Dialectics

[Luisrah]

What the heck are they? :confused:

[red cat]

Another one-liner annoying reply coming up soon; watch. :lol:

[the last donut of the night]

in before rosa

[which doctor]

They are very important.

ps. if you want to learn what they are, ignore what Rosa says

[The Vegan Marxist]

^ I agree!

[Nwoye]

they're really not important, but you should still ignore what rosa says.

[red cat]

About both; philosophy and mathematics.

[manic expression]

Here's how I'd explain it (or my simplistic understanding of it, anyway): the dialectic is two opposing forces, which then create a higher synthesis, which then leads to a new dialectic. It's how Hegel described the process of progress through history. Marx took that concept and applied it to material production instead of the mystical "consciousness" that Hegel saw as the basis of history.

[Red Commissar]

I am going to simplify this immensely, so there might be more to say but I think it's enough to get an idea of it.

Dialectics in the broader sense refers to a style of reasoning and debate, where you build up an argument using rational discussion to arrive at a truth. The ancient Greeks, such as Plato, put dialectics at the highest realm of knowledge. One component of dialectic is the concept of opposition, as an argument will have a corresponding counter-argument. Essentially this can be applied into saying that everything has a given opposite. Additionally it also holds that eventually one "force" will over come the other.

Marx's concept of dialectics takes roots from Hegel's dialectics, which at its simplest form is the process of a thesis and anti-thesis combining to form a new thesis. Marx uses this concept to make a philosophical foundation in his views about class conflict and struggle, which form into Marxism. Marx believed his dialectics was more founded in reality rather than idealism and "utopian" concepts of Hegel. You can see one element of this concept of dialectics in Marx's class struggle, the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie, two opposing forces, which will cause the eventual creation of a communist society, a synthesis arising out of these two conflicting forces.

There is much more to it than that, and it's really more of a philosophical concept of Marxism. People have opinions on the nature of that and of dialectics in general, but don't trouble yourself with having to know them exactly and committing yourself to it. Marx mostly used it to give intellectual credibility to his ideals, and people still debate over their specifics.

[el_chavista]

It's Hegels contribution to logic or "science of thought" -like Aristotle's classic logic and Bool's "laws of thought-" with which he tried to explain the changing in general.
What I don't understand is why these logics may be sometimes incompatible among them? So, the modern mathematic logic statement "A can't be notA" is incompatible with the dialectics law of the "unity and conflict of opposites"

[black magick hustla]

its pretty silly. generally maoists and new left people who like adorno and shit ride that thing

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Luisrah:


What the heck are they?

I have summarised this theory in very basic terms (for absolute beginnners, in clear and down-to-earth language) here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm

I have also pointed out its amin weaknesses.

A longer and more detailed version of the same can be found here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/nti-dialectics-made-t103349/index.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Another one-liner annoying reply coming up soon; watch.

Still watching.

When are you posting it...?:confused:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Which Doctor:


ps. if you want to learn what they are, ignore what Rosa says

Please pay attention to Which Doctor...:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Manic Expression:


Here's how I'd explain it (or my simplistic understanding of it, anyway): the dialectic is two opposing forces, which then create a higher synthesis, which then leads to a new dialectic. It's how Hegel described the process of progress through history. Marx took that concept and applied it to material production instead of the mystical "consciousness" that Hegel saw as the basis of history.

This is in fact Kant and Fichte's dialectic, not Hegel's, and nor is it Marx's, etc.

On that, see here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=707195&postcount=7

Gramsci:


Marx's concept of dialectics takes roots from Hegel's dialectics, which at its simplest form is the process of a thesis and anti-thesis combining to form a new thesis. Marx uses this concept to make a philosophical foundation in his views about class conflict and struggle, which form into Marxism. Marx believed his dialectics was more founded in reality rather than idealism and "utopian" concepts of Hegel. You can see one element of this concept of dialectics in Marx's class struggle, the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie, two opposing forces, which will cause the eventual creation of a communist society, a synthesis arising out of these two conflicting forces.

