Spain! The Unfinished Revolution (PDF download)

[Ismail]

On June 5 I had begun transcribing the 1972 book Spain! The Unfinished Revolution by Arthur H. Landis. The book is unique in that it is written from a pro-PCE point of view by an American participant in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. I had finished transcribing the book on November 20. User Intelligitimate has encouraged me to put the book up on RevLeft.

I put this book up for the following reasons:
1. The author, Arthur H. Landis, passed away in 1986.
2. As far as I know, International Publishers no longer sells this book (http://www.intpubnyc.com/Titles.html), and it is seemingly out of print.
3. The book itself is 37 years old.

Obviously if International Publishers or any other relevant organization or person objects to it being on here, then that will be the end of this topic.

If not, then that's great. And if that is so, then enjoy the book.

Megaupload link: http://www.megaupload.com/?d=3WPYAW2J

[Intelligitimate]

I want to thank Ismail for doing this. This book is a very important work. I had been planning on doing this myself, though via the much lazier way of just scanning it. Now Ismail has made this book accessible to everyone in a very easy to read and search format.

Thank you, comrade.

[Искра]

Ismail: Can you shortly explain that pro PCE point of view?

[Ismail]

Ismail: Can you shortly explain that pro PCE point of view?Like what? You don't know what the PCE advocated? He defends the PCE, its line, and the accusations made against it.

[syndicat]

He already tried to use Landis' book to defend PCE in this thread:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalinists-vs-anarchists-t123373/index.html

[Small Geezer]

I think Ismail should summarise the PCE line in order to save us the trouble. Although I may read that book sometime.

[Ismail]

Landis himself summarizes basically the PCE position:

The electoral victory of the Popular Front Government of Spain in February, 1936, has been argued in many ways; with the figures so juggled in certain analyses of the Right as to prove that the victory was actually theirs. The Left on the other hand—the “Left” in this case being the Popular Front, which was quite different from the real Left, as we shall see—included the separatist Basque Nationalist Party, which was strongly catholic-conservative in its politics. Essentially, if the Basque vote were to be added to the Center, and both of these given to the Right, then indeed would the final tally be almost equal.


There are no exact figures on the votes for Socialists, Republicans, C.E.D.A., etc. But the proportionate representation given each party as a result of the total vote indicates that the Republican vote within the Popular Front was at least as large as the combined Communist-Socialist vote and those others of the Left Independents, inclusive, of, perhaps, 700,000 votes of the Anarcho-Syndicalists who at this time had voted for the amnesty.


That is to say that in terms of a true vote in-re the simplistics of capitalism versus socialism, the then grouping of Right-Center-Republicans outnumbered the bona-fide Left at three to one. Considering, however that a large percentage of the Anarchist votes had gone to Republicans rather than to Socialists or Communists, and that in the villages, for the simple reason that they had to live there, great numbers of villagers voted Right who were strongly Left, the real tally would be like two to one. The true Left, in other words, was still outnumbered; with about 33% of the total vote.


A salient point of the Popular Front, however, was that its Republican adherents wanted no part of the Center or of the Right; certainly no dictatorship from any source. They were bourgeois and they wanted a bourgeois state of laws, governed by a mandate of the people, preferably themselves. But when one writes of Republicans, one writes primarily of the mass of Republican voters; not the leadership. The difference being, a limited but positive idealism on the part of the mass, and a propensity for class-collaboration and corruption on the part of the leadership.


Considering all these facts one must conclude that the Popular Front vote was no mandate for “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” the nationalization or industry, or the creation of communes in the areas of agriculture, as some would have others believe . . . . But it was the form of government under which these concepts—as of that moment in time—could be advocated and worked for freely, and with a minimum of interference from the Republican bourgeoisie.


Fascism would most certainly not grant the Left this right. Indeed, the prime objective condition here was that the Financial Oligarchy could not countenance the continued existence of the Popular Front for precisely these same reasons. That the ultra-left, the F.A.I., the P.O.U.M., etc., could not understand this, to a point where they would fight the Popular Front far harder than they would ever fight the real enemy was, over the years, the tragedy of the Spanish Republic.


Alone among the parties of the Front and of the Left, the P.C.E. did seem to understand the above facts. This is not to say that hundreds of thousands of socialists, republicans, anarchists, workers, intellectuals and students did not. But it is to say that their organized leadership seemed forever abysmally ignorant of the facts.


That a Rightist rebellion was now imminent was common knowledge; to everybody, that is, except the majority of the Republican leaders and some Socialists. The threat of it lay like a miasmic cloud over the length and breadth of the country, ominous and foreboding. The force of the rising, when it came, would be disciplined and terrible. And there it would be but one weapon in the people's arsenal to hold it and destroy it. That was the now proven weapon of Left-Republican unity embodied within the structure of the Popular Front of the Spanish Republic.


The battles won thus far, for amnesty and for the restoration of all gains of the 1931 elections, had been won within that structure; had been won by the whole of the people who had fought for and created the Front; who had worked for the Front; who had voted for the Front, and who had not sat on their hands.


The P.C.E. too had fought wholeheartedly for the Popular Front; were in fact its initiators, its creators. And it was, perhaps, because of this reason, that they continued an almost selfless support to this same “unity of the people” that their strength grew rapidly from the days of February to the days of July.
In the end the idea was that the PCE would eventually move the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the Communist revolution once it had the confidence of the masses on its side, à la the Russian Revolution.

[syndicat]

Actually the PCE's strategy was to organize the middle classes behind the banner of rebuilding the authority of the Republican state, given the support of managers, business owners, farm owners etc for hierarchical authority. And part of their strategy was to worm their way into control of a rebuilt conventional military and police hierarchy, as their strategy for gaining state power. Hence their initiating tests of power with the workers organizations in May 1937, with the Communist controlled poliece engaging in coordinated seizures of the worker controlled telephone exchanges. And then after they had gotten their pal Negrin -- a wealthy professor and Communist sympathizer -- installed as Prime Minister, he let them do as they wish with the Military Intelligence Service, murdering revolutionaries, and using police power to seize the unions, newspapers and offices of the Left Socialists, to gain in this way control over the apparatus of the UGT union federation. Meanwhile, attacking the conquests of the workers revolution was a funny way of getting the confidence of the masses.

