NATO liberated a 'city' that doesn't exist

[Q]

Source (https://www.counterfire.org/index.php/news/82-stop-the-war/4085-nato-liberated-a-city-that-doesnt-exist):


NATO liberated a 'city' that doesn't exist (https://www.counterfire.org/index.php/news/82-stop-the-war/4085-nato-liberated-a-city-that-doesnt-exist)


Last Updated on Wednesday, 10 March 2010 16:53 Wednesday, 10 March 2010 07:02
Written by Chris Nineham

For weeks the international media has been excitably reporting on NATO's campaign to capture or liberate the 'city' of Marjah in Helmand, southern Afghanistan. But Marjah, it appears, does not exist.

https://www.counterfire.org/images/stories/news/us_troops_marjah.jpg
US Troops in Marjah

In a long running narrative, the world was told that the occupying forces had shown their concern for the local people by encouraging them to leave the city before it was taken from the remaining 'insurgent forces'. The extraordinary extent of the fiction that seems to have been sold to the world via an ever willing media now stands exposed.

Marjah, it appears, does not exist. An official from the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), who asked not to be identified, first raised questions marks about the situation on the weekend when he told a journalist at Counterpunch in the US that Marjah was 'not urban at all', rather he described it as a 'rural community', ' a collection of village farms, with typical family compounds'.

Other experts have confirmed the view of the ISAF insider. Richard B. Scott, who worked in Marjah as an adviser on irrigation for the U.S. Agency for International Development, agrees that Marjah has nothing that could be mistaken as being urban. It is an "agricultural district" with a "scattered series of farmers' markets," he said.

NATO sources have been quoted saying Marjah had a population of 80,000. The capure of the city has been portrayed as the centrepiece of the 'successful' and extremely high profile recent offensive dubbed 'Operation Moshtaraq'.

But the ISAF official said the only population numbering tens of thousands associated with Marjah is spread across many villages and almost 200 square kilometres, or about 125 square miles. At the moment Marjah is not even officially recognised as an area, let alone being anything approaching a city. At the centre of the area there is a location where farmers gather for markets, but the only permanent features of the spot are a mosque and a few shops.

'Spinning' out of control

According to Gareth Porter, writing on Counterpunch, the earliest references in news stories to Marjah as a city with a large population have a common origin in a briefing given on February 2 by officials at Camp Leatherneck, the U.S. Marine base there.

The media fell into line at once. The Associated Press published an article the same day quoting "Marine commanders" as saying that they expected 400 to 1,000 insurgents to be "holed up" in the "southern Afghan town of 80,000 people."

The decision to turn Marjah into a city and make it the central objective of "Operation Moshtarak" would not have been made independently by the Marines at Camp Leatherneck.

A central task of "information operations" in counterinsurgency wars is "establishing the COIN [counterinsurgency] narrative", according to the Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual as revised under Gen. David Petraeus in 2006. The manual notes that this narrative should be determined at HQ, not in the field.

Military officials have been quite clear about the propaganda importance of operation Moshtaraq. Just before the Marjah offensive was launched, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of ISAF went on record as saying "This is all a war of perceptions."

The Washington Post reported Feb. 22 that the decision to launch the offensive against Marjah was intended largely to impress US public opinion with the effectiveness of the US military in Afghanistan by showing that it could achieve a "large and loud victory."

What neither the military nor the media have admitted is that this propaganda war would go so far as to invent cities in order to liberate them.
:lol:

[Mumbles]

large and loud victory.

If even your propaganda can't work, I don't think you need to be working on trying to get a military victory. :p

[cb9's_unity]

This definitely reminds me of a few parts of 1984.

One might think that America's victory's over the radical Islamists (who America never-ever allied with) was swift and glorious.

[CartCollector]

"Marjah" must be Pashtun for "Potemkin."

[Audeamus]

Again we see how, for all the perceived differences in mainstream media outlets, they'll all line up and disseminate propaganda to sell the war. Or they just don't like to be constrained by irrelevant things like fact checking. :lol:

[Saorsa]

http://www.traveljournals.net/explore/afghanistan/map/m4810338/marjah.html

What the fuck! I'd never have looked if not for this article, but they're right, Marjah isn't an urban area. It's a collection of scattered compounds and farm houses with big stretches of road in between, that's not a fucking city. Lying bastards!

[Scary Monster]

HAHAH omg! This is among the dumbest fucking things ive ever heard about! Inventing non-existant cities to please the public opinion on the Afghan war! :lol: Just more evidence that the world is completely mad, and that the US government is getting desperate :lol:

[jake williams]

This isn't suprising to people who have been following the war. NATO has an urban strategy for a country that mostly doesn't have cities except for Kabul. This is pretty standard stuff.

[Sendo]

This definitely reminds me of a few parts of 1984.

One might think that America's victory's over the radical Islamists (who America never-ever allied with) was swift and glorious.

While I don't like Orwell for his snooty and inconsistent criticism of socialist states, his essays on double speak and 1984 are valuable works. This is 1984 to a tee. Outright making up battles with our supposedly eternal enemy. Good lord. No one has any right to call anything left-wing propaganda as an insult. At least we never outright fabricate entire events, places, and people.

[Guerrilla22]

Not the first time they have made up stories for publicity in recent years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jessica_Lynch

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat_Tillman

[Uppercut]

Goddammit I hate this country...I guess we're pretty far down the line by now and it doesn't look like there's anyway we can reverse what we've done in the Mid-East. When it gets to the point where your nation has to make up cities and landmarks to make itself look heroic, it's time to give the military the middle finger.

[The Douche]

This isn't suprising to people who have been following the war. NATO has an urban strategy for a country that mostly doesn't have cities except for Kabul. This is pretty standard stuff.

This.

It was also the soviet strategy.

[Sasha]

Afghanistan: D-Day On St. Barts (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-greener/afghanistan-d-day-on-st-b_b_493257.html)

Richard Greener (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-greener)



(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-greener/afghanistan-d-day-on-st-b_b_493257.html#comments)




Imagine this. It's June 1944. Allied forces commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower using an armada of thousands of ships with hundreds of thousands of soldiers launch an amphibious attack. It is the boldest move in a long and bloody war. In a massive, coordinated effort they hit the beaches on St. Barts in the Caribbean. An announcement is made - "The invasion of France has begun!" Technically correct, but who would have laughed harder, the Germans or us? This is exactly what's happening right now in Afghanistan.
The US war in that oft-invaded land has become George Orwell's perpetual phony war against a phony enemy. In order to wage such a "struggle" Orwell understood it was necessary to have phony campaigns on fake battlefields against nonexistent "insurgents" resulting in fictional victories. In any foreign war, from time to time, the public needs to see action. They require news of some sort of forward movement, some kind of violent encounter, and some kind of result they can call victory. They don't actually require that it be real. They only need to be told about it. They need to see and hear about it in "the news." Sound familiar? That's Afghanistan today.
On February 13th fifteen thousand US and NATO troops launched a "major offensive" against what we were told was the largest Taliban stronghold left in Afghanistan. The Taliban was "in control" of the "city of Marjah" in southern Afghanistan, 360 miles or 610 kilometers southwest of Kabul, near the Pakistan border. This bustling metropolis, headquarters of the Taliban, had 80,000 people living there. The Taliban was dug in ready for a fight. Game on!
By March 1st victory was at hand. United States Marines helicoptered in an Afghan Vice President from Kabul to raise the Afghan flag over "the city of Marjah" in Helmand province. Afghanistan has 34 provinces of which Helmand is the largest. And yet nobody from the Afghan national government had been able to set foot in it in 35 years. Thirty-five years! Imagine, if you can, an equivalent situation here in the US. Imagine that not a single federal officer or employee - not a single person from any federal agency at all - had been able to enter Texas since 1975. And then imagine the reason for it was - Texas was controlled by armed insurgents. The Afghan VP was whisked in, raised the flag, and was then promptly flown back to the comfort of the capital, Kabul.
"The significance of this is that it happened." So said Mark Sedwill, NATO counterpart to US Gen. Stanley McCrystal who was also present for the occasion. "It happened," he said, meaning it could be photographed and reported around the world especially in those countries that had military forces in Afghanistan like the United States and Britain. Mission Accomplished.
Why was the "Battle For Marjah" a phony campaign? Was the battlefield a fake? Was the enemy nonexistent? Was the victory fictional? Could any of that be true?
"The city of Marjah" does not exist. Is that enough to make it phony? There is a rural area of Helmand province called Marjah or Marja, but it is just a collection of scattered farms, which just happen to produce 42% of the world's heroin, a few marketplaces and some tiny villages. There is no city or town anywhere - not anywhere at all. Yet we were told there are 80,000 people in Marjah. Some European news reports said no more than 50,000. The world's leading commercial demographic map company (Falling Rain Genomics) has maps and data on practically every place in the world. I looked up my own hometown before writing this. It was as complete and accurate as anything I've seen. FRG lists Marja, Afghanistan with a population of 4,874. You could look it up too.
The flag raising photo of the Afghan VP, the NATO spokesperson and General McCrystal can be found in newspapers, on TV and across the Internet. Take a look. There is a single, obviously temporary flagpole erected in a vacant field, surrounded as far as the eye can see by - nothing but empty, flat, barren land. Not a single structure in sight. The caption, carried by worldwide media, says the ceremony took place in "Marjah's central marketplace." Like the Mall of America, maybe? More like the Middle Of [email protected]#*&$g Nowhere.
Following this biggest military victory in the Afghanistan War, a check of the worldwide press, broadcasting and Internet services fails to produce a single photo showing any US or NATO troops engaged in battle with any enemy. No TV video has been shown in which any Taliban forces are visible. There is nothing showing Taliban dead or wounded. There are no captured Taliban fighters. No POWs. No "enemy combatants." And Marjah - we were told by our Generals - was the biggest Taliban stronghold left in Afghanistan. What happened to the Taliban?
According to American television and various other news services, the Marines were told by "several residents" that the Taliban had pulled back. They had retreated. But to where? Nobody seemed to know. A US Marine Capt. Joshua Winfrey was quoted: "I don't expect they can keep this up for long," he said. Keep what up? That's the question. No one can find the enemy. Fifteen thousand US and NATO troops on the ground, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft overhead, satellite images flying across military computer screens, and the best they could come up was this - Commanders with the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment said they "believed" there were "about 100" Taliban fighters... in another place, not in Marjah but in "an area known as Kareze." Huh?
A phony war, on a fake battlefield, against a nonexistent enemy with a fictional victory. D-Day on St. Barts.


source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-greener/afghanistan-d-day-on-st-b_b_493257.html :lol:

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

One has to chuckle.

