@nti-dialectics Made Easy -- Thread Three

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, here are my basic objections to this mystical 'theory'.

[Comrades need to make note of the fact that this was written in response to a request from RevLefters who were not well-versed in philosophy, but who wanted to read a summary of my main objections, so it is aimed at novices, not experts. Hence, it greatly simplifies the issues. Critics have pointed this out, but when I go on at greater length, and in more detail, they then moan about the length of my replies!]


Abbreviations used

DM = Dialectical Materialism; HM = Historical Materialism; NON = Negation of the Negation; UO = Unity of Opposites; FL = Formal Logic.

-----------------------

Logic

Dialecticians tell fibs about FL; indeed, they regularly say things like this:


"Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless." [Rob Sewell.]


"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition cannot cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]

However, I have yet to see a single quotation from a logic text (ancient or modern) that supports such allegations -- certainly dialecticians have so far failed to produce even one.

And no wonder: it is completely incorrect.

Indeed, Formal Logic uses variables -- that is, it employs letters to stand for named objects, designated expressions (some of these are called "predicates"), and the like -- all of which can and do change.

This handy device was invented by the very first logician we know of (in the West): Aristotle (384-322BC). He experimented with variables approximately 1500 years before the same tactic was extended into mathematics by Muslim Algebraists -- who in turn used them several centuries before René Descartes (1596-1650) began employing them in the 'West'.

However, Engels said the following about that particular innovation:


"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes' variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics, and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels (1954), p.258.]

No one doubts that modern mathematics can handle change, so why dialecticians deny this of FL is something of a mystery.

With very little variation between them, dialecticians also like to assert things like the following:


"The basic laws of formal logic are:

1) The law of identity ('A' = 'A').

2) The law of contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').

3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.91.]

Even a cursory examination of a handful of logic texts will show that not only are the above claims incorrect, but not even Aristotle's logic was based on these so-called 'laws'!

Sure, dialecticians claim that Aristotle founded his logic on such principles, but they have yet to produce the evidence. In fact, Aristotle knew nothing of the 'Law of Identity' [LOI], which was a medieval invention.

The LOI will be examined presently, but the 'Law of Contradiction' [LOC] merely says that if one proposition is true then its negation is false, and vice versa -- or, in some versions found in mathematical logic, it says that no contradiction can be true, but must be false. The LOC says nothing about "equality", or the lack of it.

The criticism advanced above by Woods and Grant, and by most other dialecticians, is in fact a descendant of ideas put forward by Hegel (1770-1831), who committed a series of logical blunders which dialecticians have, even to this day, failed to notice. But these errors are the only way that Hegel's 'system' can be made to seem to work.

[His ideas are destructively analysed here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm). A far easier summary of this material can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm).]

In that case, the 'logic' underlying 'Materialist Dialectics' was bogus from the start.

Likewise, the 'Law of Excluded Middle' [LEM] says nothing about objects being identical, or otherwise, merely that any proposition has to be either true or false; there is no third option.

[Some claim that Quantum Mechanics [QM], among other things, has refuted this 'law', but QM has merely forced us to reconsider what we should count as a scientific proposition.]

Contrary to what we are often told, this 'law' does not deny change, nor is it incapable of handling it. Indeed, we are only capable of studying change if we are clear about what is or is not true about whatever is changing.

The LOI is equally badly handled in DM-texts; this is because dialecticians have unwisely copied the above errors from Hegel's Logic. [On that, see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm).]

The basic idea behind the hackneyed criticism of the LOI seems to be this:


"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

Unfortunately, this is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self.

So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine if and when it has occurred.

These criticisms now remove the main motivating point of Dialectical Logic. Hegel's system is based on a series of logical blunders, and hence, so is 'Materialist Dialectics'. Small wonder then that when it has been tested in practice, practice has refuted it.

Motion

According to Hegel, motion is 'contradictory'; unfortunately, dialecticians have bought into this rather odd idea, too.

Almost as if they are singing from the same hymn sheet, they like to argue alongside Engels as follows:


"...[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another[,] [t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]

This is an age-old confusion derived from a paradox invented by an Ancient Greek thinker called Zeno (490?-430?BC).

As seems obvious, all objects (which are not mathematical points) actually occupy several places at once. So, for example, while you are sat reading this Essay, your body is not compressed into a tiny point!

Hence, material bodies can be in one place and in another, at the same time, and stationary all the while.

For example, a car could be parked half in, half out of a garage. Here the car is in one and the same place and not in it, and it is in two places at once (in the garage and in the yard), even while it is at rest relative to a suitable frame of reference.

In that case, this 'contradiction' does not distinguish moving from stationary bodies. So, this alleged contradiction has more to do with linguistic ambiguity than it has with anything in material reality.

Any attempt to circumvent this objection with the counter-claim that moving objects occupy regions of space equal to their own volumes (hence a moving object will occupy two of these regions at the same time, occupying and not occupying each at once) cannot work either. This is because such a re-description would clearly depict a moving body occupying a region greater than its own volume -- in which case, such objects would not so much move as expand!

Worse still, Engels's account depicts objects moving between locations outside of time (that is, with time not having advanced an instant), otherwise the said objects could not be in two places at once. This is impossible to reconcile with a materialist (or even with a comprehensible) view of nature.

Finally, as noted above, this 'contradiction' was created by notorious ambiguities in Zeno's (and thus in Hegel and Engels's) use of certain words (like "moment", "move", and "place"), which means that when these have been resolved, the alleged 'contradiction' simply disappears. [This has been carried out here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2005.htm).]

DM: Imposed On Nature

Has dialectics been read from nature, or imposed on it?

It seems the former must be correct, since we regularly encounter these seemingly modest disclaimers in the writings of dialecticians:


"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), p.13.]

Why is this important? As dialecticians themselves admit, the reading of certain doctrines into reality is a hallmark of Idealism and dogmatism. If DM is to live up to its materialist credentials, its theorists must take care to avoid doing this.

As, George Novack points out:


"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17.]

Here is Communist Party theoretician, Maurice Cornforth:


"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…." [Cornforth (1976), p.15.]

However, when we examine what dialecticians actually do, as opposed to what they say they do, we find that the exact opposite is the case. For example, Engels himself went on to claim the following of motion:


"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself.... Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphasis added.]

Had this observation been derived from the facts available in Engels's day (a policy to which he had just sworn allegiance), he would have expressed himself perhaps as follows:


"Evidence so far suggests that motion is what we call "the mode of existence of matter". Never anywhere has matter without motion been observed, but it is too early to say if this must always be the case…. Matter without motion is not inconceivable, nor is motion without matter, we just haven't witnessed either yet…." [Re-vamped version of Engels (1976), p.74.]



As is easy to demonstrate, all dialecticians do the same (the evidence for this can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm)). First, they disarm the reader with the 'modest' sorts of claims we saw rehearsed above; then, sometimes on the same page, or even in the very next sentence, they proceed to do the exact opposite, imposing dialectics on nature.

Why they do this (and what significance it has) will be examined below.

Traditional Thought

In the West, since Ancient Greek times, traditional theorists have been imposing their theories on nature (as Cornforth noted, above). This practice is so widespread, and has penetrated into thought so deeply, that no one notices it, even after it has been pointed out to them. Or, rather, they fail to see its significance. [More on that below, too.]

Now, if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought. As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies. All of these were imposed on reality (plainly, since they cannot be read from it).

Indeed, this is how Marx depicted things:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it...."[The German Ideology.]

However, as Marx also noted, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system.

In Ancient Greece, with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old Theogonies [i.e., stories about the 'gods'] and myths were no longer relevant. So, in the newly emerging republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC, far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were needed.

[I]Enter Philosophy.

From its inception, Philosophers constructed increasingly complex and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which they then happily imposed on nature.

As Marx also noted:


"...The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Ibid., p.118.]

Philosophers felt they could do this, since, for them, nature was Mind (or, indeed, the product of Mind). In that case, the human mind could safely project its thoughts onto reality --, of which true thoughts were supposed to be a reflection, anyway. "As above, so below", went the old Hermetic (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/glenn_magee.htm) saying. The microcosm (the inner world of thought) reflected the macrocosm (outer reality). This doctrine of Correspondences (as it was called) thus came to dominate all ancient and modern theories of knowledge -- in which case, all true, 'philosophical' knowledge corresponded with 'essences' that underpinned the world of experience. These 'essences' were impossible to detect in any way whatsoever (meaning that the 'uneducated' could not raise any doubts as to their existence), and were accessible by thought alone.

All this was based on the idea that language was a secret code by means of which each thinker (with the 'right sort of education' and class position, of course) could represent the 'Mind of God', or the underlying 'secrets' of nature, to him/herself. Language was thus viewed as a representational device (which was later interpreted individualistically, as each lone theorist represented reality to herself/himself) -- and not a means of communication created by collective labour (as Marx and Engels had argued).

Naturally, this view of discourse had profound ideological implications connected with the legitimation of class power. [More on this below.]

This ancient tradition has changed many times throughout history, as different Modes of Production rose and fell, but its form has remained basically the same: fundamental truths about reality are accessible by thought alone. [More on this below, as well.]

So, just like Theology, but in this case in a far more abstract and increasingly secularised form, subsequent philosophies came to reflect the 'essential' structure of reality, one that supposedly underpinned and rationalised alienated class society, mystified now by the use of increasingly baroque terminology and technical jargon.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the modern form of 'the dialectic' was invented by a quintessentially Idealist Philosopher working in this ancient tradition (Hegel), and it was subsequently appropriated by Marxist classicists before the working class could provide it with a materialist counter-weight. DM was thus born out of Idealism, and, as we will see, it has never really escaped from its clutches -- despite the materialist flip dialecticians claim to have inflicted upon it.

And that is why dialecticians happily impose their ideas on nature: because it is traditional to do so.

Moreover, since this theory is based on ancient and idealised abstractions, it cannot be derived from the non-abstract material world, but must be read into it.

But, in doing this dialecticians are (unwittingly) positioning themselves with a tradition that was not built by working people and which does not serve their interests.

Indeed, since dialectics is not based on material reality it cannot be used to help change it.

Small wonder then that it has failed our movement for so long.

Hence, for all their claim to be radical, DM-theorists are thoroughly conservative when they try to philosophise. Despite the fact that DM-theorists appear to be challenging traditional ideas, their practice reveals they are part of a tradition that is quite happy to derive fundamental truths about nature from thought alone, just as ruling-class theorists have always done.

The 'Laws' of Dialectics

This age-old tactic (of imposing theses onto nature) can be seen if we examine the use made of Engels's so-called 'Three Laws of Dialectics':


"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [Engels (1954), p.17.]

All dialecticians (i.e., the majority who accept these 'Laws') impose them on nature (the evidence for this can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm) and here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm)). What little evidence dialecticians supply to substantiate these 'Laws' is not only woefully insufficient, it is highly contentious -- to say the least.

Anyone who has studied and practiced genuine science will know the lengths to which researchers have to go to alter even minor aspects of current theory, let alone justify major changes in the way we view nature.

In stark contrast, and without exception, dialecticians offer a few paragraphs of trite (and over-used) clichés to support their claims. Hence, all we find are hackneyed references to things like boiling water, balding heads, plants 'negating' seeds, Mamelukes fighting the French, a character from Molière suddenly discovering that he speaks prose, and the like, all constantly retailed, year in, year out.

From such banalities, dialecticians suddenly derive universal laws, applicable everywhere and at all times. Also so traditional.

Even at its best (for example, in Woods and Grant (1995), which is one of the most comprehensive defences of classical, hard-core DM to date, and in Gollobin (1986), which is in fact an up-market version of Woods and Grant), all we find are perhaps a few dozen pages of secondary and tertiary information, extensively padded out with repetition and bluster (much of which is taken apart here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm)). Contrary evidence (of which there is much) is simply ignored. This is indeed Mickey Mouse Science.

In many ways, this endeavour to substantiate Engels's 'Laws' resembles Creationist attempts to show that the Book of Genesis is correct: it is heavily slanted, repetitive, selective and contentious.

The First 'Law', the alleged change of quantity into quality, ignores the many cases in nature where change is not "nodal":


"Hegel invented the nodal line of measure relations, in which small quantitative changes at a certain point give rise to a qualitative leap. The example is often given of water, which boils at 100oC at normal atmospheric pressure. As the temperature nears boiling point, the increase in heat does not immediately cause the water molecules to fly apart. Until it reaches boiling point, the water keeps its volume. It remains water, because of the attraction of the molecules for each other. However, the steady change in temperature has the effect of increasing the motion of the molecules. The volume between the atoms is gradually increased, to the point where the force of attraction is insufficient to hold the molecules together. At precisely 100oC, any increase in heat energy will cause the molecules to fly apart, producing steam." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.49.]

But, not everything in nature changes in this way; consider melting glass, metal, rock, butter and plastic. No nodal points anywhere in sight, here. Do Woods and Grant (do any other DM-theorists) consider these counter-examples? Are you kidding? [More details here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

And not every change in quality is produced by quantitative differences (contrary to what Engels said):


"...the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63.]

There are in fact countless changes in quality that are not determined in this way. For example, there are certain molecules that have exactly the same material content and energy levels as one another, but are qualitatively dissimilar because of the different spatial arrangement of their constituent atoms. These are called 'Stereoisomers'. [More examples here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

So, here we have a change in quality produced by change in geometry, not quantity.

Other qualitative changes in nature and society can be produced by different timing or by a different ordering of the relevant events -- or even by altering their context. [Again, examples are given here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

Moreover, this 'Law' only appears to work because of the vague way that both "quantity" and "quality" have been characterised by DM-theorists. In fact, they seldom if ever bother to define these terms.

Can you imagine this happening in genuine science?

This allows DM-theorists to see changes in quality 'caused' by changes in quantity whenever and wherever they please, just as it 'permits' them to ignore the many cases where this does not happen, introducing an element of subjectivity into what is supposed to be an 'objective law'.

The other 'Laws' fare no better. Change though 'internal contradiction' will be examined in the next sub-section, but the "Negation of the Negation" [NON] depends for its 'plausibility' on the confusion of linguistic with material categories in a thoroughly traditional manner. [Again, more details here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

Hence, solely on the basis that we have a negative particle in language, it is assumed that negation is a real process in nature. On that basis, of course, one would be justified in believing in Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy.

However, since the veracity of the NON depends on the truth of the second 'Law', it is to that I now turn.

Internal Contradictions

Mechanical materialism holds that all things are set in motion by an external 'push' of some sort. In contrast, dialecticians claim that because of their 'internal contradictions', objects and processes in nature and society are "self-moving".

Lenin expressed this idea as follows:


"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]

There are a number of serious problems with this passage, not the least of which is that it clearly suggests that things are self-moving. In fact, Lenin did more than just suggest this, he insisted upon it:


"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90.]

Other Marxists talk the same way; here are comrades Woods and Grant (readers will note, I am sure, how they happily impose this doctrine on nature):


"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....

"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....

"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"...Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 72.]

But, if this were so, nothing in nature would or could have any effect on anything else. Hence, while you might think that it is your kick that moves a ball, according to the above, the ball moves itself!

Now, in order to avoid such absurd consequences, dialecticians have had to allow for the existence of "external contradictions", which are somehow also involved in such changes.

But, as seems obvious, this makes a mockery of the idea that all change is internally-generated, just as it undermines the contrast drawn above between mechanical and 'dialectical' theories of motion. Indeed, what becomes of Lenin's "insistence" if everything that changes in fact violates his rule?

Also, DM-theorists appeal to "internal contradictions" in order to undercut theism (as we saw in the quotation from Lenin and from Woods and Grant, above); here, too, is Cornforth:


"The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause.

"Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert -- without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls is, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.

"No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the "initial push"....

"No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organisation of matter,* any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning.... But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning....

"So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained in things themselves." [Cornforth (1976), pp.40-43.]

But, if external causes are now permitted, in order to stop this theory becoming absurd (as we saw above), then that will simply allow 'god' to sneak back in through a side door.

Of course, all this is independent of whether or not it makes sense to say that anything in nature or society can be described as a "contradiction". Dialecticians, following Hegel, certainly believe they can, but up until now they have merely been content to assert this for a fact, forgetting the proof. Hegel's authority -- that of an Idealist -- is sufficient apparently. And it is worth recalling that Hegels' use of this term was based on a crass piece of sub-Aristotelian logic.

But even if all objects and processes in fact possessed "internal contradictions", exactly as DM-theorists suppose, this would still not explain why anything actually moved or changed.

In fact, as is easy to confirm, dialecticians have been hopelessly unclear as to:

(1) Whether things change because of their internal contradictions (and/or opposites), or

(2) Whether they change into these opposites, or, indeed,

(3) Whether they create such opposites when they change.

Of course, if the third option were the case, the alleged opposites could not cause change, since they would be produced by it, not the other way round. Moreover, they could scarcely be 'internal opposites' if they were produced by change.

If the second alternative were correct, then we would see things like males naturally turning into females, the working class into the capitalist class, electrons into protons, left hands into right hands, and vice versa, and a host of other oddities. [On this, see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm). Use the 'Quick Links' to go to the 'Dialectics Cannot Explain Change' section.]

And as far as the first option is concerned, it is worth making the following point:

If objects/processes change because of already existing internal opposites, and they change into these opposites, then plainly they cannot change, since those opposites already exist!

So, if object/process A is already composed of a dialectical union of A and not-A, and it 'changes' into not-A, where then is the change? Not-A already exists!

At the very least, this account of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-A itself came about. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.

which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past will merely reduplicate this problem.]

[This argument is worked out in greater detail here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm), where several obvious objections are neutralised. Once more, use the 'Quick Links' to go the 'Dialectics Cannot Explain Change' section.]

Now, in order to answer such questions, dialecticians have appealed to forces (of attraction and repulsion) to explain how and why these obscure 'contradictions' are capable of actually moving bits of matter about the place.

Unfortunately, the nature of forces is a mystery even to this day; this is one reason why scientists have abandoned them, preferring to talk about exchange of energy and momentum instead.

Of course, in popular and school physics, people still talk about forces, but since there is no way of giving them any sort of physical sense (other than as part of a vector field, etc.), advanced physics translates forces in the way indicated in the previous paragraph. Indeed, in Relativity Theory, the 'force' of gravity has been replaced by the movement of objects along "geodesics".

Even Woods and Grant concede this point:


"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]

However, Woods and Grant failed to tell us how such a "relation" can make anything move; still less do they reveal how these items are 'opposites', let alone 'internal opposites'.

As physicist Max Jammer notes:


"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]

This is re-iterated by Nobel prize winner, Professor Wilzcek (of MIT):


"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote

"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'"

This is probably why Engels himself said the following:


"When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), p.71. Bold emphasis added.]

But, if there are no classical forces, then there can't be any (dialectical) contradictions in nature --, 'external' or 'internal' (or, at least, none that could make anything happen).

Hence, even if there were such 'contradictions' in nature, they would do no work, and DM, the erstwhile philosophy of change, would not be able to account for it!

Faced with this, some DM-apologists have tried to argue that modern science is either dominated by 'positivism', or is 'reactionary'. In other words, to save their theory, they are prepared to cling on to an animistic view of nature, one that even Engels was ready to abandon!

[However, this is a complex issue; for more details I can only refer the reader to my extensive discussion here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm).]

Totality

Dialecticians believe that everything is interconnected:


"Dialectics is the science of universal interconnections…." [Engels (1954), p.17.]


"Nothing exists or can exist in splendid isolation, separate from its conditions of existence, independent from its relationships with other things…. When things enter into such relationships that they become parts of a whole, the whole cannot be regarded as nothing more than the sum total of the parts…. [W]hile it may be said that the whole is determined by the parts it may equally be said that the parts are determined by the whole….

"Dialectical materialism understands the world, not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which all things go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away....

"Dialectical materialism considers that…things come into being, change and pass out of being, not as separate individual units, but in essential relation and interconnection, so that they cannot be understood each separately and by itself but only in their relation and interconnection….

"The dialectical method demands first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in their interconnections with other things…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.46-48, 72.]

Readers are invited to check, but we are never told what this "Totality" actually is! [More details here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm).]

This is, of course, a doctrine that dialecticians share with all known mystical systems of thought. As Glenn Magee notes:


"Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines "As above, so below." This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is reflected.

"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies." [Magee (2001), p.13.]

Indeed, the vast majority of mystical systems account for change by appealing to unities of interpenetrating opposites. Consider these examples:


"The Taoists saw all changes in nature as manifestations of the dynamic interplay between the polar opposites yin and yang, and thus they came to believe that any pair of opposites constitutes a polar relationship where each of the two poles is dynamically linked to the other. For the Western mind, this idea of the implicit unity of all opposites is extremely difficult to accept. It seems most paradoxical to us that experiences and values which we had always believed to be contrary should be, after all, aspects of the same thing. In the East, however, it has always been considered as essential for attaining enlightenment to go 'beyond earthly opposites,' and in China the polar relationship of all opposites lies at the very basis of Taoist thought." [Fritjof Capra.]

"Buddhist enlightenment consists simply in knowing the secret of the unity of opposites -- the unity of the inner and outer worlds....

"Hindus envision the cosmic process as the growth of one mighty organism, the self-actualization of divinity which contains within itself all opposites."

"Sufism is usually associated with Islam. It has developed Bhakti to a high point with erotic imagery symbolising the unity of opposites. The subtle anatomy and microcosm-macrocosm model also found in Tantra and Taoism is used by it, dressed in its own symbols. Certain orders use ecstatic music and/or dance which reminds one of the Tantric celebration of the senses. Sometimes, the union of opposites is seen as a kind of gnosis. This is similar to Jnani Yoga."

"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle-the Principle of Polarity-embodies the truth that all manifested things have "two sides"; "two aspects"; "two poles"; a "pair of opposites," with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: "Everything is and isn't, at the same time"; "all truths are but half-truths"; "every truth is half-false"; "there are two sides to everything"; "there is a reverse side to every shield," etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that "the pairs of opposites may be reconciled," and that "thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree''; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites" is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity...." [This is from The Kybalion, reputed by some to be the third most important book of Hermeticism.]

[Links to where these were taken from can be found at my site; see the end.]

It would not be difficult to extend this list indefinitely to establish the fact that practically every mystic who has ever walked the earth thinks, or has thought, 'dialectically'.

Once again: the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.

[Notice, too, how both the arguments and examples used by the above mystics are broadly similar to those found in DM-texts. Mystics, it seems, also use Mickey Mouse science to support their 'theories'.

Why both types of mystics (i.e., the traditional sort and dialectical variety) do this is explained in Essay Nine Part Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm).]

However, the only obvious difference between these overt mystics and the covert Dialectical-Marxist Tendency lies in the extent to which the former employ openly religious language. Even so, both are quite happy to use obscure jargon lifted from traditional Philosophy, and then impose the results on nature in a thoroughly traditional manner.

Nevertheless, and on a different tack, exactly how Dialectical Marxists know that everything is interconnected they have kept annoyingly to themselves (save the excuse that they pinched this idea from Hegel -- who, alas, also copied it from his mystical forebears).

And it is no use dialecticians appealing to modern Physics to support this idea; the latter merely hypothesises that everything was once connected (in the alleged 'Big Bang'), not that everything is now interconnected. Indeed, certain theoretical considerations suggest that most things cannot even be connected, let alone be interconnected. [Look up 'Light Cone (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_cone)', at Wikipedia.]



Moreover, the BBT is associated with the 'Block View (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_(philosophy_of_time))' of time (wherein everything is seen as a part of a four-dimensional manifold (mathematical shape)); in such a set-up nothing changes. Or, rather, change is no more than a subjective view of how things seem to us to alter. So, given this theory, objective reality is in fact changeless. In that case, this aspect of modern Physics is no friend of DM. [More on this here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm) and here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011%2002.htm).]

[And an appeal to "Quantum Entanglement" cannot help either; at best, experimental evidence shows that certain states of matter are interlinked locally, not across billions of light years, nor indeed with the past. This is quite apart from the fact that there are Scientific Realists who question the validity of this anti-realist aspect of modern Physics.]

But, even if DM-theorists were correct, the thesis of universal interconnection is incompatible with change through 'internal contradiction', for if all change is internally-induced then no object or process could be interconnected. Alternatively, if everything is interlinked, then interconnection can play no causal role in change (or change would not be the result of 'internal contradictions', once more).

Naturally, this would lead to the rather odd result that the Sun, for example, does not ripen fruit, it ripens itself!

Or, of course, if the Sun actually does the ripening, then that would not be the result of 'internal contradictions' in fruit.

