Philosophy at the Service of History

[N.Beltov]

There's an interesting piece in a recent issue of the publication of the Society for Socialist Studies. Prof. Jeffrey Noonan of the University of Windsor (Canada) has an article as follows:

NOONAN, J.. Philosophy at the Service of History: Marx and the need for critical philosophy today. Socialist Studies: The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies, North America, 5, nov. 2009. Available at: Date accessed: 16 Dec. 2009.

[I am unable to provide a link as I am a new poster. Maybe if I break it up into two parts? The article can be found at "WorldWideWeb dot socialiststudies.com" ...

Noonan outlines "a conception of philosophy as a uniquely practical discipline distinguished from empirical science by its unique capacity to synthesize values from the facts of life."

What values?

Values ... "symthesized out of those aspects of the facts of life which are meaningful because they are requirements of human life and free human activity."

Noonan makes use of some of Marx's early philosophical writings ( The E/P Manuscripts in particular) and underlines 3 key facts of life: human beings cannot live apart from on-poing interactions with the natural world; humans live in societies and must cooperatively produce their requirements (to live); consequently (from 1 and 2) "human freedom is at first a fact of the productive nature of human beings."

I like the way this author has tried to address the whole fact/value distinction that is trumpeted by (bourgeois) science as some sort of bedrock truth untouchable as Euclid's first four postulates.

Anyway, a good read and I'd be interested in any comments about how the author addresses this distinction noted above.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here's the PDF:

http://journals.sfu.ca/sss/index.php/sss/article/view/81/77

Or try here:

http://www.socialiststudies.com/index.php/sss

[N.Beltov]

Thanks for that. The link, I mean.

I don't understand this anti-dialectics. isn't that simply ripping the heart out of Marxism? Or is that the general idea?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, I fully accept Historical Materialism (and I am a Leninist, too!), I just reject the mystical gobbledygook we inhertited from Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up').

[N.Beltov]

Well, this is not really the topic of the thread ... but I'm game. If you "reject the mystical gobbledygook" of dialectics ... then how do you understand development and change? What is the role of contradictions, for example, in change and development? If you reject this central role of contradictions here, then what concepts do you use to explain development? Do you distinguish quantitative from qualitative change? There's a zillion questions there, more, but that would be good for a start.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Beltov:


then how do you understand development and change?

Well, as I said, Historical Materialism explains change quite well, and ordinary language contains countless words that allow us to depict it in almost unlimited detail, like these:


Vary, alter, adjust, amend, make, produce, revise, improve, deteriorate, edit, bend, straighten, weave, dig, plough, sow, twist, turn, tighten, fasten, loosen, relax, tense up, slacken, bind, wrap, pluck, rip, tear, mend, perforate, repair, damage, mutate, metamorphose, transmute, sharpen, modify, develop, expand, contract, constrict, constrain, widen, lock, unlock, swell, flow, differentiate, divide, partition, unite, amalgamate, connect, fast, slow, swift, rapid, hasty, heat up, melt, harden, cool down, flash, shine, glow, drip, cascade, drop, pick up, fade, darken, wind, unwind, meander, peel, scrape, graze, file, scour, dislodge, is, was, will be, will have been, had, will have had, went, go, going, gone, return, lost, age, flood, precipitate, crumble, disintegrate, erode, corrode, rust, flake, shatter, percolate, seep, tumble, mix, separate, cut, chop, crush, grind, shred, slice, dice, saw, sew, knit, spread, coalesce, congeal, fall, climb, rise, ascend, descend, slide, slip, roll, spin, revolve, oscillate, undulate, rotate, wave, conjure, quickly, slowly, instantaneously, suddenly, gradually, rapidly, hastily, inadvertently, accidentally, extremely, snap, chew, gnaw, digest, ingest, excrete, join, resign, part, sell, buy, acquire, lose, find, search, explore, cover, uncover, reveal, stretch, depress, compress, lift, put down, win, ripen, germinate, conceive, gestate, abort, die, rot, perish, grow, decay, fold, many, more, less, fewer, steady, steadily, jerkily, smoothly, awkwardly, quickly, very, extremely, exceedingly, intermittent, discontinuous, continuous, continual, push, pull, slide, jump, sit, stand, *run, chase, walk, swim, drown, immerse, plunge, break, split, charge, retreat, assault, squash, raze, demolish, dismantle, pulverise, disintegrate, dismember, replace, undo, reverse, repeal, enact, quash, throw, catch, hour, minute, second, instant, invent, innovate, rescind, destroy, annihilate, extirpate, boil, freeze, thaw, cook, liquefy, solidify, congeal, neutralise, flatten, crimple, evaporate, condense, dissolve, mollify, pacify, calm down, terminate, initiate, instigate, enrage, inflame, protest, challenge, expel, eject, remove, overthrow, expropriate, scatter, distribute, gather, assemble, defeat, strike, revolt, riot, march, demonstrate, rebel, campaign, agitate, organise...