There is much more to it than that, and it's really more of a philosophical concept of Marxism. People have opinions on the nature of that and of dialectics in general, but don't trouble yourself with having to know them exactly and committing yourself to it. Marx mostly used it to give intellectual credibility to his ideals, and people still debate over their specifics.

Same comment.

[cmdrdeathguts]

Dialectics, in a word, is movement. In a dialectical version of philosophy, a concept is not simply arrayed against other equivalent concepts, like different fruit in a bowl. It enters into a logical relationship with other concepts, whose content it implies. Bertrand Russell, no dialectician, summarised it by pointing out that the concept 'uncle' couldn't exist without the concept 'nephew' or 'niece', which in turn implied further possible permutations of kinship, ad infinitum. As a style of thought or logic, dialectics in itself implies no more than this.

For Marxism, the picture is less obvious. It is easy enough to demonstrate such developments in thought; Marxism has traditionally posited that this is true of society at large. there are any number of arguments for this; the historicist subordination of thought to the movement of historical epochs, for example, can simply 'work backwards' from thought which goes dialectically to a social reality of which that thought is only a mediated reflection. Or you can produce theory that has some explanatory or predictive power in real life, etc. A Marxist dialectic is, in any case, subordinated to Marxist political practice, which is the ultimately validating instance of any philosophy's usefulness.

It's important not to view the dialectic in narrowly 'Hegelian' terms; this has as much to do with Hegel, who is a rich and complex thinker of whom a great deal of interpretations are possible, as with Marx. It's my view that the mainstream of Hegelian Marxist scholarship doesn't do much justice to Hegel, let alone Marx. Hegel didn't invent it, either; certain pre-socratics, particularly Heraclitus, hold that honour.

[blake 3:17]

I love the following passage from Trotsky. A pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar...



I will here attempt to sketch the substance of the problem in a very concise form. The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A' is equal to 'A'. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality 'A' is not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens - they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar - a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true - all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself 'at any given moment.'

Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this 'axiom,' it does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist.

[black magick hustla]

I love the following passage from Trotsky. A pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar...

this is the silliest thing trotsky wrote.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

cmdrdeathguts:


For Marxism, the picture is less obvious. It is easy enough to demonstrate such developments in thought; Marxism has traditionally posited that this is true of society at large. there are any number of arguments for this; the historicist subordination of thought to the movement of historical epochs, for example, can simply 'work backwards' from thought which goes dialectically to a social reality of which that thought is only a mediated reflection. Or you can produce theory that has some explanatory or predictive power in real life, etc. A Marxist dialectic is, in any case, subordinated to Marxist political practice, which is the ultimately validating instance of any philosophy's usefulness.

But this is historical materialsm; dialectics merely obscures the clarity that the latter brings to Marxism.


It's important not to view the dialectic in narrowly 'Hegelian' terms; this has as much to do with Hegel, who is a rich and complex thinker of whom a great deal of interpretations are possible, as with Marx. It's my view that the mainstream of Hegelian Marxist scholarship doesn't do much justice to Hegel, let alone Marx. Hegel didn't invent it, either; certain pre-socratics, particularly Heraclitus, hold that honour.

Indeed, this theory was invented by mystics and by ruling-calss hacks. Small wonder then that Marx told us that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Blake 3:17:


I will here attempt to sketch the substance of the problem in a very concise form. The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A' is equal to 'A'. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality 'A' is not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens - they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar - a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true - all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself 'at any given moment.'

Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this 'axiom,' it does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist.

There are so many errors in this passage, it is not easy to know where to begin.

However, these should do for starters:

First, Aristotelian Logic is not based on the Law of Identity [LOI]; if anything, Aristotle criticises it.

Second, even if his logic were based on this 'law', the LOI does not preclude change, for if two objects /processes are identical, they will both change equally quickly. So, identity is no enemy of change.

Third, Trotsky confuses equality with identity. They aren't the same.

Some might argue that this is unfair since the principle of equality is in fact the same as the principle of identity, but if that is so, then, plainly, at least two items (namely these) obey the LOI, and Trotsky was wrong.

