water boiling and so on?

Yes, so far every system has been observed to develop due to struggle between opposites. For example, boiling water itself is a result of collision of particles in mutually exclusive states of motion.



And what does dialetics tell us that we cannot already find out though normal reasoning? Why is it even nessacary to invoke dialetics to explain rapid/dynamic change, when we can already do so without that theory.

As an example;

Water boils when it reaches 100c and quickly turns from liquid into gas having remained mostly as water for all the lower temperatures.

I mean, why do we need this theory when it just seems to provide an explanation for everything that may be right in some cases (assuming dialeticians can agree on what the theory predicts) and may be totally wrong in others?

Dialectical materialism makes some observations that are true for every system we have come across so far.

Of course, the laws of dialectics are not enough to make useful conclusions about most systems. For example, even though these laws hold true for any chemical reaction, they hardly tell us anything deep about their properties. So we use chemistry instead of dialectics for studying chemical reactions.

Dialectical materialism is used for studying social phenomena and altering them. That is the field where it is applied to for obtaining concrete results.

[which doctor]

What is a science? What relationship does Marxism have to the knowledege that we develop and build up about our society, about health, about the world around us? Like I said, I don't think you know what a science is.

You have to understand that when people say Marxism is a science, they mean it in a way that no other science actually is. Namely, Marxism as science is in the unique position of overcoming the very object of its critique. One could say that the point of being a Marxist, is ultimately to make Marxism obsolescent.

[JazzRemington]

The relationship between the bourgeoisie and proletatriat is an interesting one, isn't it? They are mutually exclusive in that the identity of one excludes the other. But at the same time the existence of one is absolutely dependent on the existence of the other. So on one level they are in opposition to each other but, on another level, find their origin within the same relation.

I don't see what this has to do with dialectics. IDENTITIES aren't mutually exclusive, it's MEMBERSHIP in one class or the other that's mutually exclusive.

[JazzRemington]

Yes, that is what I mean by a system, but I have no idea of what system designing is.

What you meant wasn't the question. The question was in what context are you using the term system? System design, sociology, etc.


Well, it might be convenient to do so for analytical or grammatical purposes, but it might not be possible always.

Convenience has nothing to do with it. It's for conceptual clarity. A verb is not the same thing as a noun no more than X is the same letter as Y.


What do you mean by contradicting objects ?

You tell me. You seem to think that two cars going in opposite directions are themselves contradictions. Like I said, normally the word "contradiction" isn't used to describe objects or actions, but rather statements. Contradictions are usually bad things that are supposed to be avoided in making statements.

[black magick hustla]

You have to understand that when people say Marxism is a science, they mean it in a way that no other science actually is. Namely, Marxism as science is in the unique position of overcoming the very object of its critique. One could say that the point of being a Marxist, is ultimately to make Marxism obsolescent.

I think the issue is not so much that marxism is "scientific" in the same sense chemisty is. But the point of "scientific" socialism was to differentiate it from the lofty blueprinty utopian socialism, which was based on the idea that if people change their lifestyles, the world will be saved.

[Hit The North]

I don't see what this has to do with dialectics. IDENTITIES aren't mutually exclusive, it's MEMBERSHIP in one class or the other that's mutually exclusive.

What's the difference?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apologies to Syndicat for the delay in replying, but I have been away for a while. I'll respond to him later this week, just as I will reply to several of the mystics who have posted in this thread since I was here last.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gangsterio:


I'm not trolling here, could someone answer my question?

Has there been any rigorous scientific proof of dialectics, as opposed to examples of water boiling and so on?

No, there hasn't. Nothing even remotely like it either.

Here is what I have posted here before about this (DM = Dialectical Materialism):


In general, however, the examples usually given by DM-fans to illustrate their laws are almost without exception either anecdotal or impressionistic. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal purporting to establish the veracity of a new law with the same level of vagueness, imprecision, triteness, lack of detail and/or mathematics, compounded by such theoretical naivety, it would be rejected out-of-hand at the first stage. Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any attempt to establish, say, either the truth of classical economic theory or the falsity of Marx's own work with an evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as this --, to say nothing of the contempt they would show for such theoretical wooliness. In circumstances like this, those who might be quick to cry "pedantry" at the issues raised in my Essays would become devoted pedants themselves, and nit-pick with the best at such inferior anti-Marxist work.

Now, anyone who has studied or practiced real science will know this to be true. It is only in books on DM (and internet discussion boards) that Mickey Mouse material of this sort seems acceptable.

At this point we might wonder where Engels's predilection for Mickey Mouse Science came from. After all, he was familiar with the careful and detailed work of contemporary scientists (like Darwin). Why then was he prepared to assert that his 'Laws' were indeed laws on the basis of very little primary data (or none at all), but rely on secondary or tertiary (but nonetheless selective) evidence and sloppy analysis instead? Well, we need look no further than Hegel for a clue here, for Hegel was the original Mickey Mouse Scientist (making Engels merely the Sorcerer's Apprentice).

Anyone who has practiced genuine science will know the great lengths scientists have to go to, to establish even a minor change in any theory in each discipline, never mind confirm a new law. The precision, the care and attention to detail, and the theoretical clarity required in genuine science puts DM to shame.

Contrast this, too, with the level of detail and the careful, novel research comrades devote to issues arising in Historical Materialism (in economoc theory, current affairs, history, etc.), and the crass nature of DM becomes all the more apparent.

G:


And what does dialetics tell us that we cannot already find out though normal reasoning? Why is it even nessacary to invoke dialetics to explain rapid/dynamic change, when we can already do so without that theory.

In fact, dialectics is far too vague and confused to tell us anything (other than the depths to which comrades will descend to defend this dogma)


As an example;

Water boils when it reaches 100c and quickly turns from liquid into gas having remained mostly as water for all the lower temperatures.

I mean, why do we need this theory when it just seems to provide an explanation for everything that may be right in some cases (assuming dialeticians can agree on what the theory predicts) and may be totally wrong in others?

In fact, dialectics fails even here, since in the change from liquid water to steam, the substance is still H2O. So no new 'quality' has emerged.

In which case, the most over-used example that DM-fans employ to illustrate their 'theory' does not even do that!

[JazzRemington]

What's the difference?

Abstract concepts cannot be "opposites" or contradict one another, in the sense of how the terms are normally used. In themselves, they aren't mutually exclusive because we don't know what distinction is being made.

[Hit The North]

Abstract concepts cannot be "opposites" or contradict one another, in the sense of how the terms are normally used. In themselves, they aren't mutually exclusive because we don't know what distinction is being made.

Sorry, are you claiming that social classes cannot be in opposition to each other? If so, this seems a peculiar assertion for a revolutionary to be making.

[JazzRemington]

Sorry, are you claiming that social classes cannot be in opposition to each other? If so, this seems a peculiar assertion for a revolutionary to be making.

I only asked how classes can be the opposite of one another. "Opposite" is not the same thing as "to be in opposition". Two football teams playing against each other are in opposition with one another, but it wouldn't make sense to say that one team is the opposite of the other. "Opposite" may look similar to "opposition", but it doesn't suggest the same thing when it's used in ordinary language.

[red cat]

The main question here is that whether to refer to mutually opposite states or the objects that assume these states as "opposites"? What is the Leninist convention ?

[S.Artesian]

I only asked how classes can be the opposite of one another. "Opposite" is not the same thing as "to be in opposition". Two football teams playing against each other are in opposition with one another, but it wouldn't make sense to say that one team is the opposite of the other. "Opposite" may look similar to "opposition", but it doesn't suggest the same thing when it's used in ordinary language.

But opposite can and does mean in opposition in Hegel and Marx's dialectic, and the opposition exists in the antinomy of the social relationship of production, that the class of laborers does not expand its powers, its appropriation of nature and society as wage-labor, does not enhance living labor, but rather enhances the power of the class expropriating that labor, it enhances the power of those who own the accumulated, alienated "dead" labor.

This opposition is also the basis for the identity of capital and wage-labor, each exists only through the organization of the other.

[Hit The North]

I only asked how classes can be the opposite of one another. "Opposite" is not the same thing as "to be in opposition". Two football teams playing against each other are in opposition with one another, but it wouldn't make sense to say that one team is the opposite of the other.
I haven't claimed they were opposites of each other, I wrote the following:


Originally posted by Bob The Builder
on one level they are in opposition to each other but, on another level, find their origin within the same relation.It is you who decided to imbue my remarks with some logical definition of the word "opposite".



"Opposite" may look similar to "opposition", but it doesn't suggest the same thing when it's used in ordinary language.

So why assume that when I say one class is in opposition to another, I mean "opposite" in some other sense?

But anyway, in ordinary language use, the two words may easily suggest the same relation: When I take to the football field in my role as the left winger, the right full-back in the opposition team is my opposite number. It is he who will oppose my attempt to move the ball upfield.

I'm not really sure what your definitions of these words are, but to be honest, I think your objections are trivial and knit-picking.

[JazzRemington]

But opposite can and does mean in opposition in Hegel and Marx's dialectic, [...]

If that is the case, then that's confused use of language.

[JazzRemington]

I haven't claimed they were opposites of each other, I wrote the following:

It is you who decided to imbue my remarks with some logical definition of the word "opposite".

I was under the impression you were defending Red Cat's assertions.


But anyway, in ordinary language use, the two words may easily suggest the same relation: When I take to the football field in my role as the left winger, the right full-back in the opposition team is my opposite number. It is he who will oppose my attempt to move the ball upfield.

That seems like a play on words, more than anything.


I'm not really sure what your definitions of these words are, but to be honest, I think your objections are trivial and knit-picking.

I make no definitions beyond the way the words are used in ordinary language. As I've said, "oppose" and "opposite" used two different words used to describe different things. Clarity is never trivial nor has the quality of knit-picking. Note that I'm not objecting to whatever you claim to describe (e.g. the struggles between classes), but am trying to raise the concern that maybe you're making a poor choice of words.

[Hit The North]

That seems like a play on words, more than anything.


What else is language use, if not playing with words? Are you saying my use of the words 'opposition', 'opposite' and 'oppose' are somehow faulty or unintelligible?



I make no definitions beyond the way the words are used in ordinary language.

Which is how? In order to not be so slippery, you will have to define your terms.


As I've said, "oppose" and "opposite" used two different words used to describe different things.

"Things"? Surely you mean "relations"?


Clarity is never trivial nor has the quality of knit-picking.
Indeed.


Note that I'm not objecting to whatever you claim to describe (e.g. the struggles between classes), but am trying to raise the concern that maybe you're making a poor choice of words.

If you're not knit-picking, you need to explain how my use of the words above are in error or serve to obscure what needs to be explained.

[JazzRemington]

What else is language use, if not playing with words? Are you saying my use of the words 'opposition', 'opposite' and 'oppose' are somehow faulty or unintelligible?

Using language isn't playing with words. Word play is a specific literary technique. I doubt most linguists would argue that all language use is word play. I'm saying you are misusing the words when you are claiming that "opposition" is the same as "opposite", which is not the case.


"Things"? Surely you mean "relations"?