In fact, as I have shown here:


Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77

dialectics itself cannot account for change -- or, alternatively, if dialectical materialism were true, change would be impossible.


What is the role of contradictions, for example, in change and development?

None at all, since I deny the examples usually given of 'contradictions' are in fact contradictions to begin with.

And, even if they were, why they can't help us understand change is detailed in the above links, or, more concisely, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/nti-dialectics-made-t103349/index.html


Do you distinguish quantitative from qualitative change?

Sure, but I deny dialectics can help here, too. You can find my reasons briefly outlined in the above link, or in extensive detail here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

[革命者]

I'd say it's more about the mind. Apparent contradictions need to be resolved. And if dialectics is a way of doing the analysis. I don't say formal logic is any better or worse: it's a tool for analysis.

I don't see your problem.

But this forum is a lot about the truths or wrongs of dialectics, and I haven't in the least kept up with all the discussion that have been going on. But I see philosophy as a way of making tools to do abstract analysis on reality. Hegel has given us such a tool for history, and Marx partly redefined it. But it's not reality itself, but how we try to understand it, right?

If you can analyse it in a DM-way, I say that's fine. If you use formal logic or any other tools for abstraction, that's fine either.

Or am I missing the point?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ae:


Apparent contradictions need to be resolved. And if dialectics is a way of doing the analysis. I don't say formal logic is any better or worse: it's a tool for analysis.

In fact, just one of the problems facing dalectical logic is that not only can it not cope with change, if it were true, change could not happen. I have demonstrated that here:


Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77

So, if dialectical logic is just a method, then it is one of the most useless the human mind has ever dreamt up.

[N.Beltov]

We're going to have to agree to disagree, Rosa.

ETA: How then to theorize change? Without change generated by internal contradictions, then one is left with some mechanical notion of external change. That's just wrong. Why do societies change? Due to invasion? Great leaders who see and know all? God? Not likely. And what about people? Why do people change? You see, the idea of development taking place via internal contradictions - really very much at the heart of a dialectical approach - cannot be rejected without rejecting change itself.

So go ahead and throw dialectics and all the categories and terms and concepts out the window. However, whatever position you're defending ... it isn't Marxism. It's something else. Furthermore, if all you can do is to make reference to some link, and cannot muster your own short arguments, then don't bother me or waste my time. I've got better things to do.

Have a nice day.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

N Beltov:


ETA: How then to theorize change? Without change generated by internal contradictions, then one is left with some mechanical notion of external change. That's just wrong. Why do societies change? Due to invasion? Great leaders who see and know all? God? Not likely. And what about people? Why do people change? You see, the idea of development taking place via internal contradictions - really very much at the heart of a dialectical approach - cannot be rejected without rejecting change itself.

Well, this is a series of complex questions; but I have shown that this entire way of looking at change is misguided, and cannot work, In fact, if it were true, change would be impossible.


So go ahead and throw dialectics and all the categories and terms and concepts out the window. However, whatever position you're defending ... it isn't Marxism. It's something else. Furthermore, if all you can do is to make reference to some link, and cannot muster your own short arguments, then don't bother me or waste my time. I've got better things to do.

Ok, here is the argument; quotations first:


Dialecticians are unclear whether objects and processes change (1) because of a 'struggle' between their internal opposites, or whether they (2) change into these opposites as a result of that "struggle", or indeed whether they (3) also produce these opposites while they change --, or they do so as a result of that change.

Here are a few quotations from a wide selection of theorists to that effect:


"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]

"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... Mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891), p.414.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid., pp.311-18.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.

"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.

"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]

Bold emphases added.

References and links can be found at my site, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

Apologies for the link, but this post is long enough as it is.

In my next post I will add my criticism of this theory.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, here it is:

As we are about to see, this idea -- that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites" (etc.), which cause change -- presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics (quoted above).

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/ist; NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]

To see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites" O* and O**, and it thus changes as a result.