[Psy]

This.

It was also the soviet strategy.

No the Soviet strategy was the same for the Fulda Gap (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fulda_Gap)

The Soviet tactic was the throw a wall of armor at the enemy, this tactic had the problem of armor are crap in mountains and in Afghanistan the enemy was not in the valleys to get overrun by Soviet armor. The USSR eventually changes tactics to airlifting light infantry into mountains but this tactic was flawed due to the stinger missiles the CIA provided the insurgence. Yet that said the Soviet did control the valleys it was the mountains that gave them huge problems.

[The Douche]

No the Soviet strategy was the same for the Fulda Gap (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fulda_Gap)

The Soviet tactic was the throw a wall of armor at the enemy, this tactic had the problem of armor are crap in mountains and in Afghanistan the enemy was not in the valleys to get overrun by Soviet armor. The USSR eventually changes tactics to airlifting light infantry into mountains but this tactic was flawed due to the stinger missiles the CIA provided the insurgence. Yet that said the Soviet did control the valleys it was the mountains that gave them huge problems.

The soviets attempted to control afghanistan through control of the urbanized areas (which is essentially just Kabul). Western warfighting dictates that you sieze the population centers/industrial areas and then you "win". Obviously that is not a successful strategy for Afghanistan, but that is what the soviets attempted and what the US is attempting now.

[khad]

No the Soviet strategy was the same for the Fulda Gap (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fulda_Gap)

The Soviet tactic was the throw a wall of armor at the enemy, this tactic had the problem of armor are crap in mountains and in Afghanistan the enemy was not in the valleys to get overrun by Soviet armor. The USSR eventually changes tactics to airlifting light infantry into mountains but this tactic was flawed due to the stinger missiles the CIA provided the insurgence. Yet that said the Soviet did control the valleys it was the mountains that gave them huge problems.

*facepalm*

You know, shit like this really irks the fuck out of me. No, the Soviet tactic was not a wall of armor. The core of Soviet military doctrine was operational maneuver, armor was used as an exploitation element, which means it was committed through breaches in the front lines, striking deep into the enemy's reserves, command, and log train. You cannot expect an armored unit to commit to a breakthrough and then seize objectives at operational depth. Even if it takes 5% losses, the fuel and ammo expenditures, as well as the command disruption will make such a task nigh-impossible.

Put in terms of a tactical example, in a standard battalion sized meeting engagement, one company would be left in place to pin the enemy down, while the rest of the battalion, vehicles and all would attempt to maneuver into the enemy's back to cut off retreat. Of course, travel through rugged terrain was slow and often unreliable, so the mujahideen often had plenty of time to slip out of the trap. Gradually helo airborne was used as an alternative maneuver force, though armor remained in use throughout the war. Tanks are good mobile artillery, and artillery kills the shit out of infantry.

That said, the Soviets did a damn fine job pushing armor through the mountains of Afghanistan, building roads as they went. The Japanese thought that the Soviet Army couldn't make it past the mountains and swamps of Manchuria in '45, but as it turned out an entire tank army rolled down from the mountains across near-undefended Kwantung Army positions. The USSR had arguably the finest combat engineers in the world. The only reason that NATO doesn't deploy more heavy equipment is because it simply does not have the ability to cut paths through rough terrain like that.

Stop spreading the dumbassed myths about the Soviet Army you learned from the history channel.


The soviets attempted to control afghanistan through control of the urbanized areas (which is essentially just Kabul).
Where did you ever get the idea that Kabul is the only city in Afghanistan?

This fatalism of the left is just idiotic. There is no historical inevitability at work here. The idea of seizing urban centers was absolutely the correct strategy to pursue, especially given that industrial development in Afghanistan meant that the populations of Afghan cities were swelling during the time of the PDPA. Had the USSR not fallen and had continued to provide aid to Afghanistan, the Afghan state could have survived--it had already proved its capability to utterly smash the rebels in battle after battle without the need for Soviet military intervention. All the mujahideen factions banded together in 1989 could not dislodge the PDPA from one small southeastern city in the and were driven back into Pakistan for the attempt.

The only difference between the current situation and the one in the 1980s is that the Afghan Army is in no way capable of shouldering the burden of the fighting and that the Taliban doesn't have the benefit of billions of dollars of assistance from the governments of Pakistan, the USA, and China.

And this is where the idiocy of the left runs right smack into a huge wall of fail. You guys all assume that it's going to end in failure, but depending on the political will of the western imperialists, Afghanistan might end up as another Philippines, where there is a more or less stable state which contends with simmering insurgencies that cannot be eradicated, but can be easily contained. That is close enough for a win for the United States, and that is a very real danger. It appears that this has already happened in Iraq. The left, it seems, has conveniently forgotten about this.

[Psy]

*facepalm*

You know, shit like this really irks the fuck out of me. No, the Soviet tactic was not a wall of armor. The core of Soviet military doctrine was operational maneuver, armor was used as an exploitation element, which means it was committed through breaches in the front lines, striking deep into the enemy's reserves, command, and log train. You cannot expect an armored unit to commit to a breakthrough and then seize objectives at operational depth. Even if it takes 5% losses, the fuel and ammo expenditures, as well as the command disruption will make such a task nigh-impossible.

Put in terms of a tactical example, in a standard battalion sized meeting engagement, one company would be left in place to pin the enemy down, while the rest of the battalion, vehicles and all would attempt to maneuver into the enemy's back to cut off retreat. Of course, travel through rugged terrain was slow and often unreliable, so the mujahideen often had plenty of time to slip out of the trap. Gradually helo airborne was used as an alternative maneuver force, though armor remained in use throughout the war. Tanks are good mobile artillery, and artillery kills the shit out of infantry.

You do know armor includes light armor (APCs, infantry fighting vehicle, armored cars, armored self-propelled anti-tank and anti-air vehicles) what you are referring to is tanks that are also armor but classified as medium/heavy armor. The USSR troops in afghanistan was in contrast to US soilders in Vietnam that mostly operated without light armor support and considering the amount of light armor the USSR used it was still a wall of armor espically with the narrow initatial front in Afganistan.



That said, the Soviets did a damn fine job pushing armor through the mountains of Afghanistan, building roads as they went. The Japanese thought that the Soviet Army couldn't make it past the mountains and swamps of Manchuria in '45, but as it turned out an entire tank army rolled down from the mountains across near-undefended Kwantung Army positions. The USSR had arguably the finest combat engineers in the world. The only reason that NATO doesn't deploy more heavy equipment is because it simply does not have the ability to cut paths through rough terrain like that.

That is true but they are still far less effective in mountains terrain.

[khad]

You do know armor includes light armor (APCs, infantry fighting vehicle, armored cars, armored self-propelled anti-tank and anti-air vehicles) what you are referring to is tanks that are also armor but classified as medium/heavy armor. The USSR troops in afghanistan was in contrast to US soilders in Vietnam that mostly operated without light armor support and considering the amount of light armor the USSR used it was still a wall of armor espically with the narrow initatial front in Afganistan.
Are you trying to insult me? I was referring to a standard battalion, meaning a motor rifle battalion, which is equipped with BTRs or BMPs. Each MRR would be composed of 1 tank battalion and 3 MRBs, not that you'd know anything about that.

The American airborne operated without light armor support in Vietnam because they had no way to air drop M113s. There was research done, but due to contracting squabbles it was never implemented. Soldiers complained for more M113s all the time.

Mechanized infantry has a huge advantage over any other kind of infantry for the simple fact that you can use the vehicle as a mule. Throw your extra gear in/on top of your IFV, and you can go on patrol with just your weapon and ammo. The vehicle can also be used to knock down small trees and flatten brush, making advances through dense vegetation that much easier.

The M113 was one of the most valued vehicles in the war, and it earned the nickname "the green dragon" from the Viet Cong.


That is true but they are still far less effective in mountains terrain.You try hiking up a hill with 100lbs on your back, and you'll wish for a tracked vehicle to carry your shit.

The advantage of mech/motorized infantry explained in one picture:
http://www.combatreform.org/008russianinfantryfansoutoveropenterrain.jpg

[Psy]

Are you trying to insult me? I was referring to a standard battalion, meaning a motor rifle battalion, which is equipped with BTRs or BMPs. Each MRR would be composed of 1 tank battalion and 3 MRBs, not that you'd know anything about that.

The American airborne operated without light armor support in Vietnam because they had no way to air drop M113s. There was research done, but due to contracting squabbles it was never implemented. Soldiers complained for more M113s all the time.

Even now the US has far fewer light armor in Afghanistan then the USSR had in Afghanistan (as you can't count unarmored Humvees as light armor, they are just motorized units as most can't stop even small arms and even armored Humvees are on the low end of light armor).

Thus as I said from a NATO perspective the USSR invasion was a wall of armor as they used more armor then most NATO countries even had. Even in the 1980's most NATO countries still mostly used motorized infantry not mechanized infantry including the USA which is mostly impossible for the US with the Bradley not that easy to mass produce on a large scale.



Mechanized infantry has a huge advantage over any other kind of infantry for the simple fact that you can use the vehicle as a mule. Throw your extra gear in/on top of your IFV, and you can go on patrol with just your weapon and ammo. The vehicle can also be used to knock down small trees and flatten brush, making advances through dense vegetation that much easier.

The M113 was one of the most valued vehicles in the war, and it earned the nickname "the green dragon" from the Viet Cong.

You try hiking up a hill with 100lbs on your back, and you'll wish for a tracked vehicle to carry your shit.

Yet is easier for infantry to scale a mountain then any vehicle when your talking about steep grade with rough terrain.

[khad]

Even now the US has far fewer light armor in Afghanistan then the USSR had in Afghanistan (as you can't count unarmored Humvees as light armor, they are just motorized units as most can't stop even small arms and even armored Humvees are on the low end of light armor).

Thus as I said from a NATO perspective the USSR invasion was a wall of armor as they used more armor then most NATO countries even had. Even in the 1980's most NATO countries still mostly used motorized infantry not mechanized infantry including the USA which is mostly impossible for the US with the Bradley not that easy to mass produce on a large scale.
You need to check your history.

The US army was far more mechanized during Vietnam with its M113s before restructuring mothballed the Gavins for the Humvee (so that they could milk the Bradley contract)


Yet is easier for infantry to scale a mountain then any vehicle when your talking about steep grade with rough terrain.
Do you even have a concept of what mountain warfare involves? It is not scaling cliff faces or going over 60 degree grades. Most of it is walking on rough, very hilly terrain.
http://www.olive-drab.com/images/army-horses-mules_21c_02_700.jpg

[Psy]

You need to check your history.