It is as you wish. But NOW you're paying attention to word usage?


If you're not knit-picking, you need to explain how my use of the words above are in error or serve to obscure what needs to be explained.

When laypeople use the term "to oppose", it's like to struggle against, resist, fight back against, etc. Thus something like "the enemy's advance was opposed by our ground troops" or "the law was opposed on the grounds that it was believed to be unconstitutional".

My argument against the example with cars given above was that it was based on confusing the object with its actions (compare this with confounding nouns with verbs and vice versa). If I and someone else are walking on opposite sides of the street, that does not mean that we are opposites. Below are some ways the word is used in ordinary language. There may be others, but I'm limited in my recall at the moment. Rosa Lichtenstein can supplement.

"Jane is a member of the opposite sex." - the word opposite is used to describe a part of a diametric relationship.

"The ball landed on the opposite side of the street." - the word is describing a location.

"She was standing on the opposite end of the room from me." - referring to a spatial orientation in relation to the speaker.

"Eddie is usually late while Bill is usually early; they are total opposites." - here, "opposite" is describing personalities or behaviors.

"I intend to go south but ended up going in the opposite direction." - now it's used to describe a relative direction.

"Opposite" is never usually referring to, say, people or cars or social classes themselves. One wouldn't normally say "The Indiana Colts are the opposite of the Chicago Bears" or "The chair is the opposite of the stool". The distinction is unclear. The word "opposite" is normally applied to this distinction, and not, say, the Chicago Bears or a chair. Otherwise, we are left with wonder how a chair could be the opposite of a stool. If it's because they are on opposite sides of the room, then why not just skip a step and just say that? That's more precise.

Now, if you are using "opposite" as logicians, then it's different. I believe the opposite of something in a logical statement would be conditioned with "not", like the opposite of A would be ~A. If this were the case, then the opposite of, say, "proletariat" is "not proletariat," which would mean that everything is the opposite of "proletariat". This, I'm not so sure about as I have no training in logic.

[ChrisK]

We did not proceed that far yet.

Then how is the eggs development dialectical? You haven't shown this at all. You've called changing in the egg to different, mutually exlusive states dialectical.


Not always. The bourgeoisie and proletariat co-exist under capitalism.

Then they are not mutually exclusive.


The same system can of course not display mutually exclusive state at the same time. But different systems or objects displaying mutually exclusive states can co-exist, as in the example above.

Then how does a dialectician define a system? Also, considering that the proletariat and the bourgeosise are part of the same system, then how are they contradictory? You've already said that systems cannot display mutually exclusive states at the same time, but you've also called proletariats and bourgeoisie mutually exclusive. Which is it?


No, but notice the equivalence of the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and proletariat to that between capitalism and socialism.

Ummmm, no. There is no equivelance because there are no contradictions there.

Also, doesn't one of the dialectical laws state that a things opposite is already in existance?


This is how:
I know this will be a bit difficult in the beginning, but it happens with all subjects. In mathematics, when we are introduced to numbers beyond rationals or reals, we don't ask how they are "numbers" according to our previous understanding; we expand our notion of numbers of which rationals or reals are a subset.

I've already responded to that.

[red cat]

Using language isn't playing with words. Word play is a specific literary technique. I doubt most linguists would argue that all language use is word play. I'm saying you are misusing the words when you are claiming that "opposition" is the same as "opposite", which is not the case.



It is as you wish. But NOW you're paying attention to word usage?



When laypeople use the term "to oppose", it's like to struggle against, resist, fight back against, etc. Thus something like "the enemy's advance was opposed by our ground troops" or "the law was opposed on the grounds that it was believed to be unconstitutional".

My argument against the example with cars given above was that it was based on confusing the object with its actions (compare this with confounding nouns with verbs and vice versa). If I and someone else are walking on opposite sides of the street, that does not mean that we are opposites. Below are some ways the word is used in ordinary language. There may be others, but I'm limited in my recall at the moment. Rosa Lichtenstein can supplement.

"Jane is a member of the opposite sex." - the word opposite is used to describe a part of a diametric relationship.

"The ball landed on the opposite side of the street." - the word is describing a location.

"She was standing on the opposite end of the room from me." - referring to a spatial orientation in relation to the speaker.

"Eddie is usually late while Bill is usually early; they are total opposites." - here, "opposite" is describing personalities or behaviors.

"I intend to go south but ended up going in the opposite direction." - now it's used to describe a relative direction.

"Opposite" is never usually referring to, say, people or cars or social classes themselves. One wouldn't normally say "The Indiana Colts are the opposite of the Chicago Bears" or "The chair is the opposite of the stool". The distinction is unclear. The word "opposite" is normally applied to this distinction, and not, say, the Chicago Bears or a chair. Otherwise, we are left with wonder how a chair could be the opposite of a stool. If it's because they are on opposite sides of the room, then why not just skip a step and just say that? That's more precise.

Now, if you are using "opposite" as logicians, then it's different. I believe the opposite of something in a logical statement would be conditioned with "not", like the opposite of A would be ~A. If this were the case, then the opposite of, say, "proletariat" is "not proletariat," which would mean that everything is the opposite of "proletariat". This, I'm not so sure about as I have no training in logic.

But the bourgeoisie and proletariat oppose each other in real life. Hence they can be considered as opposites.

You have given some examples in which we don't use the word "opposite" in the sense same as "opposition", but this should not stand in way of slightly transforming the notion of opposites for the sake of a rigorous subject, especially when it is not entirely outside of our many common notions of "opposites".

As you have pointed out, opposite means something else for logic. Similar to this, "or" in logic means something other than what we commonly take it to be.

[red cat]

Then how is the eggs development dialectical? You haven't shown this at all. You've called changing in the egg to different, mutually exlusive states dialectical.



Then they are not mutually exclusive.



Then how does a dialectician define a system? Also, considering that the proletariat and the bourgeosise are part of the same system, then how are they contradictory? You've already said that systems cannot display mutually exclusive states at the same time, but you've also called proletariats and bourgeoisie mutually exclusive. Which is it?



Ummmm, no. There is no equivelance because there are no contradictions there.

Also, doesn't one of the dialectical laws state that a things opposite is already in existance?



I've already responded to that.

I will answer your questions one by one.

The egg's development is the result of the many chemical changes within it. These can be associated with building and breaking of bonds, which are due to transformation of particles in mutually exclusive states of motion, position or charge. These transformations can be viewed as struggle between opposites.

[Hit The North]

Using language isn't playing with words. Word play is a specific literary technique. I doubt most linguists would argue that all language use is word play.


Of course not, but I'm flippantly responding to your dismissive brush-off that my example was word-play. The real point is whether it is intelligible and within the realms of ordinary usage. You've yet to say if it is or is not and why.


I'm saying you are misusing the words when you are claiming that "opposition" is the same as "opposite", which is not the case.
I haven't made that claim.My claim was that they can both be used to make sense of the same relation. To whit:


"Jane is a member of the opposite sex." - the word opposite is used to describe a part of a diametric relationship.
"Lord Ashcroft is a member of the opposite class." - the word opposite is used to describe a part of a diametric relationship.

Etc.

Btw, if you're going to deny that the proletariat and the bourgeoisie form the two parts of a diametric* relationship, then you are departing from a Marxist analysis of capitalism. This is key. At the heart of Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production is that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat form the opposite outcomes of the same relation.

*But of course I prefer the word dialectic as it emphasises, as S.Artesian has above, that "each exists only through the organization of the other." Further this is why my correction above that the words 'opposite' and 'opposition' describe the relation between things, not the things themselves, is an important point. Capitalism is not a thing, it is a relation which must reproduce itself through the constant organisation and reorganisation of the social means of production. Social classes, too, do not exist as things but as a series of relations. You, on the other hand, seems to be referring to them as if they are things. This leads you to object to the assertion that when two like-things are defined as opposites this is a misuse of the term. How can the opposite of 'social class' be 'social class'? And this is true. But this has always been the problem with the analytical account of social phenomena, found in Positivistic systems theories. However, when social class is considered not as a thing but as a relation then talk of 'opposites' makes more sense, don't you think?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


when we specify truth conditions, it doesn't matter that there is not a one-to-one relationship between sentence tokens and states of affairs. for some odd reason you seem to think it should matter. what would be unacceptable would be if the conditions we specified were not consistent.

Well, that wasn't the point I was making. Let me try this from another angle, using a modified example of yours (modified to avoid problems with the definite description you used). Call the cat on the fence "Tibbles".

T1: Tibbles is sat on the fence.

Now, it seems to me that your theory would hold that the 'truth-maker' here is the situation:

S1: Tibbles sitting on the fence.

But S1 is tenseless, whereas T1 is tensed. In order for S1 to be the 'truth-maker' for T1 we would have to know that S1 is actual, in the here-and-now. In that case, S1 would have to be:

S2: Tibbles sitting on the fence is actual/happening now,

or, perhaps:

S3: Tibbles sitting on the fence is the case now.

But, S2 and S3 are just paraphrases of T1, which is what makes your theory vacuous (as I indicated in an earlier post): you have to repeat T1 in its own alleged truth conditions, which means you have explained nothing at all. This is the 'internal connection' between a proposition/indicative sentence and its truth conditions to which I was alluding earlier. And this is the only legitimate way you can exclude all my counter-examples, which is why I listed them

Tractatus, and he held on to this idea (in a modified form) in his later work.]

I won't get distracted over the points you make about infinite regresses since they are not really central to my case; maybe we can debate them another time. However, I fail to see what your comments about copying tokens of certain type words has got to do with this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


In short, identify moving east and moving west as two opposite or mutually exclusive states. Object A can move east and co-exist with object B that moves west. But object A moving east cannot coexist with itself moving west. That is why these two states are mutually exclusive.

Not so. Imagine someone on board a ship out on the ocean travelling due east at 5kmph. Imagine further that this person is walking due west at 4kmph relative to the ship. Here we have someone moving, with respect to the boat, 4kmph due west at the same time as he/she is moving 1kmph due east with respect to the ocean (assuming the ocean is calm, and stationary). Since all motion is relative to some inertial frame or other, there is no such thing as "mutually exclusive" motion.

So, your example is no good, and Jazz was right to question your attempt to circumvent the fatal defect he highlighted in your 'theory'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


The egg's development is the result of the many chemical changes within it. These can be associated with building and breaking of bonds, which are due to transformation of particles in mutually exclusive states of motion, position or charge. These transformations can be viewed as struggle between opposites.

1) In what way are they 'internal opposites'?

2) In what way are they contradictions?

3) However, according to Mao, they should all be turning into one another, but this is not in general the case. And even if they do, as i have shown in the mao thread in Theory, and the other Mao thread in Philosophy, if this 'theory' were true, change would be impossible.

Consider process "P" inside developing egg, "E".

A) According to Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Mao (quotations can be found here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76)), P can only change if it struggles with its opposite.

B) Call this opposite P*.

C) But the above dialecticians tell us that P must also change into P*.

D) And yet, this can't happen since P* already exists. If it didn't, P could not struggle with it.

