Nazi-Soviet Pact [Archive]

Bankotsu

26th December 2009, 06:22

Anyone here who thinks that he can fuck with me on british appeasement policy of Nazi Germany and succeed can try.

I will welcome such a challenge.

Commons Sitting (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1938/oct/04#commons) EUROPEAN SITUATION.

HC Deb 04 October 1938 vol 339 cc169-308:

If hon. Gentlemen opposite are hugging the delusion that Germany, if allowed to become a dominant Power in Europe, will attack the Soviet Union and destroy that great Socialist Power, they had better wake up before it is too late.

Germany will have no hesitation in breaking any word that was given and taking advantage of this country.

The National Government are not isolating Soviet Russia.

They are isolating Britain. I do not care what armaments you have, if Britain is alone her position is impossible and the position of this Empire is impossible. The one policy for the people of this country is to have unity with the peace peoples of all other countries and to make appeal after appeal to the peoples of Germany and Italy on that basis...

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/oct/04/european-situation#S5CV0339P0_19381004_HOC_66

There has frequently been expressed a desire in the House that we should endeavour to get Germany and Russia involved in war so that we could sit back and look at them destroying one another.

Is it not because we have a Government which has been concerned all along with pursuing its own Imperialist policy first, and in trying to direct Germany against the Soviet Union?

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/oct/03/war-situation#S5CV0351P0_19391003_HOC_350 (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/oct/03/war-situation#S5CV0351P0_19391003_HOC_350)

In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things:

(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia;

(2) to prevent France from honoring her alliances with these countries; and

(3) to hoodwink the English people into accepting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem.

The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding...

...The liquidation of the countries between Germany and Russia could proceed as soon as the Rhineland was fortified, without fear on Germany’s part that France would be able to attack her in the west while she was occupied in the east...

...It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States.

For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland...

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

mykittyhasaboner

26th December 2009, 06:36

The Soviet Union never invaded Poland, the reactionary Polish government fled to Romania before any Soviet tanks came rolling in to take back the territory lost in the Russian Civil War. Essentially the eastern part of Poland formed a power vacuum, and if the Soviet Army didn't fill the gap then the Germans would have.

Piece of advice: don't learn history from high school text books. Or for that matter all history books in the English language, since they all cry about the Soviet Union "invading Poland". Green Dragon, why not actually do a little bit of research before spouting ridiculous things like the CCCP had a role in "starting WW II". The blame for that lies solely on the belligerent imperialist powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, as well as their appeasers in the US, Britain, and France.

Bankotsu

26th December 2009, 06:56

Piece of advice: don't learn history from high school text books. Or for that matter all history books in the English language

The english history textbook that teaches students that Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler so as to get him to go eastwards to destroy the Soviet Union doesn't exist.

It cannot be allowed to exist.

Only fairytales about Chamberlain's appeasement policies of Hitler are allowed to exist in the west.

Only falsification of history is allowed.

Truth, facts, evidence - these are NEVER allowed.

Kayser_Soso

26th December 2009, 07:01

This trend is actually changing. When I was younger, there was some attempt to conflate the USSR with the Nazis, and there still are ignorant people who think that the US was fighting the USSR AND the Nazis in WWII. But for the non-morons, most educational materials mentioned appeasement, Chamberlain, etc. Nowadays, especially in Europe, there is more and more attempt to pin WWII on the Soviet Union. As you can see, Green Dragon has fallen for this hook, line, and sinker.

Bankotsu

26th December 2009, 16:18

The true suppressed history of Munich 1938:

He alluded to a luncheon meeting of 10 May 1938 hosted by Lady Astor, where Chamberlain reportedly communicated to twelve American journalists his secret plans concerning a Four-Power Pact in Europe, with the exclusion of Russia.

The Premier also stated at that time that he was in favor of ceding the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia to the Germans...

http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=KWQcos95hHsC&pg=PA20&vq=also+stated+at+the+time&dq=may+10+chamberlain+astor&client=firefox-a&source=gbs_search_s&sig=ACfU3U1VxtDuerKLZSziA9UVltVqaXhhtg

The Prime Minister has carried through the Four-Power Pact, as he has so ardently desired, and it must be clearly recognised that he has been perfectly consistent, perfectly logical, the whole way through.

He has desired the Four-Power Pact, he has desired the present condition of affairs, and he has obtained it.

I believe he actually enjoys the society of dictators. He feels at home sitting beside Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. With his many amiable qualities, he has something of the dictator mind himself, as I am sure Members of the Cabinet perfectly well appreciate and as hon. Members know.

I think the facts were brought to the attention of this House by certain incidents which occurred in the month of June.

I ventured to call attention to a certain luncheon party which had taken place at the house of the Noble Lady the Member for the Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor), when the Prime Minister had, not an interview but table-talk, with certain American journalists, in the course of which views were expressed by the Prime Minister, noted by those correspondents, and passed on to newspapers in America.

Here is an extract from the "New York Times" of 14th May, contained in an article by "Augur": The question may well be asked whether Mr. Chamberlain attaches importance to a settlement of the German problem in Czechoslovakia and what his idea may be.

Originally the Prime Minister certainly held the view that the best way out of the deadlock was to transform Czechoslovakia into a sort of second Switzerland, with each nationality forming a separate canton and possessing far-reaching autonomy.

But expert investigation has shown drawbacks to such a scheme, and Mr. Chamberlain to-day, without prejudice naturally to the rights of the principal interested parties to decide for themselves, certainly favours a more drastic measure—namely, separation of the German districts from the body of the Czechoslovak republic and the annexation of them to Germany.

It is perfectly clear that, contrary to the knowledge of the country generally, except in so far as this article had been read, the Prime Minister then was in favour of the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/oct/04/european-situation#S5CV0339P0_19381004_HOC_66 (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/oct/04/european-situation#S5CV0339P0_19381004_HOC_66)

While all this was going on, the remorseless wheels of appeasement were grinding out of existence one country after another. The fatal loss was Czechoslovakia.

This disaster was engineered by Chamberlain with the full co-operation of the Milner Group. The details do not concern us here, but it should be mentioned that the dispute arose over the position of the Sudeten Germans within the Czechoslovak state, and as late as 15 September 1938 was still being expressed in those terms.

Up to that day, Hitler had made no demand to annex the Sudeten area, although on 12 September he had for the first time asked for “self-determination” for the Sudetens.

Konrad Henlein, Hitler’s agent in Czechoslovakia and leader of the Sudeten Germans, expressed no desire “to go back to the Reich” until after 12 September.

Who, then, first demanded frontier rectification in favor of Germany ?

Chamberlain did so privately on 10 May 1938, and the Milner Group did so publicly on 7 September 1938...

The last piece of evidence which we might mention to support the theory—not of a plot, perhaps, but that the Munich surrender was unnecessary and took place because Chamberlain and his associates wanted to dismember Czechoslovakia—is even more incriminating...

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

All these events showed very clearly the chief result of Munich: Germany was supreme in central Europe, and any possibility of curtailing that power either by a joint policy of the Western Powers with the Soviet Union and Italy or by finding any openly anti-German resistance in central Europe itself was ended.

Since this was exactly what Chamberlain and his friends had wanted, they should have been satisfied...

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#45

If hon. Gentlemen opposite are hugging the delusion that Germany, if allowed to become a dominant Power in Europe, will attack the Soviet Union and destroy that great Socialist Power, they had better wake up before it is too late.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/oct/04/european-situation

Two weeks after Munich, Baldwin said in a conversation with Lord Hinchingbrooke: "Can't we turn Hitler East? Napoleon broke himself against the Russians. Hitler might do the same".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Baldwin#Later_life

True history of appeasement cannot be allowed to be made known to western public.

It must be suppressed and denied forever.

Lies must be told.

History must be falsified.

A fake history must be invented and taught.

There is no other way.
(http://www.revleft.com/vb/Two%20weeks%20after%20Munich,%20Baldwin%20said%20i n%20a%20conversation%20with%20Lord%20Hinchingbrook e:%20%22Can%27t%20we%20turn%20Hitler%20East?%20Nap oleon%20broke%20himself%20against%20the%20Russians .%20Hitler%20might%20do%20the%20same%22.%20%20http ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Baldwin#Later_life)

RaÃºl Duke

26th December 2009, 17:14

Kayser_Soso

26th December 2009, 18:44

From what I heard...

The pact was a realpolitik attempt to avoid war with Germany (or to atleast extend time till that eventual war) after some attempts towards better diplomatic relations with the west (France/England) failed/stagnated. Although, if I remember correctly, the pact delineated certain "spheres of control" for both Germany and Russia.

In terms of Russia and Poland, I heard that Russians barely even fought.

The USSR invaded the territories of Western Belarus and Galicia, non-Polish territories annexed by Poland with the treaty of Riga. By the time the USSR invaded, the Polish government had fled the country and the Germans had declared the state of Poland non-existent. This was key because the Germans attempted to go beyond the agreed upon dividing line(similar to the Curzon line, which established Poland's original borders in 1918). The Red Army moved in to prevent this from happening. The commander and chief of the remaining Polish forces, Rydz-Smigly, ordered the Polish army to continue resisting the Germans, but not to fight the Soviets.

Green Dragon

27th December 2009, 03:44

[QUOTE=mykittyhasaboner;1635031]The Soviet Union never invaded Poland, the reactionary Polish government fled to Romania before any Soviet tanks came rolling in to take back the territory lost in the Russian Civil War. Essentially the eastern part of Poland formed a power vacuum, and if the Soviet Army didn't fill the gap then the Germans would have.

There is a topic regarding colonialism hereabouts--- The most obvious cause of colonialism is in filling a "power vaccum" which exists from time to time and from place to place.

Piece of advice: don't learn history from high school text books. Or for that matter all history books in the English language, since they all cry about the Soviet Union "invading Poland". Green Dragon, why not actually do a little bit of research before spouting ridiculous things like the CCCP had a role in "starting WW II".

Germany and the USSR were allies in the dismembering of Poland.

gorillafuck

27th December 2009, 04:25

In terms of Russia and Poland, I heard that Russians barely even fought.
I'd find it very hard to believe that there was ever a large scale invasion where the soldiers barely fought. Also, if we're gonna use anecdotal evidence, I heard that they wreaked havoc in Poland.

Revy

27th December 2009, 05:31

Kayser_Soso

27th December 2009, 07:08

The truth is that USSR membership in the Axis was even taken seriously. This is a fact just as scandalous as the pact.

The USSR was not part of the Axis.

Kayser_Soso

27th December 2009, 07:09

I'd find it very hard to believe that there was ever a large scale invasion where the soldiers barely fought. Also, if we're gonna use anecdotal evidence, I heard that they wreaked havoc in Poland.

Well then you ought to do some research. As I said, Rydz-Smigly ordered Polish troops to continue resistance against the Germans and not resist the Soviets.

Kayser_Soso

27th December 2009, 07:09

Germany and the USSR were allies in the dismembering of Poland.

No, actually they weren't.

Revy

27th December 2009, 08:06

The USSR was not part of the Axis.

I never claimed that. The USSR and the Axis both talked about the possibility of the USSR joining.

so it was far more than a non-aggression pact. it was a relationship.

Bankotsu

27th December 2009, 09:09

I never claimed that. The USSR and the Axis both talked about the possibility of the USSR joining.

so it was far more than a non-aggression pact. it was a relationship.

Chamberlain also wanted a non aggression pact with Germany and he wanted to divide the world into spheres of interests as well.

The report of the anglo-german talks to start negotiations for a pact:

Memorandum of German Ambassador in London Dirksen regarding Wohlthat's Conversations with Wilson and Hudson (July 21 1939)

http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQCSpVMC&pg=RA1-PA239&dq=secret+anglo+german+talks+1939+wilson&sig=lXrEqXsNEx1VI4XpZklSvcUMKx8#PRA1-PA239,M1 (http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQCSpVMC&pg=RA1-PA239&dq=secret+anglo+german+talks+1939+wilson&sig=lXrEqXsNEx1VI4XpZklSvcUMKx8#PRA1-PA239,M1)

We have mentioned that the economic discussions between Britain and Germany, which were publicly broken off on March 28th, were secretly reopened five days later. We do not know what became of these, but, about July 20th, Helmuth Wohlthat, Reich commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, who was in London at an international whaling conference, was approached with an amazing proposition by R. S. Hudson, secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade.

Although Wohlthat had no powers, he listened to Hudson and later to Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's personal representative, but rejected their suggestion that he meet Chamberlain. Wilson offered (1) a nonaggression pact with Germany, (2) a delimitation of spheres of interest, (3) colonial concessions in Africa along the lines already mentioned, (4) an economic agreement, and (5) a disarmament agreement. One sentence of Dirksen's report on this matter is significant. It says, "Sir Horace Wilson definitely told Herr Wohlthat that the conclusion of a nonaggression pact would enable Britain to rid herself of her commitments vis-เ-vis Poland."

That Chamberlain wanted a nonaggression pact with Germany was stated by him publicly on May 3rd, only five days after Hitler denounced his nonaggression pact with Poland. Dirksen's report of July 21st continued: "Sir Horace Wilson further said that it was contemplated holding new elections in Britain this autumn. From the point of view of purely domestic political tactics, it was all one to the Government whether the elections were held under the cry 'Be Ready for a Coming War!' or under the cry 'A Lasting Understanding with Germany in Prospect and Achievable!' It could obtain the backing of the electors for either of these cries and assure its rule for another five years. Naturally, it preferred the peaceful cry."

News of these negotiations leaked out, apparently from the French, who wished to break them off, but the rumor was that the discussions were concerned with Chamberlain's efforts to give Germany a loan of ฃ1,000,000,000. This is not supported by the documents. This outcry, however, made it difficult to carry on the discussions, especially as Hitler and Ribbentrop were not interested.

But Chamberlain kept Lord Runciman busy training to be the chief economic negotiator in the great settlement he envisaged. On July 29th, Kordt, the German charg้ d'affaires in London, had a long talk with Charles Roden Buxton, acting, he believed, on behalf of Chamberlain.

It was along the same lines. These offers were repeated in a highly secret conversation between Dirksen and Wilson in the latter's residence on August 3rd. Wilson wanted a four-Power pact, a free hand for Germany in eastern Europe, a colonial agreement, an economic agreement, and so forth. Dirksen's record of this conversation then reads:

"After recapitulating his conversation with Wohlthat, Sir Horace Wilson expatiated at length on the great risk Chamberlain would incur by starting confidential negotiations with the German government. If anything about them were to leak out, there would be a grand scandal and Chamberlain would probably be forced to resign." Dirksen did not see how any binding agreement could be reached under conditions such as this, "for example, owing to Hudson's indiscretion, another visit of Herr Wohlthat to London was out of the question." To this, Wilson suggested that "the two emissaries could meet in Switzerland or elsewhere." It was pointed out by Wilson that if Britain could get a nonaggression pact with Germany, it would adopt a nonintervention policy in respect to Greater Germany. This would embrace the Danzig question, for example.

It is clear that these negotiations were not a purely personal policy of Chamberlain's but were known to the Foreign Office. For example, on August 9th Lord Halifax repeated much of the political portion of these conversations. After Munich, he said, he had looked forward to fifty years of peace, with "Germany the dominant power on the continent, with predominant rights in southeastern Europe, particularly in the field of commercial policy; Britain would engage only in moderate trade in that area; in Western Europe, Britain and France protected from conflicts with Germany by the lines of fortification on both sides and endeavoring to retain and develop their possessions by defensive means; friendship with America; friendship with Portugal; Spain for the time being an indefinite factor which for the next few years at least would necessarily have to hold aloof from all combinations of powers; Russia an out-of-the-way, vast and scarcely surveyable territory; Britain bent on safeguarding her Mediterranean communications with the dominions and the Far East." This was "three-bloc-world" talk straight from All Souls College or Cliveden.

It was almost impossible to keep negotiations such as these, or rather proposed negotiations, secret. There can be no doubt that rumors about them reached the Russians in July 1939 and, by strengthening their ancient suspicions of Britain, made them decide to avoid any agreement with Britain and to take instead the nonaggression pact offered by Hitler.

The outburst of public rage at Russia for doing this by Britain and America now seems singularly inappropriate in view of the fact that the British government was trying to do the same thing at the same time and the fact that France had signed what Russia regarded as a nonaggression pact with Germany on December 6, 1938.

Indeed, Sir Nevile Henderson, who undoubtedly was more extreme than some of his associates, went so far as to condone an alliance between Britain and Germany, on August 28, 1939. Obviously, such an alliance could be aimed only at Russia. The relevant portion of his report to Lord Halifax reads:

"At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I said there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would, provided Germany cooperated with him. Herr Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a possibility provided the development of events justified it."

The theory that Russia learned of these British approaches to Germany in July 1939 is supported by the fact that the obstacles and delays in the path of a British-Russian agreement were made by Britain from the middle of April to the second week of July, but were made by Russia from the second week in July to the end on August 21st. This is supported by other evidence, such as the fact that discussions for a commercial agreement between Germany and Russia, which were broken off on January 30, 1939, were resumed on July 23rd and this agreement was signed on August 19th...

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#46

Russian intelligence service has released documents on their activities regarding british appeasement policy:

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service declassifies Munich Agreement papers
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080929/117271264.html

Munich secrets: declassified
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4gH2raI-AiE&feature=channel

THE FALSIFIERS
http://english.ruvr.ru/2009/07/03/267993.html

USSR propaganda report on western falsification of pre-WWII history:

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact - Falsifiers of History
http://www.shunpiking.com/ol0207/0207-Non-agres-USSR-ger.htm

http://web.archive.org/web/20050616080438/agitprop.org.au/lefthistory/1948_falsifiers_of_history.php

Valery Yegoshkin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Kenya's article regarding suppression of facts in pre-WWII history in the west:

Russia: Get it right on World War II
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion%20&%20Analysis/-/539548/657826/-/ty6n8qz/-/

Kayser_Soso

27th December 2009, 12:52

I never claimed that. The USSR and the Axis both talked about the possibility of the USSR joining.

so it was far more than a non-aggression pact. it was a relationship.

I'm sorry but a "relationship" means dick. The rest is just realpolitik bullshit for appearances.

Kwisatz Haderach

27th December 2009, 18:06

Germany and the USSR were allies in the dismembering of Poland.
The United States and the USSR were allies in the dismembering of Germany. Does that prove that American capitalism and Soviet "communism" were somehow the same?

If you think that the German-Soviet non-aggression pact shows any affinity between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, then you need to explain why you do not believe the same thing about the much longer and much closer alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

What is forgotten is this: The USSR and nazi Germany were allies in the invasion of Poland. This alliance allowed Germany to to send almost assign almost their entire army to the invasion of France, Denmark, Norway ect ect.
Umm, yeah, that was the point. The West tried to get the Nazis to invade the Soviet Union in 1939, and the Soviets countered with the non-aggression pact, which got Germany to attack the West instead. Seems fair to me.

Or do you believe the USSR should have sacrificed itself in 1939 to spare the West from having to fight in the war? Fuck that.

Green Dragon

28th December 2009, 14:16

The United States and the USSR were allies in the dismembering of Germany. Does that prove that American capitalism and Soviet "communism" were somehow the same?

If you think that the German-Soviet non-aggression pact shows any affinity between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, then you need to explain why you do not believe the same thing about the much longer and much closer alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Umm, yeah, that was the point. The West tried to get the Nazis to invade the Soviet Union in 1939, and the Soviets countered with the non-aggression pact, which got Germany to attack the West instead. Seems fair to me.

Or do you believe the USSR should have sacrificed itself in 1939 to spare the West from having to fight in the war? Fuck that.

WW II began in the East, with an invasion of Poland... an invasion which the USSR joined.
My note simply observed that that alliance allowed for Germany to do what it did. It gave Germany, the breathing space it needed. Unlike the UK with respects to Austria or Czechoslovakia, the USSR was not a passive observer to the dismemberment of Poland.

Bankotsu

28th December 2009, 14:43

WW II began in the East, with an invasion of Poland... an invasion which the USSR joined.
My note simply observed that that alliance allowed for Germany to do what it did. It gave Germany, the breathing space it needed. Unlike the UK with respects to Austria or Czechoslovakia, the USSR was not a passive observer to the dismemberment of Poland.

Heath: I think the Soviet Union has a lot of troubles. They are facing domestic economic difficulties and agricultural predicament, and there are also differences within the leadership, over questions of tactics and timing, not over long-term strategy.

Mao: I think the Soviet Union is busy with its own affairs and unable to deal with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China and the Pacific. I think it will lose.

Heath: However, its military strength is continually augmented. Although the Soviet Union has encountered troubles at many places in the world, its strength is continuing to grow. Therefore, we deem this to be the principal threat. Does the Chairman think the Soviet Union constitutes a menace to China?

Mao: We are prepared for it to come, but it will collapse if it comes. It has only a handful of troops, and you Europeans are so frightened of it! Some people in the West are always trying to direct this calamity toward China. Your senior, Chamberlain, and also Daladier of France were the ones who pushed Germany eastward.

Heath: I opposed Mr. Chamberlain then.

http://english.pladaily.com.cn/special/mao/txt/w24.htm

Chamberlain and others in the west wanted Hitler to go east to destroy the Soviet Union. They also shared the blame for starting the war.

Soviet Union wanted an alliance with the west against Hitler.

But due to the policy of letting Hitler go eastwards to destroy the USSR, the chance to stop Hitler failed.

Stalin 'planned to send a million troops to stop Hitler if Britain and France agreed pact'

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/3223834/Stalin-planned-to-send-a-million-troops-to-stop-Hitler-if-Britain-and-France-agreed-pact.html (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/3223834/Stalin-planned-to-send-a-million-troops-to-stop-Hitler-if-Britain-and-France-agreed-pact.html)

Stalin wanted to stop Hitler in 1939 - report
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTuh-hRoCNU

Red Icepick

28th December 2009, 19:32

The USSR was not part of the Axis.

He said they were considered, which is true. The Nazis sent an offer to Molotov to join the Tripartite Pact, potentially making it a four-power pact.. Stalin gave terms to join which were never responded to, and a year later, Hitler invaded.

I think for the most part this issue is just turned into an anti-Stalin slander. At the time, it was a pragmatic move on behalf of Stalin, and the Nazis didn't have the stigma at the time which they do now. The Holocaust hadn't even been considered until 1942, and a lot of the world admired Hitler before the war. Stalin was just about the only real enemy to the Nazis in the pre-war years, and the reasons for the pact have already been exhaustively gone over in these threads.

Anyhow, I don't see why Stalininists get so uppity about the issue. Personally, I think Stalin would have attacked if Hitler didn't beat him to the punch. The real scandal was that the Fascists caught the Soviet Union off guard. That was the real blunder.

Bankotsu

29th December 2009, 06:54

He said they were considered, which is true. The Nazis sent an offer to Molotov to join the Tripartite Pact, potentially making it a four-power pact.

Chamberlain also wanted a four power pact of Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

He wanted the big politics of europe to be regulated by this four power pact; that is secure peace in western europe and let Hitler go east to destroy the USSR. This was why he appeased Hitler.

Western europe safe from war, let Germany and Soviet Union fight it out among themselves.

But this history is suppressed in the west.

1933 four power pact proposed by Mussolini which was not ratified:

Four-Power Pact

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four-Power_Pact

Chamberlain's efforts to secure a four power pact in 1938-1939 (history suppressed in the west):

In the meantime, both the people and the government were more demoralized in France than in England. The policy of the Right which would have used force against Germany even in the face of British disapproval ended in 1924. When Barthou, who had been one of the chief figures in the 1924 effort, tried to revive it in 1934, it was quite a different thing, and he had constantly to give at least verbal support to Britain's efforts to modify his encirclement of Germany into a Four-Power Pact (of Britain, France, Italy, Germany).

This Four-Power Pact, which was the ultimate goal of the anti-Bolshevik group in England, was really an effort to form a united front of Europe against the Soviet Union and, in the eyes of this group, would have been a capstone to unite in one system the encirclement of France (which was the British answer to Barthou's encirclement of Germany) and the Anti-Comintern Pact (which was the German response to the same project).

The Four-Power Pact reached its fruition at the Munich Conference of September 1938, where these four Powers destroyed Czechoslovakia without consulting Czechoslovakia's ally, the Soviet Union. But the scorn the dictators had for Britain and France as decadent democracies had by this time reached such a pass that the dictators no longer had even that minimum of respect without which the Four-Power Pact could not function.

As a consequence, Hitler in 1939 spurned all Chamberlain's frantic efforts to restore the Four-Power Pact along with his equally frantic and even more secret efforts to win Hitler's attention by offers of colonies in Africa and economic support in eastern Europe.

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42

The point of view of The Round Table was not identical with that of the Chamberlain group (which intersected, through common members, with the second circle of the Milner Group). The Round Table, speaking for the inner circle of the Milner Group, was not nearly so anti-Russian as the Chamberlain group. Accordingly, it never regarded a collision between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as a practical solution of Europe’s problems.

It did accept the idea of a four-power pact to exclude Russia from Europe, but it was not willing to allow Germany to expand eastward as she wished. The Milner Group’s misunderstanding of the Nazi system and of Germany itself was so great that they envisioned a stable situation in which Europe was dominated by a four-power pact, with Soviet Russia on one side and an Oceanic bloc of the British Commonwealth and the United States on the other.

The Group insisted on rapid British rearmament and the building up of the Oceanic System because they had a lower opinion of Britain’s own powers than did the Chamberlain group (this idea was derived from Milner) and they were not prepared to allow Germany to go eastward indefinitely in the hope she would be satisfied by a war with Russia...

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

He alluded to a luncheon meeting of 10 May 1938 hosted by Lady Astor, where Chamberlain reportedly communicated to twelve American journalists his secret plans concerning a Four-Power Pact in Europe, with the exclusion of Russia.

The Premier also stated at that time that he was in favor of ceding the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia to the Germans...

http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=KWQcos95hHsC&pg=PA20&vq=also+stated+at+the+time&dq=may+10+chamberlain+astor&client=firefox-a&source=gbs_search_s&sig=ACfU3U1VxtDuerKLZSziA9UVltVqaXhhtg
The Prime Minister has carried through the Four-Power Pact, as he has so ardently desired, and it must be clearly recognised that he has been perfectly consistent, perfectly logical, the whole way through.

He has desired the Four-Power Pact, he has desired the present condition of affairs, and he has obtained it.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/oct/04/european-situation#S5CV0339P0_19381004_HOC_66

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain promised in the House of Commons this week, as he asked approval for armed forces expenditure this year of $1,758,750,000 (see p. 18). In his house at No. 10 Downing Street, meanwhile, he had given swift impetus last week to negotiations for the Four-Power Pact which Britain, Germany, France and Italy will try to make (TIME, March 7), possibly admitting Poland to make it a Fiver.

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,759275,00.html (http://www.revleft.com/vb/../Prime%20Minister%20Neville%20Chamberlain%20promise d%20in%20the%20House%20of%20Commons%20this%20week, %20as%20he%20asked%20approval%20for%20armed%20forc es%20expenditure%20this%20year%20of%20$1,758,750,0 00%20%28see%20p.%2018%29.%20In%20his%20house%20at% 20No.%2010%20Downing%20Street,%20meanwhile,%20he%2 0had%20given%20swift%20impetus%20last%20week%20to% 20negotiations%20for%20the%20Four-Power%20Pact%20which%20Britain,%20Germany,%20Franc e%20and%20Italy%20will%20try%20to%20make%20%28TIME ,%20March%207%29,%20possibly%20admitting%20Poland% 20to%20make%20it%20a%20Fiver.%20%20%20http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,759275,00.html)

With the private blessing of Hitler and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, a meeting between Goering and his advisers and the group of seven British businessmen was arranged in a farmhouse on the German Baltic island of Sylt.

The seven made their separate ways to Sylt for the meeting. Their purpose was to offer a "second Munich" - a four-power agreement involving Britain, Germany, France and Italy - to make further concessions to German demands for lebensraum (room for living) on condition that the Nazis did not invade Poland.

This offer, authorised by the leading appeaser Lord Halifax...

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/12/1044927661990.html

Documentation of anglo-german talks on discussions regarding four power pact can be read from below sources:

Record of a Conversation between the Fuhrer and Reichskanzler and Lord Halifax, in the presence of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, in Obersalzberg, Nov. 19, 1937

http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQCSpVMC&pg=RA1-PA129&dq=lord+halifax+began+by+saying+that+he+welcomed&lr=#v=onepage&q=lord%20halifax%20began%20by%20saying%20that%20he %20welcomed&f=false

Record of a Conversation between the Fuhrer (and Reichskanzler) and His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador which took place in the presence of Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop, on March 3, 1938, in Berlin

http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=8XXVVQCSpVMC&pg=PA3&dq=Sir+Horace+Wilson+definitely+told+Herr+Wohlthat +that+the+conclusion+of+a+non-aggression+pact+would+enable+Britian+to+rid+hersel f+of+her+commitments+vis-a-vis+Poland&client=firefox-a&sig=S0HhPZu4UDCpbJwqGs_6sxXnwFI#PRA1-PA140,M1 (http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=8XXVVQCSpVMC&pg=PA3&dq=Sir+Horace+Wilson+definitely+told+Herr+Wohlthat +that+the+conclusion+of+a+non-aggression+pact+would+enable+Britian+to+rid+hersel f+of+her+commitments+vis-a-vis+Poland&client=firefox-a&sig=S0HhPZu4UDCpbJwqGs_6sxXnwFI#PRA1-PA140,M1)

Most of the information above is usually not discussed in western histories of western diplomacy in mainstream history texts and is suppressed and falsification of history is presented to most people.

Bankotsu

29th December 2009, 07:18

Tudor wrote to Churchill on 4th August 1936:

The situation in Europe certainly seems to be getting worse. Spain is a new complication.

If the rebels win the Fascist group will be strengthened in Europe, and Spain may line up with Italy and Germany.

If the red government wins Bolshevism will come very near us. With Spain Bolshie, France half Bolshie, and Russia subsidising our communists are we going to line up with them and Russia?
I know how important even vital our friendship with France is, but I feel many in England would rather make a strong western pact with Germany and France and let Germany settle Russia and Bolshevism in her own way.

No doubt Germany would eventually be stronger after defeating Russia but in the meantime we and France would have time to get our defences right; and it would take years before Germany would be in a position to make war again, nor do I suppose she would want to having got a satisfactory expansion. Even Germany cannot like war.

Russia deserves what is coming to her as she will never stop undermining capitalistic governments in every way she can. If she is left alone, in 10 years or so she would be the strongest power on earth and she may want to take in India and may be a more dangerous enemy than Germany.

Churchill's reply on 16 August 1936:

I have as you divine, been much perturbed in my thoughts by the spanish explosion. I feel actuely the weight of what you say... I am sure it represents the strong and growing Conservative opinion, and events seems to be driving us in that direction.

http://books.google.com/books?id=MTPzJRV9hhgC&pg=PA52&dq=tudor+wrote+on+4+august+1936&sig=tHxdxYsrTs_EaknIMD8WiiCx2rk

Red Icepick

29th December 2009, 07:52

Chamberlain also wanted a four power pact of Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

He wanted the big politics of europe to be regulated by this four power pact; that is secure peace in western europe and let Hitler go east to destroy the USSR. This was why he appeased Hitler.

Western europe safe from war, let Germany and Soviet Union fight it out among themselves.

I will look into your information further, but this isn't the way I see it. Hitler's dream was to form an alliance with Britain. He absolutely cherished the thought just as much as he wanted to pillage the land of the Russian people.

If Chamberlain wanted it, I think it's likely that it would have happened. The British, under Chamberlain, were the ones, with the French, who declared war on Hitler for attacking Poland. Chamberlain also pressed on through the Phoney War when many people believed that it had already ended and up until Hitler's western blitzkrieg.

Why was Hitler appeased? Because the British were reluctant to fight, and they knew their empire was going to burn. One could imagine these hardcore imperialists would really sweat that one. I think it's important to look at things objectively, and this is how it appears to me.

Bankotsu

29th December 2009, 08:16

If Chamberlain wanted it, I think it's likely that it would have happened. The British, under Chamberlain, were the ones, with the French, who declared war on Hitler for attacking Poland. Chamberlain also pressed on through the Phoney War when many people believed that it had already ended and up until Hitler's western blitzkrieg.

Why was Hitler appeased? Because the British were reluctant to fight, and they knew their empire was going to burn. One could imagine these hardcore imperialists would really sweat that one. I think it's important to look at things objectively, and this is how it appears to me.

I am afraid your views are all wrong. There are a lot of myths contained in your post. This is common since the truth is suppressed in the west and a fake history propagated in the mainstream. So there is much confusion on facts, interpretations and evidence.

See below for a clearer picture of events:

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html
http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_index.html

Security, 1919-1935
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/06.html#16
(http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/06.html#16)
The Policy of Appeasement, 1931-1936
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html

The Disruption of Europe: 1937-1939
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html

Bankotsu

30th December 2009, 04:28

Invader Zim said:

Where does Britain and France's responce to the German invasion of Poland fit into that?
The reason that Britian and France didn't entertain the notion of an aggressive military pact with the USSR is simple, Stalin had purged the military and British and French intelligence assessments concluded that the USSR wouldn't be able to effectively mout a war outside of its own borders (and given the thrashing the Red Army recieved at the hands of Finland a little later it seems that is one of the few things British intelligence got right in the 1930s). Invader Zim, you know I won't tolerate denial of british appeasement strategy of letting Hitler go eastwards to destroy Soviet Union.

But you insist and persist in denials.

I am not going to accept that from you Invader Zim.

On this issue I am firm.

I won't let anyone distort or deny facts of history.

This was nothing but the appeasement program of Chamberlain and Halifax—that concessions should be made to Germany to strengthen her on the Continent and in Eastern Europe, while Britain should remain strong enough on the sea and in the air to prevent Hitler from using war to obtain these concessions. The fear of Hitler’s using war was based not so much on a dislike of force (neither Lothian nor Halifax was a pacifist in that sense) but on the realization that if Hitler made war against Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, public opinion in France and England might force their governments to declare war in spite of their desire to yield these areas to Germany.

This, of course, is what finally happened...

The German Foreign Ministry memorandum on this conversation makes it perfectly clear that the Germans did not misunderstand Halifax except, possibly, on the last point. There they failed to see that if Germany made war, the British Government would be forced into the war against Germany by public opinion in England.

The German diplomatic agents in London, especially the Ambassador, Dirksen, saw this clearly, but the Government in Berlin listened only to the blind and conceited ignorance of Ribbentrop.