In fact the sectarian policy of the PCE had the effect of demoralizing the ranks of the army and demoralizing all the working class people who had fought for the revolution in 1936.

The alternative for worker political power in Spain was the national and regional defense councils -- a workers government -- proposed by the anarcho-syndicalists in Sept 1936, and a unified people's militia under the control of the worker mass union organizations (UGT and CNT).

[Ismail]

Actually the PCE's strategy was to organize the middle classes behind the banner of rebuilding the authority of the Republican state, given the support of managers, business owners, farm owners etc for hierarchical authority. And part of their strategy was to worm their way into control of a rebuilt conventional military and police hierarchy, as their strategy for gaining state power.Apparently Republican bourgeois control of the police and army was preferable, then?

And yes, a Popular Front rallied the petty-bourgeois against Fascism. Excuse me while I recover from the shock.


The alternative for worker political power in Spain was the national and regional defense councils -- a workers government -- proposed by the anarcho-syndicalists in Sept 1936, and a unified people's militia under the control of the worker mass union organizations (UGT and CNT).The PCE did not reject it, though it had obvious apprehensions (as did others) since it would in effect put the CNT-FAI in a leading position. Landis discusses this incident in the book. (PDF pages 222-26)


Hence their initiating tests of power with the workers organizations in May 1937, with the Communist controlled poliece engaging in coordinated seizures of the worker controlled telephone exchanges.The Wikipedia article I wrote for Catalan police chief E.R. Salas has a section dedicated to the Telefónica incident (as it was, after all, the main thing he was known for). I feel that, after having looked through as many sources as I could (anarchist included), it is worth posting here and those interested types may look at it and the sources I noted: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eusebio_Rodr%C3%ADguez_Salas#Telef.C3.B3nica_Incid ent

I would say that the "Communist-controlled police" taking control of the Telefónica was justified.


And then after they had gotten their pal Negrin -- a wealthy professor and Communist sympathizer -- installed as Prime Minister, he let them do as they wish with the Military Intelligence Service, murdering revolutionaries, and using police power to seize the unions, newspapers and offices of the Left Socialists, to gain in this way control over the apparatus of the UGT union federation. Meanwhile, attacking the conquests of the workers revolution was a funny way of getting the confidence of the masses.Apparently professors cannot be progressive. "Wealthy" professors (like Chomsky I guess) are always ominous. Besides, "A progressive bourgeois leader of a progressive state is well off. GOD HELP US."

Also if Casado, Besteiro, and various other rightists who would later overthrow his Government (with some Anarchist support, no less) and surrender to Franco were allowed to be in such positions as they were in, and when the Anarchists had given consent to Casado some time before this despite PCE calls to remove him, then I can only conclude that the PCE didn't "infiltrate" the government and armed forces enough.

[syndicat]

The PCE did not reject it,

They strongly urged against it. Marcel Rosenberg, the Soviet ambassador, warned Largo Caballero that it would "destroy the international legitimacy of the Spanish Republic." This brings out the unrealistic approach of the Communists. They thought that by hiding what was really going on in Spain...a workers revolution...somehow they could get the capitalist states such as USA and UK and France to give arms to an anti-fascist government where the large capitalists had been largely expropriated. This is why the US CP pursued a policy of systematic lying about Spain..."Oh it's just a defense of a democratically elected government"...ignoring the actual proletarian revoluition underway.

The PCE was against the CNT proposal because it would block the strategy of the PCE for capturing state power via control over a rebuilt hierarchical army and police....the strategy that they did in fact pursue.

And Negrin allowing the SIM to murder revolutiionaries and become essentially a colony of the Soviet secret police doesn't say much about his "progressiveness". The conservative social dems like Prieto and Negrin had little base of support in the working class, unlike the Left socialists around Largo Caballero. Your talk of "progressiveness" ignores the class nature of the conflict.

The bit about Casado ignores the fact that the Republican army at that point had been destroyed and could no longer offer resistance. As Antony Beevor documents quite well in "The Battle for Spain" this happened largely thru PCE policies in control of the army...emphasis for propaganda reasons on large set piece battles with infantry advances. Vast numbers of people were killed and arms and materiel lost in battles like Brunete, Teruel, Ebro. As I say, and as Beevor shows, it destroyed the Republican army. By the time of the Casado Council there was no ability to continue to resist. They were hoping to negotiate a surrender or slow down the collapse, which they were unable to do because of Franco's intransigence, which they should have expected. But Casado and Besteiro, as honest liberals and "progressives", as you would say, didn't understand that.

Also, you ignore the fact that a PCE takeover was in the offing at that point because the PCE was afraid that Negrin was about to surrender and they wanted to be the party in control of a resistance movement. The Casado Council gained anarchist support to block the PCE takeover. When it became clear their attempt to seize power would fail...because many of the officers they had bludgeoned or wiled into PCE membership in fact had no deep loyalty to the PCE. So when the PCE leaders realized that, they fled the country...and of course they were happy to allow the Casado Council take the hit as "the people who surrendered"...even tho it was PCE policies that had destroyed the Republican army.

[Ismail]

They strongly urged against it. Marcel Rosenberg, the Soviet ambassador, warned Largo Caballero that it would "destroy the international legitimacy of the Spanish Republic." This brings out the unrealistic approach of the Communists. They thought that by hiding what was really going on in Spain...a workers revolution...somehow they could get the capitalist states such as USA and UK and France to give arms to an anti-fascist government where the large capitalists had been largely expropriated. This is why the US CP pursued a policy of systematic lying about Spain..."Oh it's just a defense of a democratically elected government"...ignoring the actual proletarian revoluition underway.Besides parts of Aragón and Catalonia, it was for most people a battle between two Spains. The fact that the UK and such refused aid (and favored the Francoists) shows how scared the international bourgeoisie were of the Spanish Republic since it was seen as a "transitional stage" to socialism.


And Negrin allowing the SIM to murder revolutiionaries and become essentially a colony of the Soviet secret police doesn't say much about his "progressiveness".Care to give any examples of the "revolutionaries" murdered with Negrín's consent?


