Main Battle tanks vs. Attack helicopters

[Comrade_Stalin]

I have been reading a lot about the two and have noted that each points out, the end of the other.

People for Attack Helicopters point out how land mines and low cost anti-tank weapons, make the Main battle tank useless. While people for Main battle tanks, say that helicopters are easy to shot down with Anti air weapons. I would like to know what you guys think about the two and their usefulness on the today battlefield.

[khad]

The simple answer--they're all useful. Combined arms and all that.

If this turns into another dick flagging contest about how my tank is better than your tank, I'm out.

[Comrade_Stalin]

The simple answer--they're all useful. Combined arms and all that.

If this turns into another dick flagging contest about how my tank is better than your tank, I'm out.

I don't plan for it to turn into one. The question is on there usefulness on today battlefield not how they fit into some ones ideal of "combined arms", which normallly turns into a game of buy my product. Do you think one or both of them are out of date, or that they wiull be replaced some day?

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

I don't plan for it to turn into one. The question is on there usefulness on today battlefield not how they fit into some ones ideal of "combined arms", which normallly turns into a game of buy my product. Do you think one or both of them are out of date, or that they wiull be replaced some day?

Of course they will both be replaced, for the same reason we no longer use war chariots or biplanes.

[Morgenstern]

Of course they will both be replaced, for the same reason we no longer use war chariots or biplanes.

I never got the memo on that one...

The thing about MBTs (Main Battle Tanks) vs AH (Attack Helicopters) is also climate conditions. The Canadian Armed Forces were beginning to phase out MBTs for a AH fleet then the Iraq war hit. They learned a very valuable lessons that sometimes it is best to have some MBTs. If you're in a climate like Europe's you can use helicopters and tanks. But in a very rough environment like Iraq your effectiveness with helicopters are limited. Also the tank field is filled with competition, you have so many nations throwing their hats in the ring it turns into a quality vs cost battle. Do you get lots of the cheaper T-90s or get the better M1 Abrams?

Helicopters in my opinion are a bit more clear cut with the biggest competitors being from the USA, Russia, and Italy (A129).

[Raúl Duke]

It depends on many factors but in general combined arms is the ideal.

Also, I don't think many tanks have anti-air weapons...
So if that's the case than a attack helicopter wins.
Although I might be wrong...

[khad]

It depends on many factors but in general combined arms is the ideal.

Also, I don't think many tanks have anti-air weapons...
So if that's the case than a attack helicopter wins.
Although I might be wrong...
The Russian refleks ATGM which can be fired from the main gun can be used against low-flying helicopters.

[S.Artesian]

Depends on terrain, the type of engagement, the "masking" ability of the tank and/helicopter, it's offensive firepower.. etc.

In Vietnam, in certain battles on certain terrain, main battle tanks were pretty useless-- those were the M60s.

Meanwhile, the NVA and NLF managed to shoot down over 1000 helicopters, basically with automatic small arms fire. And still-- still Huey's managed to deliver, resupply, medevac and extract troops.

In other engagements, particularly after Tet with the NLF forces pretty well decimated by the US counterattack, the US Congress prohibited direct use of US troops in ground combat, the NVA went to more main force engagements, the NVA used battle tanks with great effectiveness-- particularly in response to the ARVN's Lam Son 719 campaign. Messy bit of business that.

Anyway, amateurs talk tactics [and tactical weapons], professionals to logistics-- lift and deliver capability.

[Psy]

It depends on many factors but in general combined arms is the ideal.

Also, I don't think many tanks have anti-air weapons...
So if that's the case than a attack helicopter wins.
Although I might be wrong...
Self Propelled anti-air SAMs/Guns are used to protect tanks from air power.

For example the tunguska-M1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGLmqq4f2eU that would rip a attack helicopter to sheds if it got in range of its guns and even then its missiles would quickly take care of any helicopter.

[khad]

Depends on terrain, the type of engagement, the "masking" ability of the tank and/helicopter, it's offensive firepower.. etc.

In Vietnam, in certain battles on certain terrain, main battle tanks were pretty useless-- those were the M60s.
Yes and no. M60s had very poor mobility, which limited their effectiveness over soft ground. APCs and T/55s didn't have nearly as much trouble.