We have already seen that DM-theorists try to get around this fatal consequence of their theory by appealing to both alternatives (i.e., on the one hand claiming/insisting that everything is a sealed unit --, and is thus "self-moving" --, while on the other, asserting that everything is interconnected, and thus 'full of holes' for external causes to sneak back in), which is a rather fitting 'contradiction' in itself.

Now, dialecticians are fond of pointing to the contradictions in other, rival and thus allegedly defective systems of thought (the evidence for this allegation can be found in Essay Eleven Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm)) as a reason for rejecting them, but the above contradiction is of such prodigious proportions that it dwarfs any they have so far found in rival theories.

Think about it: how can everything be maximally-interconnected and causally isolated all at the same time? And, how is it possible for everything to be internally-driven yet externally-defined (or "mediated", to use the jargon) as part of a unified Totality?

Practice

Is Marxism true? How can we tell? Dialecticians have a direct answer: the validity of revolutionary socialism must be tested in practice.

But, what if it turns out that in practice they themselves reject this criterion?

Indeed, but worse: what if it should turn out that practice has refuted Dialectical Marxism?

Do we abandon the criterion of practice as a test of truth, or bury our heads in the sand and hope no one notices?

Up until now DM-fans have opted for the latter strategy.

But, is this conclusion as hasty as it is unfair?

As we will see, it is neither of these.

In order to substantiate this latest allegation, we need to back-track a little.

Lenin asserted the following:


"From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality." [Lenin (1961), p.171.]

He was, of course, merely underlining ideas that all dialecticians hold in common. Hence, in their view, it is not enough for Marxists to try to develop the right sort of theory to explain the world, their ideas must be tested and refined in practice if they are to succeed in changing society. Indeed, no theory could be 'correct', or 'objective', without an intimate, long-term and 'dialectical' connection with political activity -- or, at the very least, with some form of material practice.

Unfortunately, as hinted at earlier, the results of "practice" have not been too kind to Marxists of every stripe. Indeed, they have been even less kind to Trotskyists (comrades not known for their 'mass following').

And they are not alone; practice has not looked at all favourably on our side as a whole for close on a hundred years. All Four Internationals have failed (or have vanished), and the 1917 revolution has been reversed. Indeed, we are no nearer (and arguably much further away from) a workers' state now than Lenin was in 1918. Practically all of the former 'socialist' societies have collapsed (and not a single worker raised his or her hand in their defence). Even where avowedly Marxist parties can claim some sort of mass following, this is passive and electoral --, and those parties themselves have openly adopted reformism (despite the contrary-sounding rhetoric).

So, if truth is tested in practice, practice has delivered a rather clear verdict: "materialist dialectics" does not work, so it cannot be true.

But, when confronted with such disconcerting facts, dialecticians tend to respond in one or more of the following ways:

1) They flatly deny that Marxism has been an abject failure.

2) If they admit to failure, they blame it on "objective factors", or on other Marxist parties.

3) They simply ignore the problem. Or:

4) They say it is too early to tell.

Now, there doesn't seem to be much point in dialecticians claiming that their theory guides all they do, avowing that truth is tested in practice, if, when that practice reveals its disappointing and long-term verdict, that verdict is denied, ignored or 'explained' away. In that event, what sort of practice could possibly constitute a test of dialectics if, whatever the results, it is always excused/exonerated? What exactly is being tested if the results of every test are ignored or re-configured as a success?

Hence, dialectics is not so much not tested in practice, as dialecticians are practiced at not testing it.

Taking each excuse, one at a time:

1) Those who think Marxism is a ringing success have so far failed to show where and how it enjoys this blessed state. [Presumably there is a Workers' State on the outer fringes of the Galaxy?]

Hardcore denial of reality of this order of magnitude is difficult to counter -- just as it is difficult to counter Christian Scientists who claim that matter is the 'error of mortal mind'; there is no debating with this sort of Idealism, one that re-interprets the material world to suit a comforting idea, and then buries its head in its own idea of sand.

Anyone who can look at the international situation and fail to see that the vast majority of workers have not been seized by Marxism (and never have been) is probably a danger to him/herself.

[This should not be taken to mean that I think that things cannot change!]

So, when Marx said:


"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses." [Marx (1843), p.251.]

the only conclusions possible are that either: 1) he was wrong, or 2) dialectics has not even so much as lightly hugged the masses.

[There is a more involved explanation for the selective blindness that afflicts revolutionaries in Essay Nine Part Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm).]

2) Certainly objective factors have hindered the revolutionary movement (such as a relatively well-organised, rich, powerful and focussed ruling-class, nationalism and sectionalism among workers, a growing economy, etc., etc.), but the above comrades were quite specific: the veracity of a theory can only be tested in practice, and since the latter requires the subjective input of active revolutionaries, this aspect of practice has badly failed.

Often revolutionaries recognise this, but they depict it as a failure of 'revolutionary leadership', failing to note the input of dialectics, here. But if this theory is as central to Marxism as these comrades believe, then DM cannot be unconnected with this long-term lack of success.

So, whether or not there have been 'objective factors', practice itself has refuted the subjective side of Marxism: dialectics.

Now, since the Essays at my site show that DM is not so much false as far too confused even to be assessed for its truth or falsity, the long-term failure of Marxism is no surprise. And since this theory arose from the brains of card-carrying ruling-class theorists (like Hegel), this is doubly no surprise.

3) This is probably the safest option for dialecticians to adopt: ignore the problem. It is certainly the best one that inadvertently helps preserve the interests of the ruling-class, since it prevents the serious theoretical problems our movement faces from being addressed, guaranteeing another century of failure.

Indeed, the bosses could not have designed a better theory to screw with our heads (and initiate a monumental waste of time as our best theorists try to grapple with Hegel's fluent Martian and attempt to make sense of it) if they tried.

All this is quite apart from the fact that practice cannot distinguish between a correct and an incorrect theory. Incorrect theories can often work (and they can do so for many centuries -- for example, Ptolemaic Astronomy was highly successful for over a thousand years, and it became increasingly accurate with age), and correct ones can fail (for example, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which failed to be observed until the 1838, after the work of Friedrich Bessel). [More examples of both are given in Essay Ten Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm).]

And even if this were not so, and success were indeed a criterion of truth, since there is as yet no socialist society on earth, we will only know if Marxism is correct after the event. So, this criterion cannot tell us whether Marxism is correct now. Indeed, the following declaration could come true:


"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, [B]or in the common ruin of the contending classes." [Marx and Engels (1848), pp.35-36. Bold emphasis added.]

According to this, the "contending classes" could wipe each other out --, or at least the class war could result in their "common ruin" (which outcome is not easy to square with the NON). Of course, should that happen, it would declare all theories false (if, that is, the criterion that truth is tested in practice is itself correct -- but, the way that dialecticians ignore the deliverances of practice suggests that even they do not accept this criterion, in practice).

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

Unfortunately, pragmatic theories (like this one) are hostages to fortune; those who adhere to them should feign no surprise if history takes little note of their hermetically-compromised day-dreams, and delivers decade after decade of refutation.

There are other (and much better, materially-based) ways of confirming the validity of HM -- these will be explored in an Essay to be published at my site in the next few years.

All this means that if we want our practice to be more successful, we will have to remove the theory that dropped our movement into this Hermetic quagmire: DM.

The above represents about 2/3rds of the following Essay (at my site):

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

where more details (including references and links) can be found.

Further sections dealing with how 'materialist dialectics' has damaged Marxism and why dialecticians cling on to this failed theory like grim death have also been omitted from the above.

I would greatly appreciate it if anyone thinks I have still not made things clear, that they tell me exactly where I have failed, and I will put it right, if it is my fault.

[In the original Essay, any the technical terms I have used are linked to dictionaries and internet sites where they are clearly explained.]

Incidentally, anyone who finds the above either too difficult or too long, shorter, easier versions can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm), and here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/disclaimer.htm).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades might like to know that I have published another of Guy Robinson's essays at my site:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Robinson_Essay_Three_The_Concept_Of_Nature.htm

Links to his other essays can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/other_material.htm

[Foot of the page.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades might like to know that I have completely re-written this Essay, making the argument much clearer:

Essay Nine Part Two: The Damage Dialectical Materialism Has Done To Marxism (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm).

[ChrisK]

I can't wait to read it. That was always one of my favorite essays.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, I have added about 4500 words of new material, corrected a few errors, and made the argument clearer.

Working on Essay Ten Part One as we speak.

[ChrisK]

Excellent. I can't wait for the rest of the unfinished essay's to come out either!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, the next one (Essay Thirteen Part Two) is about the relationship between science and dialectics. It will take me quite a while to finish, so it won't be ready until 2011.

[ChrisK]

I very much appreciate that you write all of these essays and go through all this hard work and then don't charge for it. Thank you for what you are doing.

Have you thought of publishing a book on the subject?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, I was going to publish this material in book form when it was finally finished (in about ten years time), but in 2005 a few friends who saw my work thought it important enough to publish on the internet right away, even if it was only half finished -- so I did.

I very much doubt if a publisher will touch this work (not without massive editorial changes anyway), so I will have to publish it myself since I do not want to relinquish editorial control over it.

[ChrisK]

Found this on your website and saw nothing of it after. Any transcript that I'm missing?

04/03/08: The seminar in Oxford went well. I filmed the talk and subsequent discussion, but the lighting was poor. If I can improve the quality of the video on edit, I'll post it on YouTube.
I'll also post a transcript of the talk, and discussion at a later date.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I've still to get round to doing this!

Sorry.

Later this year, I hope!

My ex-partner gave the talk, and owns the video, but he's now dragging his feet.:(

[ChrisK]

How sad! But that does happen.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I should be able to get the film off him when I see him next, in September.

[ChrisK]

Can't wait to see it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, unlike me, he's a very good public speaker.

[ChrisK]

Hmm, I always thought you would be a great public speaker. In fact, I still bet you could be.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Not really; I'm far too shy.

[RasTheDestroyer]

2 of those 3 laws of logic were in fact formulated by Aristotle, the 3rd, the Law of Identity, was formulated first by Parmenides, who, unsurprisingly, held that reality was motionless, and was touched upon by Aristotle later.

[ChrisK]

2 of those 3 laws of logic were in fact formulated by Aristotle, the 3rd, the Law of Identity, was formulated first by Parmenides, who, unsurprisingly, held that reality was motionless, and was touched upon by Aristotle later.

How is that unsuprising? Also, Newton was a blatant occultist, better ignore those silly laws of motion.

[Hit The North]

How is that unsuprising? Also, Newton was a blatant occultist, better ignore those silly laws of motion.

I think the point Ras is making is that there is a connection in Parmenides thinking: that the law of identity follows from the premise that reality is motionless and unchanging or vise versa.

Whereas there is no connection between Newton's occultism and his laws of motion.

[RasTheDestroyer]

How is that unsuprising? Also, Newton was a blatant occultist, better ignore those silly laws of motion.

It's unsurprising that a law which dialectics criticizes for not seeing things in their motion would be formulated by a thinker who held reality to be motionless.

[ChrisK]

It's unsurprising that a law which dialectics criticizes for not seeing things in their motion would be formulated by a thinker who held reality to be motionless.

Mind explaining how this is so?

[RasTheDestroyer]

Mind explaining how this is so?

http://www.revleft.org/vb/blog.php?b=1110

[ChrisK]

http://www.revleft.org/vb/blog.php?b=1110

Ummm, I don't think it is a religion. I think its a philosophy. You apparantly didn't read that thread as I didn't see anyone call it a religion.

Further, you never once talked about logic. Okay, fine, you mentioned syllogism, but didn't say shit. You haven't told me at all how logic cannot deal with change.

[RasTheDestroyer]

You asked me why it was unsurprising why a thinker who held reality to be motionless formulated a law of logic that dialectics criticizes for not seeing things in their motion. Why wouldn't it be? It can be demonstrated apogogically: it would be surprising if a thinker who held reality be to motionless formulated a law of logic that does see things in their motion. His law of logic indeed follows from his static monism.
Dialectical materialists do not insist that the LOI 'denies' change, but that it does cannot represent it. Logico-linguistic symbols are simply that: signs. Signs can only be an imperfect representation of what they signify. These 'laws of logic' are not inherent features of the universe but an imperfect human social construction which we use to understand it. To say that an abstraction like the variable 'A' can handle the changes in the reality it represents is like saying that a picture of an object - an abstraction/signifier - can handle the constant changes of the actual object it represents. This imperfection is demonstrated by ideas like Godel's incompleteness theorem and the Turing proof. (research these)

Consider what was written in the OP

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]
'Unfortunately, this is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self.'

This is not incorrect because if an object changes, anything identical to it will not change equally quickly. Time is not linear or divisible or synchronous. This change is constant. No sooner than an object changes to something not identical to itself does it change again. Things don't change into something no longer identical with its former self. Things never are identical with themselves. Against, time is not divisible into discrete parts. No object is ever identical to itself and therefore there can be nothing identical to it that will change 'equally quickly' in the first place.

The second assertion, that 'if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self' is a confused and fragmented idea. 'A' signifies the 'thing' represented. If A possesses all the properties of the thing it represents, and the thing represented changes, it will cease not only to be identical to itself, but will cease to be itself entirely (because, as I pointed out above, things never are identical with themselves), and therefore A, the sign which represented the thing will not only cease to be identical to A, but will cease to be A.

[ChrisK]

You asked me why it was unsurprising why a thinker who held reality to be motionless formulated a law of logic that dialectics criticizes for not seeing things in their motion. Why wouldn't it be? It can be demonstrated apogogically: it would be surprising if a thinker who held reality be to motionless formulated a law of logic that does see things in their motion. His law of logic indeed follows from his static monism.
Dialectical materialists do not insist that the LOI 'denies' change, but that it does not represent it. Logico-linguistic symbols are simply that: signs. Signs can only be an imperfect representation of what they signify. These 'laws of logic' are not inherent features of the universe but an imperfect human social construction which we use to understand it. To say that an abstraction like the variable 'A' can handle the changes in the reality it represents is like saying that a picture of an object - an abstraction/signifier - can handle the constant changes of the actual object it represents. This imperfection is demonstrated by ideas like Godel's incompleteness theorem and the Turing proof.

Using your reasoning I can argue that DM cannot represent change either. DM can only be expressed by language, something that is a human social construction. Therefore, it cannot represent change.


Consider what was written in the OP

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]
'Unfortunately, this is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self.'

This is not incorrect because if an object changes, anything identical to it will not change equally quickly. Time is not linear or divisible. This change is constant. No object is ever identical to itself and therefore there can be nothing identical to it that will change 'equally equally' in the first place.

Thats not true. From what I understand, there is a strong possibility that Protons do not change and are therefore identical with themselves.


The second assertion, that 'if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self' is a confused and fragmented idea. 'A' signifies the 'thing' represented. If A possesses all the properties of the thing it represents, then if the thing represented changes, it will cease not only to be identical to itself, but will cease to be itself entirely, and therefore A, the sign which represented the thing will not only cease to be identical to A, but will cease to be A.

Thats kind of the point. If A changes it becomes not A. A does not equal not A.

[RasTheDestroyer]

Using your reasoning I can argue that DM cannot represent change either. DM can only be expressed by language, something that is a human social construction. Therefore, it cannot represent change.

No. Neither Logico-linguistic constructs or internal logic itself are built into the universe essentially, as the two examples of the incompleteness of internal logic I presented shows. Matter is built into the universe. Dialectical materialism implies something that is in fact built into the universe. It can only be expressed in language, but the method of dialectical materialism proceeds from the analysis of the concrete to the abstract, including predicates and generalized terms (constructs). Language is the external mode of representing many things, including both the dialectical materialist laws intrinsic to nature, and at the same time the external mode of representing the laws of formal logic not intrinsic to nature, but which are constructions for understanding simple processes. Of course language is a construct, but the imperfect representation of reality arises from the construction of the so-called 'laws' of logic.


Thats not true. From what I understand, there is a strong possibility that Protons do not change and are therefore identical with themselves.

Uh, protons change into neutrons and neutrons into protons all the time, based on changes in the speed of their 'spin' known in quantum physics as 'angular momentum.' Angular momentum - the sum of speed, momentum, and mass - determine which particle is produced. This is the dialectical transformation of quantity into quality. Show me how to represent this, or any non-linear system at all, in formal logic please?




Thats kind of the point. If A changes it becomes not A. A does not equal not A.

No. The three laws of formal logic are the same proposition stated differently. The proposition 'A != -A' is the same as the proposition 'A = A,' which I've pointed out it doesn't. It is correct that if A changes it becomes not A. This is expressed in the proposition 'A = -A', a violation of the laws of formal logic.

In other words, you have stated two different logical propositions and conflated them.

"If A changes it becomes not A" = "A is not A"

"A does not equal not A" = "A is not not A"

To make it simpler for you to understand I'll replace the variable 'A' with the term 'proton.' in the law of identity, law of the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction.'

'A proton is not not a proton.'

'A proton is a proton'

'A proton is not a neutron.'

How do these account for the change of a proton to a neutron? In formal symbolic logic, the object the symbol represents (a value, function, vector, etc.) remains constant.



Do you see the difference now?

[ChrisK]

No. Neither Logico-linguistic constructs or internal logic itself are built into the universe essentially, as the two examples of the incompleteness of internal logic I presented shows. Matter is built into the universe. Dialectical materialism implies something that is in fact built into the universe. It can only be expressed in language, but the method of dialectical materialism proceeds from the analysis of the concrete to the abstract, including predicates and generalized terms (constructs). Language is the external mode of representing many things, including both the dialectical materialist laws intrinsic to nature, and at the same time the external mode of representing the laws of formal logic not intrinsic to nature, but which are constructions for understanding simple processes. Of course language is a construct, but the imperfect representation of reality arises from the construction of the so-called 'laws' of logic.

1. Define abstraction

2. Define concrete

3. Prove that DM laws are intrinsic to nature

4. Why would an idealist theory created by a Heremetic Christian Philosopher "turned on its head" be inherent to nature? That makes no sense in the least.


Uh, protons change into neutrons and neutrons into protons all the time, based on changes in the speed of their 'spin' known in quantum physics as 'angular momentum.' Angular momentum - the sum of speed, momentum, and mass - determine which particle is produced. This is the dialectical transformation of quantity into quality. Show me how to represent this, or any non-linear system at all, in formal logic please?


Sure, thats actually quite easy. In fact, I'll use a logical argument created by the Stoics 2000 years ago to do that.

If the Angular momentum of a partical is x, then a proton was produced.
The angular momentum of the partical was x
Therefore a proton was produced.

Thats called modus ponens (Aristotle didn't know about it).

I don't know much predicate logic, but I'd be willing to bet that someone who knows more predicate logic could show you how to do that.


No. The three laws of formal logic are the same proposition stated differently. The proposition 'A != -A' is the same as the proposition 'A = A,' which I've pointed out it doesn't. It is correct that if A changes it becomes not A. This is expressed in the proposition 'A = -A', a violation of the laws of formal logic.

Now your no longer making sense. How on Earth did you come up with "A = -A" from A changing?


In other words, you have stated two different logical propositions and conflated them.

"If A changes it becomes not A" = "A is not A"

"A does not equal not A" = "A is not not A"

Ahh, I get it. You think equals and identity are identical to each other. The law of identity in action in your own writing.


To make it simpler for you to understand I'll replace the variable 'A' with the term 'proton.' in the law of identity, law of the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction.'

'A proton is not not a proton.'

'A proton is a proton'

'A proton is not a neutron.'

How do these account for the change of a proton to a neutron? In formal symbolic logic, the object the symbol represents (a value, function, vector, etc.) remains constant.

You have a shallow understanding of logic. These so called three laws only account for the smallest portions of logic; Aristotlean Logic, it ignores all logic formulated from the late 19th century onward.


Do you see the difference now?

I see the diffence when you use Aritotlean logic. Still haven't seen it for the whole of formal logic.

[RasTheDestroyer]

An abstraction is a sign, symbol, general term or predicate that is instantiated by a number of particulars. Some particulars are concrete: objects that exist in space and time.

An idealist philosophy turned on its head is materialist. Matter is the fundamental property of reality. Dialectical motion is a law intrinsic to the universe as can be observed in the universe's movement through successive developments from simpler to more complex, and lower to higher states of organization. The development of a star - a gaseous celestial body - is based on the contradictory forces of outward explosions of gas and gravitational pull. And DM is not a philosophy. It is an investigative method based on practice: the notion that our ideas and consciousness develop through material production, the class struggle, and scientific experiment. Hegel's idealism was based on the notion of contemplative reasoning: the criticism of an idea would reveal itself by isolating its content and moving through its implicit features in continuous and deeper movement. This raised a problem, of course, about how the mind could justify the very concepts it creates to give fixity to our fleeting perceptions. You have a shallow understanding of dialectical materialism.

Your modus ponens argument does not address matter in its constant motion because it is still bivalent.

If the angular momentum of a particle is x it is a proton. If it is not x it is not a proton. It is either true that it is a proton or it is false.

But this does not present the actual changes the particle undergoes in the course of its development. Even before the angular momentum of a particle is x, the proton is in the process of creation and the neutron in the process of destruction. In this transitional phase of a series of quantitative changes, it cannot be said to be either one or the other. It is both a proton and a neutron, each of which is united with and interpenetrates the other. It is both a proton and not a proton. The variable 'X' in your argument form again defines change and motion as discrete and divisible into parts.

Even modus ponens argument forms are based on axiomatic systems, which I have again pointed out are incomplete. Axioms require their own justification, and the knowledge of the motion or development of an object can only be understood through practice.

Engels writes: 'For everyday purposes, we know and can say, e.g., whether an animal is alive or not. But, upon closer inquiry, we find that his is, in many cases, a very complex question, as the jurists know very well. They have cudgelled their brains in vain to discover a rational limit beyond which the killing of the child in its mother's womb is murder. It is just as impossible to determine absolutely the moment of death, for physiology proves that death is not an instantaneous, momentary phenomenon, but a very protracted process...'

In other words, you are observing a natural process in isolation.

For the record, using a 'modus ponens' is redundant in this case. A logical biconditional would have sufficed: 'A particle is a proton if and only if its angular momentum is x.' But that still would be incorrect. And neither of these satisfy the criteria for expressing non-linear functions, of which the polarization of particles is one.

[RasTheDestroyer]

From what I understand, there is a strong possibility that Protons do not change and are therefore identical with themselves.

You have a shallow understanding of physics. These so called laws only account for the smallest portions of physics; it ignores all physics formulated from the 18th century onward.

[RasTheDestroyer]

Anyway, I think this thread is dead and will refrain from posting.

I don't teach pigs to sing. It will waste my time and just annoy the pig.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ras the Destroyer, thanks for those posts. I will be replying to some of the things you say over the next week or so.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ras The Destroyer:


2 of those 3 laws of logic were in fact formulated by Aristotle, the 3rd, the Law of Identity, was formulated first by Parmenides, who, unsurprisingly, held that reality was motionless, and was touched upon by Aristotle later.

The so-called 'law of identity' does not appear in Parmenides (or if you think otherwise, let's see the reference/quote), and Aristotle knew nothing of it, either.

But, even if he/they had, this 'law' is no enemy of change, for if something changes, then anything identical with it will change equally quickly.

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2006.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I think the point Ras is making is that there is a connection in Parmenides thinking: that the law of identity follows from the premise that reality is motionless and unchanging or vise versa.

Can we see the steps in your proof that the 'law' of identity follows from anything Parmenides ever said?

And there is a connection between Newton's ideas about gravity (which explain at least one of his laws) and his mystical beliefs.

Check these out:

Webster, C. (1982) From Paracelsus To Newton: Magic And The Making Of Modern Science (Cambridge University Press).

Dobbs, B. (2002), The Janus Face Of Genius: The Role Of Alchemy In Newton's Thought (Cambridge University Press).

McGuire, J. (1968), 'Force, Active Principles and Newton's Invisible Realm', Ambix 15, pp.154-208.

McGuire, J., and Rattansi, P. (1966), 'Newton And The "Pipes Of Pan"', Notes And Records Of The Royal Society Of London 21, pp.108-43.

And several of the entries listed here:

http://www.isaac-newton.org/

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ras:


Dialectical materialists do not insist that the LOI 'denies' change, but that it does cannot represent it.

That is not so; check these out:


"Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Trotsky (1971) In Defence of Marxism, p.63-64.]

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A is equal to A.

"…If a thing is always and under all conditions equal or identical with itself, it can never be unequal or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A always equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971) An Introduction to the Logic of Marxism, p.20.]