The conservative social dems like Prieto and Negrin had little base of support in the working class, unlike the Left socialists around Largo Caballero.Landis cites Gabriel Jackson, who states that:

“In Republican Spain the sheer will-power of Prime Minister Negrín had staved off panic in the first days of April. Arms, oil and food, pouring over the reopened French border and rapidly delivered to the Army, enabled it to mount increasingly stiff resistance to the Nationalists in the last days of the month. The Republican Navy convoyed supply ships between Barcelona and Valencia, and serious air-raid preparations were made in the coastal cities. The arms workers of Sagunto stayed on the job despite repeated heavy bombings of the City. The Prime Minister visited the front constantly, infusing the troops with his own renewed energy and optimism. No occupations were more highly respected by Spanish workingmen than those of doctor and professor. Juan Negrín was both, and in addition, a man whose warm personality inspired the individual loyalty of both troops and officers. The soldiers referred to themselves proudly as hijos de Negrín (sons of Negrín) . . . and to his thirteen point political program as puntos de Negrín. For the majority of men not committed to a particular political line, his image effaced those of Azaña, Prieto, and Largo Caballero.”

[syndicat]

Besides parts of Aragón and Catalonia, it was for most people a battle between two Spains. The fact that the UK and such refused aid (and favored the Francoists) shows how scared the international bourgeoisie were of the Spanish Republic since it was seen as a "transitional stage" to socialism.


It was in fact a revolutionary class war. Not only in "parts of Aragon and Catalonia" but in the whole country. In any event, your comment here agrees that the Communist strategy was unrealistic. Socialism was what the workers of Spain were creating. That's what it means when a working class seizes the means of production throughout a country...and, by the way, not just in "parts of Aragon and Catalonia" but also in New Castille, Murcia, Levante, etc.


Care to give any examples of the "revolutionaries" murdered with Negrín's consent?


When the PCE proposed a purge of the POUM, Largo Caballero refused to go along. That was when the PCE walked out of the government. And the PCE was supported by the Republican, Basque Nationalist parties and the social-dems (Negin and Prieto faction of PSOE). These latter parties were based on the middle classes. Negrin then became prime minister. Negrin because he was quite prepared to go along with the PCE purge of the POUM. He never showed any particular qualm about the SIM's work even tho it was an open secret. And you had the murder of Nin and many others. For some eye witness acounts, see "Jumping the Line" by Bill Herrick. Herrick was a member of the American CP serving in the Abraham Lincoln Battalian at the time. Even at the beginning of the civil war the Communist International had said that in Spain they would do to the Trotskyists and anarchosyndicalists what they had done to them in Russia.

Your quote from liberal, CP symp hhistorian Gabriel Jackson (whose inaccuraces were attacked by Chomsky famously in "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship" (http://question-everything.mahost.org/Archive/chomskyspain.html)) provides zero evidence of any working class support to Negrin.

The working class in Spain, outside the more conservative and Catholic Basque country, had two major organizations, the UGT and the CNT. The CNT was the majority with over 2 million members and was anarcho-syndicalist. Negrin and the conservative social dems hated the CNT.

And then there was the UGT. at the beginning of the revolution & civil war this was under the control of the Left Socialists. Communists had support in sections of this union. But they gained control of it in 1937, not be democratic means, but by the use of the police power Negrin allowed them to use. PCE-controlled police raided and seized the union halls, newspapers and buildings of the Left Socialists and the UGT sections under Left Socialist influence. The largest union in the UGT was the Land Workers Federation which had 500,000 members in spring of 1936 and was a mass revolutionary movement in the countryside. It was led by the Left Socialists. This is why throughout the revolution there was an alliance between the UGT land workers federation and the CNT peasants union.

So where would this working class support of the social dems be? They had only a minority of support in the UGT.

The PCE's support was also not mainly in the working class either. A majority of its membership were drawn from the middle classes. The Republican, Basque Nationalist parties were middle class parties. And that is where the social dems like Negrin had their support.

[Ismail]

It was in fact a revolutionary class war. Not only in "parts of Aragon and Catalonia" but in the whole country. In any event, your comment here agrees that the Communist strategy was unrealistic. Socialism was what the workers of Spain were creating. That's what it means when a working class seizes the means of production throughout a country...and, by the way, not just in "parts of Aragon and Catalonia" but also in New Castille, Murcia, Levante, etc.It is obvious that the workers in many cases did take the initiative to take control over the means of production. Socialists and Communists played a role in this, as did Anarchists. The Telefónica itself was an example of this, etc.

The issue isn't that. The issue is saying ultra-left stuff such as (Landis quoting Santillán): “For we who were in the Spanish social vanguard, whether Negrín triumphed with his communist cohorts, or if Franco won, with his Italians and Germans, the results would be the same . . . .” To alienate the Republican Army and the peasantry, plus many workers who were not with the Left to any significant extent, would have been suicide. The foremost goal was to win the civil war. Had the Republic won it then the prospect of advancing towards socialism would have been made as clear as day.


When the PCE proposed a purge of the POUM, Largo Caballero refused to go along. That was when the PCE walked out of the government. And the PCE was supported by the Republican, Basque Nationalist parties and the social-dems (Negin and Prieto faction of PSOE). These latter parties were based on the middle classes. Negrin then became prime minister. Negrin because he was quite prepared to go along with the PCE purge of the POUM.Landis (citing Ibárruri) paints a different story, with the main concerns being over the conduct of the war, and the issue of the POUM secondary. (PDF pages 338-341) You also fail to note that the PSOE (both wings, the Left to an obviously lesser extent) was itself supported by the middle classes, and that the Anarchists were given the ability to participate in the new government, but they declined.


And you had the murder of Nin and many others. For some eye witness acounts, see "Jumping the Line" by Bill Herrick. Herrick was a member of the American CP serving in the Abraham Lincoln Battalian at the time. Even at the beginning of the civil war the Communist International had said that in Spain they would do to the Trotskyists and anarchosyndicalists what they had done to them in Russia.The Barcelona "May Days" were viewed as an attempt by the Anarchists and POUM to basically coup the government while being subtly supported and egged on by Francoist agents. This, coupled with the Soviet trials in-re the Trotskyists, makes it unsurprising that the PCE would be concerned about the POUM.