On the other hand, if they are not identical, then Trotsky attacked the wrong target!

It could be objected that these two principles are approximately identical, so much so that the difference between them can be ignored. However, as we will see, this is not even remotely correct; these two concepts/words are totally different.

But, even if it were the case that they were approximately identical, that would be no help, either. Unless we had a clear idea what would count as absolute identity between these two, we would be in no position to declare they are only approximately identical. An approximation only makes sense if we know with what it is that it approximates, and for us to know that, we would have to know how the LOI applies absolutely to these two, to be able to say why this is a mere approximation. [More on this below.]

It could be argued that the above is just an example of abstract identity, which dialecticians do not query, they merely wish to point out the limitations of LOI applied to concretely changing reality. But, the passages above are expressed in very material ink (or are represented by very material pixels), so they are not abstract. On the other hand, if they are still to be rejected as abstract then Trotsky's point about the letter "A"s he refers to cannot stand, for they are equally material.

Anyway, abstract identity is discussed below.

The Difference Between Equality and Identity

As noted above, identity and equality are relatively easy to distinguish (such that even the children of workers can tell them apart). For example, in elementary mathematics the equation 2x + 1 = 7 is true if and only if x = 3, but no one supposes that x is identical to 3, otherwise it could never equal any other number (as it does in, say, 3x – 2 = 19).



In contrast, the equivalence sign which appears in, say, 2sinxcosx (equiv) sin2x expresses identity, for this rule yields the true for all defined values of x.

Worse still: two or more identicals can be equal to, [I]and different from the same identical at the same time. For instance, even though 0 = 0, it is also true that 0 + 0 = 0, and 0 x 0 = 0 -- even though it is also true that neither 0 + 0 nor 0 x 0 are identical to 0.

In Modern Formal Logic [MFL] (i.e., outside of mathematics), the distinction between these two is even more pronounced. The "=" sign is used as a relational expression (and can be flanked only by names (or other singular terms)), whereas "(equiv)" is a truth-functional operator (and can be flanked only by propositions, and the like).

[Of course, these distinctions are not the same as those which feature in ordinary language (no irony intended), nor yet those found in traditional Philosophy -- more on this below.]

Furthermore, in ordinary language the difference between equality and identity is even clearer. So, we can say things like "The author of What is To Be Done? is identical with Lenin" (whereas, it would be decidedly odd to say "The author of What is To Be Done? is equal to Lenin"), just as we can say that "The number of authors of What is To Be Done? is equal to one" (but not, "The number of authors of What is To Be Done? is identical to one"). And, since counting objects is just as material a practice as weighing them, no dialectician can consistently take exception to these and other such awkward material examples of the difference between identity and equality, while accepting uncritically Trotsky's point about weighing bags of sugar.

Not only that, two things can be equal even while they fail to be identical, and vice versa. For example, two distinct comrades could be equal first in two separate lists and/or queues. Now, the material embodiment of such facts could alter either greatly or hardly at all without affecting their status; so, for example, the names of the said comrades could be written in neon signs that flashed on and off every second, and out of sequence -- or, one could do handstands while the other reads a book --, but they would still both be equal first, and non-identical for all that.

And some things can be equal and identical, or not, as the case may be. For example, the letter "T" can occur identically in first place in two different words (such as "Trotsky" and "teamster") even though neither letter nor word is equal or identical in size or shape. And, two letters, which are identically first in the alphabet (namely two "A"s) can be non-identically positioned in two unequal words (such as "target" and "Antarctic"). Indeed, careful optical examination will fail to show that those two "T"s were not identically-positioned at the front of the two quoted words (or that they are not equally first in each), or even that the two numerically different "A"s are not identically the opening letter of the alphabet. This sort of identity is clearly not sensitive to empirical test, eyeglass or no.

And we needn't concentrate on examples that some might still consider "abstract"; two physical ink marks on a page (two letter "A"'s, say) which are not identical in shape or size (i.e., "a" and "A") could be identically positioned between other non-identical letters. So, in "pat" and "PAT" each letter "A" is identically sandwiched between two other non-identical letters. Now the physical position of material ink marks on a page, or even that of these electronically produced pixels on your screen, is not abstract, it is eminently material --, so much so that one or both can be obliterated by the non-dialectical application either of Tippex or the delete key.

