Wittgenstein

[Meridian]

After member Rosa Lichtenstein namedropped him I decided to read his first big work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

It's been a fascinating read so far. An eye opener when it comes to the way language and logic functions, and forms our understanding. A semi-quote, since I have a translated version anyway:
"We create images of facts. The collection of those facts is reality. The image is a model of reality. In the image, the elements of the image represents objects. That the elements in the image relate to each other in a certain way represents the objects relating to each other in this way."

What is interesting for me is how, and I have not given this that much thought until now, dependant traditional philosophy has been on the idea of sight (or the senses in general, but I have always felt we put alot of emphasis on sight) giving understanding beyond the framework of language.

Just thought I'd post this here, though maybe there have been topics about him before. I recommend Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and will read his Philosophical Investigations (his later major work, in which he supposedly critiques some of the TLP stuff) next.

So... Discuss Wittgenstein, his work, any critique?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well done trying the read the Tractatus! However, Wittgenstein deliberately left 90% of this book out, since he did not want to make things too easy for the reader.

And don't confuse 'picture' or 'image' with sight.

The very best guide -- and by a long way -- to the Tractatus is: Roger White's Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Continuum, 2006).

I can't recommend it highly enough.

The Philosophical Investigations is totally different, though, and you will find it hard to believe that it was written by the same man, but it is the most influential book on philosophy written, probably since Kant.

There is no comaparable guide to the latter work, but Anthony Kenny's Wittgenstein (Penguin Books, 2006) is the best so far -- but it deals with both books.

[ZeroNowhere]

PI is a lot easier to read, so once you make it through TLP you should be able to more or less breeze through it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yes, but PI is deceptively easy -- in reality it is nearly as difficult as the Tractatus.

[Meridian]

Well done trying the read the Tractatus, but Wittgenstein deliberately left 90% of the book out, since he did not want to make things too easy for the reader.

And don't confuse 'picture' or 'image' with sight.

The very best guide -- and by a long way -- to the Tractatus is: Roger White's Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Continuum, 2006).

I can't recommend it highly enough.

The Philosophical Investigations is totally different, though, and you will find it hard to believe that it was written by the same man, but it is the most influential book on philosophy written, probably since Kant.

There is no comaparable guide to the latter work, but Anthony Kenny's Wittgenstein (Penguin Books, 2006) is the best so far -- but it deals with both books.
Thanks for the recommendations!

I am not confusing sight with picture. I merely used sight as a representative of the senses, in the context of how philosophers tend to appeal to it when it comes to understanding the world. At least that is my experience of the matter, although not all are guilty of this. In doing so they often confuse themselves and everyone else by using unclear language.

[ComradeMan]

The very confusion here over use of words is very Wittgensteinian! :) I have read that book a couple of times, it's not light reading and can be quite tricky at times, with concepts to wrestle with that are not easy. As I don't read German, I have read it in English and Italian translation it doesn't help... I think certain things need to be read in the original language to be fully understood.

Wittgenstein certainly does make you think about things in a different way, even if I think that there is a slight flaw in that he (inevitably) discusses things from the mindset of a European and who's to say that other people's with language systems that reflect a very different worldview might not see things in a different way.
E.g.
Here's a fact-
The sky is blue.
Okay, Italians might say azzurro, English might say blue, Romans celest etc but we have more or less the same idea.
In Celtic languages I believe there is no exact word for blue or green but it depends on whether something is natural or not natural.
But these are not big differences.
However in some Native-American languages the sentence would be more like
The sky is being blue.
That changes a lot, it changes the fundamental nature of the fact. The fact which is a state of things is now an action in progress.
It's not an ideal example and I am not Noam Chomsky (I stand to be corrected on some of the points above) but I am sure you get my point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ComradeMan, these are precisely the issues Wittgenstein raises in his later work, leading him to revise the Tractatus radically

[ComradeMan]

Thanks Rosa, I must admit I have only read the Tractatus, so I stand corrected on the later revisions. Wow, Wittgenstein and I saw the same flaws!!! :D
Great minds think alike.... ha ha.

Thanks for the information, seriously!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, he saw problems with his account of simple propositions being logically independent and their supposed capacity to express states of affairs involving colour. He began to see this in the late 1920s, and by the early 1930s he concluded his earlier views were radically flawed, but he never totally repudiated all of his earlier opinions.

He also came to realise -- after long talks with Pierro Sraffa, the Marxist economist and W's friend -- that he had neglected what he later called an "anthropological" view of language, that is, that is was invented and used by human beings with a history. He later said the Tractatus was like a stopped clock that managed to tell the time 'correctly' only twice a day. He also came to see that language was a means of communication not so much of representation, as he had earlier thought.

[Hit The North]

He also came to see that language was a means of communication not so much of representation, as he had earlier thought.

What are the implications of this?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


What are the implications of this?

I have in fact explained all this before. Here is the skinny:

The ancient view of language (invented by priests and Greek philosophers) was that (1) language was the means by which 'god' made the heavens and earth (in many creation myths, 'he' spoke, and everything sprang into existence and stood to attention, 'obeying' various assorted 'laws' ever since) and (2) a means by which 'god' represented his ideas/commands/intentions to humanity (mediated, of course, by these ruling-class hacks). This connected the nature of the universe with human thought, and the form of the state with the deepest fabric of the heavens.

So, for such theorists, language was, or contained, a secret code by means of which human beings (or, rather, only those with the right sort of education and/or leisure time) could access fundamental truths about reality from language/thought alone, totally divorcing such 'knowledge' from material reality. Purely 'coincidentally' these 'divine' thoughts always seemed to rationalise the status quo and class division.

This view of language has dominated thought (East and West) ever since -- underlining how right Marx was to say that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class.

By way of contrast, if Marx and Engels are right (when they tell us that language is the product of co-operative labour and the need to communicate, and that we should return theory to ordinary language, because it is the medium that has arisen from a direct relation between human beings, and as a result of their attempt to control material reality), then language is not a secret code understood only by ruling-class hacks and priests. It also means that philosophy is not a sort of super-science, but an activity aimed at exposing centuries of ruling-class confusion and ideology expressed in traditional thought.

This makes the defence ordinary language a class issue.

Which, of course, explains my approach.

More here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

did say (in his later work) is compatible with it.]

[Hit The North]

Ok, thanks.

[narcomprom]

with Pierro Sraffa, the Marxist economist
the Sraffian economist :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Indeed, and Wittgenstein said this in the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations:


"Even more than this…criticism I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly practiced on my thoughts. I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book." [Wittgenstein (1958), p.viii.]

This is quite remarkable: the author of what many believe to be the most original and innovative philosophical work of the 20th century -- and one that, if correct, brings to an end 2500 years of traditional Philosophy -- claims that his most "consequential" ideas were derived from a man who was an avowed Marxist, and friend of Gramsci!

[JazzRemington]

Indeed, and Wittgenstein said this in the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations:



This is quite remarkable: the author of what many believe to be the most original and innovative philosophical work of the 20th century -- and one that, if correct, brings to an end 2500 years of traditional Philosophy -- claims that his most "consequential" ideas were derived from a man who was an avowed Marxist, and friend of Gramsci!

Evidently, Sraffa made made a "rude gesture" to Wittgenstein, remarking something like "what is the logical form of that?", that got him thinking.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, according to Norman Malcolm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Malcolm), Sraffa made a Neopolitian gesture with his hand (brushing the underside of his chin with the outside of his fingers in an outward sweep), saying: "What is the logical form of that?"

This non-plussed Wittgenstein, but it shouldn't have since it wasn't a proposition.

What it did do was suggest to Wittgenstein that there are many different forms of language and communication than he had allowed for in his earlier work.

[syndicat]

The now discredited "conceptual analysis" school of philosophy, which was at its apex when i was in college in the '60s, did seem to think there were some "meanings" that we could apriori grasp in the head. But they held this view despite being influenced by Wittgenstein to take ordinary language as a starting point, as their interpretation of his statement that "meaning is use." So it's not clear that philosophers in the post-WW2 period, when Wittgenstein was all the rage, did interpret it as a rejection of the old apriori tradition, as you suggest. I found the "Philosophical Investigations" anything but pellucid. "Conceptual analysis" and "ordinary language philosophy", through its attempt to rebuild apriori philosophy on the basis of linguistiic analysis, was atttempting to desperately defend the claim that philosophy had a special intellectual turf where it was okay to work in an apriori fashion.

When the old apriori tradition did come under attack in the '60s-'70s period, it was not thru Wittgenstein but through Quine and Sellars...old radical empiricists.