[The same problems arise if these are viewed as 'external' contradictions.]

But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory, O* could not change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.

Hence, it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it is now said to be what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!

So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (interpreting O** now as not-O*), how can O* possibly change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this hermetic hole. Either:

(1) O* 'changes' into not-O*, meaning there would now be two not-O*s where once there was one (unless, of course, one of these not-O*s just vanishes into thin air -- see below); or:

(2) O* does not change, or it disappears. Plainly, O* cannot change into what already exists -- that is, O* cannot change into its opposite, not-O* without there being two of them (see above). But even then, one of these will not be not-O* just a copy of it. In that case, O* either disappears, does not change at all, or changes into something else; or:

(3) Not-O* itself disappears to allow a new (but copy) not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if is has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict the new not-O* that afflicted the old. If it exists in order to allow O* to change, then we are back where we were to begin with.

Anyway, as should seem obvious, among other things already mentioned, alternative (2) plainly means that O* does not in fact change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- O* -- according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can either be destroyed or created from nowhere!

Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. This means that the dialectical process will grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence to start things up again.

But what could possibly engineer that?

Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too. [Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising either his error or the serious problems this creates.]

But, not-O* cannot have come from O* itself, since O* can only change because of the operation of not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems.

[However, on the NON, see below.]

Now, it could be objected that all this seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the above argument is entirely misguided.

Fortunately, repairs are easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O**, (the latter once again interpreted as not-O*) and it thus develops as a result.

The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing dialectical union of O* and not-O*, and O* 'develops' into not-O* as a result, how is it possible for O* to change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Of course, it could be argued that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' into O*.

[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]

But, if this were so, while it was happening these two would no longer be 'opposites' of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more.

But, if we ignore that 'difficulty' for now, and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O* while not-O* 'developed' into O*, and such process were governed by the obscure term "sublation", this alternative will still not work (as we are about to see).

Indeed, developing this option further before it is demolished, it could be argued that Engels had himself anticipated the above objections when he said:


"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976), pp.172-73.]

"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....

"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81.]

Engels's argument seems to be that "dialectical negation" is not the same as ordinary negation in that it is not simple destruction. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, we have already seen here [in the original article, this 'here' links to another argument at my site, as do several of the other 'here's dotted around this post], that Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect, and we will also see below [again, this 'below' refers to a later section of the essay from which this was extracted] that this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as did Engels).

Well, despite all this, is it the case that the above comments neutralise the argument presented in this part of this post? Is the argument here guilty of the following:


"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]

To answer this, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and not-O*, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary, but not into not-O* -- incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.

Putting this minor quibble to one side, too, on this 'revised' view, let us suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "O*(1)" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').

If so, then O*(1) must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*(1) in existence to make it develop any further.

[Recall that on this 'theory', everything (and that must include O*(1)) changes because of a 'struggle' with its opposite.]

So, there must be a not-O*(1) to make O*(1) change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt O*(1) from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that O*(1) changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events contained in the DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process changes because of the operation of opposites (and O*(1) is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.

[This would also mean that the second 'Law' (discussed here) was not a 'law' either, just like the first.]

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to O*(1)) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change, and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.

Ignoring this, too, even if O*(1) were to change into not-O*(1) (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems simply reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*(1) already existed to make it happen! But not-O*(1) cannot already exist, for O*(1) has not changed into it yet!

Once more, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O* to produce not-O* is not ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.

In that case, let us say that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite not-O*(s), but if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Gospels, not-O*(s) must already exist! If so, and yet again, O* cannot turn into not-O*(s), for it already exists! On the other hand, if not-O*(s) does not already exist, then O* cannot change, for O* can only change if it struggles with what it changes into, i.e., not-O*(s).

Once more we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.

It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For example, it might be the case that John is a boy, but in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man. Now, the fact that other individuals are already men, does not stop John changing into a man (his opposite), as the above argues. So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists.

Or so it could be claimed.

But, this theory tells us that things/processes change because of a struggle with their opposites, and with what they become. Are we now to assume that John has to struggle with all the individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself (if we now treat all these other men as John's opposites)? And are we to suppose that John struggles with what he is to become, even before it exists? If not, then the above response is beside the point. And, in view of the fact that John must turn into his opposite, does that mean he has to turn into these other men, or even into one of them? But he must do so if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed.