The US army was far more mechanized during Vietnam with its M113s before restructuring mothballed the Gavins for the Humvee (so that they could milk the Bradley contract)

Most US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan mobility are provided by unarmored Humvees (as utility vehicles) rather then the armored version of the Humvee (as armored cars). Yet even during Vietnam the USSR had more light armor then NATO.



Do you even have a concept of what mountain warfare involves? It is not scaling cliff faces or going over 60 degree grades. Most of it is walking on rough, very hilly terrain.
http://www.olive-drab.com/images/army-horses-mules_21c_02_700.jpg
It is mountain paths like this
http://www.whs.mil/library/Afghanistan.jpg

that causes problems as vehicles don't have much manoverablity and makes it hard for troops to see what it higher up the mountain.

[khad]

It is mountain paths like this
http://www.whs.mil/library/Afghanistan.jpg

that causes problems as vehicles don't have much manoverablity and makes it hard for troops to see what it higher up the mountain.
In mountain paths like this, BMPs would have little trouble. The Taliban regularly uses pack animals and Toyota trucks on these passes, so I don't see what the problem is. Tracked vehicles are quite good over rough terrain, and that right there is a road.

Unless you suggest that scaling that 60-70 degree slope on the road bank while carrying 100 lbs of gear like any pure foot slogger would is a viable option. I'd like you to try it to see how many meters you can go before you collapse from exhaustion.

Here, you can see some footage of the Soviet airborne's BMDs on mountain exercises:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xAZPWMgU0qc
And here you can see an old Afghan BMP winding its way through one of those so-called impassable mountain passes:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ceRC1YNVeA

[Psy]

In mountain paths like this, BMPs would have little trouble. The Taliban regularly uses pack animals and Toyota trucks on these passes, so I don't see what the problem is. Tracked vehicles are quite good over rough terrain, and that right there is a road.

In a battle where can a BMP go, they can't climb down the side of mountain without risking rolling. To hostile infantry higher up the mountain a BMP would be a sitting duck, even anti-tank rifles would be highly effective as a sniper would be easily be able to predict the path of vehicles on such mountain roads making BMPs not a significant treat to infantry entrenched on mountains. Infantry could at least take cover lower down the mountain even without climbing gear where they have good enough footing.



Unless you suggest that scaling that 60-70 degree slope on the road bank while carrying 100 lbs of gear like any pure foot slogger would is a viable option. I'd like you to try it to see how many meters you can make it before you collapse from exhaustion.

Even if they started on the top of the mountain infantry can more easily scale down the mountain then it is for vehicles down the side of the mountain unless you have very good drivers that are very lucky to navigate down the slide of mountain and there is good chance they would over shoot the enemy and keep going to bottom, meaning the enemy would be very shocked to see BMPs coming down the side mountain yet the BMPs probably keep going right past their positions unable to stop and just keep sliding right to bottom as their drivers simply focus on not rolling, hitting anything (as odds are BMPs would just bounce of trees going down a mountain side) or falling to far (so they slide down the mountain instead of fall off the mountain).

[khad]

In a battle where can a BMP go, they can't climb down the side of mountain without risking rolling. To hostile infantry higher up the mountain a BMP would be a sitting duck, even anti-tank rifles would be highly effective as a sniper would be easily be able to predict the path of vehicles on such mountain roads making BMPs not a significant treat to infantry entrenched on mountains.
What did I tell you about dismounting? Having a vehicle makes the combat load on the infantry very light. They can move with much greater ease than foot sloggers if they ever have to disembark to engage the enemy. And they don't have to backtrack after every engagement to play this bullshit game of hide-and-go-seek with their rucksacks.

That is the primary advantage of mechanization.


Infantry could at least take cover lower down the mountain even without climbing gear where they have good enough footing.Are you fucking kidding me? You NEVER take cover on a slope beneath the enemy. Elevation differentials increase range, meaning that you can't hit them, but they can hit you.


Even if they started on the top of the mountain infantry can more easily scale down the mountain then it is for vehicles down the side of the mountain unless you have very good drivers that are very lucky to navigate down the slide of mountain and there is good chance theyAnd I want to see you do this with 100lbs of gear weighing you down. You won't have to worry about getting back down because you'll collapse or break your ankles long before you get to the top.


would over shoot the enemy and keep going to bottom, meaning the enemy would be very shocked to see BMPs coming down the side mountain yet the BMPs probably keep going right past their positions unable to stop and just keep sliding right to bottom as their drivers simply focus on not rolling, hitting anything (as odds are BMPs would just bounce of trees going down a mountain side) or falling to far (so they slide down the mountain instead of fall off the mountain)Yeah, and I assume that the fire support capabilities of light armor have to be used at point blank range too. :rolleyes:

A BMP can easily hang back a full kilometer or two from the front line and provide useful suppressive fire, longer if firing from elevation. Even the BMP's KPV can provide fire support at considerable range.

How is this not a simple concept to understand? Mechanization increases troop mobility by reducing the combat load and thus fatigue over long distances. The alternative is to go back to foot slogging where soldiers have to carry every bit of equipment on their backs, with combat loads that can easily exceed 100lbs. Neither solution is perfect, but mechanization provides far more mobility and endurance for troops out in the field.


The bigger point I'm trying to make is that I hate this bullshit fatalistic attitude that clouds objective analysis of anything regarding Afghanistan. Oh, mechanization is bad because vehicles can have some problems over rough and hilly terrain, which, I may add, that the Taliban regularly traverses with their pack animals and Toyotas. I guess if everyone goes back to humping their massive rucksacks and collapses due to exhaustion and injury, you'd be complaining about that too.

[Psy]

What did I tell you about dismounting? Having a vehicle makes the combat load on the infantry very light. They can move with much greater ease than foot sloggers if they ever have to disembark to engage the enemy. And they don't have to do this bullshit game of running back to recover rucksacks dropped somewhere in the field after every engagement.

That is the primary advantage of mechanization.

Even mounted infantry has that advantage and mules can climb mountains better then most vehicles.



Are you fucking kidding me? You NEVER take cover on a slope beneath the enemy. Elevation differentials increase range, meaning that you can't hit them, but they can hit you.

That assumes the infantry above has a clear line of sight all the way down the mountain which is very rare on mountain ranges (especially if the enemy infantry is not even on the same mountain and attacking from another mountain on the range). It also assumes the infantry taking cover is working alone and can't call on support and can't rely on their support be a helicopter, sniper, artillery or air strike to take out the threat.




And I want to see you do this with 100lbs of gear weighing you down. You won't have to worry about getting back down because you'll collapse or break your ankles long before you get to the top.

Yet going down is easy the 100lbs would just mean you'd lose balance easier.



Yeah, and I assume that the fire support capabilities of light armor have to be used at point blank range too. :rolleyes:

A BMP can easily hang back a full kilometer from the front line and provide useful suppressive fire, longer if firing from elevation.

True but it is better when it has some kind of cover or can quickly move to cover.



The bigger point I'm trying to make is that I hate this bullshit fatalistic attitude that clouds objective analysis of anything regarding Afghanistan. Oh, mechanization is bad because vehicles can have some problems over rough and hilly terrain, which, I may add, that the Taliban regularly traverses with their pack animals and Toyotas. I guess if everyone goes back to humping their massive rucksacks and collapses due to exhaustion and injury, you'd be complaining about that too.
My point was that mechanization worked far better in the vallies of Afganistan where armor had the room to maneuver. Mountains are where infantry is king, in NATO WWIII war games entrenched heavy infantry usally slaughtered superiour numbers of armor in mountains terrian, due to opforce armor running signal file through passes.

[khad]

That assumes the infantry above has a clear line of sight all the way down the mountain which is very rare on mountain ranges (especially if the enemy infantry is not even on the same mountain and attacking from another mountain on the range). It also assumes the infantry taking cover is working alone and can't call on support and can't rely on their support be a helicopter, sniper, artillery or air strike to take out the threat.
Attacking from another mountain range? :rolleyes:


Yet going down is easy the 100lbs would just mean you'd lose balance easier.Umm, no. I think anyone who has done any amount of hiking will tell you how dangerous going down a hill can be if you don't have control.


True but it is better when it has some kind of cover or can quickly move to cover. The BMP's 73mm can even be fired indirect, plunging over obstacles. What's your point?


My point was that mechanization worked far better in the vallies of Afganistan where armor had the room to maneuver. Mountains are where infantry is king, in NATO WWIII war games entrenched heavy infantry usally slaughtered superiour numbers of armor in mountains terrian, due to opforce armor running signal file through passes.So? What point is that? You have no understanding of how the military operates in an organic sense. You speak of hypothetical scenarios and engagements, but you never stop to think of how these infantrymen are transported, supplied, and fed.

For any modern army, your "infantry is king" mantra is fucking bullshit because the distances they have to cover would leave foot sloggers exhausted far before they reached their objectives. How would you even get to the battle in the first place if it weren't for APC/IFV transport? Mechanization cuts down on combat load and fatigue, even if the vehicle has to be left behind in the final stretch while one's forces move into the engagement.

Even the Taliban relies on vehicles. The ubiquitous Toyota truck is cheap and effective.


There is a hierarchy of vehicles among the more important lieutenants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Mr. bin Laden's terrorist organization. Not for them anything discreet and durable, to go with the austerity of their faith: nothing but a Land Cruiser will serve. For ordinary fighters, men with long beards and longer barrels on their ubiquitous Kalashnikovs, the vehicle of choice is the Toyota Hilux, a compact pickup truck popular throughout the developing world.

[The Douche]

Most US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan mobility are provided by unarmored Humvees (as utility vehicles) rather then the armored version of the Humvee (as armored cars). Yet even during Vietnam the USSR had more light armor then NATO.


This is soooooooooo not correct. Unarmored humvees never go outside the wire. Even inside the wire all of my company's trucks were uparmored. I never even saw a regular humvee the whole time I was in country. Furthermore, the picture you supply of a humvee in that post is of an uparmored truck.



The US has a vastly smaller mechanized element than the former USSR. However, virtually all light (as in dismounted) units in the Iraq theater are using uparmored humvees, not doing foot patrols.

I talked to a guy who was in a stryker batallion deployed to afghanistan and he said that when they went out they pretty much never had stryker support unless they were on flat land.

I don't think we have ever deployed bradleys to afghanistan.

[Psy]

Attacking from another mountain range? :rolleyes:

Another mountain on the same mountain range.



Umm, no. I think anyone who has done any amount of hiking will tell you how dangerous going down a hill can be if you don't have control.

True but going down grade decreases the amount of energy required to move.