If we take seriously the idea that humans are evolved creatures and that our language capacity is a biological trait, this can lead to a materialist theory of language. And this does lead to the "defense of ordinary language" as you put it and a rejection of apriori knowledge. An American philosopher who has pursued this rigorously is Ruth Garrett Millikan with her approach that borrows some ideas from evolutionary biology. Millikan's theory completely destroys any basis for apriori speculation of the old variety but also defends realism and "ordinary language." Marx was essentially a scientific realist and so is Millikan. Marx assumes that there are such things as "laws of motion" in the world which we can discover. (Millikan's latest book is "Language: A Biological Model".)

Another interesting consequence of Millikan's theory is that she rebuilds something akin to Wittgenstein's Tractatus theory but on a purely aposteriori basis. That's because we will need to suppose that descriptive language has a biological function if it's a biological trait. Being able to convey information about the world to each other and coordinate cooperative activity was hugely adaptive for our species.

A good intro to her theory is in the little book by John Post "Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction". Or you can read my summary in the biosemantics supplement to my encyclopedia entry on "States of Affairs" at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy. My summary should also make clear the commonality between Millikan and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. So, in a way, you could say Millikan marries some aspects of the later and earlier Wittgenstein. On Millikan's view, there is no real distinction between philosophy and science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


The now discredited "conceptual analysis" school of philosophy, which was at its apex when i was in college in the '60s, did seem to think there were some "meanings" that we could apriori grasp in the head. But they held this view despite being influenced by Wittgenstein to take ordinary language as a starting point, as their interpretation of his statement that "meaning is use." So it's not clear that philosophers in the post-WW2 period, when Wittgenstein was all the rage, did interpret it as a rejection of the old apriori tradition, as you suggest. I found the "Philosophical Investigations" anything but pellucid. "Conceptual analysis" and "ordinary language philosophy", through its attempt to rebuild apriori philosophy on the basis of linguistiic analysis, was atttempting to desperately defend the claim that philosophy had a special intellectual turf where it was okay to work in an apriori fashion

1) How has it been 'discreditied'?

2) And where did Wittgenstein say 'meaning is use'?

3) And what is 'a priori' about it?


If we take seriously the idea that humans are evolved creatures and that our language capacity is a biological trait, this can lead to a materialist theory of language. And this does lead to the "defense of ordinary language" as you put it and a rejection of apriori knowledge. An American philosopher who has pursued this rigorously is Ruth Garrett Millikan with her approach that borrows some ideas from evolutionary biology. Millikan's theory completely destroys any basis for apriori speculation of the old variety but also defends realism and "ordinary language." Marx was essentially a scientific realist and so is Millikan. Marx assumes that there are such things as "laws of motion" in the world which we can discover. (Millikan's latest book is "Language: A Biological Model".)

And, you must know that scientific realism is no less a priori than anything you have described as such.


Another interesting consequence of Millikan's theory is that she rebuilds something akin to Wittgenstein's Tractatus theory but on a purely aposteriori basis. That's because we will need to suppose that descriptive language has a biological function if it's a biological trait. Being able to convey information about the world to each other and coordinate cooperative activity was hugely adaptive for our species.

A good intro to her theory is in the little book by John Post "Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction". Or you can read my summary in the biosemantics supplement to my encyclopedia entry on "States of Affairs" at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy. My summary should also make clear the commonality between Millikan and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. So, in a way, you could say Millikan marries some aspects of the later and earlier Wittgenstein. On Millikan's view, there is no real distinction between philosophy and science.

And yet, science is experimental, and philosophy isn't.

[Hit The North]

Sounds trite, but doesn't some philosophy conduct thought experiments?

[Meridian]

In TLP, Wittgenstein says that logic is transcendental, so there exists something which is a priori according to Wittgenstein. I see that as the foundation of the ideas in TLP.

[black magick hustla]

i dont know if he really said "logic is transcendental", but if he did, I dont think he meant it from a platonic viewpoint. Rather it is not necessary to elucidate about "logic" in the same way one elucidates if orbits are eliptical or not, but rather, that logical forms are self-evident and it is not necessary to philosophize about them.

if p is q
and q is w
then p is w

and this speaks for itself. "what one cannot speak of, one must remain silent"

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


but doesn't some philosophy conduct thought experiments?

Indeed, but these are no more experiments than socialist utopias are socialist societies.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


In TLP, Wittgenstein says that logic is transcendental, so there exists something which is a priori according to Wittgenstein. I see that as the foundation of the ideas in TLP.

Indeed, at 6.13 he said "Logic is transcendental", but this followed the following comment in the first part of 6.13: "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world". It is not a body of truths, and hence is not part of the a priori, but a conditions on our ability to express truth or falsehood. In that sense it transcends the world in that it allows us to state truths or falsehoods about the world. The propositions of logic are thus senseless, for Wittgenstein.

[syndicat]

me:

The now discredited "conceptual analysis" school of philosophy, which was at its apex when i was in college in the '60s, did seem to think there were some "meanings" that we could apriori grasp in the head. But they held this view despite being influenced by Wittgenstein to take ordinary language as a starting point, as their interpretation of his statement that "meaning is use." So it's not clear that philosophers in the post-WW2 period, when Wittgenstein was all the rage, did interpret it as a rejection of the old apriori tradition, as you suggest.

I found the "Philosophical Investigations" anything but pellucid. "Conceptual analysis" and "ordinary language philosophy", through its attempt to rebuild apriori philosophy on the basis of linguistiic analysis, was atttempting to desperately defend the claim that philosophy had a special intellectual turf where it was okay to work in an apriori fashion]

Rosa:
1) How has it been 'discreditied'?

When I studied philosophy in the '60s and '70s "conceptual analysis" was the dominant research paradigm in English-speaking philosophy. It no longer is. There is no longer any consensus on whether there even is such a thing as apriori knowledge.

It wasn't so much the later Wittgenstein who led to this change. It started with attacks on intellectual intuition and the analytic/synthetic
distinction by Quine and Sellars...two old empiricists.


2) And where did Wittgenstein say 'meaning is use'?

I'm not a Wittgensteinian. Although I spent years in philosophy grad school and taught philosophy there were certain philosophers I could never "get"...Hegel, Heidegger, Derrida..or the "synchopated pipings of Herr Wittgenstein's flute" (as CD Broad described the later Wittgenstein).

But his followers in the '50s/'60s period claimed "meaning is use" as a major Wittgensteinian position.



3) And what is 'a priori' about it?

I didn't claim there was anything apriori about the "meaning is use" doctrine. In fact Millikan and I agree with this doctrine. But it's been interpreted many different ways. I was saying that conceptual analysis is aprioristic. It assumes that we have some direct "intuition" of "meanings", of conceptual connections, direct access because "meanings" are in the head or "mind". This is tied up with the whole doctrine of the synthetic/analytic distinction.

me:


If we take seriously the idea that humans are evolved creatures and that our language capacity is a biological trait, this can lead to a materialist theory of language. And this does lead to the "defense of ordinary language" as you put it and a rejection of apriori knowledge. An American philosopher who has pursued this rigorously is Ruth Garrett Millikan
with her approach that borrows some ideas from evolutionary biology. Millikan's theory completely destroys any basis for apriori speculation of the old variety but also defends realism and "ordinary language." Marx was essentially a scientific realist and so is Millikan. Marx assumes that there are such things as "laws of motion" in the world which we can discover.
(Millikan's latest book is "Language: A Biological Model".)

rosa:

And, you must know that scientific realism is no less a priori than anything you have described as such.

There is no reason that realism has to be defended from an apriori position. Millikan's theory of language provides a defense of realism from a purely empirical basis.

me:

Another interesting consequence of Millikan's theory is that she rebuilds something akin to Wittgenstein's Tractatus theory but on a purely aposteriori basis. That's because we will need to suppose that descriptive language has a biological function if it's a biological trait. Being able to convey information about the world to each other and coordinate cooperative activity was hugely adaptive for our species.

A good intro to her theory is in the little book by John Post "Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction". Or you can read my summary in the biosemantics supplement to my encyclopedia entry on "States of Affairs" at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy. My summary should also make clear the commonality between Millikan and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. So, in a way, you could say Millikan marries some aspects of the later and earlier Wittgenstein. On Millikan's view, there is no real distinction between philosophy and science.

rosa:

And yet, science is experimental, and philosophy isn't.

What experiments do political economists, sociologists, archeologists, climatologists and geologists do?

Not all human knowledge exists in the heads of people called "scientists". That would be an elitist position. So it can't be that the only human knowledge is "scientific" knowledge.So-called "scientific" communities start with the basic cognitive equipment that humans in general have, and this means they have the ability to engage in various kinds of observations and reasonings. Abductive reasoning is essential to all the "sciences." This
means they employ the method of making hypotheses to explain observations and things known in their field of study. This is a form of human reasoning that all humans use. The ability and tendency to reason this way comes with having a human brain. It's just that "scientific" communities over time developed ways of applying these methods self-consciously and extending and evaluating their own tactics for evaluating hypotheses.