This non-dialectical deletion would not be removing an abstraction.

Finally, large or small differences in these letters, and any other incidental changes they undergo (that do not alter their position) will not affect the fact that they are identically positioned between two other letters.

Ordinary material language is in fact almost limitless in the capacity it allows its users to express sameness, equality, identity and difference if they refuse to be led astray by the obscure jargon employed by Idealist philosophers (like Hegel). It is a pity that Trotsky's otherwise brilliant mind failed to notice such familiar facts about the vernacular.

The triteness of some of the above examples should provide no reason for anyone to cavil; after all, Trotsky it was who advised his readers to consider bags of sugar and letter "A"s.

It could be objected that the above examples do not address the classical problem, which concerns the entire set of predicates "true of" an object, or indeed of some 'substance'. This is undeniable, but then DM-theorists do not consider "the classical problem" either (fixated as they are on "A = A"), and neither did Hegel. As soon as they do, I will address what they have to say.

Worse still, some things can change even while they stay the same. For example, it is easy to transform 1/√n into √n/n thus: 1/√n x √n/√n = √n/n. But, 1/√n does not even look like √n/n, although the two are identical: 1/√n (equiv) √n/n. So, here we have change with no change!

[Recall: the signs used here are eminently material. Note also that I am using the "(equiv)" sign mathematically here, not logically.]

Finally, someone might object that despite the above, all these examples are "abstract". But even if that were so, there would still be a clear difference between abstract identity and abstract equality, something Trotsky also failed to notice.

Trotsky Refutes Himself

Even if it had have been correctly worded and targeted, Trotsky's attack on the LOI would still backfire. This is because his argument depends on the LOI being true of instants in time so that he can criticise it when it is applied to bags of sugar. Hence, his criticism relies on, say, a bag of sugar being non-self-identical during the same moment in time. But, moments in time are just as capable of being measured as bags of sugar are. In that case, Trotsky cannot consistently use "same moment" while criticising "same weight"; both are legitimate examples of identity (as he interprets it). In that case, Trotsky needs the LOI to be true of instants in time so that he can criticise it as false when it is applied to bags of sugar!

Again, if time can be measured (just as sugar can be weighed), the above objection (of mine to Trotsky's 'analysis') cannot be neutralised by claiming that time and/or temporal moments are "abstractions". Weighing and timing are both material activities, and thus subject to the same constraints over variability.

But, even if they weren't, Trotsky cannot argue that a bag of sugar changes in the same instant, for there could be no such thing (if he were right, since nothing can be the same, according to him) -- unless the LOI can be applied validly to such instants (as abstractions). So, even if moments in time are abstractions, Trotsky would have to be able to refer to the same 'abstract moment'. But then, he has also referred to the same weight. If, therefore, the latter can never be ascertained in this world (if no two bags ever weigh the same), then no two moments can be the same either. And if that is so, then Trotsky cannot refer to the "same moment" during which weights may vary --, in which case, his criticism collapses.

Moreover, Trotsky (or one of his epigones) can't use the fall-back option that bags of sugar are the same, yet different (employing the "identity-in-difference" gambit) since Trotsky had already torpedoed that response way below the water-line, declaring that all things are never the same:


"Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is true (sic) -- all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves." [Emphasis added.]

Hence, if objects and processes are never the same, they cannot be "the same, yet different", they can only be "different, yet different". Of course, if it is true that they are "the same, yet different" then it cannot be true that they are never the same. Either way, Trotsky's criticism backfires.

'Abstract' And Approximate Identity

Again, some might complain that the above ignores the fact that dialecticians are not attacking the abstract version of the LOI, merely pointing out that when applied to changing reality, this Law is only approximately true.

However, dialecticians certainly have to use identically the same words/concepts as one another (or as they themselves do from day to day) if they want to make this point, and/or communicate with each other.