E) So, either no struggle of opposites takes place or no egg ever changes

In that case, according to this 'theory', no 'dialectical egg' will ever develop. And what applies to eggs applies to anything else that changes. Hence, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

You keep ignoring this other fatal defect of your 'theory'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


The relationship between the bourgeoisie and proletatriat is an interesting one, isn't it? They are mutually exclusive in that the identity of one excludes the other. But at the same time the existence of one is absolutely dependent on the existence of the other. So on one level they are in opposition to each other but, on another level, find their origin within the same relation.

This 'relation' and this 'oppostion' follow from the defintion; there is nothing in nature or society that forces this upon us. If you define the proletariat in terms that exclude the captialist class (and vice versa), then it is no suprise they exclude one another.

But, why this is a 'contradiction' has yet to be explained.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Capitalism is not a thing, it is a relation which must reproduce itself through the constant organisation and reorganisation of the social means of production. Social classes, too, do not exist as things but as a series of relations. You, on the other hand, seems to be referring to them as if they are things. This leads you to object to the assertion that when two like-things are defined as opposites this is a misuse of the term. How can the opposite of 'social class' be 'social class'? And this is true. But this has always been the problem with the analytical account of social phenomena, found in Positivistic systems theories. However, when social class is considered not as a thing but as a relation then talk of 'opposites' makes more sense, don't you think?

Well, is capitalism (or are social classes) a 'thing', a 'relation', a 'series of relations' or a 'process'? You seem to want to have it (these) as all four at once.

[JazzRemington]

But the bourgeoisie and proletariat oppose each other in real life. Hence they can be considered as opposites.

No, to oppose something does not imply opposites.

[JazzRemington]

Of course not, but I'm flippantly responding to your dismissive brush-off that my example was word-play.[quote]

If you try operationalize something with word play in, say, scientific research, odds are you would get called on it.

[quote]The real point is whether it is intelligible and within the realms of ordinary usage. You've yet to say if it is or is not and why.

If one has to ask why something is an opposite of something, then the usage of the word "opposite" is unintelligible. I've only pointed out that something is not the opposite of something just because they oppose one another (or travel in opposite directions, etc.). And then I asked why the proletariat is the opposite of the bourgeoisie, and I get words that are thought to be synonyms, which gets us nowhere. If the proletariat opposes the bourgeoisie, and to oppose means the same thing as "to be an opposite", we get nowhere because now the statement is "the proletariat is the opposite of the bourgeoisie because it is the opposite of the bourgeoisie." Even if "to oppose" means "to be in the opposite position of a relationship," we still get nowhere.


"Lord Ashcroft is a member of the opposite class." - the word opposite is used to describe a part of a diametric relationship.

But, if a diametric relationship is composed of opposites, and Lord Ashcroft is a member of the opposite class, then we still don't know WHY his class is opposite to any other. What distinction are you making? Depending on that, it's entirely possible for the petit-bourgeoisie to be the opposite of the bourgeoisie, instead of the proletariat (which is usually claimed to be the case). With sex, it doesn't matter what distinction is made because the end result will still be the same (every distinction that is normally made is arbitrary and will still lead to the same result, which is why we can say male is the opposite sex of female; it is self-evident). With somethings, the distinction matters because differences will result. Class is one of those cases.


Btw, if you're going to deny that the proletariat and the bourgeoisie form the two parts of a diametric* relationship, then you are departing from a Marxist analysis of capitalism.

I've never denied that proletariat and bourgeoisie are in opposition or form two parts of a relationship. Denying they are opposites does not deny they have a relationship. Things in a relationship don't necessarily have to be opposites. Dialecticians do not have a monopoly on understanding change and relationships, so please don't make things up by claiming I deny change or relationships between classes.

[Hit The North]

JR, this really is the ABC of Marxism, but here goes:


But, if a diametric relationship is composed of opposites, and Lord Ashcroft is a member of the opposite class, then we still don't know WHY his class is opposite to any other. What distinction are you making? The distinction between labour and capital, of course.


Depending on that, it's entirely possible for the petit-bourgeoisie to be the opposite of the bourgeoisie, instead of the proletariat (which is usually claimed to be the case). Then you would be claiming that small capital is the opposite of big capital, which is even more untenable.


I've never denied that proletariat and bourgeoisie are in opposition or form two parts of a relationship. Denying they are opposites does not deny they have a relationship.You're right. Your denial doesn't change a thing.


Dialecticians do not have a monopoly on understanding change and relationships, so please don't make things up by claiming I deny change or relationships between classes. I wouldn't dream of stating such a thing. However, you seem not to understand the nature of this relationship.

[JazzRemington]

The distinction between labour and capital, of course.

That depends upon what you mean by labor and capital.


Then you would be claiming that small capital is the opposite of big capital, which is even more untenable.

Small isn't the opposite of big?


You're right. Your denial doesn't change a thing.

And yet your claiming that oppositional relationships imply opposites doesn't make it so, either.


I wouldn't dream of stating such a thing. However, you seem not to understand the nature of this relationship.

What nature?

[Hit The North]

What nature?

Oh, you're going to bore us by getting all busy with the word "nature" now are you? But I'll concede to your point. I should have said, "you seem not to understand the fundamentals of this relationship." But that's not surprising if you don't understand the terms 'labour' and 'capital'. :rolleyes:

[JazzRemington]

Oh, you're going to bore us by getting all busy with the word "nature" now are you? But I'll concede to your point. I should have said, "you seem not to understand the fundamentals of this relationship."

What fundamentals? I don't know the distinction you are trying make. That is what the previous question was getting at. You can't say something like "that's the nature of capitalism" because the distinction isn't clear. Fundamental, compared to what?


But that's not surprising if you don't understand the terms 'labour' and 'capital'. :rolleyes:

Do you care to explain what you mean by "labor" and "capital," or are you trying to cop out by ridiculing me? You can't say that "labor" and "capital" are opposites without distinction because that's too vague to be of any use. Even then, one could still have to explain how they can be opposites to begin with.

"Labor" can refer to the proletariat itself, to the labor process, or labor power. One refers to a person or class, the second is a process, and the third is a quality of a person (namely the proletariat, in this case).

"Capital" can refer to the money used to obtain the raw materials necessary in production and cover incidentals in production (accidents, obtaining buildings and shelter for the process, storage, etc.) or said materials themselves (known collectively as constant capital). "Capital" can also refer to the labor power hired by the bourgeoisie (as in variable capital).

[Hit The North]

BTB:

Well, is capitalism (or are social classes) a 'thing', a 'relation', a 'series of relations' or a 'process'? You seem to want to have it (these) as all four at once.

I'm not the only one:


capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character. Capital is not the sum of the material and produced means of production. Capital is rather the means of production transformed into capital, which in themselves are no more capital than gold or silver in itself is money. It is the means of production monopolised by a certain section of society, confronting living labour-power as products and working conditions rendered independent of this very labour-power, which are personified through this antithesis in capital. It is not merely the products of labourers turned into independent powers, products as rulers and buyers of their producers, but rather also the social forces and the future [? illegible] [A later collation with the manuscript showed that the text reads as follows: "die Gesellschaftlichen Kräfte und Zusammenhängende Form dieser Arbeit" (the social forces of their labour and socialised form of this labour). — Ed.] form of this labour, which confront the labourers as properties of their products. Here, then, we have a definite and, at first glance, very mystical, social form, of one of the factors in a historically produced social production process.

K. Marx, Capital Vol III, Chapter 48

Jazz, see above.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I'm not the only one:

Indeed, but which one do you mean?


is capitalism (or are social classes) a 'thing', a 'relation', a 'series of relations' or a 'process'? You seem to want to have it (these) as all four at once.

Moreover, Marx does not show that capital is a relation, he just asserts it, and his assertion destroys its capactiy to be a relation. Here's why:

If it's a relation, then the use of a proper noun to refer to it changes it into an object or process. Relational terms operate in language in a different way, as in "A is bigger than B", "C is longer than D", "E is next to F", "H is between G and J".

But who says "A is capital than B"? Or "C is capital to D"? Or "M is capital N and P"?

So, "capital" cannot be a relational expression.

[red cat]

No, to oppose something does not imply opposites.

Can you give an example where two opposing objects are not considered as opposites ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Can you give an example where two opposing objects are not considered as opposites ?

Easy, in any football game, team A wil oppose team B, but they aren't opposites.

The opposite of a football team is presumably "not a football team".

Same with any sport.

Also, two houses can be opposite to one anoter (on facing sides of a road), but they do not oppose one another.

There are countless other examples.

[S.Artesian]

BTB:



Indeed, but which one do you mean?



Moreover, Marx does not show that capital is a relation, he just asserts it, and his assertion destroys its capactiy to be a relation. Here's why:

If it's a relation, then the use of a proper noun to refer to it changes it into an object or process. Relational terms operate in language in a different way, as in "A is bigger than B", "C is longer than D", "E is next to F", "H is between G and J".

But who says "A is capital than B"? Or "C is capital to D"? Or "M is capital N and P"?

So, "capital" cannot be a relational expression.


Sorry, this is where formal logic, and Rosa, miss the point completely. Marx indeed shows that capital, that capitalism, originates and is identical to a specific social relation of production; this is a relation between classes; that is historically determined by the organization of property and of labor; and on and on we go.

For anyone to miss this is to miss it all; to miss everything aspect of Marx's analysis of capital as the expropriation of surplus value which is itself a relation of paid and unpaid labor.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


Sorry, this is where formal logic, and Rosa, miss the point completely. Marx indeed shows that capital, that capitalism, originates and is identical to a specific social relation of production; this is a relation between classes; that is historically determined by the organization of property and of labor; and on and on we go.

In fact, it shows that this 'theory' derived from the confused ruminations of a logical incompetent, Hegel.

Anyway, how does this show these things are 'contradictions'? You and Hegel keep helping yourselves to this word with no attempt at justification.


For anyone to miss this is to miss it all; to miss everything aspect of Marx's analysis of capital as the expropriation of surplus value which is itself a relation of paid and unpaid labor.

As I have told you several times already, I'm Ok with all this; what I cannot see is why you need Hegel's obscure jargon (which not one of you can explain) here.

No wonder Marx felt that 'coquetting' was the best he could do with it

[syndicat]

Well, that wasn't the point I was making. Let me try this from another angle, using a modified example of yours (modified to avoid problems with the definite description you used). Call the cat on the fence "Tibbles".

T1: Tibbles is sat on the fence.

Now, it seems to me that your theory would hold that the 'truth-maker' here is the situation:

S1: Tibbles sitting on the fence.

But S1 is tenseless, whereas T1 is tensed. In order for S1 to be the 'truth-maker' for T1 we would have to know that S1 is actual, in the here-and-now. In that case, S1 would have to be:

S2: Tibbles sitting on the fence is actual/happening now,

or, perhaps:

S3: Tibbles sitting on the fence is the case now.

But, S2 and S3 are just paraphrases of T1, which is what makes your theory vacuous (as I indicated in an earlier post): you have to repeat T1 in its own alleged truth conditions, which means you have explained nothing at all.

well, unfortunately your example T1 is not grammatical. So let's use this:

T*: Tibbles sat on the fence.

