Has Anyone Read

[Wolf Larson]

Jean Paul Sartre's 'Critique of Dialectical Reason'? He tried to mix existentialism with socialism. Wonderful book. Usually existentialism has been used to justify capitalism- capitalists have used anyone from Stirner to Nietzsche... even Ayn Rand cherry picked existentialist thought.

There was a BBC documentary called "Century Of Self" which told how existentialism was used to get the yippie movement in the 60's to accept capitalism/materialism.

I'd be interested to see a detailed critique of property from Sartre, the man who said we are always free no matter what situation we're in.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^I have and I thought it confused non-sense.

[Wolf Larson]

^^^I have and I thought it confused non-sense.

Ha ha. Many philosophers over complicate their message. I had to read a couple of his earlier works to understand some of his concepts- bad faith and so forth. The basic point of the book is his effort to reconcile his early position that man is always free no matter what situation he is in with socialism's cause which is the effort to free man. So if man is already free why be a socialist? He ended up saying much of his early work, the works that made him famous, were bunkum and he wanted to be remembered for his advocacy of socialism. I tend to agree with him. His early work was bunkum. The existentialists have been anti revolutionary at their core and had a hand in marginalizing the 60's revolutionary efforts. I thought this book was interesting though- too bad it wasn't the piece he's remembered for.

What specifically turned you off? I cant stand Heidegger. Not Hegel but Heidegger. I read "The Question concerning Technology" and decided he was a bastard. Not for what he was saying but how he said it. He was also a bastard for supporting Nazi's. It took me a while to understand Hegelian rhetoric as well. If I write a book it will be in plain language. Accessible to all. I'll get to the point- but- as you know, some complicated concepts require complicated thought.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I had to study this stuff as an undergraduate. What put me off, and what puts me off all French Philosophy, is its needless prolixity and its dogmatic a priorism.

I have explalned why I reject this approach to philosophy here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20


but- as you know, some complicated concepts require complicated thought.

Indeed, but these guys are wrestling with empty questions, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

I cannot disagree with Chomsky on this:


I've returned from travel-speaking, where I spend most of my life, and found a collection of messages extending the discussion about "theory" and "philosophy," a debate that I find rather curious. A few reactions -- though I concede, from the start, that I may simply not understand what is going on.

As far as I do think I understand it, the debate was initiated by the charge that I, Mike, and maybe others don't have "theories" and therefore fail to give any explanation of why things are proceeding as they do. We must turn to "theory" and "philosophy" and "theoretical constructs" and the like to remedy this deficiency in our efforts to understand and address what is happening in the world. I won't speak for Mike. My response so far has pretty much been to reiterate something I wrote 35 years ago, long before "postmodernism" had erupted in the literary intellectual culture: "if there is a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret," despite much "pseudo-scientific posturing."

To my knowledge, the statement was accurate 35 years ago, and remains so; furthermore, it extends to the study of human affairs generally, and applies in spades to what has been produced since that time. What has changed in the interim, to my knowledge, is a huge explosion of self- and mutual-admiration among those who propound what they call "theory" and "philosophy," but little that I can detect beyond "pseudo-scientific posturing." That little is, as I wrote, sometimes quite interesting, but lacks consequences for the real world problems that occupy my time and energies (Rawls's important work is the case I mentioned, in response to specific inquiry).

The latter fact has been noticed. One fine philosopher and social theorist (also activist), Alan Graubard, wrote an interesting review years ago of Robert Nozick's "libertarian" response to Rawls, and of the reactions to it. He pointed out that reactions were very enthusiastic. Reviewer after reviewer extolled the power of the arguments, etc., but no one accepted any of the real-world conclusions (unless they had previously reached them). That's correct, as were his observations on what it means.

The proponents of "theory" and "philosophy" have a very easy task if they want to make their case. Simply make known to me what was and remains a "secret" to me: I'll be happy to look. I've asked many times before, and still await an answer, which should be easy to provide: simply give some examples of "a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to" the kinds of problems and issues that Mike, I, and many others (in fact, most of the world's population, I think, outside of narrow and remarkably self-contained intellectual circles) are or should be concerned with: the problems and issues we speak and write about, for example, and others like them. To put it differently, show that the principles of the "theory" or "philosophy" that we are told to study and apply lead by valid argument to conclusions that we and others had not already reached on other (and better) grounds; these "others" include people lacking formal education, who typically seem to have no problem reaching these conclusions through mutual interactions that avoid the "theoretical" obscurities entirely, or often on their own.

Again, those are simple requests. I've made them before, and remain in my state of ignorance. I also draw certain conclusions from the fact.

As for the "deconstruction" that is carried out (also mentioned in the debate), I can't comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. But if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words that I can understand, and show why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before and and have continued to do since without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. That will cure my deficiencies --- of course, if they are curable; maybe they aren't, a possibility to which I'll return.

These are very easy requests to fulfil, if there is any basis to the claims put forth with such fervor and indignation. But instead of trying to provide an answer to this simple requests, the response is cries of anger: to raise these questions shows "elitism," "anti-intellectualism," and other crimes --- though apparently it is not "elitist" to stay within the self- and mutual-admiration societies of intellectuals who talk only to one another and (to my knowledge) don't enter into the kind of world in which I'd prefer to live. As for that world, I can reel off my speaking and writing schedule to illustrate what I mean, though I presume that most people in this discussion know, or can easily find out; and somehow I never find the "theoreticians" there, nor do I go to their conferences and parties. In short, we seem to inhabit quite different worlds, and I find it hard to see why mine is "elitist," not theirs. The opposite seems to be transparently the case, though I won't amplify.

To add another facet, I am absolutely deluged with requests to speak and can't possibly accept a fraction of the invitations I'd like to, so I suggest other people. But oddly, I never suggest those who propound "theories" and "philosophy," nor do I come across them, or for that matter rarely even their names, in my own (fairly extensive) experience with popular and activist groups and organizations, general community, college, church, union, etc., audiences here and abroad, third world women, refugees, etc.; I can easily give examples. Why, I wonder.

The whole debate, then, is an odd one. On one side, angry charges and denunciations, on the other, the request for some evidence and argument to support them, to which the response is more angry charges -- but, strikingly, no evidence or argument. Again, one is led to ask why.

It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I just lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have been unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their followers. I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years, when similar charges have been made -- but without any answer to my questions. Again, they are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an answer: if I'm missing something, then show me what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if it's all beyond my comprehension, which is possible, then I'm just a lost cause, and will be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be interested in them and seem to understand them (which I'm perfectly happy to do, having no interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in these things, but apparently little else).

Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left with the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm certainly willing to grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll have to remain suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don't understand -- say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand it. Now Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. --- even Foucault, whom I knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest --- write things that I also don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says they do understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a) some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden genetic mutation, which has created a form of "theory" that is beyond quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b) ... I won't spell it out.