Consider just one example of the difficulties this now creates: any two dialecticians who fancy they have the same idea of "abstract identity" must either accept that a material version of the LOI (if it exists in their central nervous system somewhere, or written on the page, in one of Trotsky's essays, say) applies to their two distinct ideas of "abstract identity" (so that they can confirm they are talking about exactly the same thing), or they must concede that they are talking about two different things, and stop their blather.

[And any response from the dialectical-community to the effect that the above two both are and are not doing what is outlined above must suffer the same fate, for any dialectician who says this today must mean exactly the same as any other dialectician who says this today (or as he/she meant it yesterday), or admit they are not talking about the same thing, once more.]

Furthermore, the idea that ordinary identity (or even the misconstrued version of it that Trotsky used) only really approximates to abstract identity (so that no two concrete things in material reality are exactly the same, even if they are approximately (abstractly) identical, or that any one particular thing is only approximately (abstractly) self-identical), is equally misconceived.

We are surely no further forward unless we are told with what it is that our ordinary terms for identity are supposed to approximate, for if these terms do not approximate to anything specifiable, they must be empty notions.

In order to underline this point, consider an analogy: let us suppose that someone introduced a word into the language -- say "schmidentity" -- but could give no examples of anything in reality that could possibly exhibit "schmidentity". If we were then told that certain things were "approximately schmidentical" (or even "schmidentical only within certain limits") we would still have no clear idea of what this new word meant; if we do not know what "schmidentity" is, we certainly do not know what "approximate schmidentity" is. And calling this new 'concept' "abstract schmidentity", "absolute schmidentity", or even "relative schmidentity" would be equally useless.

In that case, when dialecticians presume to tell us that a word (or set of words) in ordinary material language connected with sameness and identity, which we all know how to use, does not mean what we usually take it to mean, then the onus is on them to tell us what they do mean by their new word (or set of words). Until they do, they might as well be talking about schmidentity.

And it is little point referring to Hegel's criticisms of the LOI; as I have demonstrated here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm), he badly misconstrued this 'law', compounding such folly with a series of crass errors over the nature of propositions.

Indeed, for all DM-fans know, they could very well be talking about schmidentity -- or, alternatively, about nothing whatsoever.

For example, how do they know that their notion of identity is not absolutely identical with schmidentity? Or, indeed with nothing? The fact that I have not defined "schmidentity" is no objection. They have yet to tell us what they mean by their use of words for identity. In fact, they mis-identify this word right from the start, and they copied this exact misidentification from Hegel!

In which case, they probably are talking about nothing.

On the other hand, if DM-apologists can say with what it is that our words for identity do in fact approximate, then they must have a clear idea of abstract identity which cannot itself be subject to Trotsky's criticisms, since their idea of abstract identity must be materially identical to abstract identity itself. On the other hand, if this idea is not identical to abstract identity (or to put this better, if they haven't got a clue what abstract identity is so they are in no position to say that their idea of approximate identity approximates to the right concept), then what they say about identity (ordinary or abstract) can be safely ignored, for it won't be about identity, but about something different.

Sugar-Coated Refutation

Furthermore, Trotsky's appeal to the hypothetical weighing of bags of sugar is no less misconceived. Since weighing devices are just as susceptible to change as are bags of sugar, Trotsky had no way of knowing whether the different weights he predicted were genuine effects (because only the weight of the sugar (etc.) had altered), or whether they are merely artefacts of changes in the machinery used, the result of a locally variable gravitational field, the changing eyesight of the experimenter, or, indeed, are a consequence a host of other factors.

In fact, this latest objection can only be neutralised if weighing machines, experimenters and the rest of the universe (other than bags of sugar) are all exempted from consideration as changeless beings. Only in such circumstances would it be safe to assume that differing measurements were solely the result of changes in the items being weighed. Short of that, Trotsky could only be 100% confident that subsequently detected differences were always and only the result of changes to the weight of the sugar because of an a priori stipulation to that effect. In that case, Trotsky would have imposed dialectics on nature, contrary to what he elsewhere said should never be done:


"Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), [I]Problems Of Everyday Life, p.233.]

On the other hand, if Trotsky had been faced with someone who claimed that at least two of their results were identical, he could only have responded in one or more of the following ways:

(1) Insisting that this experimenter must have been mistaken.

(2) Pointing out that the machines used were not accurate enough.

(3) Maintaining that his instructions had not been carried out exactly to the letter.

(4) Arguing that identically the same experiments had not been performed each time.

In other words, in the absence of a mistake (and if the same results were recorded on more accurate scales) -- i.e., ruling out (1) and (2) above --, Trotsky would only be able to criticise the above reported experimental verification of the LOI by an appeal to that very same 'law', but now applied to his own instructions!

Hence, in order to counter results that would disconfirm his forecast (about varying weights) he would have to argue that only those who followed his instructions identically and to the letter could disprove the LOI!

The irony is thus quite plain: identically performed experiments are required to prove that nothing is identical with anything else -- including experiments!

To be sure, anyone who only roughly followed his instructions (who was perhaps content with a wishy-washy, "approximate-within-certain-limits" dialectical-sort-of-equality) would probably find that many (if not most) of their measurements gave identical results for the weights of bags of sugar, confirming this 'law'!

In which case, Trotsky's predictions about such objects would end up being refuted by anyone who adopted this diluted/'dialectical' version of the LOI!

Such experimenters would thus succeed in confirming the absolute version of the 'law' by adopting a weaker variant of it!

Conversely, the more exactly the experimenters adhered to Trotsky's instructions, the more likely it would be that they detected non-identical weights. In that case, they would succeed in disconfirming the absolute version of this 'law' by applying an exact copy of Trotsky's instructions!

So, by reverse irony, they would refute Trotsky in practice by doing exactly as he instructed, using the LOI applied to instructions to disconfirm it as applied to bags of sugar!

Some might think all this irrelevant; if things change, who cares what causes it? But, Trotsky is here appealing to the results of an experiment -- one that he clearly did not carry out -- to substantiate a claim about all objects everywhere in the universe. It now turns out that because of that thesis itself, it might not be possible to verify some of his claims. If so, we are still owed an explanation as to why Trotsky thought it correct to say everything changes all the time, when this cannot be confirmed. And this is not just because many of the above complications could cancel each other out or mask a temporary lack of change in other things, it is because we do not have access to most regions of space and time!

Relying on evidence alone, therefore, Trotsky was certainly not justified in projecting his conclusions as far as he thought he could --, i.e., across the entire universe, and for all of time; not least because he evidently performed no experiments himself.

These arguments are worked out in considerable detail here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2006.htm

[Wobblie]

Here (http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/books/dd.php) is what I understand to be a good introduction of Marx's dialectical method.

[Luisrah]

Thanks for all the replies :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Wobblie: Ollman's version of the 'dialectic' makes all the usual mistakes, and he adds a few more of his own for good measure. I have exposed some of them here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_02.htm

Use the 'Quick Links' at the top to jump to section 5iii) Ollman's Traditionalism.

[blake 3:17]

Dear Rosa, you do seem on the slope to solipsism. A relatively pragmatic embrace of the dialectical method seems a lot more sensible. Maybe you're correct.

There's also the whole hoohaw on Dialectics of Nature -- I'm very sympathetic to Lukacs and Benjamin on many issues. My own concerns are primarily ethical and aesthetic as opposed to logic/math or natural science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Blake 3:17:


Dear Rosa, you do seem on the slope to solipsism.

How do you figure that out?


A relatively pragmatic embrace of the dialectical method seems a lot more sensible. Maybe you're correct.

But, this 'method' makes not one once of sense -- so no wonder it has presided over 150 years of almost total failure.

[blake 3:17]

Perhaps I'm confusing the over technical with solipsism. When I took Wittgenstein with Ian Hacking he admitted to living several decades as a solipsist. Maybe LW cured him of it. I'm unconvinced.


Dear Rosa, you do seem on the slope to solipsism.