Plenty more examples listed at my site:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2006.htm


Logico-linguistic symbols are simply that: signs. Signs can only be an imperfect representation of what they signify. These 'laws of logic' are not inherent features of the universe but an imperfect human social construction which we use to understand it. To say that an abstraction like the variable 'A' can handle the changes in the reality it represents is like saying that a picture of an object - an abstraction/signifier - can handle the constant changes of the actual object it represents. This imperfection is demonstrated by ideas like Godel's incompleteness theorem and the Turing proof. (research these)

But these symbols are variables, and they picture change far better than dialectical 'logic' ever will. In fact, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761299&postcount=30

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761300&postcount=31


This imperfection is demonstrated by ideas like Godel's incompleteness theorem and the Turing proof. (research these)

This 'proof' is based on Cantor's notorious 'diagonal argument', and there are good reasons to question the validity of the latter:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Godel_letter.htm


"...Consider what was written in the OP


If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

'Unfortunately, this is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self.'

This is not incorrect because if an object changes, anything identical to it will not change equally quickly. Time is not linear or divisible or synchronous. This change is constant. No sooner than an object changes to something not identical to itself does it change again. Things don't change into something no longer identical with its former self. Things never are identical with themselves. Against, time is not divisible into discrete parts. No object is ever identical to itself and therefore there can be nothing identical to it that will change 'equally quickly' in the first place.

But, how do you know the following?


because if an object changes, anything identical to it will not change equally quickly.

Have you examined every single object in the universe?

Anyway, even if that were so, the second object you refer to cannot be identical with the first, contrary to the hypothesis.


No object is ever identical to itself and therefore there can be nothing identical to it that will change 'equally quickly' in the first place

From this, it looks like you are imposing your ideas on nature, not reading them from it, contrary to what these worthy sages argued:


"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976) Anti-Duhring, p.13.]

"The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels (1954) Dialectics of Nature, p.62.]

"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator from painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it." [Trotsky (1986) Notebooks, p.92. Bold emphasis added]

"Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973) Problems of Everyday Life, p.233.]

"Whenever any Marxist attempted to transmute the theory of Marx into a universal master key and ignore all other spheres of learning, Vladimir Ilyich would rebuke him with the expressive phrase 'Komchvanstvo' ('communist swagger')."

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965) [I]Origin of Materialism, p.17.]

You:


The second assertion, that 'if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self' is a confused and fragmented idea. 'A' signifies the 'thing' represented. If A possesses all the properties of the thing it represents, and the thing represented changes, it will cease not only to be identical to itself, but will cease to be itself entirely (because, as I pointed out above, things never are identical with themselves), and therefore A, the sign which represented the thing will not only cease to be identical to A, but will cease to be A.

But you have already told us this:


Logico-linguistic symbols are simply that: signs. Signs can only be an imperfect representation of what they signify.

If so, then your argument, which uses such "signs", too, cannot represent things accurately, either. Hence, your response to what I argued self-destructs.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ras:


No. Neither Logico-linguistic constructs or internal logic itself are built into the universe essentially, as the two examples of the incompleteness of internal logic I presented shows. Matter is built into the universe. Dialectical materialism implies something that is in fact built into the universe. It can only be expressed in language, but the method of dialectical materialism proceeds from the analysis of the concrete to the abstract, including predicates and generalized terms (constructs). Language is the external mode of representing many things, including both the dialectical materialist laws intrinsic to nature, and at the same time the external mode of representing the laws of formal logic not intrinsic to nature, but which are constructions for understanding simple processes. Of course language is a construct, but the imperfect representation of reality arises from the construction of the so-called 'laws' of logic.

Yet more imposition onto nature, yet more a priori dogmatics, I see.


Uh, protons change into neutrons and neutrons into protons all the time, based on changes in the speed of their 'spin' known in quantum physics as 'angular momentum.' Angular momentum - the sum of speed, momentum, and mass - determine which particle is produced. This is the dialectical transformation of quantity into quality. Show me how to represent this, or any non-linear system at all, in formal logic please?

And yet we read the following:


In particle physics, proton decay is a hypothetical form of radioactive decay in which the proton decays into lighter subatomic particles, usually a neutral pion and a positron. Proton decay has not been observed. There is currently no experimental evidence that proton decay occurs.

In the Standard Model, protons, a type of baryon, are theoretically stable because baryon number is conserved (under normal circumstances, however see chiral anomaly.) Therefore protons will not decay into other particles on their own, because they are the lightest (and therefore least energetic) baryon.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proton_decay


Along with neutrons, protons make up the nucleus, held together by the strong force. The proton is a baryon and is considered to be composed of two up quarks and one down quark.

It has long been considered to be a stable particle, but recent developments of grand unification models have suggested that it might decay with a half-life of about 10^32 years. Experiments are underway to see if such decays can be detected. Decay of the proton would violate the conservation of baryon number, and in doing so would be the only known process in nature which does so.

http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/particles/proton.html

And if Protons do decay, it can't be because of their 'internal contradictions', since they do not have any.

But, even if you were right, since the Neutron is not the opposite of a Proton, the change you mention would not be the result of a dialectical 'law'. As the dialectical gospels tell us:



"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]

"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... Mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891), p.414.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid., pp.311-18.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.

"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.

"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]

Bold emphases added.

References and links can be found at my site, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

Protons should thus turn in to electrons, if dialectics were true.

I see you have copied the latest dialectical jargon (about 'non-linear systems):


Show me how to represent this, or any non-linear system at all, in formal logic please?

Examples here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm

But, this claim of yours is a bit rich in view of the fact that dialectical 'logic' cannot represent anything at all, as I pointed out in my last post.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ras:


An abstraction is a sign, symbol, general term or predicate that is instantiated by a number of particulars. Some particulars are concrete: objects that exist in space and time.

But this destroys generality since it turns predicates into the names of abstract particulars. Details can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

The argument is summarised here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

And, I'd like to see you explain how 'abstractions' can be formed -- and you'll be the first person in human history to do so, if you succeed.


An idealist philosophy turned on its head is materialist. Matter is the fundamental property of reality. Dialectical motion is a law intrinsic to the universe as can be observed in the universe's movement through successive developments from simpler to more complex, and lower to higher states of organization. The development of a star - a gaseous celestial body - is based on the contradictory forces of outward explosions of gas and gravitational pull. And DM is not a philosophy. It is an investigative method based on practice: the notion that our ideas and consciousness develop through material production, the class struggle, and scientific experiment. Hegel's idealism was based on the notion of contemplative reasoning: the criticism of an idea would reveal itself by isolating its content and moving through its implicit features in continuous and deeper movement. This raised a problem, of course, about how the mind could justify the very concepts it creates to give fixity to our fleeting perceptions. You have a shallow understanding of dialectical materialism.

1) Yet more a priori dogmatics, I see.

2) Why are the things you mention 'contradictions' to begin with?

3) DM is certainly not a science. So, if it's not a philosophy (but many DM-fans would disagree with you, most of whom post here), what is it?


But this does not present the actual changes the particle undergoes in the course of its development. Even before the angular momentum of a particle is x, the proton is in the process of creation and the neutron in the process of destruction. In this transitional phase of a series of quantitative changes, it cannot be said to be either one or the other. It is both a proton and a neutron, each of which is united with and interpenetrates the other. It is both a proton and not a proton. The variable 'X' in your argument form again defines change and motion as discrete and divisible into parts.

But, how do you know this? Can we see the experimental results that confirm what you allege?

And you can only get away with such sweeping statements because of your vague use of 'quality', as I pointed out in the OP.


Even modus ponens argument forms are based on axiomatic systems, which I have again pointed out are incomplete. Axioms require their own justification, and the knowledge of the motion or development of an object can only be understood through practice.

The propositional calculus is complete; Godel's 'theorem' does not affect it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_calculus#Soundness_and_completeness_ of_the_rules

http://www.iep.utm.edu/prop-log/


Engels writes: 'For everyday purposes, we know and can say, e.g., whether an animal is alive or not. But, upon closer inquiry, we find that his is, in many cases, a very complex question, as the jurists know very well. They have cudgelled their brains in vain to discover a rational limit beyond which the killing of the child in its mother's womb is murder. It is just as impossible to determine absolutely the moment of death, for physiology proves that death is not an instantaneous, momentary phenomenon, but a very protracted process...'

In other words, you are observing a natural process in isolation.

Once more, how does Engels know this? Is he not, contrary to what he told us (see my previous posts), imposing dialectics on nature?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ras:


I don't teach pigs to sing. It will waste my time and just annoy the pig.

Even so, you are far better at name-calling than you are at logic.

May I suggest, therefore, you resume your promising career as a music teacher?

[Thirsty Crow]

Rosa, can you analyse the paragraph I will post and conclude whether the notion of dialectics you uphold (and criticize severely) matches the one found here:


However, as traditional dialectics teaches us, the operation of historization may follow two distinct paths, one of historical origin of things (material objects, social relations) and one of less tangible historicity of notions and concepts which help us understand all of it.

(I translated it from Serbo-Croatian)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Menocchio (quoting Jameson):


However, as traditional dialectics teaches us, the operation of historization may follow two distinct paths, one of historical origin of things (material objects, social relations) and one of less tangible historicity of notions and concepts which help us understand all of it.

Well, this seems to me to be a confused and very brief summary of one aspect of Historical Materialism, a theory I fully accept (once Hegel's confused ideas have been filtered out).

I cannot see anything 'dialectical' in it at all.

[Thirsty Crow]

Menocchio (quoting Jameson):



Well, this seems to me to be a confused and very brief summary of one aspect of Historical Materialism, a theory I fully accept (once Hegel's confused ideas have been filtered out).

I cannot see anything 'dialectical' in it at all.

And my suspicion that some formidable theorists use the term ("dialectics") in a confused manner is, at least partially, confirmed. But I'll deal with these problems more, a lot more.
Still, thanks for the input.

[Zanthorus]

And, I'd like to see you explain how 'abstractions' can be formed -- and you'll be the first person in human history to do so, if you succeed.

This is a little confusing. Surely an "abstraction" can easily be formed by ignoring all the contigencies of a specific phenomena which is irrelevant to understanding that phenomena?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


This is a little confusing. Surely an "abstraction" can easily be formed by ignoring all the contigencies of a specific phenomena which is irrelevant to understanding that phenomena?

Ok, abstract the colour blue for me.

[Zanthorus]

Ok, abstract the colour blue for me.

When we talk about abstraction, we talk about abstracting from things, circumstances, events etc.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, abstract the colour blue from, say, the sky.

Or even the concept, 'colour', from anything you like.

[Zanthorus]

So maybe it can't be applied in every case. Nonetheless, it is a word which appears in the dictionary with a definition, so clearly "ordinary language" facilitates talking about "abstractions" even if they can or cannot be made.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'm OK with the ordinary language term, it's the philosophical term I think is indefensible.

So -- go on, 'abstract' any term you like. You have a free hand...

Why you will always fail is explained in extensive detail here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_02.htm

Summarised here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Three_Part_One.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Three_Part_Two.htm

I base my case on these perceptive remarks of Marx's:


"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction…presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that if you leave out of account the limits of this body, you soon have nothing but a space -– that if, finally, you leave out of account the dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction the only substance left is the logical categories. Thus the metaphysicians, who in making these abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their core…." [Marx (1978) The Poverty of Philosophy, p.99.]


"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction….

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -– 'Fruit'….

"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'

"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975) The Holy Family, pp.72-75. Bold added.]

No wonder he also said:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphasis added.]

And:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Ibid., pp.64-65, quoted from here.]

Abstractionism is based on the idea that from thought alone we may extract fundamental truths about reality, truths that relate to a hidden world that is more real than the world we see around us. Such abstractions may then be imposed on reality in a thoroughly dogmatic and a priori manner.

Ruling-class hacks (aka philosophers) have been doing this since Anaximander was a lad...

[Zanthorus]

I think you mean Thales... but thanks for the slew of links nonetheless :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, I meant Anaximander. We just do not know enough about Thales to rope him in with the other abstractionists.

[Hit The North]

R:

Abstractionism is based on the idea that from thought alone we may extract fundamental truths about reality, truths that relate to a hidden world that is more real than the world we see around us. Such abstractions may then be imposed on reality in a thoroughly dogmatic and a priori manner.


Nevertheless, in the 1st Preface to Capital Vol 1, Marx writes, “In the analysis of economic forms neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of assistance.
The power of abstraction must replace them both.” So Marx, at least, deploys abstraction as a stage in his scientific method.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Nevertheless, in the 1st Preface to Capital Vol 1, Marx writes, “In the analysis of economic forms neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of assistance.
The power of abstraction must replace them both.” So Marx, at least, deploys abstraction as a stage in his scientific method.

Indeed he does, and he was wrong to do so. Marx was still partially in thrall to the same 'ruling ideas' that hold far too many of you lot fully in their grip.

When he was much younger he rejected such abstractions (as the quotes above show). It's a pity both he and Engels lost their earlier clarity of vision.

[Hit The North]

So now we know you think that Marx clarity of vision was suffering when he wrote Capital.

Nice one. :lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


So now we know you think that Marx clarity of vision was suffering when he wrote Capital.

On abstractions certainly -- as he realised 20 years earlier.

[Hit The North]

And yet this is Marx, in the first Preface of Das Kapital Vol 1, writing about his approach to the investigation of his subject. Was he telling porkies? Or was he using the word abstraction in a way contrary to your philosophical reading? He's certainly not arguing that the scientific method comprises of "the idea that from thought alone we may extract fundamental truths about reality, truths that relate to a hidden world that is more real than the world we see around us," as you put it. Isn't he referring to the construction of conceptual models of generality through the process of abstracting processes under consideration from the manifold relations in which they exist in the concrete? Similar to the way in which a chemist can study a process or phenomenon in the abstracted conditions of the laboratory?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


And yet this is Marx, in the first Preface of Das Kapital Vol 1, writing about his approach to the investigation of his subject. Was he telling porkies? Or was he using the word abstraction in a way contrary to your philosophical reading? He's certainly not arguing that the scientific method comprises of "the idea that from thought alone we may extract fundamental truths about reality, truths that relate to a hidden world that is more real than the world we see around us," as you put it. Isn't he referring to the construction of conceptual models of generality through the process of abstracting processes under consideration from the manifold relations in which they exist in the concrete? Similar to the way in which a chemist can study a process or phenomenon in the abstracted conditions of the laboratory?

Well, I have set out my objections to the traditional use of this word, briefly above, and in extensive detail at my site -- objections which coincide with Marx's earlier views on this obscure word. So, either find fault with my arguments, or just admit (ha, some hope!) you are, once again, out of your depth.

Or, more likely, just slope off in a sulk, as usual... :lol:

[Hit The North]

So was Marx confused about his own method of inquiry in Capital or is the method he chose faulty in your view?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


So was Marx confused about his own method of inquiry in Capital or is the method he chose faulty in your view?

Neither.

You be far better occupied trying to put up some sort of defence of the traditional theory of abstraction.

Oh wait -- you can't.:(

[Hit The North]

Still dodging the issue, I see.

Same old boring Rosa.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Still dodging the issue, I see.

Not at all. You gave me two options, neither of which applied to me. That, of course, is your problem, not mine.


Same old boring Rosa.

Ah, I see you do believe in the 'law of identity'.:lol:

[Hit The North]

Not at all. You gave me two options, neither of which applied to me. That, of course, is your problem, not mine.


Instead of dancing around the issue like a drunken diva, why don't you stop pouting and address my points?

They were:


And yet this is Marx, in the first Preface of Das Kapital Vol 1, writing about his approach to the investigation of his subject. Was he telling porkies? Or was he using the word abstraction in a way contrary to your philosophical reading? He's certainly not arguing that the scientific method comprises of "the idea that from thought alone we may extract fundamental truths about reality, truths that relate to a hidden world that is more real than the world we see around us," as you put it. Isn't he referring to the construction of conceptual models of generality through the process of abstracting processes under consideration from the manifold relations in which they exist in the concrete? Similar to the way in which a chemist can study a process or phenomenon in the abstracted conditions of the laboratory? The notion that you can dismiss Marx's claim to employ the power of abstraction in his analysis of Capital, by reference to some philosophical straw man called "abstractionism", doesn't wash. It is clear that Marx is not making an appeal to "abstractionism", as you define it above, when he writes:
In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p1.htmMoreover, in the passages you reproduce from the earlier work, it is not clear that Marx is attacking abstraction itself, but those who mistake the abstraction as primary to the concrete phenomenon it is derived from. He is attacking those who's goal is abstraction, instead of understanding the abstract as a necessary, but not final, stage in understanding a complex whole.

He discusses the role of abstraction in the methods of political economy and works out the methodological issues in the Grundrisse, his preparatory notes for Capital, and the reference to the 'force of abstraction' in his preface to the the first edition of Capital is a nod back towards this working out.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Instead of dancing around the issue like a drunken diva,

I'm sorry, but mercifully I'm nothing like you. Perhaps you need to go into rehab?


why don't you stop pouting and address my points?

Indeed, I will -- just as soon as you address the many hundreds I have raised with you since 2006 that you have ignored.


The notion that you can dismiss Marx's claim to employ the power of abstraction in his analysis of Capital, by reference to some philosophical straw man called "abstractionism", doesn't wash. It is clear that Marx is not making an appeal to "abstractionism", as you define it above, when he writes:

And where have I defined 'abstractionism'?


Moreover, in the passages you reproduce from the earlier work, it is not clear that Marx is attacking abstraction itself, but those who mistake the abstraction as primary to the concrete phenomenon it is derived from. He is attacking those who's goal is abstraction, instead of understanding the abstract as a necessary, but not final, stage in understanding a complex whole.

And where does he say that?


He discusses the role of abstraction in the methods of political economy and works out the methodological issues in the Grundrisse, his preparatory notes for Capital, and the reference to the 'force of abstraction' in his preface to the the first edition of Capital is a nod back towards this working out.

And yet, as I have shown, no sense can be made of this mythical 'force of abstraction' -- a traditional theory that you have yet to defend, or even explain.

[Hit The North]

R:

And where have I defined 'abstractionism'?Duh, here:



Abstractionism is based on the idea that from thought alone we may extract fundamental truths about reality, truths that relate to a hidden world that is more real than the world we see around us. Such abstractions may then be imposed on reality in a thoroughly dogmatic and a priori manner.



And where does he say that?Well we know from your interpretation of the 2nd Postface, that you have trouble with basic comprehension, but in the quotes you use, Marx is specifically referring to speculative philosophy. Moreover, in his discussion of the methods of political economy, Marx makes it clear that abstraction is a stage in the method of understanding general social phenomena:


Originally written by Karl Marx
When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin with its population, its distribution among classes, town, country, the coast, the different branches of production, export and import, annual production and consumption, commodity prices etc.

It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts [Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations. The former is the path historically followed by economics at the time of its origins. The economists of the seventeenth century, e.g., always begin with the living whole, with population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always conclude by discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations such as division of labour, money, value, etc. As soon as these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended from the simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market. The latter is obviously the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception. Along the first path the full conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second, the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought. In this way Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being. For example, the simplest economic category, say e.g. exchange value, presupposes population, moreover a population producing in specific relations; as well as a certain kind of family, or commune, or state, etc. It can never exist other than as an abstract, one-sided relation within an already given, concrete, living whole. As a category, by contrast, exchange value leads an antediluvian existence. Therefore, to the kind of consciousness – and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness – for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production – which only, unfortunately, receives a jolt from the outside – whose product is the world; and – but this is again a tautology – this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head’s conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3

Originally posted by Rosa Lichtenstein
And yet, as I have shown, no sense can be made of this mythical 'force of abstraction' -- a traditional theory that you have yet to defend, or even explain. I don't have to explain it, as Marx clearly does so himself. In case you missed it, here it is:


Originally written by Karl Marx
When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin with its population, its distribution among classes, town, country, the coast, the different branches of production, export and import, annual production and consumption, commodity prices etc.

It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts [Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations. The former is the path historically followed by economics at the time of its origins. The economists of the seventeenth century, e.g., always begin with the living whole, with population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always conclude by discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations such as division of labour, money, value, etc. As soon as these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended from the simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market. The latter is obviously the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception. Along the first path the full conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second, the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought. In this way Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being. For example, the simplest economic category, say e.g. exchange value, presupposes population, moreover a population producing in specific relations; as well as a certain kind of family, or commune, or state, etc. It can never exist other than as an abstract, one-sided relation within an already given, concrete, living whole. As a category, by contrast, exchange value leads an antediluvian existence. Therefore, to the kind of consciousness – and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness – for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production – which only, unfortunately, receives a jolt from the outside – whose product is the world; and – but this is again a tautology – this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head’s conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Duh, here:


Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein
Abstractionism is based on the idea that from thought alone we may extract fundamental truths about reality, truths that relate to a hidden world that is more real than the world we see around us. Such abstractions may then be imposed on reality in a thoroughly dogmatic and a priori manner.

That's not a definition. It's a partial background explanation. Notice, it tells you what abstractionism is based on, not what it is.

You seem to have confused 'explanation' with 'definition'.

And thanks for the quotation from Marx (when I post things twice, you accuse me of spamming!), but I have actually dealt with it before (in a thread about Bertell Ollman's work) -- in your haste to malign me, you clearly missed it.

Here it is again:


Now it is undeniable that Marx uses this word, and he certainly imagines he has applied the 'process' to his studies, but there nothing in Marx's writings to show he actually abstracted a single thing. And this is not just because the 'process' itself is impossible to carry out. The famous passage that is usually quoted to show that Marx does in fact use abstraction, as we have already seen, actually fails in that regard:


"It seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete…with e.g. the population…. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest…. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and I would then, by further determination, move toward ever more simple concepts, from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations…. The latter is obviously scientifically the correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse." [Marx (1973), pp.100-01.]

As I noted in one of my Essays:


In fact, Marx does not actually do what he says he does in this passage; he merely gestures at doing it, and his gestures are about as substantive as the hand movements of stage magicians. This is not to malign Marx. Das Kapital is perhaps one of the greatest books ever written; but it would have been an even more impressive work if the baleful influence of traditional thought had been kept totally at bay.

What Marx actually did was set out to use familiar words in new ways, thus establishing new concepts that enabled him to understand and explain Capitalism with startling clarity. Anyone who reads the above passage can actually see him doing just this. They do not need to do brain scans on Marx, nor apply psychometric tests to follow his argument (or, indeed, re-create his 'abstractions'). And they certainly do not have to copy his moves -- and they most certainly cannot copy them, for Marx did not say what he had actually done with the concepts he used, or how he 'mentally processed' them (that is, if he did!). In fact, his 'instructions' on how to abstract the "population" are about as useful as John Lennon's famous remark that to find the USA you just turn left at Greenland. Hence, no one could possibly follow Marx here since there are no useful details, which suggests that Marx did not in fact do what he said he did --, otherwise, careful thinker that he was, he would have included them. More significantly, no one since has been able to reconstruct these mythical moves, or show that their own weak gestures at copying this method are exactly the same as those used by Marx (or even that they yield the same results -- as I noted earlier).

None of this is surprising. Abstractionists become very vague when it comes to the giving the details of this 'process'; that is why, after 2400 years of this metaphysical fairy-tale, over and above, that is, the sort of vague gesture theorists like Ollman give, no one can say what this 'process' actually is!

And neither have you been able to fill in these missing details.

No surprise there then -- since, in matters philosophical, you are the non-existent deity's gift to superficiality.

[Small wonder then that Marx chose not to publish the Grundrisse.]

[S.Artesian]

Well, here we have Rosa stating:


In fact, Marx does not actually do what he says he does in this passage; he merely gestures at doing it, and his gestures are about as substantive as the hand movements of stage magicians. This is not to malign Marx. Das Kapital is perhaps one of the greatest books ever written; but it would have been an even more impressive work if the baleful influence of traditional thought had been kept totally at bay.

This of course seems to conflict with her claims that Marx completely extirpated all influences of the baleful thought of Hegel, from whom Marx took over the category of abstraction, and the process of determining, explicating the abstract in the concrete, and vice-versa.

Mere technicality, I'm sure.

More concretely, referring to the abstract, in denying the validity of the process, even the possibility of abstraction, by distorting it as a "mystical process," Rosa has once again provided evidence of her distance from Marx, and in particular Marx's theory of value within capitalism, for what is value except abstract labor, social labor, labor in general, labor defined by its social, and human, essence-- the expenditure, "embedding" of time in production?

Tell us, Rosa, how are commodities exchangeable if there is no abstract, no abstract labor? How is there exchange value?

More reasons why Rosa has nothing to say about the substance of Marx's critique of capital, his investigation of value and valorisation.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants:


Well, here we have Rosa stating:

Still addressing your microscopic set of fans, and not debating with me, I see.


