BobKKKindle$
22nd October 2009, 23:52
I thought comrades might find this interesting.
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The first task of this essay, however, is to demonstrate that relations were always problematic. Whilst there was a long period characterized by manipulation of the CPC by the Comintern, the period of relations that is relevant to this essay can be said to have begun in 1945, when the USSR, having joined the war against Japan, occupied large expanses of Manchuria, and, in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945, conducted with the KMT government, agreed that this region would be transferred to the control of the KMT, albeit on the condition that the Soviet forces would be permitted to remain in place. Gittings also notes that the USSR participated in the three-power conference on the future of China which concluded that only the KMT would be permitted to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, whilst also calling on both the KMT and the CPC to participate in talks in Chongqing, with the USSR subsequently playing a major role in the joint declaration issued in December, which called for a “unified and democratic China under the National Government”, referring to the KMT. This indicates that the foremost objective of the USSR was to utilize the northern regions as a buffer zone, which also meant being opposed to the renewed outbreak of the civil war, and acting in a way that would dissuade the KMT from moving closer to the United States – the underlying theme here being that the USSR was conscious of its own interests before any commitment to the struggles of its ideological allies. As Jun notes, this concern also manifested itself in the form of deliberate attempts to constrain the activities of the CPC, as, in August of that year Soviet forces reportedly demanded that CPC troops provide them with proof of their status with the KMT when they met, and, in September, a military representative sent by the USSR to Yan'an requested that the party not allow its forces to openly enter the Northeast before the Soviets had left, and to withdraw the CPC units that had already occupied the cities. Whilst temporarily lending greater support to the CPC after September, this approach continued, as Jun reports that in November the Northeast Bureau of the CPC was informed that the Soviets had decided to transfer all cities located along the Changchun railroad to the KMT, with CPC forces being ordered to evacuate all areas within thirty miles of the railroad, and in the same month it was decided that CPC forces would not be allowed to enter areas where Soviet troops had been stationed or attack KMT forces in those areas before the Soviets had evacuated their own forces. The unwillingness of the Soviets to support the CPC was such that in April of 1947, Molotov, addressing himself to Marshall, noted that Stalin's suggestion of “a common policy”, made in December of the previous year, would amount to the 1945 joint declaration, and Stalin, even after acknowledging he had made mistakes in February 1948, called, in response to a proposal from the allies, for an end to the civil war.
Nor was the constraining approach of the USSR limited to strategic questions. It is accepted by Shu and all others that Soviet forces proceeded to dismantle major enterprises as soon as they had established themselves in Manchuria and ship the machinery back to Russia. The agreement that was eventually decided upon in 1949 after the CPC had come to power and then formally ratified in 1950 in the form of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, was largely based on the 1945 treaty and forced the PRC to make a number of concessions, such as recognizing the independence of Outer Mongolia, and the establishment of four joint ventures, eventually raised to six, in China's mineral-rich regions, as part of which the Soviet Union demanded that they be allowed to own as much as 50%, take 50% of the profits, and be responsible for general management, in exchange for benefits such as low-interest credit amounting to $300 million, although much of this was subsequently spent on the Korean War, in which the USSR had no direct role, and refused to reimburse the PRC's expenditure and loss of infrastructure. Moreover, this credit was low in comparison to the $450 million that had been granted to Poland the previous year despite Poland's comparatively better position, and the devaluation of the ruble in February 1950 by about a quarter further reduced the value of this the sum. It is also significant that the talks leading up to the treaty were led by Liu Shaoqi, and that Stalin told Liu in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union would not lend air and naval support to an attack on Taiwan due to the threat of war from the United States.
[...]
The story of Soviet military and economic advisers, who never numbered near the total of 10,000 claimed by the Soviets, exhibits similar themes, as the conditions imposed by Stalin concerning the treatment of these advisers remained in place throughout their time in China. These conditions included the requirement that China would guarantee the provision of “full living and working conditions”, which amounted to the advisers all being given “the best possible homes and offices”, and it was also required that their spouses would be given “a certain amount of stipend” when they visited China and that the Chinese government would be solely responsible for their travel and stay, as well as the further requirement that, in the event of any crimes or errors being committed, the advisers would remain within Soviet jurisdiction, such that the PRC would not have any legal authority over them. Kaple also reports problems concerning the work of the advisers, giving as an example a report dated July 15, 1857, relating to the work of scientific and technical personnel, who, being responsible for educational reform, were apparently simply copying Soviet textbooks without bothering to pay any attention to China's specific conditions, going so far as to abolish the traditional Chinese grading system in favour of the Soviet five-point system, which led to problems for those graduating, and those expecting to graduate.