Anyway, according to the DM-worthies quoted above, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. Are we now really supposed to believe that "John is a man" is struggling with "John is a boy" -- or that manhood is struggling with boyhood?

Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, in that case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the present. [Of course, adolescence cannot struggle with anything, since it is an abstraction.] But, John-as-a-man does not yet exist, and so 'he' cannot struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-man does exist, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy cannot change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!

To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that opposite cannot now exist otherwise John would not need to become him!

Looking at this more concretely, in ten or fifteen years time, John will not become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "Man-J". But, once again, Man-J must exist now or John cannot change into him (if the DM-worthies quoted earlier are to be believed), for John can only become a man if he is locked in struggle with his own opposite, Man-J. But, if that is so, John cannot become Man-J since Man-J already exists!

[This, of course, is simply a more concrete version of the argument outlined above.]

Consider another hackneyed example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? This must be so if the Dialectical Saints are to be believed.

Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!

In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!

In fact, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it, we shall call it "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into "S1". But, if the DM-Worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 could not change into it! Again, if that is so, where does S1 disappear to if W1 changes into it?

In fact, according to the Dialectical Magi, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1 at the same time as W1 is turning into S1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this Superscientific 'theory', steam must be turning back into the water you are boiling, and it must do so at the same rate!

One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.

This must be so, otherwise when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists, or W1 could not change into it -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be one! Matter created from nowhere!

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other alleged examples of DM-change).

It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas; so the dialectical classicists are correct. However, if we take them at their word, then that gas must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change. But that gas does not yet exist; in which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true. But even if it did, it is heat that causes the change not the gas! However we try and slice it, this 'theory' is totally useless -- that is, what little sense can be made of it.

This, of course, does not deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.

Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

[N.Beltov]

Sorry to have wasted your time. All that seems rather incoherent to me; both the critique and the lengthy set of quotations. You would do better, if you were serious, to take a dialectics textbook, say one from the old Soviet regime or something like that, and critique it from beginning to end. Ripping quotes out of context is only a trick. And i would just add that you'd probably get money for such a project from funders of right wing philosophy. This last point should get you to think, a little, about the merit of the ideas you're defending.

I also notice that you've exchanged one question for another. I mean you've replaced, in at least a few spots, the usefulness of dialectics as a doctrine about change to the uselessness of dialectics to "create" change. I've seen this done by more right wing authors in other books.

Anyway, think about my idea of trying to find a text on dialectics and systematically taking it apart. You'd get more respect for that. Have a good one.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

N Beltov:


All that seems rather incoherent to me; both the critique and the lengthy set of quotations. You would do better, if you were serious, to take a dialectics textbook, say one from the old Soviet regime or something like that, and critique it from beginning to end. Ripping quotes out of context is only a trick. And i would just add that you'd probably get money for such a project from funders of right wing philosophy. This last point should get you to think, a little, about the merit of the ideas you're defending.

Nowhere near as incoherent as Hegel's 'Logic' and most books on this theory.

And what 'context' can make this defective theory work? In what way can every object and process in the existence (according to Lenin) both struggle with and change into its opposite? If that opposite already exists in order for an object or process to struggle with, then how can that object or process change into it? On the other hand, if that opposite does not already exist, how can an object or process struggle with it?

Hence, if true, dialectical materialism woud make change impossible. It certainly can't explain it.

As to the books you mention, I have read and studied the lot. Take a look at the reading list I complied for the Dialectical Materialism Group:


My sincere and comradely thanks to Rosa Lichtenstein (ironic, no?) for compiling the this list. I originally was going to organize it into the various schools of thought each writing comes from, but right now I don't have the patience. Rosa has put asterisks after the ones she considers the best resources, and more asterisks means that they are more useful.

Afanasyev, V. (1968), Marxist Philosophy (Progress Publishers, 3rd ed.).

Baghavan, R. (1987), An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Marxism (Socialist Platform).

Bakhurst, D. (1991), Consciousness And Revolution In Soviet Philosophy. From The Bolsheviks To Evald Ilyenkov (Cambridge University Press).

Binns, P. (1982), "What Are The Tasks Of Marxism In Philosophy?", International Socialism 17, pp.92-128.

Bukharin, N. (1925), Historical Materialism (George Allen & Unwin).

--------, (2005), Philosophical Arabesques (Monthly Review Press).*****

Callinicos, A. (1983), "Marxism And Philosophy: A Reply To Peter Binns", International Socialism 19, pp.113-42.