This of course seems to conflict with her claims that Marx completely extirpated all influences of the baleful thought of Hegel, from whom Marx took over the category of abstraction, and the process of determining, explicating the abstract in the concrete, and vice-versa.

In fact, if you read what I actually said, and not what you'd like me to have said, you would have seen that I point out that abstraction is not a uniquely Hegelian ploy -- it dates back to the ancient Greeks (in the 'west'). See my next post.

But, anyway, this 'abstractionist' text is not to be found in Das Kapital -- perhaps you aren't familiar enough with Marx's work to know this.

Good job I'm here to help you out then, isn't it?:)

No -- no thanks needed.


More concretely, referring to the abstract, in denying the validity of the process, even the possibility of abstraction, by distorting it as a "mystical process," Rosa has once again provided evidence of her distance from Marx, and in particular Marx's theory of value within capitalism, for what is value except abstract labor, social labor, labor in general, labor defined by its social, and human, essence-- the expenditure, "embedding" of time in production?

Well, Marx chose not to publish this document; clearly, on second thoughts, he preferred his earlier published comments about this mythical process:


"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction…presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that if you leave out of account the limits of this body, you soon have nothing but a space -– that if, finally, you leave out of account the dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction the only substance left is the logical categories. Thus the metaphysicians, who in making these abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their core…." [Marx (1978) The Poverty of Philosophy, p.99. Bold added.]

And, even more pointedly:


"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction….

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -– 'Fruit'….

"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'

"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975) The Holy Family, pp.72-75. Bold added.]

Moreover, he put this ploy down to the distortion of ordinary language (already hinted at in his comments above about what 'the ordinary man' thinks):


"The philosophers would only have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Emphases added.]

In my next two posts, I'll explain the background to this ancient verbal trick.

Anyway -- I'm so honoured; Saint Artesian is now addressing me:


Tell us, Rosa, how are commodities exchangeable if there is no abstract, no abstract labor? How is there exchange value?

As you have been told before, I'll answer your naive questions just as soon you answer the many I have asked you, but which you simply ignore.

Back to 'his' miniscule audience, now:


More reasons why Rosa has nothing to say about the substance of Marx's critique of capital, his investigation of value and valorisation.

Better to say nothing than to mystify his work, as you do, I'd say. :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is a summary (taken from my site) of Hegel's basic logical errors -- many of which he derived from the logical screw ups of earlier mystics:


Dialectical 'Logic' derives from Hegel's (deliberate) misunderstanding of Aristotle, and from a linguistic dodge invented in the Middle Ages.

First of all, Hegel thought that certain sentences contained an in-built contradiction.

If we use Lenin's example:

J1: John is a man.

we can see where this idea came from, and thus where it goes astray. [Hegel in fact used the sentence, "The rose is red".]

First of all, Hegel accepted a theory invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians (which is now called the Identity Theory of Predication (http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/identity-theory-of-predication.php)) that re-interprets propositions like J1 in the following way:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

The former "is" of predication (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/predication) was replaced by an "is" of identity.

[Predication involves saying something about someone or some thing. So, in J1, Lenin was saying something about John. "John" is the subject, and "is a man" is the predicate. When this "is" is turned into one of identity, this becomes the monstrosity, "John is identical with man." This why J2 is often used, even though it, too, is a monstrosity.]

The argument then went as follows: since John cannot be identical with a general term (or, rather, with what it represents, a universal (http://www.iep.utm.edu/universa/)), we must conclude the following:

J3: John is not identical with Manhood.

But then again, if John is a man, he must be identical with (or at least he must share in) what other men are, so we must now conclude:

J4: John is not not identical with Manhood.

Or, more simply:

J5: John is not a non-man.

It's hard to believe, but out of this was born the Negation of the Negation.

Hegel thought this showed that motion was built into our concepts, as thought passes from one pole to another, and that this indicated that it has dialectics built into it.
It also allowed him to cast doubt upon the validity of the 'Law of Identity' [LOI] -- a 'Law', incidentally, that cannot be found in Aristotle's work, but which was invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians, once more.

Hegel thought this showed that it was now possible to state this 'Law' negatively.

However, in order to proceed, Hegel not only employed a barrage of impenetrably obscure jargon, he relied on some hopelessly sloppy syntax (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syntax). He plainly thought he could ignore the logical/grammatical distinctions that exist between the various terms he used, or, at least, between the roles they occupy in language -- i.e., between naming, saying, describing and predicating. This 'enabled' him to pull-off several neat verbal tricks --, and from the ensuing confusion, 'the dialectic' emerged.

For instance, Hegel thought that the LOI could be stated negatively, and that this implied the so-called Law of Non-contradiction [LOC].


When the principles of Essence are taken as essential principles of thought they become predicates of a presupposed subject, which, because they are essential, is "everything". The propositions thus arising have been stated as universal Laws of Thought. Thus the first of them, the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical with itself, A = A: and negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and Not-A. This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing but the law of abstract understanding. The propositional form itself contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate; while the present one does not fulfil what its form requires. But the Law is particularly set aside by the following so-called Laws of Thought, which make laws out of its opposite. It is asserted that the maxim of Identity, though it cannot be proved, regulates the procedure of every consciousness, and that experience shows it to be accepted as soon as its terms are apprehended. To this alleged experience of the logic books may be opposed the universal experience that no mind thinks or forms conceptions or speaks in accordance with this law, and that no existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. [Hegel, Shorter Logic, quoted from here (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slessenc.htm).]

So, from A =A he thought he could obtain "A cannot at the same time be A and not-A", which is supposed to be the LOC. But, the LOI concerns the conditions under which an object is identical with itself, or with something else; it's not about the alleged identity of propositions, nor of clauses with propositions.



In that case, the alleged negative version of the LOI cannot have anything to do with the connection between a proposition and its contradictory. The LOC, on the other hand, is about propositions (or clauses), not objects. Only by confusing objects (or the names of objects) with propositions (and clauses) -- that is, by confusing objects and their names with what we say about them, truly or falsely -- was Hegel able to concoct the 'dialectic'.

[The full details here are rather complex, so I have omitted them. However, readers can find out what these are here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm) and here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm).]

Furthermore, propositions are not objects; if they were they could not be used to say anything. Sure, we use signs to express propositions, but these signs become symbols (i.e., they signify things for us, and convey meaning). We achieve this by the way we employ such signs according to the grammatical complexity our ancestors built into language.

To see this, just look at any object or collection of objects and ask yourself what it/they say to you. You might be tempted to reply that it/they say this or that, but in order to report what it/they allegedly say, you will be forced to articulate whatever that is in a proposition. You could not do this by merely reproducing the original objects, or just by naming them. This is not surprising, since objects have no social history, intellect or language, whereas we do, and have. And so does our language.

Unfortunately, Engels and Lenin swallowed this spurious Hegelian line of reasoning hook, line and sinker; and that is because they both knew no logic, but had a wildly inflated view of Hegel and his expertise in this area. [This is not to demean these two great revolutionaries; many others, who should know better, have similarly been duped.]
However, because of this misplaced respect for Hegel, Marxists have been saddled with his loopy logic ever since (upside down, or 'the right way up').

Here is Lenin, for example:


To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a "nucleus" ("cell") the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. [Lenin (1961) (http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/volume38.htm), i.e., [I]Philosophical Notebooks, pp.359-60.]

In this passage, Lenin felt he could 'derive' fundamental truths about reality, not from a scientific investigation of the world, but from examining a few words seen through Hegel's distorting lens!

[And yet, dialecticians still tell us with a straight face that their theory has not been imposed on nature! (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm)]

However, J1 is a descriptive sentence, so it cannot be treated in the way Hegel imagined. In fact, Aristotle would have approached it differently. In order to explain its structure, he would have said:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

[J1: John is a man.]

In other words, in J1 the predicate is used to describe John; it is not expressing an identity.

Indeed, it makes no sense to suppose with Hegel that John (or his name) could be identical with a general term (any more than it would make sense to suppose that you, for example, are identical with a conjunction, a preposition, or an adverb) --, or even with what any of these allegedly 'represent'.

In which case, this example of Medieval, Roman Catholic 'logic' is not simply misguided, it's bizarre!

It surely takes a special sort of 'genius' (which we are assured by Lenin that Hegel possessed) to suppose that an object like John could be identical with a predicate, or with the abstraction which it designated!

Now, if we return to the original sentence, translated this time into Hegel-speak, we can see where the argument goes further astray:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

It is now impossible to explain what the extra "is" here means (highlighted), which has to be used to make the alleged identity between John and Manhood (or whatever) plain.

In fact, if all such uses of "is" expressed disguised identities (as we are assured they must), J2 would now have to become:

J2a: John is identical with identical with Manhood.

as the green "is" is replaced with what it is supposed to mean, i.e., "is identical with" --, in blue. After another such dialectical switch, J2a would in turn become:

J2b: John is identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

as this new "is" we had to use in J2a is given a similar dialectical make-over to yield J2b. And so on:

J2b: John is identical with identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

[These untoward moves can only be halted by those who do not think "is" always expresses an identity; but dialecticians gave up the right to lodge that particular appeal the moment they accepted the Identity Theory of Predication.]

Fortunately, Aristotle's approach short-circuits all this; there is no "is" at all in A1:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

In contrast to this, Hegel's 'analysis' cannot avoid this verbal explosion; indeed, it invites it.

Anyone who thinks this is nit-picking need only reflect on the fact that Hegel, or anyone who agrees with him, cannot explain his theory without using J2:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

But, Hegel's theory stalls at this point, for this extra "is" cannot be one of identity (for the above reasons), and if it isn't, then the theory that tells us that "is" is always one of identity (in such contexts) must be false.

In fact, this Hegelian trick can only be carried out in Indo-European (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-European_languages) languages. By-and-large, other language groups do not have this particular grammatical feature. The above moves depend solely on the subject-predicate form (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predicate_(grammar)) taking the copula (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copula_(linguistics)) "is" (and its cognates), which is found almost exclusively in the aforementioned language group.

This shows that Hegel's logic is not just bizarre, it's highly parochial. Hence, no general conclusions (or any at all) can follow from it.

To illustrate these bogus moves, consider, for example, J1 again:

J1: John is a man.

Given traditional grammar, this is in effect:

G1: S is P.

[Where, "S" = "Subject", "P" = "Predicate".]

Now, we already have the facility in language to express identity (and genuinely so). For example, here is an uncontroversial identity statement:

G2: Cicero is Tully.

["Tully" was Cicero's other name. Cicero was a right-wing politician who lived in Ancient Rome, about the same time as Julius Caesar.]

So, G2 quite legitimately means:

G2a: Cicero is identical with Tully.

Or:

G3: A = B.

[Where "A" is "Cicero and "B" is "Tully"; using "=" as the identity sign, here.]

G3 expresses an unambiguous "is" of identity. No problem with that. But, it is important to note that the identity expressed here is between two names, or between two named individuals (depending on how it is read). This is typical of the use of the "is" of identity.

Now, just look at the similarity between the following two linguistic forms -- especially between G1 (a predication) and G2 (an identity):

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G3: A = B.

Highly influential ancient and medieval logicians noticed this, too, and combined the two distinct forms into one, reading the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity.

But this now turns the predicate "P" into a name, for identities are expressed between names (or between other singular terms). Unfortunately, if "P" is a name, it cannot now be a predicate.

Hegel also adopted this approach to such propositions, confusing the "is" of identity with the "is" of predication. This then 'allowed' him to claim that propositions like J1 were in fact identity statements. Of course, that means this part of Hegel's 'logic' was based solely on what is in effect a grammatical stipulation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition) (i.e., a dogmatic assertion that these two forms are one and the same, which then creates the sorts of problems we have seen above). Moreover, this is a stipulation that destroys the capacity language has for expressing generality, for that is what predicates do (they allow us to say general things about named individuals, etc.).

Given the 'Hegel treatment', J1 thus becomes J1a and/or J1b:

J1: John is a man.

J1a: John = man/Manhood.

J1b: John is identical with man/Manhood.

[Unfortunately, however, in his old age Aristotle was already moving in this direction -- i.e., he too was beginning to confuse predication with identity, or, rather, he was beginning to confuse predicates with names, and describing with naming.]

Hence, on this view, just as "Tully" names Cicero, "man" 'names' Manhood --, or perhaps, the class/set of all men. The rationale underlying these moves had already been established by earlier mystics and theorists, who were, among other things, concerned about the union or identity between the human soul and 'God'/'Being'. Hence, they played around with the Greek verb "to be" (and thus the "is" of predication) until it was made to say what they wanted it to say.

Of course, this grammatical sleight-of-hand helps account for the emphasis placed by subsequent Idealists on the 'identity' of 'Thought' and 'Being', which later became the main problematic of German Idealism --, a problematic Engels also accepted.

[On that, see his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.]

There is in fact no other reason for adopting the Identity Theory of Predication, which also helps explain why it was theologians and mystics who invented it. Of course, none of this occurred in an ideological vacuum; a brief outline of the relevant details can be found here.

Anyway, logicians after Aristotle, and especially those working in the Middle Ages, began to conflate these two distinct forms as a matter of course. This fed into, and was fed in return by, an increasingly elaborate and complex metaphysic supposedly about the ultimate structure of reality and the relation of 'Thought' to 'Being' --, all based solely on this ancient linguistic sleight-of-hand!

[Similar moves underpinned Anselm's (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anselm/) infamous Ontological Argument (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/) for the existence of 'God'. In this case, too, Anselm thought he could 'derive' profound 'truths' about 'divine reality', valid for all of space and time -- and beyond -- solely from language/thought.]

So, in the end, J1/G1 and G2-type sentences were both modelled along the lines expressed in G4 and G5 -- i.e., as identity statements.

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G4: A = B.

G5: John = Manhood.

But, once more, this turns predicates into Proper Names -- i.e., "...is a man" becomes the proper name of Manhood, which it plainly is not. Naming is not the same as describing. We name our children when they are born, we do not describe them. We do not call children "is a man", or "is tall". Not even pop stars do that to their off-spring! We describe the world around us, we do not name it.

The untoward result of this process is explained clearly by Professor E J Lowe:


What is the problem of predication? In a nutshell, it is this. Consider any simple subject-predicate sentence, such as..., "Theaetetus sits". How are we to understand the different roles of the subject and the predicate in this sentence, "Theaetetus" and "sits" respectively? The role of "Theaetetus" seems straightforward enough: it serves to name, and thereby to refer to or stand for, a certain particular human being. But what about "sits"? Many philosophers have been tempted to say that this also refers to or stands for something, namely, a property or universal that Theaetetus possesses or exemplifies: the property of sitting. This is said to be a universal, rather than a particular, because it can be possessed by many different individuals.

But now we have a problem, for this view of the matter seems to turn the sentence "Theaetetus sits" into a mere list of (two) names, each naming something different, one a particular and one a universal: "Theaetetus, sits." But a list of names is not a sentence because it is not the sort of thing that can be said to be true or false, in the way that "Theaetetus sits" clearly can. The temptation now is to say that reference to something else must be involved in addition to Theaetetus and the property of sitting, namely, the relation of possessing that Theaetetus has to that property. But it should be evident that this way of proceeding will simply generate the same problem, for now we have just turned the original sentence into a list of three names, "Theaetetus, possessing, sits."

Indeed, we are now setting out on a vicious infinite regress, which is commonly known as "Bradley's regress", in recognition of its modern discoverer, the British idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley. Bradley used the regress to argue in favour of absolute idealism.... [Lowe (2006). Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at my site.]

So, a collection of names is a list, and lists say nothing --, just as objects say nothing.
Of course, it could be objected that there are languages in which names describe. For example, Native Americans use names such as "Sitting Bull", "Crazy Horse", or "Rain In The Face", which describe what the individual concerned either did or was reminiscent of.
Even so, no Native American would argue as follows:

N1: Sitting Bull has just stood up.

N2; Therefore Sitting Bull is no longer Sitting Bull, he is Standing Bull.

But they would argue as follows:

N3: That animal over there is a sitting bull.

N4: It has just stood up, so it is now a standing bull.

These show that the logical use of names is distinct from that of descriptions. Any contingent psychological or idiosyncratic associations a name has are logically irrelevant, no matter how important they are to a given culture.

Hence the name "Sitting Bull" here is a logical unit, and cannot be split up like a description can. This is because, as Aristotle noted (De Interpretatione, Section 3), names are tenseless, but predicates are not. The above examples bring this out, since change (expressed by the use of tensed verbs) applies to predicates, not to names.

[These and other complications are discussed at length in Geach (1968), pp.22-80. See also here (http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Courses/Ancient/predication.html).]

So, for Hegel, "...is a man" became the Proper Name of Manhood, which was then dignified by being called an "abstraction", or even worse, an "essence" -- both of which entities were conjured into existence by this linguistic dodge, and nothing more.

In this way then, dialectics follows solely from such ancient and defective logic, compounded by a crass misconstrual of a sub-branch of Indo-European grammar!
Hard to believe? Well, Marx himself indicated that this was so:


"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels: The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Now, even if the above analysis of mine were incorrect in some way, neither Aristotle nor Hegel (nor anyone else for that matter since) has been able to explain how or why contingent features of Indo-European grammar could possibly have such profound implications built into them --, or how they could reveal to us such fundamental truths about the deep structure of reality, valid for all of space and time.

In fact, I call this approach to knowledge Linguistic Idealism.

More on that here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Rest_of_Summary_of_Twelve.htm).

References

Geach, P. (1968), Reference And Generality (Cornell University Press).

Lowe, E. (2006), 'Take A Seat And The Consider This Simple Sentence', Times Higher Education Supplement, 07/04/06.

In my next post I will trace this back to its roots in Ancient Greek thought.

[S.Artesian]

But of course Marx does publish the demonstration of his dialectic; he does demonstrate his use of abstraction, describing the two-fold nature of the labor process, both in the particular and in the abstract as the valorisation process, the creation of value. It is this that Our Lady of the Anti-Dialectic must ignore, disregard, present as "flirtation" and non-serious use of language, and consequently a non-serious analysis of the relations that define the commodity.

And he does all this in volume 1 of Capital, that very same volume that Rosa cannot comment on, other than to distort the plain meaning of the plain language Marx uses in the afterword to the second edition.

Here are some of those sections:

First, as if he had Rosa, and those like her in mind, Marx says:


The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both. But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.
With the exception of the section of value-form, therefore, this volume cannot stand accused on the score of difficulty. I presuppose, of course, a reader who is willing to learn something new and therefore to think for himself.


And then to the passages themselves:




This common “something” cannot be either a geometrical, a chemical, or any other natural property of commodities. Such properties claim our attention only in so far as they affect the utility of those commodities, make them use values. But the exchange of commodities is evidently an act characterised by a total abstraction from use value. Then one use value is just as good as another, provided only it be present in sufficient quantity….


But even the product of labour itself has undergone a change in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use value, we make abstraction at the same time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use value; we see in it no longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put out of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labour of the joiner, the mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labour. Along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the various kinds of labour embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labour; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labour, human labour in the abstract….


A use value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human labour in the abstract has been embodied or materialised in it. How, then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured? Plainly, by the quantity of the value-creating substance, the labour, contained in the article….


Productive activity, if we leave out of sight its special form, viz., the useful character of the labour, is nothing but the expenditure of human labour power. Tailoring and weaving, though qualitatively different productive activities, are each a productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles, and in this sense are human labour. They are but two different modes of expending human labour power. Of course, this labour power, which remains the same under all its modifications, must have attained a certain pitch of development before it can be expended in a multiplicity of modes. But the value of a commodity represents human labour in the abstract, the expenditure of human labour in general….

Just as, therefore, in viewing the coat and linen as values, we abstract from their different use values, so it is with the labour represented by those values: we disregard the difference between its useful forms, weaving and tailoring….

On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labour power, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and forms the value of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of human labour power in a special form and with a definite aim, and in this, its character of concrete useful labour, it produces use values….

If we say that, as values, commodities are mere congelations of human labour, we reduce them by our analysis, it is true, to the abstraction, value; but we ascribe to this value no form apart from their bodily form. It is otherwise in the value relation of one commodity to another. Here, the one stands forth in its character of value by reason of its relation to the other….

In this roundabout way, then, the fact is expressed, that weaving also, in so far as it weaves value, has nothing to distinguish it from tailoring, and, consequently, is abstract human labour. It is the expression of equivalence between different sorts of commodities that alone brings into relief the specific character of value-creating labour, and this it does by actually reducing the different varieties of labour embodied in the different kinds of commodities to their common quality of human labour in the abstract….

This concrete labour becomes, therefore, the medium for expressing abstract human labour. If on the one hand the coat ranks as nothing but the embodiment of abstract human labour, so, on the other hand, the tailoring which is actually embodied in it, counts as nothing but the form under which that abstract labour is realised. In the expression of value of the linen, the utility of the tailoring consists, not in making clothes, but in making an object, which we at once recognise to be Value, and therefore to be a congelation of labour, but of labour indistinguishable from that realised in the value of the linen. In order to act as such a mirror of value, the labour of tailoring must reflect nothing besides its own abstract quality of being human labour generally….

The equalisation of the most different kinds of labour can be the result only of an abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them to their common denominator, viz. expenditure of human labour power or human labour in the abstract. The twofold social character of the labour of the individual appears to him, when reflected in his brain, only under those forms which are impressed upon that labour in every-day practice by the exchange of products….


The truth of the proposition that, “although gold and silver are not by Nature money, money is by Nature gold and silver,”6 is shown by the fitness of the physical properties of these metals for the functions of money.7 Up to this point, however, we are acquainted only with one function of money, namely, to serve as the form of manifestation of the value of commodities, or as the material in which the magnitudes of their values are socially expressed. An adequate form of manifestation of value, a fit embodiment of abstract, undifferentiated, and therefore equal human labour, that material alone can be whose every sample exhibits the same uniform qualities. On the other hand, since the difference between the magnitudes of value is purely quantitative, the money commodity must be susceptible of merely quantitative differences, must therefore be divisible at will, and equally capable of being reunited. Gold and silver possess these properties by Nature…

If the interval in time between the two complementary phases of the complete metamorphosis of a commodity become too great, if the split between the sale and the purchase become too pronounced, the intimate connexion between them, their oneness, asserts itself by producing – a crisis. The antithesis, use-value and value; the contradictions that private labour is bound to manifest itself as direct social labour, that a particularised concrete kind of labour has to pass for abstract human labour; the contradiction between the personification of objects and the representation of persons by things; all these antitheses and contradictions, which are immanent in commodities, assert themselves, and develop their modes of motion, in the antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of a commodity…


The expansion of value, which is the objective basis or main-spring of the circulation M-C-M, becomes his subjective aim, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations….

Consequently, we see, first, that the addition of new value takes place not by virtue of his labour being spinning in particular, or joinering in particular, but because it is labour in the abstract, a portion of the total labour of society; and we see next, that the value added is of a given definite amount, not because his labour has a special utility, but because it is exerted for a definite time….




Marx clearly does, in the body of his analysis of capital, exactly what he says constitutes the scientific method, the method of distillation and abstraction, of reduction, only to reconstruct the entire system being analyzed in all its "richness" based on its own immanence.

And all of this, Rosa cannot comment upon, cannot provide an iota of explanation of the interpenetration of labor, and wage-labor, of the labor-process and the valorisation process, of the commodity as a use-value and as an object embedded with and therefore existing as value.

Rosa makes herself a know-nothing.

PS. Yes, I read what Rosa said, i.e about "the baleful influence of traditional thought." Rosa didn't read what I said, that in his demonstration of abstraction, of the organization of the particular and the concrete, the abstract and the general in each other, Marx has consciously taken over this dialectic from Hegel.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This is also a summary of my ideas on abstractionism -- taken from my site:


Abstraction, The Heart Of The Beast

Traditional Thought

In ancient Greece, and for ideologically-driven reasons that will be examined in Essay Twelve (summary here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Rest_of_Summary_of_Twelve.htm)), the idea took hold that there was an invisible, underlying structure to reality accessible to thought alone, which was in fact more real than the material world around us.

From the record it is possible to show how and why these early thinkers had to invent abstract terms to account for the structure of this unseen world, using jargon (such as "Being", "Substance", "Essence", and the like) that has entered western intellectual life ever since. [These terms should not be confused with typographically similar words found in the vernacular.]

We saw in Essay Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm), that dialectical Marxists are nothing if not traditionalists, keen to impose their a priori theses on nature. This has meant that this ancient approach to knowledge has also been copied by all card-carrying dialecticians: the Greek emphasis on "abstraction" aimed at uncovering "essences" by thought alone.

It is worth pointing out here that the usual philosophical justification for assuming the existence of abstractions is that they account for general features of the world, and thus for our ability to study nature. It is also worth noting that the ordinary use of abstract nouns is not being questioned here, merely their metaphysical misuse.

Linguistic Distortion

The idea that language can and has been distorted for ideological reasons, and that abstractionism is in fact at the heart of this process, is not just the invention of latter-day Wittgensteinian Marxists like myself, Marx and Engels themselves referred to it:


"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'" [Marx and Engels (1975), p.75. Bold emphases added.]

"...The philosophers would only have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis only added.]

One particular form of linguistic distortion that is relevant to the formation of Hegelian, and later 'materialist' dialectics, centres around a seemingly innocent form of indicative sentence (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/indicative_mood) almost exclusively found in the Indo-European family of languages. This is the subject-predicate form, and a limited sub-category even of this, too, where the copula is a cognate of the verb "to be".

Consider an example Hegel himself used: "The rose is red". Here the subject is clearly the rose, and the predicate is what it is said to be, i.e., red. The verb "is" merely connects the two parts of the sentence. As readers will no doubt appreciate, sentences like this are used to describe things, and no one thinks for a minute there is a secret code that has been buried in such sentences by our ancestors, waiting for alert Philosophers to come along and uncover for us.

The logical form of such sentences may be expressed thus: "The F is G", or more simply "A is G", or in a more complex form, "Some F is G", "Every F is G", and so on.

[Here "F" and "G" stand for various sorts of nouns, and "A" for a proper name, say. Clearly this is to over-simplify -- but this is a summary!]

From Aristotle's time onwards it became increasingly common to interpret this sort of predication, not as "The F is G", or "A is G", but as "The F is identical with G", "A is identical with G", or as "Every A is identical with (every) G". In the Middle Ages this re-write became known as the "Identity (or Essential) Theory of Predication". This allowed Philosophers to imagine that predicates were really the names of "Universals", "Forms" or "Essences", which could be abstracted into existence in the minds of those willing to perform the trick -- and who plainly had too much leisure time on their hands to allow them to do so.

To cut a long story short, this is the theory that motivated Hegel, for it now seemed to him that no subject could be identical with the predicate to which it was related. In that case, all such sentences surreptitiously alluded to a contradiction at the heart of thought: the subject both is and is not identical to the predicate term. It never occurred to him to draw the obvious conclusion that this way of looking at this tiny (and unrepresentative) class of sentences, in a minor grammatical aspect of only one family of languages, was not perhaps the best way of proceeding. The normal descriptive mode of predication was ignored because he wanted to find an allusion to "essences" in language to allow him to discover fundamental truths about "Being" in the comfort of his own day-dreams.

Of course, this approach to discourse had been at the heart of traditional thought since Greek times (in fact it originated in Egyptian/Babylonian myth), whereby language was seen as (or as containing a) secret code that was capable of re-presenting the inner structure of "Being" in the minds of elite thinkers. This was partly because the 'gods' themselves had called the world into existence by means of language, and they had also invented language as a gift to humanity in order to re-present their thoughts to us, and partly for ideological reasons (since it allowed such theorists to connect the structure and authority of the State with the 'will of the gods' (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Rest_of_Summary_of_Twelve.htm)).

Language was thus seen, not as a material and social product, created in and by collective labour in order to facilitate communication, but as a secret code invented by 'divine beings' to represent their thoughts to humanity (or rather to priests, kings and elite thinkers). That is why deep truths about "Being" could be ascertained by thought alone, and it is also why they could then be imposed on reality.

The trick that bound all this together was the mental process of "abstraction", for this allowed traditional thinkers to access hidden, abstract ideas, inaccessible to the senses, by thought alone. This approach to knowledge has dominated Western (and, in a different, way Eastern) thought ever since. Through Hegel's influence, it now dominates the minds of dialecticians. Small wonder then Marx and Engels said the following:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

As it turns out, this ancient thought-form is in fact inimical to Dialectical Materialism, anyway.

This is because the process of abstraction radically alters key features of language, robbing indicative sentences of their capacity to say anything at all. This in turn is because this process changes general terms (i.e., "universals" -- which are outwardly general in form, but which are in fact either bogus general nouns or reified linguistic functions) -- into abstract particulars named by abstract nouns.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

[A linguistic function is an expression that allows for the formation of true or false indicative sentences when combined with singular terms, quantifier (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantification) expressions, and the like. For example, the sentence forming operator (i.e., the quasi-linguistic expression that can be used to generate indicative sentences), "... is a socialist" yields the value "true" for "Karl Marx", but "false" for "Margaret Thatcher", or "The President of the USA in 2008". There is in fact no necessity to view language like this, but it does in fact prevent the bogus moves earlier generations of Philosophers have made. There is more on this in Essay Three Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm).

An abstract particular is like a real particular (such as a book or a chair), except we cannot physically interact with 'it', only think about 'it'.]

The traditional re-write of such propositions (via the Identity Theory of Predication) in fact prevents language from expressing generality, since it actually destroys predication, and turns general terms into singular expressions -- i.e., the names of abstract particulars. Naturally, this fatally undermines DM-epistemology (which at least pretends to begin with the general to give concrete substance to the particular) by destroying generality.

We can see how and why this is so, by examining Lenin's comments on an innocent-looking sentence: "John is a man".

The Gospel Of John: In The Beginning Was The Word "Is"

In his Philosophical Notebooks Lenin attempted to derive the entire dialectic from a single sentence like "John is a man." There, Lenin was quite happy to construct several tall stories on this alarmingly weak foundation, claiming to know what must be the case for all of reality, for all of time from a single sentence (in the thoroughly traditional manner exposed here):


"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.359-60.]

However, John's material insignificance did not stop Lenin from uncovering a host of universal and omnitemporal truths concealed beneath this fictional character's imputed manhood. Thus, from this figment of the imagination, Lenin thought he could derive a number of seemingly eternal and all-embracing super-scientific facts.

["Super-scientific" is a term that refers to fundamental truths about reality that go way beyond anything the sciences could possibly confirm, which are concocted by thought alone, and which are derived from contingent facts about language (as Lenin did in the above manner). They apply to all regions of space and time, and to every possible world. Indeed, in many cases, they seem to delineate the 'logical form' of the world.]

From sentences like these -- all of which were of the subject/predicate form, as noted earlier --, and scarcely giving a thought to the epistemological megalomania this implied, Lenin was able to claim that not just John, but everything in reality must be a UO, and thus that everything in existence must be contradictory. His reason? Simply that John cannot be identical with the universal term "man", a subject cannot be identical with a predicate!



Granted, this is not a very impressive piece of logic, but it is at least quintessentially traditional.

Indeed, as pointed out above, the imposition on reality of 'truths' of this sort, and in this manner, is thoroughly traditional; in Dialectical-circles this goes largely un-remarked upon (and this is still the case even after this manoeuvre has been pointed out to comrades) because not only have all traditional theorists indulged in the sport, they still do. That is precisely what makes DM so traditional: moves like this are part of the philosophical game, as it were; one that was invented and has been played by ruling-class hacks for thousands of years.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

To change the image: this is the theoretically-poisoned chalice from which not a single DM-theorist has failed to quaff. In fact, they happily pass it around and commend its contents to others. In this way, therefore, the ideas of the ruling-class have come to rule our movement, too. Dialecticians like Engels, Plekhanov, Dietzgen, Lenin and Trotsky have been quite happy to borrow these alien-class ideas from traditional thought, internalising them and even chiding others for denying that Marxists should buy into what they regard as the only theoretical game in town: a priori Superscience.

Hardly pausing for breath, Lenin was also able to 'derive' several other ambitious theses from this defective understanding of the copula -- i.e., the predicate connective "is", as it appears in sentences like "John is a man". In so doing, he uncritically accepted Hegel's "Identity Theory of Predication", confusing the "is" of predication with the "is" of identity. To be sure, this is a seemingly minor faux pas ('screw up.), but it has alarmingly disproportionate consequences, as we will see.

This 'allowed' Lenin to argue that "John" was at the same time identical with, but different from, all men. But, neither Hegel nor Lenin so much as attempted to justify this innovative grammatical segue, and yet that did not stop them from extracting substantive metaphysical truths from so diminutive a misconstrued verb.

This manoeuvre was then compounded by the belief that the subject/predicate form had profound ontological implications. This superficial grammatical feature, of just one family of languages (i.e., this use of "is") was now transmogrified from a predicative into a relational form.

[The "is" of identity is (uncontroversially) relational, not predicative. It relates two ideas, words, or concepts (depending on which theory one adheres to). Hence, the identity statement "Cicero is Tully" asserts a relation between two named individuals (or between an individual and himself; "Tully" was Cicero's other name), and is the equivalent of "Cicero is identical with Tully". Because of this segue, propositions of the form "A is G" (i.e., "John is a man") now become "A = G" (i.e. "John is identical with Manhood"), which is just one aspect of the aforementioned medieval "Identity Theory of Predication". Descriptive sentences now become relational -- but where there is a relation, there are objects to be related. This now turns "man" into an abstract object, a particular -- Manhood --, referred to by the abstract noun "Manhood".]

It is thus no surprise then that from this serious misreading of so simple a verb bogus 'contradictions' freely flowed. This supposedly meant -- so this fable went -- that ordinary language must be riddled with paradox (since it so readily created contradictions), and thus that nature must be fundamentally contradictory, too -- and thus that the universe and thought must be universally dialectical. Moreover, it suggested that everything must be interconnected (by various hierarchies of assorted "universals"), that change is powered by 'internal contradictions' (they are internal to sentences, and thus are logically 'internal' to one another), and that necessity and contingency are dialectically united as complimentary aspects of reality. All this a priori superscience Lenin managed to extract from this one sentence! [These details are fully worked out in Essay Three Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm).]

This idea is amplified by comrade Novack:

[QUOTE]"This law of identity of opposites, which so perplexes and horrifies addicts of formal logic, can be easily understood, not only when it is applied to actual processes of development and interrelations of events, but also when it is contrasted with the formal law of identity. It is logically true that A equals A, that John is John…. But it is far more profoundly true that A is also non-A. John is not simply John: John is a man. This correct proposition is not an affirmation of abstract identity, but an identification of opposites. The logical category or material class, mankind, with which John is one and the same is far more and other than John, the individual. Mankind is at the same time identical with, yet different from John." [Novack (1971) An Introduction to the Logic of Marxism, p.92.]

Here, as elsewhere in traditional Philosophy, the re-interpretation of a seemingly insignificant grammatical feature 'permit' theorists to ignore and bypass the clear distinctions ordinary humans (i.e., workers) have built into material language. This then 'allowed' traditional thinkers to blame the vernacular and common understanding for discursive faults that were entirely of their own making.

On this basis, therefore, and on this alone, Lenin felt quite justified in projecting dialectics right across the universe -- and, to rub it in, he did so without the aid of a single confirming experiment, just like the traditionalists mentioned earlier.

This was clearly regarded as a safe manoeuvre since, if discourse itself has dialectics built into it, and because we all have to use language to depict nature, nature cannot fail to be dialectical. In that case, dialectics could now be imposed on reality and the earlier bluff denial (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm) that this is never done could safely be ignored. This then provided Lenin with the key to unlock all of reality:


"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphasis added.]

It is worth noting, that the metaphor of the Key was central to Hermeticism (http://www.renaissanceastrology.com/hermestrismegistus.html), a core component of Hegel's thought (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/glenn_magee.htm).


"A key tenet of Hermeticism is the Unity of the Cosmos and the sympathy and interconnection of all things."


The Idealism implicit in all this is not easy to miss: on this view, nature is dialectical because language can be made to say so at the flick of a verb.

In this way, sentences depicting John and his manhood guarantee that nature is contradictory because propositions contain contradictions between their subject and predicate terms (i.e., John cannot be all men).

[However, if the predicative form is merely descriptive, then predication cannot be confused with a reference to all the members of a certain group (in the case, allegedly, all men -- since description is not reference). Aristotle saw through that 'difficulty' 2500 years ago; for him predicates applied to individuals designated by subject terms -- so, as he saw things, there was no "is" anywhere in sight for anyone to magic into an identity.]

In addition, 'innovative' logic of this sort 'showed' that the LOI cannot be used by 'speculative thought' to refer to concrete reality (again, this was supposedly because subject terms are not identical to predicate terms -- this move can be seen in the quotation from Novack, above), and that contingent reality is not only ruled by dialectical logic, the entire world is an interconnected Totality, just as mystics have always claimed.

[LOI = Law of Identity]

Luckily, these amazing facts are easy to discover: no boring, time-consuming experiments and observations are required. Indeed, in a few seconds they can be 'extracted' by means of a 'dialectical analysis' of any given subject/predicate proposition, which 'analysis' shows that every part of reality is implied by, and is linked to, each and every other part. This is because John is identical with but different from a universal, which linguistic fact connects him with universal reality, but in a contradictory sort of way.

Fortunately, there are other superscientific facts that can be obtained from this 'analysis': appearances must contradict underlying 'essences' (since the essential logic of the relation between John and his universal cannot be accessed by the senses, but only by a process of 'abstraction'), and these appearances must contradict underlying "essence" (because sentences about John 'imply' this), and all of reality must be governed by dialectical law --, which, paradoxically, also guarantees freedom of the will. This is yet another DM-contradiction that just has to be "grasped" to be believed -- since John is both contingently and essentially a man, apparently.

However, the best part of this thoroughly traditional tale is that anyone so minded can indulge in dialectics with ease, in the comfort of their own convoluted jargon. Who needs expensive equipment, time-wasting experiments and rigorous scientific training when impressive truths like these can be derived so effortlessly from a few shafted words?

If every journey starts with a small step, this particular mystery tour began with just such a simple misreading of this tiny word (i.e., "is"). Traditional Philosophers (like Parmenides (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parmenides) and Plotinus (http://www.iep.utm.edu/plotinus/) -- and their latter-day clone, Hegel) have been doing this sort of thing for centuries. Of course, over time these linguistic tricks got better, more complex and increasingly baroque (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/baroque), and they changed as ambient class relations required of them, but this linguistic dodge was one of the earliest and most influential of the troupe.

Dialecticians, are thus mere parvenus in this regard; late-comers who have slotted rather nicely into this conservative groove. In fact you can't even see the join.

So, if discourse has dialectics programmed into it, then no language-user could possibly deny the 'truths' that DM-theorists have effortlessly wrung from it. Super-verities like these can now be pulled straight out of Hegel's hat since every single one of his theses is hidden in all our sentences (if they are suitably 'enhanced', that is). DM can now be read into nature (on the pretence that it hasn't -- and then this can be sold as a 'materialist inversion' of Hegel) because any reading of anything must have dialectics built into it. The need for evidence can be waved aside since the seemingly obvious nature of the 'truths' obtained from such linguistic trickery is all the proof anyone could possibly need. Dialectics has thus become self-evident; judge and jury in its own behalf.

Dialectical Mickey Mouse Science (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm) now had a dialectical licence to practice.

This helps account for the relaxed ease with which all dialecticians constantly slip into the a priori mode, and why they all fail to notice when they are doing it -- again, even after this has been pointed out to them.

It all looks so 'obvious', and 'self-evident'.

Abstract Distortion

But, the down-side is that abstraction destroys the capacity language has for expressing generality. It achieves this by turning propositions into lists of names conjoined by the misconstrued identity sign (the hapless "is" again). So, to use an earlier example ("John is a man"); here just as "John" undoubtedly names John, "man" supposedly names all men (as a singular logical category), or the abstract universal, Man. However, both this category and this abstract universal are now singular in nature, having had the generality that the word "man" formerly expressed (in ordinary material language) neutralised. Singular terms, obviously, are not general.

To compound things further, the participle "is" (of the verb "to be") is also transmogrified into a referring expression, only now it acts as the name of the identity relation. So, "John is a man" becomes "John Identity Man."

Clearly, this can't be "John is Identity Man", or even "John is identical with all men", without awkward questions arising once more over the nature of the extra (and this time irremovable) "is" we would thus be forced to use here. Now that "is" cannot be one of identity, for obvious reasons.

[U]is identical with all men" would have to become "John is identical with identical with all men", as the underlined italicised "is" is itself replaced by an "is identical with". In turn, that bold "is" must now itself suffer a similar fate, and the whole thing would quickly spin off into infinity.]

So, in this case, two Abstract terms are conjured into existence (and, indeed, possibly three, since, as it turns out, John is in fact an abstract collection of all the truths about him, and they are infinite in number (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm)), and they are related to one another in an ethereal sort of way, inaccessible to the senses. [Well, can you see the identity here between John and Manhood? Can it be photographed, weighed, timed or painted? This Abstract Particular is thus now thoroughly Ideal.]

Unfortunately, this ancient 'analysis' turns DM-propositions into lists of concatenated names (which somehow name these Abstract Particulars), preventing them from saying anything true or false -- because, of course, lists say nothing. By re-interpreting the "is" of predication as an "is" that names abstract identity, nothing at all can now be said of John, or of anyone else, or of anything else, at all. The use of Hegel's defective logic thus denies all DM-propositions a sense, preventing them from communicating anything whatsoever. In fact, they are not even propositions. [On this, see the quotation from Prof Lowe, in my last post.]

So, despite what they say, dialecticians do not in fact start with general terms in order to extend knowledge, but with the names of abstract particulars.

This stalls the dialectical juggernaut on the starting grid.

In Essay Three, Parts One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm) and Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_02.htm), the process of abstraction is subjected to destructive analysis; not only is it psychologically impossible to carry out -- and in principle impossible to check inter-subjectively --, its results are incomprehensible. And this is because, once again, abstraction undermines generality, producing only the names of abstract particulars wedged into pseudo-propositions, concatenated with other transmogrified names -- which prevents language from saying anything true or false, as noted above.

The young Marx and Engels are recruited in support of these claims because of their remarkably similar opinions in this area. On that, see the quotations I posted in my reply to S Artesian, above.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants:


But of course Marx does publish the demonstration of his dialectic; he does demonstrate his use of abstraction, describing the two-fold nature of the labor process, both in the particular and in the abstract as the valorisation process, the creation of value. It is this that Our Lady of the Anti-Dialectic must ignore, disregard, present as "flirtation" and non-serious use of language, and consequently a non-serious analysis of the relations that define the commodity.

And he does all this in volume 1 of Capital, that very same volume that Rosa cannot comment on, other than to distort the plain meaning of the plain language Marx uses in the afterword to the second edition.

Here are some of those sections:

First, as if he had Rosa, and those like her in mind, Marx says:

Thanks for those quotations, but as I also argued, in an earlier reply to BTB, it's a pity Marx failed to free himself completely from traditional thought-forms in this area, and that he forgot the clarity of thought he brought to the criticism of abstractionism in his early work.


Marx clearly does, in the body of his analysis of capital, exactly what he says constitutes the scientific method, the method of distillation and abstraction, of reduction, only to reconstruct the entire system being analyzed in all its "richness" based on its own immanence.

Except that like others you just gesture at this 'process', as Marx does, as I pointed out earlier.


And all of this, Rosa cannot comment upon, cannot provide an iota of explanation of the interpenetration of labor, and wage-labor, of the labor-process and the valorisation process, of the commodity as a use-value and as an object embedded with and therefore existing as value.

As I have also pointed out to you many times, it's far more important for me to stop the flow of Hermetic poison into Marxism (a flow you are keen to promote).


Rosa makes herself a know-nothing.

Maye be so, maybe not, -- but even if this were so, it's far better to know nothing than to know and to promote only mysticism, as you do.


PS. Yes, I read what Rosa said, i.e about "the baleful influence of traditional thought." Rosa didn't read what I said, that in his demonstration of abstraction, of the organization of the particular and the concrete, the abstract and the general in each other, Marx has consciously taken over this dialectic from Hegel.

In fact, he took this from Aristotle -- Hegel is far too confused to take anything from.

[S.Artesian]

Marx "gestures" at nothing; he demonstrates, he details the process of determining, deriving the abstract from the concrete relations of commodity exchange, and he then "reassembles" capitalist reproduction in all its richness from the historical condition, the opposition of labor to the conditions of labor, that yields value.

You make a big deal out of claiming what Marx meant without once, even once, ever dealing with the substance of his analysis, the actual content of the examination of value-- pretending that "it's more important" to "eliminate Hegelian mysticism" from Marx, including the "Hegelian Mysticism" that you claim infects Marx's published and unpublished works prior to a and coincident with the drafting and publication of Capital, yet you fail to identify any substantive correction introduced by Marx in that volume to the concepts, categories, conclusions of those "flawed works."

You simply have nothing to say about Marx's analysis of capital, an analysis that begins with Marx's critique of Hegel, and his grasp of dialectic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants:


Marx "gestures" at nothing; he demonstrates, he details the process of determining, deriving the abstract from the concrete relations of commodity exchange, and he then "reassembles" capitalist reproduction in all its richness from the historical condition, the opposition of labor to the conditions of labor, that yields value.

But this is not abstracting. As I noted, what Marx does is set up a new grammar within which to study/explain capitalism -- and he does this in the open, not in a hidden internal world of 'cognition' (which, in traditional thought, is where and how 'abstraction' is supposed to be carried out). And we can say this with some confidence, since, as I also pointed out in the posts above (that you ignored), it is not possible to describe or locate the mythical 'process of abstraction' -- certainly you have yet to do so, content as you are merely to repeat traditional confusions.


You make a big deal out of claiming what Marx meant without once, even once, ever dealing with the substance of his analysis, the actual content of the examination of value-- pretending that "it's more important" to "eliminate Hegelian mysticism" from Marx, including the "Hegelian Mysticism" that you claim infects Marx's published and unpublished works prior to a and coincident with the drafting and publication of Capital, yet you fail to identify any substantive correction introduced by Marx in that volume to the concepts, categories, conclusions of those "flawed works."

Yet another lie to add to the many I listed earlier.

In fact, I've gone out of my way since you blundered in here at RevLeft last year to point out (scores of times) that Marx's abandoned Hegel (along with the terminally obscure jargon you dote upon) in Das Kapital -- content there merely to 'coquette' with a few useless Hegelian terms-of-art. So, I have 'identified' the modifications Marx introduced in his method. Or, rather, I have reminded you where Marx himself told us he was doing this. So, you have no excuse.


You simply have nothing to say about Marx's analysis of capital, an analysis that begins with Marx's critique of Hegel, and his grasp of dialectic.

Maybe so, maybe not -- but, as I said earlier, better to say nothing than to make things worse, as you do.

Unless, of course, you can find -- even at this late date -- a source published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your odd contention that he didn't 'correct' his flawed method.

Oh wait -- you still can't...:lol:

[S.Artesian]

There's no lying here. You have stated in vol 1 Marx extirpated Hegel. You base that claim not on any analysis of the substance of Marx's writings in that volume, or coincident with that volume, but purely on a very peculiar, and distorted interpretation of the afterword to the second edition.

The first 3 chapters of Capital are the demonstration of his dialectic, his method. It is those chapters that present the reader with a bit of difficulty. The discussion of value is where Marx, despite his desire to reduce every complication and obstacle to the lay-reader actually grasping the composition of the commodity introductory volume] is forced to employ-- or in his terms 'coquette' with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel to expose the totality of the relations that make up a commodity, that define the commodity, and that reproduce themselves as commodities.

Marx quite clearly is engaged in abstraction-- the distillation of those RELATIONS common to all the exchanges of commodities that in fact initiate the prospects for exchange.

Value is an abstraction. Labor in general is an abstraction, a specific social distillation of the historical human labor process under capitalism.

Marx is not inventing a new grammar. He is in fact using a social dialectic, analyzing the historical conditions that express labor as wage-labor; that allow particular, concrete labor to only become accessible in the general, abstract form of value, of labor-time.

This process is, as Marx says, breaking down the manifest and multitudinous relations of the commodities to their shared origin, their identity, and then recomposing the manifestations of that shared identity, that abstract commonality, in all their richness. That's what the process is for Marx. He says it. He demonstrates it.

You want to say "no, that's not really abstraction," because Marx isn't doing it in an internal world of reflection, a world of epistemology? All that proves is that you don't grasp the fundamental transition Marx made through his critique of Hegel-- through recognizing that Hegel was attempting to explain the actual conditions of human existence, of human appropriation of the world. Marx grasps that Hegel in so doing could only present an alienated, estranged, explanation-- an alienated appropriation of the process of appropriation.

When Hegel's ship of reason wrecks, and Marx details how it wrecks, on the shoals of the state, Marx transposes the categories of human appropriation, which are the categories of opposition, contradiction, negation, to the real force of human history, the social organization of labor-- the opposition and contradiction of labor to the conditions of labor; the negation of the social appropriation process through the private valorisation process; the immanent prospects for the negation of that negation in the actual accumulation of capital.

There is nothing in Capital, vol 1 that Marx has not already expressed in the "Hegelian" language of his Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1864.

You cannot point to a single substantive error in those manuscripts due to Marx's old Hegelian infatuation that is corrected in vol 1 with his "new" Hegelian coquetting.

And therefore, it is clear, you understand nothing about Marx, about Marx's analysis of capital, and about capital itself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants:


There's no lying here. You have stated in vol 1 Marx extirpated Hegel. You base that claim not on any analysis of the substance of Marx's writings in that volume, or coincident with that volume, but purely on a very peculiar, and distorted interpretation of the afterword to the second edition.

And, as you rightly pointed out, that is because I have advanced the opinion that it is more important to stem the flow of Hermetic poison into Marxism -- a flow you are happy to encourage.


but purely on a very peculiar, and distorted interpretation of the afterword to the second edition

It can't be a distortion if I quote Marx's words, and you ignore them -- all the while failing to find a single passage, published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Das Kapital, that supports your attempt to re-write what he actually said.


The first 3 chapters of Capital are the demonstration of his dialectic, his method. It is those chapters that present the reader with a bit of difficulty. The discussion of value is where Marx, despite his desire to reduce every complication and obstacle to the lay-reader actually grasping the composition of the commodity is forced to employ-- or in his terms 'coquette' with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel to expose the totality of the relations that make up a commodity, that define the commodity, and that reproduce themselves as commodities.

Ah, but we already know that he was merely 'coquetting' with the sort of jargon you take seriously. So, 'the dialectic' Marx employs bears no relation to the mystified version you are trying to sell the good people here.

How do we know? Well, I am sure you must have missed it, but Marx very helpfully added a summary of 'the dialectic method' to the Postface to the second edition. That summary shows that Marx had waved 'goodbye' to Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up'), since it contained no 'contradictions', no 'unity of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'interconnected Totality'...

I say 'must have missed it' since, had you read it, you would agree with me.:)


Marx quite clearly is engaged in abstraction-- the distillation of those RELATIONS common to all the exchanges of commodities that in fact initiate the prospects for exchange.

1. Since neither you, nor Marx, explained precisely what abstraction is (and neither has anyone else, ever -- content as all of you abstractionists are merely to wave that word around as a sort of talisman) you might just as well have written this:


Marx quite clearly is engaged in [I]schmabstraction-- the distillation of those RELATIONS common to all the exchanges of commodities that in fact initiate the prospects for exchange.

And, the metaphor of distillation is no use, either, since no heat can be applied to concepts. Perhaps you think otherwise...

2. What Marx in fact does, and what all alleged abstractionists actually do, is use words in new ways, as I told you earlier. That is what you see on the page -- you have no access to any alleged mental processes of 'abstraction' that he or anyone else has ever supposedly carried out (the inner workings of which are a mystery to this day).


Value is an abstraction. Labor in general is an abstraction, a specific social distillation of the historical human labor process under capitalism.

Now you are just thumping the table, desperately repeating the traditional catechisms that have taken over your brain, just like the other 'ruling ideas' that have you in their thrall. This is like debating with a Fundamental Christian!:lol:

Until you post the precise details of this mythical process (of abstraction) -- and for the first time in human history -- you might just as well be try to persuade us genuine materialists to believe in the Holy Spirit!:rolleyes:


Marx is not inventing a new grammar.

But, that is what you actually see on the page.

Or have you access to Marx's brain scan?


He is in fact using a social dialectic, analyzing the historical conditions that express labor as wage-labor; that allow particular, concrete labor to only become accessible in the general, abstract form of value, of labor-time.

And so the mantra goes on...:rolleyes:


This process is, as Marx says, breaking down the manifest and multitudinous relations of the commodities to their shared origin, their identity, and then recomposing the manifestations of that shared identity, that abstract commonality, in all their richness. That's what the process is for Marx. He says it. He demonstrates it.

No, he actually uses words in new ways.


You want to say "no, that's not really abstraction," because Marx isn't doing it in an internal world of reflection, a world of epistemology? All that proves is that you don't grasp the fundamental transition Marx made through his critique of Hegel-- through recognizing that Hegel was attempting to explain the actual conditions of human existence, of human appropriation of the world. Marx grasps that Hegel in so doing could only present an alienated, estranged, explanation-- an alienated appropriation of the process of appropriation.

This is just empty rhetoric until you fill in the precise details of this mythical process. What we see, what you see, is Marx's novel use of language -- and he shares this trait with all scientific innovators.

And I nowhere mentioned "epistemology", or implied it.


When Hegel's ship of reason wrecks, and Marx details how it wrecks, on the shoals of the state, Marx transposes the categories of human appropriation, which are the categories of opposition, contradiction, negation, to the real force of human history, the social organization of labor-- the opposition and contradiction of labor to the conditions of labor; the negation of the social appropriation process through the private valorisation process; the immanent prospects for the negation of that negation in the actual accumulation of capital.

Ah, but we already know he was just 'coquetting' with this obscure jargon -- so why you take it seriously is a mystery.


There is nothing in Capital, vol 1 that Marx has not already expressed in the "Hegelian" language of his Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1864.

But he wasn't 'coquetting' in those earlier, unpublished works. In Das Kapital, he was.

How do we know?

He told us he was.

Get over it.


You cannot point to a single substantive error in those manuscripts due to Marx's old Hegelian infatuation that is corrected in vol 1 with his "new" Hegelian coquetting.

Where did I mention 'error'?

Once more, you prefer to put words in my mouth rather than address what I actually said.


And therefore, it is clear, you understand nothing about Marx, about Marx's analysis of capital, and about capital itself

Maybe so, maybe not -- but lack of comprehension (if that is my crime) is much less a sin than deliberate fabrication. And that is what you are trying to do with Marx's very clear words.

[S.Artesian]

So in the plain language of the anti-philosopher, is there such a thing as abstract labor? If so, what is it, how is it derived, determined? If not... then is there such a thing as value?

If so, then how is it derived? If not, what allows commodities to be exchanged? What provides money with its power to represent, in itself, all commodities? In fact, does money, can money, actually exist as the "abstraction," the detached, separate yet common factor, component, relation of all commodities?

I already know your answer, because you can't answer. Your answer will be, "I'll answer your questions when you answer mine," when in fact your questions have been answered. You don't like the answers, but that's a personal problem for you.

You can't and won't answer because you'd have to move out of the shallow end of the pool, beyond your distortion of the afterward and into the substance of volume 1. And since you have zero comprehension of materialist analysis, you are not going to make that move.

The fact that you won't deal with any of the material analysis Marx provides-- the labor process, the valorisation process-- simply proves how empty, sterile, irrelevant your remarks are.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


So in the plain language of the anti-philosopher, is there such a thing as abstract labor?

Where did I say that?

But Marx's notion of 'abstract labour' bears the same relation to traditional abstractions as Einstein's use of "rest mass" and "inertial mass" do to Aristotelian notions of 'prime matter'.

Marx is setting up here what we Wittgensteinians call a 'form of representation' -- a novel use of language that allows him to make inferences not available to, say, Smith or even Ricardo.

As I noted earlier, this is part of setting up a new grammar, something all scientific innovators do.


If so, then how is it derived? If not, what allows commodities to be exchanged? What provides money with its power to represent, in itself, all commodities? In fact, does money, can money, actually exist as the "abstraction," the detached, separate yet common factor, component, relation of all commodities?

Once again, I'll be happy to answer your questions just as soon as you answer the many I have asked you (since you staggered in here at RevLeft), which you just ignore -- see you already know this, so why you keep asking is clearly something only your psychiatrist can answer:


I already know your answer, because you can't answer. Your answer will be, "I'll answer your questions when you answer mine," when in fact your questions have been answered. You don't like the answers, but that's a personal problem for you.

Suit yourself; I can't help you if you won't help yourself. Stay ignorant, see if I care...:cool:


You can't and won't answer because you'd have to move out of the shallow end of the pool, beyond your distortion of the afterward and into the substance of volume 1. And since you have zero comprehension of materialist analysis, you are not going to make that move.

The fact that you won't deal with any of the material analysis Marx provides-- the labor process, the valorisation process-- simply proves how empty, sterile, irrelevant your remarks are.

No need to; Marx saved us the job -- perhaps you didn't know that?

[S.Artesian]

As I said, your questions have all been answered.

You answer nothing, relying on sophistry, and "new grammar" speculations which Marx himself never posits or acknowledges. Nothing in Marx's analysis, published or unpublished is based on a new grammar. The entire explication of value is demonstration of dialectic.

So what is the basis for abstract labor, Rosa?

Your comments are irrelevant to the actual undertaking of Marx, which is the analysis of the social relations of production defining capitalism, and the immanent critique, and overthrow, contained within those social relations.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


As I said, your questions have all been answered.

In that case, I have answered all yours.:)


You answer nothing, relying on sophistry, and "new grammar" speculations which Marx himself never posits or acknowledges. Nothing in Marx's analysis, published or unpublished is based on a new grammar. The entire explication of value is demonstration of dialectic.

But, as I pointed out in an earlier post, even you can see Marx doing that: he uses words written/printed on the page.

You do it too; you do not refer us to the contents of your head; you actually type words, and they appear on the screen. That is how we try to make sense of you. Same with Marx. He does not indulge in a mysterious internal process of 'abstraction' -- unless, of course, you can produce the brain scans that show Marx did what you say he did.

So, my account meshes seamlessly with what we can both see, and what we can see other great scientific innovators do.

You have to appeal to a mysterious 'process of abstraction' that no one has been able to locate or detail/explain in the last 2500 years. No wonder then that in a moment of clarity, Marx wrote this:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

Notice, abstraction is distortion.


So what is the basis for abstract labor, Rosa?

I'll answer your questions when you answer the many I have asked you...:)


Your comments are irrelevant to the actual undertaking of Marx, which is the analysis of the social relations of production defining capitalism, and the immanent critique, and overthrow, contained within those social relations.

Maybe so, maybe not -- but yours are worse than irrelevant since they seek to re-mystify Marx's work.

[S.Artesian]

"Re-mystifying" Marx's work means at some original point it was mystified. Where is Marx's original work mystified. Where in the Economic Manuscipts-- either of 1844, or 1857-1864, is there mystification of the origins, and reproduction, of capital?

Where is the mystification of the class, material, historical relations which make up the social organization of labor, in the Grundrisse, the proposed chapter 6 of Capital, the drafted volume 2 of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, etc? etc?

What is mystified in the concrete discussion of historical development, or the abstract discussions of how cost price transfers value within sectors of production, how market price adjusts and apportions profitability?

Show us this great mystification you think Marx extirpates in volume 1.

You can't. Because there is no such mystification.

Which is why everything you offer about Marxism is so irrelevant to Marx's own object, and subject, of analysis-- capital, capital as the process and product of expropriated, estranged, labor.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants:


"Re-mystifying" Marx's work means at some original point it was mystified. Where is Marx's original work mystified. Where in the Economic Manuscipts-- either of 1844, or 1857-1864, is their mystification of the origins, and reproduction, of capital?

We have already been over this. You need to show where I have gone wrong, and not just repeat yourself.


Where is the mystification of the class, material, historical relations which make up the social organization of labor in the Grundrisse, the proposed chapter 6 of Capital, the drafted volume 2 of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, etc? etc?

What is mystified in the concrete discussion of historical development, or the abstract discussions of how cost price transfers value within sectors of production, how market price adjusts and apportions profitability?

Show us this great mystification you think Marx extirpates in volume 1.

Same point.


You can't. Because there is no such mystification.

So you say, but your actions tell another story.


Which is why everything you offer about Marxism is so irrelevant to Marx's own object, and subject, of analysis-- capital, capital as the process and product of expropriated, estranged, labor.

Again, if what I say is irrelevant, you would not be stalking me here at RevLeft, posting hundreds and hundreds of comments trying to take me on. That shows not even you believe this.:lol:

[S.Artesian]

No one is stalking you. Some are opposing your distortion, your misrepresentation of Marx's analysis of capital, of Marx's method and content.

Yes, we've been over this many times. And you always evade the issues.

According to you, prior to volume 1, Marx still bears residual signs, scars, influence of his exposure to Hegel's virus, all of which are removed not in volume 1, but in an afterword written 6 years after the publication of volume 1.

Where is the substantial difference, in material analysis, in the analysis of the commodity, value, the labor process, the valorisation process between "pre-vol1" and "vol 1 afterward" Marx?

You cannot provide a single example of such material difference. And so, in your need for self-aggrandizement, throw all sorts of chaff out there about Hegel's mysticism, which Marx had already recognized and removed from his critique and refounding of the dialectic of human beings in the world from "thought" to the actual conditions of social reproduction, which conditions remain for you, and anybody who reads you, impenetrable, incomprehensible, mystified.

You provide the mystification of Marx's work in that you can never come to grips with the self-reproduction of capital as a social relation that creates, in immanence, the terms for its own overthrow, negation.

You provide the mystification in that you cannot come to grips, at any single point, with value, as social contradiction, where its every expansion creates the terms of its own de-valuation.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants:


No one is stalking you.

So you say, but your actions tell a different story.


Some are opposing your distortion, your misrepresentation of Marx's analysis of capital, of Marx's method and content.

Well, you keep repeating these allegations; we are just waiting for the proof.


Yes, we've been over this many times. And you always evade the issues.

Like what?


According to you, prior to volume 1, Marx still bears residual signs, scars, influence of his exposure to Hegel's virus, all of which are removed not in volume 1, but in an afterword written 6 years after the publication of volume 1.

Not so; I have never claimed this. Once more you prefer invention to accuracy.


Where is the substantial difference, in material analysis, in the analysis of the commodity, value, the labor process, the valorisation process between "pre-vol1" and "vol 1 afterward" Marx?

Where have I claimed otherwise?


You cannot provide a single example of such material difference. And so, in your need for self-aggrandizement, throw all sorts of chaff out there about Hegel's mysticism, which Marx had already recognized and removed from his critique and refounding of the dialectic of human beings in the world from "thought" to the actual conditions of social reproduction, which conditions remain for you, and anybody who reads you, impenetrable, incomprehensible, mystified.

I do not need to since I have never claimed this.

'Once a liar, always a liar' seems to apply to you.


You provide the mystification of Marx's work in that you can never come to grips with the self-reproduction of capital as a social relation that creates, in immanence, the terms for its own overthrow, negation.

Except, Marx was merely 'coquetting' with this word; you should emulate him instead of trying to re-mystify his work.


You provide the mystification

No need to; you are doing a pretty good job without my assistance, thank you very much.:thumbup1:


in that you cannot come to grips, at any single point, with value, as social contradiction, where its every expansion creates the terms of its own de-valuation.

Don't need to; Marx did it for us -- or didn't you know?

[S.Artesian]

According to you, prior to volume 1, Marx still bears residual signs, scars, influence of his exposure to Hegel's virus, all of which are removed not in volume 1, but in an afterword written 6 years after the publication of volume 1.


Not so; I have never claimed this. Once more you prefer invention to accuracy.

Now Rosa, your are not being candid. In previous thread, you responded to those citing Marx's footnote in vol 1 on Mills, where he, Marx, calls Hegel's contradiction the source for all dialectic
He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic by claiming it was evidence of something akin to residual confusion, that Marx did not at that point "have the tools" [I believe those were your exact words] to thoroughly excise Hegel.

And you have claimed in a version that runs parallel to Althusser's claim of a radical distinction between the "young" Marx-- influenced by Hegel, and the "mature" Marx of volume 1, that Marx's use of the terms dialectic, contradiction, negation in his manuscripts and publication is the result of his attachment to Hegel which he finally overcomes in the afterward to volume 1.

But all that to one side, anyone who seriously reads volume 1, including Marx's own footnotes, where he repeatedly quotes Hegel, where he treats Hegel with the utmost respect will be able to see how crackpot your interpretation of the afterward really is.

And you are one big crackpot.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants:


Now Rosa, your are not being candid. In previous thread, you responded to those citing Marx's footnote in vol 1 on Mills, where he, Marx, calls Hegel's contradiction the source for all dialectic

How does that show the following is true?


According to you, prior to volume 1, Marx still bears residual signs, scars, influence of his exposure to Hegel's virus, all of which are removed not in volume 1, but in an afterword written 6 years after the publication of volume 1.

Bold added.


by claiming it was evidence of something akin to residual confusion, that Marx did not at that point "have the tools" [I believe those were your exact words] to thoroughly excise Hegel.

And the relevance of this is what...?


And you have claimed in a version that runs parallel to Althusser's claim of a radical distinction between the "young" Marx-- influenced by Hegel, and the "mature" Marx of volume 1, that Marx's use of the terms dialectic, contradiction, negation in his manuscripts and publication is the result of his attachment to Hegel which he finally overcomes in the afterward to volume 1

Even if I had done this, how does that show this is true:


According to you, prior to volume 1, Marx still bears residual signs, scars, influence of his exposure to Hegel's virus, all of which are removed not in volume 1, but in an afterword written 6 years after the publication of volume 1.

Bold added.


But all that to one side, anyone who seriously reads volume 1, including Marx's own footnotes, where he repeatedly quotes Hegel, where he treats Hegel with the utmost respect will be able to see how crackpot your interpretation of the afterward really is.

1) He spent most of his life attacking Hegel, sometimes in the most vehement of terms.

2) In the Postface, he puts his respect for Hegel in the past tense.

3) The summary of 'the dialectic method' Marx endorsed contained not one atom of Hegel.

4) In Das Kapital the very best he could do with Hegel's obscure jargon was 'coquette' with it.

5) If you check the index to the English version of Volume One (in MECW) you will see he quotes and refers to Aristotle (whom he calls a 'genius' and a 'great thinker' (pp.69-70) -- no past tense there!) and the Scottish School far more times than he does Hegel. In fact Hegel gets only eight mentions (and only in passing), while Aristotle, Smith, Stewart, Hume and Ferguson get 67.

You do the math...


And you are one big crackpot.

I model myself on you, but try as much as I can, I can't quite reach your dizzyingly impressive heights.:lol:

[S.Artesian]

If you actually read the English version of vol 1, read beyond the afterword and the index, actually read the substance of vol 1, you'll be able to count about 12-13 references to, quotes from and references to Hegel in the text and footnotes.

And to say 5 other people get mentioned in total more than Hegel is an absurdity. This isn't about popularity, it's about the content. None of the references in the actual text and footnotes of vol. 1 amount to an attack on Hegel.

Marx didn't attack Hegel. He criticized him. Merciless criticism to be sure-- but contrast his treatment of Hegel to his treatment of someone he truly did attack and hold in contempt-- like that guy who was a parson and a political economist... Malthus?

Or his treatment of Rodbertus.

The afterward itself is transparently a defense of Hegel, except to you and your jabberwocky universe where defense is attack, respect is dismissal, and transformation is extirpation.

And if there's anyone Marx spent a lot of time-- not attacking-- but critiquing and exposing, its the master of the Scottish/English school itself, Adam Smith-- or perhaps you've never bothered to read those sections of Marx's work either.

Your ignorance of Marx is exceeded only by your distortion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Smarty Pants, still trying to show I'm 'irrelevant' by stalking me::lol:


If you actually read the English version of vol 1, read beyond the afterword and the index, actually read the substance of vol 1, you'll be able to count about 12-13 references to, quotes from and references to Hegel in the text and footnotes.

In that case, you'll find it easy to post the page numbers.

But, even if you are right, this palls into insignificance next to the references to the characters I mentioned.


And to say 5 other people get mentioned in total more than Hegel is an absurdity. This isn't about popularity, it's about the content. None of the references in the actual text and footnotes of vol. 1 amount to an attack on Hegel.

Except:

1) Marx spent most of his life attacking Hegel, sometimes in the most vehement of terms (but see below).

2) In the Postface, he puts his respect for Hegel in the past tense.

3) The summary of 'the dialectic method' Marx endorsed contained not one atom of Hegel.

4) In Das Kapital the very best he could do with Hegel's obscure jargon was 'coquette' with it.

So, I agree, it's not about popularity; it's about waving that mystical dolt 'goodbye', which he does in Das Kapital.


Marx didn't attack Hegel. He criticized him. Merciless criticism to be sure-- but contrast his treatment of Hegel to his treatment of someone he truly did attack and hold in contempt-- like that guy who was a parson and a political economist... Malthus?

This looks like an attack to me:


"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction….

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -– 'Fruit'….

"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'

"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975) The Holy Family, pp.72-75. Bold added.]

So does this:


"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction…presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that if you leave out of account the limits of this body, you soon have nothing but a space -– that if, finally, you leave out of account the dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction the only substance left is the logical categories. Thus the metaphysicians, who in making these abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their core…." [Marx (1978) The Poverty of Philosophy, p.99.]

As does this:


"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.

"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Notice, philosophers like Hegel distort language, and they do this with their 'abstractions'.


but contrast his treatment of Hegel to his treatment of someone he truly did attack and hold in contempt-- like that guy who was a parson and a political economist... Malthus?

Or his treatment of Rodbertus.

Contrast that too with the respect he shows the Scottish School and toward Aristotle.


The afterward itself is transparently a defense of Hegel, except to you and your jabberwocky universe where defense is attack, respect is dismissal, and transformation is extirpation.

Except, Marx added a summary of 'the dialectic method' which contained no Hegel at all -- some respect/defence eh?:lol:

Which is underlined by the fact that in Das Kapital the very best he could do with Hegel's obscure jargon was 'coquette' with it.:lol:


And if there's anyone Marx spent a lot of time-- not attacking-- but critiquing and exposing, its the master of the Scottish/English school itself, Adam Smith-- or perhaps you've never bothered to read those sections of Marx's work either.

Where have I claimed otherwise? But at least Smith was a scientist (and Marx recognised him as such) -- Hegel was an obscure mystic, which is why you are trying to rehabilitate him.:(


Your ignorance of Marx is exceeded only by your distortion.

Once more, long on assertion, short on proof. :)

Well, at least you are consistent in this regard...:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades might like to check out yet another anti-dialectical set-to taking place here:

http://www.soviet-empire.com/ussr/viewtopic.php?f=107&t=49251

Anyone who checks will see the comrades there (whom I have never encountered before) post the same sort of emotive replies we have come to know and loathe from the mystics who post here.

Except, up to now, by-and-large, they aren't abusive!

[Hit The North]

Anyone who checks will see the comrades there (whom I have never encountered before) post the same sort of emotive replies we have come to know and loathe from the mystics who post here.


So to say you "loathe" these replies is not also "emotive", I suppose? :rolleyes:

Plus your insistence on calling people who you might otherwise call "comrades", "mystics", is not conducive to fraternal debate.

Appalling.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


So to say you "loathe" these replies is not also "emotive", I suppose?

Plus your insistence on calling people who you might otherwise call "comrades", "mystics", is not conducive to fraternal debate.

Appalling.

I have never denied being emotive; but I am not just emotive. You and your mystical chums are little else.

And this 'reply' of yours can serve as Exhibit A.


Plus your insistence on calling people who you might otherwise call "comrades", "mystics", is not conducive to fraternal debate.

Which is why I have posted this here before:


Not so, whatever attitude I have adopted in the past, or now adopt, practically every single revolutionary and Marxist i have debated this with has been aggressive, patronising and abusive toward me in return. They have invented things to say about my ideas, mostly without having read my work.

Here is a recent example (and totally unprovoked, for I had been quite pleasant):

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=1105#comment-19901

You will soon see how aggressive UK comrades have been toward me (comrades i have never debated with before).

And here is the reply the worst of these individuals got (and far more than he bargained for)

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/tom_thumb_the_dialectical_dwarf.htm

There are two notable exception to this general reception (and, oddly enough, they both post at this site), toward whom I have been a model of good behaviour.

Toward anyone else, I am in general very aggressive; here is why (this taken from the opening page of my site, and refers to a page where I have recorded the most recent attacks (mostly at RevLeft) that have been made on me:


How Not To Argue 101

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

This page contains links to forums on the web where I have 'debated' this creed with other comrades.

For anyone interested, check out the desperate 'debating' tactics used by Dialectical Mystics in their attempt to respond to my ideas.

You will no doubt notice that the vast majority all say the same sorts of things, and most of them pepper their remarks with scatological and abusive language. They all like to make things up, too, about me and my beliefs.

25 years (!!) of this stuff from Dialectical Mystics has meant I now take an aggressive stance with them every time -- I soon learnt back in the 1980's that being pleasant with them (my initial tactic) did not alter their abusive tone, their propensity to fabricate, nor reduce the amount of scatological language they used.

So, these days, I generally go for the jugular from the get-go.

Apparently, they expect me to take their abuse lying down, and regularly complain about my "bullying" tactics.

So, these mystics can dish it out, but they cannot take it.

Given the damage their theory has done to Marxism, and the abuse they all dole out, they are lucky this is all I can do to them.

In which case it is you mystics who stopped being comradely. Indeed, the moment you arrived here you began with abuse.


Appalling.

Cut it out then.

[Hit The North]

Funny, how everyone is abusive to you, but to no one else. Yeah, it must be everyone else's fault. :rolleyes:

Pathetic

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Funny, how everyone is abusive to you, but to no one else.

Not everyone; just you mystics.

And just like genuinely religious mystics, you dialectical mystics can't stand to have your source of consolation undermined, so you behave like they do toward 'heretics'.


Pathetic

Buck your ideas up then.

[ChrisK]

Funny, how everyone is abusive to you, but to no one else. Yeah, it must be everyone else's fault. :rolleyes:

Pathetic

Funny, your very first post on what she said was instantly aggressive. Now this. Nice job supporting her point.

[Hit The North]

Funny, your very first post on what she said was instantly aggressive. Now this. Nice job supporting her point.

This only supports her point if you swallow her guff that she is charm personified until others attack her. This is simply not sustainable. She accused me of instantly being abusive to her when I joined Revleft and this is not true. I was at first interested in her point of view until she began to patronise and insult me and others.

I tell you what, somewhere on her site there is a section dedicated to illustrating how awfully she is treated in debate. Look at that and you will see that at least in equal measure, it is Rosa who begins the abuse. Even those who initially approach Rosa with equanimity are soon ridiculed and traduced for being "mystics" and "class enemies".

Besides, what is aggressive about my response, pointing out that her accusation of emotionalism on behalf of her interlocutors is also appropriate to her own style of debate? What is aggressive about pointing out that using the pejorative label of 'mystic' against her opponents is not conducive to constructive debate?

Is there one single Marxist who posts here, or on another site, who seeks to defend the dialectic, who Rosa is not rude to and dismissive of?

My challenge to you, dear Christofer, is to find one single example.

[Black Sheep]

I have questions about dialectis, but i will not post them, as past experience in here has shown that all answers are either too frickin huge, or contain a link to a fricking huge article/essay.
I guess i will reside in ignorance.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


This only supports her point if you swallow her guff that she is charm personified until others attack her. This is simply not sustainable. She accused me of instantly being abusive to her when I joined Revleft and this is not true. I was at first interested in her point of view until she began to patronise and insult me and others.

You can actually see that happenning if you follow the link to the Socialist Unity website I listed above. Moreover, almost from the first moment you arrived here, you indulged in unprovoked abuse, only to complain when I returned it with interest. Here it is again:

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=1105#comment-19901

Jump to comment number 131. Then check out comment 145. 'Eddie Truman' began with abuse, and never relented. He wasn't the only one.

Here are more examples, from the same site:

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=3044/#comment-101395

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=3057/#comment-102051

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=3102

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=3169#comment-107190

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=3369#comment-113835


I tell you what, somewhere on her site there is a section dedicated to illustrating how awfully she is treated in debate. Look at that and you will see that at least in equal measure, it is Rosa who begins the abuse. Even those who initially approach Rosa with equanimity are soon ridiculed and traduced for being "mystics" and "class enemies".

In fact, what you will see is that, in the vast majority of cases, I respond to abuse in like manner. Rarely do I indulge in unprovoked abuse.

Check it out for yourself:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm


Besides, what is aggressive about my response, pointing out that her accusation of emotionalism on behalf of her interlocutors is also appropriate to her own style of debate? What is aggressive about pointing out that using the pejorative label of 'mystic' against her opponents is not conducive to constructive debate?

I told you back in 2006 that because of the unremitting abuse you levelled at me, I'd always be agressive toward you. You now act surprised when I carry out that promise.


Is there one single Marxist who posts here, or on another site, who seeks to defend the dialectic, who Rosa is not rude to and dismissive of?

Plenty -- for example, the Marxists who are listed as members of the anti-dialectics group. And many of those here:

http://discussion.newyouth.com/index.php

In addition, there are many others here with whom I have an excellent relationship: Meridian, Chris, Kleber, Yaz, Led Zep (before he left) and Hyacithn, for example.

Of course, the vast majority of Dialectical Marxists begin by verbally attacking me (especially here). Why you act surprised when I give as good as I get suggests that you do think I should be all sweetness and light in return.:lol:


My challenge to you, dear Christofer, is to find one single example.

Here's the most recent:

http://www.soviet-empire.com/ussr/viewtopic.php?f=107&t=49251

Check out how I respond to 'Mabool' and 'gRed Britain'. Then check out how 'Loz' responds to me -- all unprovoked.

And I do not once use the word 'mystic'...

The same happened at the Socialist Unity site (link above) -- as you will be able to see if you check it out. I begin very respectfully, but that only invited some pretty awful abuse from UK comrades in return. On another site (Lenin's Tomb) an SWP comrade (JohnG -- who writes for Socialist Worker from time to time) even went so far as to allege that I was worse than the Nazis, the US marines and the Israeli army!

Yes, you mystics are wonderful role models...:rolleyes:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Black Sheep:


I have questions about dialectis, but i will not post them, as past experience in here has shown that all answers are either too frickin huge, or contain a link to a fricking huge article/essay.
I guess i will reside in ignorance.

That is not entirely true. In PMs to you, I have been (I hope) very helpful. And you can't expect a summary and criticism of a theory that its supporters can often take several hundred pages to explain to be less than 500 words, can you?

[Hit The North]

BTB:

You can actually see that happenning if you follow the link to the Socialist Unity website I listed above. Moreover, almost from the first moment you arrived here, you indulged in unprovoked abuse, only to complain when I returned it with interest. Here it is again:

http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=1105#comment-19901



Thanks for the link and all that but what has this got to do with me? As the exchange doesn't include me, I can only take it as another example of the disingenuous debating technique which others have noted you employ. So if you have evidence that from the first moment I arrive at RevLeft, I indulged in unprovoked abuse, let's have it.


I told you back in 2006 that because of the unremitting abuse you levelled at me, I'd always be agressive toward you. You now act surprised when I carry out that promise.
Not surprised, but a little discouraged. But really all this shows is that 'you can give it out, but you can't take it', because, frankly, I do not take this position with you. In fact, you have claimed to share 99% of your politics with me, so your avowed policy of constant aggression is merely an example of your micro-sectarianism, placing philosophical disagreements above political agreement.


Plenty -- for example, the Marxists who are listed as members of the anti-dialectics group. And many of those here:

http://discussion.newyouth.com/index.php

In addition, there are many others here with whom I have an excellent relationship: Meridian, Chris, Kleber, Yaz, Led Zep (before he left) and Hyacithn, for example. Yes, as I said, you take a far more abusive stance to those who attempt to defend the dialectic.

[ChrisK]

This only supports her point if you swallow her guff that she is charm personified until others attack her. This is simply not sustainable. She accused me of instantly being abusive to her when I joined Revleft and this is not true. I was at first interested in her point of view until she began to patronise and insult me and others.

I tell you what, somewhere on her site there is a section dedicated to illustrating how awfully she is treated in debate. Look at that and you will see that at least in equal measure, it is Rosa who begins the abuse. Even those who initially approach Rosa with equanimity are soon ridiculed and traduced for being "mystics" and "class enemies".

I have looked at that section of the site. From what I have seen, it usually starts with her being told that she knows fuck all about dialectics and proceed to misrepresent what she said.

And yes, there have been times when she has started it, but after years of doing this, one can hardly blame her. Further, this appears to be a rare occurance.

Now I don't know about your case, but I'll look into it and tell you what I think.


Besides, what is aggressive about my response, pointing out that her accusation of emotionalism on behalf of her interlocutors is also appropriate to her own style of debate? What is aggressive about pointing out that using the pejorative label of 'mystic' against her opponents is not conducive to constructive debate?

It was the mode of the response. Sarcasm is an aggressive form of response. If it were not, arguments and fights would not break out over it.


Is there one single Marxist who posts here, or on another site, who seeks to defend the dialectic, who Rosa is not rude to and dismissive of?

My challenge to you, dear Christofer, is to find one single example.

Philzer.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Thanks for the link and all that but what has this got to do with me? As the exchange doesn't include me, I can only take it as another example of the disingenuous debating technique which others have noted you employ. So if you have evidence that from the first moment I arrive at RevLeft, I indulged in unprovoked abuse, let's have it.

I see that I am going to have to walk you through this once more (using visual aids, if necessary). You asserted this:


This only supports her point if you swallow her guff that she is charm personified until others attack her. This is simply not sustainable.

and this:


Is there one single Marxist who posts here, or on another site, who seeks to defend the dialectic, who Rosa is not rude to and dismissive of?

My challenge to you, dear Christofer, is to find one single example.

Those links were aimed at answering those slurs.

As far as this is concerened:


This is simply not sustainable. She accused me of instantly being abusive to her when I joined Revleft and this is not true. I was at first interested in her point of view until she began to patronise and insult me and others.

I will now locate the threads where your initial abuse is plain even for you hyper-myopic mystics to see.


Not surprised, but a little discouraged. But really all this shows is that 'you can give it out, but you can't take it', because, frankly, I do not take this position with you. In fact, you have claimed to share 99% of your politics with me, so your avowed policy of constant aggression is merely an example of your micro-sectarianism, placing philosophical disagreements above political agreement.

Indeed, and despite the fact that we agree over 99% of our politics, you even refused to call me a comrade and asserted I wasn't a revolutionary, or even a Marxist -- just because I questioned your quasi-religious beliefs.


Yes, as I said, you take a far more abusive stance to those who attempt to defend the dialectic.

Not so; some of the DM-fans at that site were comradely with me all the time, and I treated them in like manner. Others weren't and I returned their abuse with interest ('Axel 1917' (remember him?), who is called 'Volkov' there, being the one of the best examples of this).

I can post the precise links if you are too lazy to check for yourself...:lol:

[ChrisK]

All right Bob, upon reviewing old threads I have found, what I believe to be, the thread that started your fighting with Rosa. Here it is:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/ollman-dialectics-t47880/index2.html?highlight=dialectic

Now, here is what I saw. I saw you asking the same question over and over, which she repeatedly responseds to.

Then accusing her of supporting empiricism, common sense and so-called bourgeoise science.

You further mocked her for posting a link to her website where you would have had all the information you wanted about her justification for being against dialectics.

You even mocked her defense of ordinary language, without even taking the time to understand what that means.

Finally, she retailiated. I would have retaliated sooner so I can't see how she is the abusive one. You really had it coming in that one.

[ZeroNowhere]

Now here's an interesting philosophical debate: in what conditions is it justified to insult people on an internet forum? Is retribution an acceptable motive, or is it an irrational reaction which fails to take into account social influence on the insulter? If morality is to be based upon the principle of universalisability, then does insulting somebody due to being insulted mean that they may acceotably insult you in return, if one is to be morally consistent? Does the total happiness caused by the insult outweigh the harm caused, or, if this depends on too many unknown variables, does this serve to invalidate a hedonic calculus as a means of deciding upon ethical questions? To what extent do these insults contribute towards the development of virtues on a social and individual level? Do they needlessly create a negative and combative atmosphere which hinders the accessibility of the Philosophy board and restricts it primarily to the petty squabbles of a few members? What is the meaning of insults? Is contradiction equivalent to debate, and how does this relate to a certain Monty Python sketch? If it is, then to what extent is this dialectical? What are the similarities between the equality of commodity exchange undergoing a dialectical inversion due to the nature of the capitalist production process and a forum for discussion undergoing a dialectical inversion into a space for verbal jousting, and does this prove that motion is a contradiction? If God is a projection of the human essence, is Hell a projection of human conversation?

So much potential for discussion.

[Hit The North]

All right Bob, upon reviewing old threads I have found, what I believe to be, the thread that started your fighting with Rosa. Here it is:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/ollman-dialectics-t47880/index2.html?highlight=dialectic

Now, here is what I saw. I saw you asking the same question over and over, which she repeatedly responseds to.

Then accusing her of supporting empiricism, common sense and so-called bourgeoise science.

You further mocked her for posting a link to her website where you would have had all the information you wanted about her justification for being against dialectics.

You even mocked her defense of ordinary language, without even taking the time to understand what that means.

Finally, she retailiated. I would have retaliated sooner so I can't see how she is the abusive one. You really had it coming in that one.

Chris, you plainly have too much time on your hands, although your attention to this matter is touching.

If this was the moment that Rosa and I fell out, I don't know, I feel like there may have been earlier skirmishes. But I cannot endorse your interpretation of the thread in question. From my reading, I ask Rosa to explain her version of historical materialism with the dialectic expunged and, in my opinion, she fails to do so convincingly, and actually never has to this day. I then question not ordinary language philosophy but something she calls "the language of the working class". Again, her response is inadequate and fails to rise above evasion: "If you need to ask I cannot help you." Now, you may feel that this is a perfectly adequate explanation and a genuine attempt to clarify a concept she is keen to employ. I do not.

As for accusing her of empiricism or common sense (why is that an insult?), I do no such thing. I phrase this as a speculation as I try to grasp Rosa's position. In fact, I even concede:
Regardless, I'm willing to accept that you're not an empiricist, but I'm still mystified as to what you are.

Of course, this is always frustrating trying to pin Rosa down as she will not own up to any position. But the fact that she interprets these comments as telling lies about her is, in fact, her own problem. Besides, if you actually read the words and not some sarcastic" intent which you imagine, you will see that it is Rosa who begins the personal insults, accusing me of being unable to think straight, etc.

Btw, she ends the thread with petty attempts to get the last word in, by repeatedly ridiculing Hoopla for his poor English language skills. Very nice.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In response to BTB, and to add to what Chris has posted, here are the precise links:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=726471&postcount=19
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=726514&postcount=21
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=726552&postcount=24
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=726604&postcount=28
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=729561&postcount=70
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=729607&postcount=73

Starts to go down hill at 73.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=729650&postcount=74
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=730019&postcount=75
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=730075&postcount=76
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=730166&postcount=77
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=731034&postcount=86
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=731245&postcount=87
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=731549&postcount=88
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=731605&postcount=89

Now, a few weeks earlier, BTB (who was called 'Citizen Z' in those days) and I were involved in debate, for example here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/idealism-vs-materialism-t46820/index2.html

There we acted in an exemplary manner.

However, everything changed when BTB began to make stuff up and lie about my ideas, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=729607&postcount=73

Up to then, I had lost count of the number of dialectical mystics who have done this (and still do -- S Artesian being one of the best recent examples), and as I indicated above, as soon as that happens, I go straight for the throat; I do not p*ss about anymore, like I used to do.

From then onwards, it has been downhill all the way.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I ask Rosa to explain her version of historical materialism with the dialectic expunged and, in my opinion, she fails to do so convincingly, and actually never has to this day. I then question not ordinary language philosophy but something she calls "the language of the working class". Again, her response is inadequate and fails to rise above evasion: "If you need to ask I cannot help you." Now, you may feel that this is a perfectly adequate explanation and a genuine attempt to clarify a concept she is keen to employ. I do not.

As noted above, I always react to mystics like you who lie about me and my ideas.

And if you check the earlier debates between me and 'hoopla', you will soon see why I adopted this attitude toward him.

Next to 'Red Che', he was one of the biggest idiots ever to post at RevLeft, and spared no effort to post the vilest abuse directed at me. These days, he'd be given infraction after infraction. But in those days the mods were far more tolerant.

This is despite the fact that I used to PM him with help with his essays.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Now here's an interesting philosophical debate: in what conditions is it justified to insult people on an internet forum? Is retribution an acceptable motive, or is it an irrational reaction which fails to take into account social influence on the insulter? If morality is to be based upon the principle of universalisability, then does insulting somebody due to being insulted mean that they may acceotably insult you in return, if one is to be morally consistent? Does the total happiness caused by the insult outweigh the harm caused, or, if this depends on too many unknown variables, does this serve to invalidate a hedonic calculus as a means of deciding upon ethical questions? To what extent do these insults contribute towards the development of virtues on a social and individual level? Do they needlessly create a negative and combative atmosphere which hinders the accessibility of the Philosophy board and restricts it primarily to the petty squabbles of a few members? What is the meaning of insults? Is contradiction equivalent to debate, and how does this relate to a certain Monty Python sketch? If it is, then to what extent is this dialectical? What are the similarities between the equality of commodity exchange undergoing a dialectical inversion due to the nature of the capitalist production process and a forum for discussion undergoing a dialectical inversion into a space for verbal jousting, and does this prove that motion is a contradiction? If God is a projection of the human essence, is Hell a projection of human conversation?

So much potential for discussion.

May I suggest you open a thread on this? It is off-topic here, I think.

[ChrisK]

Chris, you plainly have too much time on your hands, although your attention to this matter is touching.

Took about five whole minutes to find it!


If this was the moment that Rosa and I fell out, I don't know, I feel like there may have been earlier skirmishes. But I cannot endorse your interpretation of the thread in question. From my reading, I ask Rosa to explain her version of historical materialism with the dialectic expunged and, in my opinion, she fails to do so convincingly, and actually never has to this day. I then question not ordinary language philosophy but something she calls "the language of the working class". Again, her response is inadequate and fails to rise above evasion: "If you need to ask I cannot help you." Now, you may feel that this is a perfectly adequate explanation and a genuine attempt to clarify a concept she is keen to employ. I do not.

As for accusing her of empiricism or common sense (why is that an insult?), I do no such thing. I phrase this as a speculation as I try to grasp Rosa's position. In fact, I even concede:

What is meant by ordinary language is the language of the working class. And you did mock that, without any background into what is meant by this.

She was not evading you; you were being a sarcastic ass about the language of the working class and she responded.

As for common sense being an insult, it has more to do with putting words into her mouth. It would be the same as saying that Wittgenstein (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wittgenstein) is a pupil of Thomas Reid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Reid) and G.E. Moore (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G.E._Moore) without taking the time to read them and see the differences.


Of course, this is always frustrating trying to pin Rosa down as she will not own up to any position. But the fact that she interprets these comments as telling lies about her is, in fact, her own problem. Besides, if you actually read the words and not some sarcastic" intent which you imagine, you will see that it is Rosa who begins the personal insults, accusing me of being unable to think straight, etc.

Btw, she ends the thread with petty attempts to get the last word in, by repeatedly ridiculing Hoopla for his poor English language skills. Very nice.

Reading the words, it starts with you putting words in her mouth. As for Hoopla, thats a different argument between two people with problems with each other. Of course there will be insults.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Anyway, I'm away for a few hours -- off to watch the local derby between Man U and Man City...:)

[Kotze]

Found a text that not only explains the gist of dialectics, but also almost all of philosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation).
in what conditions is it justified to insult peopleAlways, for what is considered insulting is defined by the ruling class.

For example, in economics using the term parasitic for a certain group that is objectively not needed in production while taking a considerable share out of it is called agitation on par with Hitler, whereas certain models with assumptions that insult my intelligence are tolerated, encouraged even.

Did I just—
Eh, at worst that's only a half-equivocation.

[Hit The North]

What is meant by ordinary language is the language of the working class.


Well, I'll raise the same question with you as I raised with Rosa, namely, which language is the language of the working class: German, English, Spanish or Mandarin? Or are you using the word "language" in some new way? I've heard of people going to college to learn French, Spanish, Portugese, Russian, even Swahili, but never Working Class. Must be the effect of the bourgeois academy, eh?

Btw, how do you separate the language of the working class from the language of shop keepers or bank managers?


And you did mock that, without any background into what is meant by this.
If there's mockery, it is to those who employ high faluting phrases like "the language of the working class" without having a clear means of definition. So consider yourself mocked.


She was not evading you; you were being a sarcastic ass about the language of the working class and she responded.
And you are being an 'ikkle fanboy by pretending that your hero provided anywhere near a decent definition of the "language of the working class" in that thread. If I'm wrong, by all means provide a quote where she did this. But it had better be more than just "What is meant by ordinary language is the language of the working class."

[S.Artesian]

Tell you what, Chris, she's evading me over on the Dialectics thread. Why don't you ask her to answer the questions I asked her about her claim that historical materialism is a scientific theory that has nothing to do with dialectics.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA:


Tell you what, Chris, she's evading me over on the Dialectics thread.

No I'm not.


Why don't you ask her to answer the questions I asked her about her claim that historical materialism is a scientific theory that has nothing to do with dialectics.

As you have been told dozens of times: I'll answer all your questions when you answer the many I have asked you which you just ignore.

[S.Artesian]

Blahblahblahblah... you're a troll Rosa, nothing more.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Well, I'll raise the same question with you as I raised with Rosa, namely, which language is the language of the working class: German, English, Spanish or Mandarin? Or are you using the word "language" in some new way? I've heard of people going to college to learn French, Spanish, Portugese, Russian, even Swahili, but never Working Class. Must be the effect of the bourgeois academy, eh?

This was answered back in that thread: any language the working class use from day-to-day.

The sort of language you use everyday. The sort of language Socialist Worker, for example, uses all the time (minus the few mystical words that creep in from time to time) -- or which appears in its foreign language equivalents.


Or are you using the word "language" in some new way?

Same way as Marx:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

BTB:


Btw, how do you separate the language of the working class from the language of shop keepers or bank managers?

In their everyday affairs they have to use ordinary langauge too.


If there's mockery, it is to those who employ high faluting phrases like "the language of the working class" without having a clear means of definition. So consider yourself mocked.

Perhaps you think workers don't use language?

Maybe they communicate with Aldis Lamps, or by semaphore?


And you are being an 'ikkle fanboy by pretending that your hero provided anywhere near a decent definition of the "language of the working class" in that thread. If I'm wrong, by all means provide a quote where she did this. But it had better be more than just "What is meant by ordinary language is the language of the working class."

Check out the links I posted for yourself. Or are you too lazy?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA, making sense for once:


Blahblahblahblah...

SA:


you're a troll Rosa, nothing more.

Not even you believe that, or you'd not have bothered posting 1000+ posts having a go at me.:lol:

[ChrisK]

Well, I'll raise the same question with you as I raised with Rosa, namely, which language is the language of the working class: German, English, Spanish or Mandarin? Or are you using the word "language" in some new way? I've heard of people going to college to learn French, Spanish, Portugese, Russian, even Swahili, but never Working Class. Must be the effect of the bourgeois academy, eh?

Still haven't bothered to figure out what she meant by researching Wittgenstein. I mean really. She has been a supporter of his for a long time, if you bothered to look him up this would have all been resolved.

Ordinary language is the language of the working class. Ordinary language is language as it is used in social interactions.

You could have learned that in five minutes on google.


Btw, how do you separate the language of the working class from the language of shop keepers or bank managers?

If there's mockery, it is to those who employ high faluting phrases like "the language of the working class" without having a clear means of definition. So consider yourself mocked.

It is a phrase that distinguishes social language from scientific language and philosophical language.

This is funny coming from a guy who can't give a solid definition of "contradiction."


And you are being an 'ikkle fanboy by pretending that your hero provided anywhere near a decent definition of the "language of the working class" in that thread. If I'm wrong, by all means provide a quote where she did this. But it had better be more than just "What is meant by ordinary language is the language of the working class."

Fanboy eh, copying S.Artesian's insults now? Sorry, they actually came out well from him, from you they come out sounding like that little kid cursing for the first time. Could be that you lack originality. Or it could be that you want to distract me from the issue; you kept putting words in her mouth. Man up or shut up.

[ChrisK]

Tell you what, Chris, she's evading me over on the Dialectics thread. Why don't you ask her to answer the questions I asked her about her claim that historical materialism is a scientific theory that has nothing to do with dialectics.

What questions?

[Hit The North]

Still haven't bothered to figure out what she meant by researching Wittgenstein. I mean really. She has been a supporter of his for a long time, if you bothered to look him up this would have all been resolved.


Why, does Wittgenstein mention "the language of the working class"?


Ordinary language is the language of the working class. Ordinary language is language as it is used in social interactions.Is this the same ordinary language used by capitalists in their social interaction? Is it the same ordinary language used by the petite bourgeoisie? If no, then what's the difference? If yes, then how is ordinary language the "language of the working class" as distinct from the language of other social classes?


It is a phrase that distinguishes social language from scientific language and philosophical language.Are you claiming that scientific language is not also a social language? In fact, isn't all language social? Are you arguing for some built-in superiority of ordinary language over scientific language? Do you think the ordinary language of the shop floor or the stock market explains capitalism more accurately than, say, the scientific language of Das Kapital? Do you assume that "ordinary language" is free from the distortions of class society? Is it a phrase that distinguishes reactionary language from progressive language? In fact, is this appeal to "ordinary language" of any analytical use whatsoever?


This is funny coming from a guy who can't give a solid definition of "contradiction."
Any definitions I offer for "contradiction" accords with its usage in Marxism. The fact that you disagree with Marxist theory and, specifically, Marx's analysis of the laws of motion of capitalist society, is your problem and one which has been pointed out to you many times.


Man up or shut up. :lol:

"Man up"? Is this an example of your "ordinary language"? It is certainly a good example of how it can be corrupted with sexist and other power relations. Meanwhile, it's indeed a shame that we are separated by an ocean, as I would love to give you the chance to make me shut up. Dickhead.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Why, does Wittgenstein mention "the language of the working class"?

In fact, Chris was responding to the words I have highlighted in this comment of yours:


Well, I'll raise the same question with you as I raised with Rosa, namely, which language is the language of the working class: German, English, Spanish or Mandarin? Or are you using the word "language" in some new way? I've heard of people going to college to learn French, Spanish, Portugese, Russian, even Swahili, but never Working Class. Must be the effect of the bourgeois academy, eh?

You:


Is this the same ordinary language used by capitalists in their social interaction? Is it the same ordinary language used by the petite bourgeoisie? If no, then what's the difference? If yes, then how is ordinary language the "language of the working class" as distinct from the language of other social classes?

Since Engels and Marx had hypothesisd that language was invented as a result of collective labour, then language is naturally the invention and preserve of the working class. But, since those you mention also have to be able to communicate with one another, and with workers, they too are socialised in ordinary language.

Or have you noticed that bosses and managers speak a radically different language from you (even in English), such that you can't understand much of what they say when they talk to you?

So ordinary language, the language of the working class, is the language we are all socialised in. That is why Socialist Worker (and other reviolutionary papers right across the planet) use it.

Technical and other specialised vocabularies may then be superimposd on it, but that's another story.


Any definitions I offer for "contradiction" accords with its usage in Marxism. The fact that you disagree with Marxist theory and, specifically, Marx's analysis of the laws of motion of capitalist society, is your problem and one which has been pointed out to you many times.

Except, you have yet to explain how things can be 'mutually exclusive' (as Marx says of 'contradictions'). If they are, they can't exist together, in which case they can't interact and this 'contradict' one another. On the other hand, if they do 'contradict' one another, then they must co-exist and so cannot 'mutually exclude' one another.


"Man up"? Is this an example of your "ordinary language"?

1) Who has said that we must only ever use ordinary language? [You can't do that in many areas of science (natural and social), for example.]

2) It's is now widely used, and so, if it isn't yet part of ordinary language, it soon will be.


It is certainly a good example of how it can be corrupted with sexist and other power relations.

Who has ever denied that? In fact, as you have already been told (by me), for every sexist, racist and ideologically regressive and backward thing that can be said (by bosses, workers or, indeed, by anyone), there exists its negation in ordianary language. That is why, as socialists, we can say such things as "Women aren't sex objects", "Blacks aren't an inferior race", "Capitalism isn't free and fair", etc. -- and still be understod even by those who disagree with us.


Meanwhile, it's indeed a shame that we are separated by an ocean, as I would love to give you the chance to make me shut up. Dickhead.

Fine words for a mod...:(

[ChrisK]

Why, does Wittgenstein mention "the language of the working class"?

In the sense that it is ordinary language.... YES. For someone who is somewhat intelligent, you're quite the idiot at comprehending anything that wasn't spoonfed to you by the party.


Is this the same ordinary language used by capitalists in their social interaction? Is it the same ordinary language used by the petite bourgeoisie? If no, then what's the difference? If yes, then how is ordinary language the "language of the working class" as distinct from the language of other social classes?

It is the same ordinary language. Additionally, the middle classes and bourgeosie use more technical languages focused on their professions. The point of calling it the language of the working class is to distinguish it from how philosophers (including the likes of Engels, Lenin and Trotsky in their works on DM) misuse language.


Are you claiming that scientific language is not also a social language? In fact, isn't all language social? Are you arguing for some built-in superiority of ordinary language over scientific language? Do you think the ordinary language of the shop floor or the stock market explains capitalism more accurately than, say, the scientific language of Das Kapital? Do you assume that "ordinary language" is free from the distortions of class society? Is it a phrase that distinguishes reactionary language from progressive language? In fact, is this appeal to "ordinary language" of any analytical use whatsoever?

I'm not knocking on scientific language. I'm pointing out that it is different from ordinary language used in a social, non-specialized setting. But, of course, you can't be bothered to look into Wittgenstein and are far too dogmatic to ever look beyond your party line so....


Any definitions I offer for "contradiction" accords with its usage in Marxism. The fact that you disagree with Marxist theory and, specifically, Marx's analysis of the laws of motion of capitalist society, is your problem and one which has been pointed out to you many times.

Oh please. You've never been able to give a definition that agrees with Marx's technical use of "contradiction," just the Hegelian notion of "contradiction." You've never shown how things are both a and not-a at the same time.


:lol:

"Man up"? Is this an example of your "ordinary language"? It is certainly a good example of how it can be corrupted with sexist and other power relations. Meanwhile, it's indeed a shame that we are separated by an ocean, as I would love to give you the chance to make me shut up. Dickhead.

Dickhead... just got off the playground I see. Okay internet tough-guy, I see you just want to evade the issue. But then again it could be that you can't get your "man up" and and to act all tough because of it. If that is the case a doctor should be consulted.

In the mean time, will you admit you're a fucking prick and put words in others mouths?

[Hit The North]

Since Engels and Marx had hypothesisd that language was invented as a result of collective labour, then language is naturally the invention and preserve of the working class. But, since those you mention also have to be able to communicate with one another, and with workers, they too are socialised in ordinary language.


I'd agree with the hypothesis that human language did emerge as a result of the collective labour of human beings, and I'd add that it continues to be shaped by it. But this only highlights how it is dependent on class society. Whatever language was spoken in pre-class society, it is no longer spoken today. In fact, no one today speaks a language that has not been shaped by class society. So any ‘ordinary language’ develops in the exchanges between individuals as determined by class society. Therefore it makes no sense to call ordinary language ‘the language of the working class’ without conceding that it is also ‘the language of the petite bourgeoisie’ and ‘the language of the bourgeoisie’ (after all, all three of these classes take part in the collective labour of capitalist society, even if the roles of the two latter are parasitic).

The problem with an appeal to ordinary language is that it cannot provide us with a critique of ordinary language itself and recognise that ordinary language inevitably becomes the vehicle for ideological persuasion and social control. I have every sympathy with a sociological focus on ordinary language use which recognises that the term “ordinary” is, itself, context dependent. But your approach suggests that ordinary language should be considered as some context-independent, a-historical and unproblematic result of practical living, which emerges from classless society and is then later corrupted by ruling class norms and values. It is an essentialist reading, as if we can uncover some deep structural meanings. What we need, however, is a relational and historical reading which recognises that if language emerges from the alienated conditions of class society (the actual historical context in which collective labour takes place) then it will reflect that alienation.

By understanding that language, as used in ordinary social contexts, reflects the class struggle, with all the ambiguities and contradictions that entails, it cannot be relied upon as being some oasis of good sense which we can retreat to, or use as a yardstick for critiquing specialist discourses.


Who has ever denied that? In fact, as you have already been told (by me), for every sexist, racist and ideologically regressive and backward thing that can be said (by bosses, workers or, indeed, by anyone), there exists its negation in ordianary language. That is why, as socialists, we can say such things as "Women aren't sex objects", "Blacks aren't an inferior race", "Capitalism isn't free and fair", etc. -- and still be understod even by those who disagree with us.So, in fact, an appeal to ordinary language is politically useless.


Fine words for a mod...:(
Yes, well no one insults my insults and gets away with it.

[Hit The North]

In the sense that it is ordinary language.... YES. For someone who is somewhat intelligent, you're quite the idiot at comprehending anything that wasn't spoonfed to you by the party.


At least I'm in a party, jackass.


It is the same ordinary language. Additionally, the middle classes and bourgeosie use more technical languages focused on their professions. The point of calling it the language of the working class is to distinguish it from how philosophers (including the likes of Engels, Lenin and Trotsky in their works on DM) misuse language.
But not Marx? Why so coy? You could throw Das Kapital on your bonfire of philistinism as well. Oh, except then you wouldn't be able to maintain your precarious hold on a body of theory which you reject in its main principles of analysis but, for some obscure reason, wish to be identified with.


I'm not knocking on scientific language. I'm pointing out that it is different from ordinary language used in a social, non-specialized setting. But, of course, you can't be bothered to look into Wittgenstein and are far too dogmatic to ever look beyond your party line so.... :lol: Do you even know what my party's line on Wittgenstein is? I'm sure I don't.


Oh please. You've never been able to give a definition that agrees with Marx's technical use of "contradiction," just the Hegelian notion of "contradiction." Marx's technical use as opposed to his non-technical use? Refresh my memory.


You've never shown how things are both a and not-a at the same time.
I'm sorry, is that sentence supposed to be gibberish?


Dickhead... just got off the playground I see. Okay internet tough-guy, I see you just want to evade the issue.
Well, that's untrue given that the issue is that you are a dickhead.


But then again it could be that you can't get your "man up" and and to act all tough because of it. If that is the case a doctor should be consulted.
Meow, ikkle fanboy. :crying: Dat hurt.


In the mean time, will you admit you have a wonderful fucking prick and I'd like it in my mouth?Yeah, ok.

[ChrisK]

At least I'm in a party, jackass.

Sorry, no expansion into my area as of yet. So sad, I guess I have to wait a couple of years.


But not Marx? Why so coy? You could throw Das Kapital on your bonfire of philistinism as well. Oh, except then you wouldn't be able to maintain your precarious hold on a body of theory which you reject in its main principles of analysis but, for some obscure reason, wish to be identified with.

Because he was an anti-philosopher and wrote books against philosophy. Das Kapital was economics not philosophy. Keep up.


:lol: Do you even know what my party's line on Wittgenstein is? I'm sure I don't.

Well now, if you could read you would understand the point, which you just helped me further prove. You know nothing without your party feeding it to you.

Last time I was with the ISO I remember him being called a bourgeosie philosopher so I assume the SWP has a similar position.


Marx's technical use as opposed to his non-technical use? Refresh my memory.

Mutual exclusiveness. His non-technical use is playing around with Hegelian terminology.


I'm sorry, is that sentence supposed to be gibberish?

You haven't shown how things are mutually exclusive. That is what that sentence meant.


Well, that's untrue given that the issue is that you are a dickhead.

You sound like a little kid trying to be tough. How clever are you.... its adorable!


Meow, ikkle fanboy. :crying: Dat hurt.

Sorry, went a wee bit overboard on that last one.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I'd agree with the hypothesis that human language did emerge as a result of the collective labour of human beings, and I'd add that it continues to be shaped by it. But this only highlights how it is dependent on class society. Whatever language was spoken in pre-class society, it is no longer spoken today. In fact, no one today speaks a language that has not been shaped by class society. So any ‘ordinary language’ develops in the exchanges between individuals as determined by class society. Therefore it makes no sense to call ordinary language ‘the language of the working class’ without conceding that it is also ‘the language of the petite bourgeoisie’ and ‘the language of the bourgeoisie’ (after all, all three of these classes take part in the collective labour of capitalist society, even if the roles of the two latter are parasitic).

I agree with much of this, but not only does the working class form the vast bulk of society (almost right across the planet), but through its labour it runs the world. That being so, ordinary language is indeed their language.


Therefore it makes no sense to call ordinary language ‘the language of the working class’ without conceding that it is also ‘the language of the petite bourgeoisie’ and ‘the language of the bourgeoisie’ (after all, all three of these classes take part in the collective labour of capitalist society, even if the roles of the two latter are parasitic)

And yet, if they want to get anything done, they have to be able to communicate with workers; so they too have to use the ordinary language of workers.


The problem with an appeal to ordinary language is that it cannot provide us with a critique of ordinary language itself and recognise that ordinary language inevitably becomes the vehicle for ideological persuasion and social control.

1) Not so. Admittedly, ordinary language may be used to express the most patent of falsehoods and the most regressive of doctrines, but it cannot itself be affected by "false consciousness", nor can it be "ideological".

Without doubt, everyday sentences can express all manner of backward, racist, sexist and ideologically-compromised ideas, but this is not the fault of the medium in which these are expressed, any more than it is the fault of, say, a computer if it is used to post racist bile on a web page. Ideologically-tainted ideas expressed in ordinary language result either from its misuse or from the employment of specialised terminology borrowed from religious dogma, sexist beliefs, reactionary ideology, racist theories and superstitious ideas. This is not to suggest that ordinary humans do not, or cannot, speak in such backward ways; but these are dependent on the latter being expressed in ordinary language, but are not dependent on that language itself.

It is worth pointing out at this stage that this defence of ordinary language is not being advanced dogmatically. Every user of the vernacular knows it to be true since they know that for each and every sexist, racist and ideologically-compromised sentence expressible in ordinary language there exists its negation.

This is why socialists can say such things as: "Blacks are not inferior"; "Human beings are not selfish"; "Wages are not fair", "Women are not objects", "Belief in the after-life is baseless" -- and still be understood, even by those still in thrall to such ideas, but who might still take an opposite view. If ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense' -- and if it were ideological (per se), in the way that some imagine -- you just could not say such things.

We all know this to be true -- certainly, socialists should know this --, because in our practical discourse we manage to deny such things every day.

In this regard, it is as ironic as it is inexcusable that there are revolutionaries who, while they are only too ready to regale us with the alleged limitations of ordinary language -- on the grounds that it reflects "commodity fetishism", "false consciousness" or "static thinking" --, are quite happy to accept (in whole or in part) impenetrably obscure ideas lifted from the work of a card-carrying, ruling-class-warrior like Hegel. Not only are his theories based on alienated thought (i.e., mystical Christianity), his Absolute Idealism was a direct result of a systematic fetishisation of language.

2) Ordinary language cannot be 'critiqued'.

I will supply a proof of this on request.


I have every sympathy with a sociological focus on ordinary language use which recognises that the term “ordinary” is, itself, context dependent. But your approach suggests that ordinary language should be considered as some context-independent, a-historical and unproblematic result of practical living, which emerges from classless society and is then later corrupted by ruling class norms and values. It is an essentialist reading, as if we can uncover some deep structural meanings. What we need, however, is a relational and historical reading which recognises that if language emerges from the alienated conditions of class society (the actual historical context in which collective labour takes place) then it will reflect that alienation.

I'm sorry if what I have posted has suggested this to you; that wasn't my intention. There is nothing in what I have said that implies ordinary language is static or isn't historically conditioned. So, my ideas about it do not express 'essentialism'.

And I have dealt with the alleged 'corruption' of ordinary language above.


By understanding that language, as used in ordinary social contexts, reflects the class struggle, with all the ambiguities and contradictions that entails, it cannot be relied upon as being some oasis of good sense which we can retreat to, or use as a yardstick for critiquing specialist discourses.

Who said it was an 'oasis of good sense'? Stupid and idiotic ideas are as easily expressed in ordinary language as are their opposites.

And 'contradiction' is itself an ordinary language term. Moreover, if there are any of these, as you allege, they can be resolved in ordinary language.

And of course the vernacular can be used as a yard-stick. Not only did Marx advise we do this (see the quote I added above), what you have to say is already in ordinary language.

Furthermore, as is relatively easy to show, any attempt to abrogate the norms expressed in our use of the vernacular rapidly descends into non-sense. I have summarised part of that demonstration here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1718346&postcount=61


So, in fact, an appeal to ordinary language is politically useless.

But, Socialist Worker and Socialist Review do this all the time -- and it's much the same with International Socialism. The same can be said for most other revolutionary publications, blogs and articles.


Yes, well no one insults my insults and gets away with it.

You didn't used to say that when I was a mod and verbally abused others.

[S.Artesian]

Because he was an anti-philosopher and wrote books against philosophy. Das Kapital was economics not philosophy. Keep up.

Technically not. Capital is subtitled A Critique of Political Economy. It is no more economics than it is sociology. As a critique, it is more akin to a critical history.




Mutual exclusiveness. His non-technical use is playing around with Hegelian terminology.

No, it isn't. He's not playing around with anything in his discussions of value. He is demonstrating how each facet, each face, each moment of value simultaneously excludes the other, yet reproduces the entire system, the entire movement, including that "other." Thus the long discussion and demonstration of equivalent and relative value.




You haven't shown how things are mutually exclusive. That is what that sentence meant.

But Marx clearly does, explaining at the same time that the exclusion entails the inclusion in the already existing identity.


So... since I know RL doesn't want to discuss Marx's analysis of the value form, if you would like to do so, I am always willing.

[ChrisK]

Technically not. Capital is subtitled A Critique of Political Economy. It is no more economics than it is sociology. As a critique, it is more akin to a critical history.

It is a book on the subject of economics which is critical of capitalist political economy. It is not philosophy.


No, it isn't. He's not playing around with anything in his discussions of value. He is demonstrating how each facet, each face, each moment of value simultaneously excludes the other, yet reproduces the entire system, the entire movement, including that "other." Thus the long discussion and demonstration of equivalent and relative value.

Take it up with him. He is teasing around with Hegelian terms. He says so himself.


But Marx clearly does, explaining at the same time that the exclusion entails the inclusion in the already existing identity.

So... since I know RL doesn't want to discuss Marx's analysis of the value form, if you would like to do so, I am always willing.

Go ahead. I'm game.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA:


No, it isn't. He's not playing around with anything in his discussions of value. He is demonstrating how each facet, each face, each moment of value simultaneously excludes the other, yet reproduces the entire system, the entire movement, including that "other." Thus the long discussion and demonstration of equivalent and relative value.

And yet you have yet to explain how any two things/process/facets can be 'mutually exclusive' and 'contradictory' at the same time.

If they are 'mutually exclusive, they can't exist together, in which case they can't interact and thus 'contradict' one another. On the other hand, if they do 'contradict' one another, then they must co-exist and so cannot 'mutually exclude' one another.


But Marx clearly does, explaining at the same time that the exclusion entails the inclusion in the already existing identity.

Not so, he ignores this problem, as do you.

And that is because he is merely 'coquetting' with this word-- as you should, too.


So... since I know RL doesn't want to discuss Marx's analysis of the value form, if you would like to do so, I am always willing.

You know nothing of the sort.

[S.Artesian]

OK, will start with value-- shortly; have some other things to take care of tonight.

In the meantime, the terms he was playing around with were terms that were removed from the original German of the first edition and not the terms that Marx retained in the 2nd edition. I believe Graymouser has covered this area in irrefutable detail.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^Can you discuss that in another thread please?


In the meantime, the terms he was playing around with were terms that were removed from the original German of the first edition and not the terms that Marx retained in the 2nd edition. I believe Graymouser has covered this area in irrefutable detail.

Not so, I was able to show he was mistaken.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/does-anyone-actually-t137570/index8.html

From the bottom of the page, onwards.

[ChrisK]

OK, will start with value-- shortly; have some other things to take care of tonight.

Thats okay. I work tonight anyway.


In the meantime, the terms he was playing around with were terms that were removed from the original German of the first edition and not the terms that Marx retained in the 2nd edition. I believe Graymouser has covered this area in irrefutable detail.

Graymouser failed to definatively prove this. Further, he never was able to respond to the objection that if Marx was teasing with Hegelian terms, why would it only be in the most important chapter of the book? That makes no sense.

He additionally was never able to explain why the sentence structure shows that Marx was claiming that these terms were used in the whole book.

[ChrisK]

S.Artesian, when you're ready for our debate do you want to make a thread in theory? You can have the first post.

[S.Artesian]

Thats okay. I work tonight anyway.



Graymouser failed to definatively prove this. Further, he never was able to respond to the objection that if Marx was teasing with Hegelian terms, why would it only be in the most important chapter of the book? That makes no sense.

He additionally was never able to explain why the sentence structure shows that Marx was claiming that these terms were used in the whole book.

Have to disagree Chris, look at the original version of Capital as published in
German, and compare that with the subsequent editions and translations-- you see "forms of expression peculiar to Hegel" in the original, but not in the subsequent versions.

Marx does not say he was teasing-- he says coquetting with forms of expression-- flirting with them, those forms of expressoin. That's quite a different thing from stating or implying he's teasing the reader.

And of course it makes perfect sense, once you read Marx's introduction to the first edition of volume 1 where he talks about trying to render this subject in as simple language as possible, but feeling compelled to introduce language and concepts in the discussion of value that might cause the reader difficulty. He, Marx, trusts that the reader will be willing to make the effort to learn the language, to grasp the methodology, in order to realize the object of the method and language, the value form.

[S.Artesian]

S.Artesian, when you're ready for our debate do you want to make a thread in theory? You can have the first post.


That's a great idea-- you want to call it "Value Form" or "Facets of Value"?

[ChrisK]

That's a great idea-- you want to call it "Value Form" or "Facets of Value"?

Facets of Value. Thats an awesome name :thumbup1:

Oh, and it was Rosa's request. Keep her thread focused on dialectics.

[ChrisK]

Have to disagree Chris, look at the original version of Capital as published in
German, and compare that with the subsequent editions and translations-- you see "forms of expression peculiar to Hegel" in the original, but not in the subsequent versions.

Unfortunately I don't read enough German to do a direct comparison. Edit: I found a translation. I'll get back to you later on the differences.


Marx does not say he was teasing-- he says coquetting with forms of expression-- flirting with them, those forms of expressoin. That's quite a different thing from stating or implying he's teasing the reader.

I mean teasing with the forms of expression. Samething as flirting.


And of course it makes perfect sense, once you read Marx's introduction to the first edition of volume 1 where he talks about trying to render this subject in as simple language as possible, but feeling compelled to introduce language and concepts in the discussion of value that might cause the reader difficulty. He, Marx, trusts that the reader will be willing to make the effort to learn the language, to grasp the methodology, in order to realize the object of the method and language, the value form.

This does not answer why he would flirt with those modes of expression in only the most important chapter. Remeber, flirting is something that is not serious. It is done to tease.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SA:


Have to disagree Chris, look at the original version of Capital as published in
German, and compare that with the subsequent editions and translations-- you see "forms of expression peculiar to Hegel" in the original, but not in the subsequent versions.

Marx does not say he was teasing-- he says coquetting with forms of expression-- flirting with them, those forms of expressoin. That's quite a different thing from stating or implying he's teasing the reader.

And of course it makes perfect sense, once you read Marx's introduction to the first edition of volume 1 where he talks about trying to render this subject in as simple language as possible, but feeling compelled to introduce language and concepts in the discussion of value that might cause the reader difficulty. He, Marx, trusts that the reader will be willing to make the effort to learn the language, to grasp the methodology, in order to realize the object of the method and language, the value form.

But, we already know what Marx meant by 'the dialectic method', since he very helpfully added a summary of it to the Postface to the second edition -- and in that summary, there is no trace of Hegel at all.

Hence, it is no surprise that the very best he could do was 'coquette' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

As far as the other thngs you say are concerend, these were covered in detail in the thread I linked to above.

Here is is again:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/does-anyone-actually-t137570/index8.html

What you need to do is show where I go wrong in that thread, rather than merely repeat a few of the things GM said (to which I replied).

[S.Artesian]

Chris...

Here's the link to the thread on facets of value:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/facets-value-t144942/index.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades might like to know that I have now published another of Guy Robinson's essays at my site:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Robinson_Essay_Four_On_Misunderstanding_Science.ht m

It's a survey of key aspects of Thomas Kuhn's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn) work.

Unless I can persuade him to send me some more, this will be the last of his essays I will be publishing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Over the last few years I have been posting summaries of my Essays. These have been designed for those who find the main Essays either too long, or too difficult. They do not pretend to be comprehensive since they are simply summaries of the core ideas presented at my site.

Up until this morning there was in fact no summary of Essay Thriteen Part One -- Lenin's Disappearing Definition of Matter. This has now been rectified, and the summary can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Thirteen_Part_One.htm

And Index to the other summaries can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/essay_sixteen%20Index.htm

[ChrisK]

Since she has been gone, Rosa has written a couple of things.

First, she has rewritten Essay Eight Part Two -- Opposing Forces Aren't Contradictions:
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm

Second, she has rewritten Essay Thirteen Part Three -- Mind, Language and Cognition:
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm