Any interested in history of Czechoslovak communists?

[vid]

Hi, I am interested in history of Czechoslovak communists, and always in for a discussion on this topic. So if anyone here wants to ask / discuss something about this topic, go on.

I have one question myself: How do you guys, as communists, view the short-lived 1968 era of "socialism with human face"?

[The Vegan Marxist]

Czechoslovakia's communists became quite authoritative in my opinion, though I don't know much about them, so I wouldn't know whether the authoritarian policies were justified or not. But when it came to the socialist reformers that came about, which is what made up the 'Prague Spring', they were initially being censored & arrested by the communist party, & the fact that the soviet union went after them after several disagreements, it's noticeable that the socialists were pushing some buttons there that the communist parties did not like one bit.

[Ismail]

Who were the "socialist reformers"? Dubček was a revisionist anti-communist, just like the rest of the leadership. Only he was pro-US, not pro-Soviet. He was a proto-Gorbachev and Gorby himself noted Dubček's "contributions."

The genuine Communists, the Marxist-Leninists who called for the reestablishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat against the Soviet revisionists and Dubček market-capitalists, were already being repressed pre-1968.

See: http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/WCRC68.html

A Czechoslovakia ruled firmly by Dubček would have been another Yugoslavia. Lame, revisionist and market-capitalist with a "non-aligned" (pro-US and dependent upon US aid) leadership. Maybe it would have joined the equally lame "Non-Aligned Movement" which consisted of various pro-US and pro-Soviet "neutral" states.

[FSL]

Hi, I am interested in history of Czechoslovak communists, and always in for a discussion on this topic. So if anyone here wants to ask / discuss something about this topic, go on.

I have one question myself: How do you guys, as communists, view the short-lived 1968 era of "socialism with human face"?


This was then and remains now a sourse of great friction for those who call themselves communists. I'd agree with the opinion that "socialism with a human face" is a nicer way of saying socialism without the socialism.
Capitalism as well as socialism are societies deeply marked with class differences. A state exists to serve the interests of the rulling class and it's obsurd when you have center left parties call for a just society they know they can't deliver. The difference is that the workers are numerous (so their rule over the few is by definition democratic) and also that they produce everything so they have a "right" to rule.

The people who objected to the "injustices" in Czechoslovakia, objected to the injustices the previously rulling class had to deal with, wanting peace with them. They did get their way in the late 80s so what would happen isn't really a mystery. We saw it a few years later.

[vid]

Who were the "socialist reformers"? Dubček was a revisionist anti-communist, just like the rest of the leadership.
Position of Dubcek himself remains unclear. He surely was symbol of movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968, but it is questionable how much he identified with it, and how much he was responsible for it. Generally, he is considered a weak soft politician, who let himself be manipulated. That is by the way also reason why he was elected as general secretary of communist party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS): ratio of reformists and conservatives in CPCS CC presidium was even, and both fractions believed they would be able to influence him in their way.


Only he was pro-US, not pro-Soviet.
This is not true. Dubcek has grown up in USSR (in 1925 his family moved to USSR as a part of Interhelpo coop), and he always was and always remained very pro-russian. He studied in the most well known communist political school in Moscow (can't remember its name), and until late 1968 he was called "our Sasha" even by KGB people.


The genuine Communists, the Marxist-Leninists who called for the reestablishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat against the Soviet revisionists and Dubček market-capitalists, were already being repressed pre-1968.
The catch is that Czechoslovakia declared itself a socialist state in 1960 constitution (Czechoslovak socialist republic, CSSR). That means dictatorship of proletariat has ended, and there are no longer any major antagonistic classes. Boss of the country at that time (Antonin Novotny) later regretted this move, and viewed it as a smart move from reformists who tricked him by misinforming to do this and thus prepare ground for revision.


A Czechoslovakia ruled firmly by Dubček would have been another Yugoslavia. Lame, revisionist and market-capitalist with a "non-aligned" (pro-US and dependent upon US aid) leadership. Maybe it would have joined the equally lame "Non-Aligned Movement" which consisted of various pro-US and pro-Soviet "neutral" states.
Had CSSR been given freedom, it would have become mostly similar to Yugoslavia, but not exactly. It was heading towards market economy, but not the same type as in the west, but market economy where capital is in socialist ownership (not necessarily state ownership though), and economy is still very regulated by state. And yeah, it was heading towards neutrality.


But when it came to the socialist reformers that came about, which is what made up the 'Prague Spring', they were initially being censored & arrested by the communist party,
Not really. Most reformists were the same people who were most extreme stalinists in 1950s (including Dubcek), but changed opinion later. And they all came from high party ranks.


See: (URL snipped, marx2mao.com article)
This article gets position of Antonin Novotny wrong. Novotny was a Khruschevite, somewhat more hardliner than Khruschev, but he let himself be influnced by Soviet boss towards becoming more liberal (he later regretted that). He definitively wasn't part of group that made the Prague Spring, even though he let these people stay at high party ranks (but of course they were not openly reform-minded at that time).

[Ismail]

Position of Dubcek himself remains unclear. He surely was symbol of movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968, but it is questionable how much he identified with it, and how much he was responsible for it. Generally, he is considered a weak soft politician, who let himself be manipulated. That is by the way also reason why he was elected as general secretary of communist party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS): ratio of reformists and conservatives in CPCS CC presidium was even, and both fractions believed they would be able to influence him in their way.True. Dubček himself backed down and called on the people to not resist Soviet tanks.


This is not true. Dubcek has grown up in USSR (in 1925 his family moved to USSR as a part of Interhelpo coop), and he always was and always remained very pro-russian. He studied in the most well known communist political school in Moscow (can't remember its name), and until late 1968 he was called "our Sasha" even by KGB people.Gorbachev was born in the USSR and grew up in it, and became Soviet General-Secretary and liquidated any pretenses of "socialism" that had existed up to that point. Birthplace doesn't really matter.


Not really. Most reformists were the same people who were most extreme stalinists in 1950s (including Dubcek), but changed opinion later. And they all came from high party ranks.A lot of people were "extreme Stalinists" pre-1956, including Khrushchev. The fact that their positions changed so rapidly, though, is telling.

[vid]

True. Dubček himself backed down and called on the people to not resist Soviet tanks.
I wouldn't call it "backing down". Dubcek wanted to do different policy than Soviets wanted him to do, and he probably believed soviets won't enforce it by army, but there was no thought about resisting. It was obvious to everyone that resistance is not an option.


Gorbachev was born in the USSR and grew up in it, and became Soviet General-Secretary and liquidated any pretenses of "socialism" that had existed up to that point. Birthplace doesn't really matter.
It matters for one's sympathies, and Dubcek was definitively pro-Soviet both in personal and political meaning. He just wanted to create different type of socialism than Soviet rulers at the time did. He wanted good relations with west, not struggle, but it was obvious Czechoslovakia is to remain more aligned with USSR.


A lot of people were "extreme Stalinists" pre-1956, including Khrushchev. The fact that their positions changed so rapidly, though, is telling.
I wouldn't say it was rapid.... it lasted 10-15 years. For most people it started after XX. CPSU congress, another landmark were 1963 rehabilitations during which high party cadres learnt about all the nasty details of stalinist show-trials in Czechoslovakia, and then it culminated in 1968 when censorship was abolished and press published about lot of dirt done in previous years. That was what led some (by far not all) communists to conclusion that these things could only happen because of one party system without public oversight, and so they wanted return to multi-party system, with at least two socialist parties.

Discussion whether to allow multi-party system or not was one of main topics of public discussion in 1968.

[Sam_b]

I have one question myself: How do you guys, as communists, view the short-lived 1968 era of "socialism with human face"?

This is one of my academic areas of interest.
The era of 1968 of so-called 'socialism with a human face' did not really deviate that much from the idea of the KSČ being the central organ of the state, or that there was some real process being made - a la the 1960 constitution stating that building the socialist state had been completed. Most of the reforms made, though liberating to a generation living under Stalinisation under Novotný (eg the openness of the media including to an extent Rudé Právo, and more legitimacy to arguments put forward by people such as Šik with regards to changes in the economy) the 'Prague Spring' was really a cumulation of a power struggle between supporters of the old guard under Novotný and reformers under Dubček and what he had done in the 'Bratislava Spring' within the KSS. The genuine concerns of the people were not really paramount to Dubček over a climate of obtaining political power and leadership. Of course, he started relishing his populist role when citizens started openly supporting him and the leadership with much more zeal than usual.

Heimann's 2009 book on Czechoslovakia (Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed - Yale) is interesting as an alternate history than what it usually accepted in the academic community in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

--

Looking back, I didn't give you an opinion based on my political ideology but rather what i've been studying :p

[vid]

The era of 1968 of so-called 'socialism with a human face' did not really deviate that much from the idea of the KSČ being the central organ of the state
I would disagree here. Many major figures wanted to renew 1945-48 "national front" of socialist parties. Even Zdenek Mlynar, who was among least radical reformers, admitted in his memoirs that he wanted to restore multi-party system. And in those few months reformers had, government became quite independent from party. Nice example is when Dubcek and other begged internal affairs minister Pavol to do something against criticism of Soviets media during Cierna nad Tisou talks, and Pavol refused. Social democratic party was in process of restoration, and there was serious talk about letting non-communist organisations like KAN or K231 participate in government.


the 'Prague Spring' was really a cumulation of a power struggle between supporters of the old guard under Novotný and reformers under Dubček
This might be just formal matter, but I wouldn't count Dubcek to reformers.. Everyone who was in politics back then says so. He was symbol of "Prague Spring", but his political stance was "centrist" for quite long, until he definitively moved to reformist position under popular pressure.

What made you interested in this topic?

[Sam_b]

Sorry for taking my time getting back to you on the topic at hand.


I would disagree here. Many major figures wanted to renew 1945-48 "national front" of socialist parties. Even Zdenek Mlynar, who was among least radical reformers, admitted in his memoirs that he wanted to restore multi-party system. And in those few months reformers had, government became quite independent from party. Nice example is when Dubcek and other begged internal affairs minister Pavol to do something against criticism of Soviets media during Cierna nad Tisou talks, and Pavol refused. Social democratic party was in process of restoration, and there was serious talk about letting non-communist organisations like KAN or K231 participate in government.


This is very true, and certainly a movement away from the Slansky trial in the 1950s et al. However, although the movement did have of course its benefits on the people of Czechoslovakia, its true intentions was of a power struggle and regardless it still entrenched the centralised role of the party. Although radical in its delivery, the Action Programme in 1968 opens with much applaud of the successes the KSC has taken in completing the road to socialism in Czechoslovakia "The social movement in Czech lands and in Slovakia during the 20th century was carried along by two great currents: the national liberation movement and socialism". Indeed, it criticises some of the measures taken in this time, but not as scathing as some hold it out to be.

The working class were only a consideration after Dubcek became more popular. The main concern of himself as president "like Novotny before him, was to hold on to power" (Heimann 2009:230), and for all those reforms made it still was a mere "amount to the liberalization of the regime" (Williams 1997:3). Skilling notes in his work on the Prague Spring that there were still many officials in leading positions opposed to the changes as it became more of an attack on their position and power over anything else.

I would therefore attain that although there were good intentions from some of the reformers, this was a process taken to mount a fundamental power struggle and didn't radically alter anything in the longterm.


This might be just formal matter, but I wouldn't count Dubcek to reformers.. Everyone who was in politics back then says so. He was symbol of "Prague Spring", but his political stance was "centrist" for quite long, until he definitively moved to reformist position under popular pressure.


I also fundamentally disagree with this analysis. Dubcek seized his moment at the (if i remember correctly, Heimann also documents this) at the 1961 international meeting of communist parties in Bucharest, which was characterised by the scathing contributions by the Chinese delegation against the Khruschevite revisionism happening in the Soviet Union. He was brought along by Novotny, Dubcek then a minister in the KSC, for the meetings as he could not adequately speak Russian; wheras Dubcek was one of the Moscow old guard. THis speech stood up for the movement away from Stalinisation by Khrushchev etc, and he was at the same time networking for a future takeover within the party. Novotny rightfully realised he was a threat and demoted him back to the KSS, where he continued the same inroads.

BTW, i'm interested in the topic as i'm in the Honours year of a Slavonic & Central and East European studies degree, although my specialism is in film (mostly of the Czech new wave, Forman, Nemec, that sort of stuff.)

[vid]

Although radical in its delivery, the Action Programme in 1968 opens with much applaud of the successes the KSC has taken in completing the road to socialism in Czechoslovakia
That was compulsory exercise, with zero political impact. They couldn't say "We screwed up, let's try it differently" in such document. But action program did lead to loosening centralism of party, as it proclaimed. So much that some local party heads were sometimes confused because they didn't even know what to do, as there were no commands from upside, and even the presidium was divided into groups, each saying something different.


Indeed, it criticises some of the measures taken in this time, but not as scathing as some hold it out to be.
In effect, Action Programme created conditions under which criticism of past was even bigger than any of its author could want. And the same communist leadership also created Piller commission, which was working on honestly examining and publishing all crimes made by KSC under stalinism for the first time (all previous commissions were limited by Novotny). And under which non-communist parties and organizations could (with success) apply for share of political power in state. How more reform could it be realistically? Even this was too much and caused Soviet invasion.


The working class were only a consideration after Dubcek became more popular. The main concern of himself as president "like Novotny before him, was to hold on to power" (Heimann 2009:230), and for all those reforms made it still was a mere "amount to the liberalization of the regime" (Williams 1997:3).
Unfortunately I don't have access to western publications. Anyway, I'd agree future was very unclear when Dubcek got into his position, and that much changed after Dubcek popularity has risen so extremely in very short time. But I wouldn't agree with the Heimann quote: who was the one threating Dubcek's power, so that holding to it should have been his "main concern"? What should he have done differently if position wasn't his main concern, according to author? Dubcek himself wasn't even extra eager to get to power, originally he proposed Hendrych to become general secretary. And his position was so strong until soviet invasion, that no one sane could even think about endangering him.


Skilling notes in his work on the Prague Spring that there were still many officials in leading positions opposed to the changes as it became more of an attack on their position and power over anything else.
Only positions of those people came under attack, who were against reforms. Whoever wanted to stay up in power struggle could just turncoat into reformist (many did), and they wouldn't come under attack.


I would therefore attain that although there were good intentions from some of the reformers, this was a process taken to mount a fundamental power struggle and didn't radically alter anything in the longterm.
Well, it didn't because Soviet forces came and forced CSSR to revert all changes made, and do no more changes. But even in summer 1968, the situation and entire system already was radically altered (de-facto, even if formally most remained same), and much more was expected after XIV party confress when remaining conservatives are out of party leadership.

If there were just some good intentions from some reformers, how come reform was so rapid?


I also fundamentally disagree with this analysis. Dubcek seized his moment at the (if i remember correctly, Heimann also documents this) at the 1961 international meeting of communist parties in Bucharest, which was characterised by the scathing contributions by the Chinese delegation against the Khruschevite revisionism happening in the Soviet Union. He was brought along by Novotny, Dubcek then a minister in the KSC, for the meetings as he could not adequately speak Russian; wheras Dubcek was one of the Moscow old guard. THis speech stood up for the movement away from Stalinisation by Khrushchev etc, and he was at the same time networking for a future takeover within the party. Novotny rightfully realised he was a threat and demoted him back to the KSS, where he continued the same inroads.
Claim that Novotny couldn't speak Russian properly is utter nonsense. I don't know what exactly is "Moscow old guard" for you, but Dubcek returned to Slovakia in 1938, and entered positions in communist party only after early 50s purge. He was typical example of a "new guard" in the Czechoslovak party.

As for positions(sorry if I get the names of positions wrong, my English lacks here): Dubcek was secretary of western Slovak region until 1960, then he became secretary of industry by Central Committee of KSC. Since 1956, Dubcek was slowly "destalinizing" himself, becoming more reform-minded, as was almost everyone in the KSC. He wrote that he had conflicts with Novotny since he came into Prague in 1960, mostly about Slovak problem (Slovak national organs had no power and were only formal). After he openly raised this topic in one session with Novotny, Novotny (who was very anti-Slovak) got furious and removed him from Prague back to Slovakia. That was in november 1962 Slovak CP (KSS) congress, and Dubcek became member of KSS CC Presidium and a KSS CC secretary.

Can you please supply more info about that session? This is first time I hear that it should be reason for demotion of Dubcek. I can't really imagine Novotny going openly against Khrushchev - Novotny was "left Khrushchevite", if anything, not a full-blown stalinist, he always fully heeded Moscow in everything, and he DID start liberalization after XXII CPSU congress even though he was afraid of it personally.


BTW, i'm interested in the topic as i'm in the Honours year of a Slavonic & Central and East European studies degree, although my specialism is in film (mostly of the Czech new wave, Forman, Nemec, that sort of stuff.
So, you speak / understand Czech?

[Sam_b]

Good post. As always I have my disagreements, but its getting late so I'll try to take time tomorrow to do my response justice. I have my thoughts (primative in areas as its not my major specialism) in a paper thats about 3,000 words long and I can always mail it to you if need be.

Hopefully i'll get a response done tomorrow if I finish my research proposal for it, which concerns Ne Zakladnam.

[vid]

Sure, I'd love to see your paper