Theory About Soviet Strategy in World War II

[Nolan]

I read this and it makes perfect sense. Instead of prematurely going to war with the fascists, the USSR tried to make good use of them against the liberals. Why barge in and slaughter the nazis (assuming you even could considering the shape of your forces) when you can kill two birds with one stone? It would also explain why Hitler foolishly attacked the USSR when he did.



According to Viktor Suvorov (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Suvorov), Stalin planned to use Nazi Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_Germany) as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West. Stalin's idea was to fuel Hitler's aggressive plans against Europe, and only after the capitalists had exhausted themselves fighting each other, would the USSR make their strike. For this reason Stalin provided significant material and political support to Adolf Hitler (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Hitler), while at the same time preparing the Red Army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Army) to liberate the whole of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov argued that Hitler lost World War II the moment he attacked Poland: not only was he going to war with the Allies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allies_of_World_War_II), but it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union) would seize the opportune moment to attack him from the rear. This left Hitler with no choice but to launch a preemptive strike (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preemptive_strike) on the Soviet Union, while Stalin's forces were redeploying from a defensive to an offensive posture, providing Hitler with an important initial tactical advantage. Thus, he argued that German Barbarossa actually was a pre-emptive strike that capitalized on the Soviet troop concentrations immediately on the 1941 borders.

[ComradeOm]

The 'Icebreaker' thesis has virtually no academic support outside of a few Russian and Polish historians who wish to paint the USSR as an aggressor state in 1941. No Western historians of note (AFAIK) credit the theory and Glantz has cut it to shreds in more than one work. The conjecture relies entirely on circumstantial evidence and there is little reason to believe that the Soviets did indeed intend an invasion of Germany. On the contrary, as millions of dead Soviet soldiers can testify to, the Red Army was in absolutely no state to fight and the Wehrmacht's invasion came completely out of the blue. Surprising for a state apparently about to invade Central Europe

At best Suvorov confuses the operationally aggressive stance of the Red Army with a strategic intention to invade. The former was a result of Soviet thinking which rightly predicted that the future of warfare lay with highly mechanised and mobile formations aggressively counterattacking. This was a result of experience on the Eastern Front of WWI, the evolution of interbellum doctrine, and observations as to the deficiency of the French static defence. In 1941 Soviet formations were therefore positioned to immediately launch aggressive spoiling attacks (one of which Chris Bellamy believes may have planned to enter German territory) to disrupt any German invasion

Unfortunately of course reality was very different. Leaving aside the criminal blindness of Stalin, the Red Army of 1941 was simply incapable of carrying this plan out. Throughout those disastrous summer months Soviet commanders repeatedly counterattacked aggressively but in an isolated and incompetent manner. The much superior German units simply enveloped and destroyed unit after unit.


Instead of prematurely going to war with the fascists, the USSR tried to make good use of them against the liberalsAnd look how well that turned out. The USSR spent decades recovering from the staggering material losses that it incurred during WWII


...stalin had removed the crack troops from the border to send them towards the japanese frontierA common myth. The Siberian units that did arrive on the Eastern Front just in time for the Battle of Moscow were not the "crack troops" or 'cold weather commandos' that they are often portrayed as. This impression was given because by late '41 these were amongst the only formations that still possessed pre-war personnel and equipment


Also the equiptment that the russians had at the start of the eastern front was horribleThe Germans were unpleasantly surprised by the modern Soviet weapons and rightly so. In almost every category (armour, small guns, artillery, etc) the Red Army ordinance was on par or superior to the German equivalent. There was no substantial difference between the Mosin–Nagant and the K98, and German troops were fond of captured PPShs. The shock recorded by German commanders on encountering the T-34 tends to overshadow the performances of the KV-1 or even that of the T-26. The latter was not particularly any worse than the hundreds of light tanks that the Wehrmacht invaded with

[khad]

At best Suvorov confuses the operationally aggressive stance of the Red Army with a strategic intention to invade. The former was a result of Soviet thinking which rightly predicted that the future of warfare lay with highly mechanised and mobile formations aggressively counterattacking.
To give some context for that, Suvorov was one of defectors who moved to the West and spent much of his career convincing Reaganites and military shitheads in the absolutely aggressive intentions of the USSR and that war had to be pushed at all costs.

This is just another of his conspiracy theories on the Absolute Evil (TM) of Stalin.


Also the equiptment that the russians had at the start of the eastern front was horrible. the tanks were light, the machine guns were ww1 style
The DP-28 had a 47 round drum. I don't see you complaining about the Bren or the BAR, which had lower capacity.


and the troops only had 15 rounds per rifle, compared to the german panzer mk3/4, mg34 and the standard load for a german soldier was 250 rounds.
No rifleman carried 250 rounds of 7.92x57 into combat. You're basically citing your asscheek here.

[Red Commissar]

Stalin may have intended to attack Nazi Germany one day, but there's little credible evidence to indicate he was planning to do so when Hitler invaded.

As far as I know the Soviet government was doing moves to form an alliance against the Nazis early on in the war, but ultimately he was making moves to ensure that the Soviet Union would not go into war while the country was being industrialized and restructured.

I have read in some places that Stalin had genuinely been thrown off guard when the Nazi forces invaded, and was not willing to accept until a few hours later what had occurred. Even before the war it seems that the military staff advised Stalin about the build up on their western borders, and intelligence suggesting a strike in the summer months before, and suggested mobilization immediately, which Stalin refused.

Generally I find this angle that Nazi Germany was doing a preemptive strike being pushed by apologists for the Nazi regime hoping to capitalize on anti-Communist feeling that skyrocketed in the West following the war.

[TheCultofAbeLincoln]

Off on a little tangent, but here in the US it is almost without question that high school students are taught that the winter was what did the Nazis in.

After reading a pretty comprehensive review of the war between germany and soviet russia, I find this to be disgusting. I am not in any way a Marxist-Leninist, but to say that the crucial factor of the war in Europe was anything but the bravery of the soviet soldier is a bold faced lie, and revisionist history.

anyways, just had to say it somehwere, it was on my mind for a while

[ComradeOm]

As far as I know the Soviet government was doing moves to form an alliance against the Nazis early on in the war, but ultimately he was making moves to ensure that the Soviet Union would not go into war while the country was being industrialized and restructuredThe search for a 'collective security' arrangement (essentially an anti-fascist with France and Britain) was a mainstay of Soviet diplomacy throughout most of the thirties. This probably would have averted the need to go to war entirely as Hitler was not crazy enough to take on both France and the USSR at the same time


I have read in some places that Stalin had genuinely been thrown off guard when the Nazi forces invaded, and was not willing to accept until a few hours later what had occurred. Even before the war it seems that the military staff advised Stalin about the build up on their western borders, and intelligence suggesting a strike in the summer months before, and suggested mobilization immediately, which Stalin refusedThe depth to which Stalin sank into depression following the invasion has often been greatly exaggerated. I would not agree with those who argue that the same can be said about Stalin's failure to anticipate the invasion. To my mind, given the host of available information and strong advise from subordinates, this was wilful ignorance that caused an unmitigated military disaster


ok lets just clarifiy something.. in 1941 when operation barborosa was launched the standard russian tank was the BT series, which was light and the 37mm low velocity gun could not penertrate the Panzer MK3 or 4And here you are comparing the weakest Soviet tanks to the strongest German ones. The reality is that even the limited number of T-34s and KVs outnumbered the Panzer IIIs and IVs available to the Germans. Indeed the latter two comprised less than half of the invading armoured force (approx 1400) with the bulk of the panzer formations relying on the Pz I, II, and 38 models (upwards of 1700). These were light tanks comparable in weight (10 tons) and armament to the BT-26

Numbers taken from Battistelli's Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front and specs from Stolfi's Hitler's Panzers East


If one thing defeated the germans in 1941 it was thier lack of planning, they had expected a quick campaign...

The Russians fought well after 1941, but during 1941 they surrendered in their thousandsI love how you've just whitewashed the Soviet soldier out of this picture. Apparently the Germans lost because of the weather and a "lack of planning" while the Soviets just sat around surrendering en masse. It would almost be rude of me to spoil the picture by pointing out the fierce (if futile) Soviet resistance; the ever-increasing German logistical constraints; complete failure of German intelligence to anticipate newly raised Soviet divisions; the success of Moscow in organising, arming, and deploying these same divisions; and so on and so on...


After reading a pretty comprehensive review of the war between germany and soviet russia, I find this to be disgusting. I am not in any way a Marxist-Leninist, but to say that the crucial factor of the war in Europe was anything but the bravery of the soviet soldier is a bold faced lie, and revisionist history.Very true. The context of this is that the myth of General Winter* was liberally used by German generals in their memoirs to explain away Soviet successes and their own failings. It was easier to write this than credit the supposedly inferior 'Slavic hordes' with mastering mobile warfare. This version of history was then taken up during the Cold War as Western historians drew from these readily available sources (in contrast to the closed Soviet archives and unfamiliar language) to construct a history of the Eastern Front that was almost uniformly told from the German perspective

I mean, imagine writing a history of the war in the Pacific only using Japanese sources! Absurd. Thankfully this situation has been increasingly addressed in the last decade or two. David Glantz has to be singled out for credit as his works, no matter how dry and boring, have really opened up the German-Soviet front to Western readers and academics. Here's (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/failures.htm) an early paper from him on that issue

*Unquestionably a factor but nowhere near as decisive as is commonly believed. It was not snow, rain, or mud that stopped German divisions but rather their own failings and the staunch Soviet resistance. What was true, and this the Soviets fully recognised, was that the Red Army was far more mobile during periods of poor weather and fully capable of exploiting this advantage

[chegitz guevara]

Logistics was the main problem for the Soviets early on. Soviet tanks were more than a match for the Germans, but they'd run out of fuel, or ammo, or simply break down. A single KV-1 held off an entire German tank unit. There are pictures of KV-2 with dozens of shell hits that simply glances off its armor.

The Germans may have had a 75mm gun, but they were short barreled until 1942, when the PzKmpf IV F2/G was introduced. Even this tank wasn't a match for the sloped armor and 76mm gun of the T-34. It wasn't until the Tigers and Panthers and finally the King Tigers were introduced that the Germans had tanks that were the equivalent of Soviet armor, and the Soviets made better tanks, the T-34/85 and the IS-2.

Most of the German light tanks were eventually converted to tank killers, light-weight tanks with big guns that only pointed forward. The Hetzer, based on the Pz38 (a Czech light tank) was the best tank killer in the war.