I don't see what any of your stuff has to do with any actual praxis. Bits of what you've written seem fairly OK but where does it lead?

I will admit to being vice ridden and neurotic -- I do get shit done. I know many people more correct than I who don't get anything done, and I know many people who are more wrong and intellectually effed up who get a lot done.

I've been revisiting some polemics between founders of Western Marxism and it is clear they disagree. Adorno took Benjamin to task on Baudelaire, claiming that Benjamin's approach was a mixture of "magic and positivism" and was undialectical. On this issue I'll side with magic and positivism.

I have looked at your site and find it very confusing. I'm unconvinced by Analytic Marxism, which doesn't mean I'm convinced by any non- or anti- Analytic Marxism.

I've been making attempts at Being and Nothingness and find myself wondering why someone as intelligent as Sartre would write such a thing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Blake:


When I took Wittgenstein with Ian Hacking he admitted to living several decades as a solipsist. Maybe LW cured him of it. I'm unconvinced.

In fact, Hacking gets Wittgenstein wrong; what the latter maintained was that, when a solipsist works out his/her theory in detail, it collapses into realism.

In several threads here I have tried to show how this is so.


I don't see what any of your stuff has to do with any actual praxis. Bits of what you've written seem fairly OK but where does it lead?

Hopefully to a far less unsuccessful Marxist movement. Here is how I answered a somewhat similar question a few years ago ('Why is Dialectics Bad?):


There are several reasons:

(1) It is easy to show it makes no sense, and so cannot be used to change the world (but it does confuse comrades).

(2) It has undeniable roots in ruling-class thought, and thus represents a non-working class view of the world (hence its other faults; see below).

(3) Because it makes a virtue out of 'contradiction', it can be, and has been used to defend all manner or counter-revolutionary and anti-Marxist political doctrines, and their opposites, sometimes 24 hours later.

(4) It insulates militant minds from the facts (thus preventing the scientific development of Marxism). For example, because it teaches that surface 'appearances' 'contradict' underlying reality, it prevents dialectically-distracted comrades from acknowledging the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism. In many cases, because it encourages comrades to see failure as its opposite, its 'contradictory', 'success' (or 'success' about to happen any day soon), they refuse to admit (they won't even countenance the possibility) that their core theory (dialectics) as anything to do with this. So, even though dialectics teaches that everything is interconnected, apparently, the only two things in the entire universe that are not linked in any way at all are: a) the long-term decline of Dialectical Marxism and b) its core theory!

(5) It exacerbates (but does not cause) sectarianism.

(6) Because it is a source of consolation for the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism (for reasons outlined in (4) above), its acolytes cling on to it like grim death, and become highly irrational and emotive in its defence. [Added: See how Red Cat has behaved in the thread on Mao in Theory!]

There are other reasons why this mystical creed is deleterious to Marxism, but these will do for now.

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm
*
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm

So, if our practice is to improve, removing this poison will help considerably.

You:


I have looked at your site and find it very confusing. I'm unconvinced by Analytic Marxism, which doesn't mean I'm convinced by any non- or anti- Analytic Marxism.

1) Which part confused you?

2) Well, I'm not an Analytic Marxist.


I've been making attempts at Being and Nothingness and find myself wondering why someone as intelligent as Sartre would write such a thing.

I try to explain why in the first of the two links above, a tiny part of which I summarised also a few years back (in answer to the question: Why is dialectics a world-view?):


There are two interconnected reasons, I think.

1) The founders of this quasi-religion weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated to believe there was just such a hidden world that governed everything, looked for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and their reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history has predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for the rest of us, which means that they are our 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses' and who could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand. This is because the masses are too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why DM is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that Dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact peachy, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts; it tells such comrades that reality 'contradicts' outward appearances. Hence, even if Dialectical Marxism appears to be a long-term failure, those with a the equivalent of a dialectical 'third eye' can see the opposite is in fact the case: Dialectical Marxism is a ringing success!

In that case, awkward facts can either be ignored or they can be re-configured into their opposite.

In that case:

Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves.

I stand no chance...

With slight modifications, this applies to Sartre, too.