Quantum vs materialism

[ComradeMan]

Do the discoveries of the later 20th century, especially in the area of quantum physics demolish the whole basis of any form of materialism as we have had up to now?

Materialism is a radically empirical philosophy that is based in the conviction that all phenomena originate from a physical cause and can be understood and explained through natural science. According to materialism, matter is the total explanation for space, nature, man, society, history and every other aspect of existence. Materialism does not acknowledge any alleged phenomenon that cannot be perceived by the five senses such as the supernatural, God, etc.

So does not the presence of anti-matter and anti-particles and the mysterious "dark" matter than cannot be detected as such but only inferred call into question all pre-Quantum theories of materialism?

Probabilism demolishes determinism- we only can observe non-determistic phenomena governed by probabilities in spite of the "Multiverse" being deemed deterministic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, since the materialism to which we subscribe is Historical Materialism, upon which quantum mechanics has no impact.

[Schrödinger's Cat]

Refer to my username as a reason to not confuse quantum mechanics with material physics. :D As a side note: most RevLeft users are not hard determinists, so this point is moot for them. Either way, it still appears that the visible consequences of our minds derive from elemental, electrical, and chemical levels, not sub-atomic interactions, and even if the bizarre state of electrons does impact our behavior, who is to say our collective consciousness has control over this?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^GC: why the Christian/Cartesian assumption that we have 'minds'?

[ComradeMan]

^^^GC: why the Christian/Cartesian assumption that we have 'minds'?

Cogito ergo sum

[ComradeMan]

Refer to my username as a reason to not confuse quantum mechanics with material physics. :D As a side note: most RevLeft users are not hard determinists, so this point is moot for them. Either way, it still appears that the visible consequences of our minds derive from elemental, electrical, and chemical levels, not sub-atomic interactions, and even if the bizarre state of electrons does impact our behavior, who is to say our collective consciousness has control over this?

But what about the quantum consciousness theory? Or are you more into holonomics?:D

The effect of quantum mechanics on logical thinking is that of the notions of counter-intuitive deductions is it not?

[ZeroNowhere]

Caesar si viveret, ad remum dareris.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ComradeMan:


Cogito ergo sum

An invalid argument, at best.

[ComradeMan]

Caesar si viveret, ad remum dareris.


aaaaah.... splash!:D

[syndicat]

We use the word "mind" to refer to people's psychological abilities and their exercise of these. This doesn't presuppose any particular theory as to the nature or basis of those abilities. If we assume that believing, thinking, perceiving are biological traits, serve biological functions...such as the function of belief to mediate between perceptual interactions and behavior...then they will have a relation to our ancestors, as biological function is defined relationally in biology. E.g. eyes serve the function of sight because the adaptive advantage of sight in your ancestors, and the structural basis of sight in eyes, optic nerve etc, explains why you have eyes. Roughly. So the things we call "beliefs" might be some sort of internal brain state of some kind, that serves the relevant biological function. Whatever. The point is we need not assume the existence of anything not countenanced in physics, chemistry, biology, etc.

[AnthArmo]

Quantam Physics doesn't "disprove" Materialism or Determinism. Most explanations in Quantam Physics pertaining to "Random" events are just copouts for lack of information. Case in point, Shrodinger's Cat. The cat isn't both alive and dead, its one or the other, we just don't know which because we don't have enough information.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


We use the word "mind" to refer to people's psychological abilities and their exercise of these. This doesn't presuppose any particular theory as to the nature or basis of those abilities. If we assume that believing, thinking, perceiving are biological traits, serve biological functions...such as the function of belief to mediate between perceptual interactions and behavior...then they will have a relation to our ancestors, as biological function is defined relationally in biology. E.g. eyes serve the function of sight because the adaptive advantage of sight in your ancestors, and the structural basis of sight in eyes, optic nerve etc, explains why you have eyes. Roughly. So the things we call "beliefs" might be some sort of internal brain state of some kind, that serves the relevant biological function. Whatever. The point is we need not assume the existence of anything not countenanced in physics, chemistry, biology, etc.

Well, of course, none of these words are used this way in ordinary language, so this non-solution does not address belief, thinking or perceiving, but 'belief', 'thinking' and 'perceiving', leaving belief, thinking and perceiving untouched.

And the word 'mind', in its non-philosophical sense, appears in langauge in many ways, none of which imply what post-Cartesian philosophy would have us believe -- the mystical and religious origin of which exposed here:


"Western conceptions of mind began in religion before moving first to philosophy, and then to science. However, for two reasons psychologists have underestimated the influence of religious ideas of the soul -- the ψυχή (psychē -- soul, RL) of our science -- on conceptions of mind and self. First, psychology is an aggressively secular enterprise and psychologists like to think that they put religion behind them when they assume their role as scientists. A more subtle reason concerns the dominance of historical scholarship by Christian belief. When we as psychologists read about past thinkers such as Plato and Descartes, not only do we look at them as protopsychologists, we see them through the eyes of historians and classicists who until recently worked within a quietly but unequivocally held Christian framework. That framework rarely intrudes explicitly, but it filters out the rough splinters, odd conceptions, and obscure but vital disputes concerning mind and soul held from Greek times through to at least Descartes. Thus we psychologists inherit a conception of the mind subtly shaped by forces of which we know little, drain it of its specifically supernatural content (e.g., survival of bodily death), and fancy that what remains is somehow natural and therefore a proper object of science....

"Although there are differences in detail, religions around the world have a remarkably concordant picture of the mind, positing the existence of two immaterial souls for two distinct reasons.... The first, universal reason is to explain the difference between living and nonliving things. The second, less universal reason is to explain human personality....

"Greek religion and the concept of ψυχή underwent a profound change in the later fifth century BCE.... Traditional Greek religious thought had insisted on a great gulf between the human and divine worlds, downplaying the idea of personal immortality. However, in the wake of the Peloponnesian War, continuity between the human and divine worlds was the theme of various new cults, often imported from the non-Greek east. In their practices these new religions induced in worshippers ecstatic states through which they might for a time join the gods, perhaps even briefly becoming the god of their veneration. The ψυχή became a personal, immortal soul, taking after death its rightful place in the divine world of the gods. Plato was influenced by these new teachings, but steered them in a less ecstatic, more philosophical and cognitive direction.... For Plato, the proper object of the soul's attention was indeed something divine, but he taught that instead of seeking salvation through ecstatic communion with the gods, the soul should seek salvation through philosophical pursuit of eternal, transcendental Truth. In Plato's hands, the mind became identified with reason, the ability to formulate and know the universal Truths underwritten by the heavenly Forms." [Leahy (2005), pp.37-39.]

Leahy, T. (2005), 'Mind As A Scientific Object: A Historical-Philosophical Exploration', in Erneling and Johnson (2005), pp.35-78.

Erneling, C., and Johnson, D. (2005) (eds.), The Mind As A Scientific Object. Between Brain And Culture (Oxford University Press).

[cska]

This is why I subscribe to a combination of the scientific principle and occham's razor. All I am concerned with is increasing my understanding so I can make reliable predictions about the world. So, reality for me is any useful inference I can make from what I have observed. I can then simplify my inferences using occham's razor to make predictions more easily. For example, just because I see evidence of dark matter doesn't mean it exists or it doesn't exist. I don't care about existence. I just say that it is easier to construct this mathematical entity called dark matter when making predictions.

[syndicat]

Well, of course, none of these words are used this way in ordinary language, so this non-solution does not address belief, thinking or perceiving, but 'belief', 'thinking' and 'perceiving', leaving belief, thinking and perceiving untouched.


I guess I don't know what you're saying. "Belief", "thinking", "perceiving" refer to states that people have. If the words didn't refer to anything, they would be pretty useless for purposes of descriptive communication, or explaining behavior.

I didn't say that being a biological trait is part of what people ordinarily convey when they use those words. People could refer to perception, belief and thinking before the development of evolutionary biology. I said merely that what those words refer to are biological traits. And being biological traits, they are subject to explanations of evolutionary biology. Fairly straightforward, I think.

As to your distinction between "philosophical" and "non-philosophical" uses of "mind", well, I know you have your own particular views about distinctions of that sort, but I wasn't speculating on any such thing. I was just concerned with what people ordinarily refer to when they talk about someone's "mind", and activities like perceiving and thinking or states like belief and desire.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


I guess I don't know what you're saying. "Belief", "thinking", "perceiving" refer to states that people have. If the words didn't refer to anything, they would be pretty useless for purposes of descriptive communication.

These words are not referring expressions (proper names and definite descriptions), but even if they were, they can't refer to the things you say or only those who knew advanced neurophysiology would be able to understand them, and all communication would cease.


I didn't say that being a biological trait is part of what people ordinarily convey when they use those words. People could refer to perception, belief and thinking before the development of evolutionary biology. I said merely that what those words refer to are biological traits. And being biological traits, they are subject to explanations of evolutionary biology. Fairly straightforward, I think.

But this is a substantial theory about what people 'really' mean; if so we are going to need more than your say so in support.


As to your distinction between "philosophical" and "non-philosophical" uses of "mind", well, I know you have your own particular views about distinctions of that sort, but I wasn't speculating on any such thing. I was just concerned with what people ordinarily refer to when they talk about someone's "mind", and activities like perceiving and thinking or states like belief and desire.

But, most uses of the word 'mind' do not refer to any such things (a list can be provided on request), and those that allegedly do are plainly a left-over from mystical Christianity, and as such are of no interest to science.

[syndicat]

These words are not referring expressions (proper names and definite descriptions), but even if they were, they can't refer to the things you say or only those who knew advanced neurophysiology would be able to understand them, and all communication would cease.

No, that's like saying that water can't be H20 because if it were, people would have to know that to refer to water. It's like saying kids can't be referring to cats when they use "cat" because they don't know that cats are a lineage of copies related by the DNA copying process, even tho that is what they are, or at least, what biologists say they are.

To refer to something, or use phrases to track things in reality, you only need to have some way of identifying those things. Even if someone doesn't know that perceptions or thoughts are brain processes, they can still refer to them, track their occurrence, if they have some way to pick them out or identify when they are occurring.

I know you have your own philosophical theory (tho you would say it's not a philosophical theory) that verb phrases can't be referring expressions. But I think we use such expressions to track things in the world...processes, actions, states. I don't think we can explain why people use such expressions without making this assumption, tho to argue that would mean going into a long conversation about language, in which I would have to bring in concepts from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology and sociology.

me:


I didn't say that being a biological trait is part of what people ordinarily convey when they use those words. People could refer to perception, belief and thinking before the development of evolutionary biology. I said merely that what those words refer to are biological traits. And being biological traits, they are subject to explanations of evolutionary biology. Fairly straightforward, I think.


But this is a substantial theory about what people 'really' mean; if so we are going to need more than your say so in support.


No. I'm not talking about "what people really mean." "Mean" is an intentional verb. I have my own views about how words get linked to things in the world we're talking about, but I wasn't talking about those views.

It seems that people use the words "perceiving", "thinking" to refer to processes, and "belief" and "desire" to refer to states of people.
We posit beliefs and desires in people to explain their behavior. The belief/desire psychology is characteristically human. I know you don't like hypotheses...but I can't see how we can get along without them.

So beliefs seem to be some kind of internal state that people sometimes acquire from things they see or hear, such as
things they read, and having beliefs can account for why people do certain things. So beliefs seem to be some sort of internal state that mediates between perception and behavior. This says nothing about whether they are brain states or whatever.
Now in fact I think they are brain states, but one doesn't have to know that to be able to attribute beliefs to people or
to oneself. To talk about beliefs, you just have to have some way of attributing beliefs to people.