The BMP's 73mm can even be fired indirect, plunging over obstacles. What's your point?

It is hard for armor to find cover in mountains terrain.



So? What point is that? You have no understanding of how the military operates in an organic sense. You speak of hypothetical scenarios and engagements, but you never stop to think of how these infantrymen are transported, supplied, and fed.

In the NATO war games from airdrops as they are heavy infantry thus not meant to move from their positions on their own, they are basically a garrison airlifted into a defensive position. There is no way they are going to move semi-portable anti-tank cannons and other such equipment on their own that was airlifted to their fortification on a mountain via helicopters prior to the battle.



For any modern army, your "infantry is king" mantra is fucking bullshit because the distances they have to cover would leave foot sloggers exhausted far before they reached their objectives. How would you even get to the battle in the first place if it weren't for APC/IFV transport? Mechanization cuts down on combat load and fatigue, even if the vehicle has to be left behind in the final stretch while one's forces move into the engagement.

True but on mountains defenders can easily figure out where vehicles will approach from and easier for the enemy to cut off retreat for vehicles.

[khad]

This is soooooooooo not correct. Unarmored humvees never go outside the wire. Even inside the wire all of my company's trucks were uparmored. I never even saw a regular humvee the whole time I was in country. Furthermore, the picture you supply of a humvee in that post is of an uparmored truck.

The US has a vastly smaller mechanized element than the former USSR. However, virtually all light (as in dismounted) units in the Iraq theater are using uparmored humvees, not doing foot patrols.

I talked to a guy who was in a stryker batallion deployed to afghanistan and he said that when they went out they pretty much never had stryker support unless they were on flat land.

I don't think we have ever deployed bradleys to afghanistan.
The history of that is actually fraught with a lot of capitalist profiteering in the pentagon.

It used to be in the Vietnam era that US troops would be routinely provided light armor support in the form of the M113, with over 80,000 machines built. However, due to the coming Bradley contract, these were removed from service. However, the Bradley, by the end of its design cycle proved to be too expensive and too complex to be manufactured in truly significant numbers, so the bulk of the infantry went back to using wheeled vehicles.

[The Douche]

The history of that is actually fraught with a lot of capitalist profiteering in the pentagon.

It used to be in the Vietnam era that US troops would be routinely provided light armor support in the form of the M113, with over 80,000 machines built. However, due to the coming Bradley contract, these were removed from service. However, the Bradley, by the end of its design cycle proved to be too expensive and too complex to be manufactured in truly significant numbers, so the bulk of the infantry went back to using wheeled vehicles.

I know that today all my friends who are still in bradleys wish they had strykers. And all my friends who have strykers are absolutely in love with them.

I'm as far from mech as you can get, the only experience I have is the training on it I did before Iraq, but we didn't do a mech mission over there, and now I'm even farther from the armor in a reconaissance unit.

But I'm to young to know anybody who had experiecne with the 113.

[khad]

In the NATO war games from airdrops as they are heavy infantry thus not meant to move from their positions on their own, they are basically a garrison airlifted into a defensive position. There is no way they are going to move semi-portable anti-tank cannons and other such equipment on their own that was airlifted to their fortification on a mountain via helicopters prior to the battle.
And this applies to Afghanistan how, when you have to be the attacker? As the attacker, you can't afford to stay still, and vehicles still provide the edge in mobility and keep your soldiers rested for battle. And air transport is no solution because the infantrymen will still have to slog around with their burdensome rucksacks. All mech infantry has to do is leave them in the vehicle and dismount for battle.

I still don't get why you think the Taliban are so awesome to use their Toyotas over rugged terrain when vehicles for every other army are a liability in your book.


True but on mountains defenders can easily figure out where vehicles will approach from and easier for the enemy to cut off retreat for vehicles.And how are infantry moving through mountain passes any different? As I said before, even if your guys have to walk the last few km to reach the enemy, the fact that they have a means of motor transport means that they're that much more rested for battle.

Why do you think the Taliban has Toyota trucks?


I know that today all my friends who are still in bradleys wish they had strykers. And all my friends who have strykers are absolutely in love with them.

I'm as far from mech as you can get, the only experience I have is the training on it I did before Iraq, but we didn't do a mech mission over there, and now I'm even farther from the armor in a reconaissance unit.

But I'm to young to know anybody who had experiecne with the 113.
You can see that the USA actually tried to emulate the soviet armor model, with light tracks for the IFV (BMP/Bradley) and 8x8s for the APC (BTR/Stryker).

It's the situation that the defense industry made these projects so costly that they cannot be deployed in large numbers. Something like the Stryker should replace the humvee as the basic infantry transport, sort of like how the BTR was in the soviet army and the M113 Gavin used to be in the US Army.

[The Douche]

You can see that the USA actually tried to emulate the soviet armor model, with light tracks for the IFV (BMP/Bradley) and 8x8s for the APC (BTR/Stryker).

It's the situation that the defense industry made these projects so costly that they cannot be deployed in large numbers. Something like the Stryker should replace the humvee as the basic infantry transport, sort of like how the BTR was in the soviet army and the M113 Gavin used to be in the US Army.

This is a spot on analysis. As an infantryman in the US army I can completely agree, no infantryman likes using the humvee (in any configuration) as an IFV, which is how its being fielded now. I don't know a single infantryman who isn't head over heels for the stryker.

Unfortunately it doesn't really apply to me since I am in a LRS company and we don't ever use wheeled vehicles, unless its a partisan linkup. And I assure, the average light infantryman, with a 75 pound ruck (the average for light guys) cannot hump that in afghan terrain. My ruck is about 150 pounds, and I have to hump it in the mountains, the average soldier is not cut out for it. And more importantly, it is not possible to carry a ruck like that 7 or 8 clicks, and then jump straight into a fight. I might carry mine 10 or 12 clicks, but then I am in a week long surveillance position, not fighting a battle.

[Psy]

And this applies to Afghanistan how, when you have to be the attacker? As the attacker, you can't afford to stay still, and vehicles still provide the edge in mobility and keep your soldiers rested for battle. And air transport is no solution because the infantrymen will still have to slog around with their burdensome rucksacks. All mech infantry has to do is leave them in the vehicle and dismount for battle.

A block aid would have worked, drop heavy infantry in easily dependable positions long the mountain passes and starve the Mujahideen war effort. It would not have mattered how much supplies the CIA sent in if there was garrisons of Soviet infantry along the mountain passes that were equipped with enough supplies and arms to stop a NATO invasion force and were re-supplied by air especially if they destroyed the passes by causing avalances (since they would not need them if they are airlifting).



I still don't get why you think the Taliban are so awesome to use their Toyotas over rugged terrain when vehicles for every other army are a liability in your book.

I don't think they are awsome.



And how are infantry moving through mountain passes any different? As I said before, even if your guys have to walk the last few km to reach the enemy, the fact that they have a means of motor transport means that they're that much more rested for battle.

They can supprize the enemy, they can make their approch less noticable thought much slower. It is the reason why you have military theory that states it is better for troops to wade through a swamp to take the enemy by supprise then get there faster and easier by a road where they enemy probably is expecting you.

[khad]

A block aid would have worked, drop heavy infantry in easily dependable positions long the mountain passes and starve the Mujahideen war effort. It would not have mattered how much supplies the CIA sent in if there was garrisons of Soviet infantry along the mountain passes that were equipped with enough supplies and arms to stop a NATO invasion force and were re-supplied by air especially if they destroyed the passes by causing avalances (since they would not need them if they are airlifting).
The logistics of massive air supply drops are daunting. Not only are they very expensive, but they can be notoriously unreliable. It didn't work for the 6th army in Stalingrad, and it certainly won't work in Afghanistan. Were you to adopt that strategy, you would have to supply hundreds of thousands of troops in the field, and you'd pretty much need the lift capacity of the entire Soviet air force to even have a chance of meeting a minimal level of sustainability.

Air is the log train of LAST RESORT for any army.


I don't think they are awsome.And this changes the FACT that Toyotas are the backbone of the Taliban's transport how? Your opposition to vehicles in mountainous terrain is absurd, rooted in some idealist light force fetishism that doesn't actually examine how to solve actual problems in a materially feasible way.


They can supprize the enemy, they can make their approch less noticable thought much slower.Have you ever done any hiking with any amount of load on your back? I'd like to see you prove how this is possible for the those of us who don't have the strength and endurance of superman. As Cmoney wrote:

"I assure, the average light infantryman, with a 75 pound ruck (the average for light guys) cannot hump that in afghan terrain. My ruck is about 150 pounds, and I have to hump it in the mountains, the average soldier is not cut out for it. And more importantly, it is not possible to carry a ruck like that 7 or 8 clicks, and then jump straight into a fight. I might carry mine 10 or 12 clicks, but then I am in a week long surveillance position, not fighting a battle."

This is why vehicles are prized by every army including the Taliban. Your soldiers won't get worn out from senseless foot slogging.


It is the reason why you have military theory that states it is better for troops to wade through a swamp to take the enemy by supprise then get there faster and easier by a road where they enemy probably is expecting you.And this is just rigid western thinking. They said that about the marshy ground of Manchuria, and it's true, the Soviet Army did advance through the swamps--only they knocked over trees and built a makeshift road within hours that allowed for the massive force ratio that punched through the Kwantung army's lines. They went on to advance 600km in 2 weeks.

[The Douche]

It is the reason why you have military theory that states it is better for troops to wade through a swamp to take the enemy by supprise then get there faster and easier by a road where they enemy probably is expecting you.

When I plan missions I will take any reasonable route to avoid a swamp. Real talk, I will risk walking 40 meters to the side of a road, or low crawl through a clearing instead of planning a route that takes the team through a swamp.

[khad]

When I plan missions I will take any reasonable route to avoid a swamp. Real talk, I will risk walking 40 meters to the side of a road, or low crawl through a clearing instead of planning a route that takes the team through a swamp.
It's usually dangerous to pass through a swamp, unless you are in deep recon and are really intent on hiding.

For any standard army loaded down with gear, it's not good to pass through soft, marshy ground unless you have the path prepared by experienced combat engineers.

[Psy]

The logistics of massive air supply drops are daunting. Not only are they very expensive, but they can be notoriously unreliable. It didn't work for the 6th army in Stalingrad, and it certainly won't work in Afghanistan. Were you to adopt that strategy, you would have to supply hundreds of thousands of troops in the field, and you'd pretty much need the lift capacity of the entire Soviet air force to even have a chance of meeting a minimal level of sustainability.

Air is the log train of LAST RESORT for any army.

