The Greek Tendency

[btpound]

What do you think of Plato and Aristotle?

[FSL]

They sucked badly, Plato was the worst among the two.


I would perhaps be able to contribute more if you were a biiiiit more specific.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I think the general consensus amongst more secular philosophers (or even leftists) would be that Aristotle was the "better of the two." Plato had his head in the clouds, so to speak.

The both have some interesting concepts. I find Aristotle much more relevant. Even though Plato gets the reputation for being conservative, he actually wasn't altogether worse than Aristotle. He certainly had better opinions of women than Aristotle did.

I'm not an expert, but here are some of their ideas I like (though I may not endorse them wholly)

Aristotle: Empiricism, Eudamonia (human progression as moving towards an end).
Plato: Importance of knowledge in politics. Use of a city as a methodology for analyzing the nature of justice.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Great ruling-class theorist, who helped establish the age-old principle that fundamental truths about reality can be derived from thought alone, an approach that was copied by 99.9% of all subsequent philosophers.

The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class...

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Great ruling-class theorist, who helped establish the age-old principle that fundamental truths about reality can be derived from thought alone, an approach that was copied by 99.9% of all subsequent philosophers.

The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class...

Even if that's true, that doesn't make all the ruling class ideas bad, does it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Even if that's true, that doesn't make all the ruling class ideas bad, does it?

No, but it makes it all non-sensical.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

:drool:
Dooga:



No, but it makes it all non-sensical.


I'm confused. Empiricism is a philosophy. Physicalism is a philosophy. Are these part of the 1% minority? It seems to me these ideas came out of ruling class thinkers but are nonetheless true and contain linguistic content.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


I'm confused. Empiricism is a philosophy. Physicalism is a philosophy. Are these part of the 1% minority? It seems to me these ideas came out of ruling class thinkers but are nonetheless true and contain linguistic content.

For an idea to be ruling-class it does not have to 'come out of' the ruling class, or be invented by them, just that it should express their view of the world, or present a view that rationalises (inadvertently or not) their wealth and power.

And, I have explained to you before how the vast bulk of traditional philosophy manages to do this.

Which is why Marx said that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class.


Empiricism is a philosophy. Physicalism is a philosophy. Are these part of the 1% minority? It seems to me these ideas came out of ruling class thinkers but are nonetheless true and contain linguistic content.

Such philosophers attempt to derive fundamental truths about the world and our knowledge of it from thought alone, which makes their work part of ruling-class theory.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Don't both of those theories attempt to derive philosophical truths from experience, not thought alone?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, the claim that all knowledge comes from experience is a dogmatic theory that has itself been derived from thought alone.

And so is the denial that all knowledge comes from experience...

They are one and all non-sensical.

[Random Precision]

I quote a part of this passage in my signature:

"We work beneath the earth and above it, under the roof and in the rain, with the spade, with the spade, the pickaxe, and the crowbar. We carry huge sacks of cement, lay bricks, put down rails, spread gravel, trample the earth... We are laying the foundation for some new, monstrous civilization. Only now do I realize what price was paid for building the ancient civilizations. The Egyptian pyramids, the temples, and the Greek statues - what a hideous crime they were! How much blood must have poured on to the Roman roads, the bulwarks, and city walls. Antiquity - the tremendous concentration camp where the slave was branded on the forehead by his master, and crucified for trying to escape! Antiquity - the conspiracy of free men against slaves!

You remember how much I used to like Plato. Today I realize he lied. For the things of this world are not a reflection of the ideal, but a product of human sweat, blood and hard labor. It is we who built the pyramids, hewed the marble for the temples and the rocks for the imperial roads, we who pulled the oars in the galleys and dragged wooden ploughs, while they wrote dialogues and dramas, rationalized their intrigues by appeals in the name of the Fatherland, made wars over boundaries and democracies. We were filthy and died real deaths. They were 'aesthetic' and carried on subtle debates.

There can be no beauty if it is paid for by human injustice, nor truth that passes over injustice in silence, nor moral virtue that condones it.

What does ancient history say about us? It knows the crafty slave from Terrence and Plautus, it knows the people's tribunes, the brothers Gracchi, and the name of one slave - Spartacus.

They are the ones who made history, yet the murderer - Scipio - or the lawmakers - Cicero or Demosthenes - are the men remembered today. We rave over the extermination of the Etruscans, the destruction of Carthage, over treason, deceit, plunder. Roman law! Yes, today too, there is a law!

If the Germans win the war, what will the world know about us? They will erect huge buildings, highways, factories, soaring monuments. Our hands will be placed under every brick, and our backs will carry the steel rails and slabs of concrete. They will kill off our families, our sick, our aged. They will murder our children.

And we will be forgotten, drowned out by the voices of the poets, the jurists, the philosophers, the priests. They will produce their own beauty, virtue, and truth. They will create religion."

Tadeusz Borowski, "Auschwitz, Our Home" in This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Well, the claim that all knowledge comes from experience is a dogmatic theory that has itself been derived from thought alone.

And so is the denial that all knowledge comes from experience...

They are one and all non-sensical.

Isn't the claim that "knowledge comes from experience alone" from experience?

Are arguments such as all men are mortal... Socrates is mortal something other than what's being talked about here?

Lastly, doesn't Descartes provide an example of knowledge that can be derived from thought alone?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Isn't the claim that "knowledge comes from experience alone" from experience?

Depends on the quantifier. For example, the proposition "All knowledge comes from experience" cannot come from experience, whereas "Some knowledge comes from experience" might.

But, who is going to be all that exercised by the latter?


Are arguments such as all men are mortal... Socrates is mortal something other than what's being talked about here?

I'm sorry, I could not follow this.


Lastly, doesn't Descartes provide an example of knowledge that can be derived from thought alone?

And which example is this?

[NecroCommie]

Antique philosophers are exactly that... antique. Their ideas were revolutionary and unseen in their own time, but methods of thinking and societal norms have changed beyond the capability of antique philosophers. They are no longer as relevant as they used to be, as huge portion of their ideas are out-dated (for example the aforementioned oppinion on the "place" of women and ordinary citizens) More modern philosophers are now relevant, and in time they too will be replaced by a new generation of philosophers.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^Except, the vast majority of philosophers still indulge in a priori dogmatics -- so, while this age-old method might have changed in content over the years, its form is largely the same.

Here is why (I wrote this in answer to the question "Why is dialectical materialism a world-view?", but it is also a brief explanation why philosophy hasn't changed much in form over the last 2400 years):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1349779&postcount=2

Why all such theories collapse into non-sense is explained here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

[Tribune]

Except, the vast majority of philosophers still indulge in a priori dogmatics -- so this ancient method might have changed in content over the years, but its form is largely the same.

Here is why (I wrote this in answer to the question "Why is dialectical materialism a world-view?", but it is also a brief explanation why philosophy hasn't changed much in form over the last 2400 years):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1349779&postcount=2

Why all such theories collapse into non-sense is explained here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

They believe, also, that thinking about "the world" reveals the world, n'est-ce pas?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Tribune:


They believe, also, that thinking about "the world" reveals the world, n'est-ce pas?

If you mean by this that they all seem to believe that truths about fundamental features of reality can be derived from thought alone, then yes.

[Tribune]

Tribune:



If you mean by this that they all seem to believe that truths about fundamental features of reality can be derived from thought alone, then yes.

Ayup.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Dooga:

Depends on the quantifier. For example, the proposition "All knowledge comes from experience" cannot come from experience, whereas "Some knowledge comes from experience" might.

But, who is going to be all that exercised by the latter?

I'm sorry, I could not follow this.

And which example is this?

Aren't "all claims" just "assumption" claims? Don't materialist/physicalist philosophers tend to use the word "knowledge" in terms of "probabilities?"

My mistake on the Socrates example. I am basically referring to philosophical inference. Can't you "discover" complicated truths by putting together physical data that we already have "in the right sort of way?"

Here is the general idea from Descartes:

So “I must finally conclude that the proposition, ‘I am,’ ‘I exist,’ is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind”

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Aren't "all claims" just "assumption" claims?

Philosophical claims/assumptions are typically dogmatic and a priori. It matters not what we call them. You can call the "Susan" and they'd still be the same.


Don't materialist/physicalist philosophers tend to use the word "knowledge" in terms of "probabilities"?

I'd need to see the examples.


Can't you "discover" complicated truths by putting together physical data that we already have "in the right sort of way?"

Here is the general idea from Descartes:

So “I must finally conclude that the proposition, ‘I am,’ ‘I exist,’ is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind”

This is a classic example of the sort of 'proposition', which has no truth conditions (that is, it's alleged 'truth' follows from the supposed meaning of the words it contains, not from the way the world happens to be, which I exposed as non-sensical in this reply I gave you recently):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

So, this thesis of Descartes derives from thought alone.

The phrase 'necessarily true' is a dead give-away.

Here is why (this is an excerpt from Essay Twelve Part One, and uses a metaphysical claim of Lenin's -- about motion and matter -- to illustrate the point, but it is easily adaptable to cover what Descartes opined):


An empirical proposition derives its sense from the truth possibilities it appears to hold open (which options will later be decided upon one way or the other by a confrontation with the material world). That is why the actual truth-value of, say, T1 (or its contradictory, T2) does not need to be known before it is understood, but it is also why evidence is relevant to establishing that truth-value.

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

T2: Tony Blair does not own a copy of Das Kapital.

All that is required here is some grasp of the possibilities that both of these hold open. T1 and T2 both have the same content, and are both made true or false by the same situation obtaining or not.

It is also why it is easy to imagine T1 as true even when it is false, or false when it is true. In general, comprehension of empirical propositions involves an understanding of the conditions under which they would/could be true or false; as is well-known, these are otherwise called their truth-conditions. That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm their actual truth status by comparison with the world, since they would in that case know what to look for/expect.

As we saw earlier, these non-negotiable facts about language underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social -- and hence the communal and communicational -- nature of discourse, but they fly in the face of metaphysical/representational theories, which emphasise the opposite: that to understand a proposition goes hand-in-hand with knowing it is true (or knowing it is false) -- by-passing the confirmation/disconfirmation stage (thus reducing the usual 'truth-conditions' to only one option).

However, there are other serious problems this approach to language faces over and above the fact it would make knowledge un-communicable.

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth-status, as we have seen.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or syntactic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded (by those who propose them) as truths (or Supertruths) about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of a metaphysical proposition appears to go hand in hand with knowing its 'truth' (or its 'falsehood') -- it is based on features of thought/language alone, and not on the material world.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world, which might seem (to some) to nullify the above comments.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture.

And yet, on the other hand if its truth could be ascertained from that proposition/'thought' itself (i.e., if it were "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture, which just means that that 'thought'/proposition cannot be a reflection of the world, whatever else it is.

Furthermore, and worse, if a proposition is purported to be empirical, but which can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, T3, below, according to Lenin) then, as we will see, paradox must ensue.

Consider the following sentences, the first of which Lenin would presumably have declared necessarily false (if not "unthinkable"):

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare T3 necessarily (and always) false, the possibility of its truth must first be entertained (as we saw). Thus, if the truth of T3 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as necessarily false, then whatever would make it true has to be ruled out conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what T3 rules in so that he/she could comprehend what it is that is being disqualified by its rejection as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done if what T3 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic/conceptual grounds.

Consequently, if a proposition like T3 is necessarily false this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say (or to think) what could count as making T3 true. Indeed, Lenin himself had to declare it "unthinkable" (in T4).

However, because the truth of the original proposition (T4) cannot even be conceived, Lenin was thus in no position to say what was excluded by its rejection.

Unfortunately, this prevents any account being given of what would make T3 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, paradoxically, T3 would now be necessarily false if and only if it was not capable of being thought of as necessarily false!

That is: T3 could be thought of as necessarily false if and only if what would make it true could at least be entertained just in order to rule it out as necessarily false. But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make T3 true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. And, if the truth of T3 -- or the conditions under which it would be true -- cannot be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we would then not know what was being ruled out.

In that case, the negation of T3 can neither be accepted nor rejected by anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that it could be either countenanced or repudiated. Hence, T3 would lose any sense it had, since it could not under any circumstances be either true or false.

This is in fact just another consequence of saying that an empirical proposition and its negation have the same content. It is also connected with the non-sensicality of all metaphysical 'propositions', for their negations do not have the same content. Indeed, because their negations do not picture anything that could be the case in any possible world, they have no content at all. That, of course, evacuates the content of the original non-negated proposition.

As we can now see, the radical misuse of language governing the formation of what look like empirical propositions (such as T3, or T4):

T4: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

T3: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

T5: Motion never occurs without matter.

involves an implicit reference to the sorts of conditions that that underlie their normal employment/reception. Hence, when such sentences are entertained, a pretence (often genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they are capable of being understood. This is done even if certain restrictions are later placed on their further processing, as in T4. In that case, a pretence has to be that we understand what might make such propositions true, and their 'negations' false, so that those like T30 can be declared 'necessarily' false or "unthinkable".

But, this entire exercise is an empty charade, for no content can be given to propositions like T3 (and thus to T4, nor in fact to any metaphysical 'proposition').

With respect to motionless matter, even Lenin had to admit that!

Indeed, he it was who told us this 'idea' was "unthinkable".

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

Finally, as Hume pointed out, 'necessay propositions' cannot follow from contingent propositions, so they cannot be cobbled together from scientific knowledge.

[puke on cops]

Am I the only person who thought that the Greek Tendency was to riot, burn banks and shoot cops?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No you weren't, but infortunately this isn't a relevant consideration in Philosophy.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Sorry, it took me awhile to get around to this. I see what you mean with respect to Descartes' conclusion following from language. However, the language also reflects the state of affairs in the world.

When something is thinking, there is a corresponding thinker. Verbs have no context without a noun. A priori arguments are grounded in facts. I'm confused.

We look at the world to see the meaning of the terms in Descartes' arguments. Then we take those together to make a conclusion? We didn't need to check.

Take:



All mammals have lungs.
All whales are mammals.
Therefore all whales have lungs.

Also, consider another scenario. I lost a dog in a locked room where only I have the key. I hear a bark. I don't need to turn around to know the dog has returned.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


However, the language also reflects the state of affairs in the world.

No; it's mirrors that reflect. Language does nothing; it's not an agent.

We certainly state truths or falsehoods (among many other things) by means of language.


When something is thinking, there is a corresponding thinker. Verbs have no context without a noun. A priori arguments are grounded in facts. I'm confused.

Perhaps you need to read more Wittgenstein.


We look at the world to see the meaning of the terms in Descartes' arguments. Then we take those together to make a conclusion? We didn't need to check.

Well, the words Descartes used were in fact either distortions of ordinary language, or specialised jargon with no meaning at all.


All mammals have lungs.
All whales are mammals.
Therefore all whales have lungs.

I'm sorry, but I fail to see your point.


Also, consider another scenario. I lost a dog in a locked room where only I have the key. I hear a bark. I don't need to turn around to know the dog has returned.

Have you been smoking that odd-smelling tobacco again...?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Dooga:

No; it's mirrors that reflect. Language does nothing; it's not an agent.

We certainly state truths or falsehoods (among many other things) by means of language.

Perhaps you need to read more Wittgenstein.

Well, the words Descartes used were in fact either distortions of ordinary language, or specialised jargon with no meaning at all.

I'm sorry, but I fail to see your point.

Have you been smoking that odd-smelling tobacco again...?

Are you suggesting I can't a priori reduce that a dog is in the room? Logical inference is technically a form of a priori knowledge. Deriving true synthetic statements from other synthetic statements already known.

Planes have wings.
There is a plane in the other room.
It has wings.

We know it has wings without checking based on the shared definitions of the terms. As long as our language already mirrors reality in the "right way" it is possible to reach an a priori conclusion that turns out to be correct upon observation. The majority of physics works this way, does it not?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Are you suggesting I can't a priori reduce that a dog is in the room? Logical inference is technically a form of a priori knowledge.

Well, it will be an inference based on a posteriori information, won't it?

Now I'm not sure what you mean by this:


Logical inference is technically a form of a priori knowledge.

Can you give an example? Perhaps this is one:


Planes have wings.
There is a plane in the other room.
It has wings.

We know it has wings without checking based on the shared definitions of the terms. As long as our language already mirrors reality in the "right way" it is possible to reach an a priori conclusion that turns out to be correct upon observation. The majority of physics works this way, does it not?

As I noted, this is an inference from a posteriori knowledge -- that there is a plane in the next room.


Deriving true synthetic statements from other synthetic statements already known

Sure, but you need to show that this is an example of a priori knowledge untainted by the a posteriori.

I suspect you did not read the links I posted too carefully, since I covered this there.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

That was an example. I was under the impression that a priori is inference based on a posteriori information. That's what I take Descartes argument to be.

I guess I'm mistaken? Do you have an example of a supposed "a priori argument" so I could understand the deference?

I read the links, but I've also been refreshing my understanding of what a priori knowledge means. I guess I'm missing something.

Here is what I'm going with from Wikipedia:

Examples of a priori propositions include:


"All bachelors are unmarried."
"7 + 5 = 12."

The justification of these propositions does not depend upon experience: one does not need to consult experience in order to determine whether all bachelors are unmarried, or whether 7 + 5 = 12. (Of course, as Kant would have granted, experience is required in order to obtain the concepts "bachelor," "unmarried," "7," "+," and so forth. However, the a priori / a posteriori distinction as employed by Kant here does not refer to the origins of the concepts, but to the justification of the propositions. Once we have the concepts, experience is no longer necessary.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


That was an example. I was under the impression that a priori is inference based on a posteriori information. That's what I take Descartes argument to be.

Well it isn't. It's not even a valid argument.


Do you have an example of a supposed "a priori argument" so I could understand the deference?

Anselm's ontological argument is a classic example, so is Hegel's 'derivation' of 'Nothing' and 'Becoming' from 'Being', but there are countless examples from traditional philosophy.


"All bachelors are unmarried."
"7 + 5 = 12."

Well the first is analytic a priori and the expression of a rule of language, and the second is merely the expression of a rule of mathematical language.


The justification of these propositions does not depend upon experience: one does not need to consult experience in order to determine whether all bachelors are unmarried, or whether 7 + 5 = 12. (Of course, as Kant would have granted, experience is required in order to obtain the concepts "bachelor," "unmarried," "7," "+," and so forth. However, the a priori / a posteriori distinction as employed by Kant here does not refer to the origins of the concepts, but to the justification of the propositions. Once we have the concepts, experience is no longer necessary.)

Well, it is not possible to 'justify' such propositions; they are used to justify others.

[ComradeMan]

They are both valuable for their part in the progression of human thought but whether or not their values of over 2,500 years ago are still valid for today I sincerely doubt. You have to view the men in the times that produced them.

[Gustav HK]

I know the following about Plato and Aristotle:

Plato:
All things are just copies of the perfect "ideas".
For example there is many different kinds of horses, but there is also an "ideal (immaterial) horse" that exist outside our world (metaphysics) and is used like a "cake form" to make the material horses.
The closest we can come to the world of ideas is through mathematics (when you say, that a triangle has 180 degrees in total, then you doesn´t mean a particulary triangle, but triangles in general).

He also was a politic philosopher, and he wanted to create his own philosopher-ruled utopia, with philosophers at the top as the "enlighted leadership", then the warriors, and then the working people.

Aristotle:
More concerned about the material world.
Formulated the "aristotelian logic", for example all a is b, all c is a, therefore all c is b.
Had the idea of a "casua finalis", the teleological cause of something happening.
For examle a drop of rain falls to the ground, because it is its purpose to fall to the ground.

I know he also had three other "causes", but i have forgotten what they concretely were about.

[Belisarius]

I know the following about Plato and Aristotle:

Plato:
All things are just copies of the perfect "ideas".
For example there is many different kinds of horses, but there is also an "ideal (immaterial) horse" that exist outside our world (metaphysics) and is used like a "cake form" to make the material horses.
The closest we can come to the world of ideas is through mathematics (when you say, that a triangle has 180 degrees in total, then you doesn´t mean a particulary triangle, but triangles in general).

He also was a politic philosopher, and he wanted to create his own philosopher-ruled utopia, with philosophers at the top as the "enlighted leadership", then the warriors, and then the working people.

Aristotle:
More concerned about the material world.
Formulated the "aristotelian logic", for example all a is b, all c is a, therefore all c is b.
Had the idea of a "casua finalis", the teleological cause of something happening.
For examle a drop of rain falls to the ground, because it is its purpose to fall to the ground.

I know he also had three other "causes", but i have forgotten what they concretely were about.
the four causes are the material, teleological, formal and the efficient cause: for example the causes of a house:
material: the house is made out of stone
teleological: the house has as purpose to be lived in
formal: the house is seen as a house. it has a houselike essence
efficient: the house is built by a builder