For example, Joe says "I think that P." So you can say, "Joe believes that P." So that's one way of identifying a belief state in someone.

Now in fact I believe that being a belief is a relational sort of condition where it means not only mediating
between perception and action, but also that playing this role is due to the fact that it was adaptive for our
ancestors to have these internal states playing this sort of role, the role that beliefs play, as I think belief is
a biological trait that has an evolutionary explanation. But a person can talk about beliefs without thinking that
this is what the belief faculty is. It's a particular thesis in evolutionary psychology, and it may be true, but even if it is, people
don't have to be familiar with it to talk about beliefs.

In regard to the word "mind" my dictionary lists the following usages:

Intellect or intelligence.
Consciousness that originates in the brain and directs mental and physical behavior.
Memory or recollection.
Conscious thoughts.
Attention.
Mental or emtional sanity (as in "he's out of his mind")
Opinions.

This refers to a collection of abilities and processes in people.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


No, that's like saying that water can't be H20 because if it were, people would have to know that to refer to water. It's like saying kids can't be referring to cats when they use "cat" because they don't know that cats are a lineage of copies related by the DNA copying process, even tho that is what they are, or at least, what biologists say they are.

Human beings were able to talk about water long before scientists told us it was H20, and we will still do so even if they decide they are wrong, as they almost always are.

Moreover, we describe Deuterium as water, even though it isn't H20, just as we do with polluted or muddy rivers and lakes, even though much of either isn't H20.

And, of course, because of hydrogen bonding, pure water isn't even H20!

Same with cats.


To refer to something, or use phrases to track things in reality, you only need to have some way of identifying those things. Even if someone doesn't know that perceptions or thoughts are brain processes, they can still refer to them, track their occurrence, if they have some way to pick them out or identify when they are occurring.

This has yet to be demonstrated; certainly we will need more than this a priori psychology to establish the point.


It seems that people use the words "perceiving", "thinking" to refer to processes, and "belief" and "desire" to refer to states of people.
We posit beliefs and desires in people to explain their behavior. The belief/desire psychology is characteristically human. I know you don't like hypotheses...but I can't see how we can get along without them.

"Seems"! Is that the best you can do?

And, why do you say I don't 'like hypotheses'? Where did you get that idea from? They are fine in the sciences (and in detective work); but not here.

Moreover, we do not 'posit' things. You might, but then you have read too much scientistic philosophy for your own good.


No. I'm not talking about "what people really mean." "Mean" is an intentional verb. I have my own views about how words get linked to things in the world we're talking about, but I wasn't talking about those views.

But you are talking about what people 'really mean', otherwise your argument about water would not be apposite.


I know you have your own philosophical theory (tho you would say it's not a philosophical theory)

Correct, I don't.


that verb phrases can't be referring expressions. But I think we use such expressions to track things in the world...processes, actions, states. I don't think we can explain why people use such expressions without making this assumption, tho to argue that would mean going into a long conversation about language, in which I would have to bring in concepts from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology and sociology.

If verb phrases were referring expressions, that would turn them into noun phrases, thus destroying the unity of the proposition, transforming indicative sentences into lists.


So beliefs seem to be some kind of internal state that people sometimes acquire from things they see or hear, such as
things they read, and having beliefs can account for why people do certain things. So beliefs seem to be some sort of internal state that mediates between perception and behavior. This says nothing about whether they are brain states or whatever.
Now in fact I think they are brain states, but one doesn't have to know that to be able to attribute beliefs to people or
to oneself. To talk about beliefs, you just have to have some way of attributing beliefs to people.

More of the "seems"!

And we manage to attribute beliefs to people without this theory (which has yet to be proven).


In regard to the word "mind" my dictionary lists the following usages:

Intellect or intelligence.
Consciousness that originates in the brain and directs mental and physical behavior.
Memory or recollection.
Conscious thoughts.
Attention.
Mental or emotional sanity (as in "he's out of his mind")
Opinions.

This refers to a collection of abilities and processes in people.

You, of all people, should know that dictionaries are repositories of ideology as much as anything else; in this case, the dictionary you used clearly reflects Christian and post-Cartesian ideas about 'the mind' which have dominated 'western' thought for centuries, as that quote I added earlier indicated it would.

Look up words like "property", "king" or "queen". Full of ideology.

Or 'wage':



money paid to an employee for work done, and usually figured on an hourly, daily, or piecework basis


Are you going to accept that as a fair, non-ideological definition of what workers are paid?

[syndicat]

me:


No, that's like saying that water can't be H20 because if it were, people would have to know that to refer to water. It's like saying kids can't be referring to cats when they use "cat" because they don't know that cats are a lineage of copies related by the DNA copying process, even tho that is what they are, or at least, what biologists say they are.

rosa:


Human beings were able to talk about water long before scientists told us it was H20, and we will still do so even if they decide they are wrong, as they almost always are.

Yes, quite so. Thanks for agreeing with me.

me:

To refer to something, or use phrases to track things in reality, you only need to have some way of identifying those things. Even if someone doesn't know that perceptions or thoughts are brain processes, they can still refer to them, track their occurrence, if they have some way to pick them out or identify when they are occurring.



This has yet to be demonstrated; certainly we will need more than this a priori psychology to establish the point.


It's not apriori. As I said, if we were to have a conversation about language, it would be a long one in which I would have to refer to evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology and sociology to defend my conclusions. Here I am simply stating my viewpoint. And I don't think that a defense of a viewpoint on such a topic is going to be a "demonstration"...at least not as this term has been used historically, to refer to cogent deductive arguments...an apriori method of argument.

me:

It seems that people use the words "perceiving", "thinking" to refer to processes, and "belief" and "desire" to refer to states of people. We posit beliefs and desires in people to explain their behavior. The belief/desire psychology is characteristically human. I know you don't like hypotheses...but I can't see how we can get along without them.



[QUOTE]
And, why do you say I don't 'like hypotheses'? Where did you get that idea from? They are fine in the sciences (and in
detective work); but not here.

In the W. thread you seemed to reject all theories. A hypothesis is a theory.

Types of reasoning don't become and then cease to be cogent depending upon the particular club who are using it. You don't
define what "the sciences" are. I think the view you imply here is elitist. It denogrates knowledge of working class people.

When I worked in computer engineering departments, the engineers often had only a theoretical knowledge about what would actually happen in the real world when their products were put to use. That's because they came straight out of college to work in the industry. Their education was science-based and thus theoretical. Often I found in practice that the people who had to work with and repair their products had much more practical expertise. For example, they had more accurate predictions about what the equipment or software would do in various complex environments. But your arbitrary chopping of the human race into the SCIENTISTs (all bow down) and the rest of the species is just not defensible.

Now, in this particular case, however, the view concerning language that I was simply stating, not trying to provide a case for in detail, which could take a book, does have its origin in scientific results and theory. It wasn't "apriori"...but that's just a put-down you use. So you're merely engaged in sniping.



Moreover, we do not 'posit' things. You might, but then you have read too much scientistic philosophy for your own good.


oh but we do. We do believe that people have beliefs and desires. Again, more sniping.

me:

No. I'm not talking about "what people really mean." "Mean" is an intentional verb. I have my own views about
how words get linked to things in the world we're talking about, but I wasn't talking about those views.



But you are talking about what people 'really mean', otherwise your argument about water would not be apposite.


Okay, that's a fair point. But if you object that brain processes can't be what people "really mean" by "belief" because that isn't what they believe beliefs are, then I'd say you're confusing a person's conception of beliefs with the referential meaning of "belief"...which is publically determined. Individuals don't run their own private languages. The referential meaning of "belief" is belief. And that is what it is. And just as water may be other than what people think and still be able to refer to it, so, too, with "belief".

me:

that verb phrases can't be referring expressions. But I think we use such expressions to track things in the
world...processes, actions, states. I don't think we can explain why people use such expressions without making
this assumption, tho to argue that would mean going into a long conversation about language, in which I would
have to bring in concepts from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology and sociology.



If verb phrases were referring expressions, that would turn them into noun phrases, thus destroying the unity of the
proposition, transforming indicative sentences into lists.

Wrong. Anyway there are no such things as propositions. There are sentences tho. Your assumption here begs
the question. Seems that your apriori theory is getting in the way. At any rate I don't notice any empirical arguments here.

me:

So beliefs seem to be some kind of internal state that people sometimes acquire from things they see or hear, such as
things they read, and having beliefs can account for why people do certain things. So beliefs seem to be some sort of internal state that mediates between perception and behavior. This says nothing about whether they are brain states or whatever.
Now in fact I think they are brain states, but one doesn't have to know that to be able to attribute beliefs to people or
to oneself. To talk about beliefs, you just have to have some way of attributing beliefs to people.




And we manage to attribute beliefs to people without this theory (which has yet to be proven).

Yes, exactly. As I said, we can refer to things if we have some way to identify them or pick them out. And we
do indeed pick out things like colors and activities and processes, like the burning in the fireplace...and activities,
processes and states are correlated with verb phrases. So if we are using verb phrases to track these features
(processes, activities, states) of things and attribute them to things, it seems strange to say we're not referring to
them...but, hey, that's YOUR theory, not mine.

I don't take dictionaries seriously, so I would agree with you on that. But I think in this case the kinds of abilities
and processes in people the dictionary listed are the sorts of things that people think of as "mental" or "aspects of
the mind." If you think the word "mind" doesn't refer to these kinds of capacities or abilities and processes and
states in people, what do you think it refers to? I know you think there is a certain evil Platonist theory of mind
you are against. But, as I've been arguing here, people can have mistaken ideas about things and still refer to them. Same with
our mental abilities and processes.

As to my use of "seems", hey, I admit I could be wrong.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


Yes, quite so. Thanks for agreeing with me.

I'm not agreeing with you. Re-read what I said, only this time with more care.


In the W. thread you seemed to reject all theories. A hypothesis is a theory.

Again, you need to learn to read with more care -- I reject all philosophical theories, as you have been told several times already. Are you now returning to your old ploy: lying about my beliefs?


It's not apriori. As I said, if we were to have a conversation about language, it would be a long one in which I would have to refer to evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology and sociology to defend my conclusions. Here I am simply stating my viewpoint. And I don't think that a defense of a viewpoint on such a topic is going to be a "demonstration"...at least not as this term has been used historically, to refer to cogent deductive arguments...an apriori method of argument.

Your psychological musings are all a priori, which is what i alleged.

I passed no comment on your non-standard evolutionary ideas.


Types of reasoning don't become and then cease to be cogent depending upon the particular club who are using it. You don't
define what "the sciences" are. I think the view you imply here is elitist. It denigrates knowledge of working class people.

In fact, it's the other way round. I am championing the language and opinions of ordinary people; it is you who is trying to sell us a few badly supported scientistic nostrums.

And I am using "science" in a perfectly ordinary way.


When I worked in computer engineering departments, the engineers often had only a theoretical knowledge about what would actually happen in the real world when their products were put to use. That's because they came straight out of college to work in the industry. Their education was science-based and thus theoretical. Often I found in practice that the people who had to work with and repair their products had much more practical expertise. For example, they had more accurate predictions about what the equipment or software would do in various complex environments. But your arbitrary chopping of the human race into the SCIENTISTs (all bow down) and the rest of the species is just not defensible.

Where have I done this? You again appear to be substituting your own flights of fancy for what you take to be my beliefs.


Now, in this particular case, however, the view concerning language that I was simply stating, not trying to provide a case for in detail, which could take a book, does have its origin in scientific results and theory. It wasn't "apriori"...but that's just a put-down you use..

What 'scientific results'?


So you're merely engaged in sniping

Slightly less than you are engaged in lying.


oh but we do. We do believe that people have beliefs and desires.