As dictators themselves, unfamiliar with the British social or constitutional systems, the German rulers assumed that the willingness of the British Government to accept the liquidation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland implied that the British Government would never go to war to prevent this liquidation. They did not see that the British Government might have to declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused. The British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war but not to wage war on Germany. This distinction was not clear to the Germans and was not accepted by the inner core of the Milner Group.

It was, however, accepted by the other elements in the government, like Chamberlain himself, and by much of the second circle of the Milner Group, including Simon, Hoare, and probably Halifax. It was this which resulted in the “phony war” from September 1939 to April 1940...

Only after the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 21 August 1939 did Halifax implement the unilateral guarantee to Poland with a more formal mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland. This was done to warn Hitler that an attack on Poland would bring Britain into the war under pressure of British public opinion. Hitler, as usual, paid no attention to Britain. Even after the German attack on Poland, the British government was reluctant to fulfill this pact and spent almost three days asking the Germans to return to negotiation.

Even after the British were forced to declare war on Germany, they made no effort to fight, contenting themselves with dropping leaflets on Germany. We now know that the German generals had moved so much of their forces to the east that they were gravely worried at the effects which might follow an Allied attack on western Germany or even an aerial bombing of the Ruhr...

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

Neville Chamberlain held a Cabinet meeting on 24th September 1938. Duff Cooper , First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote about it in his autobiography, Old Men Forget (1953)

..I said that I was sure popular opinion would eventually compel us to go to the assistance of the Czechs; that hitherto we had been faced with the unpleasant alternatives of peace with dishonour or war...

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWmunich.htm

The fear of Hitler’s using war was based not so much on a dislike of force (neither Lothian nor Halifax was a pacifist in that sense) but on the realization that if Hitler made war against Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, public opinion in France and England might force their governments to declare war in spite of their desire to yield these areas to Germany.

This, of course, is what finally happened...

Invader Zim, please I beg you.

Just accept the facts of history.

That are not lies or false propaganda.

That are just facts.

Just facts that's all.

Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler because he wanted him to go eastwards to destroy the Soviet Union is a fact of history.

Just accept it.

Bankotsu

30th December 2009, 05:40

So why did Neville Chamberlain declare war on Germany on the 3rd of September 1939?

The answer is simple but it cannot really be stated in the west or Britain.

British public wanted Chamberlain to honor the guarantee to Poland.

Chamberlain didn't care about Poland because he wanted Hitler to go all the way east until he finally attacked the Soviet union.

But Chamberlain was a politician, if he defied british public opinion in such a way at that time, he would had to resign as prime minister of Britain.

So, he had to declare war on Germany.

He was forced to declare war.

They did not see that the British Government might have to declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused.

The British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war but not to wage war on Germany.

I know that for you as a british person, Invader Zim, what I have stated above will be impossible for you to accept.

You will never accept such an interpretation.

But we all have to deal with the cruel facts, Invader Zim.

We all have to.

It is difficult, but we must respect facts of history.

At the very least, we shouldn't deny or falsify history.

Red Icepick

30th December 2009, 08:35

Ok, Bankotsu, now you are full of it. The British people did not want the war. That is absolutely ridiculous.

Bankotsu

30th December 2009, 08:44

Ok, Bankotsu, now you are full of it. The British people did not want the war. That is absolutely ridiculous.

Sorry. But my history are all based on facts.

3 September 1939, commons sitting:

Mr. Arthur Greenwood (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/people/mr-arthur-greenwood)

The atmosphere of this House has changed overnight.

Resentment, apprehension, anger, reigned over our proceedings last night, aroused by a fear that delays might end in national dishonour and the sacrifice of the Polish people to German tyranny.

Those feelings, I have reason to believe, were shared by large numbers of people outside, and, from messages which have come to me this morning, I believe that what I said last night met with the approval of our people.

This morning we meet in an entirely different atmosphere— one of relief, one of composure, and one of resolution.

The intolerable agony of suspense from which all of us have suffered is over; we now know the worst.

The hated word "war" has been spoken by Britain, in fulfilment of her pledged word and unbreakable intention to defend Poland and so to defend the liberties of Europe. We have heard more than the word spoken. We have heard the war begin, within the precincts of this House.

(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/sep/03/prime-ministers-announcement)http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/sep/03/prime-ministers-announcement

2 September 1939:

Sir John Wardlaw-Milne (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/people/mr-john-wardlaw-milne)

I say this not because I disagree with the Prime Minister — and I am sure that everybody will agree with me in this — and not because I do not appreciate the burden that is upon him, the terrible responsibility which he has to bear; but I do pray that he will remember, as indeed, I know he will remember, that the whole country is nervous about this continual delay in carrying out our pledges.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/sep/02/germany-and-poland-italian-proposals

The German invasion of Poland at 4:45 A. M. on September 1, 1939, did not by any means end the negotiations to make peace, nor, for that matter, did the complete collapse of Polish resistance on September 16-17.

Since these efforts were futile, little need be said of them except that France and Britain did not declare war on Germany until more than two days had elapsed. During this time no ultimatums were sent to Germany, but she was begged to withdraw her forces from Poland and open negotiations.

While Poland shuddered under the impact of the first Blitzkreig, British public opinion began to grumble, and even the government's supporters in Parliament became restive.

Finally, at 9:00 A. M. on September 3rd, Henderson presented to Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter, an ultimatum which expired at 11:00 A. M. In a similar fashion France entered the war at 6:00 P. M. on September 3rd.

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html

Red Icepick

31st December 2009, 08:11

Was it the British people too who insisted King Edward be deposed for being a fascist sympathizer? There was an imperialist cabal in England who manipulated the Germans with counterintelligence and who desperately wanted the war, but it was not the British people.

Bankotsu

31st December 2009, 08:57

Truth is truth.

It may be hard to acccept but truth is truth.

With Hitler's invasion of Poland on 1 September the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement had clearly failed.

In the face of a revolt from members of his Cabinet and a growing feeling in the country that Hitler must be tackled, he had little choice but to declare war.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/08/99/world_war_ii/430071.stm (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/08/99/world_war_ii/430071.stm)

On September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. On September 3rd, Britain declared war on Germany. The Second World War had begun dawn, on Friday September 1st, 1939 (with the Nazi-Soviet pact firmly in place), the German invasion of Poland began with a devastating air and artillery bombardment, followed by thousand of troops and armoured divisions crossing the German/Polish border.

In London that same morning the mobilisation of British forces was ordered, and in the Houses of Parliament the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, came under increasing pressure from both sides of the House to “Speak for England!”, which, sadly, he seemed unable to do, even to a country now united and waiting for war...

The pressure for Chamberlain to declare war was simply too great to resist, and, after personal telephone calls to the French and American presidents, Chamberlain instructed Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, to instruct the British Ambassador in Berlin to hand a written ultimatum to the German Government at 9am British time on Sunday the 3rd.

http://socyberty.com/history/a-declaration-of-war-september-1939/ (http://socyberty.com/history/a-declaration-of-war-september-1939/)

On September 1, Hitler attacked Poland. Britain and France were caught in their own trap. These two countries assisted in all of Hitler's adventures, hoping to use him against the Soviet Union. Right from 1933, they never stopped speaking in praise of Hitler's battle against Communism.

Now they were forced to declare war against Germany, although they had no intention of doing so in an effective manner.

Their rage exploded in a virulent anti-Communist campaign: `Bolshevism is fascism's natural ally'. Half a century later, this stupid propaganda is still be found in school books as an unquestioned truth. However, history has shown that the Germano-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was a key for victory in the anti-fascist war. This may seem paradoxical, but the pact was a turning point that allowed the preparation of the necessary conditions for the German defeat...

http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node131.html#SECTION001210000000000000000

On September 1st German units crossed the Polish border. Chamberlain and Daladier made last desperate efforts to involve Mussolini in some form of 'mediation' before public opinion forced the two governments to declare war on Germany on 3 September. There now commenced what the French called 'drole de guerre', the phoney war...

http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm (http://www.columbia.edu/%7Elnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm)
They did not see that the British Government might have to declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused.

The British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war but not to wage war on Germany.

This distinction was not clear to the Germans and was not accepted by the inner core of the Milner Group.

It was, however, accepted by the other elements in the government, like Chamberlain himself, and by much of the second circle of the Milner Group, including Simon, Hoare, and probably Halifax.

It was this which resulted in the “phony war” from September 1939 to April 1940.

SouthernBelle82

5th January 2010, 19:44

Well then Hitler went and invaded the USSR so some ally....

Invader Zim

7th January 2010, 17:31

I see old Banky is upto his old tricks again. To be honest the last time you and I went through this topic you couldn't provide a single piece of evidence from within the government to substanciate your accusations. Glancing through your posts in this thread I see nothing has changed.

This was nothing but the appeasement program of Chamberlain and Halifax—that concessions should be made to Germany to strengthen her on the Continent and in Eastern Europe, while Britain should remain strong enough on the sea and in the air to prevent Hitler from using war to obtain these concessions.

What a load of nonsense. Militarily, Britian was outclassed, out gunned and outnumbered during the appeasement period as result of British disarmament policy following WW1 and a failure to grasp the importance posed by Nazi Germany until 1936.

“A third fact in restricting the navy’s expansion was more alarming still: when the Royal Navy began its plans for new ships which the war clouds looming on the horizon dictated and which even the Treasury found it impossible to resist fully, it was discovered that Britain no longer possessed the productive strength to satisfy these urgent orders. The long lean years of virtually no construction, the lack of incentive for technological innovation, the unwillingness to invest capital in what had been regarded as unprofitable fields and, above all, that steady cancerous decay of the country’s sinews, were now showing their fruit.”

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), pp. 286-287.

Furtehrmore, Germany was spending $4 billion on its armed forces in 1937, while Britain was spending around $1.25 billion.

Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 429.

As for the airforce, German airforce production had already outstripped British as early as 1934, before German rearmament had ceased being a small clandestine affair. The fact is that, as far as britain was concerned in 1936, she was in no position to prevent Germany doing anything it pleased on the continent or anywhere else. Especially as Britain also had spread its forces thinly across the Empires, due to the threats posed by a militant Japan in the pacific and Indian oceans, Italy in Med. and Germany at home on Britain's doorstep.

but on the realization that if Hitler made war against Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, public opinion in France and England might force their governments to declare war in spite of their desire to yield these areas to Germany.

More nonsense. British public opinion was firmly opposed to Britain involving itself in a foreign European conflict with Germany, so soon after the previous war, until the night of Nov. 9 1938, after which public opinion altered to allow for a policy other than appeasement.

The German Foreign Ministry memorandum on this conversation makes it perfectly clear that the Germans did not misunderstand Halifax except, possibly, on the last point. There they failed to see that if Germany made war, the British Government would be forced into the war against Germany by public opinion in England.

Still more nonsense, bevcause it ignores the factt hat Britain made guarantees, which the government did not have to do, especially if the overarching policy was to bring the Soviet Union and Germany into a war. Which you still haven't provided a single scrap of evidence for. I recall last time we discussed this, your idea of 'evidence' was the comments of backbench MPs, retired soldiers and historians moonlighting out of their fields.

B][/B]

As dictators themselves, unfamiliar with the British social or constitutional systems, the German rulers assumed that the willingness of the British Government to accept the liquidation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland implied that the British Government would never go to war to prevent this liquidation. They did not see that the British Government might have to declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused. The British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war but not to wage war on Germany. This distinction was not clear to the Germans and was not accepted by the inner core of the Milner Group.

It was, however, accepted by the other elements in the government, like Chamberlain himself, and by much of the second circle of the Milner Group, including Simon, Hoare, and probably Halifax. It was this which resulted in the “phony war” from September 1939 to April 1940...