Now, you point out that S1 is tenseless:

S1: Tibbles sitting on the fence

That's fine. T* will be true if S1 obtained at some time that is wholly past relative to now. It's best not to think of tense as being packed in to the states of affairs anyway. Tense has to do with our perspective from where we are in spacetime. S1 obtains whenever Tibbles has that particular property, sitting on the fence. So S1 can come into and go out of existence. My cat Lucy likes to sit on top of the fence in my backyard. So, her sitting on top of that fence is a state of affairs that is actual episodically, at various discrete periods of time.

Again, you seem to think that I have to suppose that there are different states of affairs that would vary depending on various tensed sentences referring to S1. But I don't see it that way.

Again, consider:

T5: Lucy is not white.

There are a number of different states of affairs that would verify this. Her being black happens to be actual and that's the state of affairs that verifies T5 in fact, but if she were tortoise shell or a brown striped cat that would verify T5 also.

so the idea is that there doesn't have to be a one-to-one relationship between sentence tokens and states of affairs. I think this is what we should expect since language is a human construct and states of affairs in the world are not (except to the degree we bring them about).

[Hit The North]

BTB:
If it's a relation, then the use of a proper noun to refer to it changes it into an object or process. Relational terms operate in language in a different way, as in "A is bigger than B", "C is longer than D", "E is next to F", "H is between G and J".

But who says "A is capital than B"? Or "C is capital to D"? Or "M is capital N and P"?

So, "capital" cannot be a relational expression.

Missing the point, big time. It's a social relation. Moreover, the passage I quoted above demonstrates that Marx viewed capital as a social relation which appears in the form of a thing. As S. Artesian points out, to miss this is to miss the central thrust of Marx's analysis.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


well, unfortunately your example T1 is not grammatical. So let's use this:

I disagree. It may not be a sentence that drips with style, but it is surely grammatical.


T*: Tibbles sat on the fence.

Now, you point out that S1 is tenseless:

S1: Tibbles sitting on the fence

That's fine. T* will be true if S1 obtained at some time that is wholly past relative to now. It's best not to think of tense as being packed in to the states of affairs anyway. Tense has to do with our perspective from where we are in spacetime. S1 obtains whenever Tibbles has that particular property, sitting on the fence. So S1 can come into and go out of existence. My cat Lucy likes to sit on top of the fence in my backyard. So, her sitting on top of that fence is a state of affairs that is actual episodically, at various discrete periods of time.

But in that case, you will simply have smuggled the past tense into S1, making it a paraphrase of T*, and you are no further forward.


It's best not to think of tense as being packed in to the states of affairs anyway. Tense has to do with our perspective from where we are in spacetime. S1 obtains whenever Tibbles has that particular property, sitting on the fence. So S1 can come into and go out of existence. My cat Lucy likes to sit on top of the fence in my backyard. So, her sitting on top of that fence is a state of affairs that is actual episodically, at various discrete periods of time

I can see why you want to argue this way since these hidden verbs (which introduce the tenses you need) turn the linguistic form of your situations into propositions/indicative sentences, making your theory circular.

Moreover, it's rather odd that you appeal to what we ordinarily say one minute, then have to introduce arcane ideas from Relativity the next to make your theory work. There is no way that this can be made consistent with what our ancestors were up to when they devised this way of speaking truthfully about the world (which is another integral part of your theory, if I read you right).


Again, you seem to think that I have to suppose that there are different states of affairs that would very different tensed references to S1. But I don't see it that way.

I'm sorry, but this does not seem to make much sense. Are there some words missing here?


T5: Lucy is not white.

There are a number of different states of affairs that would verify this. Her being black happens to be actual and that's the state of affairs that verifies T5 in fact, but if she were tortoise shell or a brown striped cat that would verify T5 also.

so the idea is that there doesn't have to be a one-to-one relationship between sentence tokens and states of affairs. I think this is what we should expect since language is a human construct and states of affairs in the world are not (except to the degree we bring them about).

Well, as I noted in my previous reply, Wittgenstein confronted this problem in the Tractatus, and decided there would have to be just such an isomorphism. Now, I do not want to defend this here since 1) the discussion will get rather messy, especially since he abandoned this way of seeing things, along with the 'situations' (or state of affairs) that went with it, and 2) I am now a little clearer about what you do mean.

However, I still feel that the objection I raised in my last post is fatal to your theory.

[red cat]

No, to oppose something does not imply opposites.

Another point; the problem here seems to be centered around language rather than the analysis. In that case, we can just redefine "opposites" if we need to.

Also, what about languages that more or less equate the notion of opposites with opposition ? DM must be valid in those languages then ?

[JazzRemington]

Another point; the problem here seems to be centered around language rather than the analysis. In that case, we can just redefine "opposites" if we need to.

Language affects our understanding of the situation. If we were to use language differently, we would most assuredly get a different analysis. One can't just redefine terms on a whim. If that were the case, then I could redefine communism as the fifth stage of matter, in terms of physics. This wouldn't be any different from redefining "opposite".


Also, what about languages that more or less equate the notion of opposites with opposition ?

The two can't be equated in ordinary language, but suppose there is a language (read: language game) that equates the two. If we were to use the term "opposite" from such a language in any other language, we would automatically be misusing it, even if the other language has a word that is typographically similar to "opposite". The word "opposite" only has such a particular meaning in that, and only that, language. Think of what you would tell someone if he asked "who wrote the laws of nature?" or if a creationist says "evolution is just a theory."

[red cat]

Language affects our understanding of the situation. If we were to use language differently, we would most assuredly get a different analysis. One can't just redefine terms on a whim. If that were the case, then I could redefine communism as the fifth stage of matter, in terms of physics. This wouldn't be any different from redefining "opposite". Why do we redefine "or" for logic then ?




The two can't be equated in ordinary language, but suppose there is a language (read: language game) that equates the two. If we were to use the term "opposite" from such a language in any other language, we would automatically be misusing it, even if the other language has a word that is typographically similar to "opposite". The word "opposite" only has such a particular meaning in that, and only that, language. Think of what you would tell someone if he asked "who wrote the laws of nature?" or if a creationist says "evolution is just a theory."

May be so, but this means that a reasonable portion of the human population, who use such languages, would agree with DM.

[syndicat]

Moreover, it's rather odd that you appeal to what we ordinarily say one minute, then have to introduce arcane ideas from Relativity the next to make your theory work.

I do not rely on relativity at all. I simply rely on the obvious fact that tenses are modes of reference to location in time. And human languages deal with this in different ways. There are a lot of non-Indo-European languages that don't pack tense (temporal reference) into verbs. For example, you couldn't run your argument here in Chinese because verbs in Chinese have no tense. Reference to time is made via adverbial modifiers: "Lucy sits (tenselessly) on the fence in the past."

It's part of Millikan's theory, which I am using here, that different elements of language serve different kinds of social functions, and not all of these are representational. Identity is an example. I've suggested that the subject phrases track items we want to talk about, and the verb phrases track properties we may wish to attribute to them. But a variety of language devices serve non-representational functions, such as questioning tone or question marks.

Now, of course, if we want to talk about the various items that are referents -- tracked items -- we have to use language to do it, and then you can raise your "circularity" argument. But note it implies a kind of linguistic idealism, inability to get out of the circle of language to reality, so to speak. But I don't see where there is any circularity.

[JazzRemington]

Why do we redefine "or" for logic then ?

The point is that words don't have meanings in abstract from particular uses in particular languages. There is no universal definition of "or" that covers all uses. Plus, I don't think logic uses such words differently than in ordinary language, but rather uses symbols to represent such words. If that's the case, then it's just a more "formal" way of stating these words. But as I've said, I have no formal training in logic, so I could be wrong. It does seem that way, though. As I've said, no one really just redefines terms on a whim. It's actually quite a harrowing experience, because it involves a lot arguing and debate. For instance, sociologists often fight and argue constantly about the proper definition of "structure" within their particular language game.


May be so, but this means that a reasonable portion of the human population, who use such languages, would agree with DM.

But DM has a completely different use of "opposite" that is completely unlike any other use. One wants to make a definition in abstract from particular uses of the word. When the word is used in DM, it has no meaning because it systematically misuses and misunderstands the word. No other use of the word "opposite" implies anything related to DM. When it can be construed otherwise, it can be shown that DM does not offer any particular or unique understanding, but rather redundancy, convolution, and vagueness. The language I described doesn't exist so I don't know how it's possible that anyone would use such a language.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


I do not rely on relativity at all.

Then you shouldn't use words like 'spacetime'.


I simply rely on the obvious fact that tenses are modes of reference to location in time. And human languages deal with this in different ways. There are a lot of non-Indo-European languages that don't pack tense (temporal reference) into verbs. For example, you couldn't run your argument here in Chinese because verbs in Chinese have no tense. Reference to time is made via adverbial modifiers: "Lucy sits (tenselessly) on the fence in the past."

In that case, you'd find it even harder to make your case in Chinese, since it is you who needs to tense the 'situations' to make them applicable to the sentences you use as examples.


It's part of Millikan's theory, which I am using here, that different elements of language serve different kinds of social functions, and not all of these are representational. Identity is an example. I've suggested that the subject phrases track items we want to talk about, and the verb phrases track properties we may wish to attribute to them. But a variety of language devices serve non-representational functions, such as questioning tone or question marks.

I agree, and she plainly got all that from Wittgenstein.


Now, of course, if we want to talk about the various items that are referents -- tracked items -- we have to use language to do it, and then you can raise your "circularity" argument. But note it implies a kind of linguistic idealism, inability to get out of the circle of language to reality, so to speak. But I don't see where there is any circularity.

Not so; it is this attempt to link language to 'reality' (an idealist notion in itself) that ends up in linguistic idealism.

We can perhaps debate that in another thread.

[red cat]

The point is that words don't have meanings in abstract from particular uses in particular languages. There is no universal definition of "or" that covers all uses. Plus, I don't think logic uses such words differently than in ordinary language, but rather uses symbols to represent such words. If that's the case, then it's just a more "formal" way of stating these words. But as I've said, I have no formal training in logic, so I could be wrong. It does seem that way, though. As I've said, no one really just redefines terms on a whim. It's actually quite a harrowing experience, because it involves a lot arguing and debate. For instance, sociologists often fight and argue constantly about the proper definition of "structure" within their particular language game.

Normally by "or" we refer to only one of the given objects. But in logic we refer to at least one of the given objects. In this way we could redefine opposites for DM.




But DM has a completely different use of "opposite" that is completely unlike any other use. One wants to make a definition in abstract from particular uses of the word. When the word is used in DM, it has no meaning because it systematically misuses and misunderstands the word. No other use of the word "opposite" implies anything related to DM. When it can be construed otherwise, it can be shown that DM does not offer any particular or unique understanding, but rather redundancy, convolution, and vagueness. The language I described doesn't exist so I don't know how it's possible that anyone would use such a language.I don't understand how the ideas of mutual exclusiveness or opposition are completely different from opposites even in english.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Normally by "or" we refer to only one of the given objects. But in logic we refer to at least one of the given objects. In this way we could redefine opposites for DM.