Meanwhile, the NVA and NLF managed to shoot down over 1000 helicopters, basically with automatic small arms fire. And still-- still Huey's managed to deliver, resupply, medevac and extract troops. You should check your figures. The Americans lost more than 5000 helicopters, not even counting ARVN losses. Half of those were recorded as downed in action, and many of the rest may have crashed by maneuvering low and fast to avoid ground fire.

Helos in wartime are deathtraps. Especially under 1000 feet, small arms are the most deadly threat to them.


In other engagements, particularly after Tet with the NLF forces pretty well decimated by the US counterattack, the US Congress prohibited direct use of US troops in ground combat, the NVA went to more main force engagements, the NVA used battle tanks with great effectiveness-- particularly in response to the ARVN's Lam Son 719 campaign. Messy bit of business that.

Anyway, amateurs talk tactics [and tactical weapons], professionals to logistics-- lift and deliver capability.That conventional war was what secured the victory. The NVA learned to do combined arms mobile operations, maximizing their advantages in firepower and mobility. Armor, artillery, airpower--all these tactical components had to be organized and deployed in systematic way to ensure concentration of force and rapid maneuver.


Oh man, Psy's here. That spells the end of any rational discussion.

[Psy]

Helos in wartime are deathtraps. Especially under 1000 feet, small arms are the most deadly threat to them.

Depending on ground support and how they are being used.



That conventional war was what secured the victory. The NVA learned to do combined arms mobile operations, maximizing their advantages in firepower and mobility. Armor, artillery, airpower--all these tactical components had to be organized and deployed in systematic way to ensure concentration of force and rapid maneuver.

By the time the NVA pushed forward the NLF had already demoralized South Vietnamese and US Troops.

[S.Artesian]

Yes and no. M60s had very poor mobility, which limited their effectiveness over soft ground. APCs and T/55s didn't have nearly as much trouble.

You should check your figures. The Americans lost more than 5000 helicopters, not even counting ARVN losses. Half of those were recorded as downed in action, and many of the rest may have crashed by maneuvering low and fast to avoid ground fire.

Helos in wartime are deathtraps. Especially under 1000 feet, small arms are the most deadly threat to them.

That conventional war was what secured the victory. The NVA learned to do combined arms mobile operations, maximizing their advantages in firepower and mobility. Armor, artillery, airpower--all these tactical components had to be organized and deployed in systematic way to ensure concentration of force and rapid maneuver.


Oh man, Psy's here. That spells the end of any rational discussion.

Well, not much I disagree with in the main, just some minor points... APCs are not main battle tanks. The marines had something called "Ontos"-- 6 recoilless rifles mounted on an armored, tracked chassis. They loved it, but then again, they were Marines and loved lots of weird shit.

Thanks for the number on the choppers-- I thought it was around 2000 that were shot down in combat, but wasn't sure/couldn't remember. Didn't realize that the US lost 5000 during the course of the war. That's a lot of steel and J-4 falling out of the sky.

"Helos are deathtraps in wartime"?? Tell me about it. But that's the thing about combat, everything's a death trap when they got more of what they need than you got of what you need.

Helos with "stand-off" capability might be a bit less of a deathtrap. Hope I'm never in one to find out.

Absolutely agree that it was conventional war, coordinating armor, artillery, and infantry that won the war. Best infantry in the world was the NVA, straight-leg grunts with a purpose.

[khad]

Well, not much I disagree with in the main, just some minor points... APCs are not main battle tanks. The marines had something called "Ontos"-- 6 recoilless rifles mounted on an armored, tracked chassis. They loved it, but then again, they were Marines and loved lots of weird shit.
Well, one advantage of these light armor such as the M113 and the PT-76 is that they can be used to clear a lot of jungle brush and cut paths for infantry. But this is the primary advantage in one picture:

http://www.combatreform.org/008russianinfantryfansoutoveropenterrain.jpg

If you have a support vehicle, you can leave your heavy gear in the vehicle and fight light. None of this hide and go seek with your rucks. Your troops arrive less fatigued and more alert and have a lot more mobility to counter direct fire.


Thanks for the number on the choppers-- I thought it was around 2000 that were shot down in combat, but wasn't sure/couldn't remember. Didn't realize that the US lost 5000 during the course of the war. That's a lot of steel and J-4 falling out of the sky.Well, 2000-2500 were lost in combat. The rest were lost in accidents, some of which would be freakish in nature and others in part due to a number of combat factors (such as flying low to avoid detection).