This shows a total misunderstanding of the phoney war, on your part Bankotsu. The phoney war was from the british perspective, employed to reinforce the then weak military and civil agencies necessary to fighting the war. The British and French plan had never been to sweep into Germany, but to be defensive, gain control of the skies and waters in Europe, and employ superior longterm economic strength to squeeze Germany into submission.

Only after the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 21 August 1939 did Halifax implement the unilateral guarantee to Poland with a more formal mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland. This was done to warn Hitler that an attack on Poland would bring Britain into the war under pressure of British public opinion. Hitler, as usual, paid no attention to Britain.

Firstly, the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed on the 24th, and dated the 23rd of August, not the 21st. Secondly the guarantee to Poland was made on the 31st of March 1939, just short of six months before the pact. So not only is your argument wrong, but it is based on an anachronism.

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/78...anglo_12b.html (http://www.anonym.to/?http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html)

Lol, citing Quigley again. As I pointed out to you last time, Quigley is a worthless source on this topic, as he was an anthropologist and specialist on the formation of civilisation, not 1930s international politics; and furthermore he wrote his work before the declassification of the documents relevent to the topic.

Kayser_Soso

7th January 2010, 18:40

What a load of nonsense. Militarily, Britian was outclassed, out gunned and outnumbered during the appeasement period as result of British disarmament policy following WW1 and a failure to grasp the importance posed by Nazi Germany until 1936.

Our resident anti-Communist is wrong again. While Britain was weak militarily due to disarmament- collectively with France Germany could have easily been dealt with even in 1939. This was admitted by Rommel and other military leaders on the German side. In fact the German army was only 10% mechanized. It was a paper tiger. Sure, part of this is hindsight- but the fact is that Britain and France knew they could count on one another and if they had actually gone to war on Poland's side- or better yet had they joined the USSR in 1938, Hitler could have been strangled easily.

Invader Zim

7th January 2010, 21:40

I'm going to ignore your childish and fatuous comments, save to say; grow up. However, you do actually raise an interesting, if erronious, argument worthy of discussion.

While Britain was weak militarily due to disarmament- collectively with France Germany could have easily been dealt with even in 1939.
I disagree for three reasons, firstly Britain's politicans were not going to start a war starting in a position of over-reliance on foreign powers. Especially France, which was by this stage entirely set on a defensive stratagy.

Secondly, if we include France, then presumably you want to also include Italy (and considering the threat posed in the Pacific and Indian oceans, possibly even Japan though we can ignore them for the time being); at which point both Britain and France were out gunned and out manned. Germany and Italy began the war with a 40% numerical advantage over Britain and France. The only area in which Britain and France were superior was in terms of armour and artillary, an advantage offset by the German superiority in airpower. Not just in military terms but industrial terms, Britain and France produce 13.9% of world manufactoring output while Germany and Italy alone produced 14.1%.

This was of course in 1939, you are talking about Britain and France acting a year earlier; when Britain's forces were considerably weaker by comparison to German forces. To quote Chamberlain, “No state … ought to make a threat of war unless it was both ready to carry it out and prepared to do so.” And in his estimation, as well as the heads of his military agencies Britain was in no position to fight a war. In 1937 the joint chiefs of staff reported to the cabinet:

“we cannot foresee the time when our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our trade, territory and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan at the same time … We cannot exaggerate the importance from the point of view of Imperial Defence of any political or international action which could be taken to reduce the number of our potential enemies and to gain the support of potential allies.”

Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), p. 290.

And of course, other than France, Britain couldn't rely on any other power. the USA was driving an isolationist policy and was broke after the great depression and the subsequent financial collapse of 1937. The USSR was, of course, not considered trustworthy by the British, and their failure to bond with Stalin may well be a point of serious fault. However, in their defence, Stalin was about to purge the red army, which was hardly likely to instill confidence in the British and French of the USSR's military prowess. And as I have noted in the past, they were right to be warey; as the Red Armies performance in the Winter War would prove.

Thirdly, as you said, you are making these pronouncements with the benefit of hindsight. The actal strength of German military forces was not know to the British or the French. They were forced to rely upon their intelligence services, and the British intelligence services hve been conclusively shown to have completely failed between 1933-1939; underestimating the German threat in the early stages and wildly over-estimating the threat later on. What the government was told in 1938 was that, by the end of the year Germany would have 360 squadrons of first-line aircraft. In 1939 Britain only had 135 squadrons. Naturally when the intelligence official Malcolm Christie made those predictions of German air strength in 1938 British air power was considerably weaker still.

Bankotsu

8th January 2010, 04:21

Lol, citing Quigley again. As I pointed out to you last time, Quigley is a worthless source on this topic, as he was an anthropologist and specialist on the formation of civilisation, not 1930s international politics; and furthermore he wrote his work before the declassification of the documents relevent to the topic.

That is a cheap lie from you Invader Zim. Out to discredit sources on historians who wrote the truth on british policy.

He got his master's degree in one year and at the end of the second year of graduate work he stood for his oral examination for a Ph.D. His areas of study were, to say the least, varied. Included among them were Russian History, Constitutional History o£ England, and the History of France (1461 to 1815). The Chairman of the examining board, Professor McIlwain, a trustee of Princeton, was most impressed with the examination, especially with Mr. Quigley's ability to answer his opening question with a long quotation in Latin from the writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln in the 13th Century. As a result of his proficiency, Dr. Quigley was given a job at Princeton, where he taught for two years.

http://www.carrollquigley.net/biography/The_Improbable_Dr_Quigley.htmYou are hopelessly biased in favour of Britain propaganda for me to discuss this topic with you Invader Zim.

Please don't mislead people here on this site with british false propaganda.

I'm so sick and tired of your denials Invader Zim. Because you are british, the bias is too strong for you to overcome and see the truth.

That is why the truth cannot be learned from most british histories. The bias is too strong.

Chamberlain's policy of allowing Hitler to go eastwards to destroy the USSR is a fact of history that cannot be denied.

Mao: We are prepared for it to come, but it will collapse if it comes. It has only a handful of troops, and you Europeans are so frightened of it! Some people in the West are always trying to direct this calamity toward China. Your senior, Chamberlain, and also Daladier of France were the ones who pushed Germany eastward.

Heath: I opposed Mr. Chamberlain then.

Bankotsu

8th January 2010, 09:45

Our resident anti-Communist is wrong again. While Britain was weak militarily due to disarmament- collectively with France Germany could have easily been dealt with even in 1939. This was admitted by Rommel and other military leaders on the German side.

The whole story about Germany having a stronger military than Britain and France pre-war is just propaganda bullshit to cover up their hidden agendas and blunders.

Two additional points, concerned with the degree of German armaments and the position of the anti-Hitler resistance within Germany, require further elucidation.

For years before June 1938, the government had insisted that British rearming was progressing in a satisfactory fashion. Churchill and others had questioned this and had produced figures on German rearmament to prove that Britain’s own progress in this field was inadequate.

These figures were denied by the government, and their own accomplishments were defended. In 1937 and in 1938, Churchill had clashed with Baldwin and Chamberlain on this issue. As late as March 1938, Chamberlain said that British armaments were such as to make her an “almost terrifying power ... on the opinion of the world.”

But as the year went on, the government adopted a quite different attitude. In order to persuade public opinion that it was necessary to yield to Germany, the Government pretended that its armaments were quite inadequate in comparison with Germany.” We now know, thanks to the captured papers of the German Ministry of War, that this was a gross exaggeration.

These papers were studied by Major General C.F. Robinson of the United States Army, and analyzed in a report which he submitted to the Secretary of War in October 1947.

This document, entitled Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods, shows that all of the accepted estimates of German rearmament in the period 1933-1939 were gross exaggerations. From 1936 to the outbreak of war, German aircraft production was not raised, but averaged 425 planes a month.

Her tank production was low and even in 1939 was less than Britain’s. In the first 9 months of 1939, Germany produced only 50 tanks a month; in the last 4 months of 1939, in wartime, Germany produced 247 “tanks and self-propelled guns,” compared to a British production of 314 tanks in the same period. At the time of the Munich crisis, Germany had 35 infantry and 4 motorized divisions, none of them fully manned or equipped.

This was no more than Czechoslovakia had alone. Moreover, the Czech Army was better trained, had far better equipment, and had better morale and better fortifications. As an example of this point, we might mention that the Czech tank was of 38 tons, while the Germans, before 1938, had no tank over 10 tons. During 1938 they brought into production the Mark III tank of less than 20 tons, and in 1939 brought into production the Mark IV of 23 tons.

Up to September 1939, the German Army had obtained only 300 tanks of the Mark III and Mark IV types together. Most of these were delivered during 1939. In comparison, the Germans captured in Czechoslovakia, in March 1939, 469 of the superior Czech tanks. At the same time they captured 1500 planes (of which 500 were first-line), 43,000 machineguns, and over 1 million rifles.

These figures are comparable with what Germany had at Munich, and at that time, if the British government had desired, Germany would have been facing France, Britain, and Russia, as well as Czechoslovakia.

It should perhaps be mentioned that up to September 1939 the German Navy had acquired only 53 submarines during the Hitler regime. No economic mobilization for war had been made and no reserve stocks built up. When the war began, in September 1939, Germany had ammunition for 6 weeks, and the air force had bombs for 3 months at the rate of expenditure experienced during the Polish campaign.

At that time the Air Force consisted of 1000 bombers and 1050 fighters. In contrast, the British air program of May 1938 planned to provide Britain with a first-line force of 2370 planes; this program was stepped up in 1939. Under it, Britain produced almost 3000 military planes in 1938 and about 8000 in 1939. The German figures for planes produced in these 2 years are 5235 and 8295, but these are figures for all planes produced in the country, including civil as well as military airplanes. As Hanson Baldwin put it, “Up until 1940, at least, Germany’s production did not markedly outstrip Britain’s.” It might also be mentioned that British combat planes were of better quality.

We have no way of knowing if the Chamberlain government knew these facts. It should have known them. At the least, it should not have deluged its own people with untrue stories about German arms. Surprisingly, the British have generally refused to modify these stories, and, in order to perpetuate the fable about the necessity for the Munich surrender, they have continued to repeat the untrue propaganda stories of 1937-1939 regarding German armaments.

This is as true of the critics of Munich as of its defenders. Both have adopted the version that Britain yielded to superior and overwhelming force at Munich.

They have done this even though this story is untrue and they are in a position to know that it is untrue. For example, Winston Churchill, in his war memoirs, repeats the old stories about German rearmament, although he has been writing two years or more after the Reichswehr archives were captured.

For this he was criticized by Hanson Baldwin in The New York Times of 9 May 1948. In his recent book, Munich : Prologue to Tragedy, J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, the British editor of the captured papers of the German Foreign Ministry, accepts the old propaganda tales of German rearmament as axiomatic, and accordingly does not even discuss the subject.

He merely tells his readers: “By the close of 1937 Germany’s preparedness for war was complete. The preference for guns rather than for butter had brought forth results. Her rearmament had reached its apogee and could hold that peak level for a certain time. Her economy was geared to a strict regime of rationing and output on a war level.” None of this was true, and Mr. Wheeler-Bennett should have examined the evidence. If he had, he would not have been so severe on what he calls Professor Frederick Schumann’s “fantastic theory of the 'Pre-Munich Plot.’ ”

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

False information on German military in Churchill's War memoirs

http://www.jstor.org/pss/3484039

http://www.jstor.org/pss/178120

Invader Zim

10th January 2010, 15:40

That is a cheap lie from you Invader Zim.

And the fact you think so is evidence of your failure to grasp the most basic of historiographical facts surrounding this topc, and therefore complete lack of qualification to voice anything of coherance on this topic. Carroll Quigley published his work on this topic, which was at complete varience with his major research field of the formation of civilisation, and was published in 1966. The '30 year' rule, restricting access to the key documents on appeasement, the documents which historians rely upon in their judgement of the appeasement question, allowed historians access in 1967. So Quigley's opinion on the matter, which is little more than regurgitation of the 'guilty men' hypothesis of the 1940s and 1950s, isn't particularly relevent.

You are hopelessly biased in favour of Britain propaganda for me to discuss this topic with you Invader Zim.

On the contrary, I am a historian, so my view of history is generated through analysis of facts; and the facts aren't on the side of your argument.

I'm so sick and tired of your denials Invader Zim.

Or, if you are being honest, you are tired of my pointing out the massive errors and holes in your position.

Bankotsu

11th January 2010, 03:27

On the contrary, I am a historian, so my view of history is generated through analysis of facts; and the facts aren't on the side of your argument.

I am also a historian. Then why on earth are you falsifying history and spreading british false propaganda?

I think it is simply hopeless to expect truthful interpretation of appeasement history from english historians.

They just won't accept simply logic like Chamberlain's policy of allowing Hitler to go eastwards to destroy the USSR.

Bankotsu

11th January 2010, 03:28

And the fact you think so is evidence of your failure to grasp the most basic of historiographical facts surrounding this topc, and therefore complete lack of qualification to voice anything of coherance on this topic. Carroll Quigley published his work on this topic, which was at complete varience with his major research field of the formation of civilisation, and was published in 1966. The '30 year' rule, restricting access to the key documents on appeasement, the documents which historians rely upon in their judgement of the appeasement question, allowed historians access in 1967. So Quigley's opinion on the matter, which is little more than regurgitation of the 'guilty men' hypothesis of the 1940s and 1950s, isn't particularly relevent.

What a load of bull. This is a disgrace.:(

It seems to me, to expect a british historian to say that Chamberlain wanted Hitler to go eastwards to destroy the Soviet Union is like expecting a north korean historian to say that Kim Sung Il started the war against the south.

Both are impossible things.

The propaganda, the mythology, the bias, the nationalist mental block is too strong for the truth to be told.

We have to turn to non british and non north korean sources to seek the unbiased truth.

For history of appeasement, we can turn to the american historian Carroll Quigley.

Against this background the aggressive Powers rose after 1931 to challenge Western Civilization and the "satisfied" Powers which had neither the will nor the desire to defend it.

The weakness of Japan and Italy from the point of view of industrial development or natural resources made it quite impossible for them to have issued any challenge unless they were faced by weak wills among their victims.

In fact, it is quite clear that neither Japan nor Italy could have made a successful aggression without the parallel aggression of Germany.

What is not so clear, but is equally true, is that Germany could have made no aggression without the acquiescence, and even in some cases the actual encouragement, of the "satisfied" Powers, especially Britain. The German documents captured since 1944 make this quite evident....

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.htmlYou will never get a proper history of appeasement policy of Chamberlain from british historians.

I have yet to see a single british historian to say that Chamberlain appeased Hitler so that Hitler could go east and attack and destroy and bring to an end the Soviet regime.

Other historians, yes.

American historians, russian historians, chinese historians, left wing historians, jewish historians, but never a british historian.

Never. I think it is probably a taboo topic among historians there.

Appendix section of the book I find it very interesting.Here authors have evaluated ,critically analysed works of other historians on Chamberlin's appeasment policy.Historians-Alan Bullock,AJP Taylor,Donald C. Watt Simon Newman ,Paul Kennedy-have exonerated the British leader of any wrong deeds by projecting him to be apostle of peace. All evidence to the contrary either fudged or ignored Why? They were reluctant to admit that leader of a Western democracy could collaborate with a dictator who was hell-bent on going to war to realise his ambitions.

Such distortion of facts tantamount to pulling wool over the eyes of the public.This book has presented British politicians in the true light.These men instead of stopping Hitler shamelessly connived,collaborated ,co operated with the Nazi leader.Hyocrites,they were parially responsible for the outbreak of World War II and Holocaust that ensued.

The book represents a complete reappraisal of events leading to World War II. For me the facts contained in the book were nothing new.

Having read the books of Soviet historians of war [Vladimir Trukhanovsky, Oleg Rzhevsky] I am aware of it.

However this may be first time that few people in the West have come to acknowledge this unpalatable truth which for a long time dubbed communist as propaganda.

http://www.amazon.com/Our-Time-Chamberlain-Hitler-Collusion/dp/0853459991/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_1

Invader Zim

11th January 2010, 11:40

What a load of bull.

Again, the fact that you think so proves how little you know about this topic. Look up the 30 year amendment to the 50 year rule. You will note it came in 1967.

I have yet to see a single british historian to say that Chamberlain appeased Hitler so that Hitler could go east and attack and destroy and bring to an end the Soviet regime.

The fact is you won't find any legitimate historian of the topic making that argument because it isn't one that is supported by the facts.

The really amusing thing is that you go onto cite Leibovitz garbage while in the same post proclaim that only British historians are immune from accepting the nonsense you propose. Yet the most eminent historian who actually bothered reviewing Leibovitz is Wesley K. Wark, the author of a groundbreaking work on the British intelligence services and their role in the appeasement policy, described the book as a "madcap" "conspiricy theory". Yet funnily enough Wark is an American.

Now run along Banky and do some real reading on the topic.

Bankotsu

11th January 2010, 12:10

Again, the fact that you think so proves how little you know about this topic. Look up the 30 year amendment to the 50 year rule. You will note it came in 1967.

The fact is you won't find any legitimate historian of the topic making that argument because it isn't one that is supported by the facts.

The really amusing thing is that you go onto cite Leibovitz garbage while in the same post proclaim that only British historians are immune from accepting the nonsense you propose. Yet the most eminent historian who actually bothered reviewing Leibovitz is Wesley K. Wark, the author of a groundbreaking work on the British intelligence services and their role in the appeasement policy, described the book as a "madcap" "conspiricy theory". Yet funnily enough Wark is an American.

Now run along Banky and do some real reading on the topic.

Same old bullshit from you Invader Zim. Just won't face facts. Just want to smear and discredit.

You will never admit to the truth.

You will continue to spread lies.:(

Mao: We are prepared for it to come, but it will collapse if it comes. It has only a handful of troops, and you Europeans are so frightened of it! Some people in the West are always trying to direct this calamity toward China. Your senior, Chamberlain, and also Daladier of France were the ones who pushed Germany eastward.

Heath: I opposed Mr. Chamberlain then.

"The documents received after the Munich conspiracy are particularly valuable. They analyze the post-Munich situation in Europe and clearly show that Britain was trying to draw Germany and the Soviet Union into active hostilities," Sotskov emphasized in an interview with RIA Novosti.

In a memo on December 21, 1938, Lavrenty Beria reported to Stalin about the Soviet-seized documents, which included reports of Finnish envoys to London, Paris, and Warsaw on Germany's eastward expansion, and the position of the British, French, and Polish governments on this issue.

Thus, Finnish Ambassador in London Grippenberg reported to his Foreign Ministry: "I heard the opinion that German propaganda of colonies is false. As Britons put it, it is a smokescreen to cover the preparations of a plan concerning Soviet Ukraine. Hitler himself told French Ambassador Francois-Poncet that he was not even thinking about any colonies," the document reads.

Later, on November 25, Grippenberg reported his conversation with a British government member who assured him that Britain and France would not interfere in Germany's eastward expansion.

"Britain's position is as follows: let's wait until Germany and the U.S.S.R. get involved in a big conflict," the document reads.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080929/117271264.html

Bankotsu

11th January 2010, 12:19

You can't hide truth forever.

On day the truth will be made known to the general public in Britain and the west.

Beijing, February 18, 1973, 2:43–7:15 p.m.

Talks between Chou En-lai, Premier of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:

PM Chou: Originally Western Europe had hoped that Germany would go eastwards.

Dr. Kissinger: Western Europe.

PM Chou: At Munich.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, at Munich. Western Europe had very superficial leaders. They didn’t have the courage to pursue any policy towards a conclusion. Once they had done Munich it made no sense to fight for Poland. But that is a different issue. And I don’t blame Stalin, because from his point of view he gained himself the essential time.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100320.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/

Statement by His Excellency Mr. Adam Daniel ROTFELD, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War:

We are told sometimes that the criminal plot of the two dictatorships – Stalin’s and Hitler’s – was legitimate under the international law of the time. What’s more, it constituted a justified or even essential defense in view of the Munich Agreement concluded in September 1938 among Nazi Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France. That treaty was designed to channel German aggression eastward. True, it was a shameful Agreement conceived to appease the aggressor at the expense of Czechoslovakia.

http://www.polandun.org/templates/statementRotfeld09may.html

One day the lies will fall apart and the truth will be made known to all.

Whole world knows that Chamberlain's plot was to direct Hitler east to attack USSR.

Only the british insists on suppressing obvious facts.

But the truth will be made known one day.

Bankotsu

11th January 2010, 12:27

There has frequently been expressed a desire in the House that we should endeavour to get Germany and Russia involved in war so that we could sit back and look at them destroying one another.

Is it not because we have a Government which has been concerned all along with pursuing its own Imperialist policy first, and in trying to direct Germany against the Soviet Union?

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/oct/03/war-situation#S5CV0351P0_19391003_HOC_350

If hon. Gentlemen opposite are hugging the delusion that Germany, if allowed to become a dominant Power in Europe, will attack the Soviet Union and destroy that great Socialist Power, they had better wake up before it is too late.

Germany will have no hesitation in breaking any word that was given and taking advantage of this country. The National Government are not isolating Soviet Russia. They are isolating Britain. I do not care what armaments you have, if Britain is alone her position is impossible and the position of this Empire is impossible. The one policy for the people of this country is to have unity with the peace peoples of all other countries and to make appeal after appeal to the peoples of Germany and Italy on that basis.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/oct/04/european-situation#S5CV0339P0_19381004_HOC_66

The truth will prevail in the end.

Bankotsu

11th January 2010, 13:29

Seriously, it is really that big a deal for the british to say that appeasement was designed to let Hitler go east and destroy the Soviet union?

It is really a big deal?

I mean the russians also admitted to the secret protocols in 1939 pact that divided eastern europe into spheres of interests after decades of lies and denial.

Why can't the british come out and say ya, that Chamberlain appeasement thing was designed to let Hitler go east and attack USSR.

It is really that hard and big deal?

Invader Zim, maybe you can shed some light on this.

I don't see why it is really that hard to admit it.

It's not like it's anything new. Once in a while someone does mention it in the british press.

A key factor in Britain and France's attitude towards Hitler was a desire to steer his ambitions eastwards and into war with Russia. In that way, it was hoped, the two perils could eliminate each other.

Stanley Baldwin, who preceded Chamberlain, was fairly frank. In 1936, he told Tory MPs alarmed about Hitler, that it would not 'break his heart' if the tensions in Europe led to 'the Nazis fighting the Bolshies'.

The diaries of Foreign Office chief Sir Alexander Cadogan, shine a light on Chamberlain's outlook.

The Russians had been calling for a strong stand against Hitler on every occasion he pushed forward his military ambitions - reintroducing conscription, occupying the Rhineland, annexing Austria and threatening Czechoslovakia.

On every occasion, the despairing Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov got the brush off from London on the grounds either that Soviet offers of aid were insincere or impractical.

Nevertheless the British chiefs of staff eventually came round to favouring what Cadogan called a 'whole hog alliance with Russia'.

He added, significantly, that the idea 'annoyed' Chamberlain. Cadogan himself was hostile to such an alliance, as was most of the establishment, constantly scared by the Communist bogey despite the party winning only one seat in 1935.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1066952/Andrew-Alexander-Its-just-rich-risk-bank-meltdowns.html#ixzz0cJJbMmRG

After so many years, the suppression still goes on. British historians still refuse to discuss the obvious truth.

I think we should end this silly nonsense once and for all.

Just tell the truth for god's sake.

Why is there a need for these silly suppression?

I don't see why after 70+ years after the events of appeasement had passed, there is still a need to suppress the true story.

What's the point in that?

Kayser_Soso

12th January 2010, 17:51

It would seem that the British were more honest about their appeasement and unwillingness to fight Hitler several decades back. This is evident from the words of several British politicians filmed in the famous World at War Documentary. British reluctance to fight the Germans can be easily seen even in the very words of their declaration of war against the Germans on 3 September, which essentially left the Germans the option of coming back to the negotiating table. Now lets imagine that the Germans did this after two weeks. It's obvious that Britain was willing to give the Germans at the very least, a large chunk of Poland(what else would they do? Fight?), and having done that, who here is foolish enough to believe that they would have made a guarantee to the Soviet Union if Hitler went toward the East? If they didn't fight for Poland you'd have to be high to think they were going to fight for the USSR.

Bankotsu

13th January 2010, 03:38

If they didn't fight for Poland you'd have to be high to think they were going to fight for the USSR.

The anti-bolsheviks within the allied camp were so extreme that they hatched a plan to attack the USSR during the "phoney war" and did everything they could to prolong the war between Finland and USSR.

After seeing that the red army had suffered serious military setbacks in the war with Finland, those anti-bolsheviks in the allied camp decided to launch an all out attack against the USSR to finish it off!

To some it may seem incredible, but in January 1940, France and Britain were planning an operation to weaken the military might of the Soviet Union, intending to destroy the oil industry in the USSR in the Caucasus and suppress transportations on the Black Sea. Details of the training operations in the historical literature is almost absent, and in the West that it preferred not to spread.

We captured documents on Operation Caucasian oil "almost 55 years lay in special depositories of State Security and the Central State Archive of Russia.

The idea was expressed by Prime Minister Edouard Daladier of France in a note dated 19 January 1940, intended for the attention of members of the ruling cabinet.

Daladier offered to two senior military officials - Chief of General Staff of the Army Army Gen. Maurice Gamelin and the Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral Jean Darlan think about and express concerns about "intended use for the invasion of Russia in order to destroy the oil fields."

http://the100.ru/en/military-secret/page517.html

On Feb. 6th, the Finnish government was told that the Allied High Command had decided to offer military help to Finland if it would be formally asked. (The allied motive behind this was morally questionable.

The objective of the expedition force was firstly to increase military presence in Scandinavia, threatening the ore-transports from North Sweden to Germany, and secondly to help Finland.) The French had been especially fond of the idea, but the somewhat obscure plans were starting to get shape only after the British took a supportive stand during January 1940.

(The Soviet government was aware of these plans right from the start. The expedition force was a real threat to the Soviet government, as it was now possible that the Winter War would escalate into a conflict between the allies and the Soviet Union.)

http://www.winterwar.com/War%27sEnd.htm#alliedAnd some still doubt the intentions of the british. They couldn't wait to see the Nazis and the Soviets finish each other off!

That's why they didn't stop Hitler to go east silly!

It was their dream to see Hitler move on east all the way to the gates of Moscow!

Unable to see through their dream of seeing the Nazi army charge through Poland to attack the Soviet Union, France and Britain were forced to declare war on Germany.

But on the Western Front, not a single bomb would bother Nazi tranquility.

However, a real internal political war was launched against the French Communists: On September 26, the French Communist Party was banned and thousands of its members were thrown into prison. Henri de Kerillis wrote:

`An incredible tempest swept through bourgeois minds. The crusade storm raged. Only one cry could be heard: War on Russia. It was at this moment that the anti-Communist delirium reached its apogee.'

At the same time, Stalin spoke with great insight to Zhukov:

`The French Government headed by Daladier and the Chamberlain Government in Britain have no intention of getting seriously involved in the war with Hitler.

They still hope to incite Hitler to a war against the Soviet Union. By refusing in 1939 to form with us an anti-Hitler bloc, they did not want to hamper Hitler in his aggression against the Soviet Union. Nothing will come of it. They will have to pay through the nose for their short-sighted policy.'

Knowing that war with Germany was inevitable, the Soviet government was extremely worried about Leningrad's security, as it was only 32 kilometres from the Finnish border.

On October 14, 1939, Stalin and Molotov sent a memorandum to the Finnish government about the problem of the defence of Leningrad. The Soviet Union wished to be able to `block the access to the Gulf of Finland'. It asked of Finland that it be ceded by lease the Port of Hanko and four islands. To ensure the defence of Finland, it asked for part of the ithmus of Karelia belonging to Finland. In exchange, the Soviet Union would offer to Finland part of Soviet Karelia, twice the size.

Encouraged by Germany, Finland refused. On November 30, 1939, the the Soviet Union declared war on Finland. A few days later, Hitler gave instructions for the coming war with the Soviet Union.

Here is one passage:

`On the flanks of our operation we can count on active intervention from Romania and Finland in the war against the Soviet Union.'

Britain and France, worried about not getting caught up in this `strange war', charged headlong into a real war against the Bolshevik menace!

In three months, Britain, France, the U.S. and fascist Italy sent 700 planes, 1,500 canons and 6,000 machine guns to Finland, `victim of aggression'.

The French General Weygand went to Syria and Turkey to prepare an attack against the Soviet Union from the South.

The French Chief of Staffs prepared to bomb the Baku oilfields. At the same time, General Serrigny cried out:

`In fact, Baku, with its annual oil production of 23 million tons, dominates the situation. If we succeed in conquering the Caucasus, or if these refineries were simply set alight by our air force, the monster would collapse exhausted.'

Even though no shot had been fired against the Hitlerites, despite the fact that they were in a state of war, the French government regrouped an expeditionary force of 50,000 men to fight the Reds!

Chamberlain declared that Britain would send 100,000 soldiers.

But these troops were unable to reach Finland before the Red Army defeated the Finnish army: a peace accord was signed on March 14, 1939.

Later on, during the war, a Gaullist publication appearing in Rio de Janeiro claimed:

`At the end of the 1939--1940 winter, Chamberlain's and Daladier's political and military plot failed. Its purpose was to provoke a backlash against the Soviet Union and to end the conflict between the Anglo-French alliance and Germany through a compromise and an anti-Comminterm alliance.

This plot consisted in sending an Anglo-French expedition to help the Finns, the intervention thereby provoking a state of war with the Soviet Union.'

(http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node131.html#SECTION001210000000000000000)
http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node131.html#SECTION001210000000000000000
Britain and France probably thought that by attacking the USSR and weakening it, Hitler would drop his plans to attack in the west and shift his attentions to quickly finish off the USSR now that it had already been wounded by the allied attack on their oil industry.

I think this was probably part of their strategic thinking. They knew that if USSR was weakened, Hitler wouldn't be able to restrain himself and would break off the non aggression pact and attack Russia.

And thus viola, no war in the west and all left to the Nazis and Soviets to sort it out among themselves.

ComradeMan

13th January 2010, 10:26

Found some quotes:- from the horses' mouths so to speak.

Neville Chamberlain, letter to a friend (26th March, 1939)
I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears. Moreover, she is both hated and suspected by many of the smaller States, notably by Poland, Rumania and Finland.

On 16th April, 1939, the Soviet Union suggested a three-power military alliance with Great Britain and France. In a speech on 4th May, Winston Churchill urged the government to accept the offer.)
Ten or twelve days have already passed since the Russian offer was made. The British people, who have now, at the sacrifice of honoured, ingrained custom, accepted the principle of compulsory military service, have a right, in conjunction with the French Republic, to call upon Poland not to place obstacles in the way of a common cause. Not only must the full co-operation of Russia be accepted, but the three Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, must also be brought into association. To these three countries of warlike peoples, possessing together armies totalling perhaps twenty divisions of virile troops, a friendly Russia supplying munitions and other aid is essential.

There is no means of maintaining an eastern front against Nazi aggression without the active aid of Russia. Russian interests are deeply concerned in preventing Herr Hitler's designs on eastern Europe. It should still be possible to range all the States and peoples from the Baltic to the Black sea in one solid front against a new outrage of invasion. Such a front, if established in good heart, and with resolute and efficient military arrangements, combined with the strength of the Western Powers, may yet confront Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Ribbentrop, Goebbels and co. with forces the German people would be reluctant to challenge.

Winston Churchill, speech in the House of Commons (19th May, 1939)
Undoubtedly, the proposals put forward by the Russian Government contemplate a triple alliance against aggression between England, France and Russia, which alliance may extend its benefits to other countries of and when those benefits are desired. The alliance is solely for the purpose of resisting further acts of aggression and of protecting the victims of aggression. I cannot see what is wrong with that. What is wrong with this simple proposal? It is said: "Can you trust the Russian Soviet Government?" I suppose in Moscow they say: "Can we trust Chamberlain?" I hope we may say that the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. I earnestly hope so.

Clearly Russia is not going to enter into agreements unless she is treated as an equal, and not only is treated as an equal, but has confidence that the methods employed by the Allies - by the peace front - are such as would be likely to lead to success. No one wants to associate themselves with indeterminate leadership and uncertain policies. The Government must realise that none of these States in Eastern Europe can maintain themselves for, say, a year's war unless they have behind them the massive, solid backing of a friendly Russia, joined to the combination of the Western Powers. In the main, I agree with Mr. Lloyd George that if there is to be an effective eastern front - an eastern peace front, or a war front as it might become - it can be set up only with the effective support of a friendly Soviet Russia lying behind all those countries.

in August 1939, Joachim von Ribbentrop arranged the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
To seek a settlement with Russia was my very own idea which I urged on Hitler because I sought to create a counter-weight to the West and because I wanted to ensure Russian neutrality in the event of a German-Polish conflict.

After a short ceremonial welcome the four of us sat down at a table: Stalin, Molotov, Count Schulenburg and myself. Others present were our interpreter, Hilger, a great expert on Russian affairs, and a young fair-haired Russian interpreter, Pavlov, who seemed to enjoy Stalin's special trust.

Stalin spoke - briefly, precisely, without many words; but what he said was clear and unambiguous and showed that he, too, wished to reach a settlement and understanding with Germany. Stalin used the significant phrase that although we had 'poured buckets of filth' over each other for years there was no reason why we should not make up our quarrel.

From http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSnazipact.htm

Invader Zim

13th January 2010, 11:36

Found some quotes:- from the horses' mouths so to speak.

And what, beyond what we already know (that Chamberlain didn't trust Stalin and the capacity of the Red Army to fight a war (which he was absolutely correct about) and that Churchill disagreed), does that tell us?

Kayser_Soso

13th January 2010, 11:38

[/B]

And what, beyond what we already know (that Chamberlain didn't trust Stalin and the capacity of the Red Army to fight a war (which he was absolutely correct about) and that Churchill disagreed), does that tell us?

Actually he was absolutely wrong about that.

Demogorgon

13th January 2010, 13:12

Actually he was absolutely wrong about that.
Wrong about the Red Army's capacity to fight a war? He was certainly right about that. In the late thirties the army was a mess thanks to Stalin's purges and of course had wasted resources in Finland. That was the reason the Molotov/Ribbentrop pact was signed in the first place, the Soviet Union needed time to get itself to full fighting strength.

Kayser_Soso

13th January 2010, 18:52

Wrong about the Red Army's capacity to fight a war? He was certainly right about that. In the late thirties the army was a mess thanks to Stalin's purges and of course had wasted resources in Finland. That was the reason the Molotov/Ribbentrop pact was signed in the first place, the Soviet Union needed time to get itself to full fighting strength.