And then there was the UGT. at the beginning of the revolution & civil war this was under the control of the Left Socialists. Communists had support in sections of this union. But they gained control of it in 1937, not be democratic means, but by the use of the police power Negrin allowed them to use. PCE-controlled police raided and seized the union halls, newspapers and buildings of the Left Socialists and the UGT sections under Left Socialist influence. The largest union in the UGT was the Land Workers Federation which had 500,000 members in spring of 1936 and was a mass revolutionary movement in the countryside. It was led by the Left Socialists. This is why throughout the revolution there was an alliance between the UGT land workers federation and the CNT peasants union.The Communists mostly focused their attention on the FAI. Save for a few situations, the CNT generally got along decently with the rest of the Left, and this obviously included the UGT. As for claims that the "PCE-controlled police raided and seized the union halls" etc., I'll need to see some sources.

[syndicat]

It is obvious that the workers in many cases did take the initiative to take control over the means of production. Socialists and Communists played a role in this, as did Anarchists. The Telefónica itself was an example of this, etc.


The majority union among the telephone workers was the CNT's National Industrial Federation of Telelphone Workers. This organization expropriated the Spanish National Telephone co. in July 1936. As often happened, the UGT then came along later, and they got delegates added to the worker committees that were part of the industrial federation running the telephone system.

But the Communists had no signfiicant infuence there. This is why the PCE controlled police initiated the coordinated seizure of the telephone system in May 1937. It was an attack on a center of CNT power. They accused the CNT of listening in on calls of state leaders. But the Communists were not against that, they just wanted to control that power. In "Blood of Spain" there is an interview with a former leader of PSUC who said the party wasn't against listening in on calls. "The party always wanted to be well informed" he said.


The issue is saying ultra-left stuff such as (Landis quoting Santillán): “For we who were in the Spanish social vanguard, whether Negrín triumphed with his communist cohorts, or if Franco won, with his Italians and Germans, the results would be the same . . . .” To alienate the Republican Army and the peasantry, plus many workers who were not with the Left to any significant extent, would have been suicide. The foremost goal was to win the civil war. Had the Republic won it then the prospect of advancing towards socialism would have been made as clear as day.


but de Santillan was right. if either Franco or the PCE won, the result would be a repressive dictatorial state and the continuation of a system of class subordination and exploitation. if the PCE won, the techno-managerial class would end up on top, as in the USSR.

the "Republican Army" didn't exist til the end of 1936. The militias were the anti-fascist force in the early period, and they were formed by the unions and the socialist parties. Moreover, even after creation of the Popular Army, members of the unions were still a majority. It was actually the PCE's policy of rigid hierarchical control and giving favored treatment to ciphers who would join the PCE that demoralized the army. Antony Beevor discusses this in "The Battle for Spain." It's also discussed by a Left Socialist named Gomez in "Blood of Spain."

Spain had a highly capitalist agriculture. referring to a "peasantry" is misleading. In Spain most people working in agriculture were wage laborers. The Spanish kulak class of more affluent farmers, who PCE backed in their efforts to get back land that had been expropriated by the farm worker unions, had been the rural right wing element before the civil war. Like the Autonomist Party in Valencia which was a Catholic fascist party, it was the party of the citrus grove owners, who were then cultivated by the PCE.

the PCE pursued this policy because they were trying to build a social base in the countryside to challenge the Left Socialists and anarcho-syndicalists who had the support of the rural proletarians and poor small holders (who also worked in wage labor at times).

me:

When the PCE proposed a purge of the POUM, Largo Caballero refused to go along. That was when the PCE walked out of the government. And the PCE was supported by the Republican, Basque Nationalist parties and the social-dems (Negin and Prieto faction of PSOE). These latter parties were based on the middle classes. Negrin then became prime minister. Negrin because he was quite prepared to go along with the PCE purge of the POUM.

you:

Landis (citing Ibárruri) paints a different story, with the main concerns being over the conduct of the war, and the issue of the POUM secondary. (PDF pages 338-341) You also fail to note that the PSOE (both wings, the Left to an obviously lesser extent) was itself supported by the middle classes, and that the Anarchists were given the ability to participate in the new government, but they declined.

Look, the way in which the Largo Caballero government fell is a matter of public knowledge cited in numerous books, including "The Battle for Spain" by Beevor. After the May Days events, the PCE made a cabinet motion to ban the CNT and POUM. Largo Caballero said this would be illegal and he would never go along. the PCE then walked out. Caballero then said "The meeting of the cabinet continues." But the social dems, Republicans and Basque Nationalists then walked out, leaving Caballero with only the support of the Left Socialists and anarchosyndicalists.

This makes it clear that Caballero was stupid not to agree to the CNT proposal for a joint UGT-CNT government in Sept 1936. It could have blocked whole PCE power drive.


The Barcelona "May Days" were viewed as an attempt by the Anarchists and POUM to basically coup the government while being subtly supported and egged on by Francoist agents. This, coupled with the Soviet trials in-re the Trotskyists, makes it unsurprising that the PCE would be concerned about the POUM.


This is bullshit. The May Days were a spontaneous response by the working class of Barcelona to the coordinated seizure of telefonicas by the PCE controlled police. The CNT unions had their own armed defense organization, to defend the conquests of the revolution, and it went into action against the police, and gained control of virtually the whole of the city and suburbs.


As for claims that the "PCE-controlled police raided and seized the union halls" etc., I'll need to see some sources.


Again, this is referred to in numerous sources, including Beevor's "The Battle for Spain."