"Helos are deathtraps in wartime"?? Tell me about it. But that's the thing about combat, everything's a death trap when they got more of what they need than you got of what you need.

Helos with "stand-off" capability might be a bit less of a deathtrap. Hope I'm never in one to find out.

Absolutely agree that it was conventional war, coordinating armor, artillery, and infantry that won the war. Best infantry in the world was the NVA, straight-leg grunts with a purpose.I don't know how many times I've said it here (to deaf ears), but the NLF did not win the war; it was incapable of securing a victory. Just as Mao wrote, the final decision against a state army will necessarily have to come through conventional operations.

Combined arms is absolutely essential for any modern army. Playing partisan politics with individual weapon systems is just misguided.

[Psy]

I don't know how many times I've said it here (to deaf ears), but the NLF did not win the war; it was incapable of securing a victory. Just as Mao wrote, the final decision against a state army will necessarily have to come through conventional operations.

You don't seem to understand the point of hit and run tactics, the idea is not to holding land but to chip away the moral of the enemy, disrupt logistics and tie down troops. The insurgence of Italy and Greece during WWII shows the power of hit and run tactics that eventually overthrew as the guerrillas got more and more bolder till they evolved into a full fledged revolutionary army from the confidence hit and run tactics gave them.

While the NLF was not as successful as the guerrillas of Italy, Greece and later Cuba they played a major role in demoralizing US and South Vietnamese troops, crushing their will to fight.

Ask any US or S. Vietnamese veteran of the Vietnam war and they would tell it was not the NVA that they mostly feared by the NLF as at their best they could kill them without exposing their position and leave without making a noise through tunnels.

[S.Artesian]

[QUOTE=
Ask any US or S. Vietnamese veteran of the Vietnam war and they would tell it was not the NVA that they mostly feared by the NLF as at their best they could kill them without exposing their position and leave without making a noise through tunnels.[/QUOTE]
______________

Depends where you were, and when you were there, and what type of battle is being engaged.

Inducing fear is not the measure of success in combat. Being afraid, really afraid, doesn't diminish your combat capability. That's the whole point of training.

The tunnels were not exclusive to the NLF; the NVA had extensive tunnel systems.

[khad]

You don't seem to understand the point of hit and run tactics, the idea is not to holding land but to chip away the moral of the enemy, disrupt logistics and tie down troops. The insurgence of Italy and Greece during WWII shows the power of hit and run tactics that eventually overthrew as the guerrillas got more and more bolder till they evolved into a full fledged revolutionary army from the confidence hit and run tactics gave them.

While the NLF was not as successful as the guerrillas of Italy, Greece and later Cuba they played a major role in demoralizing US and South Vietnamese troops, crushing their will to fight.

Ask any US or S. Vietnamese veteran of the Vietnam war and they would tell it was not the NVA that they mostly feared by the NLF as at their best they could kill them without exposing their position and leave without making a noise through tunnels.
Incorrect. The NLF was pretty much destroyed after Tet and was no longer an effective fighting force. Throughout the war it was plagued with desertions and even defections.

Whom did they fear the most? The NLF never caused panic to the point of the entire South Vietnamese army collapsing. They never drove fleeing soldiers into the ocean to drown. They never collapsed the entire firebase line with superior artillery immune to counterfire. And they never caused the million-man ARVN to disintegrate in a matter of months after only suffering only 90,000 killed and wounded.

I think the historical record speaks for who broke ARVN in every way possible.

The psychological effect of having some random guerrilla snipe at you is nothing compared to taking hundreds of shells from 20 miles away that you know you can't respond to.

http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/central/brush/Camp-Carroll.htm


On March 30, 1972, the NVA launched its largest offensive so far in the Vietnam War. Nearly 30,000 soldiers, with tanks, artillery and missiles, crossed the DMZ. Hundreds of rockets and artillery shells slammed into Camp Carroll and every other ARVN installation in the area. Carroll received more than 200 rounds of Soviet 130mm fire in the first hour of the attack. The U.S. Army adviser to the ARVN at Camp Carroll noted that the enemy incoming rounds caused tremendous morale problems because the South Vietnamese were not used to being on the receiving end of accurate artillery fire. Three regiments of NVA artillery continued to pound the ARVN firebases, firing more than 11,000 rounds in the first day of the Eastertide Offensive. As ARVN gun crews sought shelter, their counterbattery fire became less and less effective, and the NVA offensive continued to intensify. The only guns that could reach the NVA 130mm artillery were the 175mm guns at Camp Carroll and Dong Ha. Whenever the ARVN 175mm guns fired, the NVA countered with a heavier barrage. The ARVN artillerymen abandoned their positions.

With the fall of ARVN bases in the west, a new defensive line was established with Carroll at the forefront. Artillery attacks on Camp Carroll intensified as the NVA sought to eliminate the biggest danger to their attacking infantry. NVA artillery observers watched every helicopter attempting to resupply Camp Carroll and fired at the landing zone when the helicopters were releasing their loads. By April 2, eight ARVN firebases had fallen, and the NVA began ground attacks on Camp Carroll.

The commander of Camp Carroll was Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Dinh, who had become a national hero for his actions during the Tet Offensive of 1968. Dinh had assisted in raising the South Vietnamese flag over the Citadel in Hue when it was retaken from the NVA. As the situation worsened near Camp Carroll, the ARVN division commander told Dinh to act "as he thought proper." At 1430 hours on April 2, 1972, Dinh communicated to the NVA via radio that Camp Carroll would surrender, and a white flag was raised over the main gate of the camp. Colonel Gerald Turley, the senior U.S. advisor to the ARVN in I Corps during the 1972 invasion, considers the surrender of Camp Carroll to have been one of the most emotional war scenes ever recorded in Vietnamese history. The American advisers were stunned by the camp's surrender, which left a catastrophic void in the shrinking ARVN defensive line. The South Vietnamese government ordered B-52 strikes against Camp Carroll in an effort to deny its use to the North Vietnamese, but before they could strike the NVA had moved out the self-propelled guns that had been positioned at the camp, which they later used against the ARVN.

Less than 24 hours after his surrender, LtCol. Dinh made a broadcast over Radio Hanoi stating that he had been well-treated by the Communists and urging all ARVN soldiers to refuse to fight. Today, Dinh is a high-ranking official of the Communist government in Hue.

[Psy]

______________

Depends where you were, and when you were there, and what type of battle is being engaged.

Inducing fear is not the measure of success in combat. Being afraid, really afraid, doesn't diminish your combat capability. That's the whole point of training.

The tunnels were not exclusive to the NLF; the NVA had extensive tunnel systems.
Inducing fear is a measure of success for guerrilla warfare as it means the enemy thinks you are behind every shadow thus allowing you to defeat them phonologically by being a much larger threat in the head then in reality, it also means soldiers would be acting out of fear and not thinking rationally making them far more prone to making mistakes like shooting at animals (by mistaking them for the enemy) that give the units position away to the guerrillas. wastes ammo and covers the guerrillas approach as while they are blindly emptying their magazines into animals they can't hear enemy troops sneaking up on them and mostly likely won't that many rounds left in their magazines when the Guerrillas attack.

It also demoralizes the enemy if the are constantly fearful as it leads to drug abuse (like US troops in Vietnam and now in Iraq and Afghanistan) making troops even more prone to mistakes especially friendly fire.

[Psy]

Incorrect. The NLF was pretty much destroyed after Tet and was no longer an effective fighting force. Throughout the war it was plagued with desertions and even defections.

Yet by the US Army also became broken repelling the Tet Offensive as John Pilger "The Quite Mutiny" showed, the US Army become highly militant after the Tet Offensive and only lacked the leadership to have the massive strikes that plauge the British armed forces in 1946 (that caused the British ruling class to abandon any hope of rebuilding its empire).



Whom did they fear the most? The NLF never caused panic to the point of the entire South Vietnamese army collapsing. They never drove fleeing soldiers into the ocean to drown. They never collapsed the entire firebase line with superior artillery immune to counterfire. And they never caused the million-man ARVN to disintegrate in a matter of months after only suffering only 90,000 killed and wounded.

I think the historical record speaks for who broke ARVN in every way possible.

The psychological effect of having some random guerrilla snipe at you is nothing compared to taking hundreds of shells from 20 miles away that you know you can't respond to.

http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/central/brush/Camp-Carroll.htm

I think you miss the point of a revolutionary war, we don't want to push them into ocean we want them to mutiny and join the revolution like abroad British soilders in 1946 that sided with forces against the British ruling class.

We don't want to slaughter the capitalist armies we want to convert as many of them as possible into revolutionaries and only kill as many as we have to.

[khad]

We don't want to slaughter the capitalist armies we want to convert as many of them as possible into revolutionaries and only kill as many as we have to.
I'm sorry, but I refuse to debate those who can't be respectful enough to read an opponent's posts. I'll just copy my last post and you make sure to actually read the part in red.


On March 30, 1972, the NVA launched its largest offensive so far in the Vietnam War. Nearly 30,000 soldiers, with tanks, artillery and missiles, crossed the DMZ. Hundreds of rockets and artillery shells slammed into Camp Carroll and every other ARVN installation in the area. Carroll received more than 200 rounds of Soviet 130mm fire in the first hour of the attack. The U.S. Army adviser to the ARVN at Camp Carroll noted that the enemy incoming rounds caused tremendous morale problems because the South Vietnamese were not used to being on the receiving end of accurate artillery fire. Three regiments of NVA artillery continued to pound the ARVN firebases, firing more than 11,000 rounds in the first day of the Eastertide Offensive. As ARVN gun crews sought shelter, their counterbattery fire became less and less effective, and the NVA offensive continued to intensify. The only guns that could reach the NVA 130mm artillery were the 175mm guns at Camp Carroll and Dong Ha. Whenever the ARVN 175mm guns fired, the NVA countered with a heavier barrage. The ARVN artillerymen abandoned their positions.

With the fall of ARVN bases in the west, a new defensive line was established with Carroll at the forefront. Artillery attacks on Camp Carroll intensified as the NVA sought to eliminate the biggest danger to their attacking infantry. NVA artillery observers watched every helicopter attempting to resupply Camp Carroll and fired at the landing zone when the helicopters were releasing their loads. By April 2, eight ARVN firebases had fallen, and the NVA began ground attacks on Camp Carroll.

The commander of Camp Carroll was Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Dinh, who had become a national hero for his actions during the Tet Offensive of 1968. Dinh had assisted in raising the South Vietnamese flag over the Citadel in Hue when it was retaken from the NVA. As the situation worsened near Camp Carroll, the ARVN division commander told Dinh to act "as he thought proper." At 1430 hours on April 2, 1972, Dinh communicated to the NVA via radio that Camp Carroll would surrender, and a white flag was raised over the main gate of the camp. Colonel Gerald Turley, the senior U.S. advisor to the ARVN in I Corps during the 1972 invasion, considers the surrender of Camp Carroll to have been one of the most emotional war scenes ever recorded in Vietnamese history. The American advisers were stunned by the camp's surrender, which left a catastrophic void in the shrinking ARVN defensive line. The South Vietnamese government ordered B-52 strikes against Camp Carroll in an effort to deny its use to the North Vietnamese, but before they could strike the NVA had moved out the self-propelled guns that had been positioned at the camp, which they later used against the ARVN.

Less than 24 hours after his surrender, LtCol. Dinh made a broadcast over Radio Hanoi stating that he had been well-treated by the Communists and urging all ARVN soldiers to refuse to fight. Today, Dinh is a high-ranking official of the Communist government in Hue.

[S.Artesian]

_________

Are you speaking from personal experience?

Doesn't work like that. At all. Weapons discipline, fire discipline, noise discipline is far stronger than fear.


Breakdown in discipline comes from not being able to control the battlefield, not from the fear of guerrilla attack.

This mostly occurred [I]after Tet, after the NLF was pretty well chewed up.

The US has been able to control the battlefield in Iraq; and has not yet lost control in Afghanistan.

[Psy]

I'm sorry, but I refuse to debate those who can't be respectful enough to read an opponent's posts. I'll just copy my last post and you make sure to actually read the part in red.
You are missing the point, the NLF created a revolutionary situation in the US armed forces stationed in Vietnam, all that was missing was leadership to lead the militant troops in strike action against the US officers.



_________

Are you speaking from personal experience?

From personal experiences of veterans.



Doesn't work like that. At all. Weapons discipline, fire discipline, noise discipline is far stronger than fear.

Yet US troops still blindly fire out of fear in Iraq and Afghanistan leading to even friendly fire. Fear can easily undo training causing troops to act totally stupidly, especially with drug abuse among troops that is also a growing problem in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Breakdown in discipline comes from not being able to control the battlefield, not from the fear of guerrilla attack.

It is fear that is the catalyst causing soldiers to react without thinking.



This mostly occurred [I]after Tet, after the NLF was pretty well chewed up.

Yet was Tet that broke the moral of the US forces in Vietnam and even before then the NLF was demoralizing the US forces.



The US has been able to control the battlefield in Iraq; and has not yet lost control in Afghanistan.
It is losing control in Iraq and Afganistan, with cases of machine guners opening fire on everything that moves that have led to them to open fire on freindly units even when they are ordered to hold their fire before hand.

[Guerrilla22]

Our tankz are better than your tankz.

[Q]

Our tankz are better than your tankz.

Nowai!

We recently had a similar thread on this matter, also started by a "tankie" stereotypically. I didn't understand then what it was supposed to do in a revolutionary left forum and I still don't really.

Chit-chat maybe?

[Psy]

Our tankz are better than your tankz.
We have tankz? Why didn't anyone tell me the inernational proletariat had tankz :rolleyes:

[Salyut]

The simple answer--they're all useful. Combined arms and all that.

Summed up in one sentence.

[piet11111]

clearly the use of combined arms works best.
but in modern urban guerrilla warfare both are of very limited use.

[S.Artesian]

clearly the use of combined arms works best.
but in modern urban guerrilla warfare both are of very limited use.

Yep, that's why and how armies are constructed. That's also why close air tactical support is effective, and strategic bombing isn't [unless you use nukes].

As for urban guerrilla warfare, has that ever won a war, or a civil war, rather than a battle?

[piet11111]

As for urban guerrilla warfare, has that ever won a war, or a civil war, rather than a battle?

Think about vietnam where the americans won the majority of the battles but lost the war because they could not eliminate their enemy.

Afghanistan is heading in that direction where even more battles are being won by the invaders but they are still going to lose the war.

Guerrilla war is not about taking and holding ground but about denying the opponent to hold ground and attack him from within in the places where he feels safe to keep them off balance and to keep taking losses until they can not take any more.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Think about vietnam where the americans won the majority of the battles but lost the war because they could not eliminate their enemy.

I could be wrong, but isn't Vietnam mostly jungle, not urban area?


Afghanistan is heading in that direction where even more battles are being won by the invaders but they are still going to lose the war.

The type of attrition warfare being carried out in Afghanistan may be wearing out the occupiers, but it's also very hard on those occupied, causing significant damage to infrastructure (or at least what's left) as well as to the local population.

Guerilla warfare on one's home soil should be the last resort.


Guerrilla war is not about taking and holding ground but about denying the opponent to hold ground and attack him from within in the places where he feels safe to keep them off balance and to keep taking losses until they can not take any more.

Yes, but the enemy troops shouldn't be on your soil in the first place. If guerilla warfare is your first resort, something has gone horribly awry somewhere.

[piet11111]

I could be wrong, but isn't Vietnam mostly jungle, not urban area?

:lol: i was talking more about guerrilla war in general where you do not give them a target.
clearly that is the way to go for the afghans against the american army.



The type of attrition warfare being carried out in Afghanistan may be wearing out the occupiers, but it's also very hard on those occupied, causing significant damage to infrastructure (or at least what's left) as well as to the local population.

obviously that also goes for normal warfare


Guerilla warfare on one's home soil should be the last resort.

Yes but if the alternative is no resistance after the normal army got beaten then guerrilla warfare is the last resort.


Yes, but the enemy troops shouldn't be on your soil in the first place. If guerilla warfare is your first resort, something has gone horribly awry somewhere.

Guerilla war is clearly not a desirable way of fighting and in isolation from the population doomed to fail.
And in Vietnam it was succesful largely because they fought along the NVA to take on the americans.

[Dr Mindbender]

Tanks and Attack Helcopters are useful tools, but troops on the ground win wars....
they do in command and conquer, all you have to do is get your doods to surround the enemy tanks and keep hitting the x key.

[Dr Mindbender]

I could be wrong, but isn't Vietnam mostly jungle, not urban area?
.
The vietcong had built networks of tunnels throughout rural areas which the american soldiers could not use because they were too fat.

[Lord Testicles]

The vietcong had built networks of tunnels throughout rural areas which the american soldiers could not use because they were too fat.

Tunnel rats... (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunnel_rat_%28military%29)

[chegitz guevara]

VERY SIMPLE EXPLANATION

Tanks kill infantry.

Infantry kills helicopters.

Helicopters kill tanks.

[S.Artesian]

VERY SIMPLE EXPLANATION

Tanks kill infantry.

Infantry kills helicopters.

Helicopters kill tanks.
__________

Infantry kills tanks, too. You don't send your armour ahead without infantry support. It's not all, but close to all about maneuver, and small unit infantry can always outmaneuver armour.

[chegitz guevara]

I was oversimplifying. All of them can kill each other, but the odds are stacked a certain way.

In general, armor will destroy infantry. In WWII, it was often enough for a single tank to appear on the scene to stop an infantry advance until armor or air could be brought up to deal with it. Of course, specific cases will vary.

And armor frequently runs well ahead of infantry. In both Gulf Wars, American armor often operated independently of infantry.

[Psy]

I was oversimplifying. All of them can kill each other, but the odds are stacked a certain way.

In general, armor will destroy infantry. In WWII, it was often enough for a single tank to appear on the scene to stop an infantry advance until armor or air could be brought up to deal with it. Of course, specific cases will vary.

And armor frequently runs well ahead of infantry. In both Gulf Wars, American armor often operated independently of infantry.
Except the heavy tanks of Israel (Merkava) was regularly ripped to sheds by heavy infantry in ambushes as even the Merkava is no match against infantry with large anti-tank rockets and it is not like infantry needs any mobility when they are just going camp at a choke point to ambush enemy tanks.

Thus you could also simplify by saying heavy infantry beats armor.

[Comrade_Stalin]

I can't believe that this post is still going.


Nowai!


We recently had a similar thread on this matter, also started by a "tankie" stereotypically. I didn't understand then what it was supposed to do in a revolutionary left forum and I still don't really.

Chit-chat maybe?

To answer your question we need to stay up to date with current weapons technology as we many need to use them against the capitalist. Also communism seems to effect which weapons and how we use time, just as much as any other ideology

[chegitz guevara]

Except the heavy tanks of Israel (Merkava) was regularly ripped to sheds by heavy infantry in ambushes as even the Merkava is no match against infantry with large anti-tank rockets and it is not like infantry needs any mobility when they are just going camp at a choke point to ambush enemy tanks.

Thus you could also simplify by saying heavy infantry beats armor.

And infantry can be killed by drowning. There's a reason that I used the word generally. Ambushes, choke points, etc., are not typical situations.

[S.Artesian]

And infantry can be killed by drowning. There's a reason that I used the word generally. Ambushes, choke points, etc., are not typical situations.

The hell they aren't. You can't get more typical than ambushes and choke points. Those are called tactics, son, and they put the everyday meat in the meatgrinder of combat.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

obviously that also goes for normal warfare

True, but in conventinal warfare you can take the fight to the enemy, so to speak. Guerilla warfare is literally fighting on one's doorstep.


Yes but if the alternative is no resistance after the normal army got beaten then guerrilla warfare is the last resort.

Fair enough, but I can't help but get a strong impression that a lot of people on this site romanticise guerilla warfare and are even lead down the primrose path of believing that it should be a first resort, rather than being the only choice due to a lack of resources.


Guerilla war is clearly not a desirable way of fighting and in isolation from the population doomed to fail.
And in Vietnam it was succesful largely because they fought along the NVA to take on the americans.

Indeed, and that should be taken as a lesson. Have a proper army to back yourselves up with.

[chegitz guevara]

The hell they aren't. You can't get more typical than ambushes and choke points. Those are called tactics, son, and they put the everyday meat in the meatgrinder of combat.

Were that true, war would cease, as no offensive could ever succeed, at least not without unsustainable losses. Those are atypical situations and you know it.

[S.Artesian]

Were that true, war would cease, as no offensive could ever succeed, at least not without unsustainable losses. Those are atypical situations and you know it.

What I know is that ambushes were set up every night in Vietnam, that you arrange your fields of fire to force the enemy into either real or manufactured choke points.

Maneuver isn't all about ambush and choke points, but sure makes use of them.

[Psy]

Were that true, war would cease, as no offensive could ever succeed, at least not without unsustainable losses. Those are atypical situations and you know it.
There also aggressive maneuvers to take enemies by surprise, especially when you have the bulk of the proletariat behind you, for example railway workers giving a revolutionary army mobility and logistics while denying it to the bourgeois army (and trains can be much more heavily armored then the even the most ridiculously heavy tank)

[S.Artesian]

There also aggressive maneuvers to take enemies by surprise, especially when you have the bulk of the proletariat behind you, for example railway workers giving a revolutionary army mobility and logistics while denying it to the bourgeois army (and trains can be much more heavily armored then the even the most ridiculously heavy tank)

Not exclusive to the proletariat, comrade. Foremost example is the mobility given to the Union Army, in moving the Army of the Potomac west to Tennessee to relieve Rosencrans in 7 days.

Great book on this called Rescue By Rail.

[Scary Monster]

Wow no one mentioned the fact that main battle tanks can shoot down a helicopter with a HEAT shell, that has electronic fusing, to take out a heli with fragmentation in conjuction with the tank's accurate targeting systems. An attack helicopter is most definitely more deadly than a tank, because it obviously has more range, mobility and firepower. An attack helicopter's anti tank missle can obliterate an MBT from almost 5 miles away. Even though a MBT has the capability to shoot down a heli, the MBT's cannon has a very limited degree of upward aiming, so the heli would have to be flying pretty damn low to hit the heli, provided the heli is even flying in plain sight long enough to be detected and hit. All modern attack helis can be equipped with its own radar and have thermal vision to detect vehicles from miles away. So an MBT wouldnt even see an attack heli before it becomes obliterated. Plus there isnt really anywhere a MBT can hide from an attack heli's sensors and the altitude it can gain.

But in combined arms, both a tank and heli are equally deadly, as with any military equipment, of course. In combined arms, intelligence is much more of an advantage than a weapon's specific capabilities.

[chegitz guevara]

What I know is that ambushes were set up every night in Vietnam, that you arrange your fields of fire to force the enemy into either real or manufactured choke points.

Maneuver isn't all about ambush and choke points, but sure makes use of them.

You are aware that being ambushed was deliberate policy of the U.S. Send the troops out to get jumped, then call in air support.

Yes, it is standard defensive policy to set up choke points, but it's standard offensive policy to avoid them. Armor, unless badly led, is pretty good at avoid such things. Occasionally they are unavoidable.

And if infantry is so good at destroying armor, why do armies continue to field armor? How is it that American armor sliced through Iraqi infantry like a hot knife through liquid butter?

[Psy]

You are aware that being ambushed was deliberate policy of the U.S. Send the troops out to get jumped, then call in air support.

And US air strikes mostly hit nothing as the ambush retreated from the battlefield long before air support arrived as that is the point of hit and run, you jump on the enemy do a bit of damage then get the hell out of there before reinforcements show up.



Yes, it is standard defensive policy to set up choke points, but it's standard offensive policy to avoid them. Armor, unless badly led, is pretty good at avoid such things. Occasionally they are unavoidable.

This is why armor works better on terrain where it has decent mobility, when armor is bottled up in long convoy lines they usually are chewed up badly by infantry waiting for them.




And if infantry is so good at destroying armor, why do armies continue to field armor? How is it that American armor sliced through Iraqi infantry like a hot knife through liquid butter?
Because WWI showed infantry is useless in the open as they need cover to be effective and tanks are the most effective where the infantry are most vulnerable.

As for Iraq, Iraq infantry did not possesses powerful enough anti-tank rockets to take down M1 Abrams if they did they could have stopped American armor from the cover of cities and from the POV of the tanks they would just seen rockets fired from cities and seconds one their tanks blowing up (possibly with a small nuclear explosion as nuclear anti-tank rockets do exist).

[Psy]

Not exclusive to the proletariat, comrade. Foremost example is the mobility given to the Union Army, in moving the Army of the Potomac west to Tennessee to relieve Rosencrans in 7 days.

Great book on this called Rescue By Rail.

Still with the help of the proletariat as without the cooperation of railway workers the railways simply don't run.