Study 4GW

[Dermezel]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare



Fourth Generation Warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements:


Are complex and long term.
Terrorism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism).
A non-national or transnational base, highly decentralized.
A direct attack on the enemy's culture.
Highly sophisticated psychological warfare (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_warfare), especially through media manipulation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_manipulation) and lawfare (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawfare).
All available pressures are used - political, economic, social and military.
Occurs in low intensity conflict (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_intensity_conflict), involving actors from all networks.
Non-combatants are tactical dilemmas.



Fourth generation warfare goals:[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare#cite_note-0)


Survival
To convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare#cite_note-1)




Understanding Fourth Generation War by William S. Lind (http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702)
4GW -- Fourth generation warfare (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html)
The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation (http://web.archive.org/web/20080418065855/http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm) at the Internet Archive (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Archive)
Pre-Modern War compared to Fourth Generation War (http://tdaxp.blogspirit.com/archive/2005/05/09/fourth_generation_war_is_not_pre-modern_war.html)
Fourth Generation Politics compared to Fourth Generation War (http://tdaxp.blogspirit.com/archive/2005/04/21/the_fourth_generation_of_modern_peace_nonviolent_i deoogical.html)
Hezbollah Ushers in New Generation of Warfare (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/08/06/MNG43KC7791.DTL)
FMFM 1A, Fourth Generation Warfare Rev 3 (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/fmfm_1a_r3.pdf)
The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm)
Fourth Generation Warfare (http://knol.google.com/k/jahangir-vahid/fourth-generation-warfare/12lkc2gtf2u7n/4#)

A good place to start from a leftist perspective is Mao's Zedong "On Guerrilla Warfare":

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/

Couple that with Net tactics.

[khad]

With regards to fourth generational warfare, this is a concept originally pushed by that paleoconservative-political-scientist-playing-at-military-analyst William S. Lind. Be aware that it's a concept pushed onto insurgencies from the perspective of the forces which suppress them. Thus, when they state that Fourth Generational warfare goals are:


Survival
To convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit[2 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare#cite_note-1)

What they really mean is that the survival of an insurgency results in a political embarrassment for the forces deployed against it. It does not necessarily mean that the insurgency can win. All that shows is a stalemate.

If you want to go to Mao, he had a realistic view of what guerrilla forces can and can't do. Guerrilla actions are but one part of a broader military strategy, since guerrillas cannot take and hold ground. They are, however, good at keeping the enemy off balance and stalling for time.


A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated this way: 'Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favourable decision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their proper combinations.'

[Dermezel]

With regards to fourth generational warfare, this is a concept originally pushed by that paleoconservative-political-scientist-playing-at-military-analyst William S. Lind. Be aware that it's a concept pushed onto insurgencies from the perspective of the forces which suppress them. Thus, when they state that Fourth Generational warfare goals are:


Survival
To convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit[2 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare#cite_note-1)

What they really mean is that the survival of an insurgency results in a political embarrassment for the forces deployed against it. It does not necessarily mean that the insurgency can win. All that shows is a stalemate.

If you want to go to Mao, he had a realistic view of what guerrilla forces can and can't do. Guerrilla actions are but one part of a broader military strategy, since guerrillas cannot take and hold ground. They are, however, good at keeping the enemy off balance and stalling for time.

Okay, most generals and experts on military matters in the US tend to be right-wing and conservative. So, you would expect the latest, cutting edge theories in military strategy to come from those groups.

Secondly, these authors don't just advocate insurgents utilize 4GW but put their own theories into practice against insurgencies. See the Utility of Force (http://www.amazon.com/Utility-Force-Art-Modern-World/dp/0307265625) where the author notes how his use of 4GW psychological warfare tactics proved extremely effective against the Serbian army.

Also I'm not arguing that guerrilla forces are invincible or can 100% replace conventional armies, but most military experts agree with the 4GW paradigm.

[khad]

Okay, most generals and experts on military matters in the US tend to be right-wing and conservative. So, you would expect the latest, cutting edge theories in military strategy to come from those groups.
Lind is not a military specialist; he's a political analyst with a simplistic historical periodization of military doctrine. Like John Mearsheimer but perhaps not as stupid and plagiaristic.

Furthermore, I could care less about a military establishment that lagged 40 years behind the USSR and at least 10-15 behind Western Europe during the Cold War in terms of doctrinal innovation and theory.


Secondly, these authors don't just advocate insurgents utilize 4GW but put their own theories into practice against insurgencies. See the Utility of Force (http://www.amazon.com/Utility-Force-Art-Modern-World/dp/0307265625) where the author notes how his use of 4GW psychological warfare tactics proved extremely effective against the Serbian army. Also I'm not arguing that guerrilla forces are invincible or can 100% replace conventional armies, but most military experts agree with the 4GW paradigm.What did I just write? Here, I'll repost it for you. It really annoys me when people don't bother to read at all.

"Be aware that it's a concept pushed onto insurgencies from the perspective of the forces which suppress them. "

There are also different objectives heree. The 4GW paradigm is only at work because everything is conceptualized from the perspective of the state in terms of limited police actions, where the battlefield is no longer operational but almost entirely tactical. It offers no real insight into how armed movements can seize power.

You cited Mao, and I gave you an answer, from Mao.

There is far more to learn from the Serbian Army with its partisan legacy than from the imperialists who tried to suppress them. The Serbian Army almost completely negated NATO's air advantage through disciplined maskirovka and forced it to commit terror against civilian targets.

[Dermezel]

Lind is not a military specialist; he's a political analyst with a simplistic historical periodization of military doctrine. Like John Mearsheimer but perhaps not as stupid and plagiaristic.

Furthermore, I could care less about a military establishment that lagged 40 years behind the USSR and at least 10-15 behind Western Europe during the Cold War in terms of doctrinal innovation and theory.

What did I just write? Here, I'll repost it for you. It really annoys me when people don't bother to read at all.

"Be aware that it's a concept pushed onto insurgencies from the perspective of the forces which suppress them. "

There are also different objectives heree. The 4GW paradigm is only at work because everything is conceptualized from the perspective of the state in terms of limited police actions, where the battlefield is no longer operational but almost entirely tactical. It offers no real insight into how armed movements can seize power.

You cited Mao, and I gave you an answer, from Mao.

There is far more to learn from the Serbian Army with its partisan legacy than from the imperialists who tried to suppress them. The Serbian Army almost completely negated NATO's air advantage through disciplined maskirovka and forced it to commit terror against civilian targets.

The thing is 4GW works. The Maoists, Vietnamese, and Iraqi insurgency have used it to great effect. Most military experts now at days accept the paradigm.

[khad]

The thing is 4GW works. The Maoists, Vietnamese, and Iraqi insurgency have used it to great effect. Most military experts now at days accept the paradigm.
Mao never considered his warfare 4th generation, which is if anything a western idea of counterinsurgency. In fact he considered guerrilla war as supplementing conventional operations, just as the Soviet Army did in WW2. Mao's PLA received a huge boost by inheriting virtually the entire armory of the Kwantung army, as well as thousands of Japanese volunteers who served as artillerymen and mechanics.

Also, the Viet Cong were practically destroyed after Tet, and they never recovered. It was up to the NVA with its mobility and mechanized firepower to crush the South Vietnamese. Those firebases would not have been smashed if it weren't for the superior 130mm artillery of the NVA, which decisively outgunned the ARVN. Guerrillas can stall for time, but the final decision in a real war has to come through conventional operations. This is borne out in history again and again.

As I said before, 4th generation warfare is a paradigm pushed by those who practice counterinsurgency, where a loss is counted if the guerrillas manage to stalemate. However, a stalemate for an insurgent force is not a win either. It should be recognized for what it is--a stalling measure.

Furthermore, there is far more to learn from theories of maskirovka and from the Yugoslav partisans than from Western powerpoint jockeys who haven't done shit but lag behind the rest of the world in military thought.

And on that note, thread closed. All you're doing is parroting capitalist propaganda.