Mediation, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat

[Buffalo Souljah]

All consciousness is necessarily mediated through forms, as the nature of consciousness implies. (This is the cognitive dance of Soren Kierkegaard that was picked up by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness). Since this is the case (and the question is begged, were they right--am I only conscious insofar as I am conscious of something?) the question needs be begged of the nature of reality in the bourgeoisie capitalist society of modern times, in which the consciousness of the bourgeoisie acts as "natural" for every class (and as such encounters the proletarian as imputed or inherited consciousness, being by its nature imposed.) The question is along these lines: if consciousness is inherited, is it possible to achieve a level of consciousness by which existing archetypes are shattered and by means of which a new form of consciousness may be brought to fruition? How does such a project articulate itself in relation to the individuals which it represents?

How can we synthesize a proletarian class consciousness that "grows out of the roots of the old" and ultimately replaced the old? This would indeed be a question of class organization and imputed class consciousness, but how would any project of this sort not culminate in "revolution from above", since the revolutionary class consciousness would not be achievable without the imputed consciousness, vz, an "unnatural" consciousness that is not inherent to the proletariat in its (society's) current design. I know the current design is as irrational and created as any other, and that rationalizations of its nature are merely coagulations of a priori arguments made in the absence of "rhyme and reason", but the question still remains, how does the imputed (inherited) class consciousness of the proletariat diverge from and posit itself in contradistinction to the interests of the ruling class. Is this not the chicken vs. egg argument to which one would necessarily have to respond with the old cogito ergo absurdum point of view? How does the revolutionary process find its synthesis?

I know there is no magic formula, no "silver bullet" to the proletariat's disposal, and the odds are stacked against very heavily, but this does not negate the possibility of revolution, and revolution has to come from somewhere. The question, I guess is, where is the cohesive structure, the well-established criticism and transcendence of capitalist ideology? I do not see a well-established alternative or independent viewpoint out there, save a few isolated pockets here and there. Where is a great voice and spirit in this time and age and how does one achieve the mission of the revolution without such a well-articulated structure or framework within which to work? These are just half-thoughts and ramblings, but I think there is something there from which to understand what needs be done in order that revolution may come about.

When Lenin argues in [I]The State and Revolution that revolution does not come about by a slow "withering away" of capitalist ideology, but through a violent overthrow of the existing regime, what he is saying is that only by revolution can any change come about. Is the opportunity ripe for the project of revolution and how does one get such a project rolling without singling oneself out? This is the old "stand out, fit in" paradox and, you can't have it both ways, plain and simple. Revolution is a deeply-motivated and abundant resolution to do away with what is and replace it with what ought to be, and as such there must be some point of departure, some ideals which must be postulated in order for the purpose of revolution to exact its interests. How one utilizes these interests is the contingent factor in determining the leverage one gets from one's revolutionary mission or agenda. The coffers of revolutionary literature are dusty and need some airing out, and the new generation, the young and virile are privy to take this position. We live in an age of our elders and the raising of the level of consciousness requires a deep commitment to literature and theory. The sake of knowing what's "out there" requires it.

So, the first step is formulating a revolutionary platform and then to impel that platform into existence. There is enough out there to develop strategies to implement the platform of a revolutionary party. Then comes the struggle, and the Russian Revolution and the Paris Commune show that these can become quite bloody, the further entrenched the existing system is in the minds of the individuals it represents (or fails to). This is where that imputed class consciousness comes in, where the well-established and well-articulated criticism of the whole reveals the contradictions implicit in the whole of society and allows the indigent access to. This is the next step: to spread information and equip the general populous with the tools to come to the right conclusions. Equip them with weaponry and real-world skills that revolution requires and this will allow the process of history to realize itself. Only when this is achieved, when people are educated about the contradictions in their lives can the revolution hope to succeed.

[Dean]

Could you seperate this into more than two paragraphs? I highly doubt many will read and respond to it in this condition.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Could you seperate this into more than two paragraphs? I highly doubt many will read and respond to it in this condition.
These are just some collected half-thoughts and ramblings I penned out in a spare moment. I've been reading alot of Lenin lately, and my thoughts are constantly turned to the possibility of revolution and how this possibility might be actualized. I think thought in modern times is to a great extent delivered through mediated forms and that sometimes makes critical thinking and criticism difficult. It's like trying to get through a throng of angry bees to get to the honey sometimes, and I feel that it's hard to cut across some of that sometimes to get anything worthwhile said.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Does the term reification mean anything to you?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You are assuming that the word 'consciousness' has a clear meaning.

As I point out here, it doesn't:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/consciousn...438/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/why-do-we-t98047/index.html

[Buffalo Souljah]

You are assuming that the word 'consciousness' has a clear meaning.

Kant would argue that each individual is imbibed with a consciousness independent of his environment, an autonomous individuality, the "I above the I", and this would apply to any form of consciousness this individual may be perceptive of. This is interesting insofar as it places significance on consciousness in and for itself without qualifications. Now, thinkers since Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard in particularly, drew on the contingency of consciousness in that consciousness only becomes qualified inasmuch as it exists with reference to something: there is no absolute consiousness. I think, Rosa, this is the point you were getting at, and this is where historical materialism makes its departure. Argues Georg Lukacs,
"n reality, it is precisely the conscious activity of the individual that is to be found on the object-side of the process [of consciousness], while the subject (the class) cannot be awakened into consciousness and this activity must always remain beyond the consciousness of the--apparent--subject, the individual." ([I]History & Class Consciousness, 165)This means consciousness always takes "a position" and that there is no immutable level from which it acts. The (particular class) force is always acting through (the particular forms of) consciousness, and only by taking account of this can any hope for understanding the nature of consciousness be sought after. Insofar as it is qualified, consciousness exists, but always for something.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


Kant would argue that each individual is imbibed with a consciousness independent of his environment, an autonomous individuality, the "I above the I", and this would apply to any form of consciousness this individual may be perceptive of. This is interesting insofar as it places significance on consciousness in and for itself without qualifications. Now, thinkers since Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard in particularly, drew on the contingency of consciousness in that consciousness only becomes qualified inasmuch as it exists with reference to something: there is no absolute consiousness. I think, Rosa, this is the point you were getting at, and this is where historical materialism makes its departure. Argues Georg Lukacs,

But this in no way helps us understand this odd word, "consciousness".

In ordinary use it is a purely medical term, as in "Has the patient regained consciousness?"

Its philosophical use is a throwback to the Platonic/Christian/Cartesian soul (this is quite obvious in Kant's use of this and related words), and thus has no place in materialist theory -- as I argued in detail in the above links.


This means consciousness always takes "a position" and that there is no immutable level from which it acts. The (particular class) force is always acting through (the particular forms of) consciousness, and only by taking account of this can any hope for understanding the nature of consciousness be sought after. Insofar as it is qualified, consciousness exists, but always for something.

Well, none of this makes any sense, since we still do not understand this word, "consciousness".

[Buffalo Souljah]

George Bush:



But this in no way helps us understand this odd word, "consciousness".

In ordinary use it is a purely medical term, as in "Has the patient regained consciousness?"

Its philosophical use is a throwback to the Platonic/Christian/Cartesian soul (this is quite obvious in Kant's use of this and related words), and thus has no place in materialist theory -- as I argued in detail in the above links.

I would argue that there is no division between the two, that any such division would only occur on the syntactic level, not on the semantic level. The two meanings, "consciousness" (ie, "to be conscious") and consciousness (in the clinical or abstract) are, to me, identical.




Well, none of this makes any sense, since we still do not understand this word, "consciousness".But I am arguing we do understand what either "consciousness" or consciousness refer to. In stating, there are three dancing bears on the table, I am consciously acknowledging this circumstance. In essence, there is no difference between "consciousness" and "consciousness of consciousness" or "consciousness of something...". Again, any difference would only arise on the syntactic level: "Is he conscious"; "She is consciously doing that"; "I am conscious of this"--these all refer to the same "consciousness" which is "consciousness of some phenomena. This is exactly what concerns Heidegger in his Being and Husserl in his Nouema/Phenomena interchange. The former asserts that being exists only insofar as it is in relation to the world, vz Being-towards-death, Being-ahead-of-itself, Being-there ("Dasein"), etc. The idea that I am conscious implies a subject which is transcendent of the experience of consciousness which then comprehends or judges that particular experience. This is Kan'ts "I above the I": this is the Being-which-is-conscious-of-death (or something else), and constitutes the conscious body. Consciousness in this sense is the relation between the conscious body and the object of which it is conscious. "What is being?" Kierkegaard asks, to which he answers, "Being is relation," which is the primary tenet underlying Hegel's Phenomenology.

Husserl draws the same distinction as Heidegger, but merely dubs the object which is transcendent of the conscious being the phenomena, and the thought of these objects, the noema. The noema is contingent upon what is "out there" and always refers back to objective reality (phenomena). As such, thought of the object again arises out of the relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge (noema).(Noema, BTWrelates to noesa, which is the Greek word for sense, and they are interrelated, in that all noema are given to us through noesa. The two are mutually dependant.)

So, in conclusion, we are only conscious insofar as we are conscious of something, that there is some object of thought "out there" of which we are aware, and to which we relate in thought/action. The act of consciousness is self-existent, for one is only ever conscious qua being conscious, and just as the famous phrase states "there is no outside text", there is no "outside consciousness". If there were some logical deduction to be made from this it would be this:that the act of consciousness gives birth to itself, that is, consciousness exists insofar as it arises with reference to itself. I know by my statement "This room" that "I" am stating this and that this "this" refers to an object of which I am conscious.

Now, when you get into imputed (class) consciousness and interests relating to imputed (class) consciousness, that's where things get interesting, because *that's* when you get into the subjectivization and objectivization of the subject (the establishment of signifiers representing class interests in society, ie, the ideological ghettoization of the proletariat, the perpetuation of "middle class American values" etc etc. -- this seems to be an endless cycle in capitalism), and *that* seems more interesting to me *personally* than a priori assertions about what is and is not consciousness. But that's just me!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


I would argue that there is no division between the two, that any such division would only occur on the syntactic level, not on the semantic level. The two meanings, "consciousness" (ie, "to be conscious") and consciousness (in the abstract) are, to me, identical.

I'm sorry, but I fail to see how words that have totally different uses can possibly be semantically 'identical'.


But I am arguing we do understand what either "consciousness" or consciousness refer to. In stating, there are three cigarettes on the table, I am consciously acknowledging this fact and am thereby utilizing and referring to my conscious state. In essence, there is no difference between "consciousness" and "consciousness of consciousness" or "consciousness of something...". Again, any difference would only arise on the syntactic level: "Is he conscious"; "She is consciously doing that"; "I am conscious of this"--these all refer to the same "consciousness" which is "consciousness of some phenomena. This is exactly what concerns Heidegger in his Being and Husserl in his Nouema/Phenomena interchange. The former asserts that being exists only insofar as it is in relation to the world, vz Being-towards-death, Being-ahead-of-itself, Being-there ("Dasein"), etc. The idea that I am conscious implies a subject which is transcendent of the experience of consciousness which then comprehends or judges that particular experience. This is Kan'ts "I above the I": this is the Being-which-is-conscious-of-death (or something else), and constitutes the conscious body. Consciousness in this sense is the relation between the conscious body and the object of which it is conscious. "What is being?" Kierkegaard asks, to which he answers, "Being is relation," which is the primary tenet underlying Hegel's Phenomenology.

Well, I reject this way of doing philosophy, which amounts to little more than a series of dogmatic, a priori assertions based on an odd use of language, with no little impenetrably obscure jargon thrown in for good measure.

As far as I can see, "understanding" here amounts to expressing one set of obscure words in terms of another equally obscure set.

Here is yet more of the same:


Husserl draws the same distinction as Heidegger, but merely dubs the object which is transcendent of the conscious being the phenomena, and the thought of these objects, the noema. The noema is contingent upon what is "out there" and always refers back to objective reality (phenomena). As such, thought of the object again arises out of the relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge (noema).Noema relates to noesa, which is the Greek word for sense, and they are interrelated, in that all noema are given to us through noesa. The two are mutually dependant.

So, in conclusion, we are only conscious insofar as we are conscious of something, that there is some object of thought "out there" of which we are aware, and to which we relate in thought/action. The act of consciousness is self-referrant, for one is only ever conscious qua being conscious, and just as the famous phrase states "there is no outside text", there is no "outside consiousness". If there were some logical deduction to be made from this it would be this:that the act of consciousness gives birth to itself, that is, consciousness exists insofar as it arises with reference to a subject. The statement "I am" or "There is air" refers to and requires a subject to which these statements refer. Conversely, the statement "I am not" and "There is no air" likewise refer to (the same) thinking subject. Consciousness breeds itself, and there is no sense in semantic quibbles. I know by my statement "This room" that "I" am stating this and that this "this" refers to an object of which I am conscious.

And, no offense intended, this is as clear as mud:


Now, when you get into imputed (class) consciousness and interests relating to imputed (class) consciousness, that's where things get interesting, ebcause *that's* when you get into the subjectivization and objectivization of the subject (the creation of analagous referants, signifiers representing class interests, ie, the objectification of the proletariat through capitalist theory and ideology, etc etc), and *that* seems more interesting to me *personally* than a priori assertions about what is and is not consciousness. But that's just me!

It seems to me you have swallowed a load of 'continental philosophy' wholesale, without asking yourself, "Wtf does it all mean?"

[Buffalo Souljah]

Come on Rosa, don't be so mean.

1. How are either of the examples you used semantically different? (Ie, "Is he conscious" and your other example) I remain unconvinced they are.

2. Phenomenology is based entirely out of empirical datum. Much of it has been refuted, and, in the argument between Lukacs and Heidegger, the former was said to have won, and I find History and Class Consciousness a far more provocative text than, say, Being and Time (to which Being and Time was written in response), so I couldn't agree with you more there.

3. What I meant in my concluding statement is that *I* find real world, on-the-ground issues like fighting starvation and oppression far more engaging than abstract philosophical discussions. That is my point in speaking. By imputed class consciousness I meant the term as related to the writings of Georg Lukacs, the founder of Western Marxism, and a bulwark in 20th Century critical theory. It is argued that all consciousness (whatever we here accept that as meaning) exists through forms which are mediated to the individual through tools (language, art, conflict, etc.), and that these forms inherently shape and ultimately constitute consciousness, so to talk about consciousness without referring to these is meaningless. Excuse my metaphysical nonsense, it comes after years of prying through old books. None of it will solve world hunger or end wars, though, and that's what concerns me, fixedly.

How we begin to addres consciousness, and start to look at it more through the immediate material conditions to which it is privy depends on what those conditions are. We are currently in a state where 10% of our population is living below the poverty line. 25% of those (a disproportionate number) are blacks. Now, a question to consciousness and conscience would be, what are the material conditions that allow for this circumstance to exist, and how do we eradicate this inequity? I could ask further, how do we eradicate poverty in itself, and that might get us a little further to some answers. But, this notion of discussing consciousness inthe abstract is meaningless to me. I can do that sort of thing and I've read my share of philosophers, but honestly, there's more important things to worry about, more pressing concerns, I think, an I don't think it's a symptom of anything but humility, passion and concern to address these conditions. Philosophy attempts to develop keen conceptions and symbols for subtly different states, and that's fine, but I'd like to spend my time with more practical matters. Logic, to me, is a natural extension and use of consciousness. Logic exists as a tool between myself and the phenomenal world, and I intend to make use of that tool. Metaphysics is a tool of the bourgeousie, and, while I own a copy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ( I think it is important to study the history of thought as an act in itself, I know this is an a priori but I feel free to live with it)--but I think getting caught up in the same quibbles that metaphysicians of the 18th and 19th century did impedes the fight for social progress. I love the study of thought, but I feel these digressions get us entirely away from what is important.

4. As far as the initial argument goes, I find I work best by going through thought experiments or exercises, none of which I hold to be perfectly valid in every case, mind you. But nonetheless, if we want to find out what consciousness is, we have, I think to turn to past expositions. I think what Descartes said on this front was influential, though I'm not sure of its validity. "I think therefore I am" is an a priori assertion, and a tautology at that, so I'm not sure if we can get anywhere when referring to consciousness that isn't self-referrential in some way. I know this is Douglas Hofstadter's great predilection. I can't seem to get anywhere about consciousness without referring to consciousness. Perhaps all of this metaphysical quibble should go in Hume's fire?

[Buffalo Souljah]

Consciousness is an act, of this I am aware. But perhaps my awareness of this already entertains the notion of consciousness as an a priori. Can we define it negatively? I know what consciousness is not, so perhaps by refuting what I know not to be consciousness, I can arrive somewhere nearer to describing consciousness. I have to ask myself if there aren't more useful projects though. Here I have some reverence for Christians. They seem to be happy with admitting there are things that can't be understood about being, and are content to serve God and their communities instead, eradicating hunger and doing the Church's work and so forth. I think we atheistic scumbags have something to learn from the more orthodox branches; namely, to "put our money where our mouth is" and see justice served in the world. Marxism is based out of certain a prioris: that the interests of the working class exist above those of the rulers, for instance, so where does that leave us? I think any notion of consciousness that is not seeded in the world with reference to real world predilections is boring, and so why don't we move on to something else? Yes?

I think the notion of mediated forms is interesting, in that I am using quite sophisticated means right now to communicate with you. There is a difficulty in modern society of achieving direct communication, but perhaps this is no difficulty at all, you could argue. I know there's many ways you could spin it, but, the way I see it, people have many needs, and once those needs are met, we can move on to metaphysical arguments, but I don't see that process as ever ending, so we may never get there.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


Come on Rosa, don't be so mean.

1. How are either of the examples you used semantically different? (Ie, "Is he conscious" and your other example) I remain unconvinced they are.

Yes, I maintain they are. This is the only legitimate use of the word "consciousness" in ordinary language, and in no way refers to a mysterious inner condition.


2. Phenomenology is based entirely out of empirical datum. Much of it has been refuted, and, in the argument between Lukacs and Heidegger, the former was said to have won, and I find History and Class Consciousness a far more provocative text than, say, Being and Time (to which Being and Time was written in response), so I couldn't agree with you more there.

I fail to see the relevance of this. What have the pointless disputes between a priori dogmatists got to do with the ordinary use of the word "consciousness"?


3. What I meant in my concluding statement is that *I* find real world, on-the-ground issues like fighting starvation and oppression far more engaging than abstract philosophical discussions. That is my point in speaking. By imputed class consciousness I meant the term as related to the writings of Georg Lukacs, the founder of Western Marxism, and a bulwark in 20th Century critical theory. It is argued that all consciousness (whatever we here accept that as meaning) exists through forms which are mediated to the individual through tools (language, art, conflict, etc.), and that these forms inherently shape and ultimately constitute consciousness, so to talk about consciousness without referring to these is meaningless. Excuse my metaphysical nonsense, it comes after years of prying through old books. None of it will solve world hunger or end wars, though, and that's what concerns me, fixedly.

I have to say that I find Lukacs' work worthless, since he shares far too much with the ideas and dogmatic theories of ruling class hacks, such as Hegel.



How we begin to address consciousness, and start to look at it more through the immediate material conditions to which it is privy depends on what those conditions are. We are currently in a state where 10% of our population is living below the poverty line. 25% of those (a disproportionate number) are blacks. Now, a question to consciousness and conscience would be, what are the material conditions that allow for this circumstance to exist, and how do we eradicate this inequity? I could ask further, how do we eradicate poverty in itself, and that might get us a little further to some answers. But, this notion of discussing consciousness in the abstract is meaningless to me. I can do that sort of thing and I've read my share of philosophers, but honestly, there's more important things to worry about, more pressing concerns, I think, an I don't think it's a symptom of anything but humility, passion and concern to address these conditions. Philosophy attempts to develop keen conceptions and symbols for subtly different states, and that's fine, but I'd like to spend my time with more practical matters. Logic, to me, is a natural extension and use of consciousness. Logic exists as a tool between myself and the phenomenal world, and I intend to make use of that tool. Metaphysics is a tool of the bourgeoisie, and, while I own a copy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ( I think it is important to study the history of thought as an act in itself, I know this is an a priori but I feel free to live with it)--but I think getting caught up in the same quibbles that metaphysicians of the 18th and 19th century did impedes the fight for social progress. I love the study of thought, but I feel these digressions get us entirely away from what is important.

This assumes there is such a thing as "consciousness", to begin with. Once more, when we use the word in ordinary language it is to refer to those who have come round after an operation, or have recovered from a blow on the head. Nowhere here is something called "consciousness", beloved of traditional philosophy, alluded to.

Now I agree with you about the iniquities of capitalism, but the last thing we need are the confused, dogmatic thoughts of philosophers to help us out here.

And, I think you have an odd idea of logic too. It is merely the study of inference and not:


a tool between myself and the phenomenal world, and I intend to make use of that tool.

I'm all in favour of logic, but I think you confuse it with some sort of a priori psychology.


4. As far as the initial argument goes, I find I work best by going through thought experiments or exercises, none of which I hold to be perfectly valid in every case, mind you. But nonetheless, if we want to find out what consciousness is, we have, I think to turn to past expositions. I think what Descartes said on this front was influential, though I'm not sure of its validity. "I think therefore I am" is an a priori assertion, and a tautology at that, so I'm not sure if we can get anywhere when referring to consciousness that isn't self-referential in some way. I know this is Douglas Hofstadter's great predilection. I can't seem to get anywhere about consciousness without referring to consciousness. Perhaps all of this metaphysical quibble should go in Hume's fire?

I agree with you about Hume's bonfire: throw onto it the following: practically everything in 'Continental Philosophy' written since Kant, including Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Saussure, Sartre, and Derrida. Their work strikes me as a systematic capitulation to the misuse of language.


Consciousness is an act, of this I am aware. But perhaps my awareness of this already entertains the notion of consciousness as an a priori. Can we define it negatively? I know what consciousness is not, so perhaps by refuting what I know not to be consciousness, I can arrive somewhere nearer to describing consciousness. I have to ask myself if there aren't more useful projects though. Here I have some reverence for Christians. They seem to be happy with admitting there are things that can't be understood about being, and are content to serve God and their communities instead, eradicating hunger and doing the Church's work and so forth. I think we atheistic scumbags have something to learn from the more orthodox branches; namely, to "put our money where our mouth is" and see justice served in the world. Marxism is based out of certain a prioris: that the interests of the working class exist above those of the rulers, for instance, so where does that leave us? I think any notion of consciousness that is not seeded in the world with reference to real world predilections is boring, and so why don't we move on to something else? Yes?

Well, I think you are overly impressed with our capacity for introspection and self-awareness, but why call this "consciousness" when the only time we use this word in ordinary life is in the circumstances I mentioned above?

The alleged a prioris of Marxism are, as we Wittgensteinians call them, merely 'forms of representation', and not a priori at all.


I think the notion of mediated forms is interesting, in that I am using quite sophisticated means right now to communicate with you. There is a difficulty in modern society of achieving direct communication, but perhaps this is no difficulty at all, you could argue. I know there's many ways you could spin it, but, the way I see it, people have many needs, and once those needs are met, we can move on to metaphysical arguments, but I don't see that process as ever ending, so we may never get there.

I have great difficulty with the word "mediated", and wonder why materialists find they have to use this mystical term.

And there is no problem about 'direct communication' in ordinary life; if there were, the word "communication" itself would become problematic, and the question itself (whether we do in fact communicate) would be devoid of content (since it would be using at least one word of indeterminate meaning).

[Buffalo Souljah]

George Bush:



Yes, I maintain they are. This is the only legitimate use of the word "consciousness" in ordinary language, and in no way refers to a mysterious inner condition.

I never suggested I was referring to any inner mysterious condition. I believe consciousness to be an awareness of self, and as such, it is an awareness of something. I deduce this from the formula: If "I" determine that an act will follow another act in a causal chain, then "I" have made that determination. Before going out on a Cartesian limb, I will make the assumption that I and other beings are and that we are privy to the same human condition. I qualify this statement by arguing that I am aware of a being that transcends immediate experience and, further, that learns and reacts from different experiences. Every time I play GNU chess, I am playing the same algorithms, and the program doesn't learn. As opposed to the programmed code of GNU chess, a human being is a complex end result of a long process of evolution. We know that human beings are endowed with a sentience that transcends immediate experience. This is enough qualification for me to admit what consciousness is.




I fail to see the relevance of this. What have the pointless disputes between a priori dogmatists got to do with the ordinary use of the word "consciousness"? I agree. I reiterate, I agree.


I have to say that I find Lukacs' work worthless, since he shares far too much with the ideas and dogmatic theories of ruling class hacks, such as Hegel.
Why do you dislike Lukacs, specifically (methodologically)? Just rejecting him because he shared some of the same views as Hegel doesn't make much sense to me-- it just seems like mudslinging.



This assumes there is such a thing as "consciousness", to begin with. Once more, when we use the word in ordinary language it is to refer to those who have come round after an operation, or have recovered from a blow on the head. Nowhere here is something called "consciousness", beloved of traditional philosophy, alluded to.
I think there is such a thing as consciousness, insofar as I believe human beings are endowed with the ability to change and adapt to their surroundings, distinguishing them from rocks or other inanimate objects.



Now I agree with you about the iniquities of capitalism, but the last thing we need are the confused, dogmatic thoughts of philosophers to help us out here.
True.



And, I think you have an odd idea of logic too. It is merely the study of inference and not:



I'm all in favour of logic, but I think you confuse it with some sort of a priori psychology.

I'm going from Wittgenstein's definition of logic, as a series of synthetic prescriptions that help us understand and interpret the phenomenal world, nothing more.



I agree with you about Hume's bonfire: throw onto it the following: practically everything in 'Continental Philosophy' written since Kant, including Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Saussure, Sartre, and Derrida. Their work strikes me as a systematic capitulation to the misuse of language.
I haven't read enough of any of these individuals to suggest anything on either side, but I do feel there is a certain superfluity to much of modern thought, and I would side with Lukacs, for isntance, in his rejection of psychology and sociology as bourgeousie catch-alls.



Well, I think you are overly impressed with our capacity for introspection and self-awareness, but why call this "consciousness" when the only time we use this word in ordinary life is in the circumstances I mentioned above?
Again, I disagree, but I'll leave that where it is.



The alleged a prioris of Marxism are, as we Wittgensteinians call them, merely 'forms of representation', and not a priori at all.
I'd like to know more about these. Seems like a semantic difference to me, but I'm speaking out of ignorance.



I have great difficulty with the word "mediated", and wonder why materialists find they have to use this mystical term.
I am mediating by addressing you with language. Mediation is a fundamental category for understanding bourgeousie culture. Why do you think Chomsky is so obsessed with what the New York Times and the Washington Post are saying?



And there is no problem about 'direct communication' in ordinary life; if there were, the word "communication" itself would become problematic, and the question itself (whether we do in fact communicate) would be devoid of content (since it would be using at least one word of indeterminate meaning).I don't like to argue semantics, and that was a sloppy point for me to have made originally anyway. Just venting my frustrations, I suppose.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for the reply GB; I'll respond in a day or two.

[cenv]

I think thought in modern times is to a great extent delivered through mediated forms and that sometimes makes critical thinking and criticism difficult. It's like trying to get through a throng of angry bees to get to the honey sometimes, and I feel that it's hard to cut across some of that sometimes to get anything worthwhile said.
This is why thought, in and of itself, is inadequate. If we want to transcend the mediations of bourgeois ideology, we need to move beyond contemplative critiques of capitalism by tearing down the barrier between thought and life. Phrasing our critique in terms of "thought" only reinforces the dominant mode of existence under capitalism by assigning ourselves an observational role. Plus, we can never rival the bourgeoisie's cultural apparatus exclusively on the plane of contemplation -- after all, the dominant paradigm of thought is universal, so if we want to reach people with our ideas, we need to transcend it, not compete with it.

[Buffalo Souljah]

This is why thought, in and of itself, is inadequate.

So true. I guess too many times, it's easy to assume that if a clear path to the truth or to social justice isn't available, then there's no path at all. This isn't what the Civil Rights leaders thought in the 60's, when they faced social inequalitites and unjust systems of governance. The thinkers of the time, John L Lewis, Huey Newton, Martin Luther King Jr, Malcolm X and others established a firm criticism that transcended the established categories of thinking and worked for social change to come about. In the same way, we have to organize and collectively bargain for the rights of individual workers and of the working class in general.

Without virulent criticism, there can be no change. And you are right when you say that thinking is not enough: one must truly define the conditions with which one is dealing in order to bring about the change one wishes to address in the world. Without a firm criticism grounded in its own typology, its own vocabulary, there can be no hope of social change. And it's just natural, good-old fashioned human evolution to step beyond what bounds we've been given! We're adaptive creatures, and we change ourselves to fit our circumstances, and vice versa, though, as a species, we've been doing alot more of the former than the latter and that needs to change! Period.

[Buffalo Souljah]

“[C]onsciousness” amounts either to a technical term in modern, Western subject-centered philosophy or to a cherished ideological element of bourgeois civilization."

This is out of a footnote of a paper a friend wrote on the nature and origins of religion which I will post a link to in another thread in a minute. I think the term "consciousness" is interesting in that it is not possible to logically explicate or "prove" without providing a priori or tautologous arguments. It seems a sort of shibboleth at best or at most. All one is ever doing in trying to "prove" or qualify the existence of the term "consciousness is making just such gestures. Insofar as this is the case, there is really no use (in the practical sense) in debating what consciousness "is", and we are left, at best, with petty semantic quibbles and syllogism. The only thing to do, it seems to me from looking at this problem in many perspectives is to study the manifestations or applications (uses) of consciousness and determine from these studies abstractions or representations of what consciousness does, but it seems, again, impossible to me, short of understanding the synaptical processes of the human brain (and this would only be valid inasmuch as it described just that, human consciousness) what consciousness is. So in a sense, we are left where we started, only with the knowledge that consciousness is not something we can willfully, and ultimately, "meaningfully" define.