Greatest thinkers of our time

[革命者]

Hi,

It seems to me that every revolutionary movement needs its intellectuals who can and do write about our present day society, be it also in historical perspective, to reach a large audience with an ideological and insightful message.

Who are the great thinkers of our day? Marxist or otherwise on the Left. People who have quite recently left us, but whose legacy is still very relevant today are, as far as I am concerned, to be included.

Please also summarise what it is that makes these people's analyses worthwhile for a revolutionary movement in the next decades.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Michel Foucault is a powerhouse in modern philosophy. So are Charles Taylor and Juergen Habermas. It all depends on what arena you are thinking about. Michael Parenti, Alexander Cockburn and Noam Chomsky are, for instance all very important figures in political science, whereas Foucault and Jacques Derrida are important to sociology and philosophy proper. Different people write with different purposes in mind, so you have to consider what it is you're looking for when you mean "influencial". I can go on and on naming individuals who have influence in an endless number of empirical sciences, but this would only get us further insofar as we are concerned with some particular issue or topic. What interests you in philosophy? What are some subheadings or ideas you might be contemplating at present, or perhaps you would consider a general survey of philosophy an appropriate starting place. In that case, I know there are many Guides or Introductory texts available, I could name a couple off the top of my head. What are you into?

[scarletghoul]

Badiou and Avakian are the best Marxist thinkers of our time that I know of. Zizek is cool too

[革命者]

Michel Foucault is a powerhouse in modern philosophy. So are Charles Taylor and Juergen Habermas. It all depends on what arena you are thinking about. Michael Parenti, Alexander Cockburn and Noam Chomsky are, for instance all very important figures in political science, whereas Foucault and Jacques Derrida are important to sociology and philosophy proper. Different people write with different purposes in mind, so you have to consider what it is you're looking for when you mean "influencial". I can go on and on naming individuals who have influence in an endless number of empirical sciences, but this would only get us further insofar as we are concerned with some particular issue or topic. What interests you in philosophy? What are some subheadings or ideas you might be contemplating at present, or perhaps you would consider a general survey of philosophy an appropriate starting place. In that case, I know there are many Guides or Introductory texts available, I could name a couple off the top of my head. What are you into?Yes, well I doubted whether Philosophy was indeed the right place to put this thread in, but I am not talking about influencial people and any philosophers, necessarily. The only criterium is that it has to be you personal hero who has enlightened your views on the present era (and its relation to past eras) so much that you think it has great value to take some of his thoughts on board in a revolutionary movement.

And, with all respect, I don't buy it when you say there are many:) I want to hear of specific insights you got from one or two people's specific analyses. I don't care from what arena they are: sociology, psychology, political science, philosophy... you name it.

Please try to narrow it down. It doesn't matter so much if it is truly your biggest hero or that it is one among a few. We'll hopefully end up with a list which includes many of them. And more importantly: what is that one important analysis that did it for you.

I hope I made my intentions a bit clearer.

I know it is probably hard for people who like philosophy, but try to be succint and concrete as to the relevance for a revolutionary movement today.

[革命者]

Badiou and Avakian are the best Marxist thinkers of our time that I know of. Zizek is cool tooAnd what analyses of them are most relevant today, according to you? What did it for you?

[革命者]

For me, I'd say Pierre Bourdieu, for redefining capital.

What are the concrete ideas that we could internalise into our own analyses to give force to a revolutionary movement today of Foucault's and Derrida's? Chomsky? Cockburn?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Scarlet


Avakian

Thanks! I needed a good laugh.:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Unfortunately, this comment of mine applies to all the above characters:


For over two thousand years traditional Philosophers have been playing on themselves and their audiences what can only be described as a series of complex verbal tricks. Since Greek times, metaphysicians have occupied themselves with deriving a priori theses solely from the meaning of a few specially-chosen (and suitably doctored) words. These philosophical gems have then been peddled to the rest of humanity, dressed-up as profound truths about fundamental aspects of reality -- peremptorily imposed on nature, almost invariably without the benefit of a single supporting experiment.

In fact, traditional theorists went further; their acts of linguistic legerdemain 'allowed' them to uncover Super-theses in the comfort of their own heads, doctrines they claimed revealed the underlying and essential nature of existence, which were supposedly valid for all of space and time. Unsurprisingly, discursive magic of this order of magnitude meshes rather well with ambient ruling-class forms-of-thought (for reasons that are outlined here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1349779&postcount=2)) chief among which is the belief that reality is rational.

Clearly, the idea that the world is rational must be forced onto nature; it cannot be read from it, since nature is not Mind. Nevertheless, it is far easier to rationalise the imposition of a hierarchical and grossly unequal class system on 'disorderly' workers if ruling-class ideologues can persuade one and all that the 'law-like' order of the natural world actually reflects, and is reflected in turn by the social order from which their patrons just so happen to benefit --, the fundamental aspects of which none may question.

Material reality may not be rational, but it is certainly rational for ruling-class "prize-fighters" to claim that it is.

And:


Alas, for all their claims to be radical, when it comes to Philosophy, Marxist theorists are surprisingly conservative -- and worryingly incapable of seeing this, even after it has been pointed out to them....

Hence, in spite of frequent claims to the contrary, Marxist Philosophy has from its inception been remarkably traditional, if not disconcertingly conservative. Instead of trying to bury traditional theory, comrades have in fact done the opposite, indirectly praising it by emulating it. Hence, they have been happy to accept traditional philosphical 'problems' at face value, and then attempt to concoct their own a priori solutions to them (none of which work, which is not surprising since all such 'problems' are based on lingusitic distortion and misuse -- so no wonder they have remained unsolved for over 2400 years, and we are no nearer a solution that was Plato).

While they claim they want to smash the state, they are content to accept theories that have always been used to rationalise and justify it -- political reformism is unacceptable, but philosophical reformism, it seems, is fine.

More details here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

[Bandito]

Badiou and Poulantzas.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Well, as far as personal influences go, I would say Soren Kierkegaard (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard) and Georg Lukacs (http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/) form two polar ends of the critical theory that has been so influencial on my thinking in the last two or three years of my life. Kierkegaard I like because of his immense irony and disdain for "anything system" and his attacks on established religion and established orthodoxy, and Lukacs for his grand weaving together of Marxist dialectics and Kantian anthropology. Neither relies "over-heavily" on any particular strand of theory, and I like that about both of them. I would say these two thinkers, more than any others, have influenced my way of thinking and perceiving and being in the world and have pushed me closer to forming a cohesive synthesis with regards to my thinking in the past and present.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

How did you manage to stay awake reading Kierkegaard?

[JimFar]

Wittgenstein thought pretty highly of Kierkegaard.

[MarxSchmarx]

Wittgenstein thought pretty highly of Kierkegaard.

Argumentum ad verecundiam.

And Alexander Cockburn? Isn't that the counter-punch guy? He is a solid journalist but he can be sloppy as hell (the climate change stuff comes to mind) and I wouldn't characterize him as a great thinker.

As far as great modern leftist thinkers go, we are no longer in the age of the single great thinker. All work was always to some extent collaborative, but some of the best, most cogent work of our time comes from the group work of the likes of the Anarchist FAQ.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Jim:


Wittgenstein thought pretty highly of Kierkegaard.

Yes, but it's from him I derived the above thought, when he said that Kiekegaard was indeed profound, but when reading him he kept thinking, "Yes, yes, I've got that, now move on...".

And this was indeed my experience when trying to plough through some of his books -- page after page after page after page...on some opera!

[Buffalo Souljah]

How did you manage to stay awake reading Kierkegaard?

Wow, I find Kierkegaard one of the most provocative thinkers out there! I must have bad taste!:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You must have read the editied highlights then.

[Invader Zim]

The best thinker of our time? Probably the person who invented the Balti dish.

[Calmwinds]

Why would anyone consider Derrida an important thinker? Can anyone highlight how he and Foucault are "great".

[Buffalo Souljah]

You must have read the editied highlights then.
No, I read through the old fashioned way, with my pen and lots of highliters. I much enjoyed the journey, and I'm all the wiser for it. Martin buber, Heidegger, Sartre, Lukacs, Benjamin, Bloch, and Dostoevsky were all influenced by Kierkegaard. He is one of the most versatile and wide reaching thinkers. And a funny man, at that. "The modern church is like a trumpet and a hobby horse". I like that. Fond memories, reading him. I might leaf through my copy of Fear and Trembling, if I ever find it again...

[Buffalo Souljah]

Why would anyone consider Derrida an important thinker? Can anyone highlight how he and Foucault are "great".
There is a great debate betwen Noam CHomsky and Michel Foucault, which many people thought Foucault "won". I'll find a clip on Toutube. Here it is: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WveI_vgmPz8

[革命者]

There is a great debate betwen Noam CHomsky and Michel Foucault, which many people thought Foucault "won". I'll find a clip on Toutube. Here it is: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WveI_vgmPz8Many poststructuralist or many people at large? I found the video to be a rehash of obviously opposing ideas, but nothing to bring them closer.

And postmoderns are very much in vogue (as we live in postmodernity; not ver suprising). I personally see more in structuralism, being a linguist. But both in Linguistics and in politics I don't see how Chomsky is so great either. What is it is specific that we can use from their thoughts and writings to use in our struggle?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Speaking of Chomsky, I think he summed things up rather well with these comments:


I've returned from travel-speaking, where I spend most of my life, and found a collection of messages extending the discussion about "theory" and "philosophy," a debate that I find rather curious. A few reactions -- though I concede, from the start, that I may simply not understand what is going on.

As far as I do think I understand it, the debate was initiated by the charge that I, Mike, and maybe others don't have "theories" and therefore fail to give any explanation of why things are proceeding as they do. We must turn to "theory" and "philosophy" and "theoretical constructs" and the like to remedy this deficiency in our efforts to understand and address what is happening in the world. I won't speak for Mike. My response so far has pretty much been to reiterate something I wrote 35 years ago, long before "postmodernism" had erupted in the literary intellectual culture: "if there is a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret," despite much "pseudo-scientific posturing."

To my knowledge, the statement was accurate 35 years ago, and remains so; furthermore, it extends to the study of human affairs generally, and applies in spades to what has been produced since that time. What has changed in the interim, to my knowledge, is a huge explosion of self- and mutual-admiration among those who propound what they call "theory" and "philosophy," but little that I can detect beyond "pseudo-scientific posturing." That little is, as I wrote, sometimes quite interesting, but lacks consequences for the real world problems that occupy my time and energies (Rawls's important work is the case I mentioned, in response to specific inquiry).

The latter fact has been noticed. One fine philosopher and social theorist (also activist), Alan Graubard, wrote an interesting review years ago of Robert Nozick's "libertarian" response to Rawls, and of the reactions to it. He pointed out that reactions were very enthusiastic. Reviewer after reviewer extolled the power of the arguments, etc., but no one accepted any of the real-world conclusions (unless they had previously reached them). That's correct, as were his observations on what it means.

The proponents of "theory" and "philosophy" have a very easy task if they want to make their case. Simply make known to me what was and remains a "secret" to me: I'll be happy to look. I've asked many times before, and still await an answer, which should be easy to provide: simply give some examples of "a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to" the kinds of problems and issues that Mike, I, and many others (in fact, most of the world's population, I think, outside of narrow and remarkably self-contained intellectual circles) are or should be concerned with: the problems and issues we speak and write about, for example, and others like them. To put it differently, show that the principles of the "theory" or "philosophy" that we are told to study and apply lead by valid argument to conclusions that we and others had not already reached on other (and better) grounds; these "others" include people lacking formal education, who typically seem to have no problem reaching these conclusions through mutual interactions that avoid the "theoretical" obscurities entirely, or often on their own.

Again, those are simple requests. I've made them before, and remain in my state of ignorance. I also draw certain conclusions from the fact.

As for the "deconstruction" that is carried out (also mentioned in the debate), I can't comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. But if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words that I can understand, and show why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before and and have continued to do since without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. That will cure my deficiencies --- of course, if they are curable; maybe they aren't, a possibility to which I'll return.

These are very easy requests to fulfil, if there is any basis to the claims put forth with such fervor and indignation. But instead of trying to provide an answer to this simple requests, the response is cries of anger: to raise these questions shows "elitism," "anti-intellectualism," and other crimes --- though apparently it is not "elitist" to stay within the self- and mutual-admiration societies of intellectuals who talk only to one another and (to my knowledge) don't enter into the kind of world in which I'd prefer to live. As for that world, I can reel off my speaking and writing schedule to illustrate what I mean, though I presume that most people in this discussion know, or can easily find out; and somehow I never find the "theoreticians" there, nor do I go to their conferences and parties. In short, we seem to inhabit quite different worlds, and I find it hard to see why mine is "elitist," not theirs. The opposite seems to be transparently the case, though I won't amplify.

To add another facet, I am absolutely deluged with requests to speak and can't possibly accept a fraction of the invitations I'd like to, so I suggest other people. But oddly, I never suggest those who propound "theories" and "philosophy," nor do I come across them, or for that matter rarely even their names, in my own (fairly extensive) experience with popular and activist groups and organizations, general community, college, church, union, etc., audiences here and abroad, third world women, refugees, etc.; I can easily give examples. Why, I wonder.

The whole debate, then, is an odd one. On one side, angry charges and denunciations, on the other, the request for some evidence and argument to support them, to which the response is more angry charges -- but, strikingly, no evidence or argument. Again, one is led to ask why.

It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I just lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have been unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their followers. I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years, when similar charges have been made -- but without any answer to my questions. Again, they are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an answer: if I'm missing something, then show me what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if it's all beyond my comprehension, which is possible, then I'm just a lost cause, and will be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be interested in them and seem to understand them (which I'm perfectly happy to do, having no interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in these things, but apparently little else).

Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left with the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm certainly willing to grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll have to remain suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don't understand -- say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand it. Now Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. --- even Foucault, whom I knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest --- write things that I also don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says they do understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a) some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden genetic mutation, which has created a form of "theory" that is beyond quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b) ... I won't spell it out.

Again, I've lived for 50 years in these worlds, have done a fair amount of work of my own in fields called "philosophy" and "science," as well as intellectual history, and have a fair amount of personal acquaintance with the intellectual culture in the sciences, humanities, social sciences, and the arts. That has left me with my own conclusions about intellectual life, which I won't spell out. But for others, I would simply suggest that you ask those who tell you about the wonders of "theory" and "philosophy" to justify their claims --- to do what people in physics, math, biology, linguistics, and other fields are happy to do when someone asks them, seriously, what are the principles of their theories, on what evidence are they based, what do they explain that wasn't already obvious, etc. These are fair requests for anyone to make. If they can't be met, then I'd suggest recourse to Hume's advice in similar circumstances: to the flames.

Specific comment. Phetland asked who I'm referring to when I speak of "Paris school" and "postmodernist cults": the above is a sample.

He then asks, reasonably, why I am "dismissive" of it. Take, say, Derrida. Let me begin by saying that I dislike making the kind of comments that follow without providing evidence, but I doubt that participants want a close analysis of de Saussure, say, in this forum, and I know that I'm not going to undertake it. I wouldn't say this if I hadn't been explicitly asked for my opinion -- and if asked to back it up, I'm going to respond that I don't think it merits the time to do so.

So take Derrida, one of the grand old men. I thought I ought to at least be able to understand his Grammatology, so tried to read it. I could make out some of it, for example, the critical analysis of classical texts that I knew very well and had written about years before. I found the scholarship appalling, based on pathetic misreading; and the argument, such as it was, failed to come close to the kinds of standards I've been familiar with since virtually childhood. Well, maybe I missed something: could be, but suspicions remain, as noted. Again, sorry to make unsupported comments, but I was asked, and therefore am answering.

Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me) I've met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in print, and spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on real issues, and using language that was perfectly comprehensible -- he speaking French, me English); Lacan (who I met several times and considered an amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan, though his earlier work, pre-cult, was sensible and I've discussed it in print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly during the period when she was a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of them I haven't met, because I am very remote from from these circles, by choice, preferring quite different and far broader ones --- the kinds where I give talks, have interviews, take part in activities, write dozens of long letters every week, etc. I've dipped into what they write out of curiosity, but not very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate, based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes, that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain gibberish. When I proceed as I do in other areas where I do not understand, I run into the problems mentioned in connection with (1) and (2) above. So that's who I'm referring to, and why I don't proceed very far. I can list a lot more names if it's not obvious.

For those interested in a literary depiction that reflects pretty much the same perceptions (but from the inside), I'd suggest David Lodge. Pretty much on target, as far as I can judge.

Phetland also found it "particularly puzzling" that I am so "curtly dismissive" of these intellectual circles while I spend a lot of time "exposing the posturing and obfuscation of the New York Times." So "why not give these guys the same treatment." Fair question. There are also simple answers. What appears in the work I do address (NYT, journals of opinion, much of scholarship, etc.) is simply written in intelligible prose and has a great impact on the world, establishing the doctrinal framework within which thought and expression are supposed to be contained, and largely are, in successful doctrinal systems such as ours. That has a huge impact on what happens to suffering people throughout the world, the ones who concern me, as distinct from those who live in the world that Lodge depicts (accurately, I think). So this work should be dealt with seriously, at least if one cares about ordinary people and their problems. The work to which Phetland refers has none of these characteristics, as far as I'm aware. It certainly has none of the impact, since it is addressed only to other intellectuals in the same circles. Furthermore, there is no effort that I am aware of to make it intelligible to the great mass of the population (say, to the people I'm constantly speaking to, meeting with, and writing letters to, and have in mind when I write, and who seem to understand what I say without any particular difficulty, though they generally seem to have the same cognitive disability I do when facing the postmodern cults). And I'm also aware of no effort to show how it applies to anything in the world in the sense I mentioned earlier: grounding conclusions that weren't already obvious. Since I don't happen to be much interested in the ways that intellectuals inflate their reputations, gain privilege and prestige, and disengage themselves from actual participation in popular struggle, I don't spend any time on it.

Phetland suggests starting with Foucault --- who, as I've written repeatedly, is somewhat apart from the others, for two reasons: I find at least some of what he writes intelligible, though generally not very interesting; second, he was not personally disengaged and did not restrict himself to interactions with others within the same highly privileged elite circles. Phetland then does exactly what I requested: he gives some illustrations of why he thinks Foucault's work is important. That's exactly the right way to proceed, and I think it helps understand why I take such a "dismissive" attitude towards all of this --- in fact, pay no attention to it.

What Phetland describes, accurately I'm sure, seems to me unimportant, because everyone always knew it --- apart from details of social and intellectual history, and about these, I'd suggest caution: some of these are areas I happen to have worked on fairly extensively myself, and I know that Foucault's scholarship is just not trustworthy here, so I don't trust it, without independent investigation, in areas that I don't know -- this comes up a bit in the discussion from 1972 that is in print. I think there is much better scholarship on the 17th and 18th century, and I keep to that, and my own research. But let's put aside the other historical work, and turn to the "theoretical constructs" and the explanations: that there has been "a great change from harsh mechanisms of repression to more subtle mechanisms by which people come to do" what the powerful want, even enthusiastically. That's true enough, in fact, utter truism. If that's a "theory," then all the criticisms of me are wrong: I have a "theory" too, since I've been saying exactly that for years, and also giving the reasons and historical background, but without describing it as a theory (because it merits no such term), and without obfuscatory rhetoric (because it's so simple-minded), and without claiming that it is new (because it's a truism). It's been fully recognized for a long time that as the power to control and coerce has declined, it's more necessary to resort to what practitioners in the PR industry early in this century -- who understood all of this well -- called "controlling the public mind." The reasons, as observed by Hume in the 18th century, are that "the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers" relies ultimately on control of opinion and attitudes. Why these truisms should suddenly become "a theory" or "philosophy," others will have to explain; Hume would have laughed.

Some of Foucault's particular examples (say, about 18th century techniques of punishment) look interesting, and worth investigating as to their accuracy. But the "theory" is merely an extremely complex and inflated restatement of what many others have put very simply, and without any pretense that anything deep is involved. There's nothing in what Phetland describes that I haven't been writing about myself for 35 years, also giving plenty of documentation to show that it was always obvious, and indeed hardly departs from truism. What's interesting about these trivialities is not the principle, which is transparent, but the demonstration of how it works itself out in specific detail to cases that are important to people: like intervention and aggression, exploitation and terror, "free market" scams, and so on. That I don't find in Foucault, though I find plenty of it by people who seem to be able to write sentences I can understand and who aren't placed in the intellectual firmament as "theoreticians."

To make myself clear, Phetland is doing exactly the right thing: presenting what he sees as "important insights and theoretical constructs" that he finds in Foucault. My problem is that the "insights" seem to me familiar and there are no "theoretical constructs," except in that simple and familiar ideas have been dressed up in complicated and pretentious rhetoric. Phetland asks whether I think this is "wrong, useless, or posturing." No. The historical parts look interesting sometimes, though they have to be treated with caution and independent verification is even more worth undertaking than it usually is. The parts that restate what has long been obvious and put in much simpler terms are not "useless," but indeed useful, which is why I and others have always made the very same points. As to "posturing," a lot of it is that, in my opinion, though I don't particularly blame Foucault for it: it's such a deeply rooted part of the corrupt intellectual culture of Paris that he fell into it pretty naturally, though to his credit, he distanced himself from it. As for the "corruption" of this culture particularly since World War II, that's another topic, which I've discussed elsewhere and won't go into here. Frankly, I don't see why people in this forum should be much interested, just as I am not. There are more important things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow and (to me, at least) pretty unininteresting circles. That's a broad brush, and I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without proving them: but I've been asked, and have answered the only specific point that I find raised. When asked about my general opinion, I can only give it, or if something more specific is posed, address that. I'm not going to undertake an essay on topics that don't interest me.

Unless someone can answer the simple questions that immediately arise in the mind of any reasonable person when claims about "theory" and "philosophy" are raised, I'll keep to work that seems to me sensible and enlightening, and to people who are interested in understanding and changing the world.

Johnb made the point that "plain language is not enough when the frame of reference is not available to the listener"; correct and important. But the right reaction is not to resort to obscure and needlessly complex verbiage and posturing about non-existent "theories." Rather, it is to ask the listener to question the frame of reference that he/she is accepting, and to suggest alternatives that might be considered, all in plain language. I've never found that a problem when I speak to people lacking much or sometimes any formal education, though it's true that it tends to become harder as you move up the educational ladder, so that indoctrination is much deeper, and the self-selection for obedience that is a good part of elite education has taken its toll. Johnb says that outside of circles like this forum, "to the rest of the country, he's incomprehensible" ("he" being me). That's absolutely counter to my rather ample experience, with all sorts of audiences. Rather, my experience is what I just described. The incomprehensibility roughly corresponds to the educational level. Take, say, talk radio. I'm on a fair amount, and it's usually pretty easy to guess from accents, etc., what kind of audience it is. I've repeatedly found that when the audience is mostly poor and less educated, I can skip lots of the background and "frame of reference" issues because it's already obvious and taken for granted by everyone, and can proceed to matters that occupy all of us. With more educated audiences, that's much harder; it's necessary to disentangle lots of ideological constructions.

It's certainly true that lots of people can't read the books I write. That's not because the ideas or language are complicated --- we have no problems in informal discussion on exactly the same points, and even in the same words. The reasons are different, maybe partly the fault of my writing style, partly the result of the need (which I feel, at least) to present pretty heavy documentation, which makes it tough reading. For these reasons, a number of people have taken pretty much the same material, often the very same words, and put them in pamphlet form and the like. No one seems to have much problem --- though again, reviewers in the Times Literary Supplement or professional academic journals don't have a clue as to what it's about, quite commonly; sometimes it's pretty comical.

A final point, something I've written about elsewhere (e.g., in a discussion in Z papers, and the last chapter of Year 501). There has been a striking change in the behaviour of the intellectual class in recent years. The left intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been teaching in working class schools, writing books like "mathematics for the millions" (which made mathematics intelligible to millions of people), participating in and speaking for popular organizations, etc., are now largely disengaged from such activities, and although quick to tell us that they are far more radical than thou, are not to be found, it seems, when there is such an obvious and growing need and even explicit request for the work they could do out there in the world of people with live problems and concerns. That's not a small problem. This country, right now, is in a very strange and ominous state. People are frightened, angry, disillusioned, sceptical, confused. That's an organizer's dream, as I once heard Mike say. It's also fertile ground for demagogues and fanatics, who can (and in fact already do) rally substantial popular support with messages that are not unfamiliar from their predecessors in somewhat similar circumstances. We know where it has led in the past; it could again. There's a huge gap that once was at least partially filled by left intellectuals willing to engage with the general public and their problems. It has ominous implications, in my opinion.

End of Reply, and (to be frank) of my personal interest in the matter, unless the obvious questions are answered.

http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


No, I read through the old fashioned way, with my pen and lots of highliters. I much enjoyed the journey, and I'm all the wiser for it. Martin buber, Heidegger, Sartre, Lukacs, Benjamin, Bloch, and Dostoevsky were all influenced by Kierkegaard. He is one of the most versatile and wide reaching thinkers. And a funny man, at that. "The modern church is like a trumpet and a hobby horse". I like that. Fond memories, reading him. I might leaf through my copy of Fear and Trembling, if I ever find it again...

Well, all I can say is that you are welcome to the above; for my part, their works are long overdue candidates for Hume's bonfire.

[Buffalo Souljah]

I've read Chomsky's comments and I agree there is some unnecessary exclusion and reduction in those sorts of camps (postmodern philosophy) that tend to reduce and drag down the substance of discourse that's out there. But I have friends who are semioticians, and they take their studies very seriously, some of them with an entire life of work behind them. I will say in regards to Foucault at least, his studies of prison populations and of medical clinics are very engaging and relevant texts for understanding modern institutional culture. He really took the baton from Nietzsche and capitalized (in the general sense) on that avenue of research.

As far as if Dostoevsky and Lukacs's remarks are for the bonfire, I'd have to disagree with you, sister. I don't think there's been any major development in the novel form since Dostoevsky wrote, as he revolutionized it. He was a violent subjectivist and truly a bastion of the arts and of letters. Also, Kierkegaard's subjectivity is really the bulwark of that (existentialist) movement. Jean-Paul Sartre and Heidegger get most of their ontology from him. Though he had deep-felt criticisms, Hegel was a primary influence as well, especially the Phenomenology. All of these men (Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Hegel) were an influence to Georg Lukacs, who after converting to Marxism in the 1920's really founded the Western Marxist tradition. Lukacs never split formally from Hegelianism and his theory, especially in his middle period was an intricate (and often contradictory) balance between Kantian idealism, Hegelian formalism and Marxist pragmatics. Absolutely essential figure in the development of Marxist social theory and critical theory at large.

Don't be so contrarian.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Many poststructuralist or many people at large? I found the video to be a rehash of obviously opposing ideas, but nothing to bring them closer.

And postmoderns are very much in vogue (as we live in postmodernity; not ver suprising). I personally see more in structuralism, being a linguist. But both in Linguistics and in politics I don't see how Chomsky is so great either. What is it is specific that we can use from their thoughts and writings to use in our struggle?

Chomsky is interesting because, instead of describing what language is, he began a phase of linguistics which attempted to explain language as a tool for constructing reality. His notions on generative grammar are really interesting, if you ever get a chance to read them. He and others like him cut through all the empirical molehills (for they are that) and gets to the root or core of what distinguishes language from other similar organizational systems. If you're a linguist, you have to read him at some point. Being a structuralist, are you familiar with Levi-Strauss's arguments about language? What do you make of his notion of the heterogeneity of language systems? What do you make of his other ideas? What do you make of Quine? What are your thoughts on the purpose and place of language in society? Is language a perfect system? To what do you attribute syntactic shifts and phenomena like neologism? I'm sorry I'm all questions, but these are things that interet me, generally.

[counterblast]

http://www.grassrootsfeminism.net/cms/sites/default/files/image/audre-lorde-usa.jpg

Hands down, Audre Lorde for merging race and sexuality, where so many others have missed the point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GB, I agree with you about Dostoyevsky; for some odd reason I did not see his name in your list! A very great writer; nearly as great as Tolstoy and von Kleist.

[kalu]

Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe- for their rigorous engagement with the Marxist tradition, and their movement from a priori "base/superstructure" theorizing to the concept of hegemonic articulation as the basis for the formation of political identities.

Alasdair Macintyre- for providing a fascinating definition of "tradition" as a historically-extended, embodied argument, and important version of moral enquiry.

[Jimmie Higgins]

That little is, as I wrote, sometimes quite interesting, but lacks consequences for the real world problems that occupy my time and energies

Sounds like the marx quote.


Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe- for their rigorous engagement with the Marxist tradition, and their movement from a priori "base/superstructure" theorizing to the concept of hegemonic articulation as the basis for the formation of political identitiesReally. Engagement? More like rejection Marxism through the rejection of class analysis of society. As much as they were in vogue when I was in school in the 90s (since most profs. all agreed that class struggle was a thing of the past), I don't think their ideas have stood the test of time well at all.

[kalu]

Really. Engagement?

Yes. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (what I'm basing my comment on) is not only a stunning extension of democratic theory, but an inventive intellectual history of both the advances and the lacuna of thinkers like Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Plekhanov, Antonio Gramsci (of course), Louis Althusser, and others. What works of theirs have you read?

They do not "reject" anything, they move through and beyond the gaps of a priori Marxism. How do you figure that their ideas "have not stood the test of time"? What is your measure?

[Jimmie Higgins]

They do not "reject" anything, they move through and beyond the gaps of a priori Marxism. How do you figure that their ideas "have not stood the test of time"? What is your measure?

Post-Marxism became fashionable at a time when the class struggle was a little more hidden and so many academics tried to locate alternative ways of understanding power and oppression and resistance in society. For thinkers like this, class is an "identity" like any other and so class oppression is just one oppression among a plurality of oppressions.

I think race and class, sexism and class are all related and intertwined, not separate and autonomous from each other. Is something like the Katrina disaster just racism, is it just "classism" no, it exposes the intersection of race and class. While rich women are subject to sexism just like working class women are, do they experience it in the same way? Does Hilary Clinton (subject to racism in the election campaign despite here ruling class position) have the same interests in regards to sexism as a working class female working at the post-office - not to mention Afghan women?

Post-Marxism did not "move through and beyond" traditional socialist understanding, it brought it backwards to a pre-Marxist non-class view of socialism. While it is undoubtedly helpful to argue against some of the economic or historical determinism of some socialist groups and thinkers, this really wasn't the main problem of the 60s movements in my view. CPs or non-radical forces controlled much of the labor movement in the 60s and their bad politics along with a relative time of economic stability in the US and Europe led many in the left to try and side-step the problem of declining militancy and radicalism of the pre-war left and labor movements. So some looked to Maoist student warriors as the new force for social change or parliamentary reformism (some American Trotskyist groups for example) or whatever. A lot of academics took to post-modern ideas and post-marxism which generally saw class oppression in terms of psychological effects of snobbery and so-called classism rather than in terms of how society is run, for who, and why.

I can understand how this view might be attractive at that time - I don't understand how anyone can still hold these views today when the interrelation of class and specific opressions of some groups seems more on the surface than it has since WWII.

But I don't know maybe I'm reacting more to how their ideas were presented by some of the wanktastic instructors at my university 10 years ago than their actual work. Since you seem to like their arguments, maybe you can give me some examples of how their thoughts can help me as a radical worker organizing in the US today.


thinkers like Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Plekhanov, Antonio Gramsci (of course), Louis Althusser, and others. What works of theirs have you read?Sorry boss, I've only read dem books by Rosa Luxemburg and Gramsci. You sure has the biggest stack of books a prol like me ever did saw:rolleyes:. Seriously, this is a shitty and ineffective way to establish authority. I'm sure someone like Todd Gitlin or Christopher Hitchens has read much more than me, but I can safely call bullshit on their ideas like when Gitlin claims that radicalism is "unnatural" and counter to the "American spirit".

[kalu]

Your post is a bit confused and slightly abusive(the last part is needlessly hyperbolic, I was trying to point out that far from ignoring or rejecting marxism, laclau and mouffe have engaged with a wide variety of thinkers. I by no means equate this with the superiority of their argument per se. It is trivial and obvious to say scope alone does not equal persuasiveness)

I am less than convinced by your sweeping "history" of the emergence of postmarxism. Returning instead to my previous point, I find laclau and mouffe interesting and possibly useful because of their rejection of a restrictive politics of "class interests" based on an essentialist (and unjustifiable) separation of the "political" from the "economic". I admire their alternate point about the indeterminate terrain of the social upon which hegemonic articulations form (which retroactively construct the object they claim to represent, ie."The people"). These "abstruse" arguments essentially converge upon the openness of the political, upon which any left politics that aspires to dominance (determining the "ethical-political ideas") can rest. If neoliberalism achieves a rstrictive definition of democracy (liberty), laclau and mouffe advocate "radical democracy". Regardless of the efficacy of this last point (do we need to formulate a new discourse of criticism that moves beyond and through "democracy"?), this type of argument is, in my humble opinion, a great advance over the anachronistic politics of "class In the last instance". From a more advanced theoretical point of view, their deconstruction of economic "essentialism is fascinating, but I've made my point about the depth and reach of their thinking...

[kalu]

Also to clarify, when I wrote "what books of theirs have you read?", I meant which of laclau and mouffe's works specifically, not marxists in general.

[Jimmie Higgins]

an inventive intellectual history of both the advances and the lacuna of thinkers like Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Plekhanov, Antonio Gramsci (of course), Louis Althusser, and others. What works of theirs have you read?
Also to clarify, when I wrote "what books of theirs have you read?", I meant which of laclau and mouffe's works specifically, not marxists in general.Sorry, I misread it as an elitist dig implying that becuase they've read more than me, my view of their arguments is moot.

Regardless, reading and writing about Marx or Gramsci doesn't mean much in regards to advancing an understanding of socialism as every demonstrated by every Marx and Gramsci studies program in academia.


I admire their alternate point about the indeterminate terrain of the social upon which hegemonic articulations form (which retroactively construct the object they claim to represent, ie."The people"). These "abstruse" arguments essentially converge upon the openness of the political, upon which any left politics that aspires to dominance (determining the "ethical-political ideas") can rest.Could you expand or be more concrete on this point?


I am less than convinced by your sweeping "history" of the emergence of postmarxism.Ok, fair enough. I am by no means an expert on this subject so, from your perspective, what does postmarxism in general concretely add to our understanding of how to end oppression and win or build a better world?

[kalu]

Jimmie: I'm almost done with my second reading of the book (I read it a few years ago and barely got the point, but now I am better prepared to tackle the "theory"). I will edit this post within the next few days, after organizing my thoughts and ideas in order to offer you a clear write-up in response to your concerns.

[革命者]

Chomsky is interesting because, instead of describing what language is, he began a phase of linguistics which attempted to explain language as a tool for constructing reality. His notions on generative grammar are really interesting, if you ever get a chance to read them. He and others like him cut through all the empirical molehills (for they are that) and gets to the root or core of what distinguishes language from other similar organizational systems. If you're a linguist, you have to read him at some point. Being a structuralist, are you familiar with Levi-Strauss's arguments about language? What do you make of his notion of the heterogeneity of language systems? What do you make of his other ideas? What do you make of Quine? What are your thoughts on the purpose and place of language in society? Is language a perfect system? To what do you attribute syntactic shifts and phenomena like neologism? I'm sorry I'm all questions, but these are things that interet me, generally.Sorry, it's only now that I have returned to the Philosophy forum. I will answer your questions in multiple posts, but you may reply with questions for clarification or reactions to my views at any time. If you allow me, I'll start with Quine, as I think his views of scientific theories tie in nicely with my views on generative grammar.

Chomsky's generative grammar has seen many theories, not only (further) developed by him, but by a great many syntacticians, but he has indeed made theories which are instrumental in understanding language. But maybe the most interesting thing is that he showed how we can have different theories under the banner of generative grammar which all are quite capable of predicting the grammaticality of sentences, though, as I'd argue, these theories don't actually describe a structure of language as it exists in reality. Chomsky was half a century ago a lot more convinced that language was a system that, though accounting for all languages, was really unique to language. His theories predicted the grammaticality for many languages, though the theory had to be extended even then to account for some phenomena in language. But after his work became more popular and while more languages were (and still are being) subjected to the theories, it became clear (even) to him that the theories didn't so much prove the existence of the underlying structure of language he had described, but that it only were theories that to some limited extent could predict what the surface forms would be. That's when he started (again with other syntacticians and to this day) to minimalise the complexity of generative grammar in what he called the Minimalist program, because he thought, and I agree, that a greater simplicity of the theory, while still accounting for grammaticality is more likely to resemble a true structure behind language. And this perfectly shows the instrumentalism of Quine he explored in his work on the philosophy of science; that a theory can't be proven true, only individual outcomes or statements drawn from them.

This for me is very interesting in Quine, because I think that Chomsky, though looking for structure, is wrong when he restricts his theory to only language; I think that this (also in the light of new neurological discoveries) allows for too much complexity in his idea of this structure. And I think he has been fooled into it by disregarding the possibility of a theory that was highly instrumental still being false. But I do think this warrants more empirical research, because I personally believe there is a very simple structure underlying not just language, but all human cognition. This structure has created language and with every newborn recreates language, by external stimuli. This is still contested by many syntacticians and linguists in general, who think there to be too few stimuli for a young person to create a language ability without an innate tendency and language-specific structure. But brain research, again, is starting to prove them wrong.

Though this shows we need to take some care not to deem a theory infallible too quickly, I truly believe in universal structure (of cognition and in a broader sense) and I don't believe that behaviourism is the only way of understanding behaviour. More so, I think it is unethical to think people's behaviour can be shaped and completely reshaped by external stimuli. No, I believe the cognitive structuring of the brain is the main driving force behind behaviour and you can only forcibly make people act differently from how this make-up, but this is unnatural behaviour for them. That's also why I believe in a good education; Bildung, from an early age and I detest the transition to what I think is training instead of education in formal, government-subsidised 'education', where attitudes and skills are the primary focus.

I don't agree the Protestant idea that everyone has a God-given place in the strata he happens to live in, but the Humanist idea that everyone can do anything has been taken too far (not in the least to blame people for their inabilities). Ironically, it has changed from highly ethical values into highly unethical developments, and I think behaviourism is one of them.

[Belisarius]

For me, I'd say Pierre Bourdieu, for redefining capital.

What are the concrete ideas that we could internalise into our own analyses to give force to a revolutionary movement today of Foucault's and Derrida's? Chomsky? Cockburn?

I don't really know chomsky or cockburn, but i can explain you why derrida and foucault are interesting for marxism:

foucault is a master in indentifying the ways in which society controls its subjects and makes "docile bodies" out of them. this is exactly the problem for contemporary marxists: society brainwashed communism out of the public spirit. nobody can oppose the establishment anymore, since everyone is stuck in a panoptic world. Panoptism is the theory that all the time we could be watched and thus we behave as if we were continually watched. we see these phenomena e.g. in the cameras in malls, the small opening under the door of a toiletdoor.

Derrida is important for seeing that the negative (critique) is the way to the positive (society). his way of inverting dualisms so they generate new meanings are also relevant to marxism. Marcuse e.g. proposed pretty much the same idea in "onedimensional man". Derrida also wrote a book on marx in which he praises him, but i haven't actually read it, so i can't tell you more. it's called:" the specters of marx"

[The Vegan Marxist]

I feel Jacque Fresco should have a voice within our movement & through the revolution, for his ideals in implementing a resource-based system & the end of the capitalist machine are quite conjoined with like-minded marxist, leninist, & maoist rebels.

[BakuninFan]

I say Sartre, Marcuse, Lukacs, or Camus (who was an anarchist, but oh well)

[Faust]

Me :hammersickle:

[kalu]

Jimmie...I typed a WHOLE POST in response, and it just vanished. I am pissed, but I will begin writing again, give me a second. :cursing:

EDIT: Okay, here we go...again.

I apologize for the long wait. I did in fact finish Laclau and Mouffe's book (a week ago, actually), but I failed to take notes so I was worried about posting because I didn't know if all my ideas were there, or if I could even write them out coherently, but here goes nothing.

In response to your first point, Laclau and Mouffe begin by attacking what they perceive to be "economic essentialism." They criticize the notion that political identities are preconstituted in a conceptual object we label "the economy," and can be gleaned by reference to a transparent system (for example, "I support the working class, because I am a worker in the capitalist labour process"). They proceed by pointing to a crisis in the history of Marxism, the historical failure of the proletariat's attempt to unite, and they show the opening this provides for a new logic of hegemony. The latter concept is a direct reference to Gramsci. Gramsci, in Laclau and Mouffe's opinion, best articulated an attempt to move beyond the "corporative interests" of class, and instead frame social struggle with reference to the ethical political ideas of society (for example, the bourgeois notion of "free trade"). Laclau and Mouffe take this point further by writing that even identification with a "class," such as the proletariat, is retroactively constructed through hegemonic struggle. This theoretical debate questions an anachronistic politics of 19th-century working class unification ("capitalism eventually builds its own grave digger...and then, we unite!"). Laclau and Mouffe supplement this critique of "economic essentialism" by criticizing what they consider to be a common portrayal of "the endogenous logic of capital." They point instead to the impact of articulated workers' struggles on the development of capitalist production (here they directly reference the Italian Autonomia theorists), and they also critique the topographic conception of politics ("superstructure") as resting on an economic base. Instead, they reaffirm the openness of the political as an ontology of the social (against closure).

To fold in a response to your second point about concrete ways to fight oppression, Laclau and Mouffe end up arguing for a radical and plural democracy. In their opinion, this project can be achieved through linking struggles together in a chain of equivalences. As they say, there is nothing inherently "Leftist" about the ecological struggle, but it can be linked to other projects in order to form a hegemonic bloc that can challenge, for example, capitalist neoliberalism. In Laclau and Mouffe's opinion, neoliberalism essentially is the name for a conservative counter-revolution that achieves a restrictive definition of democracy (against expanding "rights"; for example, the social right to healthcare), by creating a restrictive definition of "liberty" (I am free to pursue my own self-interest...even if that hurts others). Laclau and Mouffe's slogan in turn is "recognition AND redistribution." There's nothing to say that radical and plural democracy HAS to be our project (though it sounds nice), but the point is that political struggle cannot be carried out by transparent reference to economics. Laclau and Mouffe similarly reject replacing the proletariat with "the students" (as some on the New Left wished to do, given the historical failure of the Soviet Union), they reject any a priori privileged agent of social change, any a priori political subject.

I do think Laclau and Mouffe have several lacuna, though I will not give my full opinion on the matter just yet. Needless to say, I think they have yet to explain how hegemonic articulations are embedded in a capitalist geography of uneven development and imperialism (and what I will crudely call the capitalist "law of value", with special reference to David Harvey's insightful work). Still, I think their proposal is a great advance that secures the openness of political struggle, and abolishes historical determinism and belief in the endogenous development of capital (clearly logics of capital are affected by POLITICAL struggle, another question might be "What then is the breaking point of capital, and what is our positive 'utopian' demand in its stead?"). Antagonisms are here to stay, the point from which "elements" are constituted as "moments" of a hegemonic articulation, to which there is never any closure that could "seal" a political identity from change. We are throwing out both historical determinism and a liberal or even Habermassian politics of consensus. Essentially, we are always in a struggle to articulate "the people" or "the masses" or "the workers." The question is, a part of what overall struggle, and with reference to what goals? Here again we meet one possibility Laclau and Mouffe offer, radical and plural democracy.

Anyways, just to give you a specific example: in the 1970s in Sri Lanka, the JVP, a Sinhala Marxist party, thought the northern Tamil youth had the potential to open a "Che Guevara front." If you know anything about the JVP today, they are a quasi-fascistic group that has blindly supported the government's war against the Tamil people. Needless to say, there has been a shift in hegemonic articulation. Where once in Sri Lanka there was a potential for a broad, cross-ethnic Left front, that dream has been smashed by the emergence of ethnic antagonisms and Sinhala hegemonic nationalism. I'm not trying to paint an idealistic portrait, sure Sri Lanka already had "ethnic troubles" by the 1970s, but my point is that how we articulate our struggles and how that changes our very primacy of identity (do you identify first as a Leftist or as "a Sinhala"? what constitutes a Leftist or a Sinhala in the first place?) shifts over time, through political struggle. Our goal should then be to achieve new articulations (instead of attempting to apologize for, and explain away past failures, ie "the failure of the working class to come to its senses"), which we can reference to a broader emancipatory project. I think that has much greater potential to bring in other groups and struggles rather than an anachronistic "workers first!" industrial European working class mentality that fails to see the struggles of other groups such as informal workers as politically constitutive of hegemonic links. The Right has been very good at this struggle, linking "family-style traditionalism" with rapacious capitalism. Now it's time to hit back.

Also, sorry I haven't more broadly included in this post a discussion of "postmarxism", but now to attempt to include Negri and my own thoughts about Butler, Zizek, et al. would make my head swim. I hope you're content with what I have given.:lol:

[Jimmie Higgins]

Jimmie...



Thank you for your thoughtful response, comrade. It's been many years since I've read this and world politics as well as my personal view of politics have changed in the intervening years.

From your response it seems like the text could be very useful in bringing up problems and reassessing some deterministic or reductionist tendencies that have always been part of the movement to varying degrees.

However I do feel that by de-emphasising the working class's role in society, they have severed their thinking from the Marxist tradition. While I completely agree that the struggle will not always take the same form or involve the same people or same concerns, the working class is fundamental to transforming society imo because of the role they play. While any oppressed group (or coalition) can and should fight back I don't think that society can be fundamentally changed without the self-emancipation of the working class transforming society themselves. This is why I think the "new left" and many of the 3rd wold revolutions that did not connect to working class struggle (either by design or by circumstances in the post-WWII era) were doomed in regards helping to achieve a real revolution. At best what can happen from a revolution that does not change society "from the bottom up" is radical democracy - I would welcome this, but I think it would keep many of the hierarchies and the "base" intact leading to the recreation of similar kinds of "superstructure".

And yes, their understanding of base and superstructure (which seems to come from a totally different understanding of Gramsci) is another thing it seems I would disagree with them on. While we shouldn't see base and superstructure in highly developed capitalist countries in the crude way these concepts have sometimes been used, I think it's still more or less true - the superstructure is just more invisible and complex in these counties.

But on the subject of limiting yourself to economic struggles: this is definitely a point of agreement for me. I think part of the problem with the "inactivity of the working class" in the post-war era comes from the denial of the other areas of struggle for the working class (racism, sexism, and so on). Conversely part of the problem with the inability of social movements to progress has been the inability to link to working class issues. The Black power and women's movements are the most obvious example because in the US, at a certain point, the more middle class elements of these movements turned their backs on work-place and economic issues connected to special oppression of groups in favor of joining the Democratic party as their route to liberation. This has had the disastrous effect of leading to black, female, or gay politicians backing bigoted policies put forward by their party in order to "keep a seat at the table" while alienating most people in the oppressed group (most minorities, women, and homosexuals are working class) from the movement by no longer taking up concrete issues of racism in policing and sentencing for poor black males, unfair hiring practices for women, and so on.

I'm at work and I've been interrupted a half-dozen times while writing this so I'm sorry if it's a little scattered. I'm going to stop here for now, but I have the book on order so I hope to re-read it sometime soon. It might be interesting to have a study-group or debate about it on this website if there are a few more people who've read it recently.

[革命者]

georgebush, I added something on Quine and Chomsky to my original post: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showthread.php?p=1641840#post1641840

I like to hear your comments on it and will post on your other questions shortly.

Best,

Scotty

[ellipsis]

Marcos.

[革命者]

Oh well, I'll just post it here:

Chomsky is interesting because, instead of describing what language is, he began a phase of linguistics which attempted to explain language as a tool for constructing reality. His notions on generative grammar are really interesting, if you ever get a chance to read them. He and others like him cut through all the empirical molehills (for they are that) and gets to the root or core of what distinguishes language from other similar organizational systems. If you're a linguist, you have to read him at some point. Being a structuralist, are you familiar with Levi-Strauss's arguments about language? What do you make of his notion of the heterogeneity of language systems? What do you make of his other ideas? What do you make of Quine? What are your thoughts on the purpose and place of language in society? Is language a perfect system? To what do you attribute syntactic shifts and phenomena like neologism? I'm sorry I'm all questions, but these are things that interet me, generally.Sorry, it's only now that I have returned to the Philosophy forum. I will answer your questions in multiple posts, but you may reply with questions for clarification or reactions to my views at any time. If you allow me, I'll start with Quine, as I think his views of scientific theories tie in nicely with my views on generative grammar.

Chomsky's generative grammar has seen many theories, not only (further) developed by him, but by a great many syntacticians, but he has indeed made theories which are instrumental in understanding language. But maybe the most interesting thing is that he showed how we can have different theories under the banner of generative grammar which all are quite capable of predicting the grammaticality of sentences, though, as I'd argue, these theories don't actually describe a structure of language as it exists in reality. Chomsky was half a century ago a lot more convinced that language was a system that, though accounting for all languages, was really unique to language. His theories predicted the grammaticality for many languages, though the theory had to be extended even then to account for some phenomena in language. But after his work became more popular and while more languages were (and still are being) subjected to the theories, it became clear (even) to him that the theories didn't so much prove the existence of the underlying structure of language he had described, but that it only were theories that to some limited extent could predict what the surface forms would be. That's when he started (again with other syntacticians and to this day) to minimalise the complexity of generative grammar in what he called the Minimalist program, because he thought, and I agree, that a greater simplicity of the theory, while still accounting for grammaticality is more likely to resemble a true structure behind language. And this perfectly shows the instrumentalism of Quine he explored in his work on the philosophy of science; that a theory can't be proven true, only individual outcomes or statements drawn from them.

This for me is very interesting in Quine, because I think that Chomsky, though looking for structure, is wrong when he restricts his theory to only language; I think that this (also in the light of new neurological discoveries) allows for too much complexity in his idea of this structure. And I think he has been fooled into it by disregarding the possibility of a theory that was highly instrumental still being false. But I do think this warrants more empirical research, because I personally believe there is a very simple structure underlying not just language, but all human cognition. This structure has created language and with every newborn recreates language, by external stimuli. This is still contested by many syntacticians and linguists in general, who think there to be too few stimuli for a young person to create a language ability without an innate tendency and language-specific structure. But brain research, again, is starting to prove them wrong.

Though this shows we need to take some care not to deem a theory infallible too quickly, I truly believe in universal structure (of cognition and in a broader sense) and I don't believe that behaviourism is the only way of understanding behaviour. More so, I think it is unethical to think people's behaviour can be shaped and completely reshaped by external stimuli. No, I believe the cognitive structuring of the brain is the main driving force behind behaviour and you can only forcibly make people act differently from how this make-up, but this is unnatural behaviour for them. That's also why I believe in a good education; Bildung, from an early age and I detest the transition to what I think is training instead of education in formal, government-subsidised 'education', where attitudes and skills are the primary focus.

I don't agree the Protestant idea that everyone has a God-given place in the strata he happens to live in, but the Humanist idea that everyone can do anything has been taken too far (not in the least to blame people for their inabilities). Ironically, it has changed from highly ethical values into highly unethical developments, and I think behaviourism is one of them.

[革命者]

Marcos.For which insights/thoughts in particular?

[Buffalo Souljah]

Thanks for the reply. Some general questions follow.


"Chomsky was half a century ago a lot more convinced that language was a system that, though accounting for all languages, was really unique to language."What do you mean by this?


But maybe the most interesting thing is that he showed how we can have different theories under the banner of generative grammar which all are quite capable of predicting the grammaticality of sentences, though, as I'd argue, these theories don't actually describe a structure of language as it exists in reality.Is there any way to do this?




That's when he started (again with other syntacticians and to this day) to minimalise the complexity of generative grammar in what he called the Minimalist program, because he thought, and I agree, that a greater simplicity of the theory, while still accounting for grammaticality is more likely to resemble a true structure behind language So does a simpler theory afford more opportunity to view language as it actually works in reality?



"...that a theory can't be proven true, only individual outcomes or statements drawn from them."Do you mean to argue that a system can only be proven using its own syntax? I am asking because I personally am led to believe that this is the case, since reading the works on "pure" systems by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennet confirmed this belief. What Hofstadter and Dennet argue is that, essentially, in trying to prove anything using systems based upon general logical principles (A=A. . . , A≠B, A≠C. . . , B=B. . . , B≠C, B≠D. . . , etc.) one necessarily "ends up where one started" or encounters infinite regress. This is generally best represented by the following Escher sketch of two hands drawing each other:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/b/ba/DrawingHands.jpg/693px-DrawingHands.jpg

Is this the case for language systems or can there really be a "theory above theory" (to quote a famous semiotician) to explain for language?


But I do think this warrants more empirical research, because I personally believe there is a very simple structure underlying not just language, but all human cognition. This structure has created language and with every newborn recreates language, by external stimuli.So is there any way to develop a theory of language that is not tied to other areas of cognition, a "language specific theory"?


"Though this shows we need to take some care not to deem a theory infallible too quickly, I truly believe in universal structure (of cognition and in a broader sense) and I don't believe that behaviourism is the only way of understanding behaviour."So do you believe that language is something innate to our being? Have we always had language (ie. chicken vs. egg problem)? Can we do without language (ie. ferile [sic] children)?


I truly believe in universal structure (of cognition and in a broader sense) and I don't believe that behaviourism is the only way of understanding behaviour.Briefly, what are some qualifications for this belief? I am assuming from what you have written that you do not merely believe that language is an innate feature of human cognition merely on the basis of faith. What leads you to believe this is the case?

I am a recent convert to the belief in a need to understand language as a system, as opposed to "running with the punches". I am asking you all these questions because I myself am considering enrolling in a linguistics graduate program at the University of Georgia, and am testing the waters of this seemingly very credible empirical [sic] science. Not few questions arise in considering the subject matter, and my travelling companions, Chomsky's Reflections on Language and Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen have proven to be formidable indeed. I would love to hear further insights about what you believe to be the nature of language and linguistics in general. Where do you think theory is headed? What are some of the more recent developments in congintive and neurological science? How do you see linguisitc theory infuenced by developments such as programming languages (or does the influence run counter, ie. programming languages based upon linguistic theory)? I have more questions, but I'll stop for here now.

[革命者]

Those are great questions, and I will try and answer them as soon as I have sufficient time to do them justice.

[ROBOTROT]

Who are the great thinkers of our day? Marxist or otherwise on the Left. People who have quite recently left us, but whose legacy is still very relevant today are, as far as I am concerned, to be included.
For me Alex Callinicos is pretty good because he takes up a lot of the more abstract theoretical ideas mentioned by many of the thinkers listed above, interrogates them, evaluates their usefulness for revolutionary practice and integrates them back into a practical political strategy. I certainly wouldn't say he is the most original or greatest thinker of our time, but he is definitely useful in cutting through other theorists' often very dense and abstract verbiage to get to the (quite often neglected) practical implications.

[Hit The North]

Alex Callinicos has more value to the workers movement when he sells copies of Socialist Worker or encourages someone to get active in politics.

Why are we so caught-up with thinkers? Revolution is something you do.

And it will get done by millions of ordinary workers.

Or it won't get done at all.

[ROBOTROT]

Alex Callinicos has more value to the workers movement when he sells copies of Socialist Worker or encourages someone to get active in politics.
Well, to a point that is true. I'm certainly not under the impression that the esoteric writings of intellectuals are going to be main influence of any upturn in struggle.

But in a time when a generation of radicals seems largely taken by the flighty notions of post-modernists, post-Marxists, etc. it is nice to have someone out there taking them to task and defending the classical Marxist tradition. I'm not under the impression that every budding revolutionary should go out their and acquaint themselves with Callinicos's critique of Negri or Badiou; but surely it helps having someone in these debates batting for your side, even if it is almost purely academic.

You've got to remember that dejected ideas of the post-'68 'left' have often been poisonous for the workers' movement. Ultimately they reflect the downturn in struggle and just serve to feed more despondency back into the movement. The quicker we dig these theories their graves the better.

[black magick hustla]

"esoteric" writings of intellectuals do encourage movements though. just resently, the "coming insurrection" which in my opinion is an awful document made everybody go crazy

[革命者]

If you want to revolutionise society you need to persuade people; articulate ideas. Those that write books are supposed to know how to do that.

Great thinkers make our own convictions more clear in our minds; those things we don't agree with we ignore or interpret in a way to fit our own convictions.

Great thinkers are just great tellers of the time; they articulate in words the necessary movements of change in peoples minds and thus in society.

That's why e.g. Sartre was popular in the 70s; he said what people thought at the time.

The postmodernist thoughts about society have now all been perverted and implemented into a new version of capitalism, albeit an improvement to the former; neoliberalism; a blame and self-blame, fully selfish society.

But now we are looking new postneoliberalist ideas we can use e.g. to show a contrast between the old and the new. So he again serves an important function.