Why use the word "posit" then? If you mean believe then use that more normal term.


Again, more sniping.

As if you do not snipe --, aggravated by fibbing.


Okay, that's a fair point. But if you object that brain processes can't be what people "really mean" by "belief" because that isn't what they believe beliefs are, then I'd say you're confusing a person's conception of beliefs with the referential meaning of "belief"...which is publicly determined. Individuals don't run their own private languages. The referential meaning of "belief" is belief. And that is what it is. And just as water may be other than what people think and still be able to refer to it, so, too, with "belief".

But you have yet to show that "water" is referential -- as I pointed out we use this word to talk about stuff that isn't H20, or which contains many impurities.

And, once more, because of hydrogen bonding, pure water isn't H20.


Wrong.

A very wise, and knowledgeable RevLefter once said this:


Assertion isn't an argument.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1613733&postcount=30


Anyway there are no such things as propositions.

Yet more a priori legislation and/or "assertion" from you.


There are sentences tho.

That is why I referred to indicative sentences too, to blunt the reply I knew was coming.


Your assumption here begs the question.

In what way?


Seems that your apriori theory is getting in the way.

What 'theory'?


At any rate I don't notice any empirical arguments here.

Seems I'm copying you then...


Yes, exactly. As I said, we can refer to things if we have some way to identify them or pick them out. And we do indeed pick out things like colors and activities and processes, like the burning in the fireplace...and activities, processes and states are correlated with verb phrases. So if we are using verb phrases to track these features
(processes, activities, states) of things and attribute them to things, it seems strange to say we're not referring to them...but, hey, that's YOUR theory, not mine.

Once more, this will change them into noun phrases.

Again, what 'theory'?


I don't take dictionaries seriously, so I would agree with you on that. But I think in this case the kinds of abilities and processes in people the dictionary listed are the sorts of things that people think of as "mental" or "aspects of the mind." If you think the word "mind" doesn't refer to these kinds of capacities or abilities and processes and states in people, what do you think it refers to? I know you think there is a certain evil Platonist theory of mind you are against. But, as I've been arguing here, people can have mistaken ideas about things and still refer to them. Same with
our mental abilities and processes.

So, let's see the "empirical evidence" you extolled earlier that supports this a priori lingusitics.


I know you think there is a certain evil Platonist theory of mind you are against.

It has dominated Christian thought, and thus Cartesian and post-Cartesian thought, for at least two millennia.

It also 'seems' to have you in its grip.

Not so much 'evil' then (your word, not mine) as ubiquitous -- as Marx noted: "The ruling ideas are in every age those of the ruling class".


As to my use of "seems", hey, I admit I could be wrong.

Indeed, and you are wrong about the "could", too.

[Luís Henrique]

Do the discoveries of the later 20th century, especially in the area of quantum physics demolish the whole basis of any form of materialism as we have had up to now?

Materialism is a radically empirical philosophy that is based in the conviction that all phenomena originate from a physical cause and can be understood and explained through natural science.

But this is not what materialism is.



According to materialism, matter is the total explanation for space, nature, man, society, history and every other aspect of existence.

Again, no. Materialists do not believe that "matter" is the total explanation for everything. We don't even believe that "matter" is the only thing that exists.


Materialism does not acknowledge any alleged phenomenon that cannot be perceived by the five senses such as the supernatural, God, etc.

That's bullshit. We believe in lots of things that cannot be perceived by the five sences, such as triangles, atoms, black holes, hierarchies, government, gravity, evolution, class struggle, etc. And evidently the "supernatural", "God", etc., can be and are perceived by the five sences - the problem here is not of perception, but of interpretation.


So does not the presence of anti-matter and anti-particles and the mysterious "dark" matter than cannot be detected as such but only inferred call into question all pre-Quantum theories of materialism?
No. Anti-matter is as much "matter" as normal matter. Vacuum would be a much bigger problem for "materialism" as described here. Except that it has never been.

Probabilism demolishes determinism- we only can observe non-determistic phenomena governed by probabilities in spite of the "Multiverse" being deemed deterministic.

No, probability is by no means incompatible with determinism. You read the surveys about who Americans are voting for President, you know that Obama was going to win. However, you would be unable to predict the vote of any single American based on the surveys - you would only have a probability to guess. And materialism does not imply determinism either.

Luís Henrique

[syndicat]

Slightly less than you are engaged in lying.

You've certainly lied on many occasions about what I have claimed. Maybe it would be more accurate or less bombastic to say that at times we haven't understood each other very well.

In regard to your rejection of "philosophical theories," you posted in the W. thread a longish piece from Kuusela which was helpful in that, unlike a lot of W.'s own writing, was pretty clear. K. says that, for W., a theory is a philosophical theory if it attributes essential properties to things. The problem with this statement is that it's ambiguous. That's because "essential" is ambiguous. "Essential" is part of a family of modal terms....possible, necessary, accidental, etc. A property F is an essential property of A iff it is not possible for A to exist but lack F. But philosophers have usually claimed that their theories were about logical or metaphysical modality. So, presumably, "not possible" in the definition of "essential" would have to be logical or metaphysical impossibility.

But the physical sciences give a basis for attributing things like physical capacity, physical possibility, physical necessity. Thus when I was working in the electronics industry, the electrical engineers and electronic techs I worked with would regard Ohm's Law as denoting a property that circuits have essentially. That is, you couldn't bring into existence a circuit that would not have the property denoted by Ohm's Law. It would not be physically possible. So, Ohm's Law wasn't just some accidental correlation that might fail tomorrow, in their view. but they wouldn't claim it was logically impossible that this should happen.



Your psychological musings are all a priori, which is what i alleged.
I passed no comment on your non-standard evolutionary ideas.


My use of evolutionary theory is not "non-standard." For those who are interested, I'd recommend reading my summary of
biosemantics at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/biosemantics.html

Alternatively, you could read the excellent discussion of Millikan's approach to language in John Post's book "Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction" or read some of Millikan's works, such as "Language: A Biological Model." Post rejects traditional metaphysics, by the way. Also, Millikan was influenced by Wittgenstein.

me:
Anyway there are no such things as propositions.


Yet more a priori legislation and/or "assertion" from you.

The positing of propositions is a philosophical theory. I thought you didn't subscribe to philosophical theories?


So, let's see the "empirical evidence" you extolled earlier that supports this a priori lingusitics.

Again, it's not apriori. You use "apriori" as an epithet. As I said, to be able to discuss how the views I espouse concerning language are rooted in results of various empirical disciplines such as evolutionary biology and psychology and sociology would require a very lengthy discussion.



It has dominated Christian thought, and thus Cartesian and post-Cartesian thought, for at least two millennia.
It also 'seems' to have you in its grip.

Nope. The theory of mind in question asserts that there is a non-material entity, a soul or entelechy, that animates human behavior and is the seat of consciousness. I don't think there is any such thing. As I said, I think that beliefs, perceivings, thinking and so on are states and processes in the brain. You've not yet said whether you think there is such a thing as perceiving and thinking or whether you think people have beliefs and desires. If so, what are they?

The word "mind" in ordinary language refers to these processes and states and abilities in people. Just as "electricity" can be used by people without knowing anything about Ohm's Law, people can refer to beliefs, perceiving, thinking etc without knowing they are processes or states in the brain. As I said, to refer to or talk about things or their properties, people only need to have the ability to pick them out. That is, they need to have at least some way of identifying them.



But you have yet to show that "water" is referential -- as I pointed out we use this word to talk about stuff that isn't H20, or
which contains many impurities.

It may contain impurities but the stuff also contains water. The point was that people don't need to know about the chemical composition of water or its minor variant chemical forms to be able to talk about it. And when people "talk about water" they are referring to it.



If verb phrases were referring expressions, that would turn them into noun phrases, thus destroying the unity of the
proposition, transforming indicative sentences into lists.

There is no such thing as propositions. There are sentence tokens and sentence types, tho. Take the sentence

(1) Lucy weighs 10 pounds.

In this sentence, "weighs 10 pounds" refers to a particular state, a weight. Your argument that "if verb phrases were referring expressions sentences would be lists" assumes that noun phrases and verb phrases don't have different social functions in language, if both are referring expressions. But that doesn't follow. Verb phrases are used to attribute properties, events, states, processes, activities to the item denoted by the noun phrase. In (1) :"Lucy" denotes one of my cats. When I attribute a weight to her in (1), I am not just referring to the weight, I am attributing it to Lucy. How can we attribute a property to the subject if we don't refer to it? That would be a neat trick. I think you're in the grip of an apriori philosophical theory.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


You've certainly lied on many occasions about what I have claimed. Maybe it would be more accurate or less bombastic to say that at times we haven't understood each other very well.

The difference is: If you point my alleged lies out, I will withdraw them, and apologise -- I have pointed your lies out, you have yet to withdraw them, or apologise. I have detailed many of them here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Poseur%20001.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/libcom_circles_the_wagons.htm


In regard to your rejection of "philosophical theories," you posted in the W. thread a longish piece from Kuusela which was helpful in that, unlike a lot of W.'s own writing, was pretty clear. K. says that, for W., a theory is a philosophical theory if it attributes essential properties to things. The problem with this statement is that it's ambiguous. That's because "essential" is ambiguous. "Essential" is part of a family of modal terms....possible, necessary, accidental, etc. A property F is an essential property of A iff it is not possible for A to exist but lack F. But philosophers have usually claimed that their theories were about logical or metaphysical modality. So, presumably, "not possible" in the definition of "essential" would have to be logical or metaphysical impossibility.

But the physical sciences give a basis for attributing things like physical capacity, physical possibility, physical necessity. Thus when I was working in the electronics industry, the electrical engineers and electronic techs I worked with would regard Ohm's Law as denoting a property that circuits have essentially. That is, you couldn't bring into existence a circuit that would not have the property denoted by Ohm's Law. It would not be physically possible. So, Ohm's Law wasn't just some accidental correlation that might fail tomorrow, in their view. but they wouldn't claim it was logically impossible that this should happen.

I think Kuusela's argument is a little bit more sophisticated and involved than that, but even if you are right, what has your comment above got to do with whether or not Wittgenstein advanced a, or several philosophical theories -- and worse, even if he did, what has it got to do with whether that is true of me?


My use of evolutionary theory is not "non-standard." For those who are interested, I'd recommend reading my summary of
biosemantics at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Thanks for that, but I hope you are not suggesting that Ruth Millikan's theory is mainstream.


Alternatively, you could read the excellent discussion of Millikan's approach to language in John Post's book "Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction" or read some of Millikan's works, such as "Language: A Biological Model." Post rejects traditional metaphysics, by the way. Also, Millikan was influenced by Wittgenstein.

I have read her work, and I have a high opinion of it, even though I disagree with her. And, I do know she was influenced by Wittgenstein (via Sellars) -- only, not enough.


The positing of propositions is a philosophical theory. I thought you didn't subscribe to philosophical theories?

Ah, once again, you leap to conclusions; my use of 'proposition' is the same as, say, Peter Geach's: it is short for 'that which is proposed', with each word in there understood in its ordinary language sense. So, I am not 'positing' anything.

No theory there then.


Again, it's not apriori. You use "apriori" as an epithet. As I said, to be able to discuss how the views I espouse concerning language are rooted in results of various empirical disciplines such as evolutionary biology and psychology and sociology would require a very lengthy discussion.

And yet, this 'biological theory' has very little empirical support; certainly none you have quoted.

In that case, the difference between an a priori thesis and what you are saying is about the same as that between a glass which is half full and one that is half empty.

Of course, if I am wrong, I'll withdraw that allegation, and apologise -- let's see you do the same...