First of all the USSR would have had an advantage fighting an offensive war rather than defensive. They were going through massive reorganization but in 1938 during the Munich Crisis they would have been an entirely different army. Not great per se, but with over 1 million troops to offer, with British, French, Czech, and possibly Polish forces, Germany would have been completely boxed in.

ComradeMan

13th January 2010, 20:02

Invader Zim

13th January 2010, 23:28

First of all the USSR would have had an advantage fighting an offensive war rather than defensive.

And how do you work that? Actually I take that back, considering just how badly the Red Army performed until well into the German invasion. Indeed it is hard to imagine how it could have possibly been any weaker. But in terms of ability to fight an offensive war, as the Winter War proved, the Red Army was nearly as unprepared. In the Winter War the Red Army eventually had a million men, well over 6,000 tanks and not far under 4,000 aircraft. Yet they couldn't fully conquer a nation with an army a third of the size, with 30 tanks and 115 aircraft.

but in 1938 during the Munich Crisis they would have been an entirely different army

Indeed it would have been 'different'; undoubtedly a lot worse, because it was the height of what you dubiously entitle Stalin's "reorganisation".

but with over 1 million troops to offer, with British, French, Czech, and possibly Polish forces, Germany would have been completely boxed in.

Possibly, but just as likely the Red Army would have collapsed; after all it would have been fighting an enemy of far greater magnitude than Finland. The French were tried to their defensive policy; and the remaining great power, Britain was hastily trying to rebuilt its armed forces and wasn't in a position to fight a major war so we can pretty much discount Britain's potential contribution at this stage.

Of course we now know, with hindsight, that the British and French thought that the Germans had coniderably greater economic and military resources to draw upon than it actually did. But they didn't know that; what they did know is that they didn't think they could fight a war and win, and that they weren't willing to place their faith in a USSR that had just purged its army.

Invader Zim

14th January 2010, 00:12

They couldn't wait to see the Nazis and the Soviets finish each other off!

That's why they didn't stop Hitler to go east silly!

It was their dream to see Hitler move on east all the way to the gates of Moscow!

Then why, we must ask, did the British warned Stalin of the impending Operation Barbarossa?

Furthermore, why did Britain offer guarantees to Poland?

So let us add this up. Bankotsu can't provide any reasonable evidence to prove his/her assertions and those assertions are roundly contradicted by actual British policy decisions. The reality is that your position is not based on analysis of the evidence, but a dogma of religious proportions. You won't be swayed by any argument; no critique of your usually ireelevent sources and worse source analysis will ever alter your opinion, however compelling; and no statement of the historical realities will succeed either. You are here to evangelise your historical cause, regardless of that cause being proven to be without foundation in fact. There is no point continuing to respond to you; your only reply to the dismantling of your sources is to proclaim that i am inherently biased.

I know this not only from my own experienc,e but because a quick google search shows that the massive errors in your position have been pointed out to you before plenty of times on numerous forums; the wfollowing being a 20+ page example:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=34&t=135256&start=210

I'm not spending 20 pages trying to get blood from a stone.

Bankotsu

14th January 2010, 04:28

Then why, we must ask, did the British warned Stalin of the impending Operation Barbarossa?

Furthermore, why did Britain offer guarantees to Poland?

You are really one hopeless dude.

Churchill's policies and Chamberlain's policies were different. He warned Stalin so? He wanted an ally to fight it out with Hitler, so if Stalin struck first that would be better for Britain right?

Why do you keep repeating stuff that I have already explained endlessly?

Like Britain guarantee to Poland?

Why Invader Zim?

Why do you keep on repeating that rubbish?

Do I really HAVE TO GO THOUGH THAT AGAIN?

The polish guarantee?

Are you a moron Invader Zim?

Well, are you?

The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters wanted. He had no intention of ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be evaded and, for this reason, refused the Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate staff discussions to implement the guarantee. The Milner Group, less susceptible to public opinion, did not want the guarantee to Poland at all. As a result, the guarantee was worded to cover Polish “independence” and not her “territorial integrity.”
The debate was one of the most bitter in recent history and reached its high point when Amery cried out to the Government benches the words of Cromwell: “You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!” In the ensuing division, the whips were on with a vengeance, but the government’s majority was only 81, more than a hundred Conservatives abstaining from voting. Most of the Milner Group members, since they held offices in the government, had to vote with it. Of the inner core, only Amery and Lady Astor broke away. In the majority, still supporting Chamberlain, were J.J. Astor, Grigg, Hoare, Malcolm MacDonald, Salter, Simon, and Somervell. But the fight had been too bitter. Chamberlain was replaced by Churchill, and Amery came to office (as Secretary of State for India). Once again the Milner Group and the government were united on the issues.

Both, from 8 May 1940, had only one aim: to win the war with Germany.

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

Did you even BOTHER TO READ the sources that I gave?

For the love of god. If you didn't even bother to read those, then SHUT the fuck UP.

Kayser_Soso

14th January 2010, 05:21

And how do you work that? Actually I take that back, considering just how badly the Red Army performed until well into the German invasion. Indeed it is hard to imagine how it could have possibly been any weaker. But in terms of ability to fight an offensive war, as the Winter War proved, the Red Army was nearly as unprepared. In the Winter War the Red Army eventually had a million men, well over 6,000 tanks and not far under 4,000 aircraft. Yet they couldn't fully conquer a nation with an army a third of the size, with 30 tanks and 115 aircraft.

How do I work this? Quite simple. I know more about East Front history than you, and the nature of the Red Army doctrine from 1935 is well discussed in Chris Bellamy's Absolute War and in the works of David M. Glantz, probably the foremost Western expert on the Red Army.

The Red Army never intended to fully conquer Finland as you say, and they did force the latter to sue for peace. Part of the problem in Finland was bad logistics, coupled with communication problems and the inability of consolidating gains.

Indeed it would have been 'different'; undoubtedly a lot worse, because it was the height of what you dubiously entitle Stalin's "reorganisation".

Idle speculation.

Possibly, but just as likely the Red Army would have collapsed; after all it would have been fighting an enemy of far greater magnitude than Finland.

That enemy would be fighting on two fronts, its own borders practically, on FAR more agreeable terrain, in better weather, and exposed on the march. It's a far different scenario.

The French were tried to their defensive policy; and the remaining great power, Britain was hastily trying to rebuilt its armed forces and wasn't in a position to fight a major war so we can pretty much discount Britain's potential contribution at this stage.

Then it wasn't such a good idea for them to allow German rearmament then was it? Do not forget that Britain was the first country to sign a treaty with Nazi Germany, allowing them to increase the size of their navy.

Also I don't see how warning the USSR of Germany's impending invasion in 1941 is such a mystery. In 1938-39 Germany was not at war with them. By 1941 it was clear that Hitler was not going to tolerate a strong Britain or British influence on the continent, so praying that Hitler would leave them alone and focus on the USSR was no longer an option.

Invader Zim

14th January 2010, 11:24

Did you even BOTHER TO READ the sources that I gave?

We've been through your moronic idea of sources several times. As I have proved repeatedly you can't produce a single source than when examined does not collapse.

The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters wanted.

This is, of course, an idiotic argument. His government did not rest upon providing a guarantee to Poland. The guarantee was part of the containment element of the appeasement policy; concessions granted but limits sets. The Night of Broken Glass and the German backtrack on Munich certainly hardened public opinion against Nazi Germany and made was a potential policy, which it simply had not been before, but it certainly did not force Chamberlain to reverse the policy and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise.

Again, we return to the fact that you don't deal in hard evidence Bankotsu.

I know more about East Front history than you,

As you seem to believe that the Red Army was capable of fighting an effective offensive war against a Great Power at this stage then clearly not.

and the nature of the Red Army doctrine from 1935 is well discussed in Chris Bellamy's Absolute War and in the works of David M. Glantz, probably the foremost Western expert on the Red Army.
I don't know about the former but the latter totally rejects your claim, read Stumbling Colossus. Admittedly Glanz takes the view that there were all manner of structural problems arising from within the Red Army that led to its catastrophic perforemance in 1941, but he certainly does not dismiss the massively negative impact of the purges had upon the Red Army. Not just in terms of removing the most experienced officers, but in destroying moral.

The Red Army never intended to fully conquer Finland as you say
On the contrary, the pre-war Soviet plans were to be in Helsinki in a matter of days. The plan had never been to simply annex the land required to buffer Leningrad.

and they did force the latter to sue for peace.

Which was accepted, after months of silence, because the Red Army was haemorrhaging resources and the threat of potential interference of the West was growing acute. But the fact is that if the Red Army had been in any kind of shape the war would, as planned, have been over far more swiftly and not cost the Red Army something in the region of four times as many dead as it inflicted upon the Finns; despite having vastly superior numbers, resources and dominance of the skys. Indeed the Finns were not defeated by the innate superiority of the Red Army, but rather its leaders willingness to conceed appauling losses and continue to excert pressure until the Finns resources expired, at which point breakthrough became guaranteed.

Part of the problem in Finland was bad logistics, coupled with communication problems and the inability of consolidating gains.

And far more pressingly utterly insufficent leadership, disipline, training and moral. While you may deny the dire insufficencies of the Red Army, the Central Committee of the Party did not, and a great many lessons were taken from the war; chief among them the need to address the dire state of training within the Red Army.

Idle speculation.

No more than your assertion to the opposite effect. In fact, if anything, far less. We know that the Red Army performed very poorly against the Finns, it is perfectly reasonable to infer from that, that it would have fared far worse still against a far larger and much better equipped great power; especially as it was in complete turmoil in the immidiate aftermath of the purges and lacked the improvements and valuable lessons learned from the Winter War.

That enemy would be fighting on two fronts, its own borders practically, on FAR more agreeable terrain, in better weather, and exposed on the march. It's a far different scenario.
You don't seem to grasp the notion that there could not have been a Western Front of any magnitude in 1938. As I have noted the French were entirely invested in a long term defensive stratagy, and the British were in no position to fight anybody as far as they were concerned.

Then it wasn't such a good idea for them to allow German rearmament then was it?

German rearmament was clandestine until 1935, by which point it had already overtaken British forces in terms of ground and air. British intelligence of course knew that Germany had been rearming in breach of Versailles, as it had been even in the 1920s. However they still were in the mindset that Germany was a defeated power and that its rearmament efforts were a small affair. So it came as quite a shock to them to discover that this was not the case, and after that they went the other way and began to massively over-estimate German rearmament.

Do not forget that Britain was the first country to sign a treaty with Nazi Germany, allowing them to increase the size of their navy.

Indeed, it was a containment policy. they knew that Germany was rearming, and knew that they couldn't stop it from happening, so the plan was to limit it through binding gGrmany to an agreement. Of course they didn't grasp what they were dealing with then.

Also I don't see how warning the USSR of Germany's impending invasion in 1941 is such a mystery.

I never said it was a mystery. What it is, however, is evidence that the British were not as keen to see the USSR destroyed as Bankotsu claims. They were perfectly well aware that if the USSR fell then the west would be next.

By 1941 it was clear that Hitler was not going to tolerate a strong Britain or British influence on the continent, so praying that Hitler would leave them alone and focus on the USSR was no longer an option.
Why? They didn't need to hope or pray, they knew full well that Barbarossa was imminent. But why, if you want the active destruction of the USSR at the hands of the Nazis, warn the USSR that the attack is imminent?

Of course Stalin didn't heed the warning, and that was costly to say the least.

Furthermore the British and French actively discouraged the Nazi expansion East in 1939 by offering a guarantee to Poland.