[Ismail]

But the Communists had no signfiicant infuence there. This is why the PCE controlled police initiated the coordinated seizure of the telephone system in May 1937. It was an attack on a center of CNT power. They accused the CNT of listening in on calls of state leaders. But the Communists were not against that, they just wanted to control that power. In "Blood of Spain" there is an interview with a former leader of PSUC who said the party wasn't against listening in on calls. "The party always wanted to be well informed" he said.As Bolloten noted in The Spanish Revolution: The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War (which I used quite a bit in my E.R. Salas article) the Government as a whole was concerned over what it saw as exclusive Anarchist control. That the PCE decided to take advantage of this situation among others does, admittedly, have some basis.


but de Santillan was right. if either Franco or the PCE won, the result would be a repressive dictatorial state and the continuation of a system of class subordination and exploitation. if the PCE won, the techno-managerial class would end up on top, as in the USSR.So a "Stalinist" Spain is absolutely as bad as a Fascist one?


the "Republican Army" didn't exist til the end of 1936. The militias were the anti-fascist force in the early period, and they were formed by the unions and the socialist parties. Moreover, even after creation of the Popular Army, members of the unions were still a majority. It was actually the PCE's policy of rigid hierarchical control and giving favored treatment to ciphers who would join the PCE that demoralized the army. Antony Beevor discusses this in "The Battle for Spain." It's also discussed by a Left Socialist named Gomez in "Blood of Spain."I'm aware. By "Republican Army" I meant the various Republican Generals and Co. Within this, I do stand by the fact that not every Republican soldier was a leftist, and if Spain suddenly went "Red" overnight they would turn against it, which is bad; particularly in the context of a civil war.


Spain had a highly capitalist agriculture. referring to a "peasantry" is misleading. In Spain most people working in agriculture were wage laborers. The Spanish kulak class of more affluent farmers, who PCE backed in their efforts to get back land that had been expropriated by the farm worker unions, had been the rural right wing element before the civil war. Like the Autonomist Party in Valencia which was a Catholic fascist party, it was the party of the citrus grove owners, who were then cultivated by the PCE.Landis notes relations between the Anarchists and the peasants (or farmers, if you'd like) starting from PDF page 313 onwards.


the PCE pursued this policy because they were trying to build a social base in the countryside to challenge the Left Socialists and anarcho-syndicalists who had the support of the rural proletarians and poor small holders (who also worked in wage labor at times).Landis:

Juan Peiró, one of the outstanding leaders of the C.N.T., and F.A.I., refers to the disillusion and resultant apathy of the peasantry as a result of these acts. “Does anyone believe,” he writes, “that through acts of violence an interest in or a desire for socialization can be awakened in the minds of our peasantry? Or perhaps by terrorizing it in this fashion it can be won over to the revolutionary spirit prevailing in our cities?”


“The gravity of the mischief that is being done compels me to speak clearly. Many revolutionaries from different parts of Catalonia . . . . after conquering their respective towns have tried to conquer the countryside, the peasantry. Have they tried to achieve this by informing the peasantry that their hour of emancipation from the social exploitation to which it had been subjected year after year had arrived? No! Or have they tried to accomplish this by carrying to the countryside, to the consciousness of the peasant, the spirit and the moral standards of the revolution? No, they have not done that either. When they have gone into the countryside, carrying with them the torch of the revolution, the first thing they have done has been to take away from the peasant all means of self-defense . . . . and having achieved this, they have robbed him even of his shirt.”


“If today you should go to different parts of Catalonia to speak to the peasant of the revolution, he will tell you that he does not trust you, he will tell you that the standard-bearers of the revolution have already passed through the countryside. In order to liberate it? No! They have passed through the countryside in order to rob those who throughout the years have been robbed by the very persons who have just been defeated by the revolution.” ( “Libertat,” Catalan Anarchist journal. Article by Juan Peiró, Sept. 29, 1936)

[...]

For, paradoxically, though Catalonia was the heartland of F.A.I. control, its influence did not extend to the Catalan peasantry. Gerald Brenan, reflecting upon this phenomenon, writes that, “The Anarchists stood for a system of collectivization of agricultural workers which was well suited to conditions in Andalucia. But the greater part of Andalucia fell at once into Nationalist hands, and when the Anarchists of the large industrial towns attempted to impose collectivization upon the Andalucian peasants and Valencian rice growers, they met with strong opposition. The peasants, looking around for someone who would defend them against this unwanted 'revolution,' found their champion in the Communists.”


[...]


Within two weeks of the total application of Libertarian Communism in Aragón, collectivized businesses became vacuums of empty stores and warehouses, creating a serious supply problems. The textile industry, the produce industry and in general, all light industry in Catalonia, also collectivized by the Anarchists, refused to accept the vouchers and other paper money given out by the “Committees” in Aragón. They demanded that they be paid in the coin of the Republic.


In reply the Committees of Aragón threatened the National Committee of the C.N.T. with cutting off the electric power that serviced the greater part of the industries of Catalonia, plus the central electrical system itself, if clothes and supplies were not sent to the “liberated areas.”


In reply to the gravity of this threat the National Committee of the C.N.T. ordered the Military Chief of the Anarchist forces in Aragón to execute the leaders of the Committees if they persisted in their attitude.


While the contradictions within the F.A.I./C.N.T. leadership grew ever sharper, the dominion which they continued to exercise over the peasantry of Aragón and Catalonia presented grave consequences for the war as a whole. Economically, these areas which had held such a wonderful potential for the Republic, were fast becoming wastelands. Politically, tens of thousands of peasants were losing all interest in the war; some had been actually forced into minor revolts against their persecutors.
Etc. Landis notes that: "Most of this information has been based upon the report of Ismael Sin, U.G.T. representative to the Comité de Nueva Estructuracion Social de Aragón." The other source is the PCE's 1960's Guerra y Revolución which, while not unbiased, should be refutable in such a case.

Landis does note, however, that:

On the other hand there can be no doubt that in many areas, towns and villages, the idea of Libertarian Communism was met with enthusiasm and support. And under the guidance of concerned and honest leadership, actually worked and worked well. The valley of the Llobregat would be an example of this limited success. The point is, however, these these were the exception and not the norm.

Look, the way in which the Largo Caballero government fell is a matter of public knowledge cited in numerous books, including "The Battle for Spain" by Beevor. After the May Days events, the PCE made a cabinet motion to ban the CNT and POUM. Largo Caballero said this would be illegal and he would never go along. the PCE then walked out. Caballero then said "The meeting of the cabinet continues." But the social dems, Republicans and Basque Nationalists then walked out, leaving Caballero with only the support of the Left Socialists and anarchosyndicalists.If there was a motion to ban the CNT, it obviously didn't pass under Negrín considering that it... wasn't banned. I already noted the reasons why the PCE would want the POUM made illegal and/or destroyed.


This is bullshit. The May Days were a spontaneous response by the working class of Barcelona to the coordinated seizure of telefonicas by the PCE controlled police. The CNT unions had their own armed defense organization, to defend the conquests of the revolution, and it went into action against the police, and gained control of virtually the whole of the city and suburbs.Irregardless of your view of the events, I was stating the PCE position. I'm aware of the spontaneity, etc.

Furr once said of Fascist involvement in the "May Days" that: "Such involvement might have been merely penetration -- but it probably looked like collaboration."

Landis notes:


One additional factor pertinent in the outbreak of the fighting was the part played by Franco agents-provocateurs . . . . It has been suggested “that the following evidence simply cannot be ignored.”


The General Staff of the Fascist-Military could hardly be expected to sit quietly while such a ripe possibility for disruption, or worse, of the Republic presented itself. Indeed, they were ready for the occasion. Wilhelm von Faupel, Hitler's Ambassador to Franco Spain, and a close associate of Franco, sent the following communique to Berchtesgaden, May 11, 1937:


“Concerning the disorders in Barcelona, Franco has told me that the street fighting was provoked by his agents. Nicholas Franco has confirmed this report, informing me that they have a total of thirteen agents in Barcelona. Some time ago one of them had reported that the tension between the Anarchists and Communists was so great that it could well end in street fighting. The Generalissimo told me that at first he doubted this agent's report, but later they were confirmed by other agents. Originally he didn't intend to take advantage of this possibility until military operations had been established in Catalonia. But since the Reds had recently attacked Teruel to aid the Government of Euzkadi, he thought the time was ripe for the outbreak of disorder in Barcelona. In fact, a few days after he had received the order, the agent in question, with three or four of his men, succeeded in provoking shooting in the streets which later led to the desired results.”
(http://www.revleft.com/vb/#sdfootnote1anc)

[syndicat]

Peiro was a treintista. They were a minority in the CNT. The treintistas had proposed the CNT join the Popular Front from the beginning. A position rejected by the majority. They also objected to the expropriation of the smaller capitalist exploiters, such as the expropriation of the owners of the haircutting shops. So you're quoting a factional point of view.

The position of the UGT and CNT farm worker unions was the same in regard to change in the countryside. They were against any forced collectivization of small holders. With regard to those farmers who owned enough land to hire wage laborers, the position of both unions was that the excess should be collectivized, leaving them with enough land to cultivate through their own efforts. This position was rejected by the PCE, who used armed violence to give land back to the more affluent farmers...who before the war were the bastion of the ultra-right in the countryside. This is an example of PCE counter-revolution.

The issue of forced collectivization in Aragon has been discussed in various more objective works than PCE propagandist Landis. Such as "Blood of Spain," which is an oral history that interviews people from all sides. In that work they reach the conclusion that forced collectivization occurred in only a few villages.

There was also disagreement within the CNT over some of the measures taken in Aragon such as abolition of money. The anarcho-syndicalists interviewed in "Blood of Spain" believe this was a mistake, and this is also my view as well. But this had been corrected long before Lister's violent campaign in Aragon, which was directed at destroying CNT power, that is, worker power, in the region. (The CNT had 80 percent of the workers in that region as members.)

When you talk about generals in the Republican Army, who are you talking about? There was no Republiican Army after July of 1936. There was a workers militia constructed by the working class organizations. The officers from the old Republican Army were not exactly very reliable...for one thing because they had no orientation to popular mobilization. This was one of the reasons for the fall of Malaga. The Republican officer in charge simply didn't deal with the situation with the kind of zeal that a revolutionary militia would have.

[Kayser_Soso]

When you talk about generals in the Republican Army, who are you talking about? There was no Republiican Army after July of 1936. There was a workers militia constructed by the working class organizations. The officers from the old Republican Army were not exactly very reliable...for one thing because they had no orientation to popular mobilization. This was one of the reasons for the fall of Malaga. The Republican officer in charge simply didn't deal with the situation with the kind of zeal that a revolutionary militia would have.

While the Republic was not able to build the large national army they wanted(thanks to some idiots wearing red and black), they did have what could be considered an army. You are woefully ignorant on this subject.

[anticap]

You are woefully ignorant on this subject.

Not according to the thread I just read.

[syndicat]

While the Republic was not able to build the large national army they wanted(thanks to some idiots wearing red and black), they did have what could be considered an army.

LOL. There was no army in the period following July 1936 because the army was fascist. During that period there was a workers militia. In the summer of 1936 there was then a debate. The Communists proposed to build a conventional top-down army, with saluting, highly paid officers etc. The anarcho-syndicalist movement proposed instead a unified militia controlled by the unions. The Communists won that debate and a new Republican army was built in 1937. And it was this army that lost the war. Antony Beevor's "The Battle for Spain" lays the blame for the defeat partly on the policies of the Communists who controlled most of the officer corps of the rebuilt army. You sound as tho you are completely ignorant of what actually occurred.

[Kayser_Soso]

LOL. There was no army in the period following July 1936 because the army was fascist. During that period there was a workers militia. In the summer of 1936 there was then a debate. The Communists proposed to build a conventional top-down army, with saluting, highly paid officers etc. The anarcho-syndicalist movement proposed instead a unified militia controlled by the unions. The Communists won that debate and a new Republican army was built in 1937. And it was this army that lost the war. Antony Beevor's "The Battle for Spain" lays the blame for the defeat partly on the policies of the Communists who controlled most of the officer corps of the rebuilt army. You sound as tho you are completely ignorant of what actually occurred.


The Communists were concerned with winning the war. You need an army for that. Yes, unfortunately this means retaining some aspects of the old military, but priority is on winning the war. The Army of Africa had no trouble rolling over the worker militias pretty much wherever they encountered them. It was the disciplined units and International Brigades, plus the tanks and the air force, that helped stop the Nationalists.

Beevor is a hack.

[jaffe]

If there were no workers militias there weren't any terrytories to stop the nationalists at first place.


plus the tanks and the air force

for what price?

[syndicat]

The Communists were concerned with winning the war. You need an army for that. Yes, unfortunately this means retaining some aspects of the old military, but priority is on winning the war. The Army of Africa had no trouble rolling over the worker militias pretty much wherever they encountered them. It was the disciplined units and International Brigades, plus the tanks and the air force, that helped stop the Nationalists.


Everyone was concerned with winning the war. The new Republican army didn't come into existence til after the battle of Madrid. You seem to have only the vaguest understanding of the chronology of events.

Landis was a Stalinist hack. Beevor's book is well documented and well researched and has gotten very good reviews from people in Spain.

Discipline is consistent with the existence of a people's militia controlled by the organized working class. The anarcho-syndicalist proposal in Sept 1936 was for a disciplined people's militia, a training academy to train officers and militia members with values consistent with worker liberation, and a unified command...accountable to the working class...rather than a top-down army controlled by a political party (PCE) bent on building a repressive one-party state and an economy with the workers subordinate to a bureaucratic class.

Tanks and aircraft can be run by a people's militia. The CNT arms factories built some armored vehicles for the militia. They could have built more if the gold reserves weren't sent off to Stalin, who cheated the Spanish Reupblic right and left on arms deals, as documented in detail by Gerald Howson in "Arms for Spain" (using Soviet archives).

at the beginning of the civil war there were two factories of Hispano-Suiza seized by the workers. one in Barcelona made very expensive luxury autos in the same class as the Rolls Royce. This factory was converted to armored car production. The other factory made high performance 12 cylinder aircraft engines. It could have been the basis for an indigenous fighter. Instead 70% of the gold reserves were sent to Stalin...and this totally destroyed the value of the Spanish currency on the world market when word got out about this. It dropped the value of Spain's currency by 50%. This means all supplies purchased for the war would cost twice as much. This means Stalin was essentially looting the Spanish Republic. Those gold reserves could have been used to build a native Spanish aircraft and armored vehicle production capacity.

[Ismail]

Peiro was a treintista. They were a minority in the CNT. The treintistas had proposed the CNT join the Popular Front from the beginning. A position rejected by the majority. They also objected to the expropriation of the smaller capitalist exploiters, such as the expropriation of the owners of the haircutting shops. So you're quoting a factional point of view.Except Peiró isn't talking about the Popular Front here. He's detailing the views of a sizable amount of the peasantry/farmers.


This position was rejected by the PCE, who used armed violence to give land back to the more affluent farmers...who before the war were the bastion of the ultra-right in the countryside. This is an example of PCE counter-revolution.

The issue of forced collectivization in Aragon has been discussed in various more objective works than PCE propagandist Landis. Such as "Blood of Spain," which is an oral history that interviews people from all sides. In that work they reach the conclusion that forced collectivization occurred in only a few villages.As Bolloten notes (p. 229): "Ralph Bates, noted author, assistant commissar of the Fifteenth International Brigade, and an authority on Spain and the Spanish Revolution, wrote to me after he had severed his ties with the Communist party: 'The C.P. drive against collectivization was absolutely wrong, for while there were plenty of abuses, forced collectivization, etc., there were plenty of good collectives, i.e., voluntary ones.' In Toledo province, for example, where even before the war rural collectives existed, 83 percent of the peasants, according to a source friendly to the Communists, decided in favor of the collective cultivation of the soil.

As the campaign against the collective farms reached its height just before the summer harvest -- a period of the year when even the more successful farms were beset with economic difficulties -- a pall of dismay and apprehension descended upon the agricultural laborers. Work in the fields was abandoned in many places or carried on apathetically, and there was danger that a substantial portion of the harvest, vital for the war effort, would be left to rot.

The Communists then suddenly changed their policy."

More than just "WE MUST WIN OVER EVERYONE" was at stake in the eyes of the PCE. The war effort was primary, and as Landis noted: "The agriculture of both Catalonia and Aragón, beneath the dictates of the F.A.I., suffered to the point of ruin. Surface areas of regions under tillage fell between 20 to 30 percent within the first year. Agricultural products diminished proportionally so that a zone which in the past had been completely self-supporting, was now forced to import foodstuffs to live. Simultaneously with this the corresponding and interrelated economy of the areas—concomitant with the provisioning of the cities—was almost totally destroyed."

It is possible to view the dismantling of some collectives as a mistake on the part of the PCE. As should be obvious, the PCE did make some mistakes.


There was also disagreement within the CNT over some of the measures taken in Aragon such as abolition of money. The anarcho-syndicalists interviewed in "Blood of Spain" believe this was a mistake, and this is also my view as well. But this had been corrected long before Lister's violent campaign in Aragon, which was directed at destroying CNT power, that is, worker power, in the region. (The CNT had 80 percent of the workers in that region as members.)I already explained Líster's actions in my debate with TAT that you linked too near the beginning of this thread.


When you talk about generals in the Republican Army, who are you talking about? There was no Republiican Army after July of 1936. There was a workers militia constructed by the working class organizations. The officers from the old Republican Army were not exactly very reliable...for one thing because they had no orientation to popular mobilization. This was one of the reasons for the fall of Malaga. The Republican officer in charge simply didn't deal with the situation with the kind of zeal that a revolutionary militia would have.Miaja ring a bell? Plus there were various other loyal Republican officials such as de Cisneros, etc. One of the major reasons the Republic lost is because most of its greatest Generals and officers had joined the Francoists, so the prospect of losing more would probably not be looked upon favorably.

[syndicat]

Ismail Edit: Sorry Syndicat, I totally "replied" to your post but it was in fact an edit by accident. Luckily my reply to you has your entire post intact, so yeah.

[The Author]

A Stalinist hack is not a credible source.

Yeah, if you say so...

Anyone who is a Stalinist is suddenly a hack.

What bullshit.

[syndicat]

Anyone who is a Stalinist is suddenly a hack.

What bullshit.

Landis' book parrots the Communist Party line. I've already shown how inaccurate it is on various points. So, we're just supposed to take this guy's word for it that self-management of agriculture was disastrous in Aragon? Where's the corroboration?

[Ismail]

Lister's rampage against the collectivized villages in Aragon wasn't just to break up the collectives. It was to destroy the power of the CNT. The CNT village unions had set up a regional workers government, the Regional Defense Council of Aragon. Lister broke up that government and arresed 600 CNT members. This was an attack on working class power.That he was commanded by Prieto to do this (and Prieto and Co. were later forced out of office by mass protests led by the PCE since Prieto himself was a rightist who wanted to start a mini-civil war between the PCE and CNT) apparently doesn't matter.


Many of the workers and facilities who were under-employed could have been put to work in an expanded arms industry...but that was prevented by the sending of the gold to Russia.The gold argument has been debated various times, namely by Intelligitimate. He has other sources (since he knows more about that issue), but here's a basic one: http://www.gutenberg-e.org/kod01/kod16.html


You over-estimate the value of these characters. They obviously didn't do so great in the actual war after rebuilding of the topdown army, now did they?Whether or not they did great was besides the point, considering that they were the few Generals and officers the Republic had to defend itself with besides the militias.


Plus, Casado ring a bell?The guy endorsed by the anarchists who overthrew Negrín and Co. (with the aid of anarchists), who murdered Communists, and who basically surrendered to Franco whereas the PCE was calling for his resignation both before and after his coup? What about him?


A conscientious colonel who was pushed aside because he wouldn't kowtow to the party. The PCE harassed officers who would not join the party...not telling them about how to contact other nearby units, not giving them supplies, not promoting them, etc. The PCE's sectarian policy in the running of the army was a major reason for the defeat, as it demoralized the army.So apparently the PCE did not want to promote officers who, in your words, "obviously didn't do so great in the actual war after rebuilding of the topdown army"? Good to know.

[syndicat]

The gold argument has been debated various times, namely by Intelligitimate. He has other sources (since he knows more about that issue), but here's a basic one: http://www.gutenberg-e.org/kod01/kod16.html (http://www.anonym.to/?http://www.gutenberg-e.org/kod01/kod16.html)



Except that he doesn't deal with the fact that transfer of the gold out of the country led to a 50% drop in the value of the Spanish currency. If Spain had kept the gold in its own territory, and sent gold only as needed for payments for weapons, this would not have happened. But then Stalin would not have as much control over who got the weapons or military policy, such as veto'ing weapons for the guerrilla army in Andalucia proposed to Negrin in 1937 by Juan Garcia Oliver, and agreed to by Negrin, but veto'd by the Soviets.

So apparently the PCE did not want to promote officers who, in your words, "obviously didn't do so great in the actual war after rebuilding of the topdown army"? Good to know.

nice try except that the PCE's sectarian policy applied to new officers as well as old. many "professional" army officers...were ciphers. Beevor talks about this.

but I'm not going to continue to engage in conversation with you when you abuse your moderator privileges by deleting my posts.

[FSL]

Instead 70% of the gold reserves were sent to Stalin...and this totally destroyed the value of the Spanish currency on the world market when word got out about this. It dropped the value of Spain's currency by 50%. This means all supplies purchased for the war would cost twice as much. This means Stalin was essentially looting the Spanish Republic. Those gold reserves could have been used to build a native Spanish aircraft and armored vehicle production capacity.


Ehm, to start what you're saying is not true.

There wasn't a global monetary system in effect at that time. Some countries, the ones with the more advanced economies mainly, kept the gold standard rule even then. Others had abandoned it for a gold exchange standard, meaning you didn't have gold reserves but instead foreign currencies (like francs or pounds) that you could exchange for gold. Some countries even let the market decide the value of their currency as is the norm today. Generally, there was a relative shortage of gold so countries started moving away from that.

Spain had large reserves of gold when the republicans took over. It exchanged 30% of them with the french government for francs. The other 70% was transfered to USSR, not given away. From there this was also exchanged to receive foreign currencies. This foreign currency was just as good as gold when foreign trade was concerned. If you're looking for reasons on why the peseta lost its value there are quite many: the country was in a civil war so there was a hostile environment for capital, production must have taken a blow and correspondigly so did exports, there was an increased need for imports to support the war effort, the governement was rapidly increasing the amount of paper money in circulation. All these are more than enough to have a devaluation.

Also, Stalin was looting? How can you be sure Stalin was the evil mastermind behind anything? The comissar of people's finance at the time was found guilty of being in the rightist block and executed shortly after. Maybe it was him or generally the reactionaries in the soviet government who demanded payment for the help given and not Stalin? Do you have any secret files pointing to the monster with the moustache?

[bcbm]

another thread about spain?

[syndicat]

yes, countries were on the gold standard then. hence the value of the currency was effected by how much gold you had backing it. if the gold suddenly disappears from the country, you don't think that will affect the value of the currency in a gold-based monetary system?

and why send 70% of the gold all at once? That would mean they would have no control on what the Soviet government sent them. and it allowed the Soviet government a veto on use of arms, as I pointed out. You can say it wasn't just Stalin, and that's true in the sense it was a bureaucratic class system in USSR. so we can talk about the class interests of the bureaucratic ruling class in USSR.

[Ismail]

Except that he doesn't deal with the fact that transfer of the gold out of the country led to a 50% drop in the value of the Spanish currency. If Spain had kept the gold in its own territory, and sent gold only as needed for payments for weapons, this would not have happened. But then Stalin would not have as much control over who got the weapons or military policy, such as veto'ing weapons for the guerrilla army in Andalucia proposed to Negrin in 1937 by Juan Garcia Oliver, and agreed to by Negrin, but veto'd by the Soviets.Intelligitimate would have more information on this.


nice try except that the PCE's sectarian policy applied to new officers as well as old. many "professional" army officers...were ciphers. Beevor talks about this.They probably wanted to prevent types like Casado (or Arandas), similar to how the Soviet army purges were to prevent hundreds of Vlasovs.


but I'm not going to continue to engage in conversation with you when you abuse your moderator privileges by deleting my posts.I didn't delete your post. I said in the post I had accidentally edited (I thought was replying) that it was a mistake, but that luckily for us both your message had been saved in its entirety because I had quoted it in my reply. It is a possibility that an admin could restore your post. Besides, the post I did edit was fairly random when (had I wanted too) I could have easily "deleted" any other post, including your initial one.

The alternative was to have a post wherein it'd look like I had taken over your PC.

Nice try, though.

Besides, click on the "Last edited by..." thing at the bottom of posts to see earlier; unedited versions. Had I intended to "delete" your post then I would have been quite incompetent at doing so.