Possible worlds

[Meridian]

In my metaphysics class I got an assignment about the theory of "possible worlds"; how necessary truths, possible truths and impossible truths relate to the theory of possible worlds.

Additionally, I am supposed to give my opinion on the argument that "if A is identical to B, then they are necessarily identical". I am not sure what that is supposed to mean.

I would appreciate any help, comments, etc. Not only on the questions above, but the theory of "possible worlds", modal logic, etc.

Personally, I suspect this is a whole bunch of bullshit but if anyone thinks otherwise then I appreciate to hear about it.

Here are some links relating to it:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-modal/

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is how I have tackled this in one of my unpublished Essays:


More recently, some theorists have managed to side-step the tangled mess into which Meinong’s work dropped Ontology by postulating the 'existence' of "possible worlds" to account for things like truth and reference (etc.), to provide a semantic model for Modal Logic and/or counterfactual conditionals. The problem with these moves is that those making them have to be prepared to countenance the existence of all possibilities distributed across such worlds. However, this seemingly trivial concession has fatal consequences for all such theories. Consider one of these: it is surely possible that the advocates of every version of this theory are individually or collectively completely wrong. If so, it is possible to prove that they are wrong, even if we cannot yet do this. But, if all possibilities are to be realised across the entire set of possible worlds, and if it is possible to refute this family of theories, and therefore to argue that such worlds do not exist, then there is a possible world in which this has already been done! That is, there is a possible world in which someone has proved that possible worlds do not exist (on any interpretation), and that therefore there are no such possible worlds!

On the other hand, if every possibility is not realised across all possible worlds then the motivation to accept this family of theories (because it provides a comprehensive account of modality, reference and truth, etc.) completely disappears.

Naturally, this ‘refutation’ of “Possible World Semantics” is a little too glib - and far too brief - to convince anyone. However, it is possible to strengthen it considerably, turning it into a cast iron and totally unanswerable argument. This will not be attempted here. There is no need to anyway, since, fortuitously, there is a possible world in which someone has already done this, saving me the job!

Incidentally, I pointed this major flaw out to one of the high priests of modal logic and possible world semantics – Professor YYYY – at a seminar in the early 1980s at the University of XXXX. I’m not sure he appreciated the neatness of my refutation of much of his professional life’s work. Despite this I am reasonably convinced that there is possible world in which he not only genuinely thanked me for my efforts, he heartily agreed with my conclusions.

The problem with 'possible world' semantics is that it presents us with far too generous a blank cheque, and no rules to help us discriminate among such absurdities. So, no wonder it self-destructs in the above manner.

As for this:


"if A is identical to B, then they are necessarily identical". I am not sure what that is supposed to mean.

They are I think getting you to consider contingent identity. For example, if these are the case:

1) K2 is identical to Mt Godwin Austen:


K2 appeared over the 40 million years or so that India has been colliding with greater Asia. It was 'discovered' (i.e. by the British) and designated K2 (Karakoram Peak 2) in 1856. The peak was granted the name [Mount Godwin-Austen] in 1888, after its first surveyor, Col Henry Haversham Godwin-Austen (1834-1923). The previous title is now preferred as being less imperialistic. Ordinarily a mountain would revert to its local name, but K2 is so remote that it appears never to have gained one.

See the Wikipedia article, too:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K2

2) Mount Everest is identical to Chomolungma.


"In Nepal they call it Sagarmatha. To the people of Tibet, it is Chomolungma, though the ruling Chinese prefer the variant Qomolangma. When the British first began mapping India, they knew it as Peak B, then as Peak XV. But in 1865, to honour the surveyor-general of India who first mapped it, Peak XV was given the name Mount Everest. And Everest the mountain has remained throughout much of the rest of the world to this day.

"Now China is launching a fresh effort to outlaw the name Everest. Accusing British colonialists of 'raping the sacred mountain of Tibetans by giving it a false name', Chinese newspapers are calling on the world to 'respect Tibetans' by using the 50th anniversary of the first ascent next year to recognise the mountain henceforward as Qomolangma.

"At first sight, the proposal does not seem unreasonable. There are, after all, lofty precedents for such renaming. The highest point in Africa, the summit of Kilimanjaro, which was once known as Kaiser Wilhelm Spitze, properly became Uhuru Peak. The world's second-highest peak, once Mount Godwin-Austen to the British, has become K2 (ironically this also dates from imperial survey days). But doubts about the new proposal soon creep in. If Everest is unacceptable, why should the world not prefer the Nepalese name to the Chinese or Tibetan one? Who are the Chinese, of all people, to accuse others of raping Tibet? And how is the 'English language hegemonism' of which China complains worse than its Chinese language equivalent?

"We hold no great brief for the name Everest, though it has to be said that the word has a fine ring to it. But the answer is to live and let live. If people prefer Chomolungma, let them use that name. If others want to stick with Everest, let them do so too. We have no problem with diversity, though the Chinese may. In the end, the world's greatest mountain is surely more important than any name that mere mortals give to it." [The Guardian, 20/11/02.]

Are these necessary identities? If so, they were identical before these words were invented. But that is absurd. On the other hand, if they are contingent, how can this be if these names refer to the same object?

And they want you to look at arguments like this:

3) The number of the planets = nine (assuming Pluto is a planet).

4) Nine is necessarily greater than seven.

5) Hence, the number of planets is necessarily = to a number greater than seven.

But the solar system might have developed in a different way, giving it only five planets.

So, we seem to have good grounds for regarding some identities as contingent, but when we do, we seem to come to grief somewhere else.

The (modern) classical source of this is Frege's Essay: 'On Sense And Meaning'.

For more details, check out Harold Noonan's essay:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/

[Meridian]

But, if all possibilities are to be realised across the entire set of possible worlds, and if it is possible to refute this family of theories, and therefore to argue that such worlds do not exist, then there is a possible world in which this has already been done! That is, there is a possible world in which someone has proved that possible worlds do not exist (on any interpretation), and that therefore there are no such possible worlds!Hehe, that is a good argument.

Thanks for the help.

I am not sure if I understood the concept of contingent identity / necessary identical. It seems to me, whether you name a thing "A" or "B" does not really matter. "A" could very well refer to some other thing tomorrow (or in 'another world'), rendering it not necessarily identical with "B". I guess I have things confused.

"The number 5 is necessarily = to a number greater than 3."

Wouldn't that escape what you said about our solar system? Or could f.ex. "the number 5" in another world refer to what we in our world call "the number 2"? I suppose that might just be linguistic nitpicking on my part.

[red cat]

In my metaphysics class I got an assignment about the theory of "possible worlds"; how necessary truths, possible truths and impossible truths relate to the theory of possible worlds.

Additionally, I am supposed to give my opinion on the argument that "if A is identical to B, then they are necessarily identical". I am not sure what that is supposed to mean.

I would appreciate any help, comments, etc. Not only on the questions above, but the theory of "possible worlds", modal logic, etc.

Personally, I suspect this is a whole bunch of bullshit but if anyone thinks otherwise then I appreciate to hear about it.

Here are some links relating to it:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-modal/

Possible worlds as in the multiverse hypothesis ?

[ZeroNowhere]

I believe Guy Robinson had treated the idea of 'possible worlds' in his book. Rosa may have the chapter on hand.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^To the best of my recollection, I don't think he did, sorry, Zero.

Meridian:


I am not sure if I understood the concept of contingent identity / necessary identical. It seems to me, whether you name a thing "A" or "B" does not really matter. "A" could very well refer to some other thing tomorrow (or in 'another world'), rendering it not necessarily identical with "B". I guess I have things confused.

Well, it centres around the alleged fact that some things are accidentally related. Had Fred Bloggs discovered K2, and named it after himself, then this would be true "K2 is identical to Mount Bloggs", and this would not "K2 is idemtical with Mount Godwin-Austen".


"The number 5 is necessarily = to a number greater than 3."

Wouldn't that escape what you said about our solar system? Or could f.ex. "the number 5" in another world refer to what we in our world call "the number 2"? I suppose that might just be linguistic nitpicking on my part.

Well, that would merely be a terminological difference. But, like everything in philosophy, this is an angle that might be worth persuing. I don't think it will take you very far, but you are welcome to explore it.

The recent locus classicus of all this is Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity, which changed the way most analytic philosophers view this topic -- wrongly in my view...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Possible worlds as in the multiverse hypothesis ?

No, it has nothing to do with this.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I'm taking a course on modal logic at the moment, but I'm certainly not an expert. Far from it. Here are some of Quine's objections, including the 8 planets reasoning:

http://www.johnwoods.ca/Courses/Phil322a-10/notes/Philosophy%20322A%20Spring%202010%20note%20number% 20fifteen.pdf

Here are some responses to Quine's objections that the modal logician can provide:

http://www.johnwoods.ca/Courses/Phil322a-10/notes/Philosophy%20322A%20Spring%202010%20Note%20number% 20sixteen.pdf

Unsurprisingly, the modal logicians favor the responses. I actually lean towards refuting Quine as well, but that doesn't mean modal logic is free and clear. That just means it may escape Quine's objections. Rosa might save Quine, though, as she probably knows more about it. Then again, I'd say she's on a particular side of the debate, and I'm certainly not skilled enough in logic to provide a good opposition (nor am I decided definitively on the issue).

***

This is for my benefit, primarily:

In philosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy), identity (also called sameness) is whatever makes an entity definable and recognizable, in terms of possessing a set of qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from entities of a different type.[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_%28philosophy%29#cite_note-0)[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_%28philosophy%29#cite_note-1) Or, in layman (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Layman)'s terms, identity is whatever makes something the same (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/same) or different (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/different).[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_%28philosophy%29#cite_note-2)

***

Modal logic is considering identity and referring to either facts about the world or metaphysical possibility. There "could" be sitting on a red chair, but I am not. That might not be true, but the idea is red is a distinguishing characteristic of the red chair. Although degrees of red can exist, that is a flaw in our language precision. I'm not sure how these identities emerge (as discovers or fictions) is that important to modal logic.

Philosophers, mathematicians, and logicians highly value their logical systems. Hence, Kripke's proof of the necessity of identity makes him win a lot of supporters:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterpart_theory#Counterpart_theory_and_the_nece ssity_of_identity

***

Now if I say "It's not necessary that I am human," I could be a turtle and people would legitimately say - look, there is a significant difference here. Maybe this is convention. I'm sympathetic to that view as are others, but I know some far more knowledgeable individuals believe otherwise so it's not definitive how identities operate as far as I am aware.

***

Now Kripke says "conceivability = possibility." Is something is conceivable, then they are distinct identities. Descartes is using this reasoning before the terminology is developed. He argues that the mind and body are "conceivably" distinct so, therefore, they must be distinct because they are "capable of being separated by God." Kripke doesn't use religion to justify his arguments and they are supported by secular people, but he is himself religious so he may have motivations. Then again, people still try to deny that Descartes philosophy was motivated by a desire to support a religious agenda, which I think it clearly was.

A lot of modal logicians, one among them is my favorite professor thus far (who happened to study under Putnam), reject that conceivability = necessity. I am always open to changing my mind, but I reject that as well. I think Kripke confuses epistemology with metaphysics in the same way he accuses opponents of doing with respect to necessary identity (which is a brilliant argument, philosophically speaking). A way of explaining Kripke's mistake might be that "John thought it was conceivable for him to lift the rock, in our world, without help, but he was mistaken. It was far to heavy for him to do so." Now the use of "within our world" might upset Kripke rightfully, but I have forgotten a mathematical example my professor has given. Basically, it's conceivable that X is mathematically possible, but it turns out that's not the case. Given that mathematics is consistent across worlds, conceivability = possibility is false.

Then you can argue about the meaning of conceivability and whether it was truly conceived. Clearly, it takes a certain time of insanity to be a philosopher, one I happen to suffer from. I mean philosopher in a loose sense. I'm by no means qualified to include myself with legitimate academics, in my view.

[Meridian]

Thanks for all the good comments. I am afraid I am still quite confused.



Well, it centres around the alleged fact that some things are accidentally related. Had Fred Bloggs discovered K2, and named it after himself, then this would be true "K2 is identical to Mount Bloggs", and this would not "K2 is idemtical with Mount Godwin-Austen".
But, it seems to me that all you are saying is that "'term 1' refers to the same as 'term 2', but it could be that 'term 1' referred to 'term 3'." :confused:


Now if I say "It's not necessary that I am human," I could be a turtle and people would legitimately say - look, there is a significant difference here. Maybe this is convention. I'm sympathetic to that view as are others, but I know some far more knowledgeable individuals believe otherwise so it's not definitive how identities operate as far as I am aware.
Actually, I think the properly legitimate response to that is just "you are batshit insane". Unless I royally misunderstand, I honestly don't see how this constitutes a legitimate philosophy. "In another world I could be a turtle." - Really? Then how would that be you? And what would make it another world? If it is something fathomable to us, which it seems it must be, then doesn't that make it of our world and reality?

[Dean]

Rosa provided a pretty good criticism of the 'possible worlds' theory.


Additionally, I am supposed to give my opinion on the argument that "if A is identical to B, then they are necessarily identical". I am not sure what that is supposed to mean.

It seems to me to be a very simple issue. Consider the following:
A=Hours
B=Minutes

At 12:12, A=B. This is obvious. But the above adds another argument: "they are necessarily identical."

For one thing, this is incredibly vague. In the context of the moment wherein A=B, yes, the two are necessarily identical. But if we go deeper into the working of minutes and hours, it becomes clear that the two are typically not identical.

Does "necessary" mean "continually"? Does it mean "fundamentally"? Clearly, "necessarily" indicates a deeper, more profound, or greater period of "identical-ness." But what fundamentally is being said here? For that matter, does "A is identical to B" provide an example of total, absolute identical-ness? If so, then yes, they are merely repeating the same phrase in two different ways, maybe asking you to compare them (and in this case, my hours/minutes example is irrelevant).

But this question sounds like incredibly vague nonsense, really. No clear distinctions are given as to what "necessarily identical" and "are identical" specifically entail, and subsequently we are lacking in basic knowledge as to what is being asked, and cannot honestly answer.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


But, it seems to me that all you are saying is that "'term 1' refers to the same as 'term 2', but it could be that 'term 1' referred to 'term 3'."

I am not sure what you mean by "term 1" etc.

[Meridian]

I am not sure what you mean by "term 1" etc.
My point was that if we are talking about objects being identical, it seems to me that we are just using two different expressions to talk about the same object. They are synonymous. If we use two terms referring to two different objects, the terms/objects are not identical.

So is not the word "identical" here replaceable with the word "synonymous"?:

Had Fred Bloggs discovered K2, and named it after himself, then this would be true "K2 is identical to Mount Bloggs", and this would not "K2 is idemtical with Mount Godwin-Austen".

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Actually, I think the properly legitimate response to that is just "you are batshit insane". Unless I royally misunderstand, I honestly don't see how this constitutes a legitimate philosophy. "In another world I could be a turtle." - Really? Then how would that be you? And what would make it another world? If it is something fathomable to us, which it seems it must be, then doesn't that make it of our world and reality?

My apologies I was saying that it wouldn't be possible for me to be a turtle because, by virtue of what makes me "me," I am not a turtle.

[Dean]

My point was that if we are talking about objects being identical, it seems to me that we are just using two different expressions to talk about the same object. They are synonymous. If we use two terms referring to two different objects, the terms/objects are not identical.

I think that the point is that there are different ways in which something can be the same, or "identical." What is not clear is what level of identical-ness is being expressed in the original phrase. If it means a total, non-divergent sameness, then the very expression 'A is identical to B' could be seen as flawed, since there is a difference between the two - one is expressed as 'A,' the other, 'B.'

As I said before, without properly identifying what is being said, its a meaningless question. The original question could be seen as obviously true or obviously false depending on how you define "identical" and "necessarily identical."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


My point was that if we are talking about objects being identical, it seems to me that we are just using two different expressions to talk about the same object. They are synonymous. If we use two terms referring to two different objects, the terms/objects are not identical.

And yet we might actually discover this by an empirical investigation.

To use Frege's example, Venus is now known as both the morning star and the evening star, but the fact that the morning star is identical to the evening star wasn't always known to be true. They were once thought to be two different heavenly objects. So this identity was a real discovery. In that case, "The evening star is identical to the morning star" cannot be about the use of two expressions for the same object, since when these names were introduced, they were about what were thought to be two different objects.

Here's a more recent example:


"In 2003, at team...[in] Moscow discovered two distant elliptical galaxies just a whisker apart. Detailed analysis of the twins known as CSL-1, suggested that they were images of the same galaxy.

"The team suggested that the duplicate images were being created by a "cosmic string".... If one of these cosmic strings were to pass between Earth and a giant galaxy, the warping of space-time by the string would create a gravitational lens and form two identical images of the galaxy -- exactly like CSL-1....

"Unfortunately for the proponents of cosmic strings, observations with Hubble on 12 January have revealed that CSL-1 is actually two different galaxies...." [New Scientist 189, 2537, 04/02/06, p.21.]

This is the reverse of Frege's example. If this was just a terminological question, scientists would not have attempted to make any observations to test this alleged identity.

And 'synonymous' applies to words that aren't singular designating expressions (i.e., names and definite descriptions -- such as "The President of the USA in 2010"); in such cases, where they pick out the same object, or we think they do, we say they are 'co-referential'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dean is right, our use of words for identity and difference (such as "equal", "same", "exactly", "precisely", etc.) is highly comples, and far richer and complicated than traditional philosophers have acknowledged.

The material I have used in this thread is taken from Essay Six, at my site. Here is just a tiny example of the complexity available to us in just some of our use of words for identity and difference, taken from the same essay (no pun intended):


However, the use of ordinary words for identity and difference is surprisingly varied, and disconcertingly complex. Consider the following (greatly shortened) list of examples:

E1: The same letter can appear in the same word in different places, and in a different word in the same place (e.g., "t" can appear first and fourth in both "trite" and "trot"); a different letter can appear in the same word, in the same or in a different place (e.g., if "chien" and "dog" are counted as the same word in different languages, "c" appears in the first place in the French word, and "d" in the same (i.e., first) place in the English word, and the different letters "d" and "g" appear in the same English word). The same word, in the same or different places in a sentence, can mean the same or different things (e.g., in Chomsky's example, "Pretty little girls' school", the word "pretty" can be taken in several ways, depending on how the whole phrase is read, as can each sub-phrase: "Pretty little", "little girls'" and "Pretty little girls'", to name but three), and different words, in the same or different places, can mean the same or different things (as in, "The striker hit the scab" and "The scab was hit by the striker" (where the same words mean the same in different places in two different sentences with the same sense); and "The striker hit the ball", where the same word could mean different things (i.e., "striker" could mean a player on a Football field or someone engaged in a strike)). Moreover, the same word can mean different things at one and the same time to two different people (e.g., if one of them reads it as a code word, on one occasion), and different things to the same person at different times (if, say, their facility with the language concerned improves). Naturally, permutations like this can be knitted together endlessly to form complex identity/equality sentences that we can all understand, given the right level of concentration. For example, the same word could mean different things to the same person at different times, but the same thing in different places, while it could mean the same thing at the same time or at different times in the same place or in different places to the same or different people (etc.).

E2: The same numeral can appear in the same place in the same number in different places at the same or different times (e.g., the figure "9" in a mathematics book, or on a bank statement), or in the same place different numbers (as in 191 and 1911). Not only that, identically the same numeral can appear in the same number in different places, where it will have a different mode of signification (e.g., in 2500, 2450 and 2445; here the same numeral "5" means something different in each case, or in 191 and 1911 where the "9" appears in the same place (i.e., second from the left) but means something different, or where it appears in different places (in the tens column and in the hundreds column) but could mean the same (i.e., if the "9" in 191 stood for 90 ten pence pieces, and the "9" in 1911 stood for 900 one pence pieces)). Furthermore, the same numeral can appear in the same sign in the same place and mean something different, depending on how it is read (e.g., the numeral "1" in "10" could mean "one" written in the tens column, or it could mean "one" written in the unitary power of two column in binary code, with the first "one" signifying "ten" and the second indicating "two"). Or the very same "2" on a clock face could signify 2am or 2pm. Or think of the way that "1" can mean something different if it occurs in the same place in 01/02 and 01/02; in the first it could mean the 1st of February (if read by a UK citizen), in the second, the 2nd of January (if read by a US citizen). So, in the last few cases, the very same thing could be identical in certain respects while being different or unequal in others. Examples are easy to multiply. The same points (or different ones) can be made about the same (or different) musical notes, dance steps, gestures, works of art, signs, signals, symbols and noises.

E3: The same day of the week occurs in the same place in different weeks, and for 24 hours on the same day in the same week. And it can occur in the same place in different weeks of the same or different months. The reader, no doubt, can supply his/her own complex permutations as the temporal vocabulary used is changed -- as in: same/different second, minute, hour, year, decade, century, millennium, geological time period, eon…

E4: The same book can appear in different libraries in the same place, or in different libraries in different places, and a different book can appear in the same or different libraries in the same or different places. The same copy of The New York Times can be read by different people in the same place at the same time, or in different places at the same time, or in the same place at different times -- and it can be read by the same person in different places at the same or different times, and so on. The same can happen with TV programmes, films, works of art and plays.

E5: The same worker could join the same strike at different times, or different strikes at the same time (if he/she has two jobs and both are in dispute). And different workers could join the same or different strikes at the same or different times in the same or different places. And the same strike could spread to different places, involving different workers at the same or different times. The same or different cheques could be made valueless if the same Bank goes bust, and the same person could be made an orphan and a lone child at the same time if both its parents are killed in the same or different accidents at the same or different times.

E6: The same element in the periodic table can appear in different parts of the universe at the same or different times, and in the same or different compounds at the same or different times. The same geodesic can be traversed by different particles, at the same or different times. The same inertial frame can contain the same or different objects at the same or different times, and different inertial frames can contain the same or different objects at the same or different times. The same (or different) goes for cars, taxis, trains, planes, ships and buses.

And so on, ad nauseam. [Try expressing any of that in Hegel-speak!]

As noted elsewhere, ordinary (and technical/semi-technical) language has a seemingly limitless capacity for allowing its users to express complex and subtle differences in meaning way beyond that permitted by the lifeless, non-material language found in traditional philosophy -- in particular, Hegel. This is not surprising: ordinary and technical/semi-technical languages were formed over tens of thousands of years by working people/materially-motivated scientists in their interaction with the world and with one another; these systems of communication reflect our species' complex inter-relationship with changing reality -- and contain our best guide to identity, sameness and difference, and much else besides.

In contrast, Hegel's lifeless, jargon-bound language reflects alienated ruling-class consciousness (cobbled-together in a dubious and class-compromised tradition of thought that stretches back over two thousand years), and (in Hegel's case) was invented by a man who, in his theoretical activity, was more concerned with his relation to the world of ideas than with his ordinary interaction with objects and processes in the material world. Small wonder then that his ideas cannot cope with living, material reality.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2006.htm

[ZeroNowhere]

^^^To the best of my recollection, I don't think he did, sorry, Zero.I just checked, and it would seem that he did mention it, as well as the transworld identification problem, in the chapter on 'Nature and Necessity'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, thanks for the reminder!

[Meridian]

After having read some more of my curriculum, hehe, I found out the basis of the argument of necessity of identity in my original post. My metaphysics book is called 'A Survey of Metaphysics', by E. J. Lowe.

Here is the argument in full:



For any object x, it is necessarily the case that x is identical with x. [the necessity of self-identity]
For any objects x and y, if x is identical with y, then whatever is true of x is also true of y. [Leibniz' Law]
a is identical with b. [assumption]
It is necessarily the case that a is identical with a. [from (1)]
It is true of a that it is necessarily identical with a. [from (4)]
If a is identical with b, then whatever is true of a is also true of b. [from (2)]
Whatever is true of a is also true of b. [from (3) and (6)]
It is true of b that it is necessarily identical with a. [from (5) and (7)]
It is necessarily the case that a is identical with b. [from (8)]

Therefore:
If a is identical with b, then it is necessarily the case that a is identical with b.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The point is, as Wittgenstein argued in the Tractatus, in a properly constructed formal language, identity is superfluous, since identity will be expressed by the use of the same variable letter.

In addition, nothing metaphysical follows from this, and for the reasons I have outlined here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

[Meridian]

So, what you are saying is that "a is identical with b" is actually "a is identical with a"? That "a is identical with b" here means "a is b"? Must not this be true, given that they are identical? If so, I get what you mean by superfluous. You could as well say "b is identical with b" or "a is identical with a".

And the conclusion from my previous post could as well be written as:
If a is identical with a, then it is necessarily the case that a is identical with a.

Which seems to me to be simply the "necessity of self-identity" which was its first premise.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


So, what you are saying is that "a is identical with b" is actually "a is identical with a"? That "a is identical with b" here means "a is b"? Must not this be true, given that they are identical? If so, I get what you mean by superfluous. You could as well say "b is identical with b" or "a is identical with a".

No, such identity 'propositions' are senseless; they can't be false, so they can't be true (the rationale for that statement can be found in the links I posted); in fact, I'd go further and say they are non-sensical (that is, they are incapable of being either true or false).

Hence, except where we are dealing with contingent identity (see below), the identity relation is an empty one. We indicate identity by the use of the same name (which comes with a criterion of identity) for the same person.

So, we do not need to say "Blair is identical with Blair"; his (verbal) identity comes with the use of his name, and the criteria we use to identify people: name, fingerprints, date of birth..., and now DNA profile.


If a is identical with a, then it is necessarily the case that a is identical with a.

Which seems to me to be simply the "necessity of self-identity" which was its first premise.

Well, this is one of those unsolvable pseudo-problems traditional philosophy regularly threw up, since philosophers insist on using words in odd ways.

When in ordinary life would you say "Blair is identical with Blair"?

Now, as I noted earlier, we might be interested in contingent identity ("K2 is the same as Mt Godwin-Austen"), but even here we are merely alluding to the fact that this mountain has two names, and anyone who thought they named different mountains would have made a simple error, or was unaware perhaps that these were two names of the same mountain.

Very little metaphysics can be squeezed out of that dry husk.

No one (except a philosopher in the grip of a theory) would argue that since K2 is identical with Mt Godwin-Austen, K2 is identical with itself, since that is expressed by the use of that name to name to same mountain.

Anyone who did not know how to use this word in this way would certainly be in no position to reveal deep philosophical truths to us.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

So, what you are saying is that "a is identical with b" is actually "a is identical with a"? That "a is identical with b" here means "a is b"? Must not this be true, given that they are identical? If so, I get what you mean by superfluous. You could as well say "b is identical with b" or "a is identical with a".

Here is why there is an issue between A=A and A=B. You can know a=a simply by having knowledge about how identities work. By definition, a=a is a true statement. The necessity of identity is valid by definition.

A=B seems to be a more complex situation. You can have A = Clark Kent and B = Superman. I can be unaware that Clark Kent is Superman, but this still holds in the same way a=a holds where I am unfamiliar with logic.

Some want to say Clark Kent could have been someone other than Superman. Therefore, the statement Clark Kent=Superman is not a necessary identity, but Clark Kent=Clark Kent is a necessary identity by virtue of how names and identities operate.

Kripke and others want to say that any statement a=b that is valid becomes a necessary statement. If you say Clark Kent=Superman you're saying a=a and, therefore, there is necessity occurring.

Removing the necessity of self-identity as an axiom isn't appealing to most people, and I'm not sure it helps. The debate is surrounding whether contingent identity can exist, in my understanding. The popular opinion, if I am correct, is that identity is necessary. This opinion was far less prevalent before Kripke.

Kripke uses a clearer example of Hesperus = Phosphorus, which I will abbreviate H=P. If H=P it is necessarily so. People saw these two planets, one in the evening and one in the morning. They mistakenly thought they were two distinct planets. Of course, they are not. H=P therefore if H=P necessarily so, by definition. Thus, identity statements are always necessary because they presuppose necessity, by definition.

It's like saying. Is Hesperus necessarily Phosphorus? No, there could have been two planets. This seems reasonable, but this is not what is occurring. The statement is really asking "could that thing over there, which we call Hesperus, not be the same thing it is, also called Phosphorus?" No, things are necessarily themselves and names, for Kripke, rigidly refer to whatever they are labeling.

***

I'm not sufficiently versed in this debate to give the best defense possible, but hopefully I can illuminate the debate occurring somewhat.

Kripke is going to disagree with Frege's view that H=P is a discovery of an identity. Kripke will have the identities already in existence independent of our finding them. By definition, whatever we might refer to as H will also be P because of how the world works. We simply haven't discovered the identity yet, I guess. Identity confuses me so that's the best I can do.

Kripke accuses people like Frege of confusing metaphysics with epistemology. Identities can be viewed in many ways, and I believe Frege is more focused on language and notions of constructing identities, but I don't know enough Frege to say for sure.

[Meridian]

Rosa, I see what you are saying, and I think it was what I tried to write in my previous post.

This is mostly for my own sake:

"If K2 is identical to Mt Godwin-Austen then they are necessarily identical."

- But that doesn't seem to make much sense. The reasoning for that 'proposition' is based on the following argument:

"If K2 is identical to K2, then it is necessarily identical."(This is what is referred to as the necessity of self-identity in my book.)

- Now, that seems to be complete rubbish to me. The "necessity of self-identity" basically says "a is necessarily identical to a", or "a = a", which is just superfluous. What does the words "necessarily identical" mean there? Following the argument it just seems like they were placed there to give easy access to the "a is necessarily identical to b" conclusion.

It is hard to criticise because it just seems meaningless to me.

Edit: I wrote this before Dooga's post.

Dooga your post was quite helpful, thanks for that.


Kripke and others want to say that any statement a=b that is valid becomes a necessary statement. If you say Clark Kent=Superman you're saying a=a and, therefore, there is necessity occurring.
I think there is some serious confusion between term and referent going on, but it might just be going on in my head!

How can language or logic alone show that a statement "referent a = referent b" is valid or not? Any statements regarding referents require empirical knowledge to know whether they are true or not; perhaps with the exception of "referent a = referent a" that does not seem to say anything at all. Therefore, if you say "Clark Kent = Superman" then you are making an empirical claim about the referents of those terms. If it was truly "referent a = referent a" (which I agree is correct but completely uninteresting) then why is claiming "Clark Kent = Superman" entirely different from claiming "Superman = Superman"? I suppose they do not have the same referent. The same applies to the morningstar/eveningstar example.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Here is why there is an issue between A=A and A=B. You can know a=a simply by having knowledge about how identities work. By definition, a=a is a true statement. The necessity of identity is valid by definition.

But, as I showed you a few months back, there are no 'necessary truths'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian, yes, I can now see you are on the right lines.

[syndicat]

yeah, following on Rosa's last post, it's possible to hold that "A is identical with B" isn't really a statement carrying truth value. If someone says

Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens

one of the things they are telling you is that whatever you believed about Mark Twain and whatever you believed about Samuel Clemens, you can now merge this info together, and treat these names as interchangeable.

I used to teach modal logic. A problem that I see is the whole concept of logical possibility that it is based on. I doubt there is such a thing. Just because one can conceive or imagine A being F, it doesn't follow that it is actually possible that A be F. We can imagine or conceive of things that happen to be impossible but without realizing this.

However, I think there is a concept of possibility that can be defended...physical possibility. Whenever we suppose that things have potentialities that they haven't realized, we are assuming that there are possibilities that are not real or actualized. A person hasn't learned to speak Russian but could do so. Her speaking Russian is a real possibility because she has the capacity to learn languages.

When we develop our conceptions or hypotheses about how things work in the real world, we develop our understanding of what is possible for them, and sometimes also what is necessary. Any electrical engineer knows Ohm's Law which tells us what must happen if you make changes in the voltage in a circuit for example. So, instead of talking about "possible worlds", I suppose we could limit ourselves to talking about physically possible situations, situations that would be actually realizable. And you could develop a kind of modal logic on that basis.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat is, I think, developing Quine's view of modality, which is certainly on the right lines.

However, the problem with this:


However, I think there is a concept of possibility that can be defended...physical possibility. Whenever we suppose that things have potentialities that they haven't realized, we are assuming that there are possibilities that are not real or actualized. A person hasn't learned to speak Russian but could do so. Her speaking Russian is a real possibility because she has the capacity to learn languages.

is that if this is to account for all actualisations (as the manifestation of a potential or a possibility), then the actualisation of a potential/possibility itself also requires a potentaility/possibility behind it to account for it, too. Down this route there exists, I fear, an infinite regress.

This does not affect our ordinary use of the words "potential"/"possibility" since it is not theoretically-based.

[syndicat]

is that if this is to account for all actualisations (as the manifestation of a potential or a possibility), then the actualisation of a potential/possibility itself also requires a potentaility/possibility behind it to account for it, too. Down this route there exists, I fear, an infinite regress.



well, this is I guess the old Bradley's Regress problem which the early Wittgenstein ran into. I think it can be gotten around. I have a piece on Bradley's Regress at:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/bradleyregress.html

basically, I think what is primitive in modality is the properties of actual physical things or systems, their possibilities of development or capacities. I think our talk of possible situations really is merely grounded in, or based on, those properties of actual physical things.

[syndicat]

that's a different sense of "world." You're thinking of planets as worlds.

in philosophy possible worlds are more all inclusive and more abstract than that. the actually existing "world" is said to encompass everything that has ever occurred and ever will occur. you can think of it as a total history of the universe. so "possible worlds" are sort of alternative histories of the universe.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that, but it's not Bradley's regress. Anyway, I'll check your article out, and get back to you.

But, who is this directed at?


that's a different sense of "world." You're thinking of planets as worlds.

in philosophy possible worlds are more all inclusive and more abstract than that. the actually existing "world" is said to encompass everything that has ever occurred and ever will occur. you can think of it as a total history of the universe. so "possible worlds" are sort of alternative histories of the universe.

[syndicat]

But, who is this directed at?


Someone who apparently deleted their post.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Dooga:



But, as I showed you a few months back, there are no 'necessary truths'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

I still have trouble with this. Which text from Hume makes this argument?

I'm having difficulty understanding how a=a and a v ~a, etc, can be anything other than necessary truths.

[syndicat]

well, your argument is directed against the idea that there are sentences where one only has to understand them to know they're true. this is the analytic apriori, i think. but there may be necessities that aren't like that, where we find out they're necessary only empirically. for example, it may be a physical necessity that any circuit have the property denoted by Ohm's Law. this would then be a kind of necessary truth, but not one known apriori. in regard to

A=A

it's not clear one has to regard it as a "truth" at all. now, it may be that

no physical surface is both red all over and yellow all over

is necessary. but, again, this may be due to the way the world is, so that it's a physical necessity, like Ohm's Law.

[Meridian]

Well, isn't it true that sentences that can be known to be true simply by seeing the sentences are tautologies? It seems to me that the only sentences where that is true are sentences like a iff. a. And those are tautologies, no?

To me, it seems like those kind of sentences does not say anything at all.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, if something can be true it must also be capable of being false; but these allegedly a priori truths cannot be false. Hence, they cannot be true.

In fact, many of them are just badly-stated rules of language (and rules can neither be true nor false, only obeyed or broken, practical or impractical...).

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Well, if something can be true it must also be capable of being false; but these allegedly a priori truths cannot be false. Hence, they cannot be true.

In fact, many of them are just badly-stated rules of language (and rules can neither be true nor false, only obeyed or broken, practical or impractical...).

What concept/theorist/argument is done to support the view that a truth must be capable of being false. I would've thought the opposite would be the case. A truth must be incapable of being false.

But even if we accept that definition, aren't things that are "true by definition" necessary truths, by definition? All bachelors are unmarried seems like a necessary truth, to me. Yes, it might be accused of circularity, but I'm inclined to think it's still a truth.

I guess most of my encounters with truth have dealt with providing validity by ruling out interpretations that are invalid (counterexamples). So the idea that truth must be capable of being false is something I'm rather unfamiliar with or am not recognizing as having already encountered.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


What concept/theorist/argument is done to support the view that a truth must be capable of being false. I would've thought the opposite would be the case. A truth must be incapable of being false.

Well, I went over this with you in detail a few months ago. Here it is again:



Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived.

Contrast this with a typical empirical proposition:

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, to the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative mood.

[Sometimes, the latter is beefed-up with subjunctive and/or modal qualifying terms (such as 'must', 'necessary', etc.) -- which, incidentally, helps create even more of a false impression.]

Now, this apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

As noted above, expressions like these look as if they reveal deep truths about reality since they certainly resemble empirical propositions (i.e., propositions about matters of fact). In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again an ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative (but nonetheless typical metaphysical) sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

In order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or not.

However, the comprehension of T2 and T3 goes hand-in-hand with knowing either or both are true (or, conversely, knowing either or both are false). The truth of T2 and T3 thus follows from the meaning of certain words (or from certain definitions -- i.e., from yet more words).



This now intimately links the truth status of T2 and T3 with [I]meaning, but not with material confirmation/facts, and hence not with a confrontation with reality. Their truth-status is independent of and anterior to the evidence (even if there were any!).

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent its confirmation or refutation -- indeed, it would be impossible to do either if T1 had not already been understood. However, the truth/falsehood of T1-type propostions follows from the way the world is, not solely from meaning.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth/falsehood on their faces, as it were.

So here, we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different 'relation' to 'reality'.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

In the second (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or on those in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true.

Indeed, metaphysical theses (like T2 and T3) are deliberately constructed to transcend the limitations of the material world, which tactic is excused on the grounds that it allows the aspiring metaphysician to uncover "underlying essences", revealing nature's "hidden secrets". Theses like these are "necessarily true" (or "necessarily false"), and are thus held to express genuine knowledge of fundamental aspects of reality, unlike contingent/empirical propositions whose actual truth-status can alter with the wind. Traditionally, this meant that empirical propositions like T1 were considered to be incapable of revealing authentic knowledge. Indeed, "philosophical knowledge" (underlying absolute certainty) has always been held to be of the sort delivered by T2 or T3-type sentences: necessary, a priori, non-contingent, and generated by thought alone.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound super-empirical truths which cannot fail to be true (or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be). They do this by aping the indicative mood --, but they go way beyond this. Thus, what they say does not just happen to be this way or that, as with ordinary empirical truths -- these propositions cannot be otherwise. The world must conform to whatever they say. Indeed, this accounts for the use of modal terms (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") if and when their status is questioned --, or, of course, whenever their content is being sold to us -- as in "I must exist if I can think", or "Existence can't be a predicate".

Conversely, if anyone were to question the truth of T1, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of Das Kapital" would be highly inappropriate -- unless, perhaps, T1 itself were the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one", or it was based on a direct observation statement. But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

In the latter case, with empirical propositions, reality is dictating to us whether what we say is true or false. We would not be dictating to reality what it must contain, or what it must be like, as metaphysicial theses have always done.

Hence, with respect to T2 and T3, things are radically different; the second option above applies, for their truth-values (true or false) can be determined independently and in advance of the way the world happens to be. Here, the essential nature of reality can be ascertained from words/thought alone. Such Super-Truths (or Super-Falsehoods) can be derived solely from the alleged meaning of the words sentences like T2 and T3 contain (or from the 'concepts' they somehow express). In that case, once understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or their own falsehood. They are thus true a priori.

So, to understand a metaphysical thesis is to know it is true or to know it is false. That is why, to their inventors, metaphysical propositions appear to be so certain and self-evident. Questioning them seems to run against the grain of our understanding, not of our experience. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their truth-status; they provide their own evidence, and testify on their own behalf. Their veracity follows from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, guarantee their own truth (or falsehood).

Unfortunately, this divorces such theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or false on conceptual grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one.

This might seem to be a somewhat dogmatic statement to make, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality (and on one whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test), which collapses into incoherence when examined closely.

The paradoxical nature metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic principles on which it is based -- those which, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such a fuss.

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth-status; it is not possible to verify/falsify an alleged proposition if no one understands it.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, or when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such linguistic/structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded by those who propose them as truths, or Super-truths, about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appears to go hand in hand with knowing their 'truth' (or their 'falsehood'): they are based on features of thought/language, not on the material world. This means that they can't be related to the material world or anything in it, and hence they can't be used to help change it.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture. But this is not so with such 'reflected' theses.

On the other hand, if their truth-status can be ascertained from such propositions/'thoughts' alone (i.e., if they are "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture. Naturally, this just means that such 'thoughts'/propositions cannot be reflections of the world, whatever else they are.

Another odd feature of metaphysical theses is worth underlining: since the truth-values of defective sentences like these are plainly not determined by the world, they have to be given a truth-value by fiat. That is, they have to be declared "necessarily true" or "necessarily false", and this is plainly because their truth-status cannot be derived from the world, with which they cannot now be compared.

Or, more grandiloquently, their opposites have to be pronounced "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- a Philosopher of some sort.

Metaphysical decrees like this are as common as dirt in traditional thought.

Isolated theses like these have necessary truth or falsehood bestowed on them as a gift. Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, they are derived solely from or compared only with other related theses (or to be more honest, they are merely compared with yet more obscure jargon) as part of a terminological gesture at 'verification'. Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal and 100% bogus.

The normal cannons that determine when something is true or false (i.e., a comparison with reality) have to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- or, if it is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a sort of 'thought experiment', or perhaps as part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.

As far as traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what happened as the subject developed; philosophers simply invented more and more jargonised words, juggled with such bogus terminology, and thereby derived countless 'truths' from thought/language alone.

But, none of these 'truths' can be given a sense, no matter what is done with them; in that case, they are all non-sensical.

These ideas are worked out in extensive detail, and defended in depth here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

This, of course, illustrates why Marx said:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels, (1970) The German Ideology, p.118.]

Now, there is a reason why traditional theorists attempted to derive 'truths' from thought alone. I have already summarised this reason; here it is again:


This traditional way of seeing reality taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who have always viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for each ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

And this is why all of traditional philosophy is dogmatic, and thus non-sensical.

Now the reason why this traditional approach to 'philosophical truth' has dominated 'western' (and 'eastern') thought for 2500 years was outlined by Marx, too:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65.]

And:



You:

So “I must finally conclude that the proposition, ‘I am,’ ‘I exist,’ is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind”

This is a classic example of the sort of 'proposition', which has no truth conditions (that is, it's alleged 'truth' follows from the supposed meaning of the words it contains, not from the way the world happens to be, which I exposed as non-sensical in this reply I gave you recently):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

So, this thesis of Descartes derives from thought alone.

The phrase 'necessarily true' is a dead give-away.

Here is why (this is an excerpt from Essay Twelve Part One, and uses a metaphysical claim of Lenin's -- about motion and matter -- to illustrate the point, but it is easily adaptable to cover what Descartes opined):


An empirical proposition derives its sense from the truth possibilities it appears to hold open (which options will later be decided upon one way or the other by a confrontation with the material world). That is why the actual truth-value of, say, T1 (or its contradictory, T2) does not need to be known before it is understood, but it is also why evidence is relevant to establishing that truth-value.

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

T2: Tony Blair does not own a copy of Das Kapital.

All that is required here is some grasp of the possibilities that both of these hold open. T1 and T2 both have the same content, and are both made true or false by the same situation obtaining or not.

It is also why it is easy to imagine T1 as true even when it is false, or false when it is true. In general, comprehension of empirical propositions involves an understanding of the conditions under which they would/could be true or false; as is well-known, these are otherwise called their truth-conditions. That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm their actual truth status by comparison with the world, since they would in that case know what to look for/expect.

As we saw earlier, these non-negotiable facts about language underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social -- and hence the communal and communicational -- nature of discourse, but they fly in the face of metaphysical/representational theories, which emphasise the opposite: that to understand a proposition goes hand-in-hand with knowing it is true (or knowing it is false) -- by-passing the confirmation/disconfirmation stage (thus reducing the usual 'truth-conditions' to only one option).

However, there are other serious problems this approach to language faces over and above the fact it would make knowledge un-communicable.

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth-status, as we have seen.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or syntactic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded (by those who propose them) as truths (or Supertruths) about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of a metaphysical proposition appears to go hand in hand with knowing its 'truth' (or its 'falsehood') -- it is based on features of thought/language alone, and not on the material world.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world, which might seem (to some) to nullify the above comments.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture.

And yet, on the other hand if its truth could be ascertained from that proposition/'thought' itself (i.e., if it were "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture, which just means that that 'thought'/proposition cannot be a reflection of the world, whatever else it is.

Furthermore, and worse, if a proposition is purported to be empirical, but which can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, T3, below, according to Lenin) then, as we will see, paradox must ensue.

Consider the following sentences, the first of which Lenin would presumably have declared necessarily false (if not "unthinkable"):

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare T3 necessarily (and always) false, the possibility of its truth must first be entertained (as we saw). Thus, if the truth of T3 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as necessarily false, then whatever would make it true has to be ruled out conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what T3 rules in so that he/she could comprehend what it is that is being disqualified by its rejection as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done if what T3 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic/conceptual grounds.

Consequently, if a proposition like T3 is necessarily false this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say (or to think) what could count as making T3 true. Indeed, Lenin himself had to declare it "unthinkable" (in T4).

However, because the truth of the original proposition (T4) cannot even be conceived, Lenin was thus in no position to say what was excluded by its rejection.

Unfortunately, this prevents any account being given of what would make T3 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, paradoxically, T3 would now be necessarily false if and only if it was not capable of being thought of as necessarily false!

That is: T3 could be thought of as necessarily false if and only if what would make it true could at least be entertained just in order to rule it out as necessarily false. But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make T3 true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. And, if the truth of T3 -- or the conditions under which it would be true -- cannot be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we would then not know what was being ruled out.

In that case, the negation of T3 can neither be accepted nor rejected by anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that it could be either countenanced or repudiated. Hence, T3 would lose any sense it had, since it could not under any circumstances be either true or false.

This is in fact just another consequence of saying that an empirical proposition and its negation have the same content. It is also connected with the non-sensicality of all metaphysical 'propositions', for their negations do not have the same content. Indeed, because their negations do not picture anything that could be the case in any possible world, they have no content at all. That, of course, evacuates the content of the original non-negated proposition.

As we can now see, the radical misuse of language governing the formation of what look like empirical propositions (such as T3, or T4):

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T5: Motion never occurs without matter.

involves an implicit reference to the sorts of conditions that that underlie their normal employment/reception. Hence, when such sentences are entertained, a pretence (often genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they are capable of being understood. This is done even if certain restrictions are later placed on their further processing, as in T4. In that case, a pretence has to be that we understand what might make such propositions true, and their 'negations' false, so that those like T30 can be declared 'necessarily' false or "unthinkable".

But, this entire exercise is an empty charade, for no content can be given to propositions like T3 (and thus to T4, nor in fact to any metaphysical 'proposition').

With respect to motionless matter, even Lenin had to admit that!

Indeed, he it was who told us this 'idea' was "unthinkable".

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

Finally, as Hume pointed out, 'necessay propositions' cannot follow from contingent propositions, so they cannot be cobbled together from scientific knowledge.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

Since allegedly 'necessary truhs' are in fact misconstrued rules of language, if the are deemd 'false', then the meaning of the terms involved must change, and when that happens the proposition involved is no longer the saem as it used to be.

So, since 'necessary propositions' cannot be false, they cannot be true either.

And, as I pointed out, this is no surprise: 'necessary propositions' are misconstrued rules for the use of certain words, and rules can be neither true nor false, only obeyed or otherwise, practical or otherwise...

[syndicat]

i don't think there are these "rules of language" you talk about. What would be the evidence for their existence?

If a 6 year old says

(1) that cat is black but the other one is white

she understands "cat" as along as she can successfully identify and re-identify cats. Developmental psychologists have found that children master the concept of natural kinds, like cat, by about the age of 4. In order to do this, they have to learn, for example, that a plastic cat isn't a cat. When they understand the idea of natural kinds, they understand that there is some underlying nature or principle or cause that explains their similarity, even if they don't know what it is, so that it isn't just a question of their immediately observable traits...a very realistic looking imitation cat is still not a cat.

what tells us they understand "cat" is that they can successfully identify real cats. all you need in order to under some word that tracks entities in the world is a way to identify those things. tracking various objects and traits in the world is a function of language. people can have very different ways to identify something and still understand each other. the meaning of X doesn't differ in communication between A and B just because A and B differ in what they believe about X. there are always such differences.

altho a veterinary knows very much more than the 6 year old about cats, the public language meaning of "cat" isn't different for them. the things people believe about cats or anything else tend to vary quite a bit. if having the same beliefs about things were needed for understanding what someone is referring to, communication would be impossible. all that's needed is that a person have some way to successfully identify something.

when people use words to track particular things, such as cats or colors, they are fitting into patterns in the language community they are a part of. When the child uses "cat" she copies this word from the other instances of it she's heard. so the various instances of "cat" are related in that they fall into lineages, analogous to an human family lineage, which is the result of a DNA copying process.

different uses or "meanings" of a word fall into different lineages. for example, in the USA "black" is used not only to refer to a color but to people of African ancestry, whose skin color is usually along some range of brown. use of "black" to refer to the color black is a different use, and falls into a different succession of copies. children pick up words that that are copies of other copies and they fall into the same practice.

people continue to use words to track the same thing because if they didn't, they will be misunderstood. So the whole family of language users acts as a kind of discipline on what a person uses words to track.

if someone says

(T) if event E1 comes before E2, then E2 can't have come before E1

a person might belief this because they have plenty of experience of events following events, and the temporal reality described in (T) may seem necessary. Now it may or may not be necessary but this would be an empirical question, as it depends on the nature of time. what relativity suggests is that (T) might not be necessary. for one thing, temporal relations of this sort have their meaning, in relativity, in the succession of events in, or at, a single physical particular or "frame of reference." (T) might be necessary as a statement about temporal relations of events at an individual particular. whether we have good reason to think so is an empirical question.

thus the issue of whether there are situations that hold necessarily or not can be an empirical question. Ohm's Law might be said to be necessary in that the complex property it denotes seems to be a physically necessary feature of circuits. but this was something that was uncovered empirically.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


What would be the evidence for their existence?

The fact that we can all see when they are broken. For example, if I say, "The woman stood between the lamppost" (sic), few of us would understand that sentence as it stands, but would automatically add an 's'.


If a 6 year old says

(1) that cat is black but the other one is white

she understands "cat" as along as she can successfully identify and re-identify cats. Developmental psychologists have found that children master the concept of natural kinds, like cat, by about the age of 4. In order to do this, they have to learn, for example, that a plastic cat isn't a cat. When they understand the idea of natural kinds, they understand that there is some underlying nature or principle or cause that explains their similarity, even if they don't know what it is, so that it isn't just a question of their immediately observable traits...a very realistic looking imitation cat is still not a cat

Well, we have already established in an earlier thread that there are no 'natural kinds'. What this child has plainly learnt is how to use a certain word in the way the rest of us do. She has grasped a rule.

Hence, much of this is wasted effort (coupled with no little a priori psychology and science):


what tells us they understand "cat" is that they can successfully identify real cats. all you need in order to under some word that tracks entities in the world is a way to identify those things. tracking various objects and traits in the world is a function of language. people can have very different ways to identify something and still understand each other. the meaning of X doesn't differ in communication between A and B just because A and B differ in what they believe about X. there are always such differences.

altho a veterinary knows very much more than the 6 year old about cats, the public language meaning of "cat" isn't different for them. the things people believe about cats or anything else tend to vary quite a bit. if having the same beliefs about things were needed for understanding what someone is referring to, communication would be impossible. all that's needed is that a person have some way to successfully identify something.

when people use words to track particular things, such as cats or colors, they are fitting into patterns in the language community they are a part of. When the child uses "cat" she copies this word from the other instances of it she's heard. so the various instances of "cat" are related in that they fall into lineages, analogous to an human family lineage, which is the result of a DNA copying process.

different uses or "meanings" of a word fall into different lineages. for example, in the USA "black" is used not only to refer to a color but to people of African ancestry, whose skin color is usually along some range of brown. use of "black" to refer to the color black is a different use, and falls into a different succession of copies. children pick up words that that are copies of other copies and they fall into the same practice.

people continue to use words to track the same thing because if they didn't, they will be misunderstood. So the whole family of language users acts as a kind of discipline on what a person uses words to track.

people continue to use words to track the same thing because if they didn't, they will be misunderstood. So the whole family of language users acts as a kind of discipline on what a person uses words to track.

if someone says

(T) if event E1 comes before E2, then E2 can't have come before E1

a person might belief this because they have plenty of experience of events following events, and the temporal reality described in (T) may seem necessary. Now it may or may not be necessary but this would be an empirical question, as it depends on the nature of time. what relativity suggests is that (T) might not be necessary. for one thing, temporal relations of this sort have their meaning, in relativity, in the succession of events in, or at, a single physical particular or "frame of reference." (T) might be necessary as a statement about temporal relations of events at an individual particular. whether we have good reason to think so is an empirical question.

thus the issue of whether there are situations that hold necessarily or not can be an empirical question. Ohm's Law might be said to be necessary in that the complex property it denotes seems to be a physically necessary feature of circuits. but this was something that was uncovered empirically.

I do not disagree with much of this, I simply put a non-scientistic slant on it.

And, I'd like to see you explain what work the word 'necessary' is doing here (without descending into some form of anthropomorphism).

[syndicat]

The psychology is not apriori. Calling it "apriori" is just your way of calling it names.

I don't agree it was "established" that there are no natural kinds. Natural kinds do not presuppose an exact identity of structure. In the case of cats, what accounts for their being part of the same kind is that they are all related via the DNA copying process. Since children have elements of the design plan (DNA) of the parents, their development will then tend to give them features similar to their parents, both in terms of appearance and behavioral predispositions. There is a causal relationship of lineage that holds together the kind. In fact if you take a particular species, there will be relatively little internal variation in genetic makeup, compared to other species. For example, humans have a 99.9+% overlap with other humans in DNA, but this is closer than the 98% overlap with chimpanzees.

Now, as to what necessary would mean, this is physical necessity. So if S is physically impossible, the actual most basic physical capacities of things are such that there is no possibility of S being realized. There is no physically possible path of change through which S could be realized, or could have been realized. If there is a physically necessary relationship between S1 and S2, then the actual basic physical capacities of things are such that there is no way that S1 could occur without S2 occurring also.

we can also explain this in terms of physically possible situations. If S is physically necessary, there is no phyiscally possible situation where S would not hold.

By rules of language you seem to mean grammatical rules. But grammatical rules don't determine meaning.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


The psychology is not apriori. Calling it "apriori" is just your way of calling it names.

And your saying it isn't is, too.

I
don't agree it was "established" that there are no natural kinds. Natural kinds do not presuppose an exact identity of structure. In the case of cats, what accounts for their being part of the same kind is that they are all related via the DNA copying process. Since children have elements of the design plan (DNA) of the parents, their development will then tend to give them features similar to their parents, both in terms of appearance and behavioral predispositions. There is a causal relationship of lineage that holds together the kind. In fact if you take a particular species, there will be relatively little internal variation in genetic makeup, compared to other species. For example, humans have a 99.9+% overlap with other humans in DNA, but this is closer than the 98% overlap with chimpanzees.

But, no two cats have exactly the same DNA. And no two DNA molecules have exactly the same atomic structure. And no two atoms have exactly the same quantum state.

So, there are no natural kinds.


Now, as to what necessary would mean, this is physical necessity. So if S is physically impossible, the actual most basic physical capacities of things are such that there is no possibility of S being realized. There is no physically possible path of change through which S could be realized, or could have been realized. If there is a physically necessary relationship between S1 and S2, then the actual basic physical capacities of things are such that there is no way that S1 could occur without S2 occurring also.

we can also explain this in terms of physically possible situations. If S is physically necessary, there is no phyiscally possible situation where S would not hold.

Well this is just a re-description. I'd like to see you exaplin why this happens without descending into anthropomorphism, as I alleged.


By rules of language you seem to mean grammatical rules. But grammatical rules don't determine meaning.

Where did I say they do?

[syndicat]

But, no two cats have exactly the same DNA. And no two DNA molecules have exactly the same atomic structure. And no two atoms have exactly the same quantum state.

So, there are no natural kinds.



nonsequitur. as i explained in the case of cats, it isn't necessary for them to have the exact same DNA to form a natural kind. individuals have a particular nature. they have a structure and there are limits to what is possible for them in virtue of this. individual natures are grouped into kinds. the similarity of nature or structure between individuals in the kind may be more or less tight or loose.

re necessity:


Well this is just a re-description. I'd like to see you exaplin why this happens without descending into anthropomorphism, as I alleged.


there is no "anthropomorphism" in what i wrote.

me:
By rules of language you seem to mean grammatical rules. But grammatical rules don't determine meaning.

By rules of language you seem to mean grammatical rules. But grammatical rules don't determine meaning. Where did I say they do?

Then meaning can't be explained by reference to "rules of language."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


nonsequitur. as i explained in the case of cats, it isn't necessary for them to have the exact same DNA to form a natural kind. individuals have a particular nature. they have a structure and there are limits to what is possible for them in virtue of this. individual natures are grouped into kinds. the similarity of nature or structure between individuals in the kind may be more or less tight or loose.

Except, it's scientists who determine, statistically, or by convention, where these boundaries lie; so these are, if anything, 'conventional kinds', not natural.


there is no "anthropomorphism" in what i wrote.

Read more carefully, this time, what I did say:


Well this is just a re-description. I'd like to see you exaplin why this happens without descending into anthropomorphism, as I alleged.

You:


Then meaning can't be explained by reference to "rules of language."

Where did I say they could?

You really must get out of the habit you displayed back in 2007 of confusing the contents of your over-active imagination with what I have in fact said.:(