--------, (1998), "The Secret Of The Dialectic", International Socialism 78, pp.93-103.

--------, (2006), The Resources Of Critique (Polity Press).

Cameron, N. (1995), Dialectical Materialism And Modern Science (International Publishers).

Chan, A. (2003), Chinese Marxism (Continuum Books).

Cornforth, M. (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5th ed.).**

Engels, F. (1888), Ludwig Feuerbach And The End Of Classical German Philosophy, reprinted in Marx and Engels (1968), pp.584-622.

--------, (1892), Socialism: Utopian And Scientific, in Marx and Engels (1968), pp 375-428.

--------, (1954), Dialectics Of Nature (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1976), Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Press).

Gasper, P. (1998), "Bookwatch: Marxism And Science", International Socialism 79, pp.137-71.

Graham, L. (1971), Science And Philosophy In The Soviet Union (Allen Lane).

--------, (1987), Science, Philosophy, And Human Behaviour In The Soviet Union (Columbia University Press).

--------, (1993), Science In Russia And The Soviet Union: A Short History (Cambridge University Press).

Gollobin, I. (1986), Dialectical Materialism. Its Laws, Categories And Practice (Petras Press).***

Guest, D. (1963), Lectures On Marxist Philosophy (Lawrence & Wishart).

Harman, C. (1983), "Philosophy And Revolution", International Socialism 21, pp.58-87.

Hirsch, R. (2004), "Logic And Dialectics", Cultural Logic 7.***

Hunt, I. (1993), Analytical And Dialectical Marxism (Ashgate Press).****

Ilyenkov, E. (1977), The Dialectics Of The Abstract And The Concrete In Marx's Capital (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1982b), Leninist Dialectics And The Metaphysics Of Positivism (New Park).

Jackson, T. (1936), Dialectics (Lawrence & Wishart).***

James, C. (1980), Notes On Dialectics (Allison & Busby).

Jones, B. "Marxism in a Single Volume". International Socialist Review 59, May/June 2008.

Joravsky, D. (1961), Soviet Marxism And Natural Science 1917-1932 (Routledge).

Kharin, Y. (1981), Fundamentals Of Dialectics (Progress Publishers).

Knight, N. (2005), Marxist Philosophy In China: From Qu Qiubai To Mao Zedong, 1923-1945 (Springer).

Konstantinov, F., et al. (1974), The Fundamentals Of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (Progress Publishers, 2nd ed.).

Kosok, M. (1976), "The Formalisation Of Hegel's Dialectical Logic", reprinted in MacIntyre (1976), pp.237-87.

Krementsov, N. (1997), Stalinist Science (Princeton University Press).

Kuusinen, O. (1961) (ed.), Fundamentals Of Marxism-Leninism (Lawrence & Wishart).**

Lawler, J. (1982), "Hegel On Logical And Dialectical Contradictions, And Misinterpretations From Bertrand Russell To Lucio Colletti", in Marquit, Moran, and Truitt (1982), pp.11-44.*****

Lefebvre, H. (1968), Dialectical Materialism (Jonathan Cape).**

Lenin, V. (1921), One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1961), Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works, Volume 38 (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1972), Materialism And Empirio-Criticism (Foreign Languages Press).

Levins, R., and Lewontin, R. (1985), The Dialectical Biologist (Harvard University Press).**

--------, (2007), Biology Under The Influence. Dialectical Essays On The Coevolution Of Nature And Society (Monthly Review Press).**

MacIntyre, A. (1976) (ed.), Hegel: A Collection Of Critical Essays (University of Notre Dame Press).

Mao Tse-Tung, (1937), On Contradiction, in Mao (1964), pp.311-47.

--------, (1964), Selected Works Volume One (Foreign Languages Press).

Marquit, E., Moran, P., and Truitt, W. (1982), Dialectical Contradictions And Contemporary Marxist Discussions. Studies in Marxism, Volume 10 (Marxist Educational Press).

Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1968), Selected Works in One Volume (Lawrence & Wishart).

McGarr, P. (1994), "Engels And Natural Science", International Socialism 65, pp.143-76.

Meissner, W. (1990), Philosophy And Politics In China: The Controversy Over Dialectical Materialism In The 1930s (Hurst & Company).

Norman, R., and Sayers, S. (1980), Hegel, Marx And Dialectic: A Debate (Harvester Press).

Novack, G. (1964) Is Nature Dialectical?