And if a supporter of capitalism were to 're-define' it as "Stable, just and fair" you'd have to say that was OK, wouldn't you -- if you were consistent?

But, what is this 'new definition' of 'opposites'? We have yet to see it.


I don't understand how the ideas of mutual exclusiveness or opposition are completely different from opposites even in english.

In fact, I gave you several examples.

[JazzRemington]

But in logic we refer to at least one of the given objects.

Remember that we were talking about possible uses of the word "or" in ordinary language. This is similar to its use in logic.

[red cat]

Remember that we were talking about possible uses of the word "or" in ordinary language. This is similar to its use in logic.

But we don't mean "at least" when we say "or", do we ?

And here are some meanings of "opposites" from wiktionary:


Adjective

opposite



located (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/located) directly (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/directly) across (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/across) from something else, or from each other
facing (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/face) in the other direction (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/direction)
of either of two complementary (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/complementary) or mutually exclusive (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mutually_exclusive) things

http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/opposite

Opposites can also mean mutually exclusive things.

[JazzRemington]

But we don't mean "at least" when we say "or", do we ?

But how do you do that?


And here are some meanings of "opposites" from wiktionary:

http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/opposite

Opposites can also mean mutually exclusive things.

Well, that's no good because different dictionaries have (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/opposite) different (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/opposite) definitions (http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861635204).

But, it's not the definition we're concerned about. Rather, it's use.

[ChrisK]

I will answer your questions one by one.

The egg's development is the result of the many chemical changes within it. These can be associated with building and breaking of bonds, which are due to transformation of particles in mutually exclusive states of motion, position or charge. These transformations can be viewed as struggle between opposites.

That doesn't make sense. The changing is from one state to another and these states are mutually exclusive. You speak as if these states exist at the same time, which is impossible as they are mutually exclusive.

Also, why can transformations be viewed as struggle between opposites? You say this but you don't seem to support it at all.

[red cat]

But how do you do that?

What I want to say is that by A "or" B normally we mean either A or B. But in logic we mean at least one of A and B.




Well, that's no good because different dictionaries have (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/opposite) different (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/opposite) definitions (http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861635204).

But, it's not the definition we're concerned about. Rather, it's use.

True, but the definition in wiktionary and the corresponding example indicates that it is one of the many uses of the word opposite.

[JazzRemington]

What I want to say is that by A "or" B normally we mean either A or B. But in logic we mean at least one of A and B.

What does wanting this or that have to do with it? Why not say that when I say A "or" B" I don't mean ether A or B?


True, but the definition in wiktionary and the corresponding example indicates that it is one of the many uses of the word opposite.

What would make wiktionary a better representative of how words are used than any other dictionary? It's open and free for laypeople to edit, but whose use of the world do researchers include when they write any other dictionary?

But, as I've said, actually using the word is a different matter. We've been through this before.

[red cat]

That doesn't make sense. The changing is from one state to another and these states are mutually exclusive. You speak as if these states exist at the same time, which is impossible as they are mutually exclusive.

The same egg cannot be in different states at the same time. But the transformations inside it uniquely determine to which state it will transform. That is why we can say that the sum total of transformations within the egg are equivalent to the transformation of the egg as a whole. So, if we call the transformations within an egg a result of transformation within struggle of opposites, then all the things that they uniquely determine are also results of struggle between opposites. For this the mutually exclusive states of the egg need not coexist. It is just that we can view the whole transformation as a struggle between the two states.



Also, why can transformations be viewed as struggle between opposites? You say this but you don't seem to support it at all.With respect to the egg, I mentioned this before:


These can be associated with building and breaking of bonds, which are due to transformation of particles in mutually exclusive states of motion, position or charge.To make things clearer, consider two particles rushing towards each other from two opposite directions and then colliding. I think we can call this a struggle between opposites.

[red cat]

What does wanting this or that have to do with it? Why not say that when I say A "or" B" I don't mean ether A or B?

I don't get your point. What I want to say is that common words might be subject to slight change in meaning for using them in certain subjects.




What would make wiktionary a better representative of how words are used than any other dictionary? It's open and free for laypeople to edit, but whose use of the world do researchers include when they write any other dictionary?

But, as I've said, actually using the word is a different matter. We've been through this before.

But wiktionary has given an example where mutually exclusive things are being termed as opposites.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^But we already know that even if this were the case, Mao's theory of change (and that ot Engels and Lenin), with these obscure 'dialectical opposites' thrown in, would make change impossible.

[JazzRemington]

I don't get your point. What I want to say is that common words might be subject to slight change in meaning for using them in certain subjects.

What does wanting to say anything have to do with what a word means? How do you say one thing but mean something else at the same time? That doesn't make any sense.


But wiktionary has given an example where mutually exclusive things are being termed as opposites.

Again, if that's the case then it's redundant because that means that something is opposite because it is opposite. That gets us no where.

[REVLEFT'S BIEGGST MATSER TROL]

...Still waiting guys...

[S.Artesian]

BTB:



Moreover, Marx does not show that capital is a relation, he just asserts it, and his assertion destroys its capactiy to be a relation. Here's why:

If it's a relation, then the use of a proper noun to refer to it changes it into an object or process. Relational terms operate in language in a different way, as in "A is bigger than B", "C is longer than D", "E is next to F", "H is between G and J".

But who says "A is capital than B"? Or "C is capital to D"? Or "M is capital N and P"?

So, "capital" cannot be a relational expression.


That's what you wrote Rosa, and Marx did show that capital is a mode of production derived from, based on, identical with a specific, historical relation in the organization of social labor.

Relation, in the plain language that philosophers need only use to recognize the alienation of the real world in their alienated language, is defined in the OED as:

2. The existence or effect of a connection, correspondence, or contrast between things; the particular way in which one thing stands in connection with another; any connection or association conceivable as naturally existing between things. LME. b. logic A constituent of a proposition or propositional function that predicates a connection of two or more terms.

3. a. The position which one person holds with another by means of social or other mutual connections;


Capitalism is a "thing"-- a mode of production, based on its connection, its relation to another "thing," labor organized as wage-labor.

[S.Artesian]

In fact, it shows that this 'theory' derived from the confused ruminations of a logical incompetent, Hegel.



Not the first time, I've ever head deny that Marx identified a special social relation of labor as being essential, inherent, determinant to the organization, development, and manifestations of capitalism. "World system" theorists, Wallerstein et al make analogous, if implicit, denial; various 3rd world theorists make such denials, and bucket loads of pretenders to bourgeois political economy make the denial. But when a Marxists makes that denial I have to ask him or her, then what's remaining to Marx's analysis? Rates of turnover? The history of merchant capital?

Obvously, such organization, development and manifestation of the inherent relation, the identity of capitalism and wage labor is mediated, distorted, shaped,varied by the pre-existing relations of production of land and labor in which capital finds itself enmeshed, but to claim Marx proves capitalism does not exist as a relation, and does not exist in relation to a specific organization of labor is to reject the analysis of the commodity, of surplus value, of the labor theory of value, of value.

So... I think Rosa's Wittgensteinian approach, the formality of the logic clearly refutes itself as being "Marxist" in that her approach leads one, inevitably, to rejection of the concrete historical analysis Marx provides of class.

[ChrisK]

The same egg cannot be in different states at the same time. But the transformations inside it uniquely determine to which state it will transform. That is why we can say that the sum total of transformations within the egg are equivalent to the transformation of the egg as a whole. So, if we call the transformations within an egg a result of transformation within struggle of opposites, then all the things that they uniquely determine are also results of struggle between opposites. For this the mutually exclusive states of the egg need not coexist. It is just that we can view the whole transformation as a struggle between the two states.

How are the states struggling with each other? In order for a struggle to exist, the things struggling must exist. But you claim they don't exist at the same time?

Also, how are these states opposites? They may be mutually exclusive, but opposite they are not.


With respect to the egg, I mentioned this before:
To make things clearer, consider two particles rushing towards each other from two opposite directions and then colliding. I think we can call this a struggle between opposites.

Well, no. These two particles aren't opposite in anyway other than their motion. However, who is to say that they are actually moving in opposite directions? Wouldn't that depend on the observer of the particles?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


That's what you wrote Rosa, and Marx did show that capital is a mode of production derived from, based on, identical with a specific, historical relation in the organization of social labor.

Well, he certainly showed that it was based on a series of social relations, but how that also shows it's a relation is somewhat mysterious. When science shows you are made out of atoms, does that mean you are an atom, or are identical to an atom?

This is called the Fallacy of Composition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition) by us logicians.

And that is why we do not use the word "capital" as a relational expression, as I argued in my reply to BTB -- it is also why Marx did not use it as a relational expression, either, but as a proper noun.


Relation, in the plain language that philosophers need only use to recognize the alienation of the real world in their alienated language, is defined in the OED as:

2. The existence or effect of a connection, correspondence, or contrast between things; the particular way in which one thing stands in connection with another; any connection or association conceivable as naturally existing between things. LME. b. logic A constituent of a proposition or propositional function that predicates a connection of two or more terms.

3. a. The position which one person holds with another by means of social or other mutual connections;

Well, philosophical and/or logical problems cannot be solved by quoting a dictionary, as I have shown you already -- when you tried to quote one dictionary's definition of 'contradiction' --, but even if they could, and the above were 100% accurate/acceptable, how this shows that capital itself is a relation is not too clear.

It might confirm that capital is based on a series of social relations, which I accept anyway, but the odd idea that capital itself is a relation is still confused (and probably based on a fallacy)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


Not the first time, I've ever head deny that Marx identified a special social relation of labor as being essential, inherent, determinant to the organization, development, and manifestations of capitalism. "World system" theorists, Wallerstein et al make analogous, if implicit, denial; various 3rd world theorists make such denials, and bucket loads of pretenders to bourgeois political economy make the denial. But when a Marxists makes that denial I have to ask him or her, then what's remaining to Marx's analysis? Rates of turnover? The history of merchant capital?

Obviously, such organization, development and manifestation of the inherent relation, the identity of capitalism and wage labor is mediated, distorted, shaped, varied by the pre-existing relations of production of land and labor in which capital finds itself enmeshed, but to claim Marx proves capitalism does not exist as a relation, and does not exist in relation to a specific organization of labor is to reject the analysis of the commodity, of surplus value, of the labor theory of value, of value.

How is this a reply to my comment about the egregious 'logic' one finds in Hegel, which you lot have uncritically swallowed?

Here it is again:


In fact, it shows that this 'theory' derived from the confused ruminations of a logical incompetent, Hegel.

Anyway, how does this show these things are 'contradictions'? You and Hegel keep helping yourselves to this word with no attempt at justification.

You


So... I think Rosa's Wittgensteinian approach, the formality of the logic clearly refutes itself as being "Marxist" in that her approach leads one, inevitably, to rejection of the concrete historical analysis Marx provides of class.

[I thought we were done with accusations and name-calling?]

Where have I denied/rejected Marx concrete analysis of such social relations? All I have done is point out that certain aspects of your traditional approach are based on sub-Aristotelian logic, to which objections you have yet to reply. In fact, all you do here is repeat stuff I already agree with, and then name-call me, or accuse me of abandoning Marxism, as if Marxism were a set of dogmas we have to accept while we suspend our critical faculties.

That of course would make it analogous to a religion.

A bit like the Christians who have to deny simple arithmetic to make their Trinity work.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gangsterio:


...Still waiting guys...

I answered you several pages ago.

[REVLEFT'S BIEGGST MATSER TROL]

Gangsterio:



I answered you several pages ago.

Yeah, I probably should of acknowledged that, what I meant was still waiting for a response from an actual dialectian.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Don't hold your breath. I've been waiting for over 25 years!

[Weezer]

I found this nice graph explaining dialectic materialism off the Communist Party of Australia's Communist University (http://communistuniversity.org/) site explaining dialectic materialism, thought you all would like/critique it.

http://communistuniversity.org/intro/images/intro-01-02-graphic01-gok.jpg

[red cat]

What does wanting to say anything have to do with what a word means? How do you say one thing but mean something else at the same time? That doesn't make any sense.

May be it does not make sense to you, but this is a very common practice. There are other examples besides the usage of "or" in logic.



Again, if that's the case then it's redundant because that means that something is opposite because it is opposite. That gets us no where.

The partial consistence of what we mean by opposites in DM with normal usage has also been shown by the example in wiktionary. What more do you want ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Velvet, unfortunately this just highlights several core weaknesses of the 'theory'.

I can elaborate on request.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


The partial consistence of what we mean by opposites in DM with normal usage has also been shown by the example in wiktionary. What more do you want ?

Some attempt to show why my claim/argument (that this 'theory' implies change is impossible) is mistaken, will do...:)

[S.Artesian]

S Artesian:

[I thought we were done with accusations and name-calling?]

Where have I denied/rejected Marx concrete analysis of such social relations? All I have done is point out that certain aspects of your traditional approach are based on sub-Aristotelian logic, to which objections you have yet to reply. In fact, all you do here is repeat stuff I already agree with, and then name-call me, or accuse me of abandoning Marxism, as if Marxism were a set of dogmas we have to accept while we suspend our critical faculties.

That of course would make it analogous to a religion.

A bit like the Christians who have to deny simple arithmetic to make their Trinity work.


I'm not calling you a name Rosa, you wrote that Marx doesn't prove capital is a relation, he just calls it a relation and then destroys its capacity to be a relation.

I think parsing Marx's analysis along the lines of Wittgenstein, leading to your conclusion that Marx either did not describe capitalism as a mode of production that is specifically a social relation of production, or if he did he "destroyed" that description, takes one to the point of losing what Marx's analysis of capitalism really is, and really is about-- which is the development of capitalist accumulation and its immanent tendency towards its own negation, breakdown, overthrow.. etc.

Again, no name calling is involved. I'm not doubting your sincerity. I do think that the logic of your rejection of that "organizing principle" of Marx's work leaves Marxism with little to distinguish it from "political economy" or non-class specific radicalism.

Marx doesn't show that capitalism is what it is due to a "series of social relations." Marx show that all that capitalism is, it is because it is based upon, dependent upon, derived from, and recreates a specific social relation of production, a specific social organization of labor.

[red cat]

How are the states struggling with each other? In order for a struggle to exist, the things struggling must exist. But you claim they don't exist at the same time?

Correct, but in this case for the whole egg, by struggle of opposites we actually refer to an equivalence to a struggle of opposites.


Also, how are these states opposites? They may be mutually exclusive, but opposite they are not.

Mutually exclusive things are also said to be opposites.



Well, no. These two particles aren't opposite in anyway other than their motion. However, who is to say that they are actually moving in opposite directions? Wouldn't that depend on the observer of the particles?

That is exactly what we mean by opposites; objects opposite in at least one way.

As for your second question, irrespective of his position, the observer will be able to deduce whether there is any possible coordinate shift that will result in some vector whose multiples will be able to express the motion of both of the bodies. And anyway, the speed of the bodies with respect to no observer will be the same, so that they remain in mutually exclusive states with respect to any frame of reference.

Now consider the real life example in which two cars A and B move with speeds of 50 kmph to the east and 50 kmph to the west on the same road respectively, with respect to an observer C standing on the pavement. With respect to C, they are opposites. Now consider an observer D in a car that moves with speed of 51 kmph to the east. D will deduce that A and B move in the same direction ! However, to D, A and B are opposites in the sense that one is fast while the other is slow. This is a very special example, but it illustrates how the practice of terming objects displaying mutually exclusive states as "opposites" captures many of the normal meanings of the word.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


I'm not calling you a name Rosa, you wrote that Marx doesn't prove capital is a relation, he just calls it a relation and then destroys its capacity to be a relation.

You certainly made an accusation.


I think parsing Marx's analysis along the lines of Wittgenstein, leading to your conclusion that Marx either did not describe capitalism as a mode of production that is specifically a social relation of production, or if he did he "destroyed" that description, takes one to the point of losing what Marx's analysis of capitalism really is, and really is about-- which is the development of capitalist accumulation and its immanent tendency towards its own negation, breakdown, overthrow.. etc.

1) I'm not 'parsing' Marx using Wittgenstein. In fact, if anything, I am using medieval logic.

2) However, my argument depends on how even you use the word "capital"; you do not, nor can you, use it as a relational expression -- and this is so even had Wittgenstein never been born.

3) You are now helping yourself to an odd use of "negation", which is no way to defend your already odd use of "contradiction".


Marx doesn't show that capitalism is what it is due to a "series of social relations." Marx show that all that capitalism is, it is because it is based upon, dependent upon, derived from, and recreates a specific social relation of production, a specific social organization of labor.

Where did I say he did?

But this in no way shows that capital is a relation, any more than the fact that you are made of atoms shows you are an atom.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Correct, but in this case for the whole egg, by struggle of opposites we actually refer to an equivalence to a struggle of opposites.

And yet, if these opposites struggled with one another and turned into one another, change would be impossible, as I have shown.

And your 'cars' example fails to cope with this objection I made a few days ago:


Imagine someone on board a ship out on the ocean travelling due east at 5kmph. Imagine further that this person is walking due west at 4kmph relative to the ship. Here we have someone moving, with respect to the boat, 4kmph due west at the same time as he/she is moving 1kmph due east with respect to the ocean (assuming the ocean is calm, and stationary). Since all motion is relative to some inertial frame or other, there is no such thing as "mutually exclusive" motion.

So, your example is no good, and Jazz was right to question your attempt to circumvent the fatal defect he highlighted in your 'theory'.

[JazzRemington]

May be it does not make sense to you, but this is a very common practice. There are other examples besides the usage of "or" in logic.

This doesn't answer the question. How do you mean one thing when you say something else? How do you mean "at least" when you say "one case"? Do you say "at least" to yourself?


The partial consistence of what we mean by opposites in DM with normal usage has also been shown by the example in wiktionary. What more do you want ?But the other dictionaries did not mention opposite also meaning mutually exclusive. Even if it were the case, the converse cannot be true, regardless of what you claim. Otherwise, you're saying that something is opposite because it is opposite. You keep saying that opposite means mutually exclusive, but when you use either of the terms it's never the case and you can't explain why it would be. If the proletariat is the opposite of bourgeoisie because they are mutually exclusive (and supposing that mutually exclusive doesn't mean opposite), how are the proletariat and bourgeoisie mutually exclusive?

[red cat]

This doesn't answer the question. How do you mean one thing when you say something else? How do you mean "at least" when you say "one case"? Do you say "at least" to yourself?

When we use "or" normally, then I refer to only a single case. But when we use it in context of logic, then we mean "at least". The meaning varies according to the topic of discussion.


But the other dictionaries did not mention opposite also meaning mutually exclusive. Even if it were the case, the converse cannot be true, regardless of what you claim. Otherwise, you're saying that something is opposite because it is opposite. You keep saying that opposite means mutually exclusive, but when you use either of the terms it's never the case and you can't explain why it would be. If the proletariat is the opposite of bourgeoisie because they are mutually exclusive (and supposing that mutually exclusive doesn't mean opposite), how are the proletariat and bourgeoisie mutually exclusive?

A single well known dictionary suffices to prove some possible use of a word.

The bourgeoisie and proletariat are mutually exclusive things. So they are opposites.

[JazzRemington]

When we use "or" normally, then I refer to only a single case. But when we use it in context of logic, then we mean "at least". The meaning varies according to the topic of discussion.

You've said that already but have not shown how it's the case. Where is "at least" in the logic statement "A or B"? Everything is in the open, there is nothing hiding anywhere. Where is this "at least" at? It has to be explicitly stated, which it is not. There are countless uses of the word "or", some referring to single cases some referring to multiple cases.


A single well known dictionary suffices to prove some possible use of a word.

The other websites took quotes from, amongst others, Merriam-Webster, which itself does not mention mutually exclusive in its entry on opposite. Merriam-Webster isn't well known? Using words to define other words is not as simple as it seems.


The bourgeoisie and proletariat are mutually exclusive things. So they are opposites.

You've said that. How are they mutually exclusive? It can't be because they are opposite, because opposite means mutually exclusive. Thus, you're saying something is mutually exclusive because it is mutually exclusive. We've been through all this before, you cannot show how the bourgeoisie and proletariat are opposite or mutually exclusive.

[red cat]

You've said that already but have not shown how it's the case. Where is "at least" in the logic statement "A or B"? Everything is in the open, there is nothing hiding anywhere. Where is this "at least" at? It has to be explicitly stated, which it is not. There are countless uses of the word "or", some referring to single cases some referring to multiple cases.

No, it is not explicitly stated, but when it is used in logic, "or" means "at least one".




The other websites took quotes from, amongst others, Merriam-Webster, which itself does not mention mutually exclusive in its entry on opposite. Merriam-Webster isn't well known? Using words to define other words is not as simple as it seems.I am not denying the fact that the other dictionaries you mention are well known. But wiktionary is well known too, and it has shown with an example that mutually exclusive things may be referred to as opposites in english.



You've said that. How are they mutually exclusive? It can't be because they are opposite, because opposite means mutually exclusive. Thus, you're saying something is mutually exclusive because it is mutually exclusive. We've been through all this before, you cannot show how the bourgeoisie and proletariat are opposite or mutually exclusive.The bourgeoisie and proletariat are mutually exclusive because a person cannot be bourgeois and proletarian at the same time.

[JazzRemington]

No, it is not explicitly stated, but when it is used in logic, "or" means "at least one".

But it can also mean all, then.


I am not denying the fact that the other dictionaries you mention are well known. But wiktionary is well known too, and it has shown with an example that mutually exclusive things may be referred to as opposites in english.

The bourgeoisie and proletariat are mutually exclusive because a person cannot be bourgeois and proletarian at the same time.

