Could Soviet Union win a war against an invasion from Nazi Germany in 1940?

[Bankotsu]

Let us say that in 1939, Hitler accepted the non-aggression pact proposed by Britain and the conflict with Poland was resolved through a "second munich".

Danzig and polish corridor given to Germany and Poland reduced to a vassal of Germany.

In 1940, Hitler then instigated a political crisis with Soviet Union and launched an invasion of the Soviet Union by driving across the baltic states and into the Soviet.

Could Soviet Union win a war against an invasion from Nazi Germany in 1940?


Hitler in 1939 agrees to the british proposed "second munich":




It was not possible to conceal these activities completely from the public, and, indeed, government spokesmen referred to them occasionally in trial balloons.

On 3 May, Chamberlain suggested an Anglo-German non-aggression pact, although only five days earlier Hitler had denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934.

As late as 28 August, Sir Nevile Henderson offered Germany a British alliance if she were successful in direct negotiations with the Poles.

This, however, was a personal statement and probably went further than Halifax would have been willing to go by 1939. Halifax apparently had little faith in Chamberlain’s ability to obtain any settlement with the Germans. If, by means of another Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken it.

It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States.

For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland.

Instead, he sought to get nothing more than a unilateral Russian guarantee to Poland to match the British guarantee to the same country. This was much too dangerous for Russia to swallow, since it would leave her with a commitment which could lead to war and with no promise of British aid to her if she were attacked directly, after a Polish settlement, or indirectly across the Baltic States.

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html





http://members.tele2.nl/gerardvonhebel/euro1939%201.GIF

Germany attacks Soviet Union by driving across the baltic states into Russia in 1940.

Could Soviet Union win a war against an invasion from Nazi Germany in 1940?

[Dimentio]

There is a reason why Germany attacked in 1941 and not in 1940. The war in the west ended on the 22nd of June 1940 with the fall of Paris. Such a massive redeployment would not be finished until the autumn, and only a fraction of the German troops held the eastern border.

I Hitler had attacked the USSR in 1940, the war would probably be over quicker.

[Bankotsu]

There is a reason why Germany attacked in 1941 and not in 1940. The war in the west ended on the 22nd of June 1940 with the fall of Paris. Such a massive redeployment would not be finished until the autumn, and only a fraction of the German troops held the eastern border.

I Hitler had attacked the USSR in 1940, the war would probably be over quicker.

Under this fictional scenario, there would had been no war with Britain and France, no invasion of Poland, no German-Soviet non aggression pact.

Under this scenario, there would had been another peace conference and Danzig and Polish corridor annexed to Germany and a non aggression pact signed between Britain and Germany.

[Dimentio]

The reason why Barbarossa wrought such havoc on the USSR was that it was acted out on a broad front. A German invasion through the Baltic States only would most likely have led to the councentration of too many German troops on a theater too small to conduct the same damage. I hold no doubt that the Soviet Union would lose a great many troops, but the Germans would never have reached Stalingrad.

[Bankotsu]

The reason why Barbarossa wrought such havoc on the USSR was that it was acted out on a broad front.

A German invasion through the Baltic States only would most likely have led to the councentration of too many German troops on a theater too small to conduct the same damage.

I hold no doubt that the Soviet Union would lose a great many troops, but the Germans would never have reached Stalingrad.


That's interesting because Mao Zedong in talks with Kissinger gave a completely opposite view:




Chairman Mao: But you are a German from Germany. But your
Germany now has met with an ill fate, because in two wars it has been
defeated.

Dr. Kissinger: It attempted too much, beyond its abilities and
resources.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and it also scattered its forces in war. For example,in its attack against the Soviet Union. If it is going to attack, it should attack in one place, but they separated their troops into three routes. It began in June but then by the winter they couldn’t stand it because it was too cold. What is the reason for the Europeans fear of the cold?

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans were not prepared for a long war. Actually
they did not mobilize their whole forces until 1943. I agree with
the Chairman that if they had concentrated on one front they would
almost certainly have won. They were only ten kilometers from
Moscow even by dispersing their forces. (Chairman Mao relights his
cigar.)

Chairman Mao: They shouldn’t have attacked Moscow or Kiev.They should have taken Leningrad as a first step. Another error in policy
was they didn’t cross the sea after Dunkirk.

Dr. Kissinger: After Dunkirk.

Chairman Mao: They were entirely unprepared.

Dr. Kissinger: And Hitler was a romantic. He had a strange liking
for England.

Chairman Mao: Oh? Then why didn’t they go there? Because the
British at that time were completely without troops.

Dr. Kissinger: If they were able to cross the channel into Britain
. . . I think they had only one division in all of England.

Prime Minister Chou: Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Also Sir Anthony Eden told us in Germany
at that time that a Minister in the Army of Churchill’s Government said
at that time if Hitler had crossed the channel they would have had no
forces. They had withdrawn all their forces back. When they were
preparing for the German crossing, Churchill had no arms. He could
only organize police to defend the coast. If they crossed they would
not be able to defend.

Dr. Kissinger: It also shows what a courageous man can do because
Churchill created by his personality much more strength than
they possessed.

Chairman Mao: Actually by that time they couldn’t hold.

Prime Minister Chou: So Hitler carried some romantic feelings
about Britain?

Dr. Kissinger: I think he was a maniac, but he did have some feelings
about Britain.

Chairman Mao: I believe Hitler was from the Rhine area?

Dr. Kissinger: Austria.

Prime Minister Chou: He was a soldier in the First World War.

Dr. Kissinger: He was in the German Army, but he was a native
of Austria.

Prime Minister Chou: From the Danube.

Dr. Kissinger: He conducted strategy artistically rather than strategically. He did it by intuition. He had no overall plan.

Chairman Mao: Then why did the German troops heed him so
much?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably because the Germans are somewhat romantic
people and because he must have had a very strong personality.

Chairman Mao: Mainly because during the First World War the
German nation was humiliated.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that was a very important factor.

Chairman Mao: If there are Russians going to attack China, I can
tell you today that our way of conducting a war will be guerrilla
war and protracted war. We will let them go wherever they want.
(Prime Minister Chou laughs.) They want to come to the Yellow
River tributaries. That would be good, very good. (Laughter) And if
they go further to the Yangtse River tributaries, that would not be bad
either.

Dr. Kissinger: But if they use bombs and do not send armies?
(Laughter)

Chairman Mao: What should we do? Perhaps you can organize a
committee to study the problem. We’ll let them beat us up and they
will lose any resources. They say they are socialists. We are also socialists
and that will be socialists attacking socialists.

Dr. Kissinger: If they attack China, we would certainly oppose
them for our own reasons.

Chairman Mao: But your people are not awakened, and Europe
and you would think that it would be a fine thing if it were that the ill
water would flow toward China.

Dr. Kissinger: What Europe thinks I am not able to judge. They cannot
do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant. (In the midst of
this Chairman Mao toasts Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord with tea.) What we
think is that if the Soviet Union overruns China, this would dislocate the
security of all other countries and will lead to our own isolation.

Chairman Mao: (Laughing) How will that happen? How would
that be?

Because since in being bogged down in Vietnam you met so many
difficulties, do you think they would feel good if they were bogged
down in China?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union?

Miss Tang: The Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: And then you can let them get bogged down in
China, for half a year, or one, or two, or three, or four years. And
then you can poke your finger at the Soviet back. And your slogan then will be for peace, that is you must bring down Socialist imperialism for the sake of peace. And perhaps you can begin to help them in doing business, saying whatever you need we will help against China.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is really very important that we
understand each other’s motives. We will never knowingly cooperate
in an attack on China.

Chairman Mao: (Interrupting) No, that’s not so. Your aim in doing
that would be to bring the Soviet Union down.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s a very dangerous thing. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: (Using both hands for gestures) The goal of the
Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia, the two continents.

Dr. Kissinger: We want to discourage a Soviet attack, not defeat it.
We want to prevent it. (Prime Minister Chou looks at his watch.)

Chairman Mao: As for things, matters, in the world, it is hard to
say. We would rather think about things this way. We think this way
the world would be better.

Dr. Kissinger: Which way?

Chairman Mao: That is that they would attack China and be defeated.
We must think of the worst eventuality.

Dr. Kissinger: That is your necessity. (Prime Minister Chou
laughs.)

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100316.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/

[ComradeOm]

Since when was Kissinger a military expert?

The reality is of course that Nazi Germany did concentrate its forces (as its doctrine called for) into three major thrusts. This strategy was highly successful but also relied on their ability to exploit the wide spaces of Russia/Ukraine in order to encircle and out manoeuvre the Soviets. A campaign conducted on a narrow front (ie, through the Baltics) would deny the Nazis such space and opportunities. They would have simply run into too large a concentration of Red Army formations while operating in less than ideal terrain

Let's not forget as well that historically the Germans were extremely successful during the early phase of the campaign. Tripling the number of divisions on the northern thrust will achive nothing that did not happen in 1941. What you will see however is a much more limited campaign that will spare most of European Russia for the ravages that it traditionally faced

Furthermore such a concentration of forces carries major disadvantages. How would these formations be supplied along such a narrow front? Historically the Germans were unable to adapt their supply chain when faced with much lower troop concentrations

[Bankotsu]

Since when was Kissinger a military expert?