**********
The first task of this essay, however, is to demonstrate that relations were always problematic. Whilst there was a long period characterized by manipulation of the CPC by the Comintern, the period of relations that is relevant to this essay can be said to have begun in 1945, when the USSR, having joined the war against Japan, occupied large expanses of Manchuria, and, in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945, conducted with the KMT government, agreed that this region would be transferred to the control of the KMT, albeit on the condition that the Soviet forces would be permitted to remain in place. Gittings also notes that the USSR participated in the three-power conference on the future of China which concluded that only the KMT would be permitted to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, whilst also calling on both the KMT and the CPC to participate in talks in Chongqing, with the USSR subsequently playing a major role in the joint declaration issued in December, which called for a “unified and democratic China under the National Government”, referring to the KMT. This indicates that the foremost objective of the USSR was to utilize the northern regions as a buffer zone, which also meant being opposed to the renewed outbreak of the civil war, and acting in a way that would dissuade the KMT from moving closer to the United States – the underlying theme here being that the USSR was conscious of its own interests before any commitment to the struggles of its ideological allies. As Jun notes, this concern also manifested itself in the form of deliberate attempts to constrain the activities of the CPC, as, in August of that year Soviet forces reportedly demanded that CPC troops provide them with proof of their status with the KMT when they met, and, in September, a military representative sent by the USSR to Yan'an requested that the party not allow its forces to openly enter the Northeast before the Soviets had left, and to withdraw the CPC units that had already occupied the cities. Whilst temporarily lending greater support to the CPC after September, this approach continued, as Jun reports that in November the Northeast Bureau of the CPC was informed that the Soviets had decided to transfer all cities located along the Changchun railroad to the KMT, with CPC forces being ordered to evacuate all areas within thirty miles of the railroad, and in the same month it was decided that CPC forces would not be allowed to enter areas where Soviet troops had been stationed or attack KMT forces in those areas before the Soviets had evacuated their own forces. The unwillingness of the Soviets to support the CPC was such that in April of 1947, Molotov, addressing himself to Marshall, noted that Stalin's suggestion of “a common policy”, made in December of the previous year, would amount to the 1945 joint declaration, and Stalin, even after acknowledging he had made mistakes in February 1948, called, in response to a proposal from the allies, for an end to the civil war.
Nor was the constraining approach of the USSR limited to strategic questions. It is accepted by Shu and all others that Soviet forces proceeded to dismantle major enterprises as soon as they had established themselves in Manchuria and ship the machinery back to Russia. The agreement that was eventually decided upon in 1949 after the CPC had come to power and then formally ratified in 1950 in the form of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, was largely based on the 1945 treaty and forced the PRC to make a number of concessions, such as recognizing the independence of Outer Mongolia, and the establishment of four joint ventures, eventually raised to six, in China's mineral-rich regions, as part of which the Soviet Union demanded that they be allowed to own as much as 50%, take 50% of the profits, and be responsible for general management, in exchange for benefits such as low-interest credit amounting to $300 million, although much of this was subsequently spent on the Korean War, in which the USSR had no direct role, and refused to reimburse the PRC's expenditure and loss of infrastructure. Moreover, this credit was low in comparison to the $450 million that had been granted to Poland the previous year despite Poland's comparatively better position, and the devaluation of the ruble in February 1950 by about a quarter further reduced the value of this the sum. It is also significant that the talks leading up to the treaty were led by Liu Shaoqi, and that Stalin told Liu in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union would not lend air and naval support to an attack on Taiwan due to the threat of war from the United States.
[...]
The story of Soviet military and economic advisers, who never numbered near the total of 10,000 claimed by the Soviets, exhibits similar themes, as the conditions imposed by Stalin concerning the treatment of these advisers remained in place throughout their time in China. These conditions included the requirement that China would guarantee the provision of “full living and working conditions”, which amounted to the advisers all being given “the best possible homes and offices”, and it was also required that their spouses would be given “a certain amount of stipend” when they visited China and that the Chinese government would be solely responsible for their travel and stay, as well as the further requirement that, in the event of any crimes or errors being committed, the advisers would remain within Soviet jurisdiction, such that the PRC would not have any legal authority over them. Kaple also reports problems concerning the work of the advisers, giving as an example a report dated July 15, 1857, relating to the work of scientific and technical personnel, who, being responsible for educational reform, were apparently simply copying Soviet textbooks without bothering to pay any attention to China's specific conditions, going so far as to abolish the traditional Chinese grading system in favour of the Soviet five-point system, which led to problems for those graduating, and those expecting to graduate.