Constructing an experiment is one way to test a hypothesis. But it is not the only way to check or evaluate a hypothesis. Moreover, it happens to be a method that is expensive in the sense it takes time and resources to do. And sometimes it isn't feasible. We can't construct whole societies in a bottle, so to speak, to test hypotheses about, say, developmental tendencies of capitalism or some other social arrangement.

One way to test hypotheses is to consider if there is anything we know, or other strongly supported hypotheses, inconsistent with hypothesis H. If there is, that counts against hypothesis H. On the other hand, if H is a good account of a lot of other things we know and we don't have a better explanation of those things, then that counts in favor of H.

Millikan's theory of language, and her defense of "ordinary language" and of realism, are entirely empirical in the sense that the line of reasoning is thoroughly abductive. If we trace back the reasoning it is based on things like hypotheses and results in evolutionary biology, experiments and results in psychology, and results in sociology. Thus for Millikan there is no distinction between philosophy and "the sciences." There is no separately guarded turf of allegedly apriori insight and speculation called "philosophy". Why is her writing called "philosophy" then? Because she is defending realism in regard to truth...and theories of truth are considered part of "philosophy".

She posits states of affairs (facts) as the entities that make descriptive sentence tokens true. And ends up in a position similar to that of the Tractatus. This is an ontological position...and ontology is considered part of "philosophy"...but it is an aductive inference. It is an entirely empirical hypothesis. There is no particular reason that these topics should not be part of some socalled "special science"...it's just that they happen not to be. For one thing, truth is a very general concept that applies throughout human knowledge and life. It's not particular to the study of some particular aspect of the physical world...such as oceans or chemistry or animals.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


When I studied philosophy in the '60s and '70s "conceptual analysis" was the dominant research paradigm in English-speaking philosophy. It no longer is. There is no longer any consensus on whether there even is such a thing as a priori knowledge.

Once more, how does this 'discredit' ordinary language philosophy? And, what evidence have you that there is such a 'consensus'?

[Of course, Wittgenstein would have agreed with you about 'a priori knowledge'.]


It wasn't so much the later Wittgenstein who led to this change. It started with attacks on intellectual intuition and the analytic/synthetic distinction by Quine and Sellars...two old empiricists.

This was ably answered by Grice and Strawson -- and Quine himself later morphed into a quasi-Platonist.


I'm not a Wittgensteinian. Although I spent years in philosophy grad school and taught philosophy there were certain philosophers I could never "get"...Hegel, Heidegger, Derrida..or the "synchopated pipings of Herr Wittgenstein's flute" (as CD Broad described the later Wittgenstein).

Fine, but how does that show that Wittgenstein believed that 'meaning is use'?


But his followers in the '50s/'60s period claimed "meaning is use" as a major Wittgensteinian position.

This is your 'proof' that Wittgenstein believed that 'meaning is use'!?

Ok, which Wittgensteinians (in the 50s and 60s) argued that 'meaning is use'?


I didn't claim there was anything a priori about the "meaning is use" doctrine. In fact Millikan and I agree with this doctrine. But it's been interpreted many different ways. I was saying that conceptual analysis is aprioristic. It assumes that we have some direct "intuition" of "meanings", of conceptual connections, direct access because "meanings" are in the head or "mind". This is tied up with the whole doctrine of the synthetic/analytic distinction.

I was aware of this. However, my question was in fact aimed at your claim that conceptual analysis was aprioristic. So, once more: what precisely is aprioristic about it?


There is no reason that realism has to be defended from an a priori position. Millikan's theory of language provides a defense of realism from a purely empirical basis.

Scientific realism is still an a priori theory, even if some try to defend it with a posteriori arguments.


What experiments do political economists, sociologists, archaeologists, climatologists and geologists do?

Political economists test models against data. Sociologists do extensive surveys, and test social interventions. Archaeologists scrape away at the earth. Geologists do seismic surveys and take rock (etc) samples from all over the globe -- just to mention a few of the empirical trials and experiments these researchers perform.


Not all human knowledge exists in the heads of people called "scientists". That would be an elitist position. So it can't be that the only human knowledge is "scientific" knowledge. So-called "scientific" communities start with the basic cognitive equipment that humans in general have, and this means they have the ability to engage in various kinds of observations and reasonings. Abductive reasoning is essential to all the "sciences." This means they employ the method of making hypotheses to explain observations and things known in their field of study. This is a form of human reasoning that all humans use. The ability and tendency to reason this way comes with having a human brain. It's just that "scientific" communities over time developed ways of applying these methods self-consciously and extending and evaluating their own tactics for evaluating hypotheses.

I agree with much of this -- except I reject abductive reasoning (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abductive_reasoning), as you know, as a valid inferential form.

Sure, in every day life we might use something like abductive inference. But then we might not, and simply guess, or worse, defend a pet theory or a set of religious beliefs and/or other irrational theories. Even so, in ordinary life, our reasoning is often informed by secure intuitions we have about how the world works at the level of common experience.

This is not so in most of the sciences where researchers have to break new ground, and construct theories and hypotheses, many of which are counter-intuitive.

This is partly why, to date, the vast majority of scientific theories and hypotheses have been false, often wildly so. Hence, if scientists have used abductive reasoning, then it has been letting them down for many centuries. A pessimistic meta-induction applied here suggests we should distrust abductive reasoning (this is the best hypothesis for this long-term failure!), if, that is, scientists have in fact ever used it. [Do you have the sociological evidence that shows scientists always have, or still do reason abductively?]

This is not surprising in view of the fact that this is an invalid form of argument.

And, you must also know that there are empiricists who hold this argument form in deep suspicion.

Anyway, thanks for the other information, but I'm not sure it adds much to your case against Wittgenstein.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Just a random interjection. I wouldn't say Ordinary Language Philosophy is dead, but I am under the impression that it has declined in popularity. That doesn't mean I couldn't be mistaken (or that popularity reflects the value of it).

I think more than anything, the label has disappeared. I don't know why, exactly. There are a lot of philosophers who I like that are influenced by Wittgenstein. They tend to try to deconstruct philosophical thesis in favor of potential scientific explanation. Their philosophy is essentially an argument to the best explanation based on coherence and parsimony, rather than intuition and logical argument.

I have heard that Kripke is a modern challenge to some of Wittgenstein's views. I don't understand either of them well enough to explain whether or not that's try/how it is true. I've heard Parfit is an ethical opposite to Wittgenstein, but I think Wittgenstein just wasn't particularly concerned with ethics so this might not be a valid point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, Kripke's Naming and Necessity is perhaps one of the most influential books published in the last 40 years, and represents a serious challenge to much of the sort of philosophy practiced in the Wittgensteinian tradition, among others.

However, even more influential was his later Wittgenstein On Rules And Private Language, which helped rehabilitate one particular form of Wittgensteinian philosophy (the so-called 'Left-wing' school).

But, very few philosophers still practice classical ordinary language philosophy. You can find many of those that still do writing for the journal Philosophical Investigations:

http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0190-0536

[syndicat]

Kripke and Putnam's "Twin Earth" thought experiments were both important in the attack against internalist theories of meaning. Internalist theories of meaning assume that one has a direct intuition of meanings, that meaning is in the "mind". The kind of externalism advocated by Millikan leads to the conclusion that we only know about meaning empirically, as an abductive inference, that is, an inference to the best explanation.

if you think "ordinary language philosophy" was "empirical" how could that be?

I never said I was offering any "proof" in regard to anything about Wittgenstein. The word "proof" refers to deductive arguments which is hardly relevant in this case. I don't really much care what the later Wittgenstein "really" thought. I'll let the academics haggle over that.

Abduction is the method of making a hypothesis and then testing it. This is what experiments are designed to do. By an "experiment" I mean a controlled experiment. Political economists, sociologists, climatologists, and archeologists do not do controlled experiments. The methods you refer to economists, sociologists, archeologists, climatologists and geologists using are indeed empirical, but not involving controlled experiments.

If realism is defended solely with empirical methods, it isn't an apriori position.

The fact that abduction is not deductively valid is irrelevant. If we had to rely only on deduction, we'd never have attained empirical knowledge to speak of. That is not how humans learn about the world. Descartes' assumption was that deduction was the only way to justify a conclusion from data. That led directly to idealism and phenomenalism.

I only know of three broad kinds of method to justify a statement by inference: deduction, induction and abduction. If you've invented a new method, let us in on it. In practice scientists use bits of causal reasoning, statistical methods, modeling techniques and so on, as well as their practical understanding of what their tools enable them to detect. Statistical and causal reasoning are forms of inductive method. Induction itself can be justified abductively.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


if you think "ordinary language philosophy" was "empirical" how could that be?

Where did I say it was?