Supposing that is the case, that would mean that the proletariat has multiple opposites, because he can be the opposite petit-bourgeoisie and the lumpen-proleteriat, and anything else, really. Mutual exclusivity would mean that there can be another opposite side of the street from where I am presently standing.

[red cat]

But it can also mean all, then.

No, for logic the meaning of "or" is defined to be "at least one".




Supposing that is the case, that would mean that the proletariat has multiple opposites, because he can be the opposite petit-bourgeoisie and the lumpen-proleteriat, and anything else, really. Mutual exclusivity would mean that there can be another opposite side of the street from where I am presently standing.

In fact this is the case in DM. The proletariat has many opposites.

[JazzRemington]

No, for logic the meaning of "or" is defined to be "at least one".

The wiktionary entry for "or" does not mention "at least one". Now to be sure, "or" can be used to the same effect in ordinary language because we use "or" in statements like "I want a turkey sandwich, a turkey sandwich, or an egg salad sandwich for lunch later", which suggests at least one will be picked. When you use the word "or" in any manner, you always end up with "at least one". This isn't any different from when it's used in ordinary language. But "at least one" isn't something in logic, or at least formal logic.


In fact this is the case in DM. The proletariat has many opposites.This could mean that there could be any number of opposites for the proletariat. If that's the case, what sense does it make to call something an opposite if there was no possibility of something not being an opposite? Now, if there are some things that aren't opposite to the proletariat, what would be the distinction? In every other use of the word, there is only one thing that is the opposite of another. Why would "opposite" even be a good word to use if it's so wildly inconsistent with any other use? What would you normally tell someone if he points to the White House and ask "who lives in that football?"

[red cat]

The wiktionary entry for "or" does not mention "at least one".

So what ?



Now to be sure, "or" can be used to the same effect in ordinary language because we use "or" in statements like "I want a turkey sandwich, a turkey sandwich, or an egg salad sandwich for lunch later", which suggests at least one will be picked. When you use the word "or" in any manner, you always end up with "at least one". This isn't any different from when it's used in ordinary language. Your example suggests that exactly one will be picked, not at least one.


But "at least one" isn't something in logic, or at least formal logic.The logic that I am familiar with means "at least one" by "or".



This could mean that there could be any number of opposites for the proletariat. This depends on the type of economy concerned.



If that's the case, what sense does it make to call something an opposite if there was no possibility of something not being an opposite? The nature of contradiction between these opposites and the proletariat determine its strategy and tactics.


Now, if there are some things that aren't opposite to the proletariat, what would be the distinction? Examples please ?



In every other use of the word, there is only one thing that is the opposite of another.Not necessarily.



Why would "opposite" even be a good word to use if it's so wildly inconsistent with any other use?I don't think it is very inconsistent.


What would you normally tell someone if he points to the White House and ask "who lives in that football?"What has this got to do with DM ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


The nature of contradiction between these opposites and the proletariat determine its strategy and tactics.

And yet Engels, Lenin and Mao tell us that all such opposites inevitably turn into one another. In that case, the proletariat must turn into the capitalist class!

[S.Artesian]

Red Cat:



And yet Engels, Lenin and Mao tell us that all such opposites inevitably turn into one another. In that case, the proletariat must turn into the capitalist class!


No, that transformation process entails an "overcoming," an aufgehoben, so the "unity of opposites" here leads to an abolition of the totality-- a transcendence of the social relation uniting the opposites, which is wage-labor.

The proletariat must turn into the ruling class; not the capitalist class, but the abolition of the capitalist class, abolishing the social relationship of production which defines, determines, reproduces the capitalist class, and in so doing, the proletariat necessarily abolishes itself as a class.

That's kind of fundamental to Marx's dialectic. I might even call that part of the ABC's of Marxism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


No, that transformation process entails an "overcoming," an aufgehoben, so the "unity of opposites" here leads to an abolition of the totality-- a transcendence of the social relation uniting the opposites, which is wage-labor.

I have dealt with that 'answer' here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1594418&postcount=90

http://www.revleft.com/vb/mao-zedong-t121784/index.html

For those who are too lazy to follow the above links, here is the relevant section:


Developing this option further, before it is demolished, it could be argued that Engels had himself anticipated the above objections when he said:


"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976) Anti-Duhring, pp.172-73. Bold emphases added.]

"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....

"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81. Bold emphases added.]

Engels's argument seems to be that "dialectical negation" is not the same as ordinary negation in that it is not simple destruction. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves and "overcomes", so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, we have already seen here, that Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect in itself, and we will also see below that this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as did Engels).

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

Well, despite all this, is it the case that the above comments neutralise the argument presented in this part of the Essay? Is the argument here guilty of the following:


"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]

To answer this, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and not-O*, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary, but not into not-O* -- incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. Given what they tell us, O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.

Putting this minor quibble to one side, too, on this 'revised' view, let us suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "O*(1)" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates'/'overcomes').

If so, then O*(1) must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*(1) in existence to make it develop any further!

[Recall that on this 'theory', everything (and that must include O*(1)) changes because of a 'struggle' with its 'opposite'.]

So, there must be a not-O*(1) to make O*(1) change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt O*(1) from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that O*(1) changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events contained in the DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process in the entire universe changes because of the "struggle" of opposites (and O*(1) is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.

[This would also mean that the second 'Law' was not a 'law' either, just like the first wasn't.]

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to O*(1)) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change, and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.

Ignoring this, too, even if O*(1) were to change into not-O*(1) (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems simply reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*(1) already exists to make it happen! But not-O*(1) cannot already exist, for O*(1) has not changed into it yet!

Once more, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O* to produce not-O* is not ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.

In that case, let us say that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite not-O*(s). But, if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Gospels, not-O*(s) must already exist! If so, O* cannot turn into not-O*(s), for it already exists! On the other hand, if not-O*(s) does not already exist, then O* cannot change, for O* can only change if it "struggles" with what it changes into, i.e., not-O*(s).

Once again, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.

This does not, of course, deny change, only that if dialectics were true, change could not happen.

You:


The proletariat must turn into the ruling class; not the capitalist class, but the abolition of the capitalist class, abolishing the social relationship of production which defines, determines, reproduces the capitalist class, and in so doing, the proletariat necessarily abolishes itself as a class.

But, it's not just any ruling class that the proletariat struggle with, and change into. They struggle with the capitalist class, and so, according to Engels, Lenin and Mao (among many others (see the quotations at the first link above) they must turn into that with which they struggle, their alleged 'opposite' -- the capitalist class!

This is all quite apart from the fact that you, like Hegel, have imposed "sublation" (aufgehoben) on the world.

Or rather, you have uncritically swallowed the line of argument that led Hegel into dreaming this up, into inventing the NON to begin with. As I have shown, Hegel's 'arguments' establishing the existence of the NON are as defective as any could be. You have yet to show where I go wrong:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

This means that this whole way of seeing things is based on egregiously flawed reasoning, which is, of course, why Marx ended up merely 'coquetting' with such Hegelian jargon.

[S.Artesian]

S Artesian:



But, it's not just any ruling class that the proletariat struggle with, and change into. They struggle with the capitalist class, and so, according to Engels, Lenin and Mao (among many others (see the quotations at the first link above) they must turn into that with which they struggle, their alleged 'opposite' -- the capitalist class!

This is all quite apart from the fact that you, like Hegel, have imposed "sublation" (aufgehoben) on the world.

Or rather, you have uncritically swallowed the line of argument that led Hegel into dreaming this up, into inventing the NON to begin with. As I have shown, Hegel's 'arguments' establishing the existence of the NON are as defective as any could be. You have yet to show where I go wrong:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

This means that this whole way of seeing things is based on egregiously flawed reasoning, which is, of course, why Marx ended up merely 'coquetting' with such Hegelian jargon.

If you want to argue that there is no such thing as aufgehoben, or transcendence, in the material that's one thing. To claim that Hegel's dialectic cannot account for change, or makes change impossible is something else altogether, and depends, hinges on the rejecting the method, path, manifestation, the becoming, that Hegel asserts is essential to change.

Yes the proletariat struggles with the bourgeoisie; each exists in opposition to each other at the same time as each exists only in the identity of the other, the organization of the other based on the social organization of labor and property.

In opposing the bourgeoisie, the proletariat has to oppose that organization of property, that organization of the means of production as private property which is the "congealed" product of organization of labor as wage-labor. Thus the emancipation of itself requires the proletariat to emancipate labor from its social "mask" of wage-labor, overturning the organization of the means of production as value extracting, as value seeking value.

Whether this fits, Rosa, with your "O" "not O" "O 1" is immaterial. Literally. Immaterial. For the materiality of this process, its proof is precisely in the concrete impetus, impulse, and tasks of a proletarian revolution which reside in the conflict between the means and relations of production.

If and when that driving conflict is rejected, then there is no longer any validity to the analysis that Marx performed, that capital was historically specific, that it created the basis for its own abolition-- not in the greed of its practitioners, not in the paucity of the markets-- but in its own need to amplify the productivity of labor. Marx talks about the immanent tendency, and tendencies, of capital. This is what he means by that. And this is what is meant by aufgehoben.

[JazzRemington]

So what ?

You tell me, you seem to think wiktionary is the authoritative source on what words mean.


Your example suggests that exactly one will be picked, not at least one.

But, that still doesn't mean "or" in ordinary language means "exactly one". See how that works?


The logic that I am familiar with means "at least one" by "or".

The logic that I am familiar doesn't mean that by "or". See how that works, also?


This depends on the type of economy concerned.

Even in capitalism there can be any number of opposites. For something to have an opposite, there can only be one opposite, period. That's how "opposite" works. You've already said that the proletariat can have many opposites. Now it depends upon the economy? What other economy is there that a proletariat can exist in?


The nature of contradiction between these opposites and the proletariat determine its strategy and tactics.

And that has nothing to do with anything I've said. It seems like you're just throwing words out without any understanding of their meaning, like a parrot who says "Polly want a cracker".


Examples please ?

You tell me. What sense does it make to say that something is opposite without the possibility of something not being an opposite? What are you using to distinguish something as its opposite?


Not necessarily.

What other use of the word suggests there are multiple opposites for a single thing?


I don't think it is very inconsistent.

When opposite is used in ordinary language, it means there are only TWO things (or, only one opposite). When you actually use the word in whatever nonsense you've concocted, there are multiple opposites for something arises. If you cannot be a member of the proletariat or bourgeoisie, then neither can you be a member of the lumpen proletariat or the petite bourgeoisie. Thus, by your definition there are multiple opposites, which is nonsense. As I've said before, even if the opposite of "proletariat" is "not proletariat", that means everything is the opposite of "proletariat". How can there be an opposite of something without the possibility of something not being its opposite?


What has this got to do with DM ?

What would you tell someone who calls something by the wrong name?

Nothing you've said thus far about anything suggests that DM is better than ordinary language at explaining change or anything, really. All I can tell is that it's redundant, vague, and makes for convoluted arguments. You seem to want to redefine terms to fit your preconceived notions of how the world works as opposed to using the terms as they are in ordinary language. This is like modifying the results of an experiment to support your hypothesis. If you do that, of course your hypothesis is supported.

[red cat]

You tell me, you seem to think wiktionary is the authoritative source on what words mean.



But, that still doesn't mean "or" in ordinary language means "exactly one". See how that works?



The logic that I am familiar doesn't mean that by "or". See how that works, also?



Even in capitalism there can be any number of opposites. For something to have an opposite, there can only be one opposite, period. That's how "opposite" works. You've already said that the proletariat can have many opposites. Now it depends upon the economy? What other economy is there that a proletariat can exist in?



And that has nothing to do with anything I've said. It seems like you're just throwing words out without any understanding of their meaning, like a parrot who says "Polly want a cracker".



You tell me. What sense does it make to say that something is opposite without the possibility of something not being an opposite? What are you using to distinguish something as its opposite?



What other use of the word suggests there are multiple opposites for a single thing?



When opposite is used in ordinary language, it means there are only TWO things (or, only one opposite). When you actually use the word in whatever nonsense you've concocted, there are multiple opposites for something arises. If you cannot be a member of the proletariat or bourgeoisie, then neither can you be a member of the lumpen proletariat or the petite bourgeoisie. Thus, by your definition there are multiple opposites, which is nonsense. As I've said before, even if the opposite of "proletariat" is "not proletariat", that means everything is the opposite of "proletariat". How can there be an opposite of something without the possibility of something not being its opposite?



What would you tell someone who calls something by the wrong name?

Nothing you've said thus far about anything suggests that DM is better than ordinary language at explaining change or anything, really. All I can tell is that it's redundant, vague, and makes for convoluted arguments. You seem to want to redefine terms to fit your preconceived notions of how the world works as opposed to using the terms as they are in ordinary language. This is like modifying the results of an experiment to support your hypothesis. If you do that, of course your hypothesis is supported.

It seems that you are twisting some arguments rather purposefully. I will focus only on a few points at a time so that this debate does not diverge and neutralize.

1) If wiktionary or any other popular dictionary has a particular usage of a word and provides a suitable example to illustrate it, then it is clear that the word in question can indeed be used that way. However, it is ridiculous to claim that the word is never used in any other way that is not mentioned in the dictionary, especially if some other popular dictionary gives examples for other usages.

2) I don't know what logic you are talking about, but the one that I am talking about is probably the most popular one. One of its many applications is building the machine that you are presently using.

3) Just as "or" in the normal sense has some instances in common with "or" when used in logic, the same can be said of "opposite" when used in the normal sense and dialectics. Precise agreement with common language is not a necessary condition for deciding terminology in mathematics or science.

[JazzRemington]

It seems that you are twisting some arguments rather purposefully. I will focus only on a few points at a time so that this debate does not diverge and neutralize.

You cannot show how DM is any better than anything else. The entire tangent we've went on is your failed attempt to explain your theory.


1) If wiktionary or any other popular dictionary has a particular usage of a word and provides a suitable example to illustrate it, then it is clear that the word in question can indeed be used that way. However, it is ridiculous to claim that the word is never used in any other way that is not mentioned in the dictionary, especially if some other popular dictionary gives examples for other usages.

So then dictionaries aren't a good source for a word's meaning! You don't even know how they compile dictionaries, do you? Even if an example of a word's use is given, it is too vague to be of any use. Actually using a word is different from its definition. When you use it, there are rules that have to be followed or else its use makes no sense. The definition for "opposite" in wiktionary involves TWO things. It only applies to two things, period. If multiple things are mutually exclusive, then they cannot all be opposites. Choosing any two as opposites is entirely arbitrary and doesn't make them opposite.


2) I don't know what logic you are talking about, but the one that I am talking about is probably the most popular one.

If you say so.


3) Just as "or" in the normal sense has some instances in common with "or" when used in logic, the same can be said of "opposite" when used in the normal sense and dialectics. Precise agreement with common language is not a necessary condition for deciding terminology in mathematics or science.

But you're not using it in any way, shape, or form like in ordinary language. You define it one way (claiming its consistent with its ordinary language use), but then you use it differently, which opens up more problems that you have yet to resolve.

[S.Artesian]

Some points: "dialectical materialism" was created as a philosophy in the fSU and the fact that DM regards itself as a "meta-theory," a philosophy, tells us how far from Marx's core, from Marx's dialectic, DM is.

Second point: I think its kind of funny that someone who carries the following quote on his personal profile should be espousing "anti-dialectics":

"With the power of the [worker's] councils — a power that must internationally supplant all other forms of power — the proletarian movement becomes its own product. This product is nothing other than the producers themselves, whose goal has become nothing other than their own fulfillment. Only in this way can the spectacle’s negation of life be negated in its turn." - Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, thesis 117

If ever there was someone wrapped up in using language in other than an ordinary manner, who deliberately juxtaposed word an image to create a tension that he thought was a dialectic in action, Debord's the one.

[JazzRemington]

Some points: "dialectical materialism" was created as a philosophy in the fSU and the fact that DM regards itself as a "meta-theory," a philosophy, tells us how far from Marx's core, from Marx's dialectic, DM is.

What does this have to do with anything? I don't give a rat's ass about "Marx's dialectic." His use of the dialectics, if he did take dialectics seriously, would just be as much nonsense as anyone else's use of it. Are you sure it wasn't that the Soviet Union applied the label of "dialectical materialism" to what DM claims to describe, in the way "historical materialism" is a more formalized term for Marx's method of researching history?


Second point: I think its kind of funny that someone who carries the following quote on his personal profile should be espousing "anti-dialectics":

"With the power of the [worker's] councils — a power that must internationally supplant all other forms of power — the proletarian movement becomes its own product. This product is nothing other than the producers themselves, whose goal has become nothing other than their own fulfillment. Only in this way can the spectacle’s negation of life be negated in its turn." - Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, thesis 117

If ever there was someone wrapped up in using language in other than an ordinary manner, who deliberately juxtaposed word an image to create a tension that he thought was a dialectic in action, Debord's the one.

That's not an argument any more than claiming Richard Dawkins is a Christian if he said "God damn it". This seems more like an ad hominem, then anything.

[red cat]

You cannot show how DM is any better than anything else. The entire tangent we've went on is your failed attempt to explain your theory.



So then dictionaries aren't a good source for a word's meaning! You don't even know how they compile dictionaries, do you? Even if an example of a word's use is given, it is too vague to be of any use. Actually using a word is different from its definition. When you use it, there are rules that have to be followed or else its use makes no sense. The definition for "opposite" in wiktionary involves TWO things. It only applies to two things, period. If multiple things are mutually exclusive, then they cannot all be opposites. Choosing any two as opposites is entirely arbitrary and doesn't make them opposite.

If you say so.

But you're not using it in any way, shape, or form like in ordinary language. You define it one way (claiming its consistent with its ordinary language use), but then you use it differently, which opens up more problems that you have yet to resolve.

I have no knowledge of how dictionaries are compiled. So let's leave dictionaries out of this debate for the time being.

Well, the meaning of opposites in DM allows several instances of it to coincide with those of the normal sense. This is enough to consider it as a good terming. There are many more examples that would seem pretty weird to you, apart from "or" in logic. The whole normal notion of distance suffers a blow if I define the distance between two different points as 1. But this is something that is allowed in mathematics !

[ChrisK]

Correct, but in this case for the whole egg, by struggle of opposites we actually refer to an equivalence to a struggle of opposites.

So it isn't actually the struggle of opposites. Its something almost like the struggle of opposites.


Mutually exclusive things are also said to be opposites.

But not all opposites are said to be mutually exclusive.


That is exactly what we mean by opposites; objects opposite in at least one way.

Thats not a contradiction, as they are not mutually exclusive. And if thats the case and things change into their opposites, how do we know which opposite it would change into? In fact it could quite possibly change into anything.


As for your second question, irrespective of his position, the observer will be able to deduce whether there is any possible coordinate shift that will result in some vector whose multiples will be able to express the motion of both of the bodies. And anyway, the speed of the bodies with respect to no observer will be the same, so that they remain in mutually exclusive states with respect to any frame of reference.

Now consider the real life example in which two cars A and B move with speeds of 50 kmph to the east and 50 kmph to the west on the same road respectively, with respect to an observer C standing on the pavement. With respect to C, they are opposites. Now consider an observer D in a car that moves with speed of 51 kmph to the east. D will deduce that A and B move in the same direction ! However, to D, A and B are opposites in the sense that one is fast while the other is slow. This is a very special example, but it illustrates how the practice of terming objects displaying mutually exclusive states as "opposites" captures many of the normal meanings of the word.

D would have to be an idiot to think that. But what about moving to the northeast? E, the car moving 120 kmph to the northeast would have trouble deducing which directions the cars were heading.

Also, why are you ignoring Rosa's response?

[red cat]

So it isn't actually the struggle of opposites. Its something almost like the struggle of opposites.


Yes, in the normal sense. But in DM we include that within the definition as well.


But not all opposites are said to be mutually exclusive.
May be so.



Thats not a contradiction, as they are not mutually exclusive.But the same car cannot be in both the states. Here it is better to relate the notion of mutual exclusivity with the mutual exclusiveness of the two states.


And if thats the case and things change into their opposites, how do we know which opposite it would change into? In fact it could quite possibly change into anything. We cannot predict transformations for every given system by using DM. DM is mostly applied in analyzing social phenomena.



D would have to be an idiot to think that. This was an example to illustrate relative motion.
But what about moving to the northeast? E, the car moving 120 kmph to the northeast would have trouble deducing which directions the cars were heading.True, it is difficult, but possible nevertheless.

EDIT:

Also, why are you ignoring Rosa's response?

Because she is someone who claims that she has disproved some well-established theorem in mathematics and then refuses to defend her work, or any other work with the same conclusion. She has also made other tall claims which she fails to prove. Such a person does not deserve any serious attention.

[S.Artesian]

What does this have to do with anything? I don't give a rat's ass about "Marx's dialectic." His use of the dialectics, if he did take dialectics seriously, would just be as much nonsense as anyone else's use of it. Are you sure it wasn't that the Soviet Union applied the label of "dialectical materialism" to what DM claims to describe, in the way "historical materialism" is a more formalized term for Marx's method of researching history?



That's not an argument any more than claiming Richard Dawkins is a Christian if he said "God damn it". This seems more like an ad hominem, then anything.

My, my, my you're a nasty little fuck. Marx's use of dialectics is much more concrete, historical, and material, than the sophistry you're practicing-- as if some how Marx's dialectic can be abstracted out of his actual analysis of capital.


There was nothing ad hominem in the previous post, although "nasty little fuck" certainly qualifies in this one, however accurate it appears to be. I thought it was humorous that you could, would attempt a critique of dialectic based on ordinary language use, and quote Debord, who was quite enamored with dialectic, and certainly believed in not using language in its ordinary manner.

As for the fSU, the attached the label dialectical materialism not to the concrete analysis of classes and the social organization but to a propagation of a particular "Marxist" "philosophy," which would explain all things-- which would in fact explain history by explaining nature, something which is exactly what Marx doesn't do.

In all seriousness, have you read Marx?