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Buffalo Souljah
29th March 2010, 17:07
Can anything useful or informative be said in regards to our understanding of knowledge? If so, what? Do we shape our theory of knowledge through experience or is there some tendency inherent in us as human beings that impels us towards this or that theory of knowledge? Is epistemology a substratum of psychology? Should we accept the data which our senses provide and formulate our theories of knowledge in accordance with them, or should we attempt to distinguish certain inalienable, necessary laws/noumena/categories/conceptions?

¿Que?
29th March 2010, 17:42
The thing about epistemology is that it signifies not only "knowledge of" but "knowledge how". This is distinct from ontology, which is primarily concerned with what is and isn't. A person could "know how" without necessarily deep consideration as to the ontological status of the activity which fundamentally defines "knowing how".

EDIT: Actually, can anyone clear this up for me. In all honesty I don't know that epistemology answers "knowledge how" in the way I described.

vyborg
29th March 2010, 17:42
Thomas Kuhn is useful because he gives some idea about how science concretely works. the rest of modern epistemology (from neopositivism to Feyerabend) is pure crap

Meridian
29th March 2010, 18:07
I wonder whether the dichotomy of epistemology versus ontology actually makes much sense. Theories relating to both of these 'fields' seems to rely on metaphysical ideas of nature, reality, etc.


Should we accept the data which our senses provide and formulate our theories of knowledge in accordance with them, or should we attempt to distinguish certain inalienable, necessary laws/noumena/categories/conceptions
What do you mean by "data which our senses provide"?

¿Que?
29th March 2010, 18:14
I wonder whether the dichotomy of epistemology versus ontology actually makes much sense. Theories relating to both of these 'fields' seems to rely on metaphysical ideas of nature, reality, etc.
I think it is a valid question. If I know how to play the piano, is it any sense to argue if the playing of the piano actually exists or not. What is the ontological status of human activity, anyway?


What do you mean by "data which our senses provide"?
I think he means empirical.

Meridian
29th March 2010, 18:38
I think it is a valid question. If I know how to play the piano, is it any sense to argue if the playing of the piano actually exists or not. What is the ontological status of human activity, anyway?

I am not quite sure what you mean by those sentences.

If you, by "ontological status of human activity" mean; what we refer to when we call something a "human activity", then I think that would be easily described by various illustrative sentences. Playing on a piano could be called a human activity.


I think he means empirical.
It is likely. But no need to use such concepts as 'sense-data'.

vyborg
29th March 2010, 19:29
we must also distinguish between gnoseology and epistemology...

¿Que?
29th March 2010, 19:30
I am not quite sure what you mean by those sentences.

If you, by "ontological status of human activity" mean; what we refer to when we call something a "human activity", then I think that would be easily described by various illustrative sentences. Playing on a piano could be called a human activity. The ontological status of something answers two simple questions as far as I know: does it exist and if so in what sense. Since no one is going to deny the former, then the latter question must be what I was referring to. I was not asking whether playing the piano is human activity. Of course, I full recognize that I'm not being presenting a very clear line of argument. It basically negates itself, if interpreted this way. I hope we can see past that mistake.


It is likely. But no need to use such concepts as 'sense-data'.You may have a point.

Rosa Lichtenstein
29th March 2010, 23:29
You'd be far better off if you looked at the many and varied ways we use the verb 'to know' (and its cognates) than to ask abstract questions about 'knowledge'.

The latter approach has, alas, been adopted by traditional philosophers since Ancient Greek times, which is why no progress has been made in over 2400 years. We are no further forward than Plato was.

The former (Wittgensteinian) approach will have the not inconsiderable advantage of providing us with clear answers.

Buffalo Souljah
30th March 2010, 00:42
The thing about epistemology is that it signifies not only "knowledge of" but "knowledge how". This is distinct from ontology, which is primarily concerned with what is and isn't. A person could "know how" without necessarily deep consideration as to the ontological status of the activity which fundamentally defines "knowing how".

EDIT: Actually, can anyone clear this up for me. In all honesty I don't know that epistemology answers "knowledge how" in the way I described.Ontology is simply "the science of being(s) qua being(s)" and concerns itself with how to describe, classify and conceptualize "something which is being" (matter and thought). Epistemology refers specifically to the science of understanding/explaining/classifying knowledge.

What is [A]?
What properties does [A] possess?

These are questions of ontology/metaphysics. As you can see, they primarily concern describing/classifying a particular object.

What can we know of [A]?
Is [A] necessary?
Is [A] necessarily not ?

These are questions which can be classified either as epistemological or ontological, as they concern both the properties of the object and our knowledge of those properties. Most epistemological claims tend to be at least somewhat metaphysical in nature, and (as far as I know) it is difficult to conceptualize our knowledge of an object's properties without first knowing what those properties are. So, (as far as I know) the two disciplines go hand in hand. Anyone with more knowledge on the subject, feel free to correct me: regardless of what I think, I am not the Fount of All Knowledge.


What do you mean by "data which our senses provide"?
It is likely. But no need to use such concepts as 'sense-data'. There is nothing wrong with using words like sense data in the epistemic context.

Quine:


...Epistemology in its new setting... is contained in natural science... [B]We are studying how the human subject... posits bodies and projects his physics from his data...and:


Awareness ceased to be demanded when we gave up trying to justify our knowledge of the external world by rational reconstruction. What to count as observation now can be settled in terms of the stimulation of sensory receptors, let consciousness fall where it may.As you can see, to refer to the phenomena we encounter as sense data is useful for the purposes of developing proper epistemic postulates. It is quite standard fare in the literature. However, if I am wrong, then Quine and a great deal of other epistemologists are also wrong.


we must also distinguish between gnoseology and epistemology... Gnoseology does not appear by all sense and determination to be a distinct discipline unto itself, as seperate from epistemology proper. Separating the two just creates confusion. They are identical as ontology and metaphysics are.

Rosa Lichtenstein
30th March 2010, 01:01
^^^And so the traditional method takes another spin across the flatlands of failure...:(

Buffalo Souljah
30th March 2010, 01:28
You'd be far better off if you looked at the many and varied ways we use the verb 'to know' (and its cognates) than to ask abstract questions about 'knowledge'.

The latter approach has, alas, been adopted by traditional philosophers since Ancient Greek times, which is why no progress has been made in over 2400 years. We are no further forward than Plato was.

The former (Wittgensteinian) approach will have the not inconsiderable advantage of providing us with clear answers.

I think regardless of whether there are definite answers out there--and I'm not saying there are-- it is an interesting project to undertake to discuss and interpret a) what we know (in the "normal" sense of the word: to understand, grasp, fathom, comprehend, etc.) b) how we come to know it and c) how this knowledge affects our "view" of the world. You may criticize my fellow epistemologists as a priori charlatans or what have you, but you have to admit to the profundity of what has been said so far (though often times the clarity of their writings is in question).

I understand yours and others' criticisms (Wittgenstein in particular is quite lucid in his attack on these ingrained "habits" of the intelligensia), but that does not mean we can't say anything about what knowledge is, or "flesh out" what we know (or think we know) about it.

I think a particular tendency of the more educated radicals is to dismiss immediately any investigation into the nature of mental categories and any number of conceptual frameworks. This is not to say those frameworks are useless or redundant. I would personally take the line of the pragmatists in this area and say that, if something is useful and practical and offers insight into how we relate to the world, there is no reason not to adopt it into practice. Of course, we revise our theory according to what we find in reality, but if we do not admit to there being something out there for us to understand and interpret, then why would we ever move except to subsist?

I had a professor advise me recently to read On Certainty. I have not got around to it, and, in lieu of my current workload (I'm a senior undergraduate and am currently so far behind in my work, I can see no clear road ahead--I shouldn't even be here posting this, but that is not the issue...) I've put off stuudying Wittgenstein until the summer. I've got some marked up pages of the Philosophische Untersuchungen to last me until then.

Buffalo Souljah
30th March 2010, 02:47
That being said, I respect anyone's skepticism and/or dismissal of epistemological theories (I just finished a paper criticizing Chisholm's response to the skeptical argument), however, they (theories of knowledge) are (I would argue) necessary (or at least use-ful) for coming to terms with and forming sound foundations for, among other things, the mathematical systems we utilize in everyday situations, and, more importantly, in determining how we come to "know" anything (however you define the word).





Rosa, like I said, I have a copy of W's PI/U here at home and access to the local university library. Are there any particular sections of his work(s) you would recommend me read in order to understand his view on epistemic problems and conjectures?

Rosa Lichtenstein
30th March 2010, 02:54
George Bush:


I think regardless of whether there are definite answers out there--and I'm not saying there are-- it is an interesting project to undertake to discuss and interpret a) what we know (in the "normal" sense of the word: to understand, grasp, fathom, comprehend, etc.) b) how we come to know it and c) how this knowledge affects our "view" of the world. You may criticize my fellow epistemologists as a priori charlatans or what have you, but you have to admit to the profundity of what has been said so far (though often times the clarity of their writings is in question).

I admit no such thing; it all strikes me as an exercise in the systematic misuse of language. Which helps explain why epistemology has got nowhere in 2400 years -- nor is it likely to.


I understand yours and others' criticisms (Wittgenstein in particular is quite lucid in his attack on these ingrained "habits" of the intelligensia), but that does not mean we can't say anything about what knowledge is, or "flesh out" what we know (or think we know) about it.

But this is a Socratic/Platonic assumption, that there is in fact anything to say about what 'knowledge is'. It has yet to be justified (that there is one thing called 'knowledge'), and we have only been waiting for 2400 years.


I think a particular tendency of the more educated radicals is to dismiss immediately any investigation into the nature of mental categories and any number of conceptual frameworks. This is not to say those frameworks are useless or redundant. I would personally take the line of the pragmatists in this area and say that, if something is useful and practical and offers insight into how we relate to the world, there is no reason not to adopt it into practice. Of course, we revise our theory according to what we find in reality, but if we do not admit to there being something out there for us to understand and interpret, then why would we ever move except to subsist?

In fact, the tendency is the exact opposite; far too many 'intellectuals' go down the traditional route, as Marx noted:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [The German Ideology, p.118. Bold added.]


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Ibid., pp.64-65.]

This a priori approach has served the interests of the ruling-class since ancient Greek times, which is why they patronised only those philosophers who practised it.

I have explained why it can't work, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1704230&postcount=256

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

By the way, good luck with your work...:)