I never said I was offering any "proof" in regard to anything about Wittgenstein. The word "proof" refers to deductive arguments which is hardly relevant in this case. I don't really much care what the later Wittgenstein "really" thought. I'll let the academics haggle over that.

In any sense of the word "proof" (which, as you should know does not always require or connote a sound argument), if you have none, then why make the assertion you did about Wittgenstein?

Remember this is a thread about Wittgenstein, so if, as you say, you are not interested in his work, why post in it?


Abduction is the method of making a hypothesis and then testing it. This is what experiments are designed to do. By an "experiment" I mean a controlled experiment. Political economists, sociologists, climatologists, and archaeologists do not do controlled experiments. The methods you refer to economists, sociologists, archaeologists, climatologists and geologists using are indeed empirical, but not involving controlled experiments.

If realism is defended solely with empirical methods, it isn't an apriori position.

The fact that abduction is not deductively valid is irrelevant. If we had to rely only on deduction, we'd never have attained empirical knowledge to speak of. That is not how humans learn about the world. Descartes' assumption was that deduction was the only way to justify a conclusion from data. That led directly to idealism and phenomenalism.

I only know of three broad kinds of method to justify a statement by inference: deduction, induction and abduction. If you've invented a new method, let us in on it. In practice scientists use bits of causal reasoning, statistical methods, modelling techniques and so on, as well as their practical understanding of what their tools enable them to detect. Statistical and causal reasoning are forms of inductive method. Induction itself can be justified abductively.

The work that geologists, sociologists and the others you mention is 'controlled'; those engaged in these practices are highly trained, and do not just gather data randomly. What you seem to mean is that this work be done in a laboratory. But that would rule out much of evolutionary biology, astrophysics and astronomy. It's a rather narrow view of "experiment" that rules such core sciences out.

And, I know what abductive reasoning is, we have debated it before. I reject it partly for the reasons I gave in my last post. You need to address the objections I raised.

And sure, the fact that abductive reasoning is not deductive is not a decisive argument against it, but in view of the additional fact that, if it has been used by scientists (but we still await your evidence that they have used it, or are still using it), and most of their hypotheses and theories are now viewed as false, then it is plainly an unsafe informal argument pattern.

That itself is an inference to the best explanation, and since it is based on everyday reasoning, it is not subject to the sceptical remarks I made about this form of reasoning applied to scientific theory.

The argument is thus:

A: Assume scientists have used abductive reasoning in the past.

B: But, most scientific theories are false.

C: Hence, the best explanation for this is that either 1) scientists haven't in fact used abductive reasoning, or that 2) when applied in most scientific contexts, it's as unsafe an argument form as one could wish to find.

This is not deductively valid, but we have already agreed that that is not decisive.


If you've invented a new method, let us in on it. In practice scientists use bits of causal reasoning, statistical methods, modelling techniques and so on, as well as their practical understanding of what their tools enable them to detect. Statistical and causal reasoning are forms of inductive method. Induction itself can be justified abductively.

As the history of science has shown, scientists use all manner of informal and formal methods, many involving the use of analogy and (the extension of) metaphor -- a set of procedures that does not easily fit your old fashioned and a priori schema for scientific research.

And we still await your reasons (I hesitate to use "proof", you do not seem to like that word) why your earlier comments mean that ordinary language philosophy has been 'discredited'.


If realism is defended solely with empirical methods, it isn't an apriori position.

This is neither deductively sound nor abductively reliable. So what is it doing here?

[syndicat]

As the history of science has shown, scientists use all manner of informal and formal methods, many involving the use of analogy and (the extension of) metaphor -- a set of procedures that does not easily fit your old fashioned and a priori schema for scientific research.

Analogy is a form of inductive reasoning. Check any good text on inductive reasoning, such as Kathleen Moore's "Inductive Arguments." Scientists regularly use bits of causal reasoning...also a form of inductive reasoning.


And we still await your reasons (I hesitate to use "proof", you do not seem to like that word) why your earlier comments mean that ordinary language philosophy has been 'discredited'?

I take it that concepts are psychological abilities people have to identify things. This does not require necessary and sufficient conditions,,,which old fashioned Anglophone linguistic analysis was preoccupied with. The various things people believe about some item can be said to make up that person's conception of that thing. But people can communicate about things even tho they have different conceptions. When people learn about things, their conceptions of those things change. But the public language meaning of the word they use to refer to or talk about these things doesn't change.

The whole business of "necessary criteria" for applications of words has been refuted I think. Like the notion of the meaning of names being given by some set of criteria which the person believes or which are generally believed.

When I talk about criteria for applications of words or names I'm thinking for example of the views of Searle...who fancied himself a follower of Wittgenstein.


Quote:
If realism is defended solely with empirical methods, it isn't an apriori position.

This is neither deductively sound nor abductively reliable. So what is it doing here?

Assertion isn't an argument. Your statement above is a mere assertion. If a person's reasons for accepting statement P are all empirical, we'd say this is an empirical statement. For a person's statement P to be apriori, their reasons for accepting it would have to be apriori. If you have some other understanding of what "empirical" and "apriori" are, you'd need to spell it out.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


Analogy is a form of inductive reasoning.

I'd like to see your "proof" of that remarkable statement.


I take it that concepts are psychological abilities people have to identify things. This does not require necessary and sufficient conditions,,,which old fashioned Anglophone linguistic analysis was preoccupied with. The various things people believe about some item can be said to make up that person's conception of that thing. But people can communicate about things even tho they have different conceptions. When people learn about things, their conceptions of those things change. But the public language meaning of the word they use to refer to or talk about these things doesn't change.

The whole business of "necessary criteria" for applications of words has been refuted I think. Like the notion of the meaning of names being given by some set of criteria which the person believes or which are generally believed.

When I talk about criteria for applications of words or names I'm thinking for example of the views of Searle...who fancied himself a follower of Wittgenstein.

This shows that you only have a tenuous grasp of Wittgenstein's work. Where does he refer to "necessary and sufficient conditions" for the application of certain words, and where has this been 'refuted', even if he had?

Sure, Searle might have argued along these lines, but he was about as much a Wittgensteinian as Bernstein was a Marxist.


Assertion isn't an argument. If a person's reasons for accepting statement P are all empirical, we'd say this is an empirical statement. For a person's statement P to be apriori, their reasons for accepting it would have to be apriori. If you have some other understanding of what "empirical" and "apriori" are, you'd need to spell it out.

You seem to use assertion quite extensively. "Sauce for the goose", and all that.

And sure, someone might give only empirical reasons for accepting P, but the justification for that procedure cannot itself be empirical, or you have an infinite regress.

Moreover, the origin of P might not be 'empirical' but religious, as for example was the case with many of the empirical claims of scientists like Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, or a priori, like those of Einstein and Maxwell. These could be defended empirically, but that does not affect their a priori nature/origin.

[syndicat]

And sure, someone might give only empirical reasons for accepting P, but the justification for that procedure cannot itself be empirical, or you have an infinite regress.


well, this is not the case. abductive method could be justified abductively. you seem to be assuming that justifications are tidy chains of linear reasoning...but non-deductive reasoning isn't necessarily of this sort.

as to your abductive argument against abduction, if H is a false hypothesis that was accepted at one time, one needs to consider whether it was a better hypothesis than the alternatives...was it closer to the truth?

anyway, i have never claimed to be any sort of expert on the later Wittgenstein or even at all familiar with the PI. however, a very wide variety of people claim to have gotten insights from him. Searle and Millikan are very far apart philosophicallly...but both claim to have gained various important insights from W. as your claim to know who the "true" Wittgensteinians are, well, I don't really care.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


well, this is not the case. abductive method could be justified abductively. you seem to be assuming that justifications are tidy chains of linear reasoning...but non-deductive reasoning isn't necessarily of this sort.

I have assumed no such thing; I have merely pointed out that if it has been used by scientists, then they were ill-advised to do so, since it led them into inventing a set of theories over the last 2500 years that is almost totally false.

So, either they did not use this shaky method, or it is among the most unreliable ever invented by the human mind (when applied in the sciences).

[syndicat]

whatever methods scientists have used to develop their various explanatory hypotheses or theories, the same argument could be made I suppose against them. but as I said, it's about getting closer to the truth. the various criteria for evaluating hypotheses are to determine the most plausible or acceptable hypothesis.

you seem to think of abductive inference only in relation to scientific "theories." But there are many less comprehensive types of conclusions that are arrived at via abductive inference. When a doctor is trying to diagnose your ailment, the inference is an abductive one. And it will be a tentative one, in the sense that as new tests are run or changes occur in your condition as a result of taking certain meds, this may cause the physician to change the diagnosis...because it changes the relative plausibility of competing explanations.

this will be shown in practice. if we make assumption H and take action on that basis, there is a greater likelihood of problems arising if H is false, or farther away from the truth of the matter as it is relevant to our action. if we make assumptions that are relevantly close to the truth as far as this is relevant to our action, then we are less likely to encounter problems. and in fact we must make assumptions about the world in order to do anything. If I step of the street at the corner, I assume that the signal has not got some peculiar defect where it turns red for me suddenly 10 seconds later, or that somehhow the street isn't solid but really a mass of liquid tar. If these assumptions are false, then I will encounter some problems.

As to analogy being a form of inductive reasoning, this is assumed in any standard treatment of inductive logic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


whatever methods scientists have used to develop their various explanatory hypotheses or theories, the same argument could be made I suppose against them. but as I said, it's about getting closer to the truth. the various criteria for evaluating hypotheses are to determine the most plausible or acceptable hypothesis.

And indeed they are by us Wittgensteinians; that is why we aren't scientific realists.


this will be shown in practice. if we make assumption H and take action on that basis, there is a greater likelihood of problems arising if H is false, or farther away from the truth of the matter as it is relevant to our action. if we make assumptions that are relevantly close to the truth as far as this is relevant to our action, then we are less likely to encounter problems. and in fact we must make assumptions about the world in order to do anything. If I step of the street at the corner, I assume that the signal has not got some peculiar defect where it turns red for me suddenly 10 seconds later, or that somehhow the street isn't solid but really a mass of liquid tar. If these assumptions are false, then I will encounter some problems.

I've already covered this; here it is again


Sure, in every day life we might use something like abductive inference. But then we might not, and simply guess, or worse, defend a pet theory or a set of religious beliefs and/or other irrational theories. Even so, in ordinary life, our reasoning is often informed by secure intuitions we have about how the world works at the level of common experience.

This is not so in most of the sciences where researchers have to break new ground, and construct theories and hypotheses, many of which are counter-intuitive.

This is partly why, to date, the vast majority of scientific theories and hypotheses have been false, often wildly so. Hence, if scientists have used abductive reasoning, then it has been letting them down for many centuries. A pessimistic meta-induction applied here suggests we should distrust abductive reasoning (that is the best hypothesis!), if, that is, scientist have in fact ever used it. [Do you have the sociological evidence that shows scientists always have, or still do reason abductively?]


As to analogy being a form of inductive reasoning, this is assumed in any standard treatment of inductive logic.

Isn't argumentum ad verecundiam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority) unreliable too?

[syndicat]

the reference of the word "induction" is determined by how it is used, the kinds of arguments it is used to track or talk about, by those who use this word.

i don't know about the use of abductive method in the distant past...the word was coined by CS Peirce in the 1870s. It was thus in practice as a method among scientists at that time.

I don't know about hypotheses all being so wildly false. Ohm's Law for example is not false.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


the reference of the word "induction" is determined by how it is used, the kinds of arguments it is used to track or talk about, by those who use this word.

This sounds like one of those "necessary criteria" you anathematised earlier. :lol:

[syndicat]

Nope. I gave no criteria for what counts as an inductive argument. I already explained Millikan's theory about how noun phrases and verb phrases in descriptive sentences track features and objects in reality and how this is determined by the current critical mass of uses, of copying from others in use, the tokens thus forming a lineage.

historically "induction" is used to refer to inferences where the premises are thought to make the conclusion more plausible (or more probable) than not. So methods that assess the probability of a hypothesis are said to be inductive. because analogical arguments are not deductively valid but provide some support for the conclusion, this is why they are treated as an inductive method.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In fact, this looks very much like a 'criterion':


the reference of the word "induction" is determined by how it is used, the kinds of arguments it is used to track or talk about, by those who use this word.

It purports to tell us about the reference of a certain word, how it can be "determined".

A rose by any other name, in fact.


I gave no criteria for what counts as an inductive argument. I already explained Millikan's theory about how noun phrases and verb phrases in descriptive sentences track features and objects in reality and how this is determined by the current critical mass of uses, of copying from others in use, the tokens thus forming a lineage.

But, this:


the reference of the word "induction" is determined by how it is used, the kinds of arguments it is used to track or talk about, by those who use this word.

is about the alleged reference of a certain word, it's not about the:


criteria for what counts as an inductive argument.

So, once more:


This sounds like one of those "necessary criteria" you anathematised earlier.

Oddly enough, the words "hoisted" and "petard" come to mind here...

[syndicat]

The social function of noun phrases and verb phraes is to track features or objects in reality.

To say this provides no criterion for the application of any particular noun phrase or verb phrase. Moreover, the term "critierion", as used by the would-be Wittgensteinians, is meant to refer to a set of features that a person believes something has, and which is the reason for their applying the word to it. I do not assume that this is what determines reference. take "cat" for example. There is no particular feature or set of features a person has to have in mind to refer to a cat. They have to have *some* ability to pick out cats. But there need be no particular feature that is the "criterion" everyone must use. Thus if we're interested in the "meaning" of "cat", we can distinguish:

A's ability to pick out cats. This is their concept of cats.
A's conception of cats. This is all the things they believe about cats. This various from one person to another and can't possibly be the public meaning of "cat".
And then there are the cats...the actual objects that we use "cat" to track. It is the cats themselves that is the public meaning of "cat". Internal "critieria of application" maintained in the head never enter the picture.

But "induction" is one of those words that does actually have a fairly simple conception associated with it usually by logic teachers. It is typically used to refer to arguments where the conclusion is asserted not on the basis that it follows necessarily from the premises, but because the premises make the conclusion more probable than not.

And argument by analogy satisfies that conception.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


The social function of noun phrases and verb phrases is to track features or objects in reality.

To say this provides no criterion for the application of any particular noun phrase or verb phrase. Moreover, the term "criterion", as used by the would-be Wittgensteinians, is meant to refer to a set of features that a person believes something has, and which is the reason for their applying the word to it. I do not assume that this is what determines reference. take "cat" for example. There is no particular feature or set of features a person has to have in mind to refer to a cat. They have to have *some* ability to pick out cats. But there need be no particular feature that is the "criterion" everyone must use. Thus if we're interested in the "meaning" of "cat", we can distinguish:

Well, you are the one who introduced, and then anathematised against the word "criterion", but who then sought to give us "necessary and sufficient" conditions for its application -- and now those applying to noun phrases!

May I suggest that given the a prioristic hole in which you have now dropped yourself, that you stop digging?

And as much as I appreciate this a priori psychology:


A's ability to pick out cats. This is their concept of cats.
A's conception of cats. This is all the things they believe about cats. This various from one person to another and can't possibly be the public meaning of "cat".
And then there are the cats...the actual objects that we use "cat" to track. It is the cats themselves that is the public meaning of "cat". Internal "criteria of application" maintained in the head never enter the picture.

I am struggling to see its relevance to Wittgenstein.


But "induction" is one of those words that does actually have a fairly simple conception associated with it usually by logic teachers. It is typically used to refer to arguments where the conclusion is asserted not on the basis that it follows necessarily from the premises, but because the premises make the conclusion more probable than not.

And argument by analogy satisfies that conception.

Well, this all looks suspiciously like 'conceptual' analysis to me. Don't tell me you have back-sassed!

Stop digging for goodness sake!

[syndicat]

Well, you are the one who introduced, and then anathematised against the word "criterion", but who then sought to give us "necessary and sufficient" conditions for its application -- and now those applying to noun phrases!



okay, now you're prevaricating. time to say bye bye.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


okay, now you're prevaricating. time to say bye bye.

Cheek! You've been ignoring most of my arguments all along.

Anyway, I accept your capitulation.

[N. N.]

"And where did Wittgenstein say 'meaning is use'?"

Lots of places, actually. See the following posts of mine:

methodsofprojection.blogspot.com/2009/11/quote-of-day.html

methodsofprojection.blogspot.com/2008/03/meaning-is-use.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that. I'll check them out.

Ok, the first is from an unpublished manuscript, and so cannot be regarded as a considered thought of his.

The second centres around one of the few places in his published writings where he says this, namely the following:


"For, a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

This is the closest Wittgenstein came to connecting these two phrases, but even here he says this does not cover every case. So even this does not equate the two, as was alleged by Syndicat.

But then you quote these sections of the Investigations:


138. But can't the meaning of a word that I understand fit the sense of a sentence that I understand? Or the meaning of one word fit the meaning of another? – Of course, if the meaning is the use we make of the word, it makes no sense to speak of such 'fitting.' But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!

197. "It's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash." – And that is just what we say we do. That is to say: we sometimes describe what we do in these words. But there is nothing astonishing, nothing queer, about what happens. It becomes queer when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present. – For we say that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word, and on the other hand its meaning lies in its use. [...]

Bold added.

It is plain from this that, as was his wont, Wittgenstein is playing around with various ideas, testing them out, while not committing himself to any particular formulation.

And this tentative approach is consistent with his insistence that we avoid dogmatism in philosophy. On that see:

Kuusela, O. (2008), The Struggle Against Dogmatism. Wittgenstein And The Concept Of Philosophy (Harvard University Press).

You then say:


And in §30, Wittgenstein writes,

So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use – the meaning – of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear.

Again, Wittgenstein is playing with views he does not necessarily hold -- hence the "might" here.

You then quote his Philosophical Grammar:


But I might also say: the meaning of a word is what the explanation of its meaning explains.
[...]
The explanation of the meaning explains the use of the word.
The use of a word in the language is its meaning. (pp. 59-60)

But, this too was unpublished, and derives from a period in his life when he was toying with the idea that language was a calculus, a notion he later dropped.

You then quote the Blue Books:


The meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it. [...] We ask: "What do you mean?", i.e., "How do you use this expression?" (p. 65)

We are inclined to forget that it is the particular use of a word only which gives the word its meaning. Let us think of the old example for the use of words: Someone is sent to the grocer with a slip of paper with the words "five apples" written on it. The use of the word in practice is its meaning. (p. 69)

Again, this was unpublished, and derives from more or less the same period as the Philosophical Grammar.

He was clearly toying with these ideas in the Philosophical Investigations, but from a much less dogmatic angle, hence the tentative nature of much of the latter work.

You then quote Peter Hacker:


An alternative, more plausible possibility is to look for exceptions to this explanation of 'the meaning of a word' (cf. AWL 48 (see 2.1 below)). For the phrases 'the meaning of a word' and 'the use of a word' are not everywhere interchangeable. W. speaks of experiencing the meaning of a word, but one would surely not call that 'experiencing the use of a word'. He speaks of meaning blindness, but one could not speak of this phenomenon as 'use blindness'. This interpretation is reinforced by PLP 175f., where Waismann notes that 'the meaning of a word is the way it is used' is not quite correct, for their are cases where it seems forced. To remedy this defect, he continues, we need a detailed account of the grammar of 'meaning' as it appears in various linguistic contexts: i.e. an account of what it is to understand the meaning of a word, to explain the meaning of a word, for two words to have the same meaning, etc. W. emphasized that not every use is a meaning, and not every difference in use is tantamount to a difference in meaning. (Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part II, p. 120)
Posted by N. N. at 12:25 AM

I would largely agree with Peter here, except I would criticise both him and Wittgenstein for conflating the use of a word with the use of a sentence, which led Wittgenstein into formulating some rather odd ideas in his later work.

Moreover, they all fail to consider the many different meanings of "meaning"; here is how I put this at my site:


Of course, part of the problem here is also the fact that the word "meaning" itself has many different meanings:

(1) Personal Significance: as in "His Teddy Bear means a lot to him."

(2) Evaluative import: as in "May Day means different things to different classes."

(3) Point or purpose: as in "Life has no meaning."

(4) Linguistic meaning: as in "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", "'Chien' means 'dog'", or "Recidivist" means someone who has resumed their criminal career.

(5) Aim or intention: as in "They mean to win this strike."

(6) Implication: as in "Winning this dispute means that management won't try another wage cut again in a hurry."

(7) Indicate, point to, or presage: as in "Those clouds mean rain", or "Those spots mean you have measles."

(8) Reference: as in "I meant him over there", or "'The current president of the USA' means somebody different at least once every eight years."

(9) Artistic or literary import: as in "The meaning of this novel is to examine political integrity."

(10) An indication of conversational focus: as in "I mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% rise in the first place?"

(11) An expression of sincerity or determination: as in "I mean it, I really do want to go on the march!", or "The demonstrators really mean to stop this war."

(12) The content of a message, or the import of a sign: as in "It means the strike starts on Monday", or "It means you have to queue here."

(13) Interpretation: as in "You will need to read the author's novels if you want to give a new meaning to her latest play", or "That gesture means those pickets think you are a scab."

(14) Import or significance: as in "Part of the meaning of this play is to change our view of drama", or "The real meaning of the agreement is that the bosses have at last learnt their lesson."

(15) Speakers' meaning: as in "When you trod on her foot and she said 'Well done!' she in fact meant the exact opposite."

(16) Communicative meaning: as in "You get my meaning", or "My last letter should tell you what I meant", or "We have just broken their secret code; the last message meant this..."

(17) Explanation: as in "When the comrade said the strike isn't over what she meant was that we can still win!"

This is not to suggest that these are the only meanings of "meaning", nor that several of the examples given do not overlap.

I consider this and many other related issues here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm

[N. N.]

The Philosophical Investigations was never published by Wittgenstein. So, if we are to disregard his unpublished writings as not his considered thought, then we best disregard the Investigations.

Wittgenstein's use of modals (e.g., 'can' and 'might') usually indicates a correct description that, nevertheless, can be replaced by a different formulation of the same point. For example, in the Grammar Wittgenstein writes,


"I want to say the place of a word in grammar is its meaning.


But I might also say: the meaning of a word is what the explanation of its meaning explains.

The explanation of the meaning explains the use of the word." (p.59)

The two descriptions, namely, that the meaning of a word is its place in grammar and the meaning of a word is its use amount to the same, i.e., they are different formulations of the same point.

Certainly, there are some instances of 'meaning' that cannot be replaced with 'use', and therefore, the two words have different grammars. Still, their grammars overlap to a large degree. And in most philosophically interesting cases, they are interchangeable.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

NN:


The Philosophical Investigations was never published by Wittgenstein. So, if we are to disregard his unpublished writings as not his considered thought, then we best disregard the Investigations.

Sure, but he was preparing it for publication, so the form we have is the most definitive expression of his 'later' views there is.

But, even if you are right, and the Investigations is no more an authoritative source than the Blue Books or the Grammar, this just shows how tentative and fluid all his ideas were. To argue otherwise is to fall into the dogmatism that Wittgenstein enjoined on us all to avoid.


Wittgenstein's use of modals (e.g., 'can' and 'might') usually indicates a correct description that, nevertheless, can be replaced by a different formulation of the same point. For example, in the Grammar Wittgenstein writes,


"I want to say the place of a word in grammar is its meaning.

But I might also say: the meaning of a word is what the explanation of its meaning explains.

The explanation of the meaning explains the use of the word." (p.59)

I fail to see how this supports your claim that "can" always seems to mean "must" or "is".

And, this in no way supports the glib formula "Meaning is use", even if we take it as an uncharacteristically dogmatic statement of his unchanging and rigidly held views (an interpretation of Wittgenstein you seem to adhere to), for it equates explanation with meaning, not use.

Here we have what appear to be two inconsistent claims:


the meaning of a word is what the explanation of its meaning explains.

and


The explanation of the meaning explains the use of the word

This appears to me to mean (!) the following: if you want to know what a word means attend to its explanation. That will tell you why it is used that way.

This is so since the mere use of a word might not help one at all. Now if meaning were use, then an explanation would be superfluous, since the meaning would be plain from the use.

So, if anything, this militates against the simplistic and un-Wittgensteinian dogma: "meaning is use".


The two descriptions, namely, that the meaning of a word is its place in grammar and the meaning of a word is its use amount to the same, i.e., they are different formulations of the same point.

Now I tend to agree with this, since it focuses on grammar, a notion that cannot easily be reduced to mere use.


Certainly, there are some instances of 'meaning' that cannot be replaced with 'use', and therefore, the two words have different grammars. Still, their grammars overlap to a large degree. And in most philosophically interesting cases, they are interchangeable.

Well, this seems to depend on a notion of "philosophically interesting" which I suggest cannot be explicated in non-question-begging terms.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Incidentally, NN, at your excellent blog, you link to this article by Kuusella on non-dogmatism!

http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=817

In fact, it's worth re-posting here:


Oskari Kuusela on why Wittgenstein rejected theories

Ludwig Wittgenstein

A distinctive feature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is his rejection of philosophical theses and theories. Instead he comprehends philosophy as an activity of clarification. How he understands the contrast between this activity and philosophical theorising, however, is not immediately obvious and constitutes a disputed topic among his readers. Apparently symptomatic of this unclarity is that many of Wittgenstein’s interpreters in fact attribute various philosophical theories to him either explicitly or implicitly, against their own self-understanding. Either way, this constitutes a problem.

To attribute theories to Wittgenstein is to characterise his work as inconsistent, as containing a contradiction between his methodological statements about philosophy and his actual philosophical practice. Beyond scholarly concerns, to attribute theories to Wittgenstein is to miss out on the possible benefits of rethinking the nature of philosophy with him. More specifically, he claims to have found a strategy for avoiding dogmatism in philosophy, a problem he sees as intimately connected with philosophical theories. The problem of dogmatism thus understood might also be seen as one central reason why philosophy remains enmeshed in dispute, and doubts persist about its value.