Again, I've lived for 50 years in these worlds, have done a fair amount of work of my own in fields called "philosophy" and "science," as well as intellectual history, and have a fair amount of personal acquaintance with the intellectual culture in the sciences, humanities, social sciences, and the arts. That has left me with my own conclusions about intellectual life, which I won't spell out. But for others, I would simply suggest that you ask those who tell you about the wonders of "theory" and "philosophy" to justify their claims --- to do what people in physics, math, biology, linguistics, and other fields are happy to do when someone asks them, seriously, what are the principles of their theories, on what evidence are they based, what do they explain that wasn't already obvious, etc. These are fair requests for anyone to make. If they can't be met, then I'd suggest recourse to Hume's advice in similar circumstances: to the flames.

Specific comment. Phetland asked who I'm referring to when I speak of "Paris school" and "postmodernist cults": the above is a sample.

He then asks, reasonably, why I am "dismissive" of it. Take, say, Derrida. Let me begin by saying that I dislike making the kind of comments that follow without providing evidence, but I doubt that participants want a close analysis of de Saussure, say, in this forum, and I know that I'm not going to undertake it. I wouldn't say this if I hadn't been explicitly asked for my opinion -- and if asked to back it up, I'm going to respond that I don't think it merits the time to do so.

So take Derrida, one of the grand old men. I thought I ought to at least be able to understand his Grammatology, so tried to read it. I could make out some of it, for example, the critical analysis of classical texts that I knew very well and had written about years before. I found the scholarship appalling, based on pathetic misreading; and the argument, such as it was, failed to come close to the kinds of standards I've been familiar with since virtually childhood. Well, maybe I missed something: could be, but suspicions remain, as noted. Again, sorry to make unsupported comments, but I was asked, and therefore am answering.

Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me) I've met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in print, and spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on real issues, and using language that was perfectly comprehensible -- he speaking French, me English); Lacan (who I met several times and considered an amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan, though his earlier work, pre-cult, was sensible and I've discussed it in print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly during the period when she was a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of them I haven't met, because I am very remote from from these circles, by choice, preferring quite different and far broader ones --- the kinds where I give talks, have interviews, take part in activities, write dozens of long letters every week, etc. I've dipped into what they write out of curiosity, but not very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate, based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes, that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain gibberish. When I proceed as I do in other areas where I do not understand, I run into the problems mentioned in connection with (1) and (2) above. So that's who I'm referring to, and why I don't proceed very far. I can list a lot more names if it's not obvious.

For those interested in a literary depiction that reflects pretty much the same perceptions (but from the inside), I'd suggest David Lodge. Pretty much on target, as far as I can judge.

Phetland also found it "particularly puzzling" that I am so "curtly dismissive" of these intellectual circles while I spend a lot of time "exposing the posturing and obfuscation of the New York Times." So "why not give these guys the same treatment." Fair question. There are also simple answers. What appears in the work I do address (NYT, journals of opinion, much of scholarship, etc.) is simply written in intelligible prose and has a great impact on the world, establishing the doctrinal framework within which thought and expression are supposed to be contained, and largely are, in successful doctrinal systems such as ours. That has a huge impact on what happens to suffering people throughout the world, the ones who concern me, as distinct from those who live in the world that Lodge depicts (accurately, I think). So this work should be dealt with seriously, at least if one cares about ordinary people and their problems. The work to which Phetland refers has none of these characteristics, as far as I'm aware. It certainly has none of the impact, since it is addressed only to other intellectuals in the same circles. Furthermore, there is no effort that I am aware of to make it intelligible to the great mass of the population (say, to the people I'm constantly speaking to, meeting with, and writing letters to, and have in mind when I write, and who seem to understand what I say without any particular difficulty, though they generally seem to have the same cognitive disability I do when facing the postmodern cults). And I'm also aware of no effort to show how it applies to anything in the world in the sense I mentioned earlier: grounding conclusions that weren't already obvious. Since I don't happen to be much interested in the ways that intellectuals inflate their reputations, gain privilege and prestige, and disengage themselves from actual participation in popular struggle, I don't spend any time on it.

Phetland suggests starting with Foucault --- who, as I've written repeatedly, is somewhat apart from the others, for two reasons: I find at least some of what he writes intelligible, though generally not very interesting; second, he was not personally disengaged and did not restrict himself to interactions with others within the same highly privileged elite circles. Phetland then does exactly what I requested: he gives some illustrations of why he thinks Foucault's work is important. That's exactly the right way to proceed, and I think it helps understand why I take such a "dismissive" attitude towards all of this --- in fact, pay no attention to it.

What Phetland describes, accurately I'm sure, seems to me unimportant, because everyone always knew it --- apart from details of social and intellectual history, and about these, I'd suggest caution: some of these are areas I happen to have worked on fairly extensively myself, and I know that Foucault's scholarship is just not trustworthy here, so I don't trust it, without independent investigation, in areas that I don't know -- this comes up a bit in the discussion from 1972 that is in print. I think there is much better scholarship on the 17th and 18th century, and I keep to that, and my own research. But let's put aside the other historical work, and turn to the "theoretical constructs" and the explanations: that there has been "a great change from harsh mechanisms of repression to more subtle mechanisms by which people come to do" what the powerful want, even enthusiastically. That's true enough, in fact, utter truism. If that's a "theory," then all the criticisms of me are wrong: I have a "theory" too, since I've been saying exactly that for years, and also giving the reasons and historical background, but without describing it as a theory (because it merits no such term), and without obfuscatory rhetoric (because it's so simple-minded), and without claiming that it is new (because it's a truism). It's been fully recognized for a long time that as the power to control and coerce has declined, it's more necessary to resort to what practitioners in the PR industry early in this century -- who understood all of this well -- called "controlling the public mind." The reasons, as observed by Hume in the 18th century, are that "the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers" relies ultimately on control of opinion and attitudes. Why these truisms should suddenly become "a theory" or "philosophy," others will have to explain; Hume would have laughed.

Some of Foucault's particular examples (say, about 18th century techniques of punishment) look interesting, and worth investigating as to their accuracy. But the "theory" is merely an extremely complex and inflated restatement of what many others have put very simply, and without any pretense that anything deep is involved. There's nothing in what Phetland describes that I haven't been writing about myself for 35 years, also giving plenty of documentation to show that it was always obvious, and indeed hardly departs from truism. What's interesting about these trivialities is not the principle, which is transparent, but the demonstration of how it works itself out in specific detail to cases that are important to people: like intervention and aggression, exploitation and terror, "free market" scams, and so on. That I don't find in Foucault, though I find plenty of it by people who seem to be able to write sentences I can understand and who aren't placed in the intellectual firmament as "theoreticians."

To make myself clear, Phetland is doing exactly the right thing: presenting what he sees as "important insights and theoretical constructs" that he finds in Foucault. My problem is that the "insights" seem to me familiar and there are no "theoretical constructs," except in that simple and familiar ideas have been dressed up in complicated and pretentious rhetoric. Phetland asks whether I think this is "wrong, useless, or posturing." No. The historical parts look interesting sometimes, though they have to be treated with caution and independent verification is even more worth undertaking than it usually is. The parts that restate what has long been obvious and put in much simpler terms are not "useless," but indeed useful, which is why I and others have always made the very same points. As to "posturing," a lot of it is that, in my opinion, though I don't particularly blame Foucault for it: it's such a deeply rooted part of the corrupt intellectual culture of Paris that he fell into it pretty naturally, though to his credit, he distanced himself from it. As for the "corruption" of this culture particularly since World War II, that's another topic, which I've discussed elsewhere and won't go into here. Frankly, I don't see why people in this forum should be much interested, just as I am not. There are more important things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow and (to me, at least) pretty unininteresting circles. That's a broad brush, and I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without proving them: but I've been asked, and have answered the only specific point that I find raised. When asked about my general opinion, I can only give it, or if something more specific is posed, address that. I'm not going to undertake an essay on topics that don't interest me.

Unless someone can answer the simple questions that immediately arise in the mind of any reasonable person when claims about "theory" and "philosophy" are raised, I'll keep to work that seems to me sensible and enlightening, and to people who are interested in understanding and changing the world.

Johnb made the point that "plain language is not enough when the frame of reference is not available to the listener"; correct and important. But the right reaction is not to resort to obscure and needlessly complex verbiage and posturing about non-existent "theories." Rather, it is to ask the listener to question the frame of reference that he/she is accepting, and to suggest alternatives that might be considered, all in plain language. I've never found that a problem when I speak to people lacking much or sometimes any formal education, though it's true that it tends to become harder as you move up the educational ladder, so that indoctrination is much deeper, and the self-selection for obedience that is a good part of elite education has taken its toll. Johnb says that outside of circles like this forum, "to the rest of the country, he's incomprehensible" ("he" being me). That's absolutely counter to my rather ample experience, with all sorts of audiences. Rather, my experience is what I just described. The incomprehensibility roughly corresponds to the educational level. Take, say, talk radio. I'm on a fair amount, and it's usually pretty easy to guess from accents, etc., what kind of audience it is. I've repeatedly found that when the audience is mostly poor and less educated, I can skip lots of the background and "frame of reference" issues because it's already obvious and taken for granted by everyone, and can proceed to matters that occupy all of us. With more educated audiences, that's much harder; it's necessary to disentangle lots of ideological constructions.

It's certainly true that lots of people can't read the books I write. That's not because the ideas or language are complicated --- we have no problems in informal discussion on exactly the same points, and even in the same words. The reasons are different, maybe partly the fault of my writing style, partly the result of the need (which I feel, at least) to present pretty heavy documentation, which makes it tough reading. For these reasons, a number of people have taken pretty much the same material, often the very same words, and put them in pamphlet form and the like. No one seems to have much problem --- though again, reviewers in the Times Literary Supplement or professional academic journals don't have a clue as to what it's about, quite commonly; sometimes it's pretty comical.

A final point, something I've written about elsewhere (e.g., in a discussion in Z papers, and the last chapter of Year 501). There has been a striking change in the behaviour of the intellectual class in recent years. The left intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been teaching in working class schools, writing books like "mathematics for the millions" (which made mathematics intelligible to millions of people), participating in and speaking for popular organizations, etc., are now largely disengaged from such activities, and although quick to tell us that they are far more radical than thou, are not to be found, it seems, when there is such an obvious and growing need and even explicit request for the work they could do out there in the world of people with live problems and concerns. That's not a small problem. This country, right now, is in a very strange and ominous state. People are frightened, angry, disillusioned, sceptical, confused. That's an organizer's dream, as I once heard Mike say. It's also fertile ground for demagogues and fanatics, who can (and in fact already do) rally substantial popular support with messages that are not unfamiliar from their predecessors in somewhat similar circumstances. We know where it has led in the past; it could again. There's a huge gap that once was at least partially filled by left intellectuals willing to engage with the general public and their problems. It has ominous implications, in my opinion.

End of Reply, and (to be frank) of my personal interest in the matter, unless the obvious questions are answered.

http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html

[Wolf Larson]

Sartre was no Marx or Engels. They were game changers and made their socioeconomic stance scientific/empirical [Das Kapial] ] and accessible [manifesto] to workers. I don't think Sartre that important for revolutionaries to read but he did, in life, advocate communism at one time but later drifted towards libertarian socialism . Sartre was a philosopher of the self and ironically [since you posted Chomsky] was promoting libertarian socialism much of the time. He wasn't so much into sociology and economics as he was ontology and his work which we're discussing here wasn't very accessible to the average reader but it's still interesting mostly because the philosophy of self has mostly been used to justify capitalism. Sartre was trying to meld Marx and existentialism. Much of it can be seen as pseudo intellectual banter I guess [especially if you're not into ontology/metaphysics] but understanding Sartre and his attempt to reconcile existentialism's selfish message with that of socialism helps counter the capitalists thoughts concerning liberty which assert the ultimate liberty is being loyal to the self's desires and capitalism is the only system which can achieve loyalty to the self. If anyone is interested try reading Search For A Method here http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/critic/sartre1.htm then go into Critique of Dialectical Reason. I don't necessarily suggest living by Sartre's message but understanding it can help bring more selfishly motivated but intellectually honest/ people able to concede points over to our side.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, as I said, I reject this way of doing philosophy, and for the reasons I have outlined in the threads I linked to in my last post.

[Wolf Larson]

Well, as I said, I reject this way of doing philosophy, and for the reasons I have outlined in the threads I linked to in my last post.

Give me a hug. Flower power. Lets be friends. [just kidding]. But seriously, I've converted a few die hard self hating white working class supporters of capitalism with Sartre's melding of the self and communism. Drops in the bucket. Meaningless perhaps. Check this out: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6111922724894802811&ei=ik1_S6G9Lpz0qAPdyOT6Bg&q=century+of+self+episode+3&hl=en&client=firefox-a# This is the melding of existentialism and capitalism. The end product? Modern USA Americana.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for the link; I am watching the video now, but can't quite see its relevance.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I don't particularly like Sartre, but his need to reconcile existentialism with dialectical materialism confuses me, somewhat. I know existentialism is quite keen on freedom, and dialectical materialism is quite deterministic.

I have quasi-dualistic views on freedom that arise somewhat from existentialist thought, but aside from that compatibilist view, I'm generally in strong disagreement with most things existentialists say.

Unless you've ran out of things to read, I'd choose something that would be more useful. Dialectical Materialism is only useful in a vague sense. It reminds you that ideas can be flawed, and they can change. It tells you that conflicts create new ideas and power shifts that move the direction of society. Aside from that, it extrapolates on common knowledge (which is nice to be reminded of) to a sort of universally deterministic realm of ideas that doesn't follow from the arguments.

And existentialist freedom isn't that great. It's pretty unjustifiable in my view. Sartre wanted to reconcile his views because all the Marxists didn't like him for his lack of materialism (as evident by his obsession with indeterminacy), and he wanted them to be his friends.

[Wolf Larson]

Thanks for the link; I am watching the video now, but can't quite see its relevance.

It's a four part documentary mostly about Edward Bernays and his use of Freud's ideas to expand capitalism but the third part which I posted ,further on in the video around the 30 minute mark, gets into the yippies and hippies use of existentialism [towards the end of the 1960's] to legitimize capitalism. Sartre isn't mentioned but it's relevant so far as it shows how existentialism has been used within the counterculture to legitimize capitalism. A fact that disgusts me. America is about me me me me. Its all about me and my self image and capitalism is the only system which can give us the so called freedom to be whoever we want to be by way of purchasing all manner of printed textiles and colored gadgets capitalists make for us. Freedom has been defined as the freedom to choose between products. This isn't freedom of course. Also it started with Wilhelm Reich- he used Sartre's work to form a new branch of existential psycho analysis.....watch the entire series but if you are pressed for time I'd say the third part is the best. the video in question here, part 3 is entitled [I] There is a Policeman Inside All Our Heads: He Must Be Destroyed .

[Wolf Larson]

If you grasp what I'm saying here and see the importance of what happened in the 1960's as far as the counterculture wanting individuality apart from 1950's capitalism then subsequently being fooled into or voluntarily exalting the self within the capitalist system then you'll see why Sartre's work, as far as the message in Critique Of Dialectical Reason, is important. Before Sartre died he said he regretted writing Being And Nothingness and most all of his early work which was centered around the self. He saw his work being used to legitimize capitalism and it was in fact used to legitimize and expand capitalism. His work helped save capitalism domestically within America. He knew it. He hated it. The basic message was: You can invent yourself- be whatever you want- only the individual matters-there is no societal concern-you living a fulfilled life is all you need to be concerned about and capitalism is the only system which can help you do this. Sartre was used by capitalists as a sort of leftist Ayn Rand. Critique Of Dialectical Reason was his work which he tried to reverse this. It's THE ONLY work from Sartre revolutionaries should be concerned with and to say Sartre had no impact on our culture is absurd. Understanding how he [existentialism] was used to legitimize capitalism by exalting the self via psychoanalysis, corporate propaganda and focus groups is important in my opinion. It explains what went wrong in the 1960's. It explains what gave birth to Reagan and the 1980's as far as Americans accepting it. Understanding all of this is a good addition to anyone's knowledge base. It's not information needed to understand communism/capitalism BUT the more you know the easier it is to articulate counterpoints to bourgeois propaganda. The more you understand the more predictable and interpretable world becomes. The more clear the so called matrix becomes. The superstructure. This is more so surrounding philosophy and sociology than it is pure economics. If you're a fan of young Marx then you can dig it and history did not stop at Marx's death - there is more to learn as we're now obviously in the future.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I think the film has definitely hit on something, but it leaves the politics out almost completely -- and to try explain US capitalism without mentioning the class war is to leave the most important part out. This then makes the film fall into the same trap, that is, of concentrating on individuals, not on the social.

And, I'll need more persuading that Sartre's works is not fit for the Hume treatment -- "into the falmes with it!".

[Belisarius]

What specifically turned you off? I cant stand Heidegger. Not Hegel but Heidegger. I read "The Question concerning Technology" and decided he was a bastard. Not for what he was saying but how he said it. He was also a bastard for supporting Nazi's. It took me a while to understand Hegelian rhetoric as well. If I write a book it will be in plain language. Accessible to all. I'll get to the point- but- as you know, some complicated concepts require complicated thought.

Ok, in real life Heidegger was a bastard for supporting tha nazis (which he did to secure a career as rector), but his theories are very profound. in stead of reading his theory on technology, you should try "being and time". it's his magnum opus and a real masterpiece. the first 60 to 100 pages are a bit difficult, but after that you are used to the vocabulary and things will go just fine. Hiedegger is put into a more marxist sense by his student Marcuse. his theory on one- and twodimensional thought is another name for Heideggers inauthenticity-authenticity. but do me a favor: don't read him like he's proclaiming some ethics, because he's most certainly not. you will notice that while you're reading it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'm sorry, Belisarius, but there is nothing profound about Heidegger's work. Indeed, it's an excellent example of (1) the systematic misuse of language, and (2) of dogmatic apriorism, of a rather confused and obscure form.

His core ideas are taken apart rather well, here:

Paul Edwards (2004), Heidegger's Confusions (Prometheus Books).

I have criticised this entire way of doing philosophy, dominant in the 'west' (and the 'east', too) for over two thousand years, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

[Belisarius]

first of all i want to stress that i do agree heidegger became a bit obscure later in his life (but not at all in being and time)
(1) heidegger didn't misuse language. most people who think that haven't understood his arguments (Carnap for example). he invented new vocabulary to get rid off all the old philosophical concepts that weren't of any use anymore. the problem with his language, in particular for english people, like you, is that he gets his terms from German (for example: in english being and a being are the same word, but in german it is sein and seiende, that's why i read his works in dutch, a language very close to german)
(2)his thinking isn't dogmatic apriorism, but phenomenology. phenomenologists believe the best kind of knowledge is the things that are so obvious we can't deny them (for example:a) being-in-the-world: of course everyone is always in a world, b) ontological difference: of course "being" is not the same as "a being", like "working" doesn't equal "a worker" (a mistake made by some theologists, who say God is the being that covers all being)). this obvious knowledge is called apodictic knowledge. his thought isn't dogmatic either since phenomenology nor ontology or metaphysics in the heideggerian sense were finished. there are still many debates and criticisms about heideggers philosophy without destroying it alltogether. Levinas for example criticized Heidegger in "time and the other" without saying goodbye to the entire framework.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, like the ancient Greeks, and most subsequent philosophers, he confused the present participle of the verb 'to be' (i.e., "being") with a noun, just for starters.


most people who think that haven't understood his arguments (Carnap for example).

On the contrary, Carnap got Heidegger absolutely right.


(2)his thinking isn't dogmatic apriorism, but phenomenology. phenomenologists believe the best kind of knowledge is the things that are so obvious we can't deny them (for example:a) being-in-the-world: of course everyone is always in a world,

Well, as I said, dogmatic and a priori, since this isn't 'obvious'.


this obvious knowledge is called apodictic knowledge

Yes, I know what traditional philosophers call it, but it isn't knowledge at all; it consists either of platitiudes dressed up in neologisms (to make them seem profound), or it is a priori, and dogmatic.


his thought isn't dogmatic either since phenomenology nor ontology or metaphysics in the heideggerian sense were finished.

Except, he substituted his own brand of a priori and dogmatic metaphysics in its place.


there are still many debates and criticisms about heideggers philosophy without destroying it alltogether.

Well, I agree with Humes' view of this tangled morass of verbiose dogma: "Into the flames with it!"

So, Levinas did not go nearly half as far as he should.

It is indeed part of the ruling ideas that, as Marx said, have ruled since ancient Greek times.

[Belisarius]

heidegger didn't see the verb "to be" as a noun, but as what it actually is: nothing. if it were a noun it would be defineable and heidegger starts "being and time" by stating that defining "to be" is ridiculous.

Carnap didn't even try to understand heidegger, he was just frustrated. he just made a framework for the everyday usage of language in which heidegger didn't fit, which is obvious, since philosophy isn't an everyday discussion. what Carnap id was quoting heidegger in "an irritating voice" and then say that it is all shit, like young children do when their parents are nagging. when Carnap is laughing at the sentence that "nothing nothings", ge doesn't get the point that this is only an expression, there is a deeper meaning than just the words. he doesn't seem to understand that meaning isn't just a case of what is said, but also of what is not literally said.

being-in-the-world is obvious. can you imagine not being somewhere? Because this somewhere where you always are is the world, whatever a world it may be.

he did have his own propositions (every philosopher has those), but his metaphysics isn't dogmatic since even the most basic parts of his ontology are still questioned. Levinas in the book i mentioned did away with Heideggers entire view of death (if you would say something is a dogma it will be his being-unto-death), but he kept his methods and most of his other thoughts.

you say heidegger uses a priori, but this is in fact not true. a priori knowledge is knowledge completely deductable by logic, without external reference (like "all bachelors are unmarried", you don't have to see a bachelor to know this). heideggers philosophy isn't a posteriori either, since it isn't based on mere empiricism. that's why there is such a fancy word like apodictic, since both a priori nor a posteriori will do the job. the only necessety involved with apodictic knowledge is that you need to be conscious, which is not such a great demand. and even if it were a priori, what's the problem with that?

i can hardly say heideggers neologisms make his writings seem profound, i would rather say the opposite. being-in-the-world is harldy such a fancy world, since it immediately tells you what it's about. i would rather say words like qualia, hypothetico-deductive modal or even a posteriori sound mystical and incomprehensible.

[LeninistKing]

Nietzsche is one of my favorite philosophers, because he was a realist. He talked about the importance of the will to power, of will power, of strength of man. The truth is that the world is very corrupt and complicated, and requires lots of will power. Schopenhauer also wrote about the will. Every thing in life is based on will-power. You cant even wake up from your bed without will, you can't even take a shower and use the computer without will, and you wont be able to overthrow the capitalist system without collective egoist passions and will. Life out there is a jungle and it is not a fairy tale idealist book.

.

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Jean Paul Sartre's 'Critique of Dialectical Reason'? He tried to mix existentialism with socialism. Wonderful book. Usually existentialism has been used to justify capitalism- capitalists have used anyone from Stirner to Nietzsche... even Ayn Rand cherry picked existentialist thought.

There was a BBC documentary called "Century Of Self" which told how existentialism was used to get the yippie movement in the 60's to accept capitalism/materialism.

I'd be interested to see a detailed critique of property from Sartre, the man who said we are always free no matter what situation we're in.

[Wolf Larson]

I think the film has definitely hit on something, but it leaves the politics out almost completely -- and to try explain US capitalism without mentioning the class war is to leave the most important part out. This then makes the film fall into the same trap, that is, of concentrating on individuals, not on the social.

And, I'll need more persuading that Sartre's works is not fit for the Hume treatment -- "into the falmes with it!".

Indeed. The video wasn't made from a socialist perspective but there is much valuable information in there for us to interpret for ourselves.

[Wolf Larson]

Ok, in real life Heidegger was a bastard for supporting tha nazis (which he did to secure a career as rector), but his theories are very profound. in stead of reading his theory on technology, you should try "being and time". it's his magnum opus and a real masterpiece. the first 60 to 100 pages are a bit difficult, but after that you are used to the vocabulary and things will go just fine. Hiedegger is put into a more marxist sense by his student Marcuse. his theory on one- and twodimensional thought is another name for Heideggers inauthenticity-authenticity. but do me a favor: don't read him like he's proclaiming some ethics, because he's most certainly not. you will notice that while you're reading it.

I'll check it out but after reading his work on technology I'm not sure if I have time to translate everything into plain english ;)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Belisarius:


heidegger didn't see the verb "to be" as a noun, but as what it actually is: nothing. if it were a noun it would be defineable and heidegger starts "being and time" by stating that defining "to be" is ridiculous.

If "Being" is nothing, as you say, then that word is functioning as a noun.


Carnap didn't even try to understand heidegger, he was just frustrated. he just made a framework for the everyday usage of language in which heidegger didn't fit, which is obvious, since philosophy isn't an everyday discussion. what Carnap id was quoting heidegger in "an irritating voice" and then say that it is all shit, like young children do when their parents are nagging. when Carnap is laughing at the sentence that "nothing nothings", ge doesn't get the point that this is only an expression, there is a deeper meaning than just the words. he doesn't seem to understand that meaning isn't just a case of what is said, but also of what is not literally said.

On the contrary, if you read what Carnap actually said, as opposed to what many report him to have said, he has got Heidegger absolutely right.

As far as "Nothing nothings" is concerend, which was only a tiny part of what Carnap said about Heidegger, this phrase has no meaning at all, unless one changes the meaning of either or both words. In that case, one would not be dealing with "nothing", for example, but with "*nothing", and thus would be no further forward.


being-in-the-world is obvious. can you imagine not being somewhere? Because this somewhere where you always are is the world, whatever a world it may be.

As I said: a platitude dressed-up in neologisms to make it look profound.


he did have his own propositions (every philosopher has those), but his metaphysics isn't dogmatic since even the most basic parts of his ontology are still questioned. Levinas in the book i mentioned did away with Heideggers entire view of death (if you would say something is a dogma it will be his being-unto-death), but he kept his methods and most of his other thoughts.

Others may question his 'ontology', but for Heidegger, his own 'ontology' is dogmatic, as is any 'ontology'.


you say heidegger uses a priori, but this is in fact not true. a priori knowledge is knowledge completely deductable by logic, without external reference (like "all bachelors are unmarried", you don't have to see a bachelor to know this). heideggers philosophy isn't a posteriori either, since it isn't based on mere empiricism. that's why there is such a fancy word like apodictic, since both a priori nor a posteriori will do the job. the only necessety involved with apodictic knowledge is that you need to be conscious, which is not such a great demand. and even if it were a priori, what's the problem with that?

You might be confusing the a priori with the analytic, logical truth or even necessary truth. A priori is that which is allegedly prior to experience, and Heidegger's work is full of this stuff.

And the allegedly 'apodictic' knowledge to which you alliude consists either of those platiudes again, or they are a priori and dogmatic, as I said.


i can hardly say heideggers neologisms make his writings seem profound, i would rather say the opposite. being-in-the-world is harldy such a fancy world, since it immediately tells you what it's about. i would rather say words like qualia, hypothetico-deductive modal or even a posteriori sound mystical and incomprehensible

Well, you began by saying his work was profound. I'm glad you have now seen the opposite it the case: that this bogus emperor is without clothes.

The other words you refer to are of course technical terns, easily translated into ordinary lnguage, but which do not turn out to be platitiudes.

[Belisarius]

it may grammatically be a noun, but that doesn't make it a thing (since it is no-thing). heidegger saw that this was quite paradoxical, so he corrected it in his later works by drawing a line over "being" (i don't know how to do this on this forum, but i hope you get what i'm saying).

i did read what carnap actually said and of course he didn't only speak of "nothing nothings", but he gave this as an example.

heidegger didn't want to look profound, 'cause if he were, he would've used much more mystical terms than "being", "in", "the" and "world", which are all simple words to express, as you say, a simple idea. it is not because an idea is easy that it is a platitude. that's what i keep trying to say with my apodicticity (which wasn't a term coined by heidegger btw). a banal truth is still a truth. the same thing exists in analytic philosophy: Tarski's "snow is white if and only if snow is white" is pretty obvious, but a fact.

Even Heidegger changed many of his ideas during his lifetime, so he didn't conceive them as dogmatic either. he changed for example his views on language from "being and time" in a lecture series some years later (i can look the name of these series up if you want). when you say that all ontology is dogma, then you say that the study of being and the being of all things is mere dogma, thus definitions are only dogmas because they reflect the being of a thing, thus you deny that there can be any logical definition.

you didn't answer my question about what the problem is with a priori knowledge.

i said his work was profound in meaning, not that his words are profound, because they sound nice. so i don't see heidegger as a bogus emperor at all. the terms heidegger used aren't even really technical terms, since they already are ordinary language.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Belisarius:


it may grammatically be a noun, but that doesn't make it a thing (since it is no-thing). heidegger saw that this was quite paradoxical, so he corrected it in his later works by drawing a line over "being" (i don't know how to do this on this forum, but i hope you get what i'm saying).

But, that is part of his misuse of a perfectly ordinary word, as Marx noted:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphasis added.]

This is indeed what traditional philosophers have been doing since Anaximander put pen to misuse: employ distorted language and attempt to derive fundamental 'truths' about reality from it, or from 'thought' alone, imposing such 'truths' on the world dogmatically and a priori.

Heidegger is just one of the most recent and confused ruling-class hacks to have done this.


i did read what carnap actually said and of course he didn't only speak of "nothing nothings", but he gave this as an example

I agree, but I think he got Heidegger exactly right: wall-to-wall non-sense.


heidegger didn't want to look profound, 'cause if he were, he would've used much more mystical terms than "being", "in", "the" and "world", which are all simple words to express, as you say, a simple idea. it is not because an idea is easy that it is a platitude. that's what i keep trying to say with my apodicticity (which wasn't a term coined by heidegger btw). a banal truth is still a truth. the same thing exists in analytic philosophy: Tarski's "snow is white if and only if snow is white" is pretty obvious, but a fact.

Indeed, analytic philosophers can also write rubbish (indeed, they too are caught up with the ruling ideas that have always ruled -- that is, of trying to derive fundamental truths about reality, or truth, or 'being', or..., from words alone).

Now, if you read the book I mentioned above, you will see how and where Heidegger was trying to be profound, and how his commentators have interpreted him that way since.

Paul Edwards (2004), Heidegger's Confusions (Prometheus Books).

And sure banal truths are still true, but hardly anything to build a philosophy upon. Grass is green, but that is not something to get excited about. Hardly worth eulogising and calling "profound", as you did.

And you must know that "being" has been used by traditional philosophers for over two thousand years; so he is tapping into a mystical tradition here.


Even Heidegger changed many of his ideas during his lifetime, so he didn't conceive them as dogmatic either. he changed for example his views on language from "being and time" in a lecture series some years later (i can look the name of these series up if you want). when you say that all ontology is dogma, then you say that the study of being and the being of all things is mere dogma, thus definitions are only dogmas because they reflect the being of a thing, thus you deny that there can be any logical definition.

Even the Christian Church has changed its mind over the centuries, but that does not prevent what they preach from being dogmatic.

So, it's no the fixity of the dogma, or its mutability that makes it dogmatic, but the fact that it has been derived from thought//language alone that makes his ideas dogmatic.


when you say that all ontology is dogma, then you say that the study of being and the being of all things is mere dogma, thus definitions are only dogmas because they reflect the being of a thing, thus you deny that there can be any logical definition.

Not so; the problem is when you misconstrue these as super-empirical truths. That's is why all ontology is dogmatic -- and, I would maintain, non-sensical.

You plainly haven't read my post on this, which explains the difference. I'll re-post it below.


you didn't answer my question about what the problem is with a priori knowledge.

Well, it's not knowledge, for starters. And I did answer it in the thread I linked to; I'll re-post that, too.


i said his work was profound in meaning, not that his words are profound, because they sound nice. so i don't see heidegger as a bogus emperor at all. the terms heidegger used aren't even really technical terms, since they already are ordinary language.

Distorted language, as I said.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here a reply to Dooga on this:



Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived.

Contrast this with a typical empirical proposition:

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, to the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative mood.

[Sometimes, the latter is beefed-up with subjunctive and/or modal qualifying terms (such as 'must', 'necessary', etc.) -- which, incidentally, helps create even more of a false impression.]

Now, this apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

As noted above, expressions like these look as if they reveal deep truths about reality since they certainly resemble empirical propositions (i.e., propositions about matters of fact). In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again an ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative (but nonetheless typical metaphysical) sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

In order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or not.

However, the comprehension of T2 and T3 goes hand-in-hand with knowing either or both are true (or, conversely, knowing either or both are false). The truth of T2 and T3 thus follows from the meaning of certain words (or from certain definitions -- i.e., from yet more words).



This now intimately links the truth status of T2 and T3 with [I]meaning, but not with material confirmation/facts, and hence not with a confrontation with reality. Their truth-status is independent of and anterior to the evidence (even if there were any!).

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent its confirmation or refutation -- indeed, it would be impossible to do either if T1 had not already been understood. However, the truth/falsehood of T1-type propostions follows from the way the world is, not solely from meaning.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth/falsehood on their faces, as it were.

So here, we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different 'relation' to 'reality'.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

In the second (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or on those in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true.

Indeed, metaphysical theses (like T2 and T3) are deliberately constructed to transcend the limitations of the material world, which tactic is excused on the grounds that it allows the aspiring metaphysician to uncover "underlying essences", revealing nature's "hidden secrets". Theses like these are "necessarily true" (or "necessarily false"), and are thus held to express genuine knowledge of fundamental aspects of reality, unlike contingent/empirical propositions whose actual truth-status can alter with the wind. Traditionally, this meant that empirical propositions like T1 were considered to be incapable of revealing authentic knowledge. Indeed, "philosophical knowledge" (underlying absolute certainty) has always been held to be of the sort delivered by T2 or T3-type sentences: necessary, a priori, non-contingent, and generated by thought alone.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound super-empirical truths which cannot fail to be true (or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be). They do this by aping the indicative mood --, but they go way beyond this. Thus, what they say does not just happen to be this way or that, as with ordinary empirical truths -- these propositions cannot be otherwise. The world must conform to whatever they say. Indeed, this accounts for the use of modal terms (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") if and when their status is questioned --, or, of course, whenever their content is being sold to us -- as in "I must exist if I can think", or "Existence can't be a predicate".

Conversely, if anyone were to question the truth of T1, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of Das Kapital" would be highly inappropriate -- unless, perhaps, T1 itself were the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one", or it was based on a direct observation statement. But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

In the latter case, with empirical propositions, reality is dictating to us whether what we say is true or false. We would not be dictating to reality what it must contain, or what it must be like, as metaphysicial theses have always done.

Hence, with respect to T2 and T3, things are radically different; the second option above applies, for their truth-values (true or false) can be determined independently and in advance of the way the world happens to be. Here, the essential nature of reality can be ascertained from words/thought alone. Such Super-Truths (or Super-Falsehoods) can be derived solely from the alleged meaning of the words sentences like T2 and T3 contain (or from the 'concepts' they somehow express). In that case, once understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or their own falsehood. They are thus true a priori.

So, to understand a metaphysical thesis is to know it is true or to know it is false. That is why, to their inventors, metaphysical propositions appear to be so certain and self-evident. Questioning them seems to run against the grain of our understanding, not of our experience. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their truth-status; they provide their own evidence, and testify on their own behalf. Their veracity follows from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, guarantee their own truth (or falsehood).

Unfortunately, this divorces such theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or false on conceptual grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one.

This might seem to be a somewhat dogmatic statement to make, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality (and on one whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test), which collapses into incoherence when examined closely.

The paradoxical nature metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic principles on which it is based -- those which, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such a fuss.

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth-status; it is not possible to verify/falsify an alleged proposition if no one understands it.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, or when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such linguistic/structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded by those who propose them as truths, or Super-truths, about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appears to go hand in hand with knowing their 'truth' (or their 'falsehood'): they are based on features of thought/language, not on the material world. This means that they can't be related to the material world or anything in it, and hence they can't be used to help change it.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture. But this is not so with such 'reflected' theses.

On the other hand, if their truth-status can be ascertained from such propositions/'thoughts' alone (i.e., if they are "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture. Naturally, this just means that such 'thoughts'/propositions cannot be reflections of the world, whatever else they are.

Another odd feature of metaphysical theses is worth underlining: since the truth-values of defective sentences like these are plainly not determined by the world, they have to be given a truth-value by fiat. That is, they have to be declared "necessarily true" or "necessarily false", and this is plainly because their truth-status cannot be derived from the world, with which they cannot now be compared.

Or, more grandiloquently, their opposites have to be pronounced "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- a Philosopher of some sort.

Metaphysical decrees like this are as common as dirt in traditional thought.

Isolated theses like these have necessary truth or falsehood bestowed on them as a gift. Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, they are derived solely from or compared only with other related theses (or to be more honest, they are merely compared with yet more obscure jargon) as part of a terminological gesture at 'verification'. Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal and 100% bogus.

The normal cannons that determine when something is true or false (i.e., a comparison with reality) have to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- or, if it is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a sort of 'thought experiment', or perhaps as part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.

As far as traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what happened as the subject developed; philosophers simply invented more and more jargonised words, juggled with such bogus terminology, and thereby derived countless 'truths' from thought/language alone.

But, none of these 'truths' can be given a sense, no matter what is done with them; in that case, they are all non-sensical.

These ideas are worked out in extensive detail, and defended in depth here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

This, of course, illustrates why Marx said:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels, (1970) The German Ideology, p.118.]

Now, there is a reason why traditional theorists attempted to derive 'truths' from thought alone. I have already summarised this reason; here it is again:


This traditional way of seeing reality taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who have always viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for each ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

And this is why all of traditional philosophy is dogmatic, and thus non-sensical.

Now the reason why this traditional approach to 'philosophical truth' has dominated 'western' (and 'eastern') thought for 2500 years was outlined by Marx, too:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65.]

And we can see this form of thought still dominating the thinking of comrades here, all of whom think it perfectly ordinary/acceptable to try to derive profound theses about 'The self', or 'consciousness' from a few (jargonised/distorted) words, or from a few minutes thought.

There is in fact a sociological reason for this ubiquitous intellectual habit, and why it afflicts the vast majority of human beings -- and it is based on ideas Feuerbach rehearsed 160-odd years ago --, but I have said enough already.

-------------------------

Added on edit:

I have outlined these 'Feuerbachian reasons' in my next reply to Dooga.

That can be found here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1408996&postcount=52

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here's another reply to Dooga I posted on necessary 'truth', but the same argument applies to the alleged truth of a priori propositions:


The phrase 'necessarily true' is a dead give-away.

Here is why (this is an excerpt from Essay Twelve Part One, and uses a metaphysical claim of Lenin's -- about motion and matter -- to illustrate the point, but it is easily adaptable to cover what Descartes opined):


An empirical proposition derives its sense from the truth possibilities it appears to hold open (which options will later be decided upon one way or the other by a confrontation with the material world). That is why the actual truth-value of, say, T1 (or its contradictory, T2) does not need to be known before it is understood, but it is also why evidence is relevant to establishing that truth-value.

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

T2: Tony Blair does not own a copy of Das Kapital.

All that is required here is some grasp of the possibilities that both of these hold open. T1 and T2 both have the same content, and are both made true or false by the same situation obtaining or not.

It is also why it is easy to imagine T1 as true even when it is false, or false when it is true. In general, comprehension of empirical propositions involves an understanding of the conditions under which they would/could be true or false; as is well-known, these are otherwise called their truth-conditions. That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm their actual truth status by comparison with the world, since they would in that case know what to look for/expect.

As we saw earlier, these non-negotiable facts about language underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social -- and hence the communal and communicational -- nature of discourse, but they fly in the face of metaphysical/representational theories, which emphasise the opposite: that to understand a proposition goes hand-in-hand with knowing it is true (or knowing it is false) -- by-passing the confirmation/disconfirmation stage (thus reducing the usual 'truth-conditions' to only one option).

However, there are other serious problems this approach to language faces over and above the fact it would make knowledge un-communicable.

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth-status, as we have seen.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or syntactic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded (by those who propose them) as truths (or Supertruths) about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of a metaphysical proposition appears to go hand in hand with knowing its 'truth' (or its 'falsehood') -- it is based on features of thought/language alone, and not on the material world.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world, which might seem (to some) to nullify the above comments.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture.

And yet, on the other hand if its truth could be ascertained from that proposition/'thought' itself (i.e., if it were "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture, which just means that that 'thought'/proposition cannot be a reflection of the world, whatever else it is.

Furthermore, and worse, if a proposition is purported to be empirical, but which can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, T3, below, according to Lenin) then, as we will see, paradox must ensue.

Consider the following sentences, the first of which Lenin would presumably have declared necessarily false (if not "unthinkable"):

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare T3 necessarily (and always) false, the possibility of its truth must first be entertained (as we saw). Thus, if the truth of T3 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as necessarily false, then whatever would make it true has to be ruled out conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what T3 rules in so that he/she could comprehend what it is that is being disqualified by its rejection as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done if what T3 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic/conceptual grounds.

Consequently, if a proposition like T3 is necessarily false this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say (or to think) what could count as making T3 true. Indeed, Lenin himself had to declare it "unthinkable" (in T4).

However, because the truth of the original proposition (T4) cannot even be conceived, Lenin was thus in no position to say what was excluded by its rejection.

Unfortunately, this prevents any account being given of what would make T3 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, paradoxically, T3 would now be necessarily false if and only if it was not capable of being thought of as necessarily false!

That is: T3 could be thought of as necessarily false if and only if what would make it true could at least be entertained just in order to rule it out as necessarily false. But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make T3 true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. And, if the truth of T3 -- or the conditions under which it would be true -- cannot be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we would then not know what was being ruled out.

In that case, the negation of T3 can neither be accepted nor rejected by anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that it could be either countenanced or repudiated. Hence, T3 would lose any sense it had, since it could not under any circumstances be either true or false.

This is in fact just another consequence of saying that an empirical proposition and its negation have the same content. It is also connected with the non-sensicality of all metaphysical 'propositions', for their negations do not have the same content. Indeed, because their negations do not picture anything that could be the case in any possible world, they have no content at all. That, of course, evacuates the content of the original non-negated proposition.

As we can now see, the radical misuse of language governing the formation of what look like empirical propositions (such as T3, or T4):

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T5: Motion never occurs without matter.

involves an implicit reference to the sorts of conditions that that underlie their normal employment/reception. Hence, when such sentences are entertained, a pretence (often genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they are capable of being understood. This is done even if certain restrictions are later placed on their further processing, as in T4. In that case, a pretence has to be that we understand what might make such propositions true, and their 'negations' false, so that those like T30 can be declared 'necessarily' false or "unthinkable".

But, this entire exercise is an empty charade, for no content can be given to propositions like T3 (and thus to T4, nor in fact to any metaphysical 'proposition').

With respect to motionless matter, even Lenin had to admit that!

Indeed, he it was who told us this 'idea' was "unthinkable".

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

Finally, as Hume pointed out, 'necessay propositions' cannot follow from contingent propositions, so they cannot be cobbled together from scientific knowledge.

Now, I illustrate this with respect to something Lenin said, but it applies to any a priori/necessary 'truth' anyone comes up with.

[Belisarius]

i haven't read it all yet, but i think we're getting at the main discussion of whih heidegger is only a manifestation, that is the relation reality-language. if i get your point, then you pose reality as undeniable (that is undeniable after experience) fact, which has to be objectively reflected by language.

on the other hand i say the reverse: reality reflects language, all reality is a symbolic framework. we generally see objects in the world as signifieds (as i believe you do), but they are actually signifiers, since they refer to a meaning (often translated in a use as in the case of a hammer or a chair). if i look at a chair, i don't need to second-think what i'll do with it, since i always already know it's a chair to sit in. that's why people tend to be upset about modern art, it seems to have no meaning, because one doesn't know what to do with it or how to look at it. i do confess i get this believe from Lacan, another nemesis of analytic thought. he believes that the reality constructed by symbols alienates us from the actual reality (which he calls the real), because actually that chair is just a bunch of matter, but i can't see this. i can only get a glimpse of it by staring for a long time at the chair, because (i don't know whether you have already experienced this) tends to lose its meaning then and becomes something strange to me, something i don't know.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Belisarius:


if i get your point, then you pose reality as undeniable (that is undeniable after experience) fact, which has to be objectively reflected by language.

Well, this is the traditional doctrine I am attacking in that long post; language is not a mirror, but a means of communication.


on the other hand i say the reverse: reality reflects language, all reality is a symbolic framework. we generally see objects in the world as signifieds (as i believe you do), but they are actually signifiers, since they refer to a meaning (often translated in a use as in the case of a hammer or a chair). if i look at a chair, i don't need to second-think what i'll do with it, since i always already know it's a chair to sit in. that's why people tend to be upset about modern art, it seems to have no meaning, because one doesn't know what to do with it or how to look at it. i do confess i get this believe from Lacan, another nemesis of analytic thought. he believes that the reality constructed by symbols alienates us from the actual reality (which he calls the real), because actually that chair is just a bunch of matter, but i can't see this. i can only get a glimpse of it by staring for a long time at the chair, because (i don't know whether you have already experienced this) tends to lose its meaning then and becomes something strange to me, something i don't know.

Well, this looks like yet more a priori dogmatics!

And your knowledge of chairs is socially-mediated. Had you not been inducted into a speech community you would not know this.

And, please do no quote Lacan at me; he's even worse than Heidegger, with his reliance on that charlatan Freud and his a priori psychology.

[Belisarius]

i think we're getting at an infinite yes-or-no-argument. you take language as only a means, i take it as the basis, means and goal of communication. you only leave a posteriori, i only a priori.

i don't deny my knowledge of chairs is socially-mediated. knowing a chair is being inducted in a speech community, since all knowing is mediated in language or speech.

btw calling someone a charlatan is often more a sign of weakness than of understanding.

[Wolf Larson]

I think the film has definitely hit on something, but it leaves the politics out almost completely -- and to try explain US capitalism without mentioning the class war is to leave the most important part out. This then makes the film fall into the same trap, that is, of concentrating on individuals, not on the social.

And, I'll need more persuading that Sartre's works is not fit for the Hume treatment -- "into the falmes with it!".
Watch it from part one on google all the way to part four. Each part is one hour long. You'll learn a lot [if you already don't know- but I'm sure you do] concerning the use of psychology/focus groups/propaganda to legitimize capitalism -to form our current fetish with things and stuff. It's more a film concerning the psychological tactics capitalists use. First it was Freud they used then Sartre.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Belisarius:


i think we're getting at an infinite yes-or-no-argument. you take language as only a means, i take it as the basis, means and goal of communication. you only leave a posteriori, i only a priori.

And yet your a priori can't give you any knowledge.


i don't deny my knowledge of chairs is socially-mediated. knowing a chair is being inducted in a speech community, since all knowing is mediated in language or speech.

I fail to see how that helps your case.


btw calling someone a charlatan is often more a sign of weakness than of understanding.

In this case, it's an accurate description.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Wolf Larson:


Watch it from part one on google all the way to part four. Each part is one hour long. You'll learn a lot [if you already don't know- but I'm sure you do] concerning the use of psychology/focus groups/propaganda to legitimize capitalism -to form our current fetish with things and stuff. It's more a film concerning the psychological tactics capitalists use. First it was Freud they used then Sartre.

I will, but not until next week.