Nope. The theory of mind in question asserts that there is a non-material entity, a soul or entelechy, that animates human behavior and is the seat of consciousness. I don't think there is any such thing. As I said, I think that beliefs, perceivings, thinking and so on are states and processes in the brain. You've not yet said whether you think there is such a thing as perceiving and thinking or whether you think people have beliefs and desires. If so, what are they?

I think your theory implies this, for you will have to appeal to what is in effect an homunculus to make it work.

And beliefs, thoughts and perceivings are what our ordinary use of such words indicate, and they do not indicate 'brain states'.


The word "mind" in ordinary language refers to these processes and states and abilities in people. Just as "electricity" can be used by people without knowing anything about Ohm's Law, people can refer to beliefs, perceiving, thinking etc without knowing they are processes or states in the brain. As I said, to refer to or talk about things or their properties, people only need to have the ability to pick them out. That is, they need to have at least some way of identifying them.

So you keep saying but as you noted elsewhere, assertion is not argument.


It may contain impurities but the stuff also contains water. The point was that people don't need to know about the chemical composition of water or its minor variant chemical forms to be able to talk about it. And when people "talk about water" they are referring to it.

Then our ordinary use of 'water' must, on your theory, refer to bodies of liquid not all of which is H20.


There is no such thing as propositions.

Again, so you keep saying, but in my sense there are.


There are sentence tokens and sentence types, tho. Take the sentence

But sentences do not say things, we do, and we do so, in many cases, by proposing things, and hence by the use of propositions.


In this sentence, "weighs 10 pounds" refers to a particular state, a weight. Your argument that "if verb phrases were referring expressions sentences would be lists" assumes that noun phrases and verb phrases don't have different social functions in language, if both are referring expressions. But that doesn't follow. Verb phrases are used to attribute properties, events, states, processes, activities to the item denoted by the noun phrase. In (1) :"Lucy" denotes one of my cats. When I attribute a weight to her in (1), I am not just referring to the weight, I am attributing it to Lucy. How can we attribute a property to the subject if we don't refer to it? That would be a neat trick. I think you're in the grip of an apriori philosophical theory.

We describe things every day without referring to them, since we use, among other things, descriptive phrases and clauses -- they are not referring expressions, and for the reasons I gave in an earlier post, which you just ignored.

[syndicat]

rosa:

Then our ordinary use of 'water' must, on your theory, refer to bodies of liquid not all of which are H20.

Of course it does. The oceans have huge amounts of impurities and so does water that comes out of the tap. Something doesn't have to be purely water to be called "a body of water" in English.

me:

My use of evolutionary theory is not "non-standard." For those who are interested, I'd recommend reading my summary of biosemantics at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy:



Thanks for that, but I hope you are not suggesting that Ruth Millikan's theory is mainstream.

It has support in cognitive sciences and evolutionary psych. What do you mean by "mainstream"?



Ah, once again, you leap to conclusions; my use of 'proposition' is the same as, say, Peter Geach's: it is short for 'that which is proposed', with each word in there understood in its ordinary language sense. So, I am not 'positing' anything.

And what are these things that are "proposed"? Are they denoted by "that" clauses? And if so, what do they refer to? I think that the things referred to by "that" clauses are states of affairs. Placing "that" before a sentence converts the sentence into a name, and thus serves the same sort of social communicative function as a nominalization, such as converting "Lucy weighs 10 pounds" into "Lucy's weighing 10 pounds", as in:

Lucy's weighing 10 pounds tells us she's gained two pounds in the past year.

Philosophers have often supposed that propositions were some sort of eternally existing abstracta, living in Plato's heaven. I gather that you and I agree there are no such entities.



And yet, this 'biological theory' has very little empirical support; certainly none you have quoted.

It's entirely empirical. But I don' t have the time to regurgitate the reasons, which would involve a long discussion of evolutionary theory and its relevance to language, language as a biological trait of humans, and so on. I'm simply asserting certain conclusions. Yes, I don't claim to have shown these things to be true here. I'm simply stating a viewpoint. Sometimes this is a worthwhile or appropriate thing to do.

me:

Nope. The theory of mind in question asserts that there is a non-material entity, a soul or entelechy, that animates human behavior and is the seat of consciousness. I don't think there is any such thing. As I said, I think that beliefs, perceivings, thinking and so on are states and processes in the brain. You've not yet said whether you think there is such a thing as perceiving and thinking or whether you think people have beliefs and desires. If so, what are they?


I think your theory implies this, for you will have to appeal to what is in effect an homunculus to make it work.

Assertion without argument.



And beliefs, thoughts and perceivings are what our ordinary use of such words indicate, and they do not indicate 'brain states'.

What do you mean by "indicate"? Do you mean refer to? How do you know the items denoted by words such as "perception", "thinking", "beliefs", "desires" are not brain states? Is this some apriori assumption on your part? Or are you claiming some "Directly Given" understanding through introspection (a philosophical theory)?



But sentences do not say things, we do, and we do so, in many cases, by proposing things, and hence by the use of propositions.

If I say "Lucy weighs 10 pounds" I'm not "proposing" anything, as "proposing" is used in ordinary English. If I propose that we all go over to Zante's to get pizza, I'm proposing something. The things we say or state are whatever it is that is indicated by "that" clauses. As I mentioned above, I take these to refer to states of affairs. Positing propositions is a useless philosophical fifth wheel. I apply Ockham's razor and get rid of them.



We describe things every day without referring to them, since we use, among other things descriptive phrases and clauses -- they are not referring expressions, and for the reasons I gave in an earlier post, which you just ignored.

It's hard for me to see how we can describe something without referring to it. If by "reasons" you refer to the "sentences aren't lists" argument, I already responded to that argument. I pointed out that you were begging the question, as you are here again.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


Of course it does. The oceans have huge amounts of impurities and so does water that comes out of the tap. Something doesn't have to be purely water to be called "a body of water" in English.

And yet someone (on a boat at sea) could be told, "Jump into the water", even though, on your theory, "water" refers to a liquid not all of which is H20. So, "water" does not refer to H20, even on your theory -- in fact, it doesn't refer at all (in the sentence I gave).


It has support in cognitive sciences and evolutionary psych. What do you mean by "mainstream"?

Well, creationists, for example, claim support from biology, chemistry and physics, but that does not make their theory mainstream.

Mainstream linguistic theory is Chomskyan, and I rather think Chomskyans reject Millikan's theory, as do many others (Quineans included).

And evolutionary psychology is a reactionary theory, so I am surprised you appeal to it.


And what are these things that are "proposed"? Are they denoted by "that" clauses? And if so, what do they refer to? I think that the things referred to by "that" clauses are states of affairs. Placing "that" before a sentence converts the sentence into a name, and thus serves the same sort of social communicative function as a nominalization, such as converting "Lucy weighs 10 pounds" into "Lucy's weighing 10 pounds", as in:

Why do they have to refer? Where did this a priori idea come from? And where did you get the idea that a "that" clause converts a sentence into a name?

So many assertions...

Remind me, who was it who told us that assertion is not argument?

And as far as proposing is concerned, if you do not understand that word, there is little I can do to help you --but see below.

Anyway, you propose all sorts of things (for example that "that" clauses refer to states of affairs) -- so your question is disingenuous.

But, what 'state of affairs' does this refer to: "I think that the things referred to by "that" clauses are states of affairs."?

[And as soon as you tell me, using a "that" clause (which, it seems you will have to do), I will simply ask the same question, and so on to infinity...]


Philosophers have often supposed that propositions were some sort of eternally existing abstracta, living in Plato's heaven. I gather that you and I agree there are no such entities.

Indeed.


It's entirely empirical. But I don' t have the time to regurgitate the reasons, which would involve a long discussion of evolutionary theory and its relevance to language, language as a biological trait of humans, and so on. I'm simply asserting certain conclusions. Yes, I don't claim to have shown these things to be true here. I'm simply stating a viewpoint. Sometimes this is a worthwhile or appropriate thing to do.

Well, I am happy to take your word for it, but, since I've heard this so many times over the last 30 years, only to find out that this is not the case in every case, I retain a healthy scepticism.

Personally, I do not think language is a biological trait, but, like Marx, a social trait, based on collective labour.


Assertion without argument.

Well, you are one to talk! You do this all the time.

I explain why this is so, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm


What do you mean by "indicate"? Do you mean refer to? How do you know the items denoted by words such as "perception", "thinking", "beliefs", "desires" are not brain states? Is this some apriori assumption on your part? Or are you claiming some "Directly Given" understanding through introspection (a philosophical theory)?

No, I mean indicate, as in "allude to".

And no, I am not "claiming some 'Directly Given' understanding through introspection".

How do I know? Because speakers can use these terms and know nothing about these alleged 'brain states', so they can't be 'referring' to them -- this is quite apart from the fact that they aren't referring expressions to begin with.

More to the point, how do you know they are referring to 'brain states' (as opposed to keep asserting this)?


If I say "Lucy weighs 10 pounds" I'm not "proposing" anything, as "proposing" is used in ordinary English. If I propose that we all go over to Zante's to get pizza, I'm proposing something. The things we say or state are whatever it is that is indicated by "that" clauses. As I mentioned above, I take these to refer to states of affairs. Positing propositions is a useless philosophical fifth wheel. I apply Ockham's razor and get rid of them.

You are indeed putting forward for consideration that the individual you mention weighs what you say he/she weighs, and what you are putting forward is what you propose I consider. If you hadn't proposed that I should consider this, I wouldn't here do it.

Now, you keep saying these 'refer' to states of affairs, but that is no less an abuse if ordinary talk than you say of my use of "propose".


It's hard for me to see how we can describe something without referring to it. If by "reasons" you refer to the "sentences aren't lists" argument, I already responded to that argument. I pointed out that you were begging the question, as you are here again.

Well, as you no doubt know "refer" has many meanings; if by "refer" you mean "allude to" then I agree. On the other hand, if you mean by "refer" what we do with unambiguous referring expressions (such as proper names), then I can't agree that to describe NN as tall, is to refer to "tallness", even though here we refer to NN by the use of her name.

It seems to me that your theory suffers from this weakness:


"What is the problem of predication? In a nutshell, it is this. Consider any simple subject-predicate sentence, such as..., 'Theaetetus sits'. How are we to understand the different roles of the subject and the predicate in this sentence, 'Theaetetus' and 'sits' respectively? The role of 'Theaetetus' seems straightforward enough: it serves to name, and thereby to refer to or stand for, a certain particular human being. But what about 'sits'? Many philosophers have been tempted to say that this also refers to or stands for something, namely, a property or universal that Theaetetus possesses or exemplifies: the property of sitting. This is said to be a universal, rather than a particular, because it can be possessed by many different individuals.

"But now we have a problem, for this view of the matter seems to turn the sentence 'Theaetetus sits' into a mere list of (two) names, each naming something different, one a particular and one a universal: 'Theaetetus, sits.' But a list of names is not a sentence because it is not the sort of thing that can be said to be true or false, in the way that 'Theaetetus sits' clearly can. The temptation now is to say that reference to something else must be involved in addition to Theaetetus and the property of sitting, namely, the relation of possessing that Theaetetus has to that property. But it should be evident that this way of proceeding will simply generate the same problem, for now we have just turned the original sentence into a list of three names, 'Theaetetus, possessing, sits.'

"Indeed, we are now setting out on a vicious infinite regress, which is commonly known as 'Bradley's regress', in recognition of its modern discoverer, the British idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley. Bradley used the regress to argue in favour of absolute idealism...." [Lowe (2006). Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Lowe, E. (2006), 'Take A Seat And The Consider This Simple Sentence', Times Higher Education Supplement, 07/04/06.

How does this 'beg the question'?

Once more, you keep asserting this -- and, as you noted, assertion is not argument...

[New Tet]

[...]
Again, no. Materialists do not believe that "matter" is the total explanation for everything. We don't even believe that "matter" is the only thing that exists.


Luís Henrique

It doesn't matter what Materialists believe. What maters is the interpretation of history that materialism allows us to make, one which by all objective standards approximates the actual events as they took place.

Historical Materialism, carefully applied to the study of our biological origins seems to have yielded impressive results:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Jay_Gould

Fuck, I would venture to guess that even Albert Einstein himself may have been influenced by the materialist conception of history in his physics and theoretical astronomy ("guess" because what I know of those sciences is so rudimentary as to make a college phys professor laugh out loud).

[syndicat]

me:

Of course it does. The oceans have huge amounts of impurities and so does water that comes out of the tap. Something doesn't have to be purely water to be called "a body of water" in English.

rosa:


And yet someone (on a boat at sea) could be told, "Jump into the water", even though, on your theory, "water" refers to a liquid not all of which is H20. So, "water" does not refer to H20, even on your theory -- in fact, it doesn't refer at all (in the sentence I gave).

I don't know what "theory" you're talking about. What I said is that people only need some way to identify things to refer to them. They don't need to know about their ultimate constitution or have elaborate theories about them. Water is something like "that stuff", pointing to a lake or the water flowing in a stream. But, as experimental pscyhologists have shown, children by age 4 understand the concept of a natural kind. This means they know that just because something looks like a cat this doesn't mean it is a cat. So they learn that plastic cats aren't cats. The idea of a natural kind is that there is some not necessarily immediately perceived underlying basis of things of this kind exhibiting similar behavior. Thus people understand that there may be some underlying nature that the various bodies of water have in common that makes them similar. This is why there is nothing inconsistent with ordinary usage of "water" in saying that water is what the chemists say it is. When the chemists provide their theoretical understanding of water, they are talking about exactly the same stuff as a boy who refers to water. The word "water" doesn't change its public language meaning because a boy grows up and becomes a chemist and learns a great deal more about water. It still refers to the same stuff.

The chemical stuff that chemists would identify as "what water is" is mostly what the ocean is made of. It's reasonable for the chemists to say that "what water is" is stuff (or a family of chemically very closely related) having a certain structure.

When someone jumps into the ocean, they are jumping into water (that's what it mostly is). It doesn't follow that water is not what the chemists say it is.

And when you say that "water", "perceives", "thinking", "black", "cat" are not referring expressions, you're imposing your philosophical theory apriori, because you're rigidifying the use of "refers".

me:

It has support in cognitive sciences and evolutionary psych. What do you mean by "mainstream"?


Well, creationists, for example, claim support from biology, chemistry and physics, but that does not make their theory mainstream.

But the creationists are totally at odds with evolutionary theory whereas Millikan's views are based on it. Hence they are based on a well-supported, mainstream theory.



Mainstream linguistic theory is Chomskyan, and I rather think Chomskyans reject Millikan's theory, as do many others (Quineans included).

Okay, so by "mainstream" you mean the majority or dominant view. Yes, her theory isn't the "mainstream" view about language. But Chomsky accepts apriori knowledge, which you reject.



And evolutionary psychology is a reactionary theory, so I am surprised you appeal to it.

Sometimes it is, as is sociobiology. But it doesn't have to be. In any event, I should have said developmental and experimental psychology and evolutionary biology.

ME:


And what are these things that are "proposed"? Are they denoted by "that" clauses? And if so, what do they refer to? I think that the things referred to by "that" clauses are states of affairs. Placing "that" before a sentence converts the sentence into a name, and thus serves the same sort of social communicative function as a nominalization, such as
converting "Lucy weighs 10 pounds" into "Lucy's weighing 10 pounds", as in:



Why do they have to refer? Where did this a priori idea come from? And where did you get the idea that a "that" clause converts a sentence into a name?

It's not apriori. It falls out of Millikan's theory of language that descriptive sentences denote states of affairs. But a sentence describes the state of affairs by way of attributing features to things, whereas a nominalization creates a name or canonical designator for the state of affairs.

It's hard to see why would have language if it did not serve a purpose of describing actual states of affairs in the world. But, again, I don't have the time to lay out the argument here. I will refer you to Post's little book or my biosemantics article.


And as far as proposing is concerned, if you do not understand that word, there is little I can do to help you --but see below.

Great. Your communication of your philosophical theory requires use of a piece of academic philosophical jargon.



Anyway, you propose all sorts of things (for example that "that" clauses refer to states of affairs) -- so your question is disingenuous.

Now you're being gratuitously insulting. Why I am not surprised?


But, what 'state of affairs' does this refer to: "I think that the things referred to by "that" clauses are states of affairs."?


My having a certain belief. The intentional object of a belief may or may not exist. In this case I think it does.



[And as soon as you tell me, using a "that" clause (which, it seems you will have to do), I will simply ask the same question, and so on to infinity...]

I'm not quite sure what you're asking here. Noun phrases serve the social function of denoting things that we wish to talk about. The reference is kept in place through the pressure of expectations of others in our language group. The dominant mass of uses within a particular lineage of copies of a sentence containing the phrase will determine what it is it is tracking. That is, if someone formulate a hypothesis to try to explain what "cat" refers to when English speakers use it, then what they are explaining is this mass of uses. The uses -- the tokenings -- are related as copies within a lineage of copies. In other words, people who use "cat" are copying this usage from a long line of uses of "cat." Now there are actually discrete lineages of usages of "cat." In the USA there is lineage where "cat" means something like "guy." ("See that cat over there with a beret on the last bar stool.")

So, when I say that "that" clauses refer to states of affairs, I'm offering a hypothesis to account for this particular linguistic usage. But the hypothesis makes sense in the context of my subscribing to something like Millikan's view, which holds that the function of descriptive sentences is to refer to states of affairs (except for pretend uses as in fiction). The sentence is true iff there is an actual state of affairs it tracks. Sometimes states of affairs fail to perform their function, and do not track an actual state of affairs, and then they are false.

me:

It's entirely empirical. But I don' t have the time to regurgitate the reasons, which would involve a long discussion of
evolutionary theory and its relevance to language, language as a biological trait of humans, and so on. I'm simply
asserting certain conclusions. Yes, I don't claim to have shown these things to be true here. I'm simply stating a
viewpoint. Sometimes this is a worthwhile or appropriate thing to do.



Personally, I do not think language is a biological trait, but, like Marx, a social trait, based on collective labour.

Then you'll have a hard time explaining why children learn language in a matter of a very short time, if they don't
have a biological predisposition or faculty for doing so. You know that Chomsky views the tendency to have a
language with certain structures as innate. This implies that it is a biological trait. Now it seems you are asserting
a theory that is not mainstream.

me:

What do you mean by "indicate"? Do you mean refer to? How do you know the items denoted by words such as "perception", "thinking", "beliefs", "desires" are not brain states? Is this some apriori assumption on your part? Or are you claiming some "Directly Given" understanding through introspection (a philosophical theory)?


No, I mean indicate, as in "allude to". And no, I am not "claiming some 'Directly Given' understanding through introspection".
How do I know? Because speakers can use these terms and know nothing about these alleged 'brain states', so they
can't be 'referring' to them -- this is quite apart from the fact that they aren't referring expressions to begin
with.

This is a non-sequitur. People can refer to electricity without knowing about Ohm's Law or electron flows. People can refer to gasoline without knowning its chemical composition or its origin. People can talk about water without knowing about the composition of water that chemists believe. People can refer to cats without knowing they're a lineage of copies related via the DNA copying process. To refer to something you only need to have a way to identify it, to track it. Thus people can refer to perceptions, thinking, beliefs, and so on if they have some way to identify when someone has one of these states or processes. This is consistent with them being brain states.

Moreover, if you agree they exist and you hold they aren't brain states, then what are they? Are they states of a material organism? Or do you think there are non-physical properties of humans? That would push you in the direction of the Cartesian theory you say you reject.


More to the point, how do you know they are referring to 'brain states' (as opposed to keep asserting this)?

Because there are well defended theories in psychology that hold this.

me:

If I say "Lucy weighs 10 pounds" I'm not "proposing" anything, as "proposing" is used in ordinary English. If I propose
that we all go over to Zante's to get pizza, I'm proposing something. The things we say or state are whatever it is
that is indicated by "that" clauses. As I mentioned above, I take these to refer to states of affairs. Positing propositions
is a useless philosophical fifth wheel. I apply Ockham's razor and get rid of them.


You are indeed putting forward for consideration that the individual you mention weighs what you say he/she weighs,
and what you are putting forward is what you propose I consider. If you hadn't proposed that I should consider this,
I wouldn't here do it.

If I propose that we go to Zante's to get pizza, what I'm proposing in that case is an action. Are actions propositions?
It seems to me you have a certain academic philosophical theory that you are committed to.



Now, you keep saying these 'refer' to states of affairs, but that is no less an abuse if ordinary talk than you say of my use
of "propose".

Not it's not. Consider:
Jack believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Henry believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Hence, there is something that Jack and Henry both believe.

For this to be a valid inference, as it is, there must be something referred to by the "that" clause here.

In any event, I'm happy to concede that "states of affairs" is a term of art, as is "proposition". I have a fairly good idea what states of affairs are. I have no idea what you mean by "proposition." In other words, I don't know what sort of entity this is. And if you talk about "propositions" you're assuming there are such things.

me:

It's hard for me to see how we can describe something without referring to it. If by "reasons" you refer to the
"sentences aren't lists" argument, I already responded to that argument. I pointed out that you were begging the
question, as you are here again.


Well, as you no doubt know "refer" has many meanings; if by "refer" you mean "allude to" then I agree.
On the other hand, if you mean by "refer" what we do with unambiguous referring expressions (such as proper names),
then I can't agree that to describe NN as tall, is to refer to "tallness", even though here we refer to
NN by the use of her name.

It seems to me that your theory suffers from this weakness:



"What is the problem of predication? In a nutshell, it is this. Consider any simple subject-predicate sentence,
such as..., 'Theaetetus sits'. How are we to understand the different roles of the subject and the predicate in this
sentence, 'Theaetetus' and 'sits' respectively? The role of 'Theaetetus' seems straightforward enough: it serves to
name, and thereby to refer to or stand for, a certain particular human being. But what about 'sits'?
Many philosophers have been tempted to say that this also refers to or stands for something, namely, a
property or universal that Theaetetus possesses or exemplifies: the property of sitting. This is said to be a
universal, rather than a particular, because it can be possessed by many different individuals.

"But now we have a problem, for this view of the matter seems to turn the sentence 'Theaetetus sits' into a mere
list of (two) names, each naming something different, one a particular and one a universal: 'Theaetetus, sits.'
But a list of names is not a sentence because it is not the sort of thing that can be said to be true or false, in
the way that 'Theaetetus sits' clearly can. The temptation now is to say that reference to something else must
be involved in addition to Theaetetus and the property of sitting, namely, the relation of possessing that
Theaetetus has to that property. But it should be evident that this way of proceeding will simply generate
the same problem, for now we have just turned the original sentence into a list of three names, 'Theaetetus,
possessing, sits.'

"Indeed, we are now setting out on a vicious infinite regress, which is commonly known as 'Bradley's regress', in
recognition of its modern discoverer, the British idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley. Bradley used the regress to
argue in favour of absolute idealism...." [Lowe (2006). Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions
adopted here.]

Lowe, E. (2006), 'Take A Seat And The Consider This Simple Sentence', Times Higher Education Supplement, 07/04/06.

The argument above is fallacious. I have provided a solution for Bradley's regress at:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/bradleyregress.html

We can't really understand why we have language as a communicative tool without supposing that we are tracking states of affairs in reality. But this also applies to the noun-phrases and verb-phrases that make up sentences. What explains patterns of usage if there is nothing in the world that "is black", "kicks", "sits on", "weighs 8 pounds", are tracking to? From the fact that "is smoking a cigarette" tracks an activity, it does not follow that its social function, or role, to use your language, is the same as that of names. That assumption begs the question. When we attribute weighing 10 pounds to Lucy, we are attributing to her a property she has. We can't be doing that if we aren't picking out a particular property to be attributing to her.

[New Tet]

[...]
Not it's not. Consider:
Jack believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Henry believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Hence, there is something that Jack and Henry both believe.
[..]

You jumped from one analogy to another in such rapid succession that I don't know whether to weigh Lucy, kiss Zante's, order a pizza from Jack and split it with Henry and you!

I may be dumber than you, but not so dumb as to not know when I've waded in deeper than I anticipated.

Hold the anchovies.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


I don't know what "theory" you're talking about.

Yours. You can disown it if you like.


I don't know what "theory" you're talking about. What I said is that people only need some way to identify things to refer to them. They don't need to know about their ultimate constitution or have elaborate theories about them. Water is something like "that stuff", pointing to a lake or the water flowing in a stream. But, as experimental psychologists have shown, children by age 4 understand the concept of a natural kind. This means they know that just because something looks like a cat this doesn't mean it is a cat. So they learn that plastic cats aren't cats. The idea of a natural kind is that there is some not necessarily immediately perceived underlying basis of things of this kind exhibiting similar behavior. Thus people understand that there may be some underlying nature that the various bodies of water have in common that makes them similar. This is why there is nothing inconsistent with ordinary usage of "water" in saying that water is what the chemists say it is. When the chemists provide their theoretical understanding of water, they are talking about exactly the same stuff as a boy who refers to water. The word "water" doesn't change its public language meaning because a boy grows up and becomes a chemist and learns a great deal more about water. It still refers to the same stuff.

The chemical stuff that chemists would identify as "what water is" is mostly what the ocean is made of. It's reasonable for the chemists to say that "what water is" is stuff (or a family of chemically very closely related) having a certain structure.

When someone jumps into the ocean, they are jumping into water (that's what it mostly is). It doesn't follow that water is not what the chemists say it is.


Well, your point was that when we use "water" we are referring to H20, but there are no pure samples of H20 anywhere on the planet. Not only do hydrogen bonds ruin this neat picture, so do the various isotopes of hydrogen (so not even Hydrogen is a 'natural kind'!), and in its natural state, water contains much that isn't H20, but we still call it water. Even worse, there are things that are H20 which we don't call water, namely steam, and arguably ice. And, it is not as if you have a clear definition of the alleged 'natural kind' water, or H20, even though you refer us to what "chemists say" (while you quote not one). Do they call D20 water? Sure they do. What about D30 tritium)? They still call that water. And, it's not as if we can refer to the chemical structure of the H20 molecule, since, in its natural state it exists in an ionised form (hence the hydrogen bonds).

Under pressure, you have now watered down (no pun intended) your original statement to: what we are referring to by the use of "water" is "mainly H20", but we still describe liquids as water even if they are entirely D20.

So, the core of your theory is in disarray.

More anti-essentialist details (and these from a Chemist, too!) here:

Van Brakel (2000), Philosophy Of Chemistry. Between The Manifest And The Scientific Image (Leuven University Press).


And when you say that "water", "perceives", "thinking", "black", "cat" are not referring expressions, you're imposing your philosophical theory apriori, because you're rigidifying the use of "refers".

I am not imposing anything on anything, I am merely denying what you say, and drawing your attention to the fact that in ordinary language we distinguish between referring and describing.


But the creationists are totally at odds with evolutionary theory whereas Millikan's views are based on it. Hence they are based on a well-supported, mainstream theory.

The point is that anyone can claim the support of this or that branch of science, even though what they have to say is a load of rubbish. So, the fact that you claimed this theory of yours had the support of the sciences implies nothing about its veracity.


Okay, so by "mainstream" you mean the majority or dominant view. Yes, her theory isn't the "mainstream" view about language. But Chomsky accepts apriori knowledge, which you reject.

I wasn't advocating Chomsky's ideas; in fact I reject them. I was merely explaining what "mainstream" meant.


It's not apriori. It falls out of Millikan's theory of language that descriptive sentences denote states of affairs. But a sentence describes the state of affairs by way of attributing features to things, whereas a nominalization creates a name or canonical designator for the state of affairs.

Fine, then that just militates against her theory. And you keep telling us that sentences describe states of affairs, but I see no argument supporting this counter-intuitive doctrine -- so it still looks a priori to me. [On the one argument you do give, see the end.]


It's hard to see why would have language if it did not serve a purpose of describing actual states of affairs in the world. But, again, I don't have the time to lay out the argument here. I will refer you to Post's little book or my biosemantics article.

Who said it had no purpose? Not me.


Your communication of your philosophical theory requires use of a piece of academic philosophical jargon.

Why do you keep saying I have a philosophical theory, when I don't? And what piece of 'jargon' are you referring to?


Now you're being gratuitously insulting. Why I am not surprised?

Why should you not be surprised? Answer: because you have been doing this to me since we first met on Libcom.


I'm not quite sure what you're asking here. Noun phrases serve the social function of denoting things that we wish to talk about. The reference is kept in place through the pressure of expectations of others in our language group. The dominant mass of uses within a particular lineage of copies of a sentence containing the phrase will determine what it is it is tracking. That is, if someone formulate a hypothesis to try to explain what "cat" refers to when English speakers use it, then what they are explaining is this mass of uses. The uses -- the tokenings -- are related as copies within a lineage of copies. In other words, people who use "cat" are copying this usage from a long line of uses of "cat." Now there are actually discrete lineages of usages of "cat." In the USA there is lineage where "cat" means something like "guy." ("See that cat over there with a beret on the last bar stool.")

So, when I say that "that" clauses refer to states of affairs, I'm offering a hypothesis to account for this particular linguistic usage. But the hypothesis makes sense in the context of my subscribing to something like Millikan's view, which holds that the function of descriptive sentences is to refer to states of affairs (except for pretend uses as in fiction). The sentence is true iff there is an actual state of affairs it tracks. Sometimes states of affairs fail to perform their function, and do not track an actual state of affairs, and then they are false.

Well, it seems to me that you take an awful lot for granted here, some of which I have already addressed. However, you have yet to show that noun phrases are always referring expressions. So, much of the above was wasted effort. [But, see the end.]


Then you'll have a hard time explaining why children learn language in a matter of a very short time, if they don't have a biological predisposition or faculty for doing so. You know that Chomsky views the tendency to have a language with certain structures as innate. This implies that it is a biological trait. Now it seems you are asserting a theory that is not mainstream.

I am not concerned to explain how and why children learn language, since I am not offering a theory, but even if I were, I do not see how this would make things difficult for me. Moreover, I reject Chomsky's innate hypothesis, and have explained why here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm

Anyway, adults can very often learn a second language pretty quickly too, despite what Chomskyans tell you.

Chomsky's ideas are demolished here:

Sampson, G. (2005), The 'Language Instinct' Debate (Continuum).

Seuren, P. (2004), Chomsky's Minimalism (Oxford University Press).

Cowie, F. (1997), 'The Logical Problem Of Language Acquisition', Synthèse 111, pp.17-51.

--------, (2002), What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered (Oxford University Press).

--------, (2008), 'Innateness And Language', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.

Lecercle, J-J. (2006), A Marxist Philosophy Of Language, translated by Gregory Elliott (Brill).


This is a non-sequitur. People can refer to electricity without knowing about Ohm's Law or electron flows. People can refer to gasoline without knowing its chemical composition or its origin. People can talk about water without knowing about the composition of water that chemists believe. People can refer to cats without knowing they're a lineage of copies related via the DNA copying process. To refer to something you only need to have a way to identify it, to track it. Thus people can refer to perceptions, thinking, beliefs, and so on if they have some way to identify when someone has one of these states or processes. This is consistent with them being brain states.

The word "electricity" was in fact introduced into language by scientists, so its meaning was determined by them. This is not so with "water", or "belief", or even "cat".


Moreover, if you agree they exist and you hold they aren't brain states, then what are they? Are they states of a material organism? Or do you think there are non-physical properties of humans? That would push you in the direction of the Cartesian theory you say you reject.

Why do they have to be anything?

"Value" in Marxist economic theory is not identifiable with anything (it is certainly not a 'brain state'), so why is this idea a surprise to you? The centre of mass of the galaxy is not anything either, but it exercises a decisive influence on the whole galaxy -- but it certainly isn't a 'brain state', either.


If I propose that we go to Zante's to get pizza, what I'm proposing in that case is an action. Are actions propositions?

It seems to me you have a certain academic philosophical theory that you are committed to.

Not at all; I am merely proposing a certain way of viewing spoken token indicative sentences. And in your example, what you are proposing is that this action be brought about.


Not it's not. Consider:
Jack believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Henry believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Hence, there is something that Jack and Henry both believe.

For this to be a valid inference, as it is, there must be something referred to by the "that" clause here.

Nice try, but I bet you think I know nothing about referential opacity (http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/referentialopacity.html). Hence, the conclusion could be false, even though the premisses are true.


In any event, I'm happy to concede that "states of affairs" is a term of art, as is "proposition". I have a fairly good idea what states of affairs are. I have no idea what you mean by "proposition." In other words, I don't know what sort of entity this is. And if you talk about "propositions" you're assuming there are such things.

It is not an entity; it is a certain way of presenting a spoken token indicative sentence.

[syndicat]

In regard to water, you're engaging in nitpicking. It obviously didn't matter, for the purpose of my example, what chemists think the chemical structure of water is, or that it has some related variant forms, which, as you note, chemists also consider to be water. The point is that both chemists and a 12 year old are referring to the same thing when they use "water." The meaning of "water" doesn't change because you learn more about it. Same for cognitive states like believing, perceiving, etc.

In regard to referring, if Alfred says "Jack smokes cigarettes outside the doors of the factory and so does Suzette," people could say "Alfred was referring to smoking outside the factory doors." People do this all the time.

Your rigidification of "refer" to only refer to names has a certain history in academic philosophy, going back to Gottlob Frege, and was based on his semantical theories. And Frege was a Platonist and a believer in apriori theorizing, so the Fregean tradition isn't something you should be defending.

So now you say that words like "believes" or "beliefs", "thinking" or "thoughts", "perceiving" etc don't refer to anything. Well, that is a problem. We in fact refer to these states...perceptions people have, what they believe, their desires etc...to explain the behavior of people. Things that aren't real entities can't enter into explanatory relations with other activities, processes, events.

These sorts of processes and states and abilities in people are studied extensively by experimental pscychologists.

me:


Not it's not. Consider:
Jack believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Henry believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Hence, there is something that Jack and Henry both believe.

For this to be a valid inference, as it is, there must be something referred to by the "that" clause here.


Nice try, but I bet you think I know nothing about referential opacity (http://www.anonym.to/?http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/referentialopacity.html). Hence, the conclusion could be false, even though the premisses are true.

Well, apparently you don't understand referential opacity since my little argument here does not attempt to grab hold of something referred to inside the scope of "believes that". For example, referential opacity is relevant for this kind of inference:

Thomas believes that Stuart is a police spy.
Stuart is the rector of the university.
Hence, Thomas believes that the rector of the university is a police spy.

This is an invalid inference. Thomas might not know that Stuart is the rector of the university. In this case the quantification grabs hold of "Stuart" in the first sentence. The referential opacity in the first sentence refers to expressions inside the scope of "believes that". In the case of the example I gave, we're not trying to grab hold of any referring expression inside the scope of "believes that" to quantify on it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


In regard to water, you're engaging in nitpicking. It obviously didn't matter, for the purpose of my example, what chemists think the chemical structure of water is, or that it has some related variant forms, which, as you note, chemists also consider to be water. The point is that both chemists and a 12 year old are referring to the same thing when they use "water." The meaning of "water" doesn't change because you learn more about it. Same for cognitive states like believing, perceiving, etc.

It's not nit-picking to point out that your original claim that when we use "water" we are all referring to H20, when (1) few people (world-wide) are aware of this alleged fact, (2) not even chemists are referring to H20 when they use "water" (they call D20, D4H2, D6H3...D2nHn water, too), (3) pure water (as H20) is nowhere to be found on earth, (4) because of ionisation, and thus hydrogen bonding, and because of the presence of isotopes (thus, not even Hydrogen is a natural kind!), the chemical structure of water isn't even H20, (5) much that isn't water is in fact H20 etc., (ice and steam), and to add to your difficulties, a molecule of H20 shares none of the physical properties with water -- it isn't a liquid, it doesn't boil at 100 degrees C, it doesn't have a density of 0.99707, its surface tension doesn't exist, and it doesn't put fires out. So, H20 isn't water in any sense of the term that I can see.

You tell us that "The point is that both chemists and a 12 year old are referring to the same thing when they use "water."", when this is not relevant, since they soon learn that it isn't H20, just as they soon learn that the structure of the atom isn't a mini-solar system. Are you now going to argue that the atom is still a mini solar system because that is what 12 years olds are taught?

Then you try this one: "The meaning of "water" doesn't change because you learn more about it.", but this can't be so since, as I have shown, not even chemists believe that water is H20!

And the meaning of water" certainly changes for those 12 year olds as they learn that water nowhere in the universe is H20. And this is also true of chemists over the last couple if centuries as they have learnt more about it. This is bound to continue. Scientists are always changing their minds.


In regard to referring, if Alfred says "Jack smokes cigarettes outside the doors of the factory and so does Suzette," people could say "Alfred was referring to smoking outside the factory doors." People do this all the time.

Your rigidification of "refer" to only refer to names has a certain history in academic philosophy, going back to Gottlob Frege, and was based on his semantical theories. And Frege was a Platonist and a believer in apriori theorizing, so the Fregean tradition isn't something you should be defending.

I pointed out that the word "refer" has many meanings, so I can agree with you about what Alfred says while still disagreeing with you about the alleged referential role of all noun phrases -- which you have yet to show are always referring expressions. Moreover, your example isn't typical, since smoking is publicly performed, in the open. This is not so with brain states. Other than those who are in the grip of a scientistic theory, no one will agree that when Alfred says: "I believe that Jack smokes cigarettes outside the doors of the factory and so does Suzette" that he is referring to a brain state.

And my claim that unambiguous referring expressions in no way depends on Frege (anyway Mill had argued something similar before Frege); it depends on the use of ordinary language which predates both of these, and predates even Plato (who, I think, was the first theorist to broach this subject). Hence, if asked, "Who are you referring to?", we point to individuals, use demonstrative pronouns, proper names, or a definite descriptions. We do not use just any old noun or verb phrase.

Anyway, Quine ended up a Platonist, so you should not be defending his theories. And Chomsky is a Cartesian rationalist (and thus an idealist), so you have no room to point any fingers at me (especially since I am not following Frege here).


So now you say that words like "believes" or "beliefs", "thinking" or "thoughts", "perceiving" etc don't refer to anything. Well, that is a problem. We in fact refer to these states...perceptions people have, what they believe, their desires etc...to explain the behavior of people. Things that aren't real entities can't enter into explanatory relations with other activities, processes, events.

I gave you examples of words that do not refer to anything physical, so science deals with such concepts all the time, and I remarked that you should not therefore be surprised that words like "believe" do not refer.


These sorts of processes and states and abilities in people are studied extensively by experimental psychologists.

Scientists used to study Phlogiston, Caloric and the four humours, but that does not imply that these words referred to anything, same here. I agree with Wittgenstein who remarked that psychology is a combination of experimental procedures and conceptual confusion.


Well, apparently you don't understand referential opacity since my little argument here does not attempt to grab hold of something referred to inside the scope of "believes that". For example, referential opacity is relevant for this kind of inference:

Thomas believes that Stuart is a police spy.
Stuart is the rector of the university.
Hence, Thomas believes that the rector of the university is a police spy.

This is an invalid inference. Thomas might not know that Stuart is the rector of the university. In this case the quantification grabs hold of "Stuart" in the first sentence. The referential opacity in the first sentence refers to expressions inside the scope of "believes that". In the case of the example I gave, we're not trying to grab hold of any referring expression inside the scope of "believes that" to quantify on it.

And yet your conclusion does attempt to access the content of opaque clauses


Jack believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Henry believes that Zante's makes pizza.
Hence, there is something that Jack and Henry both believe.

Without that, you cannot conclude validly that there is something they both believe, since there might not be.

For example, Jack might believe that a grill that is actually called "Pete's" is what he thinks is Zante's (he's got the reference of this name wrong), so that what he in fact believes is that Pete's makes pizza. And, Henry might believe that Zante's makes something he calls pizza, which turns out not to be pizza but tortillas (he too got the name wrong). So there is nothing here they both believe.

But you argue:


In the case of the example I gave, we're not trying to grab hold of any referring expression inside the scope of "believes that" to quantify on it.

But your conclusion does precisely that; it has to, to obtain the clause "something that Jack and Henry both believe."

[ComradeMan]

This thread is interesting.....:cool:

[syndicat]

Rosa, You're desperately repeating yourself. I think we're done here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


Rosa, You're desperately repeating yourself. I think we're done here.

Chickened out again, I see.

As if you never repeat yourself.

In fact, you said more or less the same in the Wittgenstein thread -- where, purely 'coincidentally', I was also able to refute your arguments:


okay, now you're prevaricating. time to say bye bye.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1613924&postcount=42

In fact, this was largely new:


and to add to your difficulties, a molecule of H20 shares none of the physical properties with water -- it isn't a liquid, it doesn't boil at 100 degrees C, it doesn't have a density of 0.99707, its surface tension doesn't exist, and it doesn't put fires out. So, H20 isn't water in any sense of the term that I can see.

You tell us that "The point is that both chemists and a 12 year old are referring to the same thing when they use "water."", when this is not relevant, since they soon learn that it isn't H20, just as they soon learn that the structure of the atom isn't a mini-solar system. Are you now going to argue that the atom is still a mini solar system because that is what 12 years olds are taught?

Then you try this one: "The meaning of "water" doesn't change because you learn more about it.", but this can't be so since, as I have shown, not even chemists believe that water is H20!

And the meaning of water" certainly changes for those 12 year olds as they learn that water nowhere in the universe is H20. And this is also true of chemists over the last couple if centuries as they have learnt more about it. This is bound to continue. Scientists are always changing their minds.

So was this:


so I can agree with you about what Alfred says while still disagreeing with you about the alleged referential role of all noun phrases -- which you have yet to show are always referring expressions. Moreover, your example isn't typical, since smoking is publicly performed, in the open. This is not so with brain states. Other than those who are in the grip of a scientistic theory, no one will agree that when Alfred says: "I believe that Jack smokes cigarettes outside the doors of the factory and so does Suzette" that he is referring to a brain state.

And my claim that unambiguous referring expressions in no way depends on Frege (anyway Mill had argued something similar before Frege); it depends on the use of ordinary language which predates both of these, and predates even Plato (who, I think, was the first theorist to broach this subject). Hence, if asked, "Who are you referring to?", we point to individuals, use demonstrative pronouns, proper names, or a definite descriptions. We do not use just any old noun or verb phrase.

Anyway, Quine ended up a Platonist, so you should not be defending his theories. And Chomsky is a Cartesian rationalist (and thus an idealist), so you have no room to point any fingers at me (especially since I am not following Frege here).

And so was this:


Without that, you cannot conclude validly that there is something they both believe, since there might not be.

For example, Jack might believe that a grill that is actually called "Pete's" is what he thinks is Zante's (he's got the reference of this name wrong), so that what he in fact believes is that Pete's makes pizza. And, Henry might believe that Zante's makes something he calls pizza, which turns out not to be pizza but tortillas (he too got the name wrong). So there is nothing here they both believe.

So your weak excuse is no better than your scientistic 'theory'...

[syndicat]

Oh, and the bit about water: At best you showed that I had a false belief as to how chemists currently view water. That's completely irrelevant. From the fact that a child becomes a chemist and acquires more knowledge about what water is, it doesn't follow that he does not mean the same as any child on the street when using the word "water"...where we're talking about the public language meaning of "water." What it means...tracks in the world...is water. Their conceptions of water...what they believe about it...are different, but that can't be the public language meaning because conceptions of almost anything vary from person to person.

And the claim that "water" doesn't refer to water, that "believes" doesn't refer to believing, that "smokes" doesn't refer to smoking is laughably contrary to ordinary talk and speech...but you don't notice this because you're in thrall to the Fregean rigidification that came to have a grip on Anglophone academic philosophy. And Frege was a Platonist, apriorist and anti-semite (he supported the Nazis in the '20s).

But the what-chemists-really-believe-about-water deal was an opportunity for you to engage in a display of academic learning...the kind of academic egoism that is a part of the reason I'm no longer in the academic world. Anyway, bye.

[Paul Cockshott]

Do the discoveries of the later 20th century, especially in the area of quantum physics demolish the whole basis of any form of materialism as we have had up to now?

Materialism is a radically empirical philosophy that is based in the conviction that all phenomena originate from a physical cause and can be understood and explained through natural science. According to materialism, matter is the total explanation for space, nature, man, society, history and every other aspect of existence. Materialism does not acknowledge any alleged phenomenon that cannot be perceived by the five senses such as the supernatural, God, etc.

The requirement that things be sensible to us is not critical to materialism.

There are things that are too small for us to see, but that does not mean that materialism denies their existence.

materialism is quite simply the strict attitude of the scientist to the reality of his object which allows him to grasp what Engels called 'nature just as it exists without any foreign admixture'.(Althusser Lenin and Philosophy)


Now Lenin says in so many words that the distinction between the philosophical category of matter and the scientific concept of matter is vital for Marxist philosophy: Matter is a philosophical category (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, p. 130).
The sole property of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality (op. cit., pp. 260-61).
It follows that the philosophical category of matter, which is conjointly a Thesis of existence and a Thesis of objectivity, can never be confused with the contents of the scientific concepts of matter. The scientific concepts of matter define knowledges, relative to the historical state of the sciences, about the objects of those sciences. The content of the scientific concept of matter changes with the development, i.e. with the deepening of scientific knowledge. The meaning of the philosophical category of matter does not change,( op cit)









Probabilism demolishes determinism- we only can observe non-determistic phenomena governed by probabilities in spite of the "Multiverse" being deemed deterministic.
There are distinct ideas of a Multiverse some much more speculative than others. You have to be a bit more specific about who's ideas of the Multiverse you are discussing.

[Paul Cockshott]

Fuck, I would venture to guess that even Albert Einstein himself may have been influenced by the materialist conception of history in his physics and theoretical astronomy ("guess" because what I know of those sciences is so rudimentary as to make a college phys professor laugh out loud).
You may be right on Einstein see: http://www.monthlyreview.org/598einstein.php

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I'm not a chemist. However, I will argue that water=H20 because I'm bored. Here I go:

Firstly, I'm using a casual conception of naming. If I refer to Clark Kent, I'm referring to the physical person. For my purposes, Clark Kent is alive. He is also Superman. The identity superman supervenes on Clark Kent. In other words, it requires Clark Kent to exist.

Clark Kent is independent of Superman, but Superman requires Clark Kent to exist. I'll also say Superman is not an independent identity. Water supervenes on H20. It does not exist independently of H20 while H20 can exist independently of it.

My favorite car does not exist without me. It's just a car. However, I exist without my favorite car. While we can "conceive" of water without H20, this is not convincing evidence. Epistemologically, water may appear independent of H20. However when we look at the world, it appears that this is not the case.

Presentations of a particular object should not be considered independent objects. While supervenience typically concedes that the supervening phenomenon is an actual identity, I don't think this is true. Identities are not presentations of objects. Identities are the sum of the possible presentations of an object.

Me with a hat, shoes... etc = Me

I might be defeated by some sort of chemistry I am unaware of, but that's alright. Or I might be defeated because I think I blended too my strange philosophies together in a rather incoherent way.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat (I thought we "were done" -- looks like we can't believe much you say!):


Oh, and the bit about water: At best you showed that I had a false belief as to how chemists currently view water. That's completely irrelevant. From the fact that a child becomes a chemist and acquires more knowledge about what water is, it doesn't follow that he does not mean the same as any child on the street when using the word "water"...where we're talking about the public language meaning of "water." What it means...tracks in the world...is water. Their conceptions of water...what they believe about it...are different, but that can't be the public language meaning because conceptions of almost anything vary from person to person.

It's not irrelevant since no chemist believes that water is H20, and no sample of water in the universe is H20, so the word "water" can't refer to H20.


From the fact that a child becomes a chemist and acquires more knowledge about what water is, it doesn't follow that he does not mean the same as any child on the street when using the word "water"...where we're talking about the public language meaning of "water."

I agree, but I nowhere claimed this -- so if we are looking for 'irrelevant' comments, you are definitely the Daddy.

Moreover, not even chemistry students believe that water is H20 (unless they want to flunk Chemistry 101).


What it means...tracks in the world...is water.

Maybe so, but this is not H20, as you asserted it was.


And the claim that "water" doesn't refer to water, that "believes" doesn't refer to believing, that "smokes" doesn't refer to smoking is laughably contrary to ordinary talk and speech...but you don't notice this because you're in thrall to the Fregean rigidification that came to have a grip on Anglophone academic philosophy. And Frege was a Platonist, apriorist and anti-semite (he supported the Nazis in the '20s).

Well, I have already denied this Fregean attribution, here it is again (since you appear to have missed it):


And my claim that unambiguous referring expressions in no way depends on Frege (anyway Mill had argued something similar before Frege); it depends on the use of ordinary language which predates both of these, and predates even Plato (who, I think, was the first theorist to broach this subject). Hence, if asked, "Who are you referring to?", we point to individuals, use demonstrative pronouns, proper names, or a definite descriptions. We do not use just any old noun or verb phrase.

Now, I have given you a perfectly ordinary use of referring expressions here, so I am not using a theory -- just reminding you of what you already know (as Wittgenstein would have put it), since that is how you would respond if asked "And who are you referring to?"

Furthermore, have nowhere said that noun phrases of the sort you use are never referring expressions (only that they can't always be). But if verb phrases are to refer they have to be nominalised in some way. We need to see you explain how "smokes" can refer without this happening.


And Frege was a Platonist, apriorist and anti-semite (he supported the Nazis in the '20s)

Oh dear, bottom of the barrel time, I see!

Are you yet another a victim of the genetic fallacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_fallacy), I wonder?

If not, why mention the less reputable aspects of Frege's biography? [Anyway, the extent of Frege's alleged 'support' for the Nazis is one reference in his diaries, to the effect that "Hitler has a few good ideas on this...". That's all!]


But the what-chemists-really-believe-about-water deal was an opportunity for you to engage in a display of academic learning...the kind of academic egoism that is a part of the reason I'm no longer in the academic world. Anyway, bye.

In other words, you failed to do your homework. And I am not an academic, but a worker, as have told you before.


Anyway, bye

You keep repeating yourself...:rolleyes:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul, thanks for those comments, but I have shown how confused Lenin's (a priori and dogmatic) ideas are about what materialism is, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13%2001.htm

I have also shown how crass his arguments are (what few we can find in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism), here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/did-lenin-believe-t70368/index.html

To save you looking, here it is again:


Did Lenin believe in Santa Claus?

Apparently so, since he argued as follows:



"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imagined, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it." [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p.69 (http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/one3.htm). Bold emphasis added. Cf., also p.279 (http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/four6.htm).]


This can only mean that if you can form an image of something in your mind, it must exist in reality!

So, not only are there unicorns and hob-goblins in Lenin's universe, it is graced with Big Foot and dear old Santa.


You can read the ensuing sh*t storm from Lenin's highly emotional champions here at RevLeft, at the above link -- where you will also see how I succeeded in batting out of the park all their attempts to defend him.

[And I say that as a Leninist!]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Firstly, I'm using a casual conception of naming. If I refer to Clark Kent, I'm referring to the physical person. For my purposes, Clark Kent is alive. He is also Superman. The identity superman supervenes on Clark Kent. In other words, it requires Clark Kent to exist.

Clark Kent is independent of Superman, but Superman requires Clark Kent to exist. I'll also say Superman is not an independent identity. Water supervenes on H20. It does not exist independently of H20 while H20 can exist independently of it.

But is there a causal link in the case of water? If there is, you unwisely omitted the details.


My favorite car does not exist without me. It's just a car. However, I exist without my favorite car. While we can "conceive" of water without H20, this is not convincing evidence. Epistemologically, water may appear independent of H20. However when we look at the world, it appears that this is not the case.

Presentations of a particular object should not be considered independent objects. While supervenience typically concedes that the supervening phenomenon is an actual identity, I don't think this is true. Identities are not presentations of objects. Identities are the sum of the possible presentations of an object.

Me with a hat, shoes... etc = Me

I might be defeated by some sort of chemistry I am unaware of, but that's alright. Or I might be defeated because I think I blended too my strange philosophies together in a rather incoherent way.

Ok, but I am not sure how this shows that water is H20!

You also need to answer my objections to this thesis (found in my replies to Syndicat).

[Meridian]

There is a way to differ between substantives (so, apparently these are called nouns in English) when it comes to mass and counting. You are probably aware of this but thought it may be relevant.

It basically is something like this (this would be a cumulative reference):
[(a > X) & (b > X)] & [(a & b) > X)]
If both a and b gives X, and a and b combined gives X, then you have a cumulative reference.

Example: If two separate entities (a and b; these can in reality be e.g. 'a puddle' and 'an ocean') can be called 'water', then combining them will yield more 'water'.

The symbolism for something without cumulative reference would thus be something like:
[(a > X) & (b > X)] & ~[(a & b) > X)]
If both a and b gives X, and a and b combined does not yield X, then you do not have cumulative reference. These are "countable" nouns.

[Revy]

Not everyone accepts quantum mechanics, it is not a universally accepted theory, although I am no expert it seems quite nonsensical to me and often bases itself on absurd ideas. For example, these "theoretical physicists" will say things like people can exist in different places at the same time, or that if you can't see something , it cannot be said to really exist. I think this has been referred to as anti-realism.

For example, Shrödinger's cat. If not for the approval of scientists, the idea that any cat can be simultaneously alive and dead seems almost like a religious idea. And it's supposed to be related to abstract ideas of parallel universes for which there is no evidence.

This might seem controversial to say, but I believe quantum mechanics is a realm of fantasy which has manipulated the scientific community.

[New Tet]

Not everyone accepts quantum mechanics, it is not a universally accepted theory, although I am no expert it seems quite nonsensical to me and often bases itself on absurd ideas. For example, these "theoretical physicists" will say things like people can exist in different places at the same time, or that if you can't see something , it cannot be said to really exist. I think this has been referred to as anti-realism.

Which "theoretical physicists" say that?


For example, Shrödinger's cat. If not for the approval of scientists, the idea that any cat can be simultaneously alive and dead seems almost like a religious idea. And it's supposed to be related to abstract ideas of parallel universes for which there is no evidence.

I looked it up and Schrodinger's cat is still a mystery to me, even after I read this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_cat


This might seem controversial to say, but I believe quantum mechanics is a realm of fantasy which has manipulated the scientific community.

I wouldn't know, but the idea that all matter in the universe travels through space in the form of a string or a set of strings is intriguing.

[black magick hustla]

Not everyone accepts quantum mechanics, it is not a universally accepted theory, although I am no expert it seems quite nonsensical to me and often bases itself on absurd ideas. For example, these "theoretical physicists" will say things like people can exist in different places at the same time, or that if you can't see something , it cannot be said to really exist. I think this has been referred to as anti-realism.

For example, Shrödinger's cat. If not for the approval of scientists, the idea that any cat can be simultaneously alive and dead seems almost like a religious idea. And it's supposed to be related to abstract ideas of parallel universes for which there is no evidence.

This might seem controversial to say, but I believe quantum mechanics is a realm of fantasy which has manipulated the scientific community.

lol this is crazy talk.

without quantum mechanics there would not be solar panels, nanotechnology, or spectroscopy. quantum mechanics is one of the most succesful scientific theories we have.

what you might mean is the wild interpretations people give it. i believe qm is more of a tool that yields correct predictions rather than thinking about density "wave functions" really being there.

[mikelepore]

Not everyone accepts quantum mechanics, it is not a universally accepted theory, although I am no expert it seems quite nonsensical to me and often bases itself on absurd ideas. For example, these "theoretical physicists" will say things like people can exist in different places at the same time,

Thomas Young's double slit experiment demonstrated that something can "exist in different places at the same time." A single particle must have passed though both of two openings, because the pattern produced on the other side of the barrier shows the interference of two waves that have emerged from both openings. The difference between an electron doing this and a person doing this is a matter of having vastly different values for their de Broglie wavelengths, and therefore a quantitative difference in probability. Instead of saying that a person can't undergo that kind of diffraction, they say that it can happen, and that it's so improbable that it will almost certainly never happen in the entire history of the universe.

I hope you're not making this judgement based on that crackpot Michio Kaku. He's a sellout in terms of science education. He's an actual physics professor, but, in order to get invited to appear on TV, he talks, not about actual science, but instead about building time machines, warp drives, and Luke Skywalker's lightsaber.


or that if you can't see something , it cannot be said to really exist. I think this has been referred to as anti-realism.

That kind of talk about reality or existence mainly comes from people who are influence by the popular paperback books that mention the Copenhagen interpretation with an elementary school degree of sophistication.


For example, Shrödinger's cat. If not for the approval of scientists, the idea that any cat can be simultaneously alive and dead seems almost like a religious idea. And it's supposed to be related to abstract ideas of parallel universes for which there is no evidence.

Schrodinger proposed the cat story to illustrate what's _wrong_ with the human-centrist claims about quantum mechanics. There are a number of things inside the box that would collapse the wave function long before any person has an occasion to open the box, including the Geiger counter and the cat. If you need an observer, the Geiger counter and the cat are observers. In almost any classroom we would hear that the fate of the cat doesn't depend on a human observer. What they may say on the Science Channel or in Discover Magazine is another story.


This might seem controversial to say, but I believe quantum mechanics is a realm of fantasy which has manipulated the scientific community.

The way the popularizers and mass media talk about it, you're right. But not the way the college textbooks talk about it. There is evidence for the principles of quantum mechanics. For example, the electronic component called a tunnel diode works because there is a potential energy barrier that is so high that no electron can get over it, and in practice that means that a small percentage of the electrons suddenly appear on the other side. That's what QM is really for -- to explain observed results.