Part of the difficulty of understanding what exact purpose Wittgenstein’s rejection of theories and theses serves is that he doesn’t explain as clearly as one could hope for in his published work what he means by philosophical theories or theses. Thus, for example, his rejection of theorising has been taken to mean that one shouldn’t hold any positive views about the objects of philosophical investigation. For many – presumably, including those who attribute theories to him – this would mark the end of philosophy, rather than a new beginning.

On the other hand, given that this interpretation is rather straightforwardly based on the assumption that the only way to have a positive view about something in philosophy is to have a theory, one might be suspicious about it as a way to understand a suggestion about how to philosophise without theories. And indeed, as a closer inspection of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts reveals, by philosophical theories or theses he means something quite specific. What is at stake then, arguably, is not a rejection of philosophy altogether. Rather, Wittgenstein is to be seen as responding to certain well-specified problems pertaining to the practice of philosophy, and as suggesting certain methodological adjustments as their resolution.

What Wittgenstein understands by the traditional conception of philosophical theories or theses is that they are statements about essences. Customarily, a thesis of essence is understood as a statement about a necessary characteristic of an object of investigation, such a characteristic being one anything must have in order to qualify as having a particular essence or as falling under a particular concept. Accordingly, a thesis of essence, if correct, holds universally for all objects that share an essence or fall under a relevant concept. For example, if it is of the essence of humans that they are rational beings, then in order for a being to count as human (in the full sense of the word) he or she must be rational. Correspondingly, Wittgenstein characterises a theory of the essence of wishing as one “which would have to explain every single case of wishing”.

Although there might be other types of statement that can be called “philosophical theses”, theses of essence in this sense are representative, to a great extent, of what has been understood by a thesis in the philosophical tradition. (They capture by and large what might be called “metaphysical philosophy”.) It is problems pertaining to theses or theories of this kind that Wittgenstein is concerned to address.

The dogmatism of theories and theses of the above kind might be characterised in the following way. In making a statement about what all cases possessing a particular essence or falling under a concept must be, a philosopher runs the risk of doing injustice to the actual manifoldness of cases that fall under the concept or are to be identified as possessing a certain essence. More concretely, given that a philosophical analysis of something can (as a matter of fact) be based on an examination of a limited number of examples only, in making her claim about what all cases must be the philosopher is at risk of coming to confer the characteristics of the examples she has actually examined onto the rest of the cases. Thus, however apt her characterisation of those actually studied cases is, when extended to cover every possible case that falls under the relevant concept, the characterisation is in danger of becoming a prejudice and a dogma that prevents her from seeing the objects of investigation as they really are.

Importantly, the difficulty is not merely a psychological one, pertaining to philosophers’ powers to convince themselves about the correctness of their own theories. Rather it is, so to speak, a structural one, concerning the kind of statement a philosopher is supposed to make. The danger of doing injustice to some cases here has everything to do with the philosopher aspiring to make a statement that applies to all cases without exception. It is this aspiration that makes it so difficult for her to acknowledge cases that, although they don’t fit the thesis, should be recognised as falling under the concept in question. For, from the traditional point of view, to acknowledge such exceptions is, basically, to accept that the theory has been refuted by counter examples (requiring revision, at least), or to admit that (as it stands) the theory has mere empirical validity, capturing some instances but not their common essence.

Accordingly, the worry about the dogmatism of philosophical statements is not that the philosopher might be generalising carelessly – and that she should base her assertions on a more representative sample of cases as scientists are expected to do. This would be the wrong kind of corrective move because empirical generalisations cannot, as a matter of principle, support the kind of universal, exception-less statements that theses of essence are.

But it would also not be correct to take the critique to be that there is something inherently wrong with philosophers analysing individual cases. What is problematic is the combination of such analyses with a particular assumption about the unity of concepts, according to which conceptual unity depends on the presence of certain features necessarily shared by all instances falling under a concept.

Granted this assumption, an analysis of a single case could indeed reveal something that holds necessarily of all cases falling under a concept. For, if all cases must share the same essential features, then, by revealing the essence of one case one has revealed the essence of them all.

Wittgenstein, however, questions this assumption about conceptual unity. The unity of a concept, according to him, need not be based on the presence of a feature/features common to all cases falling under it. The problem with philosophical theses then is that they take for granted a problematic assumption about concepts or essential features. This is the source of the problem of dogmatism.

Consider Wittgenstein’s famous remark according to which “the meaning of a word is its use in the language”. On a widely held interpretation, the remark states a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of words. Wittgenstein’s view, it is said, is that the use of a word in a language is constitutive of its meaning and determines what meaning a word has, whereby by “use” one usually understands an established, rule-governed use. A word then has a meaning only insofar as it has such a rule-governed use in a language, or its employment is parasitic on such uses.

Thus understood, Wittgenstein’s remark about meaning emerges as a statement about a necessity pertaining to the use of language. It aims to capture a rule of language that the use of the word “meaning” is claimed to be governed by. But to state that language use conforms to the rule “the meaning of a word is its use” is to claim that all instances of meaningful uses of words fall under the concept of meaning as defined by this rule, i.e. that there are no meaningful uses of words that aren’t rule-governed or parasitic on rule-governed uses. But, problematically, if one accepts the earlier characterisation of philosophical theories or theses, Wittgenstein’s statement about meaning clearly qualifies as a philosophical thesis. To state that having an established rule-governed use is necessary for the meaningfulness of words is to make a statement about what all the cases falling under the concept of word-meaning must be. Here the problem of dogmatism arises again.

Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s rejection of philosophical theories and theses is to be understood as part and parcel of a methodological innovation that consists of rethinking the role of philosophical statements, and is meant to release us from the problem of dogmatism. This methodological adjustment can be explained by reference to his method of stating rules for language use with the purpose of making it perspicuous. Philosophical definitions can be taken as examples of such rules. Notably, however, this method of the tabulation of rules is only one method of philosophical clarification for Wittgenstein, not the method.

A key insight behind this method is that, instead of constituting the object of the philosopher’s investigation about which statements are made, rules are to be seen as the philosopher’s means or mode of presenting language use. More precisely, according to Wittgenstein, rules (such as the one about meaning as use) articulate conceptions, pictures or models that can be employed in the clarification of language use. But such models are not deployed with the purpose of making any claims about how language is actually used, asserting that language use conforms to the rule exactly and in all respects.

Instead, the models are employed in the capacity of what Wittgenstein calls an “object of comparison”. This is to use a model to clarify specific aspects of the use of expressions by comparing the actual use of language with the model and paying attention to both similarities and differences between the model and the reality described (i.e. actual language use). Thus, no claim is made that all cases falling under a concept or identified as having a particular essence must be as the model presents them. Rather than being treated as a fact about the cases falling under a concept that they all necessarily possess a certain characteristic, it is a fact about the philosopher’s mode of presentation that it presents such and such as a necessary characteristic of those cases.

Here it is important that the goal of the activity of clarification, as Wittgenstein conceives it, is to resolve certain particular philosophical problems. This means that the correctness of philosophical models is relative to particular elucidatory tasks.

For example, the conception of meaning as use seems able to resolve certain philosophical problems relating to the concept of meaning. To name one, it does away with the need to postulate abstract objects that numerals stand for, which philosophers are sometimes led to postulate. But that doesn’t mean that one should, therefore, always regard meaning as something determined by the use of an expression. Arguably, there are aspects of the meaningful use of words which don’t fit the model of meaning as use, and Wittgenstein too recognises this.

For instance, the model doesn’t take into account the relevance of tone for meaning, although the way something is said can affect meaning in various ways. Notably, tone can convey meaning also in the absence of any linguistic conventions, as illustrated by the ways we use sound to convey emotion. If so, the model of meaning as use doesn’t capture the actual use of the word “meaning” as it is. Crucially, however, employing the model as an object of comparison one is free to use other models to describe such different cases. An object of comparison does not commit one to any exclusive theses about meaning.

A benefit of Wittgenstein’s method then appears to be that it leads to a certain increase in the flexibility of philosophical thought. Philosophers are released from a particular kind of asceticism which is a consequence of the requirement of their having to make the kind of sweeping statements that traditional theses of essence are. More specifically, the employment of rules as objects of comparison makes possible what one might call multidimensional grammatical descriptions, i.e. simultaneous descriptions of the uses of language from various points of view. Aspects of language that can be captured in philosophical theses only on pain of contradiction can be captured by using definitions as objects of comparison, because the employment of one definition as an object of comparison does not exclude the use of another one in the same capacity, unlike two different philosophical theses about a subject matter. An example is Wittgenstein’s characterization of language as an instrument designed for a particular (external) purpose and his characterization of its rules as arbitrary, i.e. not determined by any independently given purpose. Comprehended as theses these characterisations contradict and exclude each other.

Wittgenstein’s rejection of philosophical theories doesn’t therefore mean that he, or whoever adopts his method, couldn’t have any positive views about the objects of philosophical investigation. It merely means not presenting those views in a dogmatic manner, as theses that all relevant cases must fit. Importantly, there is nothing in principle that prevents one from making the kind of novel use outlined here of traditional philosophical theories too. This might then enable one to avoid problems to which those theories may lead when put forward as exclusive accounts of relevant matters. In a way, Wittgenstein’s approach, therefore, allows one not to take sides in philosophical disputes and to take onboard whatever might be correct in the traditional theories.

In this sense his philosophy is not anti-metaphysical, implying a rejection of what has been said in the metaphysical tradition of philosophy. His approach is, nevertheless, non-metaphysical in the sense that it constitutes a rejection of traditional theorising about essences and the essential features of things. To adopt his approach is, ultimately, to understand the role and status of philosophical statements in a new way.

Oskari Kuusela is lecturer in philosophy at University of East Anglia and author of The Struggle Against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy, Oskari Kuusela (Harvard University Press)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Now, you comment on this at your blog as follows:


The danger, it seems to me, is to interpret Wittgenstein’s rejection of dogmatism as a sort of aspectival relativism (as Gordon Baker does). Commenting on the famous meaning is use passage in the Investigations, Hutchinson and Read seem to head in that direction:


Indeed, we are not, it seems, obliged to define meaning in terms of use even in a “large class of cases,” we merely “can” for our purposes. (Phil Hutchinson and Rupert Read, “Toward a Perspicuous Presentation of “Perspicuous Presentation’”, p. 141)

This is a bit like infering from the fact that not all games involve winning that we are not obliged to define a large class of games as involving winning.

Well, we can define what we like, but then by doing so we are already half-way toward the dogmatism Wittgenstein eschewed.

[Meridian]

There are some concepts in TLP I am struggling with. Given my current understanding of logical symbols I do not understand his theory on how numbers form in our understanding (which I presume is what he means when he introduces numbers in his theory). Numbers are a big interest of mine, does anyone care shedding some light on this?

I am also a bit befuddled about the mystical he talks about; that which can not be spoken about. Maybe it is also impossible to define further, but does he here speak of metaphysical questions, and how could it be "shown" (or, how does it manifest)?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You will find ample illumination of these themes in the book I mentioned near the beginning of this thread.

The mystical sections were added after Wittgenstein's experiences on the Italian Front in WW1, where he had some sort of a religious conversion, and form no essential part of his core argument.

He has to discuss numbers since they have always formed an important part of science, and he is keen to show that they do not represent anything other than the way we take account of repetitive operations (aka counting).

One of his aims is to show that metaphysical propositions are non-sensical (that is, they are incapable of expressing a sense, true or false). What he says about 'saying and showing' is integral to his criticism of traditional philosophy, which try to say what language shows -- as he would later have put it, it treats rules of language as if they were truths about reality.

Wittgenstein's ideas on mathematics are excellently explained here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/

[Meridian]

You will find ample illumination of these themes in the book I mentioned near the beginning of this thread.

The mystical sections were added after Wittgenstein's experiences on the Italian Front in WW1, where he had some sort of a religious conversion, and form no essential part of his core argument.

He has to discuss numbers since they have always formed an important part of science, and he is keen to show that they do not represent anything other than the way we take account of repetitive operations (aka counting).

One of his aims is to show that metaphysical propositions are non-sensical (that is, they are incapable of expressing a sense, true or false). What he says about 'saying and showing' is integral to his criticism of traditional philosophy, which try to say what language shows -- as he would later have put it, it treats rules of language as if they were truths about reality.

Wittgenstein's ideas on mathematics are excellently explained here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/

Yes, I am aware of the nature of his criticism of traditional philosophy and agree with his points. My question regarding mysticism was whether or not what he is talking about is in fact what traditional philosophy tries (and fails) to say with language.

I am not so convinced that numbers are "just" that or that, for I think numbers, even if mathematics exists merely as a language entirely constructed, points to or displays what is essentially the existence of organisation. But, perhaps this may be said of logic also, (if logic does not simply point to our language being organised). I shall read the link provided.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Recall, Wittgenstein changed his mind about such things, and adopted a much broader view of numbers in his later work. His view of logic as such, though did not change much. His rationale for it did, however.

The mysticism Wittgenstein speaks of is not directly connected with his views on metaphysics. Some have tried to connect them, but I'm not convinced.

You'll find this of great help:

Glock, H-J. (1996), A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Blackwell).

[ellipsis]

Funny I was just discussing Wittgenstein the other night after consuming some punch spiked with codeine.

[Meridian]

Sorry about bringing this thread back from the dead, but I found an interesting interview of John Searle speaking about Wittgenstein. I don't know anything about Searle, but I found this to be quite concise:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrmPq8pzG9Q
(it has 5 parts)

I think it could work as a introduction to Wittgensteins work, for those of us who are more inclined to learn from watching/hearing than theoretical reading.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that, but Searle tends to interpret Wittgenstein as a theorist, when he is in fact an anti-theorist.

Ok, I have just checked the video, and it's from a series the BBC ran in the late 1970s or early 80s when I was doing my PhD on Wittgenstein. I don't think the interview has improved with age.

One thing, though, Searle is admirably clear -- easily his his greatest strength.

[Meridian]

Thanks for that, but Searle tends to interpret Wittgenstein as a theorist, when he is in fact an anti-theorist.
In the interview they did present Wittgenstein's later work as involving a "tool theory", which I think maybe is a bit misleading. They are probably referring to the analogy of language games.

What seems weird to me was that Searle argued that there could be (correct) theories about language and mind. To me it seems that was one of the things Wittgenstein argued as impossible in his later work. It seems to me like an attempt to "step out" of language games (which Searle admitted was impossible, at least according to W., earlier in the interview).


Ok, I have just checked the video, and it's from a series the BBC ran in the late 1970s or early 80s when I was doing my PhD on Wittgenstein. I don't think the interview has improved with age.
Okay. I just found it on youtube and posted it for our comrades who haven't been very exposed to Wittgensteins work, like myself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yes, and I thanked you for it. :)

But it's important to note, as we both do, that Searle gets Wittgenstein wrong in several places.

[Meridian]

I have a sociologist friend who talks about structuralism, and french sociologists/philosophers amongst others, Bourdieu (amongst a heap of french names that are impossible to remember). She also talks about something called "critical realism" (Bhaskar), but I don't know if those views are related.

Anyways, some of this stuff strikes me as similar to some of Wittgensteins thoughts. On the other hand, it seem to fall into some 'traditional traps' as well if I am not completely mistaken.

So, how's the relation between Wittgenstein's thoughts and the philosophy I mentioned above?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, they bear no relation/similarity to his work.

I'd be interested to see why you thought so.

[Meridian]

I meant to say 'social constructionism', sorry for making that mistake. Confusing titles. I might be misunderstanding what it is about. Actually, that is very likely since I've never studied it.

But essentially, what seems similar to me is the idea that our notions of 'knowledge', 'truth', etc. are not independent of our understanding, but that these ideas have evolved as our whole framework of understanding has evolved. I guess; that our use of language has evolved, that it is a social entity, its use not intrinsically connected to 'reality' but to human life. Again, this 'summary' may be wrong.

Here is a quote from Wikipedia about ("strong") social constructionism:



Strong social constructionists oppose the existence of "brute" facts. That a mountain is a mountain (as opposed to just another undifferentiated clump of earth) is socially engendered, and not a brute fact. That the concept of mountain is universally admitted in all human languages reflects near-universal human consensus, but does not make it an objective reality. Similarly for all apparently real objects and events: trees, cars, snow, collisions. This leads to the view that all reality is a social construction, which is close to the view of many post-modernist philosophers like Jean-François Lyotard (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois_Lyotard), who claim that our view of reality is really a narrative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narrative), a discourse rooted in consensus.
I'm not saying that I necessarily agree with this view. I wonder if there is a critique to be made of this based on a Wittgensteinian understanding. :thumbup1:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You are right, the social constructivists look to Wittgenstein (particularly the so-called 'Edinburgh School' (led by David Bloor)) for inspiration, however, in so far as they try to turn Wittgenstein into a theorist, they have radically misunderstood his work.

Having said that, much of what they have to say about science is highly useful for us Marxists (providing we ignore their naturalism and their relativism).

I have writien a critique of their work in the next essay I will be publishing (on Dialectical Materialism and science) later this year, or in 2011.

Until then, the best criticism can be found in:

Arthur Fine, (1996), 'Science Made Up: Constructivist Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge', in Galison and Stump (1996), pp.231-54.

Galison, P., and Stump, D. (1996) (eds.), The Disunity Of Science (Stanford University Press).