According to Mao Zedong:

Chairman Mao: Yes, and it also scattered its forces in war. For example,in its attack against the Soviet Union. If it is going to attack, it should attack in one place, but they separated their troops into three routes.

Chairman Mao: They shouldn’t have attacked Moscow or Kiev.They should have taken Leningrad as a first step. Another error in policy was they didn’t cross the sea after Dunkirk.


So those are Mao's military views.

Here is an article arguing for a direct assault against Moscow to finish off the Soviet Union once and for all:

"The World Will Hold Its Breath": Reinterpreting Operation Barbarossa

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/hooker.htm


See also:

The Nazi Attack on Soviet Russia, 1941-1942

In planning his attack on Soviet Russia, Hitler used the customary German strategic concepts; these gave priority to the destruction of enemy armies over the seizure and occupation of enemy territory and resources. This destruction was to be achieved (and quickly achieved, according to Hitler), in a series of gigantic pincers movements of the double-arm type which had worked so well against Poland in 1939.

In these operations a huge outer pincers of armored-division spearheads and a simultaneous but smaller inner pincers of infantry-division columns would enclose a mass of enemy troops, the armored pincers cutting a large segment of these off from their supplies and communications while the infantry columns would slice up the enclosed mass of enemy forces into smaller masses willing to surrender.

This method was used, again and again, with extraordinary success against the Soviet armies, after June 1941, enclosing, and frequently capturing, hundreds of thousands of Russians at a time, but the very size of the operations used up Nazi men, materials, and (above all) time without inflicting any fatal blow on the Soviet capacity to resist.

Because of these German strategic ideas, no geographical objectives were given primary priority in the German plans. Secondary priority was given, at Hitler's insistence, to the capture of Leningrad in the north and to the capture of Kiev and the Caucasus to the south.

These geographical objectives were set in order to link up with the Finns and cut the Murmansk railway in the north, and to capture, or at least cut off from Russian armies, the Soviet oil centers in the south. The capture of Moscow was, by Hitler's direct orders, given only tertiary priority in the German strategic plans.

The German generals disagreed with Hitler's geographic conceptions, and insisted that Moscow be made the chief geographic goal of the German advance because it was the vital railroad center of European Russia; it was also an important industrial center, and contained the heart and brain of the whole Soviet autocracy.

Its capture would, according to the generals, cripple Russia's ability to shift troops and supplies north and south and would thus make it possible to isolate, for easier conquest, the Leningrad or the Kiev fronts. Moreover, its capture would paralyze the over-centralized system of Soviet tyranny, and strike such a blow to Bolshevik prestige that it would probably be unable to survive...

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/14.html#54


MAO ZEDONG:

CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE

1. The method of fighting by concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one must be employed not only in the disposition of troops for a campaign but also in the disposition of troops for a battle.

3. In the disposition for a battle, when we have concentrated an absolutely superior force and encircled one of the enemy detachments (a brigade or regiment), our attacking formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out all the encircled enemy simultaneously at one swoop and thus divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough strength anywhere, losing time and making it hard to get results.

Instead, we should concentrate an absolutely superior force, that is to say, a force six, five, four or at least three times that of the enemy, concentrate the whole or the bulk of our artillery, select one (not two) of the weak spots in the enemy's positions, attack it fiercely and be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the victory and destroy the enemy forces one by one.

4. The effects of this method of fighting are, first, complete annihilation and, second, quick decision. Only complete annihilation can deal the most telling blows to the enemy, for when we wipe out one regiment, he will have one regiment less, and when we wipe out one brigade, he will have one brigade less.

This method is most useful when employed against an enemy lacking second-line troops. Only complete annihilation can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and ammunition, but also an important source of our manpower. Complete annihilation demoralizes the enemy's troops and depresses his followers; it raises the morale of our troops and inspires our people. A quick decision makes it possible for our troops either to wipe out the enemy reinforcements one by one or evade them. Quick decision in battle and campaign is a necessary condition for the strategy of a protracted war.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_14.htm

[ComradeOm]

According to Mao Zedong:

Chairman Mao: Yes, and it also scattered its forces in war. For example,in its attack against the Soviet Union. If it is going to attack, it should attack in one place, but they separated their troops into three routes.

Chairman Mao: They shouldn’t have attacked Moscow or Kiev.They should have taken Leningrad as a first step. Another error in policy was they didn’t cross the sea after Dunkirk.


So those are Mao's military viewsWhich shows just what Mao knew (http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:PSjZLqlAaBsJ:stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA421637%26Location%3DU2%26doc%3D GetTRDoc.pdf+operation+sealion+failure&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShZyDdBLx4zj2he11aQDdwr6u8A9Lykd1B2epBy EE1ovmDqcZKrI3Gz2ybjbsSZFRsT73Axakx1QhJk-6Be0FGlNH_We94gclQmFIf_Ytq9PvdK-KKNuWbpOM0JjzykyZ-ikDSk&sig=AHIEtbQ-EQKO7D18E9rwebW034VKX3-SUA). About WWII at least. It was not a simple matter of crossing the sea

As for the idea of simply taking Leningrad, here Mao sucumbs to an even stupider view of Barbarossa. The basic premise of the Nazi plan was the destruction of the Soviet armies in European Russia. The purpose for this was the acknowledgement that Germany did not possess the resources to fight a lengthy war in the East. A secondary objective, following on from this, was the seizure of economically valuable regions (in particular the Ukraine) in order to sustain the Nazi war machine. There were good reasons for the relegation of the seizure of 'prestige cities' to a distant third objective


Here is an article arguing for a direct assault against Moscow to finish off the Soviet Union once and for all:

"The World Will Hold Its Breath": Reinterpreting Operation Barbarossa

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/hooker.htmAn article that rehashs many of the basic arguments. Needless to say, I am with the majority of historians and professionals that disagrees with this assessment. The Kiev encirclement was the greatest single Wehrmacht victory of the war and an advance on Moscow was impossible with over 600K Soviet soldiers sitting on the flank. The article overplays the importance of Moscow while assuming that merely reaching the city (one of the most heavily fortified in Europe) would secure success. This is while talking about a German army that failed to take either Leningrad or Stalingrad under more favourable conditions

I was amused by this passage though:

"This form of warfare demanded strong nerves and led to severe philosophical differences between the rising generation of panzer generals and their more conservative seniors. At issue was how the panzers should be handled: Should they be allowed to forge ahead into the operational depth of the defense, or halted to allow the infantry divisions to come up? Guderian, the founder of the panzer arm, argued that once a deep penetration had been achieved the panzers must be kept on the move--the enemy must never be allowed to rally.[34] His more doctrinaire superiors, virtually all gunners or infantrymen, strove to rein in the panzers, fearful they would be cut off, surrounded, and destroyed"

The great irony here, given the author's insistence that it was Hitler's 'meddling' that foiled the Wehrmacht, is that it was Hitler who sided with and gave free reign to this younger generation of generals. It was he who backed Manstein in France and who insisted that a short and decisive war in Russia. But then Hitler (and the weather) proved a useful scapegoat for those same generals who failed in their mission. Guderian, for example, was indeed allowed to keep his panzers on the move in a rapid advance but was forced into a number of rest days by this same pace of operations, lost the initiative relatively early, and finished up nowhere near Moscow. This was the panzer group, remember, that was supposed to encircle the city but ended up around Tula!

And, on a final note, the author assumes a historic three-pronged invasion strategy


MAO ZEDONG:

CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE

1. The method of fighting by concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one must be employed not only in the disposition of troops for a campaign but also in the disposition of troops for a battle.

3. In the disposition for a battle, when we have concentrated an absolutely superior force and encircled one of the enemy detachments (a brigade or regiment), our attacking formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out all the encircled enemy simultaneously at one swoop and thus divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough strength anywhere, losing time and making it hard to get results.

Instead, we should concentrate an absolutely superior force, that is to say, a force six, five, four or at least three times that of the enemy, concentrate the whole or the bulk of our artillery, select one (not two) of the weak spots in the enemy's positions, attack it fiercely and be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the victory and destroy the enemy forces one by one.

4. The effects of this method of fighting are, first, complete annihilation and, second, quick decision. Only complete annihilation can deal the most telling blows to the enemy, for when we wipe out one regiment, he will have one regiment less, and when we wipe out one brigade, he will have one brigade less.

This method is most useful when employed against an enemy lacking second-line troops. Only complete annihilation can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and ammunition, but also an important source of our manpower. Complete annihilation demoralizes the enemy's troops and depresses his followers; it raises the morale of our troops and inspires our people. A quick decision makes it possible for our troops either to wipe out the enemy reinforcements one by one or evade them. Quick decision in battle and campaign is a necessary condition for the strategy of a protracted war.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_14.htm[/quote]What possible relevance does this basic restatement of Napoleonic principles have? Except highlighting what the Germans actually did of course. Although note that the root of Soviet successes was their outstanding ability to raise and muster new armies of "second-line troops"