Did you forget the Berlin Airlift? Remember we are talking about infantry that would not be doing much fighting (they mostly cutting off the Mujahideen supply lines buy entrenching along mountain passes with the idea the Mujahideen would not even attempt to attack heavy entrenchments.



And this changes the FACT that Toyotas are the backbone of the Taliban's transport how? Your opposition to vehicles in mountainous terrain is absurd, rooted in some idealist light force fetishism that doesn't actually examine how to solve actual problems in a materially feasible way.

Not during the Soviet occupation, then mules were the backbone of their supply lines.



Have you ever done any hiking with any amount of load on your back? I'd like to see you prove how this is possible for the those of us who don't have the strength and endurance of superman. As Cmoney wrote:

"I assure, the average light infantryman, with a 75 pound ruck (the average for light guys) cannot hump that in afghan terrain. My ruck is about 150 pounds, and I have to hump it in the mountains, the average soldier is not cut out for it. And more importantly, it is not possible to carry a ruck like that 7 or 8 clicks, and then jump straight into a fight. I might carry mine 10 or 12 clicks, but then I am in a week long surveillance position, not fighting a battle."

This is why vehicles are prized by every army including the Taliban. Your soldiers won't get worn out from senseless foot slogging.

You do know animals also can carry infantry and supplies and during Vietnam bicycles were the backbone of the supply lines early on.



And this is just rigid western thinking. They said that about the marshy ground of Manchuria, and it's true, the Soviet Army did advance through the swamps--only they knocked over trees and built a makeshift road within hours that allowed for the massive force ratio that punched through the Kwantung army's lines. They went on to advance 600km in 2 weeks.
True and the Nazis was able to surprise the French and British by going around the Maginot Line through what was through was impassable forests of the Ardennes region. Yet these were major advances, in Afghanistan the point was not to advance the front but crush the insurgency.

[Psy]

It's usually dangerous to pass through a swamp, unless you are in deep recon and are really intent on hiding.

For any standard army loaded down with gear, it's not good to pass through soft, marshy ground unless you have the path prepared by experienced combat engineers.
Unless you have mechanized units that can handle it
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VOULfira3o

Softy marshy/mucky ground is actually something the more specialized mechanized units can easily deal with, the Vityaz Transporters could move men and equipment through a swamp much faster then infantry could wade through it.

[khad]

Did you forget the Berlin Airlift?
Which was a combined effort of the US, British, and other commonwealth air forces and didn't include supplies like ammunition. What do you think was possible for a region in which the Soviet Army could only commit a single field army?

Remember we are talking about infantry that would not be doing much fighting (they mostly cutting off the Mujahideen supply lines buy entrenching along mountain passes with the idea the Mujahideen would not even attempt to attack heavy entrenchments.Soviet experience says that you're wrong
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Hill_3234
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jalalabad#Battle_of_Jalalabad


Not during the Soviet occupation, then mules were the backbone of their supply lines. But when they got toyotas, everyone switched. There's a reason for that, and it wasn't because the Hilux was LESS effective than a mule. The foot-slogging mule men of the mujahideen were swept away like chaff in the wind by the Taliban's Toyotas. (and their tanks and, briefly, their air force)


You do know animals also can carry infantry and supplies and during Vietnam bicycles were the backbone of the supply lines early on. I don't think there is an infantryman in the world who would prefer a mule to a BMP. And do you mean to seriously suggest that a bike is better over rough terrain than a tracked vehicle?


True and the Nazis was able to surprise the French and British by going around the Maginot Line through what was through was impassable forests of the Ardennes region. Yet these were major advances, in Afghanistan the point was not to advance the front but crush the insurgency.And the historical myths continue. The Maginot Line was pierced. There were axes of advance along the entire front. What the Maginot line proved is that defensive bunker-down strategies along an entire front, like what you proposed with the soviet army being supplied out in the field with air drops, simply do not work. No matter how many defenses you put up, the enemy will find a way to stack the odds in his favor in the crucial sector. That said, holding the cities and building up the cities to be the powerhouses of the Afghan economy was the correct strategy to pursue. There only so many troops to go around.


Unless you have mechanized units that can handle it

Softy marshy/mucky ground is actually something the more specialized mechanized units can easily deal with, the Vityaz Transporters could move men and equipment through a swamp much faster then infantry could wade through it.
The Soviet Army did fine in Manchuria building roads with T-34s.

You think it's so easy to deploy forces, like with your cockamamie air supply garrisons, but the reality of any military is that there are serious material constraints. You make do with what logistical capability you have.

[The Douche]

Soviet experience says that you're wrong
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Hill_3234 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Hill_3234)

Thanks for posting that, I read about it before, its massively important in this discussion where its actually being suggestted that we should use 1940s military strategy against an insurgency.

Its also a very amazing story to me as a soldier.

[khad]

Thanks for posting that, I read about it before, its massively important in this discussion where its actually being suggestted that we should use 1940s military strategy against an insurgency.

Its also a very amazing story to me as a soldier.
That hill was held briefly just as part of a campaign to guard a road carrying supplies, but it's obvious that these isolated positions cannot be seriously held for long when under concerted attack. It's always a matter of force concentration. In order to guard vast stretches of land, you have to spread your men thin. When the enemy decides to attack, he will have overwhelming force ratio. This is why, overall holding cities is much more effective for a defensive strategy than being out in the field holding tiny outposts. The defenders of hill 3234 just barely held on, while the defenders of Jalalabad comfortably defeated the united Mujahideen and pushed their survivors back into Pakistan.

The divisional commander gave that hill everything he could give in terms of artillery, air support, resupply, and medevac, and it was a victory, but the defenders could not have gone on for much longer.

The outpost crap that Psy is suggesting has been done already, and it doesn't work, where the coalition has done arguably worse than the Soviets.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wanat
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kamdesh

[Psy]

Which was a combined effort of the US, British, and other commonwealth air forces and didn't include supplies like ammunition.

And was feeding a entire city (okay half a city).



What do you think was possible for a region in which the Soviet Army could only deploy a single field army?

Thus why I said it would require more troops as for it too work the Soviet Army would have to block all supply lines.



Soviet experience says that you're wrong
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Hill_3234

I'm talk about siege warfare were the Soviet army basically encircle Afghanistan cutting the supply lines of the Mujahideen.




But when they got toyotas, everyone switched. There's a reason for that, and it wasn't because the Hilux was LESS effective than a mule. The foot-slogging mule men of the mujahideen were swept away like chaff in the wind by the Taliban's Toyotas.

I don't think there is an infantryman in the world who would prefer a mule to a BMP. And do you mean to seriously suggest that a bike is better over rough terrain than a tracked vehicle?

If they are trying to scale a mountain they would consider it and a bike is also useful in that it is far narrower thus can go along narrow foot paths.



And the historical myths continue. The Maginot Line was pierced. There were axes of advance along the entire front. What the Maginot line proved is that defensive bunker-down strategies along an entire front, like what you proposed with the soviet army being supplied out in the field with air drops, simply do not work. No matter how many defenses you put up, the enemy will find a way to stack the odds in his favor in the crucial sector.
I fail to see how this would be the case in Afghanistan, what do you think the Mujahideen would have grown wings and flew over the block aids? If the Soviet Army also could have caused avalanches along the mountain passes it would mean they would have to scale over the rock slides, attack the Soviet entrenchment yet they still would have to get supplies through so then they would have to clear the path of the rock slide the Soviets created as a road block.

[khad]

Thus why I said it would require more troops as for it too work the Soviet Army would have to block all supply lines.
Not possible. You couldn't justify pulling more more men from the primary front, which was Europe. Even more distressing is the amount of lift capacity you'd have to divert from every other sector all for a police action in Central Asia.


I'm talk about siege warfare were the Soviet army basically encircle Afghanistan cutting the supply lines of the Mujahideen.And where would you come up with the men to do it? The borders of the USSR had to be defended, and only so many troops can be spared.


If they are trying to scale a mountain they would consider it and a bike is also useful in that it is far narrower thus can go along narrow foot paths.Bullshit. If you were forced to advance up a narrow foot path, it would mean that your operation is in the process of being fucked. And seriously, try to bike up something like that while being loaded down.


I fail to see how this would be the case in Afghanistan, what do you think the Mujahideen would have grown wings and flew over the block aids? If the Soviet Army also caused avalanches along the mountain passes it would mean they would have to scale over the rock slides, attack the Soviet entrenchment yet they still would have to get supplies through so then they would have to clear the path of the rock slide the Soviets created as a road block.Oh, so now the Soviet army has to cause rock slides, cutting their own log train and forcing themselves to rely on air drops which are subject to imprecision and weather. A lot of those supplies are going to be landing in the hands of the Mujahideen. A perfectly sound strategy according to you. To everyone else, it's called a death trap. They bring RPGs or mortars on that position, and you're fucked.

How the hell did a kid like you ever get interested in military stuff in the first place? It's clear you don't even have the slightest bit of common sense.

[The Douche]

I fail to see how this would be the case in Afghanistan, what do you think the Mujahideen would have grown wings and flew over the block aids? If the Soviet Army also could have caused avalanches along the mountain passes it would mean they would have to scale over the rock slides, attack the Soviet entrenchment yet they still would have to get supplies through so then they would have to clear the path of the rock slide the Soviets created as a road block.

Dude, do you happen to be a staff level officer in the US army? This is some of the most assinine shit I have ever fucking heard.

Let me just get this straight, you want groups of soldiers (how big? comapny size?) to trap themselves on moutain tops/passes? What if it starts raining? What if the enemy secure anti-air assets? What about enemy artillery? Sure, the mujahideen are pretty poor with mortars, but if you give them a target smack on top of a terain feature, they can eventually dial that in.

I just, honestly, can't comprehend what you're saying. You think 100 men should isolate themselves somewhere and just trust that fixed wing aircraft and helicopters will be able to keep showing up? Fuck man, jesus, fuck.

[Psy]

Not possible. You couldn't justify pulling more more men from the primary front, which was Europe. Even more distressing is the amount of lift capacity you'd have to divert from every other sector all for a police action in Central Asia.

And where would you come up with the men to do it? The borders of the USSR had to be defended, and only so many troops can be spared.

The CIA creating paramilitary forces next to the USSR border was not a threat to the USSR itself? It was in the best interest of the USSR to end the Afghanistan problem as quickly as possible thus using much more divisions for a much larger but shorter operation.



Bullshit. If you were forced to advance up a narrow foot path, it would mean that your operation is in the process of being fucked. And seriously, try to bike up something like that while being loaded down.

Not if the enemy does not know you are there.



Oh, so now the Soviet army has to cause rock slides, cutting their own log train and forcing themselves to rely on air drops which are subject to imprecision and weather. A lot of those supplies are going to be landing in the hands of the Mujahideen. A perfectly sound strategy according to you. To everyone else, it's called a death trap.

They are garrisons just stockpile their supplies before hand. Also how is helicopter drops going to fall into the hands of the Mujahideen, what a helicopter is not going to be able to hover over the mountain pass near where the garrison to drop the supplies? Yes helicopters carry less supplies but again the idea is the garrisons would already have a stockpile and odds are they won't have to be there more then a few week till the Mujahideen would be so weak to be a serious threat due to the lack of food in water in the mountains to feed a army.




How the hell did a kid like you ever get interested in military stuff in the first place? It's clear you don't even have the slightest bit of common sense.
You do know this was NATO's plan for stopping the Soviets from invading Norway? Not the avalanche part but relying on mountain garrisons that would be resupplied by helicopters.

[khad]

The CIA creating paramilitary forces next to the USSR border was not a threat to the USSR itself? It was in the best interest of the USSR to end the Afghanistan problem as quickly as possible thus using much more divisions for a much larger but shorter operation.
Yeah, and while you pull the divisions and air lift from Europe and gut that sector's defenses, NATO is going to walk all over you. Give me a break.


They are garrisons just stockpile their supplies before hand. Also how is helicopter drops going to fall into the hands of the Mujahideen, what a helicopter is not going to be able to hover over the mountain pass near where the garrison to drop the supplies? Yes helicopters carry less supplies but again the idea is the garrisons would already have a stockpile and odds are they won't have to be there more then a few week till the Mujahideen would be so weak to be a serious threat due to the lack of food in water in the mountains to feed a army.Soviet experience says that you're wrong. The rebels could attack and attack in force, to the point where air resupply was stretched to the limits, as in the battle for Hill 3234.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Hill_3234 (http://www.anonym.to/?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Hill_3234)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_...e_of_Jalalabad (http://www.anonym.to/?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jalalabad#Battle_of_Jalalabad)

Furthermore, do you even know how much ammo a typical garrison/firebase expends? For an artillery battery, it's not uncommon to fire several thousand rounds in just a few hours of a battle. You are an idiot to think that you can depend on airlifts for every need, especially when the Mujahideen had access to anti-air weapons.

And FYI, HMGs brought down more choppers than the Stinger, because as everyone knows under 1000 feet the deadliest threat to aircraft is small arms. Ironic that you'd suggest helo transport as the solution to everything.


You do know this was NATO's plan for stopping the Soviets from invading Norway? Not the avalanche part but relying on mountain garrisons that would be resupplied by helicopters.And you're trusting NATO? Their entire understanding of defense was fucked from the beginning, since they only started to move into an understanding of operational maneuver warfare in the 80s, some half century after the Soviets made the transition.

Those mountain garrisons would have been bypassed and mopped up with thermobaric strikes. The standard Soviet doctrine called for bypassing centers of resistance, which meant that after wiping out a few of those garrisons, the rest of the army could pour through and the remaining defenders could be left to starve in the snow. The only sure way to counter maneuver is with maneuver.

[Psy]

Yeah, and while you pull the divisions and air lift from Europe and gut that sector's defenses, NATO is going to walk all over you. Give me a break.

Well if the Afghanistan Army was able to pull it weight the USSR could have been used their numbers but the Afghanistan Army was not reliable so the USSR could not depend on them and the USSR was totally unable to form local militias in the urban centers to free up troops from policing the cities.

If the USSR could pull manpower from Afghanistan for their operations in Afghanistan they would have had much more to work with. Yet they totally failed on gathering support and even failed on maintaing the support they started with.



Furthermore, do you even know how much ammo a typical garrison/firebase expends? For an artillery battery, it's not uncommon to fire several thousand rounds in just a few hours of a battle.

Don't have to be in the fire base cutting off the Mujahideen supply line or even on the same mountain (within the mountain range), they could be along roads that can't be used for Mujahideen supply lines. Remeber a sniper can shoot from about a KM away (SVD sniping rifle of the USSR has a maximum effective range of 1,300 meters) heavy machine guns like the KPV a bit over a KM as are many cannons and artillery can fire from 5KM to 40KM away.



You are an idiot to think that you can depend on airlifts for every need, especially when the Mujahideen had access to anti-air weapons.

Anti-air weapons sucks up ammo very quickly, without a supply line they would run out of anti-air ability very quickly. The Mujahideen also didn't have access to anti-air weapons early on.



And FYI, HMGs brought down more choppers than the Stinger, because as everyone knows under 1000 feet the deadliest threat to aircraft is small arms. Ironic that you'd suggest helo transport as the solution to everything.

Hinds are armored so small arms are only a minor threat. Yet even the idea Hip (Mi-8) would be endangered would mean the garrison would have failed to secure the area around the garrison.




And you're trusting NATO? Their entire understanding of defense was fucked from the beginning, since they only started to move into an understanding of operational maneuver warfare in the 80s, some half century after the Soviets made the transition.

Those mountain garrisons would have been bypassed and mopped up with thermobaric strikes. The standard Soviet doctrine called for bypassing centers of resistance, which meant that after wiping out a few of those garrisons, the rest of the army could pour through and the remaining defenders could be left to starve in the snow.
That garrisons defended the passes going around would mean going off the mountain sides and during war games were well hidden in the forests through the passes. NATO with the war games though a Soviet invasion of Norway would go as well as the Soviet invasion of Finland.

[khad]

Well if the Afghanistan Army was able to pull it weight the USSR could have been used their numbers but the Afghanistan Army was not reliable so the USSR could not depend on them and the USSR was totally unable to form local militias in the urban centers to free up troops from policing the cities.

If the USSR could pull manpower from Afghanistan for their operations in Afghanistan they would have had much more to work with. Yet they totally failed on gathering support and even failed on maintaing the support they started with.
And at the Battle of Jalalabad the Afghan forces routed a united front of mujahideen and pushed them all the way back to the border. The Jalalabad militia provided crucial support in the defense of the city. When the USSR withdrew, the Afghan army was perfectly capable of fighting, and your capitalist lies will do nothing to change that fact. The collapse came with the denial of food and fuel by Gorbachev which crippled the Afghan population followed by Yeltsin's open negotiations with the mujahideen.

I'm detecting a deeply chauvinistic attitude on your part. It's a sure sign of arrogance that someone of your position and ignorance makes himself out to know better than the top military planners in the combloc, who had to balance all manner of defense requirements and could only work within the constraints of what could be spared.

Don't have to be in the fire base cutting off the Mujahideen supply line or even on the same mountain (within the mountain range), they could be along roads that can't be used for Mujahideen supply lines. Remeber a sniper can shoot from about a KM away (SVD sniping rifle of the USSR has a maximum effective range of 1,300 meters) heavy machine guns like the KPV a bit over a KM as are many cannons and artillery can fire from 5KM to 40KM away.Do you know how many misses you would get at that distance before you hit anything with a rifle? You've probably never fired a weapon or seen a weapon being fired in your life. KPVs can extend the range, but the Mujahideen had them too, as well as 12.7s, which they used to bombard low flying helicopters with deadly effect.


Anti-air weapons sucks up ammo very quickly, without a supply line they would run out of anti-air ability very quickly. The Mujahideen also didn't have access to anti-air weapons early on. I'm sure that the rebel supply lines would be a lot more reliable than your little mountain garrison that walled itself off with rockslides.


Hinds are armored so small arms are only a minor threat. Yet even the idea Hip (Mi-8) would be endangered would mean the garrison would have failed to secure the area around the garrison. Bullshit. Not every part of the Hind was armored, and the rear compartment was frequently penetrated, killing and damaging troops and supplies contained within. Also the engine exhaust port was a weak spot.

You don't know shit about shit, and you've been told this many times by a number of people. Yet you continue to offer your cockamamie, suicidal military advice. I think I could trust the Soviet and Afghan military to understand the realities of the war a lot better than some kid who doesn't even know the armor layout of an Mi-24 or understand how hard it is to foot slog through hilly terrain. You think it's so fucking easy.


That garrisons defended the passes going around would mean going off the mountain sides and during war games were well hidden in the forests through the passes. NATO with the war games though a Soviet invasion of Norway would go as well as the Soviet invasion of Finland.And in simulations American fighters achieve perfect kill ratios against every other country. I prefer to look at what really happened. Which is this:

The Soviet invasion of Finland went fairly well the second time, when STAVKA was prepared. They obliterated the Finnish front lines, and went deep enough before meeting stiffening resistance that they got Finland to sue for peace. Bear that in mind. They saw the writing on the wall, and they were only prolonging the inevitable, so they quit while they could retain any degree of autonomy. Your mighty Scandinavians were defeated by what you must consider Slavic Asiatic hordes.

[Psy]

Dude, do you happen to be a staff level officer in the US army? This is some of the most assinine shit I have ever fucking heard.

Let me just get this straight, you want groups of soldiers (how big? comapny size?)

Well about the size NATO planned to stop Russia invading Finland so the entire Finland Army plus if I remember correctly another division as NATO was going to airlift their emergency response division to Finland in the event of a USSR invasion of Finland to hold out for I think was a few weeks for a free Army group from reserves in Canada to reinforce them if not indefinitely if those reserves were needed in Europe instead. .



to trap themselves on moutain tops/passes? What if it starts raining?

They build a camp, you block paths you are going to need combat engineers.



What if the enemy secure anti-air assets?

They would have to get close enough to use them, anti-personal mines all around the garrison would protect against that.



What about enemy artillery? Sure, the mujahideen are pretty poor with mortars, but if you give them a target smack on top of a terain feature, they can eventually dial that in.

They would also be giving away their position to Soviet cannons, snipers, gunships, machine guns and artillery. Thus for what every injuries their mortar attack does they would be wiped off the mountain by support fire bases they can afford to waste ammo being on Soviet supply line.



I just, honestly, can't comprehend what you're saying. You think 100 men should isolate themselves somewhere and just trust that fixed wing aircraft and helicopters will be able to keep showing up? Fuck man, jesus, fuck.
How long do you think the Mujahideen could have lasted with no supplies on the mountain, remember they also would be cut off from the vally they would be stuck on the mountain with no stockpile or helicopters re-supplying them, there is little water and food up in the Afganistan mountains, how much fight do you think a Mujahideen fighter would have after just a week with no water? If the blockaid works in about two weeks they could pack up and abandoned their position as all the Mujahideen would either have surrendered or died of dehyradtion (or be so weak they'd soon be dead). That is it, the helicopters would just have to keep flying for about two weeks then if the Soviet block aid worked and the Mujahideen was unable to get water the USSR would have won.

[Psy]

And at the Battle of Jalalabad the Afghan forces routed a united front of mujahideen and pushed them all the way back to the border. The Jalalabad militia provided crucial support in the defense of the city. When the USSR withdrew, the Afghan army was perfectly capable of fighting, and your capitalist lies will do nothing to change that fact.

It was no National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, I mean come on even with the divisions between the USSR and Vietnam there was a fighting force in the Liberation Army of South Vietnam that was taking on the US military not just some CIA paramilitary group.

It is not like everyone in Afghanistan liked landed aristocracy the Mujahideen was mostly ran by yet the USSR messed up so badly they could not even create a revolutionary army to fight the Mujahideen for being a landed aristocracy that wanted them to remain peasants.



I'm detecting a deeply chauvinistic attitude on your part.
Do you know how many misses you would get at that distance before you hit anything with a rifle? You've probably never fired a weapon or seen a weapon being fired in your life.

I said a sniper as in a trained marksmen using a scope.




I'm sure that the rebel supply lines would be a lot more reliable than your little mountain garrison that walled itself off with rockslides.

How? Do you know how they would move through the mountain sides while lugging supplies, and I would think food and water would be much higher on their priority list while trapped on a mountain if they could get supplies up as while it is possible for a few people to survive off the land even on a mountain it is impossible for a whole army as there is just not enough animals to hunt.



Bullshit. Not every part of the Hind was armored, and the rear compartment was frequently penetrated, killing and damaging troops and supplies contained within. Also the engine exhaust port was a weak spot.

This again assumes the area is not secured when there is a garrison stationed there.

[khad]

It was no National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, I mean come on even with the divisions between the USSR and Vietnam there was a fighting force in the Liberation Army of South Vietnam that was taking on the US military not just some CIA paramilitary group.

It is not like everyone in Afghanistan liked landed aristocracy the Mujahideen was mostly ran by yet the USSR messed up so badly they could not even create a revolutionary army to fight the Mujahideen for being a landed aristocracy that wanted them to remain peasants.
Moot point. The USSR was building up the cities, and people were streaming in. Had the economy been built up further, the countryside would have become irrelevant.

Your example of the NLF is even more asinine. The Viet Cong were largely destroyed after Tet. It was combined mech-air power of the NVA that brought decisive victory for the North. All the VC were doing was a holding operation, soaking up massive losses in the process, while the NVA built up its strength and organizational sophistication. The final demonstration could not have been a more expertly executed operation of mass and maneuver.

Allow me to repeat, the VC didn't do shit to bring decisive victory. They didn't bring down the B-52s. They didn't collapse the the linchpins of the ARVN defenses, those mighty firebases, using superior M46 artillery. They didn't encircle and destroy an army that was on paper four times larger to collapse the Southern government. Only the mechanized firepower of the NVA could bring that about.

I said a sniper as in a trained marksmen using a scope.That standard scope is a 4x PSO, which was useful for its very wide FOV, lending itself to greater situational awareness. If you've ever looked through any 4x binocs, though, you'd know that it's not much magnification. You'd have to have the eyes of an eagle to target anything at 600m. The maximum effective range of the SVD given ~1MOA dispersion was about 800m, and this is pretty much what a sniper interviewed in Chechnya confirmed.


How? Do you know how they would move through the mountain sides while lugging supplies, and I would think food and water would be much higher on their priority list while trapped on a mountain if they could get supplies up as while it is possible for a few people to survive off the land even on a mountain it is impossible for a whole army as there is just not enough animals to hunt. This again assumes the area is not secured when there is a garrison stationed there.Are you a fucking moron? Do you even know how much a standard ruck weighs? And do you know how much water these guys have to carry on a combat patrol? At least 15-20lbs of what they carry is food and water. Drinking 10 liters per day on a heavy march is not uncommon.

And of course any forward base is not going to be secured. If all those coalition bases were so "secured," then they wouldn't get attacked by Taliban, then, would they? All it takes is one shot from a well-camouflaged MANPADS and it's all over.

[Psy]

Moot point. The USSR was building up the cities, and people were streaming in. Had the economy been built up further, the countryside would have become irrelevant.

The Vietnam economy was not being built up but the NLF was able to get the man power it needed.



Your example of the NLF is even more asinine. The Viet Cong were largely destroyed after Tet. It was combined mech-air power of the NVA that brought decisive victory for the North. All the VC were doing was a holding operation, soaking up massive losses in the process, while the NVA built up its strength and organizational sophistication. The final demonstration could not have been a more expertly executed operation of mass and maneuver.

The NLF put up much more of a fight then the Afghanistan Army.



That standard scope is a 4x PSO, which was useful for its very wide FOV, lending itself to greater situational awareness. If you've ever looked through any 4x binocs, though, you'd know that it's not much magnification. You'd have to have the eyes of an eagle to target anything at 600m.

Assuming we are talking standard scopes. I'm sure Spetsnaz could acquire scopes for shooting at such long ranges.




The maximum effective range of the SVD given ~1MOA dispersion was about 800m, and this is pretty much what a sniper interviewed in Chechnya confirmed.

That is about a KM (200 meters short), and you'd probably get closer to the 1,300 maximum effective range when firing at a target lower then you.



Are you a fucking moron? Do you even know how much a standard ruck weighs? And do you know how much water these guys have to carry on a combat patrol? At least 10-20lbs of what they carry is food and water.

Yhea and it would be the Mujahideen where this would be a problem as the garrison troops just need enough to hike and return to the garrison where they have stockpiles, the Mujahideen fighter cut off would have to hike long distances to get to food and water once their stockpiles got depleted and no helicopter was going to come and re-supply them. You have to think of the Mujahideen becoming hikers stuck on a mountain with no food or water where the garrision is stuck on the mountain with not only a stockpile of food and water but from time to time they get re-supplied.

[khad]

The Vietnam economy was not being built up but the NLF was able to get the man power it needed.


The NLF put up much more of a fight then the Afghanistan Army.
Hardly. The Afghan army fired more scuds than any national army in the history of the world, let alone a light infantry force like the NLF. In terms of pure firepower brought down, there is no comparison.



Assuming we are talking standard scopes. I'm sure Spetsnaz could acquire scopes for shooting at such long ranges. Spetsnaz aren't used for garrison duty, jackass. There was never a single Spetsnaz assigned to a Machine Gun Artillery (ie, border guard) regiment in the Soviet Union; it was simply not done. Those forward bases aren't going to be manned by them, and I doubt that even the Spetsnaz would use high powered scopes because Soviet military types typically preferred the greater situational awareness afforded by low power scopes.


That is about a KM (200 meters short), and you'd probably get closer to the 1,300 maximum effective range when firing at a target lower then you. You don't even know what MOA refers to, obviously. Even a customized Mosin Nagant, which is more accurate due to being bolt action, would have difficulty hitting half of its shots against an 18 inch target at 1km, which you can see from the video here. At those ranges, even fluctuations in the wind can seriously throw a bullet off.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2M1hC4c0tc

Seriously, shut up about things you know nothing about.


Yhea and it would be the Mujahideen where this would be a problem as the garrison troops just need enough to hike and return to the garrison where they have stockpiles, the Mujahideen fighter cut off would have to hike long distances to get to food and water once their stockpiles got depleted and no helicopter was going to come and re-supply them. You have to think of the Mujahideen becoming hikers stuck on a mountain with no food or water where the garrision is stuck on the mountain with not only a stockpile of food and water but from time to time they get re-supplied.Again you have no idea how fast stockpiles dwindle, especially for a garrison intentionally cut off from local sources of supply. The US army has already been running out of ammo on a tactical and strategic level, which has been embarrassingly documented a number of times, like this internal document which demonstrated that strategic stockpiles and production are insufficient for the current needs of the military.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil75.pdf

As for the Taliban, they don't need to run back for supplies. As in the case of most guerrilla armies, locals run supplies to them.

[Psy]

Hardly. The Afghan army fired more scuds than any national army in the history of the world. In terms of pure firepower brought down, there is no comparison.

They also had a high level of desertions and was unable to root defended insurgence even with USSR support. In contrast the NLF was gaining recruits faster then they could train and arm them with no significant desertions and was able was able to hold ground against superior forces for much longer then the Afghan army before being overwhelmed.



Spetsnaz aren't used for garrison duty,

Actually there are under the Ministry of Interior as counter-special forces units to garrisons within the USSR/Russia.



jackass. There was never a single Spetsnaz assigned to a Machine Gun Artillery (ie, border guard) regiment in the Soviet Union; it was simply not done.

Look at it this way, mountain garrison needs sniper that can navigate mountains terrain so why not assign it a Spetsnaz sniper with mountain training.



Those forward bases aren't going to be manned by them, and I doubt that even the Spetsnaz would use high powered scopes because Soviet military types typically preferred the greater situational awareness afforded by low power scopes.

We are talking about sniper around a KM away from the action. I doubt Spetsnaz snipers would care about situational awareness when sniper to another mountain on the range.



You don't even know what MOA refers to, obviously. Even a customized Mosin Nagant, which is more accurate due to being bolt action, would have difficulty hitting half of its shots against an 18 inch target at 1km, which you can see from the video here. At those ranges, even fluctuations in the wind can seriously throw a bullet off.

Minute of arc it is used to measure accuracy and bullet drop basically just how far the bullet is from target. And even that accuracy is good enough for support.



Again you have no idea how fast stockpiles dwindle,
especially for a garrison intentionally cut off from local sources of supply.

You have no idea how large garrison stockpiles can be. We are not talking about rucksacks worth of supplies truck loads of supplies in the initial stockpile. And for a two week operation (if the Mujahideen fail to get water) there might be no need for helicopter resupplying, as the garrison might be able to make it through with their initial stockpile.



The US army has already been running out of ammo on a tactical and strategic level, which has been embarrassingly documented a number of times, like this internal document which demonstrated that strategic stockpiles and production are insufficient for the current needs of the military.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil75.pdf

That is a much larger operation then seiging the Mujahideen.



As for the Taliban, they don't need to run back for supplies. As in the case of most guerrilla armies, locals run supplies to them.
What locals? The soviets cut off the mountains from the villages and the border, meaning locals can't get to the Mujahideen as the Mujahideen would be encircled on the mountains.

[khad]

They also had a high level of desertions and was unable to root defended insurgence even with USSR support. In contrast the NLF has gaining recruits faster then they can train and arm them with no significant desertions and was able was able to hold ground against superior forces for much longer then the Afghan army before being overwhelmed.
The NLF had shitloads of desertions too, dumbass. Not just desertions but 10,000 defectors alone in the first 4 months of 1967. As in any guerrilla force, those at the periphery of the movement could not be relied upon in a significant way. This helps explain why the VC never recovered from the Tet debacle, whereas Mao's troops bounced back stronger than ever after the Long March.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=950&dat=19670405&id=29kLAAAAIBAJ&sjid=LVcDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6084,703481

The NLF also ceased to be an effective fighting force after Tet. They were decimated and never recovered. By contrast, until Gorbachev cut off supplies, the Afghan army continued to grow stronger. By 1989 at Jalalabad, they were capable of completely decimating a united front of mujahideen largely without the help of the Soviet Army.

Actually there are under the Ministry of Interior as counter-special forces units to garrisons within the USSR/Russia.Dumbass, MVD isn't Army. They never entered Afghanistan, making your point again worthless.


Look at it this way, mountain garrison needs sniper that can navigate mountains terrain so why not assign it a Spetsnaz sniper with mountain training.No spec ops are dropped into infantry teams singly. They are deployed in units. In the case of spetsnaz, battalion size or larger.


We are talking about sniper around a KM away from the action. I doubt Spetsnaz snipers would care about situational awareness when sniper to another mountain on the range.

Minute of arc it is used to measure accuracy and bullet drop basically just how far the bullet is from target. And even that accuracy is good enough for support.These 30 cal bullets have a 30-40 foot drop at 1km. Even the most accurate rifle in the world will have difficulty shooting accurately due to fluctuations in the air at that range. And the SVD's middling 1MOA accuracy makes it largely ineffective past 800m. There, under ideal conditions, you could get your shots to land in an 8 inch circle, but given wind, combat conditions, moving targets, etc, making a shot at that range is a challenge.


You have no idea how large garrison stockpiles can be. We are not talking about rucksacks worth of supplies truck loads of supplies in the initial stockpile. And for a two week operation (if the Mujahideen fail to get water) there might be no need for helicopter resupplying, as the garrison might be able to make it through with their initial stockpile. One artillery battery will chew through several thousand shells in just a few hours. Without daily resupply, stockpiles vanish in a flash. Khe Sahn base required 180 tons of resupply per day during the siege.


That is a much larger operation then seiging the Mujahideen.

What locals? The soviets cut off the mountains from the villages and the border, meaning locals can't get to the Mujahideen as the Mujahideen would be encircled on the mountains.You would literally need millions of men to completely seal the border. Again with your useless military advice that has the feasibility rating of about zero.

[The Douche]

Well about the size NATO planned to stop Russia invading Finland so the entire Finland Army plus if I remember correctly another division as NATO was going to airlift their emergency response division to Finland in the event of a USSR invasion of Finland to hold out for I think was a few weeks for a free Army group from reserves in Canada to reinforce them if not indefinitely if those reserves were needed in Europe instead. .


How big of an element are you saying needs to operate in each of these missions? Are you saying we deliver a whole division onto a mountain? My impression was that you wanted to see isolated FOBs on major terrain features isolated by man made rockslides. Now it sounds like you want to deploy tens of thousands of troops to every mountain top and pass in afghanistan.


They build a camp, you block paths you are going to need combat engineers.

Inclement weather prevents effective air support, or even air support at all.


They would have to get close enough to use them, anti-personal mines all around the garrison would protect against that.


Those air assets can be attacked anywhere along the route to the garrison.


They would also be giving away their position to Soviet cannons, snipers, gunships, machine guns and artillery. Thus for what every injuries their mortar attack does they would be wiped off the mountain by support fire bases they can afford to waste ammo being on Soviet supply line.


So each of these garrisons needs an gun line, counter artillery radar, and some of their own air assets? Again, how big are these garrisons supposed to be in your mind? And how many of them are supposed to be deployed?


How long do you think the Mujahideen could have lasted with no supplies on the mountain, remember they also would be cut off from the vally they would be stuck on the mountain with no stockpile or helicopters re-supplying them, there is little water and food up in the Afganistan mountains, how much fight do you think a Mujahideen fighter would have after just a week with no water? If the blockaid works in about two weeks they could pack up and abandoned their position as all the Mujahideen would either have surrendered or died of dehyradtion (or be so weak they'd soon be dead). That is it, the helicopters would just have to keep flying for about two weeks then if the Soviet block aid worked and the Mujahideen was unable to get water the USSR would have won.

First of all, I have friends who have been on the afghan army transition teams, ANA soldiers will head out for a three or four day mission with nothing but a rifle, a few magazines, one bottle of water, and a blanket. They can adapt to that situation a lot better than soldiers from outside the area. Second of all, your whole plan is based on having perfect intelligence, and based on the laughable assumption that you know the terrain better than the muj, and that the local population does not support the muj.

[Psy]

How big of an element are you saying needs to operate in each of these missions? Are you saying we deliver a whole division onto a mountain? My impression was that you wanted to see isolated FOBs on major terrain features isolated by man made rockslides. Now it sounds like you want to deploy tens of thousands of troops to every mountain top and pass in afghanistan.

A whole division on a mountain range along a possible foreign supply line meaning mountain paths running to Pakistan and Iran (more so for Pakistan), garrisons in villages would be better to cut the Mujaheddin from local supplies (and I doubt the Mujaheddin could be supplied from the USSR). The Mujaheddin in mountain rangers farther in you simply ignore as it would be a siege warfare with the goal of starving the Mujaheddin out of the mountains, to surrendering or to death.



Inclement weather prevents effective air support, or even air support at all.

Right but odds are you not going to get long spells of weather bad enough for to ground air support and since we are talking garrisons we are talking stockpiles.



Those air assets can be attacked anywhere along the route to the garrison.

Yet the anti-air came from the CIA meaning coming in from Pakistan, thus air assets coming farther North to the Pakistan border should encounter little anti-air capabilities if the block aid is working and with USSR troops operating close to the Pakistan border it would make the Pakistan far more nervous about working with the CIA to arm Mujaheddin with USSR garrisons all long their border and the USSR flying sorties all along their borders.




So each of these garrisons needs an gun line, counter artillery radar, and some of their own air assets? Again, how big are these garrisons supposed to be in your mind? And how many of them are supposed to be deployed?

The ones farther back by road or narrow gauge (narrow gauge can be quickly built and easier for mountains then standard gauges), narrow gauge has the advantage of it harder for the enemy to use then roads especially if a incline railway with up to steep grade (the steepest grade on a incline railway is 74% but theoretically you have even steeper grades), I doubt Mujaheddin would climb down the tracks of incline railway especially since if the two sets of cars move they could get stuck and run over. Since long range artillery can fire some 30 KMs back (if not more) they would not be a problem and politically you'd want them farther back to as long as Pakistan does what the USSR wants and move them forward to pressure Pakistan.

Helicopters would be reserved for remote garrisons near the border that would have some protection from flying so close to the Pakistan border do to Pakistan not wanting the international incident of a USSR helicopter crash landing into their territories and hopefully the Mujaheddin would not want to be seen by Pakistan forces watching the USSR operations (lets face it Pakistan would send their forces to observe the USSR operate near their borders).

Also Pakistan would rather have helicopters supply these garrisons rather then the USSR build incline railways as incline railways would make the garrisons more permanent so it would be possible for the USSR to get Pakistan to agree for USSR supply helicopters to fly out of Pakistan in agreement the USSR won't build incline railways for those garrisons along their border and those garrisons will be destroyed after a set date. Yes the US would object but Pakistan would fear permanent fire (even if the USSR pulls out) bases along their border more then pissing of the USA.




First of all, I have friends who have been on the afghan army transition teams, ANA soldiers will head out for a three or four day mission with nothing but a rifle, a few magazines, one bottle of water, and a blanket. They can adapt to that situation a lot better than soldiers from outside the area.
Second of all, your whole plan is based on having perfect intelligence, and based on the laughable assumption that you know the terrain better than the muj, and that the local population does not support the muj.

The idea is that the Afganistan Army would help the USSR Army in that regard and would not have to be perfect knowledge. It is based on the fact that supply lines move very slowy through mountain slopes, yes pack mules can climb the side of mountains but it would take much more time causing a bottleneck on the Mujaheddin supply lines from Pakistan if it can continue at all. With garrisons having the villages near that have access to the mountains passes locked down it would the fact the Mujaheddin would become trapped in the mountains with very little sources to replenish their supplies.

[Psy]

The NLF had shitloads of desertions too, dumbass. Not just desertions but 10,000 defectors alone in the first 4 months of 1967. As in any guerrilla force, those at the periphery of the movement could not be relied upon in a significant way. This helps explain why the VC never recovered from the Tet debacle, whereas Mao's troops bounced back stronger than ever after the Long March.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=950&dat=19670405&id=29kLAAAAIBAJ&sjid=LVcDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6084,703481

Are we to believe US numbers when it is well known they labeled everyone in uncontrolled territory a VC?



The NLF also ceased to be an effective fighting force after Tet. They were decimated and never recovered. By contrast, until Gorbachev cut off supplies, the Afghan army continued to grow stronger. By 1989 at Jalalabad, they were capable of completely decimating a united front of mujahideen largely without the help of the Soviet Army.

Jalalabad only continued the stalemate, and Tet showed that the NLF had large support. Lets not forget the Afganistan Army failed in Arghandab District that is rivers,orchards and towns. Lets face it the Afghanistan Army was nowhere near as popular as the NLF.



Dumbass, MVD isn't Army. They never entered Afghanistan, making your point again worthless.

True but it is not impossible to use interior units




No spec ops are dropped into infantry teams singly. They are deployed in units. In the case of spetsnaz, battalion size or larger.

First time for everything.




These 30 cal bullets have a 30-40 foot drop at 1km. Even the most accurate rifle in the world will have difficulty shooting accurately due to fluctuations in the air at that range. And the SVD's middling 1MOA accuracy makes it largely ineffective past 800m. There, under ideal conditions, you could get your shots to land in an 8 inch circle, but given wind, combat conditions, moving targets, etc, making a shot at that range is a challenge.

True but still possible in a pinch thus meaning 1KM would be about the limited range with 1,300M the absolute range if the snipers are just firing wildly in the general area.



One artillery battery will chew through several thousand shells in just a few hours. Without daily resupply, stockpiles vanish in a flash. Khe Sahn base required 180 tons of resupply per day during the siege.

That is if artillery battiers are off supply lines.



You would literally need millions of men to completely seal the border. Again with your useless military advice that has the feasibility rating of about zero.

Not really on mountains the field of fire is massive espically if you focus on mountain passes as lugging supplies on mountain sides would be highly ineffective.