--------, (1965), The Origins Of Materialism (Pathfinder Press).

--------, (1971), An Introduction To The Logic Of Marxism (Pathfinder Press, 5th ed.).***

Ollman, B. (2003), The Dance Of The Dialectic: Steps In Marx's Method (University of Illinois Press).**

Plekhanov, G. (1908), Fundamental Problems Of Marxism (Lawrence & Wishart).

--------, (1956), The Development Of The Monist View Of History (Progress Publishers).

Rees, J. (1989), "The Algebra Of Revolution", International Socialism 43, pp.173-214.

--------, (1990), "Trotsky And The Dialectic Of History", International Socialism 47, pp.113-35.

--------, (1994), "Engels' Marxism", International Socialism 65, pp.47-82.

--------, (1998), The Algebra Of Revolution (Routledge).***

Sayers, S. (1980a), "On The Marxist Dialectic", in Norman and Sayers (1980), pp.1-24.

--------, (1980b), "Dualism, Materialism And Dialectics", in Norman and Sayers (1980), pp.67-143.

Sheehan, H. (1993), Marxism And The Philosophy Of Science (Humanities Press).**

Somerville, J. (1946), Soviet Philosophy (Philosophical Library).

--------, (1967), The Philosophy Of Marxism (Random House). Part of this is available here:

http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/Somerville(1967).htm

Sheptulin, A. (1978), Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (Progress Publishers).

Spirkin, A. (1983), Dialectical Materialism (Progress Publishers).**

Stalin, J. (1976a), Problems Of Leninism (Foreign Languages Press).

-------- (1976b), Dialectical And Historical Materialism , in Stalin (1976a), pp.835-73.

Tian, C. (2005), Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing To Marxism (Lexington Books).

Thalheimer, A. (1936), Introduction To Dialectical Materialism, the Marxist World-View (Covici Friede Publishers).****

Trotsky, L. (1971), In Defense Of Marxism (New Park Publications).

--------, (1973), Problems Of Everyday Life (Monad Press).

--------, (1986), Notebooks, 1933-35 (Columbia University Press).

Vucinich, A. (1980), "Soviet Physicists And Philosophers In The 1930s: Dynamics Of A Conflict", Isis 71, pp.236-50.

--------, (2001), Einstein And Soviet Ideology (Stanford University Press).

Wetter, G. (1958), Dialectical Materialism (Routledge).**

White, J. (1996), Karl Marx And The Intellectual Origins Of Dialectical Materialism (Macmillan).***

Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995), Reason In Revolt: Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications, 2nd ed. 2007).**

Yurkovets, I. (1984), The Philosophy Of Dialectical Materialism (Progress Publishers).

http://www.revleft.com/vb/group.php?do=discuss&group=&discussionid=1172

This a highly shortened list of the books and articles I have studied.

And no 'right winger' would fund my work since the whole point of it is to make Historical Materialism scientific by removinhg the mystical gobbledygook we inherited from Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up'); no right winger would support that. Nor would I seek or accept any such funding, even if it were available.


I also notice that you've exchanged one question for another. I mean you've replaced, in at least a few spots, the usefulness of dialectics as a doctrine about change to the uselessness of dialectics to "create" change. I've seen this done by more right wing authors in other books.

Nowhere do I mention dialectics' ability to 'create change', so I do not know where that idea has come from.


Anyway, think about my idea of trying to find a text on dialectics and systematically taking it apart. You'd get more respect for that. Have a good one.

I have been studying this theory for longer than most RevLefters have been alive, and at my site I do indeed take such books apart.

In fact, they are so repetitive that to take one apart is to take the lot apart.

[Calmwinds]

I don't understand why people hold onto dialectical materialism so dearly. It is not like it is the grand centerpiece of marxist theory, and much of what is good in marxism is still intact even if you do not accept it. What use is it at all? It has no use practically and cannot help you understand[Not even close to a science], or overthrow anything that is hurting you, just another piece of useless metaphysics.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^ Here is why (I posted this in Learning a few months ago in answer to the question "Why is Dialectical Materialism a world-view -- but I also explain why they cling on to it like drunks hold onto lamposts):


There are two interconnected reasons, I think.

1) The founders of this quasi-religion weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated to believe there was this hidden world that governed everything (even if they later abandoned this view), looked for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history had predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for them, which meant they were their 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand, since the masses were too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why DM is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact peachy, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts.

In that case:

Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves.